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Chilean Councilmen and Export Policies, 1600-1699Author(s): Della M. FluscheSource: The Americas, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Apr., 1980), pp. 479-498Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History
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CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT
POLICIES, 1600-1699
S trade between Spain and her American olonies declined n the
seventeenth century, interprovincial commerce increased. This
change within the Spanish Empire and some of its multiple
implications have only recently been recognized and given scholarlyattention. Consequently, little information is available on the partcolonial municipal governments played in the imperial economic
realignment. A case in point is the role of the Santiagocabildon regardto
the export trade which tied Chile's Central Valley, the region adminis-tered by that city council, to the Peruvian marketeconomy.' Although
various studies provide supportive data on this subject, a close scrutinyof the council minutes, focused on policies that regulated outboundcommerce and the production from which it flowed, can more clearlydelineate the extent of creole initiative andcabildo participationin policyformulationand enforcement. A correlativetheme pursued through this
appraisal of the records concerns the socio-economic attitudes of the
upper levels of society in the last century of Hapsburg rule.2Before wheat became a majorexport at the end of the century, tallow
andcordovan leather were the two main articlesproduced in the Central
'John Lynch, Spainunder heHabsburgs2 vols.; New York:Oxford University Press, 1965-1969),
II, 160-228, presents the new thesis; Demetrio Ramos P6rez, Mineriay comerciointerprovincialn
hispanoamericasiglosXVI, XVII, XVIII) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1970), 111-313,
has an older view of the century; both mention the Chilean-Peruviantie, as do Stanley J. Stein and
ShaneJ. Hunt, PrincipalCurrentsin the Economic Historiographyof Latin America, The ournal
ofEconomicHistory, XXXI (March, 1971), 222-230.
2The council minutes areActasdel cabildo eSantiago,28 Vols. of ColeccibnehistoriadoreseChile
documentoselativos la historianacional,ed. Jose Toribio Medina et al (51 vols.; Santiago:Elzevirianaet al, 1861-1953). Julio Alemparte, El Cabildoen Chilecolonial:origenesmunicipales e las repuiblicas
hispanoamericanas2nd ed.; Santiago:EditorialAndres Bello, 1966), is a helpful study firstpublishedin 1940.
479
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480 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
Valley for shipment to Lima.AThat the Santiagocouncil's interest in the
Pacific trade centered on these pastoraland, later, agrariancommodities
is understandable because, in accordance with royal law, only land-owners with a legal residence in the city were eligible for cabildo
membership. The propertied individuals (termed cosecheros,roducers)who controlled the council not only profited from export sales but could
also function as buyers without loss of social status. Thus the local
oligarchy, like aristocratic Peruvians, engaged in mercantile activity.The comerciantesmerchants)who were directly dependent on the Lima
trade for their livelihood had few social advantages and little politicalinfluence; however, individual merchants were occasionally invited to
cabildos biertos(literally, open council meetings) on a consultative basis.In this way, the councilmen (alcaldes ndregidores)ook some notice of the
views of the business community as they worked with the royal governorandaudiencia(high court) in determining policy.4
THE PRICE PROBLEM:QUANTITY AND QUALITYCONTROL
As they discussed livestock commodities, the councilmen defined
Santiago's basic economic problem as a financial one and repetitiously
3lnformationon pastoral-agrarian roduction and tradeis in Alonso de Ovalle, Hist6ricarelacibn el
reynodeChile Rome, 1646), 10-11; Diego de Rosales, Historiageneraldel reinodeChile,ed. Benjamin
Vicufia Mackenna (3 vols.; Valparaiso: Mercurio, 1877-1878), I, 192-193; Vicufia Mackenna,
Historiade Valparaisoand Historia de Santiago, Vols. III-IV, X-XI, of ObrasCompletas15 vols.;
Santiago:Universidad de Chile, 1936-1940), III, 145-166, 379-409; X,passim; Diego BarrosArana,
HistoriajeneraldeChile(16 vols.; Santiago:RafaelJover, 1884-1902),IV, 223-224, 262ff; V, 294-309;
and Francisco Antonio Encina, Historia de Chilede la prehistoriahasta 1891 (20 vols.; Santiago:
Nascimento, 1940-1953), IV, 29-35, 151-269.
4Actas, XXXI, 331-333 (1638); XXXII, 119-120 (1641); XXXVI, 368-369, 404-410 (1664);
XXXVIII, 445-446, 448-451 (1675); XLI, 200-201, 332-336 (1678-1679) XLI, 285-287 (1684);
Alemparte,passim.Royal legislation on cabildos is in Recopilaci6ne leyesde losreynosde las Indias(4
vols., Madrid, 1681), books IV, V, VIII. Frederick B. Pike, Aspects of Cabildo Economic
Regulations in Spanish America under the Hapsburgs, Inter-AmericanEconomicAffairs, XIII
(Spring, 1960), 67-86, concentrates on local market regulations; he proposes that urban interests
suffered because landed aristocrats dominated cabildos but states that Lima aristocrats often
engaged in commerce; see also Lynch, II, 212-224;Joseph B. Fichandler and Thomas F. O'Brien,
Jr., Santiago,Chile, 1541-1581:A Case Study of Urban Stagnation, T Am, XXXIII (Oct., 1976),
205-225;and
JacquesA. Barbier, Elite and Cadres in Bourbon Chile, HAHR, LII
(Aug.,1972),
416-435. Some merchants married into the Chilean aristocracy, see Nestor Meza Villalobos, La
concienciapoliticachilenadurantea monarquiaSantiago: Universidad de Chile, 1958), 103. The best
recent analysis of the Chilean elite and its enterprises is Mario G6ngora, Encomenderosestancieros:
estudios cercade la constitucibnocialaristocraiticae Chiledespues e la conquista,1580-1660 (Santiago:
Universidadde Chile, 1970), see 216-218, for dataon tallow exports for 1641, 1654-1656, 1659-1660
based on tax records. Many Santiagocouncilmen were encomenderosn the seventeenth century.
