CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
2.1 EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
2.1.1 History of Emotional Intelligence
As a scientific enterprise, the discipline of psychology started emulating other
natural science disciplines by giving measurement a key role in the discipline.
Because of historical circumstances, intelligence testing has occupied a central place
in the practice of psychology, education and human development. It is interesting to
note the paradox that the theoretical developments in the field of intelligence did not
influence the practice of its measurement. Both continued in their own spheres. On
the one hand, there was scholarly debate about the nature of human intelligence, and
on the other, the practice of intelligence testing continued to flourish in various fields.
The context of confusion and ambiguity can be inferred by one important definition of
intelligence: „intelligence is what intelligence test measures‟. Perhaps the theories
deal with different things as they operate according to different metaphors.
In the wake of recent advances in conceptualizing intelligence, a number of
concepts have emerged. Thus we have studies on wisdom, social intelligence,
practical intelligence, successful intelligence, emotional intelligence and spiritual
intelligence which have generated interest among psychologists to revive the notion
of intelligence.
Theoretical Overview 28
Plato wrote two thousand years ago that all learning has an emotional base.
Since then, scientists, educators, and philosophers have worked to prove or disprove
the importance of feelings. Unfortunately, for a large part of those two millennia,
common thought was, „Emotions are in the way. They keep us from making good
decisions and they keep us from focusing‟. In the last three decades, a growing body
of research has been proving just the opposite.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin had made incisive
observations on the expression of emotions in animals and humans and placed
emotion in the perspective of biological evolution; James (1899) had produced a
scientific description of the phenomenon of emotion, thus opening the way to its
experimental study; and Freud (1960) wrote the means by which emotion might play
a role in psychopathology.
In the 1900‟s, even though traditional definitions of intelligence emphasized
cognitive aspects such as memory and problem solving, several influential
researchers in the field of intelligence had begun to recognize the importance of
non-cognitive aspects. For instance, E.L. Thorndike, at Columbia University,
(Thorndike, 1920), used the term “social intelligence” to describe the skill of
understanding and managing other people. Similarly, in 1940 David Wechsler
described the influence of non-intellective factors on intelligent behaviour. In 1954,
Abraham Maslow wrote how people could enhance their emotional, physical, spiritual
and mental strengths. His work sparked the “human potential” movement, which
would be the greatest celebration of humanism since Renaissance. In 1975, Howard
Theoretical Overview 29
Gardner‟s The Shattered Mind, (Gardner, 1975) began the formulation of the idea for
“Multiple Intelligences”, including both interpersonal intelligence and intrapersonal
intelligence. Many psychologists, such as Gardner, believe that traditional measures
of intelligence, such as the IQ test, fail to fully explain cognitive ability (Smith, 2002).
The phenomena of emotions have traditionally been considered of limited
value by the mainstream psychological scholarship. Instead it assigned relatively
greater value to the rational and cognitive part of mind. The focus on the normal
psychological science demand certitude and rationality that are missed in the
discourse on emotions. Emotions are held as a stirred-up condition or perturbations in
the mind. It is therefore not surprising to find that the image of emotions is endorsed
in terms of phenomena that are basically irrational, abnormal, deviant, feminine, and
hence undesirable. They are of genuine concern for therapy and clinical practice. It is
only recently that there is revival of interest in the study of emotions. The increased
interest owes to advancements in research on evolutionary psychology, comparative
and biological studies, cultural and cross-cultural studies, media and communication
studies, ethological and developmental studies, and studies of organizational and
consumer behaviour. It is being gradually recognized that a dichotomy that posits
reason against passion, and cognition and affect is misconstrued and misplaced.
The human psychological functioning is complex and challenging because of
intrinsic involvement of many systems, the parts of which are irreducible in terms of
any single factor such as language, cognition, neurological functions, and socially
shared cultural processes. The emergence of concepts like emotional competence,
Theoretical Overview 30
emotional labour, emotional creativity, feelings, mood and temperament, and affect
indicate a conceptual move to solve the puzzle of emotions by recognizing the totality
of human functioning.
The first use of the term “emotional intelligence” is attributed to Payne‟s
doctoral thesis (1985), A Study of Emotion: Developing Emotional Intelligence,
Self-Integration relating to fear, pain and desire. However, prior to this, the term
„emotional intelligence‟ had appeared in the study of Leuner (1966). Greenspan
(1989) also put forward an Emotional Intelligence model followed by Salovey &
Mayer (1990) and Goleman (1995). In 1990, a seminar paper of Salovey and Mayer
defined Emotional Quotient (EQ) as a scientifically testable “intelligence”. The term
EQ may be defined as a relative measure of one‟s emotional intelligence possessed by
him at a particular period of his life. Mayer and Salovey continue to research the
concept. However, the concept gained popularity through Goleman‟s (1995)
bestseller book titled Emotional Intelligence. In October of 1995, Nancy Gibbs wrote
an article on emotional intelligence that appeared in Time Magazine, wherein she
mentioned Goleman‟s book and the work of Mayer and Salovey. Her article added
popularity to the book and caused a domino effect of media interest in emotional
intelligence.
The theoretical idea behind Emotional Intelligence (EI) is not totally new in
the psychological literature. All the existing models of EI are to some extent
overlapping with many other constructs, that is, social intelligence, alexithymia, inter
and intrapersonal intelligences, and practical intelligence. Psychometricians might not
Theoretical Overview 31
be satisfied with the implicit similarities and differences between EI and practical
intelligence. Emotional intelligence is very similar to what Sifneos (1973) coined as
alexithymia in the early seventies. One might wonder why we should talk about EI if
it is so closely related to alexithymia. The answer is that EI was started as a type of
mental ability (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), but alexithymia was considered as a
personality construct (Taylor & Bagby, 2000). Besides, positive feelings, mixed
emotions, or neural states are neglected in the construct of alexithymia, and the
emphasis is on negative emotions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).
Although affective ability was emphasized by Wechsler (1940) in general
intelligence, his scales of intelligence (e.g., WAIS) did not include a separate and
distinct entity of emotional reasoning. The revolutionaries like Gardner (1983), and
Sternberg (1985) do not accept the notion of general („g‟) factor. They further believe
that the major tests, the Stanford-Binet and the Wechsler Scales are outdated. They
believe that the traditionalists view of intelligence is too limited and ought to be
modified. In 1983, Gardner published an influential book „Frames of Mind‟. This is a
manifesto refuting the concept of IQ. It proposed that there is not one, monolithic kind
of intelligence that is crucial for success in life but rather there is a wide spectrum of
intelligence with different varieties. Certain aspects of EI are also similar to
Gardner‟s (1983) interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences, but Gardner has not
yet demonstrated the existence of these types of intelligence psychometrically
(Mayer, 2004). Gardner considered inter and intrapersonal intelligences as distinct
and relatively independent of each other (Sternberg, 1999). Moreover, EI goes much
Theoretical Overview 32
beyond inter and intrapersonal intelligences. Aristotle‟s practical intelligence is also
to a certain extent similar to EI, but Aristotle talked about practical intelligence at a
time when there was no field of psychological testing (Tigner & Tigner, 2000). So,
psychometricians might not be satisfied with the implicit similarities and differences
between EI and practical intelligence. While practical intelligence can include several
skills for dealing with daily life activities, affective reasoning is the focus in EI.
Ability model of EI could be merged with the section of emotional behaviour
under content in Guildford‟s (1985) model of intelligence, because the behaviour in
content category was explained in terms of abilities that provide social intelligence.
But, emotional reasoning was not given any focus. While several theories associated
with the EI paradigm currently exist, the three that have generated the most interest in
terms of research and application are the theories of Mayer & Salovey (1997), Bar-On
(1998, 2000) and Goleman (1998, 2000). Moreover, all these theorists have been
associated with the EI paradigm; a closer reading of their writing over time will reveal
a significant divergence in the specific language they use to label their theories and
constructs.
