United Nations Human Rights
Council
Chinese Concentration
Camps for Muslim-
minority Uyghur
People Director: José Javier Iglesias Murrieta
Moderator: Andrea Navarro Millán
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was founded by the
General Assembly to replace the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights. It was
established as an intergovernmental body responsible for
‘’strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights
violations and make recommendations of them’’ (United
Nations Human Rights Council, n.d.). It is currently conformed
by a 47-member body elected by the General Assembly, which
meets at the UN Office at Geneva, Switzerland (United Nations
Human Rights Council, n.d.).
Today, the Human Rights Council faces one of the most
challenging, controversial, but virtually inscrutable human rights violations in the modern
history of the United Nations: the existence of Chinese concentration camps aimed at its
Muslim-minority Uyghur population.
“Re Education” camps in Xinjiang
In 2017, news on Chinese authorities forcibly detaining Uyghur and Turkish Muslim
minorities raised concern over human rights violations. Satellite photos across the region of
Xinjiang later revealed the appearance of facilities built for
the purpose of “re-educating” detainees. Schools and other
official buildings, as well as recently built settlements were
used to hold over a million Muslims.
The government justified them by calling them
“counter extremism training centres” and “education and
transformation training centres.” However, testimonies
said they were forced to yell patriotic slogans, sing revolutionary songs, and study Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s teachings. Some even described them as prisons with physical and
mental abuse, and compulsory lessons on Communist propaganda.
China’s director at Human Rights Watch, Sophie Richardson, claimed the government
“has provided no credible reasons for holding these people and should free them immediately”.
She believes imprisonment is “not because they have committed any crimes, but because they
deem them politically unreliable” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).
Figure I. United Nations Human Rights Council (Source: Tamirat,
2014).
Figure II. Uyghur reeducation camps in Xinjiang (Source: Zhang, 2018).
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Nationalities policy
Since the seventeenth century, China has struggled in accommodating Islam within its
rule given the threat it posed to Chinese syncretism. With the Chinese acquisition of Muslim
territories including Xinjiang and Gansu during the Qing dynasty, these frustrations further
intensified.
Beginning in 1949, the ethnic Chinese Communist Party
implemented the Stalinist policy of creating nationalities (Johnson,
2018). The policy was meant to unify all ethnic groups, build
relationships of interdependence, and collaborate in “the creation
and development of the Chinese civilization’’ (‘’Information Office
of,’’ 1999). However, the policy was not precisely tolerant.
Minorities were forced to “limit” their beliefs and traditions to get
in line with the Communist brotherhood. In case of a conflict, the
state used military force and torture to remind them their
appropriate bounds (Leung, 2010).
During the reform era between 1970 and 2010, development
was meant to eradicate all differences, by prioritizing economy over
culture. Today, the state has taken an open policy of Han ethnocentrism. It has also taken
measurements to reduce Islam’s (and Christianity’s) visibility by tearing down temples, while
promoting “indigenous” religions including Buddhism and Taoism.
The state continues to justify the actions taken against Muslim Uyghurs “with the war
on terrorism”, when most of them “are aimed to Islam itself.” For instance, fasting during
Ramadan was banned in universities, public transportation was systematically denied to
women with veils and men with beards, and the reintroduction of re-education camps with the
objective of encouraging secular life (Johnson, 2018).
Xinjiang
Uyghurs and Hans
Having a Muslim majority was a concern for the Chinese government since the
autonomy of the region remained under Uyghur control. For this reason, in 1949 the
government encouraged Hans (the largest ethnic group in China) to populate Xinjiang to
Figure III. “All nationalities of our nation have already
united into a great family” (Source: Wei, 1955)
reduce the demographic and strengthen their position. From
this successful tactic, Xinjiang went from a populous 95%
Muslim majority to a balanced 55% (Ishfaq, 2018).
China’s official narrative regarding Xinjiang is that
Uyghurs have no claim to the area because they migrated
from other Central Asian territories. This has created
tension between Hans and Uyghurs, and inspired protests
and attacks for the autonomy of the region (Ishfaq, 2018).
China used this to further intervene in the region and increase security.
Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism
Protests quickly escalated into violence, and Hans accused the government of failing to
protect them. In response, China launched a security
campaign in the region to maintain “stability and eliminate
security dangers” (Branigan, 2010). Several campaigns
followed over the years, with many Uyghurs being arrested
and others given the death penalty. In 2014, the government
launched another campaign “against violent terrorism”,
partially inspired by the attack on the Twin Towers. The
campaign targeted electronics and religious materials from
the Uyghurs and was conducted “without discipline”. Surveillance and the use of force were
increased. Many were killed under the threat of a “premeditated attack by terrorists and
religious extremists” (Mudie, 2014).
China’s response
Chinese officials said the security measures and religious limitations on Uyghurs were
aimed at “trying to prevent violent, anti-state episodes” which they attributed to “separatism,
terrorism, and religious extremism” (Cumming-Bruce, 2018). China repeatedly denied the
existence of re-education camps, and the accusations on human rights violations. A counselor
at the Chinese mission to the UN, Yao Shaojun, claimed that Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities enjoyed “the best protection of their human rights in history” (Lynch, 2018).
CURRENT SITUATION
Figure IV. Population in Xinjiang by ethnicity (Source: Orenstein, 2013)
Figure V. Ethnic Uighur women grab a riot policeman as they protest in
Urumqi in July (Source: The Guardian, 2010)
Hints on infrastructure
In 2018, satellite photographs on Google Maps showed massive, highly secure
compounds outside the small town of Dabancheng. Academics and other international human
rights organizations continued monitoring them closely, despite Beijing’s abrupt efforts to
suppress all available online information about the camps. Further investigations later revealed
that these security camps had existed for about a decade. Over the years, their number
throughout Xinjiang had decreased, while their size had inversely increased. As of July 2018,
at least one million Uyghurs were calculated to be held in these ‘’political indoctrination’’
camps (Griffiths, Westcott, 2018).