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DELLAM. FLUSCHE 481
complained that low prices deprived Chileans of a just return. Althoughthey retained the memory of medieval just price concepts, they also
spoke in more modern terms and remarked that neither the poor butworthy cosecheros nor the comerciantes received adequate profits fromthe export trade. The cabildo believed that economic regulations couldincreaseprofit marginsfor both groups and thereby further the common
good of the kingdom of Chile, the ostensible objective of all council
activity. To approachthis goal, the causes of depressed prices had to beidentified. The cabildo records do not contain the phrase supply and
demand; however, the councilmen did recognize superfluous abun-dance as one of the reasons for their
price problem. Accordingly, theyhelped to implement policies designed to restrict this overproduction.5The first sustained effort to improve prices through production con-
trols began during the administration of Governor Francisco Lazo de la
Vega (1629-1639). In 1635 the governor established a ceiling on the
quantity of tallow to be produced for export, but he left to the cabildothe task of assigning quotas to the ranchers. The councilmen acceptedthe policy and appointed two members, Gines de Toro Mazote, the
proprietarydepositarioeneral(public trustee), and Andres de Serrain, an
elected regidor, to divide a total of 9,000 quintales(hundredweights,quintals)among the producers. The cabildo then sought confirmation ofthe quotas and penalties for violations from the royal audiencia.6
Another method used to limit the livestock commodities available for
export to Lima became operative in 1636. This was the alternativa
which, as the name implies, was nothing more than a system of
slaughtering different types of animals in alternateyears. To ensure its
effectiveness, Lazo de la Vega appointed the depositario Toro Mazote
5Actas,XXX, 288 (1631); XXXI, 189-190, 226-227, 279, 301-302 (1636-1638); XXXII, 114-115
(1641); XXXIV, 118-120 (1651); XXXVII,307 (1669); XXXVIII, 445-446 (1675); XL, 308-309,332-336 (1679); XLII, 349 (1690); Encina, IV, 32-35; Alemparte, 84-85, 117-120, 137-145; Meza
Villalobos, 101-108;John Preston Moore, The Cabildo n Peru undertheHapsburgs:A Studyin the
Origins ndPowersoftheTown Council n theViceroyaltyfPeru,1530-1700 (Durham: Duke UniversityPress, 1954), 172-173. Comparewith Pike, 67-86.
6Actas,XXXI, 42, 110, 114-115, 127, 149-151, 158(1634-1635);Alemparte, 141-142;Encina, IV,33. The sessions also mention a cattle contract for the army on the southern frontierand payment toranchers from the situado(royal military subsidy). Eugene H. Korth, SpanishPolicy n ColonialChile:
TheStruggleor SocialJustice,1535-1700 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), a penetratinganalysisof the Araucanianquestion, discusses situado peculation, 212-215. The Toro Mazotes heldthe trusteeship with its ex officio cabildo seat during much of the century; data on the family is inLuis de Roay Ursuia,El ReynodeChile,1535-1810: estudio ist6rico,enealbgicoy iogrificoValladolid:Talleres Tipogrificas, 1945), 401-402; and Domingo Amunitegui Solar, La SociedadhilenadelsigloXVIII: mayorazgostitulosdel Castilla 3 vols.; Santiago: ImprentaBarcelona, 1901-1904), I, 183-230.See Table 1 at the end of this article for production levels and prices.
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482 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
and two regidores, Agustin de Arevalo Brisefio and Gabriel Diaz
Hidalgo, as extraordinaryjudges to hear alternativacases throughout the
kingdom, even those involving corregidoresjudiciary, administrativeofficials). Whether their jurisdiction extended to violations perpetratedon estancias ranches) owned by religious orders is a moot questionbecause such enterprises usually enjoyed ecclesiastical immunity from
civil authority; however, the cabildo itself entreated religious superiorsto comply voluntarily with the slaughter regulations.7
Although the council formally recognized the gubernatorial appoin-tees drawn from its membership, it soon exerted its own influence over
the enforcement process. The first step, in 1637, took the form of
substantiating charges against persons who violated the alternativa.8
During the following year, the cabildo lobbied for permission to appointalternativajudges and on December 2 approveda formal petition to that
effect, composed by its procuratorBernardode Amasa. Under the same
date, the escribanocabildo clerk) noted that Lazo de la Vega granted the
petition and allowed any future appointees to receive salaries derived
from fines levied on those found guilty. With this faculty, the council on
December 29 commissioned a judge to hear slaughter cases.9 Thus the
governor had surrendered one of his sources of patronage. Despite hisloss of prestige, Governor Lazo retained his authority intact. He had
exercised his prerogativesin 1638by grantingcertain individuals licenses
to slaughter prohibited animals. The council could not prevent this, but
it voiced disapprovalof his relaxationof the ordinance.10Since produc-ers obtained licenses and enforcement mechanisms were necessary to
curb violations, it is obvious that some Chileans refused to abide by the
alternativa. The cabildo's interest in enforcing the policy, nevertheless,
demonstrated its faith in the principle of economic controls as well asits
determinationto share in the regulatory power.The first alternativa shortly became part of a more comprehensive
export policy (discussed below) and lasted with indifferent success until
7Actas, XXXI, 204-205, 207-208, 210-211 (1636). The Santiago corregidor presided in the
cabildo.
Actas,XXXI, 210-211, 240-241, 263-264 (1636-1637).
9Actas,XXXI, 278, 280-281, 330, 336-337, 351 (1638). The procuratorwas an annually elected
non-voting member. Information on the Amasas is in Roa y Ursuta,608; Jose Toribio Medina,Diccionariobiograficoolonialde Chile(Santiago: Elzeviriana, 1906), 427-428; Meza Villalobos, 103;
AmunaiteguiSolar, III, 135-272.
10Actas,XXXI, 318, 330(1638)
Alemparte praises the colonial respect for economic regulationand correctly stresses counciliar
power over variousaspects of colonial life, but he tends to minimize the role of the higherauthorities
re export policies.
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DELLA M. FLUSCHE 483
the Governor, the Marques de Baides (1639-1646) abolished it.12 After
grappling with the price question with several other expedients, the
cabildo again launched a major offensive on the troublesome problemduring the administration of Governor Juan Henriquez (1670-1681).Much of the initiative came from Pedro Pradode la Canal, the alferez eal
(royal standardbearer),who, in 1675, urged the cabildo to reactivatetherotational slaughtering program. As a spokesman for the livestock in-
dustry, Prado insisted that overproduction was the reason for the
existing low prices and for the financialhardshipthat Chileans had been
enduring for many years while awaiting the benefaction of time andnatural accidents to reverse the production-price pattern. This hopehad not been fulfilled and ranchers only became poorer as pricescontinued to fall. Since some arbitrary measure to effect a justevaluation and congruent price, was clearly needed, Prado recom-mended an alternativa as the most feasible solution. A cabildo abierto
composed of cosecheros and merchants accepted the proposal and com-
plimented Prado on his zeal for the universalwelfare of this kingdom.The council then draftedan ordinance and asserted that it would remainin effect until prices increased. After Governor Henriquez had approved
the ordinance, the councilmen published it and appointed inspectors andjudges to enforce it, a practice that continued until 1678 when thecabildo requested the governor to revoke the alternativa.13
Overproduction was not the only obstacle confronting the cabildo inits efforts to maintain a high profit level for livestock producers andmerchants engaged in the export trade. Quality control was another.This the council fully realized and, as early as 1619, moved resolutely tooutlaw the unethical practice of mixing tallow with sand or grease to
increase weight. To detect offenders, it ordered ranchers to pack theirtallow in containers made of hides stamped with their livestock brands,thus authorizingthe use of a type of trademark.That the ruling failed toachieve enduring results and fell into disuse is apparent from its repeti-tion and the introduction of more stringent quality controls in later
years. While Lazo de la Vega governed, the council again prohibitedadulterationand instructed the procurator,Juan Rodolfo Lisperguer, to
'2Actas,XXXII, 143-144(1641)
3Actas,XXXVIII, 445-446, 448-451, 455-456, 469 (1675); XL, 43, 56-58, 69-70,81-83,126,205-206, 264-265 (1676-1678); Alemparte, 143-144. Data on the Prado family is in Medina,Diccionario,702-704; Roa y Ursuta,542-544; AmunaiteguiSolar, II, 309-371. For a discussion of the
Henriquez era including his official and private economic interests see Barros Arana, V, 121-213,218-222; Encina, III, 336.