The quest for managing and enhancing effectiveness of people in
organizations has driven the research on identifying major contributors to
performance has been identified as one of the important behavioural constructs
considered to be a major contributor to performance (Goleman, 1995; Goleman, 1998;
& Hay Group, 2003). According to Goleman, IQ and EI should not be regarded as
competencies with an opposite direction. They are rather separate competencies.
Theoretical Overview 33
People with a high IQ but low EI (or the opposite) are, despite the stereotypes,
relatively rare. There is a correlation between IQ and some aspects of EI. The
viewpoints and ideas propagated by Goleman have brought a revolution in the field of
childcare, home and school.
According to Goleman, Boyatzis & Mckee (2002), EI is now a very helpful
construct in distinguishing highly effective leaders from the mediocre. Traditionally,
leadership was linked to vision, risk-taking, intelligence, technical knowledge, and
skill. Conventional wisdom once favoured the notion that unadulterated rationality
was the key to judicious problem resolution. But of late, there has been a marked
shift towards the recognition of key role played by affect in nearly all cognitive
processes (Eysenck & Keane, 1995; Goldstein, 2005). Today‟s effective leadership
skills have been described to depend, in part, on the understanding of emotions and
the abilities associated with EI (Caruso & Salovey, 2004; Cooper & Sawaf, 1997;
Goleman, 1998; Ryback, 1998). In recent years, the links between EI and leadership
have been explored from a number of perspectives (Goleman, Boyatzis & Mckee,
2002). As Johnson (2002) has noted, effective leaders throughout history (a) have
served as emotional guides, and (b) they have created positive temper among their
followers.
Emotional intelligence has also evoked a keen interest among practitioners
because of its wide applicability to a host of work place issues including job
satisfaction, absenteeism, organizational commitment and organizational citizenship
(Cooper & Sawaf, 1997; Megerian & Sosik, 1996; Sosik & Megerian, 1999; Wright
Theoretical Overview 34
& Staw, 1999). Goleman‟s 1998 book, Working with Emotional Intelligence, argues
that work place competencies based on emotional intelligence play a far greater role
in star performance than does intellect or technical skill, and that both individuals and
companies will benefit from cultivating these capabilities. His recent book, Primal
Leadership - Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence, explores the crucial role
of emotional intelligence in leadership. In 2003, Goleman published Destructive
Emotions, an account of a scientific dialogue between the Dalai Lama and a group of
psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers.
Psychological processes are assumed to be culturally constituted and may vary
with differences in cultural meanings and practices. Studies have shown emotion to be
dependent on cognitive appraisals of experience as well as culturally grounded
process (Lutz & White, 1986; Miller, 1984). It is argued that emotion plays an
important role in linking personality with intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).
Reviewing researches in the area of EI, Thingujam (2002) cautioning on the use of
translations of scales standardized in foreign culture states, “just because the items are
understandable in India, do not mean that the conceptions of EI or the most culturally
relevant items to measure these conceptions would be the same across cultures”(p.65).
The majority of the world‟s cultures hold conceptions of the person that can be more
accurately described as „self-in-relation to other‟ (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or as
human beings as occupants of social roles (Miller, 1984) and therefore less boundary
oriented.
Theoretical Overview 35
Indians develop a morality of caring which emphasizes broad and relatively
non-contingent interpersonal obligations, a familial view of interpersonal
relationships, and contextual sensitivity (Miller, 1984). These moral values determine
the emotional responsivity which are culture specific (Mayer& Salovey, 1997).
For instance, Ahimsa (non-violence), kindness, and benevolence are the emotional
expressions valued by Indians. In constructing of self in view of keeping the future
and past in mind certain emotional ups and downs are experienced. Emotional
learning hence in Indian context needs to be viewed as life-long processes of personal
investigation (looking inward) towards the discovery of true self. This process is
accompanied by concepts such as: yoga, karma, jitendriya, dharma, vratas, caring and
benevolence, which provide the very basis for emotional expression and responsivity.
In this culture specific ways of behaving are, therefore, basic to the notion of EI
(Sibia, Srivastava & Misra, 2003). The Indian view of emotional learning may
therefore be related to the construction of self through the process of self-perception
and self-monitoring in consonance with the socio-cultural context, the concept of EI
around these and many other related concepts.
One of the arguments against the theoretical soundness of the concept of
emotional intelligence suggests that the constant changing and broadening of its
definition – which has come to encompass many unrelated elements – had rendered it
an unintelligible concept. Goleman‟s early work has been criticized for assuming
from the beginning that EI is a type of intelligence.
Theoretical Overview 36
Locke (2005) claims that the concept of EI in itself is a misinterpretation of
the intelligence construct, and he offers an alternative interpretation: it is not another
form or type of intelligence, but intelligence (the ability to grasp abstractions) applied
to a particular life domain: emotions. He suggests the concept should be relabelled
and referred to as a skill.
Landy (2005) comments that EI is compared and contrasted with a measure of
abstract intelligence but not with a personality measure, or with a personality measure
but not with a measure of academic intelligence. In accordance with this suggestion,
other researchers have raised concerns with the extent to which self-report EI
measures correlate with established personality dimensions. Generally, self-report EI
measures and personality measures have been said to converge because they both
purport to measure traits, and because they are both measured in the self-report form.
There is insufficient evidence that emotional intelligence has a unique neural
basis. Cognitive neuroscience research suggests that human emotions and social skills
depend on a multitude of neural circuits serving many behaviours, including
attachment, empathy, face and emotional recognition, emotional sensation, emotional
expression, the mirror neuron system, language skills, personality components,
working memory, long term memory, reasoning, decision making and others. At its
worst, EI examinations can be utilized as a means of unethical discrimination against
both job applicants and current workers who happen to have either introverted
personalities or exhibits moderately flat effect.
Theoretical Overview 37
A significant criticism is that emotional intelligence has no “benchmark” to set
itself against. While IQ tests are designed to correlate as closely as possible with
school grades, emotional intelligence seems to have no similar objective quantity it
can be based on. The criticism of the works of Mayer and Salovey include a study by
Roberts, Zeidner & Mathews (2001). That research warns that EQ may actually be
measuring conformity. However, Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios (2001),
provide further theoretical basis for their theories. Nevertheless, many psychological
researchers do not accept emotional intelligence to be a part of “standard” intelligence
like IQ. Further criticism has been offered by Brody (2004), who claimed that unlike
tests of cognitive ability, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
Version 2 (MSCEIT, 2002) tests knowledge of emotions but not necessarily the
ability to perform tasks that are related to the knowledge that is assessed. The main
argument is that even though someone knows how he should behave in an
emotionally laden situation, it doesn‟t necessarily follow that he could actually carry
out the reported behaviour.
Robert Sternberg occupies a unique position in intelligence research today, as
both insider and as critic. Sternberg surveys the emotional intelligence area and
examines its contributions to traditional intelligence research. He evaluates whether
the idea of EI is “correct” or is consistent with available evidence, whether EI is novel
and appropriate in accomplishing what it is supposed to, and the practical usefulness
of EI in understanding important life outcomes.
Theoretical Overview 38
Some of the researchers indeed warn against the dangers of treating
emotional intelligence like a panacea. Harvard psychologist Jerome Kagan, whose
child-development research Goleman uses to talk about the nature of shy and
gregarious kids, warns that emotional intelligence has the same blind spots as IQ and
some people „handle anger well, but can‟t handle fear. Some people can‟t take joy‟. A
wise approach, Kagan explains, would be to examine emotions differently, and to not
encompass them in one neat package of emotional intelligence. Another criticism of
emotional intelligence is that it presumes a correct response to certain situations,
when in fact a variety of emotional responses are valid.
In short, emotional intelligence is based on a long history of research within a
variety of areas, particularly, social psychology. This impressive body of research
continues to grow and develop.
2.1.2 Defining Emotional Intelligence
Historically, emotions have been largely viewed as disorganizing forces that
disrupt one‟s ability to reason and think. Emotions are held as interfering with
attempts to function rationally in the world. Recent works, however, challenge this
perspective. Now it is thought that emotions provide information, direct attention and
facilitate the attainment of goals. It is held that adaptive processing of emotionally
relevant information is an integral part of intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). They
proposed that individuals tend to differ greatly in their ability to organize their
emotions in order to solve problems. Both emotions and moods have a subtle
influence over the strategies involved in problem solving. They came to the
Theoretical Overview 39
conclusion that positive mood enables a greater degree of flexibility in future planning
which enables better preparation for making the most of future opportunities.
Similarly, they claimed that a good mood is beneficial in creative thinking, as it
increases an individual‟s ability for developing category organizing principles.
Unfortunately, the reverse of these abilities have a tendency to hold true for
individuals in negative moods. The concept of EI involves “the ability to monitor
one‟s own and others emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the
information to guide one‟s thinking and actions” (Mayer & Salovey, 1993, p.433).
Emotions guide one‟s overall assessment and experience of the world and organisms
that ignore their own affective feedback, are not well suited to behave adaptively
(Greenberg & Safran, 1989).
Salovey and Mayer argued that emotional intelligence subsumes both inter and
intrapersonal intelligence, as proposed by Gardner (1983). Their proposal indicates
that emotional intelligence has five principal features: (i) being aware of one‟s own
emotions (ii) being able to manage one‟s own emotions (iii) being sensitive to the
emotions of others (iv) being able to respond to and negotiate with other people
emotionally (v) being able to use one‟s own emotions to motivate oneself.
There has been confusion regarding the exact meaning of the construct
emotional intelligence. The definitions are so varied, and the field is growing
so rapidly, that researchers are constantly amending even their own definitions of the
construct. Up to the present day, there are three main models of EI: ability based EI
model, mixed model of EI and trait EI model. The ability models focus on the
Theoretical Overview 40
interplay of emotion and intelligence as traditionally defined, while the mixed models
describe a composite conception of intelligence that includes mental abilities, and
other dispositions of traits (Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995). The trait EI model is
general and subsumes the Goleman and Bar-On models.
Salovey & Mayer (1990) suggested four-dimensional model. The first
dimension consisted of emotional perception and identification involving recognition
and in putting information from the system of emotion. The second and third
dimensions were emotional facilitation of thought and emotional understanding that
involved further processing of emotional information with a view to solve problems.
The emotional facilitation of thought dimension involved use of emotions for
improving cognitive processes, whereas emotional understanding incorporated
cognitive processing of emotions. The fourth dimension, emotional management,
consisted of emotional self-management and the management of emotions in others.
Mayer & Salovey (1997) revised their own definition stressing the cognitive
components of emotional intelligence and defined EI as the ability to perceive
emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand
emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to
promote emotional and intellectual growth. They emphasize that emotion makes
thinking more intelligent and that one thinks intelligently about emotions. Also, one
who possesses these abilities is considered as a well-adjusted and emotionally skilled
individual. The concept of emotional intelligence shows (Mayer & Salovey, 1997;
Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 1999) that to understand and appreciate intelligence in
Theoretical Overview 41
totality one needs to attend to the domains of personality, emotions and motivation.
They have stated that EI refers to “the ability to process emotion-laden information
competently and to use it to guide cognitive activities like problem solving and to
focus energy on required behaviours” (Salovey, Mayer & Caruso, 1999, p.159).
The concept of emotional intelligence is linked to personal and social
competence (Goleman, 1995), academic and social success (Ghosn, 1999; Davies,
Stankov & Roberts, 1998) and individual as well as team-effectiveness in
organizations (Abraham, 1999; Carson & Carson, 1998; Goleman, 1998; Sosik &
Megerian, 1999). Goleman (1995) agrees with Salovey‟s five main domains of
emotional intelligence: (i) knowing one‟s emotions (self-awareness – recognizing a
feeling as it happens) (ii) managing emotions (the ability of handling feelings
appropriately) (iii) motivating oneself (marshalling emotions in the service of a goal)
(iv) recognizing emotions in others (empathy, social awareness) and (v) handling
relationships (skill in managing emotions in others). Goleman (1995) defined EI as
the ability to know, manage one‟s own emotions, recognize them in others and to
handle relationships. He defined EI on the basis of traits that include self-control, zeal,
and persistence and the ability to motivate oneself. Cooper and Sawaf (1997) defined
emotional intelligence as the ability to sense, understand and effectively apply the
power and acumen of emotions as a source of human energy, information, connection
and influence. Bar-On (1997) defined EI: “An array of non-cognitive capabilities,
competencies, and skills that influence one‟s ability to succeed in coping with
environmental demands and pressures” (p.14). The publication of the handbook of
Theoretical Overview 42
emotional intelligence by Bar-On (2000) featuring several versions and feature of EI
was testimony to the popularity and potential of this construct. Bar-On‟s (1997) self
report EQ-i generates a total EQ score and five EQ composite scales consisting of
fifteen subscale scores: (1) intrapersonal EQ (self regard, emotional self-awareness,
assertiveness, independence and self-actualization) (2) interpersonal EQ (social
responsibility and interpersonal relationship), (3) stress management EQ (stress
tolerance and impulse control), (4) adaptability EQ (reality testing, flexibility, and
problem solving), and (5) general mood EQ (optimism and happiness).
Emotional intelligence is “the capacity of recognizing our own feelings and
those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in
ourselves and in our relationships” (Goleman, 1998, p.317). Bar-On (1998) placed EI
in the context of personality theory and Goleman (1998) formulated it in terms of a
theory of performance. Goleman (2001) has noted that the common thread underlying
all the different models of emotional intelligence is an ability to regulate emotions in
oneself and others. Accordingly, in a modified version of Mayer and Salovey‟s
theory, he has suggested that the most parsimonious definition of EI involves
four major domains, viz., self-awareness, social-awareness, self-management, and
relationship management.
Goleman through his bestselling books like Emotional Intelligence-why it can
matter more than IQ and Working with Emotional Intelligence, has stressed the
following factors while showing the importance of emotional intelligence:
(i) emotional intelligence is as powerful, and at times more powerful than IQ
Theoretical Overview 43
(ii) unlike IQ, emotional intelligence, may be the best predictor of success in life
(iii) unlike what is claimed of IQ, we can teach and improve in children and in any
individual, some crucial emotional competencies, paving the way for increasing their
emotional intelligence and thus making their life more healthy, enjoyable and
successful in the days to come (iv) the concept of emotional intelligence is to be
applauded not because it is totally new but because it captures the essence of what our
children or all of us need to know for being productive and happy (v) IQ and even
Standard Achievement Tests (SAT) scores do not predict any person‟s success in life.
Even success in academics can be predicted more by emotional and social measures
than by academic ability (vi) in working situations too, emotional intelligence helps
more than one‟s intellectual potential in terms of one‟s IQ or even professional skills
and competencies (vii) a person‟s emotional intelligence helps him in all spheres of
life through its various constituents or components namely knowledge of his emotions
(self-awareness), managing the emotions, motivating oneself, and recognizing
emotions in others (empathy, and handling relationships).
Daniel Goleman for the first time developed (1998) a framework of
emotional competencies that determine the extent of emotional intelligence acquired
by an individual. An emotional competency, according to him, is a learned capability
based on emotional intelligence that results in outstanding performance at work.
This earlier framework consisted of five dimensions such as self-awareness,
self-regulation, motivation, empathy and social skills. These five dimensions include
twenty-five competencies. This was further refined by Richard Boyatzis, Goleman
Theoretical Overview 44
and Rhee in the year 2000. They have suggested that EI is a convenient phrase with
which it is easier to focus attention on human talent. Even though it is a simple
phrase, it incorporates the complexity of a person‟s capability.