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484 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
inspect tallow being stored in Santiago's port, Valparaiso, prior to
shipment.14In the drive to increase
exportvalues that Pedro Prado
helpedto
conduct in the 1670's, the precedents from earlier decades served as
models. Prado, who was the cabildo procuratorin 1672, recommended
the use of branded containers to store and ship tallow that had been
melted and strained to remove impurities. Although four cabildo mem-
bers favored his plan, a majority of seven claimed that the cosecheros
could not possibly adopt the new process. His proposal, nevertheless,became the basis for a bando(proclamation)that Governor Henriquez
promulgated in 1672 and for measures considered in 1679. The bando
reiterated an advisory opinion that the audiencia had submitted to the
governor. Taking cognizance of the cabildo majority opinion, Henriquezand the oidoresaudienciajudges) did not require producers to implementthe melting-straining process but did enjoin them to use brands duly
registered by the cabildo escribano. The bodegueroswarehousers) in
Valparaiso, charged with keeping accurate records, had to incorporatethe brands in their account books and in promissory notes issued to
producers. This procedure, Henriquez predicted, would prevent tallow
adulterationbecause guilty ranchers, identifiable by their brands, couldbe forced to make restitution. He also praised the audiencia for suggest-
ing that heavy penalties be levied againstbodegueros who tampered with
tallow allotments. The royal authorities thus amplified and carried into
law a measure which had originated in the cabildo. In December, 1676,word reached Santiago that the tallow price on the Lima market had
shown a temporary rise,15 an indication that the quality regulations,with the previously mentioned alternativa,had had the desired effect.
The endemic financial problem, nevertheless, soon directedrenewed
attention to both quality and quantity controls. The cabildo in 1679 not
only reenacted the branding practice but also appointed a committee
composed of councilmen, producers, and merchants to study other
means to improve prices. As his representative in policy discussions,Governor Henriquez named the auditor general of the army, the licen-
tiate Juan de la Cerda y Contreras. The Chilean-born attorney, who
Actas, XX, 324, (1619);XXXI, 148, 163(1635-1636);Alemparte, 141-145, 232,; Encina, IV, 33.
On the powerful Lisperguer family see Medina, Diccionario,464-466; Meza Villalobos, 104,
143-146.
5Actas,XXXVIII, 245-246, 251-254 (1672); XL, 81-83 (1676);the penalty for a bodeguero'sfirst
offense was 200 pesos; for the second it was a 500 peso fine plus two years suspension from
warehousing.
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DELLA . FLUSCHE 485
early in the eighteenthcenturyestablishedone of the kingdom's irst
mayorazgosentailed states),had been the cabildo'segaladvisorn 1665.
He became thefiscal(crownattorney)of the audienciaof Santiago n1668andin 1676was electedan alcalde.WhenCerdaandthecommittee
reportedin 1679, the council acceptedtheir recommendation f the
preparationechniquethat Prado,now a cabildodelegateto the com-
mittee, had suggestedseven yearsearlier.However, there is no clearevidencethat it was ever fully implemented; ather,the cabildocon-tented itself with a temporary mbargoon shipments o Valparaiso.16This apparentlyerveda dualpurpose:t restricted he supplyof tallowavailable for
export,and it
gaveindividualswho had allotments
warehousedn the portmarketing riorityoverothers.
PRICE FIXING AND MONOPOLY EXPORT CONTRACTS
One of the routineactivities he cabildoperformedwas the fixingof
prices on articlesconsumed domestically.17 This local practicewas
appliedto the exporttradein 1647in an effortto protectthe valueoftallow reserves
spared bythe calamitous
earthquakehat occurred n
May. The council set a minimumprice of 5 pesos the peso was the
Spanishpieceof 8)per quintalontallowto defendproducers gainstanyunscrupulousdealerwho might takeadvantageof their straitenedcir-cumstances. The ordinanceprohibited violations under penalty ofconfiscation f the tallowand a 500peso fine.18
In 1648GovernorMartinde Mujica 1646-1649) pheldthe principleof exportpricecontrolsand grantedpermission or a tasa(mandatoryprice list) on both tallow and cordovanleather. For several years
thereafter he cabildoarrangedor a committeeof producersand mer-chants to draft an annualminimumprice list; however, the councilrecordssuggestthat the practicewas responsible or retaliatory ctionfromPeru. The corregidor uan RodolfoLisperguer eported hat theChileans eceived ow returnson the Limamarket n 1649becauseatasa
1Actas,XL, 308-309, 330-336, 399-400 (1679-1680); XLI, 107, 190-191 (1682); Alemparte,144-145; Vicufiia Mackenna, Valparaiso, II, 387-389. Data on the Cerdas is in Actas, XXXVII, 37
(1665);Medina, Diccionario,197-203;AmunaiteguiSolar, I,
129-181.
17Examples are Actas, XXIV, 150-151 (1609); XXVIII, 203 (1624); XLI, 140, 175-176 (1682);
comparewith Pike, 67-86; Moore, 168-184;Alemparte, 117-141, 145-166;Encina, IV, 19-22, 24-26;and Constantino Bayle, LosCabildosecularesnAmerica spafiolaMadrid:Sapientia, 1952), 453-518.
8Acontemporary account of the earthquake is in BibliotecaHispano-Chilena, d. Jose ToribioMedina (3 vols.; Santiago, 1897-1899), II, 5-20; see also reports on damage in Actas, XXXIII,188-190ff(1647); 202 is the price ordinance;Alemparte, 143, 145; BarrosArana, V, 436.