Emotional competencies cluster into groups, based on a common underlying
emotional intelligence capacity. The underlying emotional intelligence capacities are
vital if people are to successfully learn the competencies necessary to succeed in the
workplace. The emotional intelligence capacities are independent (each makes a
unique contribution to job performance), interdependent (each draws to some extent
on certain others, with strong interactions), hierarchical (the emotional intelligence
capacities build upon one another), necessary, but not sufficient (having an emotional
intelligence does not guarantee that the competencies will be demonstrated) and
generic (different jobs make differing competence demands).
The table below lists Goleman‟s (1998) five dimensions of emotional
intelligence and the twenty-five emotional competencies.
Theoretical Overview 45
TABLE 2.1
THE EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE FRAMEWORK
Personal Competence
These competencies determine how we manage ourselves
Self-Awareness
Knowing one’s internal states, preferences, resources, and intuitions
Emotional awareness: Recognizing one‟s emotions and their effects.
Accurate self-assessment: Knowing one‟s strength and limits
Self-confidence: A strong sense of one‟s self-worth and capabilities
Self-Regulation
Managing one’s internal states, impulses, and resources
Self- control: Keeping disruptive emotions and impulses in check
Trustworthiness: Maintaining standards of honesty and integrity.
Conscientiousness: Taking responsibility for personal performance
Adaptability: Flexibility in handling change
Innovation: Being comfortable with novel ideas, approaches, and new
information.
Theoretical Overview 46
Motivation
Emotional tendencies that guide or facilitate reaching goals
Achievement drive: Striving to improve or meet a standard of excellence
Commitment: Aligning with the goals of the group or organization
Initiative: Readiness to act on opportunities.
Optimism: Persistence in pursuing goals despite obstacles and setbacks
Social Competence
These competencies determine how we handle relationships
Empathy
Awareness of others’ feelings, needs, and concerns
Understanding others: Sensing others‟ feelings and perspectives, and taking an
active interest in their concerns.
Developing others: Sensing others‟ development needs and bolstering their
abilities.
Service orientation: Anticipating, recognizing, and meeting customers‟ needs
Leveraging diversity: Cultivating opportunities through different kinds of
people.
Political awareness: Reading a group‟s emotional currents and power
relationships.
Theoretical Overview 47
Social Skills
Adeptness at inducing desirable responses in others
Influence: Wielding effective tactics for persuasion.
Communication: Listening openly and sending convincing messages
Conflict management: Negotiating and resolving disagreements.
Leadership: Inspiring and guiding individuals and groups.
Change catalyst: Initiating or managing change
Building bonds: Nurturing instrumental relationships
Collaboration and cooperation: Working with others towards shared goals
Team Capabilities: Creating group synergy in pursuing collective goals
Goleman views emotional intelligence as a set of competencies that can be
measured by his Emotional Competency Inventory (ECI). The ECI is a 360 degree
instrument. The instrument is designed for use only as a development tool, not for
hiring or compensation decisions. The ECI model has changes from the original
model published in Goleman‟s book Working with Emotional Intelligence.
More recently, Goleman favours only four domains of emotional intelligence
(with nineteen categories, as described in his 2002 – book “Primal Leadership”) (two
extra categories added by the Hay Group):
1. Self-awareness (Emotional self-awareness, Accurate self-assessment and
Self- confidence).
Theoretical Overview 48
2. Self-management (Emotional self-control, Transparency (Trustworthiness),
Adaptability, Achievement orientation, Initiative, Optimism, Conscientiousness).
3. Social awareness (Empathy, Organizational awareness and Service orientation).
4. Relationship management (Inspirational leadership, Influence, Developing
others, Change catalyst, Conflict management, Building bonds, Teamwork and
collaboration and Communication).
In yet another popular formulation, Bar-On (2005) defines emotional-social
intelligence as a cross-section of interrelated emotional and social competencies,
skills and facilitators that determine how effectively we understand and express
ourselves, understand others and relate with them, and cope with daily demands.
Further, Bar-On points out that these competencies and skills are teachable and
learnable.
Petrides & Furnham (2000 a, 2001, and 2003) proposed a conceptual
distinction between the ability based model and a trait-based model of El. Trait EI (or
„trait emotional self-efficacy‟) refers to a constellation of behavioural dispositions and
self-perceptions concerning one‟s ability to recognize, process, and utilize emotion-
laden information. This definition of EI encompasses behavioural dispositions and
self perceived abilities and is measured by self report, as opposed to the ability based
model which refers to actual abilities as they express themselves in performance
based measures. Trait EI should be investigated within a personality framework.
Theoretical Overview 49
The trait EI model is general and subsumes the Goleman and Bar- On models
discussed above. Petrides and Furnham are major critics of the ability-based model
and the MSCEIT arguing that they are based on “psychometrically meaningless”
scoring procedures. The conceptualization of EI as a personality trait leads to a
construct that lies outsides the taxonomy of human cognitive ability. This is an
important distinction in as much as it bears directly on the operationalization of the
construct and the theories and hypotheses that are formulated about it. The trait EI
model is among the salient in the scientific literature.
2.1.3 Measuring Emotional Intelligence
As EI is basically a comprehensive concept encompassing many types
of skills, the issue of quantifying a person‟s EQ is still debatable and surrounded with
controversy, as there is no universally accepted benchmark. In fact, the methods
employed for such purposes are relatively new and their effectiveness in predicting
one‟s EQ has not been adequately analyzed. The novelty of the concept has also not
provided enough space for conducting longitudinal studies to assess the predictive
power of EI relative to IQ in distinguishing workplace performance, over the course
of a career. Nevertheless, the contemporary methods do predict one‟s emotional
acumen in a fairly accurate manner. There is now an array of validated instruments
for assessing aspects of EI model (Bar-On, 2000; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2000;
& Boyatzis, Goleman & Rhee, 2000).
To measure EI, Mayer et al. developed two assessment questionnaires. The
first is the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). The MEIS consists
Theoretical Overview 50
of twelve tasks divided into four classes or „branches‟ of abilities including:
(a) perceiving and identifying emotions (the ability to recognize how oneself and the
people around are feeling), (b) facilitation of thought (the ability to generate emotion,
and then reason with this emotion), (c) understanding emotions (the ability to
understand complex emotions and emotional “chains”, how emotions transition from
one stage to another), and (d) managing emotions (the ability which allows one to
manage emotions in self and in others).The newer version, released in 2000 is called
the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test . The MSCEIT consists of one
hundred and forty-one items that yield a total EI score, two Area scores, and four
Branches scores. There is another version of MSCEIT available for the adolescents.
Another measure, the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI) encompasses
twenty competencies organized into four clusters: self-awareness, social awareness,
self-management, and social skills (Boyatzis, Goleman & Rhee, 2000). Research
studies have suggested that ECI has high levels of internal consistency (Boyatzis &
Burckle, 1999; Church, 1997; Hazucha, Hezlett & Schneider, 1993; London & Beatty,
1993; Velsor, Taylor & Leslie, 1993; Atwater & Yammarino, 1992). Practitioners and
organizational consultants, based on their experiences with clients, firmly believe that
multi-rater or 360 degree feedback systems enhance self-knowledge and consequently
improve managerial behaviour (Hazucha, Hezlett & Schneider, 1993; London &
Beatty, 1993). Scholarly research confirmed these contentions and found that higher
levels of congruence between managerial “self” and “other” behavioural aspects is
associated with managerial effectiveness and performance (Church, 1997; Atwater &
Theoretical Overview 51
Yammarino, 1992; Velsor, Taylor & Leslie, 1993). It is also widely believed that this
self-other discrepancy is greater for higher-level managers; although empirical studies
have failed to validate this observation (Church, 1997).
Bar-On (1997) introduced Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory on the basis
of mixed model. It includes the following abilities (a) to be aware of, to understand,
and to express oneself; (b) to understand, and to relate to others; (c) to deal with
strong emotions and control one‟s impulses; and (d) to effectively adapt to change and
to solve problems of a personal or a social nature. The five main domains in this
measure are intrapersonal skills, interpersonal skills, adaptability, stress management,
and general mood. Used with over 60,000 people across thirty countries, the EQ-i is a
paper and pencil test that has one hundred and thirty three brief items and five-point
Likert Response Set. The test has been used to predict successful job performers
across many occupational areas. More specifically the US Air Force, which used the
EQ-i to select recruiters, found that the most successful recruiters scored significantly
higher in the EI competencies of assertiveness, empathy, happiness, and emotional
self-awareness than less proficient personnel. It was also found that using EI to select
recruiters significantly increased the identification of those who were successful at
this task (Cherniss, 2003). Additionally, there has been considerable research about
the instrument‟s reliability and its convergent and discriminant validity (Gowing &
Boyatzis, 2006; Salovey, Mayer & Caruso, 1999). A recent study (Dawda & Hart,
2000) reported that the average correlation between measure of the big five
personality factors (i.e., Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and
Theoretical Overview 52
Conscientiousness) and general EI derived from the Bar-On Emotional Quotient
Inventory averaged 0.5. In a latest work, Bar-On concluded that this psychometric EI
measure possessed sound construct validity (Bar-On, 2005).
Another measure that has been promoted commercially is the EQ map (Orioli,
Jones & Trocki, 1999). It quantifies facts such as current environment, awareness,
competencies, values/beliefs and life outcomes that make up a person‟s EI as well as
performance, creativity, and success outcomes. It is made up of twenty scales
measuring EI and the effect it has on one‟s life, both personally and professionally.
The factors in the EQ map are related to one‟s ability to remain healthy when under
pressure, the development of trusting relationships, and the creative pursuit of
opportunities for future advancements.
Although the presented measurements are approximations of EI, predictions
based on test scores may well be helpful to those committed to exploring the
relation of their affective life with their personal and professional development.
Self- reflective exploration for this type with the assistance of objective measures may
be particularly important for higher-level employees who may lack frank feedback
from fellow workers due to their elevated positions of authority (Sala, 2003). An
inaccurate understanding of one‟s strengths and weaknesses, particularly on the part
of high level executives, may lead these leaders to mislead advancement opportunities
due to self-serving defensiveness and misapprehension.
Theoretical Overview 53
2.2 LOCUS OF CONTROL
In psychology, locus of control is considered an important aspect of
personality. The concept was developed by Julian Rotter in the 1960‟s. The full name
he gave the construct was „Locus of control of reinforcement‟. Locus of control is an
expectancy variable that deals with the perception of control. The largest body
of empirical data about perceived control, however, derives from Rotter‟s Social
Learning Theory. Research with the locus of control construct began formally in
the early 1960s and came into prominence with the publication of a monograph by
Rotter (1966). In this publication, Rotter presented the scale he had developed to
assess the individual‟s generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement (I-E Scale). This instrument was constructed within the context of
Social Learning Theory.
Some people believe that they are masters of their own fate. Other people see
themselves as pawns of fate, believing that whatever happens to them in their life is
due to luck or chance. The first type, those who believe that they control their
destinies, have been labelled internals, whereas the latter, who see their life as being
controlled by outside forces, have been called externals. Internals consequently feel
that they have more influence over their outcomes than people with an external locus
of control.
Locus of control beliefs are not homogeneous with respect to culture. There is a
common stereotype of the Indian society as encouraging beliefs in predeterminism
and attitude of resignation and passive acceptance of what is seen to be preordained.
Theoretical Overview 54
There is also the further external stereotype based on philosophical system
(Chattopadhyaya, 1976) which depicts man‟s place in the scheme of the universe as
infinitely small and insignificant. In contrast to this, the Western subjects, are
presumably brought up under the influence of control ideology based on reward
system regulated by individual effort (Faroqui, 1984). Then, Indians seem to be led by
religious beliefs throughout their life.
Self-efficacy, a key element in Banduara‟s (1977b, 1978b) Social Learning
Theory refers to one‟s belief in one‟s capability to perform a specific task.
Self-efficacy arises from the gradual acquisition of complex cognitive, social,
linguistic, and/or physical skills through experience (Bandura, 1982). Individuals
appear to weigh, integrate and evaluate information about their capabilities; they then
regulate their choices and efforts accordingly (Bandura, Adams, Hardy &
Howells, 1980).
Self-efficacy has been compared to internal locus of control. Rotter (1966)
defined internal locus of control as a perception that rewards are contingent on
individual behaviour, while external locus of control is the notion that rewards are
controlled by outside factors, such as chance. However, two important distinctions
can be made between self-efficacy and internal locus of control. First, internal versus
external locus of control (I-E) is a generalized construct covering a variety of
situations, whereas self-efficacy is task specific, examining the individual‟s
conviction that he or she can perform a specific task at a specific level of expertise.
Bandura (1977a) stated that individuals might show strong internal locus of control in
Theoretical Overview 55
general, but believe they have low skill levels in certain areas, which would lead to
low efficacy perceptions on relevant tasks.
A second difference is that locus of control as measured by Rotter‟s I-E scale
includes outcome expectancies in addition to behaviour expectancies. In spite of these
differences, there is evidence of a relationship between the two constructs as currently
measured. Chambliss and Murray (1979) observed an interaction effect in their
research on smoking reduction: internal locus of control combined with high
self-efficacy led to the greatest reduction in smoking. Research exploring this
interaction would contribute to a better understanding of theoretical differences
between the two constructs. Further, since self-efficacy was found to affect goal level
chosen and goal commitment (Locke, Frederick, Lee & Bobko, 1984), a three-way
interaction could exist among self-efficacy, locus of control, and goal setting. Bandura
(1986) examined aspects of the self that influence self-regulation. His research
examined the effects of self-efficacy beliefs, or the expectations that people hold
about their abilities to accomplish certain tasks. If individuals believe they have
control over future events, then they attempt to exert that control in order to achieve a
positive outcome. It does not matter whether an outcome is not attainable, the
perception of control determines if one will try to attain it. Therefore locus of control
has a significant influence on Banduar‟s self-efficacy theories, and how individuals‟
expectations shape the goals they set for themselves.
In Rotter‟s Social Learning Theory, locus of control is a “generalized
expectancy” that pertains to the perception of causal relationships between behaviours
Theoretical Overview 56
and reinforcing experiences. It is similar to a belief or an attitude that persons have
about the effectiveness of their behaviour to achieve the desired outcomes. Persons,
who become fatalistic, believing that they can do little to change the nature of their
experiences, are said to hold generalized expectancies for external control. In contrast,
if individuals believe that their experiences reflect their efforts, personal
characteristics, and actions, they are said to have developed generalized expectancies
of internal control. That is, they assume that their outcomes and experiences are
at least partially shaped by their own actions. Generalized locus of control
expectancies have been used to explain the different ways in which people respond to
threats and challenges.
The most famous questionnaire to measure locus of control is the twenty-three
item forced-choice scale of Rotter (1966), but this is not the only questionnaire-
indeed, predating Rotter‟s work by five years is Bialer‟s (1961) twenty-three items
scale for children. Also of relevance to locus of control scale are the Crandall
Intellectual Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Crandall, 1965), and the Nowicki-
Strickland Scale. One of the earliest psychometric scales to assess locus of control,
using a Likert-type scale in contrast to the forced- choice alternative measure which
can be found in Rotter‟s scale, was that devised by W.H.James, for his unpublished
doctoral dissertation, supervised by Rotter at Ohio State University, although
this remained an unpublished scale. Many measures of locus of control have appeared
since Rotter‟s scale, both those, such as the Duttweiler Control Index (Duttweiler,
1984), which uses a five-point scale, and those which are related to specific areas,
Theoretical Overview 57
such as health. These scales are reviewed by Furnham & Steele (1993), and include
those related to health psychology, industrial and organizational psychology and those
specifically for children, such as Stanford Pre-school Internal-External Control Index,
which is used for 3 to 6 years old.