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486 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
issued there set price ceilings on imports. The cabildo listened to his
jeremiad on Santiago's post-earthquake condition and voted its proc-
urator, Pedro Prado, a power of attorney to argue against the tasa beforethe Lima audiencia. Another advocate, Antonio Barambio, left for Peru
in 1651 armed with 4,000 pesos collected from the supposedly im-
poverished city residents to continue the legal action.19
Santiagoclaimed to receive royal support for its subsequent resistance
to Lima tasas when dispatches arrived in 1654 from a lobbyist the city
employed at the Spanish court. Included were copies of six royalcedulas
(decrees), one of which purportedly forbade the Lima authorities to set
priceson Chilean
products.20
Sinceappeals
to
Spain
as well as to Lima
were part of the cabildo's normal correspondence, the councilmen
sought additional aid from the crown as they protested a tasa in 1666. In
an address that mirrored the pace of life in Santiago, the corregidorMelchor de Carvajaly Saravia lamented that many buildings damaged
by an earthquake some nine years earlier were not yet rebuilt. Lack of
funds had delayed repairs and now a tasa promulgated in Lima had
totally destroyed export prices. This easily persuaded the cabildo to
entreat Governor Francisco de Meneses (1664-1668) and the audiencia
judges to report conditions to Spain and Peru. The council itself senttwo emissaries to court as special procuratorsto plead municipal cases,
including the enforcement of a decree, presumably the one received in
1654, prohibiting price ceilings; they were assigned 1000 pesos for
expenses.21News came from Peru in 1676 that although the cabildo's twofold
programof production and quality controls had effected a price increase
in Lima the Viceroy of Peru, the Conde de Castellar (1673-1678), had
countered these ploys by imposing a tasa of his own. In one of its fewreferences to the Consulado of Lima, the council asserted that the
merchant association had been unable to dissuade Castellarfrom settingthe price of tallow at 6V2pesos. Obviously, the council declared, the
viceroy had been misinformed on the reason for the Peruvian shortageand wrongly supposed that Chileans had withheld exports. This the
councilmen denied, claiming that of the 27,500 quintales shipped during1676 only 13,700 were produced that year, in contrast to a normal
19Actas,XXXIII, 257-258, 268, 283-284, 402, 407-411 (1648-1649);XXXIV, 6, 18, 117-120, 139,
142-143, 148-150 (1650-1651);Alemparte, 145, mentions missions to Peru.
20Actas,XXXIV, 482-483 (1654); Encina, IV, 301-302; the contents were not copied into the
Actas;perhapsthe decree was merely of a general nature.
21Actas,XXXVII, 100-101, 124-128, 136(1666).
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DELLAM.FLUSCHE 487
annualyield of 30,000.Further, he viceroylackedknowledgeof royallegislationwhich protectedChilean productsfrom price ceilings in
Lima.To clarifymatters, he cabildomentioned specialdecreegrantedin the 1650's and cited a generalcedula dating from 1536 that
prohibited asason goodssent fromSpainto any portsunder Peruvian
jurisdiction.The Lima audienciaon January20, 1553,hadinterpretedthe earlylaw broadly o waivepricecontrolson goodstransportedromLima to Chile. From this precedent, the cabildo deduced that the
exemption houldcoverChile'scurrent hipmentso Peru.To reenforcetheseargumentsubmitted o theviceroy nwriting,thecouncilempow-eredthe Chilean
lawyerDiegoMonterodel
Aguilar,who livedin Peru
and practicedbeforethe Limaaudiencia, o present ts remonstrances.
Objectingto the tasa on the groundsthat naturalscarcityhad legiti-matelyincreased allowvalues,the councilchoseto ignorethe artificialcharacter f the shortage reatedby the alternativa, nd,whiledecryingthe viceregalorderon prices, itself consideredimposinga minimum
priceof 8 pesoson tallowexports.22Cabildo attitudes on price fixing continued to vary with cir-
cumstances.In 1678, for example, the corregidorPedro de Amasa
advocated he pricingof exports prior to shipment, yet he opposedPeruviancontrols six years later. On the latteroccasion, Amasa in-formed he producers ndmerchantsn acabildoabierto hat one Diegode Manterola,who enjoyeda virtualmonopolyas a Limapurchasingagent orChileanproducts,hadpriced allowat42 pesos.This, plushis
arbitrary riceson cordovaneather,notonly violated he royalexemp-tionsgranted o Chilebut alsocontravened commonaw. Thecouncil,in a privatesession, then resolved to enter a protest, supported by
GovernorJose de Garro(1682-1692)before the viceroyand the Con-suladoof Lima.23
The cabildofirmlydefended its right to establishminimumpriceswhen it felt conditionsmerited hem. It opposedpriceceilings mposedfromoutside. The only consistencyherewas the desireto protect ocal
profits. Appeals to secure a privilegedcommercialposition throughpoliticalinterventioncoincided with the severalpolicies which were
designed o exerteconomicpressure.Limapricecontrolswere a factor
22Actas,XL, 81-83, 87, 93-95 (1676-1677);the texts of the decrees are not included; Montero was
to receive 100 pesos for expenses.23Actas,XL, 206-207 (1678); XLI, 285-287 (1684);the prices for tanned goatskins rangedfrom 12
to 15 pesos per dozen.
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488 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
limitingprofits n Chile,butif theywereoccasionally eemednecessary,Chileans and others who supplied Peru with livestockcommodities
probablymanipulatedhe market o a considerabledegree.The councilmenwho objectedto Lima tasashad mixedfeelingson
monopolyexportcontracts.Although he cabildoresentedanycontrac-tual arrangements elievedto be unfavorableo Santiago'snterests, tdid not condemn the principleof monopolyas such and in 1690madeovertures o Limafor a tallowasientomonopolycontract)between thetwo cities. Earlier, n 1631,the possibilityof entrusting xports o onehand had beenexplored n an effortto avoid he financialdisadvantagesthatproducers ncounteredwhenthey sold their tallowindividually.24
Between 1638 and 1642, the council minutes refer to a pair ofcontracts,one of which was a monopolythe Viceroy, the Conde deChinch6n 1628-1638),and the Limacabildohadarrangedo supplythe
viceregalcapitalwith tallowcandles.The asentistacontractor)n Peruwas SanJuande Hermuia, Basquewell known n Chile becausehe hadheldbothproprietary ndappointiveofficesthere,conducted he royalmilitary subsidy from Peru, and was related to the local Cerda yContrerasamilythroughmarriage.Whenthe Santiago ouncilheardof
his importationprivilegein 1638, it registereda protest againsthiscontractbeforethe authoritiesn Peru.Nevertheless, hecabildosignedan asiento, sometimein 1639, with individualswho were either his
agents or had presumablyreachedsome agreementwith him. The
recordsof this localcontract,which mayhave beena subsidiaryof the
one in Lima,arefar fromcompleteand less thancoherent,but salientfeatures an be ascertained.To underwrite he localventure, hebuyersconvinceda numberof Santiagoaristocratso postbondtotalling80,000
pesos.The cabildothenapprovedhe financialguarantee.According othe finaltermsof the asiento,the contractorswouldpurchase he tallow
producedorexportduringa tenyear periodat thepriceof 62 pesosper
quintal, payablepartially n ropa(cloth). The tallow buyers were to
enforce healternativadoptedn 1636which wasto continueasa means
of limitingproduction.25
24Actas,XXX, 288, 332, (1631-1632);XLII, 349 (1690);Alemparte, 143.