2.2.1 Rotter’s Theory
Julian Rotter (1954) attempted to integrate the traditional behaviouristic
position on the role of reinforcement in learning with the cognitive conceptualizations
of Kurt Lewin and other field theorists. Rotter was not the first to note that most
human behaviour is learned in a social context, but he made a more conscious effort
than his predecessors to develop a systematic theory of how this takes place.
Rotter distinguished between reinforcements and cognitions: reinforcements
result in movement toward or away from a goal, whereas cognitions are internal states
such as expectancy and reinforcement value. The term expectancy refers to a person‟s
estimate of the subjective probability that a specific behaviour performed in a certain
situation will lead to reinforcement. Two generalized expectancies measured and
investigated by Rotter and others are internal-external locus of control and
interpersonal trust. Locus of control refers to the typical direction from which people
perceive themselves as being controlled (internal, or from within oneself, versus
external, or by other people). Interpersonal trust is concerned with the extent to which
a person believes that other people tell the truth.
Theoretical Overview 58
According to Rotter, reinforcement is important for performance, but not all
reinforcements are equally valued by the individual. Even when the probabilities of
occurrence of different reinforcements are equal, certain objects or actions will have
greater reinforcement value than others. Both reinforcement value and expectancies
are affected by the psychological relevance or meaning of the situation to the person,
which must be understood in order to predict how the person will behave in the
situation. In developing social learning theory, Rotter departed from instinct-based
psychoanalysis and drive-based behaviourism. He believed that a psychological
theory should have a psychological motivational principle. Rotter chose the empirical
law of effect as his motivating factor. The law states that people are motivated to seek
out positive stimulation, or reinforcement, and to avoid unpleasant stimulation. Rotter
combined behaviourism and the study of personality, without relying on physiological
instincts or drives as a motive force.
The main idea in Julian Rotter‟s Social Learning Theory is that personality
represents an interaction of the individual with his or her environment. One cannot
speak of a personality internal to the individual that is independent of the
environment. Neither can one focus on behaviour as being an automatic response to
an objective set of environmental stimuli. Rather, to understand behaviour, one must
take both the individual (i.e., his or her life history of learning and experience) and the
environment (i.e., those stimuli that the person is aware of and responding to) into
account. Rotter describes personality as a relatively stable set of potentials for
responding to situations in a particular way. Rotter sees personality, and therefore
Theoretical Overview 59
behaviour, as always changeable. He does not believe that there is a critical period
after which personality is set. Rotter conceives of people in an optimistic way. He
sees them as being drawn forward by their goals, seeking to maximize their
reinforcements, rather than just avoiding punishment.
Rotter has four main components to his social learning theory model
predicting behaviour. These are behaviour potential, expectancy, reinforcement value,
and the psychological situation.
Behaviour potential is the likelihood of engaging in a particular behaviour in a
specific situation. In any given situation, there are multiple behaviours one can engage
in. For each possible behaviour, there is a behaviour potential. The individual will
exhibit the behaviour that has the highest potential.
Expectancy is the subjective probability that a given behaviour will lead to a
particular outcome, or reinforcer. Having „high‟ or „strong‟ expectancies means the
individual is confident. Then the behaviour will result in the outcome. Having „low‟
expectancies means the individual believes it is unlikely that his or her behaviour will
result in reinforcement. If the outcomes are equally desirable, the behaviour that has
the greatest likelihood of paying off (i.e., has the highest expectancy) will be engaged.
Expectancies are formed based on past experience. The more often a behaviour
has led to reinforcement in the past, the stronger the person‟s expectancy that
the behaviour will achieve that outcome then. Expectancy is a subjective probability,
because one common source of pathology is irrational expectancy. There may be no
Theoretical Overview 60
relationship whatsoever between the person‟s subjective assessment of how
a reinforcement will likely be and the actual, objective probability of the
reinforcer occurring. People can either over/or underestimate this likelihood, and both
distortions can potentially be problematic.
Reinforcement is another name for the outcomes of our behaviour.
Reinforcement value refers to the desirability of these outcomes. There is a high
reinforcement value to the things a person desires to happen to which he is attracted
to. Similarly, there is a low reinforcement value to the things he does not like to
happen and wishes to avoid. If the likelihood of achieving reinforcement is the same,
he will exhibit the behaviour with the greatest reinforcement value (i.e., the one
directed toward the outcome that is preferred most).
As with expectancy, reinforcement value is subjective, meaning that the same
event or experience can vastly differ in desirability, depending on the individual‟s life
experience. Punishment from a parent would be negatively reinforcing to most
children, and something to be avoided. However, children who get a little positive
attention from parents can seek out parental punishment because it has a higher
reinforcement value than neglect.
Behaviour Potential (BP), Expectancy (E) and Reinforcement Value (RV) can be
combined into a predictive formula for behaviour:
BP = f (E & RV)
Theoretical Overview 61
This formula can be read as follows: behavioural potential is a function of
expectancy and reinforcement value. Or, in other words, the likelihood of a person
exhibiting a particular behaviour is a function of the probability that behaviour will
lead to a given outcome and the desirability of that outcome. If expectancy and
reinforcement value are both high, then behaviour potential will be high. If either
expectancy or reinforcement value is low, then behaviour potential will be lower.
Although the psychological situation does not figure directly into Rotter‟s
formula for predicting behaviour, Rotter believes it is always important to keep in
mind that different people interpret the same situation differently. Again, it is people‟s
subjective interpretation of the environment, rather than an objective array of stimuli
that is meaningful to them and that determines how they behave.
In social learning terms the construct-perceived control is referred to as a
generalized expectancy of internal or external control of reinforcement. The formal
terms-the generalized and expectancy of internal control refer to the perception of
events, whether positive or negative, as being a consequence of one‟s own actions and
thereby potentially under personal control. The generalized expectancy, on the other
hand, refers to the perception of positive or negative events as being unrelated to
one‟s own behaviour and thereby beyond personal control. The internal control of
reinforcement together with the external control of reinforcement is referred to as
locus of control.
For explicating the place of perceived control within Social Learning Theory,
Rotter put forth another general formula:
Theoretical Overview 62
NP = f (FM & NV)
This formula can be read as follows: the potentiality of occurrence of a set of
behaviours that lead to the satisfaction of some need (need potential) is a function of
both the expectancies that these behaviours will lead to these reinforcements (freedom
of movement) and the strength or value of these reinforcements (need value). It is
with the term freedom of movement that we approach the location of the locus of
control construct in Social Learning Theory.
Rotter defines freedom of movement “The mean expectancy of obtaining
positive satisfaction as a result of a set of related behaviour directed towards the
accomplishment of a group of functionally related reinforcements. A person‟s
freedom of movement is low if he has a high expectancy of failure or punishment as a
result of the behaviour with which he tries to obtain the reinforcements that contribute
a particular need” (Rotter, 1954, p.194). In essence, freedom of movement is a
generalized expectancy of success resulting from man‟s ability to remember and
reflect upon a lifetime of specific expectancy behaviour-outcome sequences.
Perceived control is defined as a generalized expectancy for internal as opposed to
external control of reinforcements. Like freedom of movement, it is an abstraction
deriving from a series of specific expectancy behaviour-outcome cycles. However,
where freedom of movement concerns the likelihood of success, the generalized
expectancy of internal versus external control of reinforcement involves a causal
analysis of success and failure.
Theoretical Overview 63
In Social Learning Theory, reinforcement acts to strengthen an expectancy
that a particular behaviour or event will be followed by the reinforcement in the
future. Once an expectancy for such a behaviour reinforcement sequences is built up,
the failure of the reinforcement to occur will reduce or extinguish the expectancy. As
an infant develops and acquires more experience he differentiates events, which are
causally related to preceding events and those, which are not. It follows a general
hypothesis that when the reinforcement is seen as not contingent upon the subject‟s
own behaviour that its occurrence will not increase an expectancy as much as when it
is seen as contingent upon his own behaviour. Conversely, its non-occurrence will not
reduce any expectancy so much as when it is seen as contingent. It seems likely that,
depending upon the individuals‟ history of reinforcement, individuals would differ in
the degree to which they attributed reinforcement to their own actions (Rotter, 1966).
2.3 RIGIDITY
The concept of psychological rigidity has been investigated since the early
part of this century, occasionally under other labels, such as proactive inhibitions or
perseverations. The latter concepts have been defined as the tendency to persist in a
behaviour that was appropriate in the past but that behaviour ceases to be appropriate
under new circumstances.
A considerable amount of research over the last several years has investigated
the construct of rigidity. Given the broad-based interest in the construct and its
usefulness for understanding human thought and behaviour, rigidity will undoubtedly
continue to attract researchers from many areas of psychology globally. The construct
Theoretical Overview 64
of rigidity has a productive and venerable history in the field of psychology. It
was first investigated systematically by Kounin (1941). Kounin speculated that
behavioural rigidity is a developmental phenomenon that expresses behavioural
differentiation from a concrete and rigid pattern in childhood, progressing to increased
flexibility as adulthood is reached, with a return to greater rigidity in advanced age.
Chown (1959) examined a variety of definitions of rigidity and termed rigidity to be a
rather “flexible” and multidimensional concept.
An examination of the names associated with much of the early researches on
rigidity reads like an all-star roster: Raymond Cattell, Else Frenkel-Brunswik,
William James, Kurt Lewin, Abraham Luchins, Milton Rokeach, Charles Spearman,
and Louis Thurstone. All made substantial contributions to the area.
2.3.1 Chown’s Review
One of the most comprehensive reviews of rigidity was provided in an often
cited Psychological Bulletin article by Chown (1959). Her article focused on
definitions of rigidity, rigidity tests, and experimental work involving rigidity.
Chown concluded with three generalizations. First, she noted that at the time when a
variety of instruments were available for measuring rigidity their commonalities were
unclear. Second, she advocated a return to a physical model of rigidity, in which
rigidity is defined as the ratio of environmental stress to structural strain. Finally, she
noted that the empirical evidence suggested a multidimensional construct, but that
little research had been conducted to identify the different aspects of rigidity.
Theoretical Overview 65
Another theme noted by Chown was the distinction between the functional
and structural approaches to rigidity, a distinction articulated in earlier articles by
Kounin (1948) and Werner (1946). The structural approach viewed rigidity in terms
of the amount of differentiation between „mental regions‟. A person with highly
defined and distinct mental regions was rigid, while a person with less clearly defined
mental regions (i.e., more overlap between regions) was not rigid. A functional view
of rigidity, in contrast, viewed it not as a tool for organizing information, but as a way
of using information to solve problems.
2.3.2 Defining Rigidity
The concept of rigidity is quite ambiguous because various authors have made
statements contradicting to one another as the concept of rigidity has been defined
structurally by some, and functionally by others. Unwarranted generalizations have
sometimes been derived from the assumption that rigidity is uniform rather than a
multiform trait. Thus, the nature of rigidity is very complex.
In her 1959 review, Chown noted that the construct of rigidity had proved
difficult to define. Indeed, the term had been used to describe mental sets, extreme
attitudes, ethnocentrism, lack of flexibility, perseveration, authoritarianism and the
inability to change habits. In her review, Chown failed to provide a coherent
definition of rigidity, in part because there was no consensus among researchers.
Early approaches to the study of rigidity treated it as a unidimensional
continuum ranging from rigid at one end to flexible at the other. The notion of rigidity
Theoretical Overview 66
as a unidimensional construct dates back to the late 1800s and was later articulated by
Spearman (1927), who described it as „mental inertia‟ (Lankes, 1915; Pinard, 1932).
Spearman is widely known for introducing the „g‟ factor but it is not widely known
that he also proposed a „p‟ factor (perseveration factor). According to Spearman, „g‟
consisted of the amount of mental energy available and „p‟ was the inertia of this
energy. Prior to 1960, definitions for rigidity abounded. Examples include Goldstein‟s
(1943) „adherence to a present performance in an inadequate way‟, Werner‟s (1946)
„lack of variability in response‟, Rokeach‟s (1948) „inability to change one‟s set when
the objective conditions demand it‟, and Buss‟s (1952) „resistance to shifting from old
to new discriminations‟. In their comprehensive survey of the literature, Luchins &
Luchins (1959) listed thirty- four factors identified in various studies, many of which
were conceptually similar. And they ruefully noted that “one investigator seldom
relates the factors he promulgates to those in other studies” (p.94). Clearly at the time
of Chown‟s review there was no consensus as to how to define rigidity.
A useful development since 1959 has been Rokeach‟s „The Open and Closed
Mind‟ (1960). Summarizing the wide range of approaches to the construct, Rokeach
defined rigidity as a resistance to change in beliefs, attitudes, or personal habits. The
usefulness of this definition is its multidimensional nature. Rigidity is not simply the
perseveration of behaviour on a behavioural task, but it is the one that can be divided
into cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioural components. Rokeach used the term
„dogmatism‟ to refer to resistance to change in a person‟s belief system. Rigidity
refers to single belief (or habit), whereas dogmatism refers to a system of beliefs.
Theoretical Overview 67
Review of the psychological literature suggests that a comprehensive
definition of rigidity must contain several key elements. First, rigidity involves
the formation of a mental or behavioural set (Chown, 1959; Rokeach, 1948;
Sarmany-Schuller, 1994; Stewin, 1983; Vollhardt, 1990). By set, we mean a learned
mental or behavioural pattern that forms through repeated experience in a
given situation (Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1959, 1994). Mental sets are
expectations about future events (including attitudes, beliefs, expectancies and
schemas) whereas behavioural sets are patterns of observable responses. Second,
rigidity involves the perseverations of these sets. By perseveration we mean the
continuation of the set in the face of pressure to change (Goldberg, 1986; Goldberg &
Tucker, 1979; Luchins & Luchins, 1994; Sandson & Albert, 1984). Pressure to
change can come from a variety of sources, including (a) the realization that the set is
no longer effective, efficient, or appropriate for the current situation or (b) pressure
from an external agent indicating that change is desirable. Rigidity is defined as the
tendency to develop and perseverate in the use of mental or behavioural sets. Thus,
there are two steps in the rigidity process. Set formation and set perseveration
(Guetzkow, 1951; Taylor & Mc Nemar, 1955). Presumably these two steps are
positively correlated such that a person who quickly forms a set is likely to
perseverate in its use (Luchins & Luchins, 1982). One important distinction is
between perseveration and habit. A habit is a typical pattern of behaviour - that is, a
habit is a behavioural set. Habits are behavioural sets that occur largely without
reflection.
Theoretical Overview 68
2.3.3 Measuring Rigidity
Although the review of literature suggests the emergence of some agreement
on the definition of rigidity, it is not surprising to have given the multidimensional
nature of the construct that no universally acknowledged and accepted ways exist to
measure it. Further, there has been little research aimed at establishing the relationship
among the existing techniques (Joshi, 1974). Many researchers, dissatisfied with the
available instruments, create idiosyncratic measures of rigidity, reporting only
minimal descriptions of the materials or procedures. Indeed, Chown‟s review
identified forty-seven measures of rigidity, and since that time, many additional
measures have been developed. More recently, some researchers have moved away
from the term rigidity and instead have adopted labels such as personal need for
structure, need for closure, openness, or flexibility.
By far the most widely used procedure for measuring rigidity is to ask
respondent to rate statements on a Likert type scale. These scales are easily
administered to many respondents simultaneously and have the advantage of
providing estimates for internal reliability.