25Actas,XXXI, 301-302, 331-336, 338, 340-341, 365-366, 374, 380-381, 399, 415 (1638-1639);XXXII, 34-35, 95, 162-164 (1640-1642); data on Hermua is in XXVIII, 435-440 (1627); XXX,
211-215, 217-219 (1630); XXXI, 61-64 (1634); Roa y Ursdia,628, 630-631; AmunaiteguiSolar, I,
129-181;he was both uncle and father-in-law to the attorneyJuan de la Cerda. Viceroy Mancera
mentioned the Lima contract in Relaci6ndel . . . Marquesde Mancera, Colecci6nelas memorias
relacionesqueescribieronosvirreyes elPeri, ed. RicardoBeltrin R6zpide and Angel de Altolaguirre(2
vols.; Madrid:Imprenta del Asilo de Huerfanos, 1921-1930), II, 168-169;see also Moore, 275.
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DELLA M. FLUSCHE 489
A number of intrinsic and extrinsic complications that led to thecontract's premature cancellation soon arose. Among the first obstacles
impeding its smooth functioning were disputes over the value of mer-chandise imported for payments during 1640. The audiencia created an
arbitration board, composed of asentistas and councilmen, to evaluate
the payments in kind; however, the exporters promptly asked for a
downward adjustment in the purchase price of tallow. A cabildo abierto
favored this price reduction, but the council itself deferred a final
decision despite a reminderfrom the corregidor, Valeriano de Ahumada,that the contract benefited both Santiagoand Lima. Unable to meet their
obligations, the buyersbegan
to default on payments to
producerswho,
in turn, had accumulated debts for goods received from the contractors,and on July 13, the council attempted to halt the credit buying.26
Problems relating to the contract and to the more fundamental issuesof production and prices multiplied in 1641. When the cosecheros
produced excessive amounts of tallow in violation of the alternativa,the
buyers abnegatedtheir right to enforce it, and the councilmen undertook
the task. Meanwhile, the Lima tallow price declined from 3V2 pesos in
May to only 2V2 in July, less than half the sum stipulated in the Chilean
contract. Governor Baides intervened in October with an executiveorder that prohibited all slaughtering until April, 1642, and imposed a
ceiling of 18,000 quintales on future tallow production. The cabildo had
already considered such an expedient and later approved quotas for
producers that the depositario Gines de Toro Mazote helped to prepare.To enforce the regulation, Baides, not the council, appointed a judge tohearcases.27
In order to collect the debts outstanding to producers, the cabildo had
brought suit against the asentistas on behalf of the ranchers. Theaudiencia ruled in October, 1641, that an appeal was necessary tocontinue the litigation. Although a cabildo majorityfavoredprosecuting,the alcaldeTomaisCalder6nwon a postponement with the argumentthatthe tallow buyers were bankrupt and hasty action might lead them to
pay their Peruvian creditors with Santiago's assets. In a speech to
producers gathered in a cabildo abierto at the beginning of 1642, thealcaldeJuan Rodolfo Lisperguerannounced that the local residents who
26Actas, XXXII, 12-13, 33-37, 45 (1640). Data on the Ahumadas is in Roa y Ursua, 360-361;
Medina,Diccionario,33-35.
27Actas,XXXII, 95, 99-100, 105, 114-115, 117, 119, 121-123, 134-138, 143-144, 147, 152-153
(1641); Encina, IV, 33. For subsequent mention of the maximum-quota regulations see Actas,
XXXII, 214-215, 254, 271, 287-289(1642-1643).
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490 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
hadunderwritten he contractwere in a precariousposition.Not onlywere the asentistasbankruptbut Viceroy Mancera(1638-1648)and
GovernorBaides had withdrawnauthorizationromthe contract.Theassemblyrespondedto this informationby naming delegatesto meetwith the councilon the matter,28a timeless bureaucratic roceduren
problem olving.At the end of his term as viceroy, the Marquesde Mancera ecalled
that Chileanremonstrancesagainst he Limacontracthad influencedhisdecisionto revokeit. Notwithstanding, ocal opinionon the Chileancontracthad been divided.Those individualswho had postedbondtounderwrite t had investedin its success. Othershad
pressedfor
legalactionagainst he contractorswhich mighthaveled to the forfeitureofthebond.In viewof theviceregalandgubernatorialulingsbanning he
local asiento, the councilmen and representativesrom the cabildo
abiertovotedto abolish he Chileancontract.Afterthis, they declared,in a meetingwith one of the exporters, hat it was null and void and
withdrewthe lawsuit. A finalcompromisebetweenthe partiesstipu-lated:(1) a scale of paymentsdue the ranchers or tallow previouslydeliveredto the buyers, and (2) interestpaymentson the debts that
producers wedthecontractors.29Although he firstcontracthadmerelycompoundedhe Chileanprice
problem, ts unpleasantmemoryhadfadedwhen two prominent ristoc-
ratscompetedfor anotherasientoin 1664. FranciscoBravode Saravia
Sotomayor,whom Charles I ennobledas the firstMarquesde la Pica,and Pedro Prado, active in formulatingseveraltallow policies, bid
against achotherfor theprivilegeof exportingChilean allow,withthe
latterbeingawarded he contract.The termsof the asiento,underwrit-
ten for 40,000 pesos, providedthat Prado would purchase20,000quintalesannually or afouryearperiodbeginningn 1666at thepriceof
6 pesosperquintal, payable n cashimmediatelyupondelivery.Gover-
nor Meneses,son-in-law o the futureMarques,authorized he Prado
monopolythroughout he kingdomonly to revoke t beforeit became
operative.Meneses,who earnedthe nicknameBarabbasn Chile, in-
formedthe cabildothat a higherprice could be securedwithout the
contract,pronouncedt void, and declared he ranchersreeto dealwith
28Actas,XXXII, 137-138, 159-160(1641-1642). The alfirez, Francisco Eraso, seconded Calder6n
in the call for a cabildo abierto;the texts of the viceregal and gubernatorialrulings are not included
in the Actas.
29Actas,XXXII, 160-164, 188-191 (1642); Mancera, Memorias,II, 168-169; Moore, 275. The
tallow prices ranged downward from 6 V2 pesos depending on delivery date. Meza Villalobos,
143-161, discusses cabildo factionalism.
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DELLAM. FLUSCHE 491
tallow buyers of their own choosing. Given the corruption of the
Meneses administration, his personal dislike for Prado, his intervention
in council membership, and the partisan factions in the cabildo, it isprobable that ulterior motives entered into the contract cancellation.