The Breskin Rigidity Test is based on the Gestalt Laws of Pragnanz
and measures individual differences in the tendency to form a perceptual set
(Breskin, 1968, 1969; Breskin, Gorman & Hochman, 1970; Breskin & Rich, 1971).
The flexibility sub scale of the California Personality Inventory – flexibility
(CPI; Gough & Bradley, 1996) was developed to measure rigidity–flexibility of
Theoretical Overview 69
personality that was unassociated with political ideology. The first version of the
scale, known as the Gough Rigidity Scale, was incorporated into the CPI in 1956.
Budner (1962) defined intolerance of ambiguity as the tendency to perceive
ambiguous situation as sources of threat and tolerance of ambiguity as the tendency to
perceive ambiguous situations as desirable. The research literatures on rigidity and
intolerance of ambiguity are so closely related that, quite often, the two constructs are
treated as synonymous. The sixteen items Intolerance Ambiguity Scale measures
individual differences in desires for certainty (Durrheim, 1995).
The forty-two item Need for Closure Scale (NFCS; Kruglanski, Webster &
Klem, 1993) measures individual differences in preferences for order and structure
and the abhorrence of disorder and chaos. The scale measures five correlated subsets
labelled preference for structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness,
predictability and closed mindedness.
Openness to experience is one of the personality dimensions included in the
Five-Factor Model of Personality (Mc Crae, 1996; Mc Crae & Costa, 1996). Openness is a
broad and general dimension that includes preference for novelty, cognitive
complexity, and flexibility. In contrast, closeness is manifested in a preference for
familiarity, simplicity, and closure.
Personal Need for Structure (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) refers to
individual differences in preference for cognitive simplicity and structure. Measured
Theoretical Overview 70
with a twelve-item scale, the PNS represents the degree to which people are motivated
to structure their words in simple and unambiguous ways.
Test of Behavioural Rigidity (TBR; Schaie, 1955) in a paper that was not cited
in Chown‟s (1959) review, distinguished between “motor-cognitive flexibility” and
“personality - perceptual flexibility”. Schaie reported the results from a factor analysis
of eight instruments that showed three distinct factors. The first is psychomotor speed,
which refers to the speed that a person responds to a familiar situation. The second
factor identified by Schaie is the personality - perceptual component, which is defined
as “ideational inertia” and measured with a series of true - false questions drawn from
early self-report scales of mental flexibility (Schaie, Dutta & Willis, 1989; Schaie &
Parham, 1975). This factor reflects an individual‟s ability to adjust readily to new
surroundings. More recently this factor has been termed as “attitudinal flexibility”
(Schaie, 1996). The third factor of rigidity that Schaie identified is motor-cognitive.
Motor-cognitive is a person‟s ability to shift without difficulty from one activity
to another, which is the behavioural aspect of rigidity. An eight-year longitudinal
study of rigidity using covariance structural models found support for the
identity of unique cognitive and behavioural factors (Schaie, Dutta & Willis, 1989).
Using latent variable analysis at each measurement period, they found a strong
correlation (r = .81) between the cognitive and behavioural aspects of the scale. In
addition, the study found a high degree of consistency across an eight year span.
Correlations between the latent factors across the eight-year period provided an
Theoretical Overview 71
assessment of their stability and were .98 for motor-cognitive flexibility and .80 for
personality-perceptual flexibility.
A growing body of literature suggests that intelligence and rigidity are
negatively related. The strongest evidence supporting the intelligence-rigidity
relationship comes from Schaie‟s longitudinal research (Schaie, 1994; Schaie, Dutta
& Willis, 1989). Using a „psychometric intelligence measurement battery,‟ Schaie
generated several measures of intellectual ability, including inductive reasoning,
spatial orientation, verbal ability, numerical ability, verbal memory, and perceptual
speed. He also administered the TBR. Intercorrelations among the derived
factors which revealed a strong relationship between behavioural flexibility (motor-
cognitive) and the measure of mental abilities, with correlations among the latent
factors ranging from .26 to .91. The average correlation across the combined
measures of cognitive ability was .72 for motor-cognitive flexibility. Correlations
reflect a positive relationship between flexibility and intelligence.
Although questionnaire measures of rigidity are by far the most commonly
used assessment technique, they do not end themselves to experimental methodology.
In contrast, problem-solving measures can be administered under manipulated
conditions using varied sequences of problems. Problem-solving measures have
focused almost exclusively on the perseveration aspect of rigidity (Schultz &
Searleman, 1998). Four measures of perseveration have been frequently used: the
TBR, the Einstellung Water-Jar Task, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), and
the Stroop task. Card sorting tasks have been used primarily for clinical diagnosis and
Theoretical Overview 72
psychiatric research; the Einstellung task has been used to study cognition; the
Breskin Rigidity Test has been used to study perception; the Stroop task has been
used to study interference and attention; the PNS and NFCS scales have been used to
study social cognition; Intolerance of Ambiguity has been used to study political
ideology and belief systems; and the CPI-flexibility and Openness to Experience scale
have been used to study personality. Most research on rigidity has failed to distinguish
between mental and behavioural rigidity, although the TBR has been available for
almost forty years. Even studies that employ the TBR often rely on the composite
score as the measures of rigidity and fail to report separate findings for each other.
The various approaches to the measurement of rigidity yielded several widely
used instruments, as well as many lesser known tests. Dimensions of Rigidity
Scale (DRS) developed by Chadha (1986) contains seven dimensions of rigidity
viz., intellectual rigidity, emotional rigidity, dispositional rigidity, social rigidity,
behavioural rigidity, perceptual rigidity and creative rigidity. They are defined as
follows:
A. Intellectual Rigidity
(i) Not accepting anything or any idea without logical reasoning.
(ii) Believing in setting high standards for oneself and striving for the best.
(iii) To have an inclination towards thinking about and discussing intellectual and
philosophical matters.
(iv) To have definite ideas about things.
Theoretical Overview 73
B. Emotional Rigidity
(i) Lack of emotional reaction even when the situation demands it.
(ii) To have definite ideas about what type of emotional reactions should be
abused in particular emotional situations.
(iii) To exert strict control over one‟s emotions.
C. Dispositional Rigidity (with respect to attitudes / habits)
(i) To have very definite and rigid habits and/or ideas about habits of eating,
sleeping, reading, dealing with things, etc.
(ii) To be inclined to finish works once started.
(iii) To hold extreme attitudes (positive or negative) regarding persons, things,
problems, etc.
D. Social Rigidity (with respect to society)
(i) To find it very difficult to feel comfortable in a social gathering or in a new
situation.
(ii) Not developing too many new acquaintances.
(iii) To have very well defined ideas about society and the social responsibilities of
its people.
(iv) Giving too much importance to friendship.
E. Behavioural Rigidity (with respect to tradition /custom)
(i) To stick to traditional ways of dressing.
(ii) To have strict and definite attitude towards Indian traditions and customs.
Theoretical Overview 74
F. Perceptual Rigidity
(i) Not to accept or believe anything without seeing a proof supporting it.
(ii) Generally misperceive something for some other thing.
(iii) Not able to perceive abstract relationships among things and a tendency to
stick to obvious relationship.
(iv) To perceive one‟s own knowledge about things to be always correct.
G. Creative Rigidity
(i) To be able to think of a few diverse ideas at a time (lack of fluency).
(ii) Not able to think about a thing or problem from many different angles.
(iii) To show stereotype in ideas.
In the years since Chown‟s review, little progress has been made in investigating
the relationships among the growing number of rigidity tests (Guilford, 1967;
Kreitler, Zigler & Kreitler, 1990; Muhar, 1974). The instruments for measuring
rigidity appear to have been developed in non-overlapping stages. Little research has
attempted to span the hundred years of the literature to identify commonalities among
the measures.
Theoretical Overview 75
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