Nevertheless, the councilmen who had perhaps devised some exportscheme with him approved his action.30 Expediency dictated the Chil-
eans' evaluation of monopolies; enticed by the promise of greaterprofitsor threatened by the governor, they abandoned the contract.
COMMERCIALAXES AND PORTREGULATIONS
The overlapping urisdictionshat came into play in arrangingand
cancellingexportcontractswere alsoa featureof the administrationf
Valparaiso. nitiallythe Santiagocouncil's nterest n its portcenteredon the municipalrevenueobtainedfromthe commercialactivitythere.In 1619thecouncilmen nstalledabalanzascales)andbegancharginga
dutyongoods shipped hroughValparaiso;heyusually eased hescalesto an individualwhose accountsweresubject o theirreview.In 1648 hecabildo rescinded he tax becauseof the
earthquakehe
previousyear,but the audiencia estored t in 1651,designatingt as a sourceof royalrevenue.After 1666theoidores,withroyal permission ecuredthroughcabildopetitions,allowed he councilto farmout the tariffand useit for
specifiedpublicworksprojects.The highcourtoccasionally udited hebalanza ccountsandperformed thersupervisoryunctions.31
Santiagonot only acquiredbalanza ncomethatwouldnormallyhaveaccrued o the crownbutalsoenjoyedperiodicrelieffromroyaltaxeson
30Actas,XXXVI, 368-369, 384-386, 403-411, 420 (1664);XXXVII, 40-43, 59(1665); Encina, III,299-302; IV, 33-35; Barros Arana, V, 48-73, 88, 92, 102-112, 166ff; Korth, 190-192, 214, 218-
219; Mcza Villalobos, 146-154; AmunaiteguiSolar, I, 231-270; II, 318-320; Roa y Ursuia,248-250;
Medina, Diccionario, 139-143; Barbier, 421-422; Eduardo Pino Zapata, Estampas de la vidachilena durante el gobierno de Don Francisco Meneses, Boletin de la academiachilenade historia,
Yr. 25, no. 58 (1958), 69-88. See also the council sessions on membership in Actas, XXXVI-XXXVII (1664-1667).
31Actas,XXV, 344-345 (1619); XXXII, 166, 172, 174 (1642); XXXIII, 302-303 (1648); XXXIV,
83,, 330, 482-483 (1651, 1653-1654);XXXVII, 162-163, 325-327, 335-339, 380 (1667,1669); XLI,
passim 1682);XLIII,passim(1696); XLIV, 224, 236-237, 249, 261-262, 265, 281-282 (1699);Encina,IV, 38-39; Vicufia Mackenna, Valparaiso, II, 371-372; Bayle, 319-320; Manuel Cruchaga,Estudiosobre a organizaci6ncondmicala hacienda
ptiblicade Chile(2 vols.; Santiago: 1878-1880), I, 237-238;
Manuel Josef de Ayala, Diccionario egobierno legislacion e Indias, Vols. IV, VIII of Coleccion e
documentosniditospara la historiade Ibero-Am?rica, d. Rafael Altamira et al (14 vols.; Madrid:
CompaniaIbero-Americana; 1927-1932), VIII, 151-152;Juan de Sol6rzano Pereyra,Politica ndiana
(5 vols.; Madrid:Compania Ibero-Americana, 1930), V, 58-60.
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492 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699
trade and commerce. In the sixteenth century, the crown had dispensedthe kingdom of Chile from two imposts, the alcabala sales tax) and the
almojarifazgo customs duty). This exemption lasted until they werecombined in the derecho e la uni6n de las armas intended for imperialdefense spending. At its inception, Santiago's share of the tax packagewas 12,500 pesos. Pleading the poverty of the city, earthquake damages,and the financial drain of the continuing Araucanian war, the council
successfully postponed its collection in the Central Valley until 1640and
for some twenty years thereafter won temporary exemptions from the
levy.32In addition to defending its region against imperial taxes, the cabildo
acted to prevent the loss of private profits to the warehousers who were
middlemen in the Pacific trade. The requirement that bodegueros postbond for the goods they handled was a device to insure honest transac-
tions, but repeated injunctions merely testify to the problem of enforce-
ment.33
Promissory notes issued for goods received were another persistentsource of cabildo grievance that sometimes evoked audiencia and guber-natorial intervention. The most forthright criticism of the warehouse
operators appeared in the session of March 6, 1691. The alguacilmayor(chief constable) Agustin de Vargas, seconded by the alf6rez DomingoEraso and the regidor Antonio Fernfandez Romo, indicted the
bodegueros on the charge that their promissory notes and the bonding
practice had a history of bankruptcy that led to burdensome investiga-tions. Therefore, he argued, producers should arrangefree pacts directlywith merchants without becoming embroiled with the middlemen in
Valparaiso. In sum, each rancher should remain at liberty to sell his
tallow as he pleased because it was his private property ( cosasuyapropia ).34
These remarksabout private property have a Lockean tone suggestingthe emergence of an individualistic, absolute approach to property
32Actas, XXXI, 396-397, 416-418 (1639);XXXII,passim (1640-1643);XXXIII, 193, 243-244, 281,
287-288, 429, 431 (1647-1649); XXXIV, 481-484, 487-490, 506 (1654); XXXV, 15-17, 181-183
(1655-1656); XXXVIII, 287, 290-292 (1674); XLIV, 68-69 (1697); Meza Villalobos, 76, 85-99;
Encina, III, 529-533; IV, 200; Medina,Biblioteca, I, 323-326;Lynch, II, 94-101, 164;BarrosArana,
IV., 437-442; V, 307-309; Cruchaga, I, 234-235, 239-240, 247-253; Vicufia Mackenna, Valparaiso,III, 343-347, 372-373.
33ExamplesareActas, XXXIV, 29 (1650);XLII, 52, 66 (1685);XLIV, 56, 187, 189, 192, 196-197
(1697-1698).
34Actas,XLII, 388 (1691); see also XXXVII, 127 (1666);XXXVIII, 121, 123 (1671);XLI, 65-66
(1681);XLII, 249-250, 262, 374, 384-385, 398-399 (1687-1688, 1691);Vicufia Mackenna,Valpariso,
III, 155-159, 162.
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DELLAM. FLUSCHE 493
rights. The reference to free agreements, also seems to herald a breakwith the concept of a regulatedeconomy. If Chileans had acquiredsome
of the vocabulary later employed during the Enlightenment, it would,nevertheless, be unwise to attach too much significance to the terminol-
ogy because the argument in which it was used probably flowed morefrom exasperationthan economic theory. Vargas'contempt for dishonest
middlemen was as old as it was new.
Since the Pacific was the major commercial highway to Peru, thecabildo tried to regulate the vessels plying that route. For example, itmade some occasional efforts to restrict sailings for Callao, the Lima
port,
to three month intervals. An
appeal
to the audienciafor ratificationof such a policy in 1638 emphasized that periodic departures would
increaseproducer and merchantprofits and further the common good of
both Chile and Peru. If tallow were shipped at designated times, itwould neither be too plentiful nor would the limenos Lima residents)suffer a shortage.35Whether or not the petition was granted, it reflects
balance as an ideal. Too much tallow in Lima could lower the price tothe Chileans' detriment; too little might work a hardship on the Peru-vians.
In 1698the cabildo turned its attention to excessive freight costs whichaffected both tallow and wheat. An ordinance giving it supervision of
freight charges on chartered vessels also prohibited persons who hiredthose ships from embarking before at least one-third of the potentialcargo was aboard. The cabildo, striving to keep freight costs down andto prevent exporters from racing to the Lima market, continued to
exercise these port authority functions as the tallow century gave wayto the wheat century.' 36
WHEAT REGULATIONS
Although Central Chile had produced cereals for domestic consump-tion since the sixteenth century, its grain had no significant external
5Actas,XXXI, 226-227, 274, 279 (1637-1638); Encina, IV, 33; Alemparte, 142, 145.
36Actas,XLIV, 199-201, 297-298 (1698-1699); compare with XXXVII, 103 (1666). Vicufia
Mackenna,Valparaiso,II, 408,coined the
phrases. Encina, IV, 242-248,discusses
freightcosts and
the volume of trade. More data on shipping is available in Demetrio Ramos Perez, Trigochileno:navierosdel Callaoy hacendadosimefios ntre a crisisagricoladelsigloXVIIy la primeramitaddelXVIII(Madrid:Instituto Fernaindezde Oviedo, 1967), and Sergio Sepulveda, El Trigochileno nel mercadomundial:ensayode geografiabist6rica Santiago: Editoral Universitaria, 1959), 10-21; both utilizematerialfrom Robert S. Smith, Datos estadisticos sobre el comercio de importacionen el Peru enlos afiosde 1698 y 1699, Revista hiknadehistoria geografia,CXIII (Jan./June, 1949), 162-177.
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494 CHILEAN COUNCILMENAND EXPORTPOLICIES, 1600-1699
outletuntil after the Peruvianearthquake f 1687and the subsequentcrop failures there. The price of wheat rose sharplyin Lima, but a
disease hatinfectedChileangraincomplicatedheattempts o capitalizeon the new market,and, at the sametime, guaranteeSantiago'sbread
supply.In the crisisperiodbetween1693and1697,thecabildoresortedto the timehonoredpractice f requisitioning asiccommoditiesnorderto furnishbakerswith flour. To controlprofiteeringhat threatened o
intensify he localscarcity,whichmay perhapshavebeenexaggeratedowithholdexportsuntilacuteshortagesdrovethe Limaprice higher,thecabildo also cooperated,at least outwardly, with the audiencia andGovernorTomaisMarinde Poveda 1692-1700)n issuingandenforcingfullorpartial mbargos n thegrain rade.37
The scarcity n bothkingdoms,while it confirmed he council'slongstanding conviction that prices fluctuatedaccordingto supply and
demand,not only offeredenticingprofits o wheatgrowersandspecu-lators but also presentedopportunities or peculation o the governor,the audiencia,and thecabildo. It was commonknowledge,accordingotwo councilmen, hat cabildocrop inspectionsdesignedto estimate hetotal harvestand measurehisagainstmunicipalneeds were riddledwith
fraud. Thus various measuresadoptedwith the ostensible end of ob-tainingbreadfor the city covered some dishonestadministrative rac-tices.38
If individualofficeholdersmisused authorityfor privategain, thecouncil as an institution was the instrumentof an aristocracy hat
traditionally bstructed ocialjustice.Forexample, hecouncilmen, hevoice of the elite on the labor question since the city's founding,continued o speak o this issue. Withoutspecifically ommenting n the
demands thatwheat cultivation made on the rural labor
force, theyinformed he crown in 1695 that the kingdomneededblack slaves to
supplementthe small numbersof Indian workers.39The expanded
37Actas,XLIII, 78-79, 141-142, 151-152, 155, 177, 231-233, 238-239, 242-243, 246, 254-260, 268,
271-272, 276, 278, 291-292, 298, 301-302, 307, 310-312, 322-323, 339-341, 346-350, 366-367,
369-370, 375-377, 398 (1693-1696); XLIV, 24, 52-53, 58-60 (1697); Ramos Perez, Mineria, 242-
249, and Trigo, especially 5-31, 37-53, 131-134; Sepulveda, 13-21; Barros Arana V, 295-298;
Vicufia Mackenna, Valparaiso,II, 397-409, andSantiago,X, 359-367. Encina, IV, 18-26, 218-223,
andAlemparte, 117-141,
155-166, have data on thissubject
and traditional means to provision
cities; on the latter point see also Pike, 67-86; Moore, 170-172; Bayle, 453-500.
38Seethe sessions in n. 37, especially Actas, XLIII, 246-247, 256, 334 (1695); Barros Arana, V,
296-298; Sepuilveda,20-21; compare with Ramos Perez, Trigo,passim,and Alemparte, 139-141.
39Actas,XLIII, 288-289, 307-308 (1695). On agrarian labor see Ramos Perez, Trigo, 13-14,
131-132. Authorities on colonial Chilean labor, given minimal notice here to retain the focus on
exports, include Rolando Mellafe, Gonzalo Vial Correa, Mario G6ngora, and Alvaro Jara. Korth
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DELLAM. FLUSCHE 495
marketfor an agrarian ommodityneitherofferedrespiteto Chileanlaborersnorwidenedthe aristocracy'self-serving nterpretationf the
commongood.The latter is furtherillustrated n a cabildo abiertoconvokedon
January 5, 1696.The featuredspeaker,helicentiateAlonsoRomerodeSaavedra, egal advisor to the council, presentedan analysisof theeconomicregulatory unctionsproper o a municipalgovernment.The
speechmade three mainpoints: 1)it stressed hat a city council'sbasic
duty was to supply residents with provisionsof good quality;(2) it
justified,or rationalized,he powerof a cabildo o set local breadpricesat levelsthatincludedan
adequateprofitmarginor
producersbut
onlymoderate eimbursementorbakers; 3)it defended he rightof produc-ers to market heircropsfreely aftercomplyingwith counciliar nact-ments to meet domesticneeds. Fromthesepremises,Romerodeducedthat the unusualscarcityin Santiagowarrantedan embargoon newwheat until 12,000fanegasSpanishbushels)were harvested or local
consumption.Once a cosecherohad suppliedhis quotafor the city hecould sell the remainder f his cropfor exportwithoutfurtherrestric-tion;however,wheatbuyershad to awaitpermissionbeforeexportingthe new grain.On the otherhand,all the wheat fromthe pastharvest,which had been embargoedand was spoiling, should be exported norder to enhance the common good of the kingdom, because bad
provisions,nsteadof nourishingife, harmed t. The council,whichhad
alreadygoneon record n favorof dumping he old wheat on the Limamarket,endorsedRomero'sopinion.4oChileanshad formerlysoughtgreaterprofits from livestockcommodities at Peruvianexpense yetoccasionallyextended their viewpoint to encompasstheir neighbors'
well-being.Now there was no pretenseof protecting imefiosfrom arecognizedhealthhazard.
Romero's ddressandotherrecordsconcerningwheatdiscloseharsher
feelings toward merchantsper se, whether they were ChileansorPeruvians, han do the tallow documents.But the minutesironically
demonstrates the cabildo's role in maintaining the encomienda and securing royal permission for
Indian slavery.
40Actas,XLIII, 339-341, 346-350 (1696); compare with Ramos Perez, Trigo, 13, 15-16, 39-40,43-46; Alemparte, 139-141; Encina, IV, 20.
41The accusations against the Marques and Prado are in Actas, XLIII, 76 (1693); the letter is
255-257 (1695); see also ibid., 78-79, 141-142, 151-152, 231-233, 271-272, 366-367, 375-377
(1693-1696);XLIV, 24, 52-53, 58-60 (1697);L, 1. See also Alemparte, 139-141;RamosPerez, Trigo,15-18, 38-41, 43-46, 131-132;Septilveda, 20-21; Meza Villalobos, 103, 143-161;Amunategui Solar,
I, 183-230.
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496 CHILEAN COUNCILMENAND EXPORTPOLICIES, 1600-1699
revealthat class distinctions n some casesremained,as before,morenominal hanreal. Aristocrats ccusedof speculatingo a harmfuldegree
in 1693werethe Marquesde la Picaand PedroPradode Lorca,whosefatherhad earliercontendedagainstthe Marques or a tallowasiento.Thisevidence, akenwith insinuations gainst thermembers f theelite
andassertions hatwheatgrowersshouldhavepriorityover merchantsin obtainingexport licenses, demonstrates hat the aristocracystill
engaged n commerce,sometimes n an unethicalmanner.Particularly
sharpcriticismof grainspeculators,nterwovenwithfearof violenceon
the partof the populace,appearedn a letterfrom two councilmen ent
as port inspectorsto Valparaison 1695 to enforcean embargo.The
alcalde uanAntonioCaldera ndthe depositarioMartinGonzailez e laCruz declaredthat city councils held sufficientpower to avert such
dangersas breadriots andcautioned he cabildo o relievethe domestic
grainshortage.They favoredretaining he embargobecause his would
curb the avariceof profiteers hreatening o destroy the fatherland
with their covetousness.Both men, alliedto the Toro Mazotefamily
throughmarriage,were apparentlyrathernew membersof the oli-
garchy; certain ealousy f theirsocialmobilitymaypartially xplain he
outburst.It is also possiblethat envy generatedantipathywithin thearistocracy ecause hereare undercurrentsf rivalries hatseemto pitranchersagainstwheat raisers,thus addinganotherdimensionto old
familyfeuds.41As CentralChilegeared tself forthe massivegrainproduction f the
Bourbonera, the cabildofaced the attendantsocio-economic hangewitha bodyof administrativexperience.Market onditionsplaguedbyabundancehadreversedwith the new problemof supplyinadequateo
demand,but past experienceurnishedbasic
policieswhich could be
adjusted rmodified.A senseofcontinuityandchangepervadeshefinal
years of the century. In economicthoughtand practice,the cabildo
continuedto speakof the commongood achievedwithin a regulated
economybut maintainedts biasin defending he financialnterestsof a
small,thoughnotentirelyclosed,oligarchy.42An extremeconcentrationn the localsceneis a striking haracteristic
of the council minutes devoted to exports. If imperialcommercial
42Sepuilveda,0-21;RamosPNrez, 8,39-48,MezaVillalobos,103,Barbier, 21-422. nregardo
policymotivation, he evidenceexaminedgenerally upportsAlempartebut perhaps ndicatesa
strongerprofitmotive and less concernfor social justicein the seventeenthcenturythan he
discoverednhisbroadertudy.His characterizationf thecouncilmen sbothfeudalandbourgeoishassomemerit,but it alsocreates onfusionbecause f themanyconnotationshesetermscarry.
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DELLAM. FLUSCHE 497
legislation eceived cantattention ither n the breachor in observance,the crown's permissiveness n regard to Chilean trade,43and the
economicties bindingChile to Peru were factorsin maintaininghepolitical tructure f theempire.Whenthecouncilmen eltaggrievedbyroyaltax levies or Limapricecontrols,they appealed o the Hapsburgmonarchs orredress hatthe crownoftengranted.Although hecabildoresentedviceregal asas,only a few viceroys mposedpriceceilings,and
they did not intervenewhen wheat scarcitygave Santiagoa financial
advantage over the limeiios.The councilmen showed little awareness of the competition in the
Lima market that Chilean livestock commodities had from other areas in
the viceroyalty. Neither do the records, even those pertaining to wheat,reveal that Lima merchants encountered any special animosity because
of their place of residence. The council minutes thus do not demonstrate
that anti-Peruvian feeling had hardened into overt nationalism. Ob-
versely, the emergent patriotism expressed in the cabildo's deep attach-
ment to city and kingdom, born of an aristocratic desire to guarantee
privilege,44 manifested itself in economic policies. Within their region,the Santiago councilmen, acting in conjunction with the governor and
the audiencia, wielded power over financial and economic conditions.This had repercussions on the wider Spanish world, especially the Lima
market.
DELLA M. FLUSCHE
EasternMichiganUniversity
Ypsilanti,Michigan
43Encina,IV, 199-201.
44MezaVillalobos, 100-142.
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498 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORTPOLICIES, 1600-1699
TABLE 1
TALLOW EXPORT PRODUCTION LEVELS AND PRICESa
Yearb Quintalesc Pesosper quintal
1635 9,000
1640 6V2
1641 (May) 3?2
1641 (July) 2 2d
1642 18,000e 62f
1647 5
1664 20,000 6
1676 13,700 6?
1684 4V
aSource:Actas,passim.bThe cabildo set some production levels for the following year's slaughter.cA quintal would produce 350 candles. In 1654 candles weighing 1 libra (pound) each sold in
Santiago @ 6 for 1real (the eighth part of a peso).dThe price was quoted as 19 to 20 reales, approximately 2V2pesos.eTotal production for domestic consumption and export.fPrice index ranged downward from this figure.