Both the Chinese Communist Party and its ambassadors at the United Nations
immediately rejected the allegations and the existence of
camps whatsoever. But, according to a report by the
Jamestown Foundation in 2018, spending on security-
related construction in Xinjiang rose by nearly 20 billion
yuan (US $2.9 billion), or 213%, between 2016 and 2017.
Other local budget documents analyzed by the report,
proved the expenditure on domestic security surged by
92% in the one year period, with a 239% increase in
spending for ‘’detention center management’’ and 118% increase in spending for the ‘’justice
system’’ (Westcott, 2018).
Ethnic persecution
‘’De-extremification’’ efforts
Towards the end of 2018, the Chinese government finally admitted the existence of
what it called ‘’re-education centres’’ in Xinjiang. Some Chinese officials described the sites
as vocational training centres aimed at ‘’de-extremification’’ to restore public, nationwide
stability. Numerous human rights organizations, including the Uyghur Human Rights Project
(UHRP), have called out the violations, demanding explanations. The UHRP claimed that the
cultural cleansing of Uyghurs, the predominant group among those targeted by the Chinese
government, was an ‘’attempt to find a solution to the Xinjiang problem,’’ which may require
Figure VI. Satellite image of a Dabancheng internment camp, April
2018 (Source: Sudworth, 2018).
‘’mass murder’’, thus accumulating a series of instances that resemble the ‘’precursors of
cultural and possibly physical genocide’’ (Lyons, 2018).
State-of-the-art surveillance regime
The Chinese government is widely known for developing a state-of-the-art surveillance
regime. According to Human Rights Watch, these advancements, are currently used to sustain
the state’s political purposes. By investigating Uyghurs and other Muslims who might be
deemed ‘’untrustworthy’’, these systems aid the internment camps’ purposes. These systems
include deploying flocks of drones disguised as birds to surveil citizens, using surveillance
cameras with facial recognition technology, Wi-Fi sniffers, and police checkpoints to monitor
the country’s Uyghur population (Samuel, 2018).
Out of all, the most alarming method is the Integrated
Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). According to HRW, the
app is used to flag individuals deemed suspicious, whether
or not they have committed any crime, based on criteria
provided by the system. It identifies the individual, and
automatically displays his or her personal data, including
their blood type, height, religious practices, political
affiliations, and at least two-dozen more categories that
broadly define the individuals (Human Rights Watch, n.d.).
This encouraged the targeting, and imprisonment of
minorities, and specific groups.
International media
In Xinjiang, and China as a whole, the activities of local and foreign journalists are
closely monitored by the state. There are only a few independent sources of news from the
region, and for Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities residing there, jamming of radio
frequencies and internet censorship limit access to the reports. Since a 10-month blockade on
the internet in 2009, the province has been subjected to more intense censorship and
surveillance than other parts of China (Griffiths, Westcott, 2018).
The Chinese state broadcaster CCTV has been fundamental in the knowledge the
international audience has of the Chinese internment camps. It has aired footage inside what
they describe as ‘’vocational training camps’’, showing smiling Uyghurs learning Chinese and
Figure VII. Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). (Source: Ma, 2019)
other manual skills. It is because of the Chinese government, they say, that they were
‘’discovered’’ and ‘’saved’’ (Westcott, Xiong, 2018).
However, the international media has said
Uyghurs are ‘’ill-treated’’ there, tortured, and
‘’brainwashed.’’ Uyghurs are ‘’forced to yell patriotic
slogans, sing revolutionary songs, and study Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s teachings’’. Pictures have also
shown that Uyghur Muslims have been forced to
welcome Communist Party officials to their homes to
‘’maintain social stability and achieve lasting security’’ (Westcott, Xiong, 2018). It is the
ultimate demonstration of political indoctrination, charismatic authoritarianism, and
ethnocentrism in the modern era.
International response
In the United States, Vice President
Mike Pence has emphasized arguable political
flaws by the Chinese state, and a deliberate
attempt to repress its Uyghur population. He
said Chinese citizens are ‘’theoretically’’ free to
practice any religion but have been subjected to
mass surveillance to bring religious worship
under stricter state control. He also declared
that, by 2020, China’s government ‘’aim[s] to
implement an Orwellian system premised on controlling virtually every facet of human life’’,
but promised that, as much as China wants to eliminate the United States from the international
political stage and ‘’prevent [them] from coming to the aid of [their] allies,’’ they will ‘’fail’’
(The White House, 2018).
The United Kingdom has claimed that their own diplomats have visited Xinjiang and
have ‘’concur[red] that those reports [of internment camps] are broadly accurate’’. The
European Parliament and the European Union’s External Action Service have repeatedly
demanded the release of jailed and disappeared human rights lawyers, dissenters, and activists,
and have expressed concerns about the situation in Xinjiang (Westcott, 2018).
In contrast, more than a dozen members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) signed a statement supporting China’s policies against its Muslim-minority Uyghur
Figure VIII. Uyghur journalist Gulchehra Hoja holds a picture of her brother who has been
missing in Xinjiang for more than a year. (Source: Watson, Westcott, 2018).
Figure IX. A Chinese flag flies above a closed mosque in the Xinjiang city of Kashgar. The wall poster reads
‘’Stability is a blessing, instability is a calamity.’’ (Source: Sudworth, 2018).
populations. The delegations, which include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, have been widely criticized for their dichotomous stance as, on one hand, they have
been vocal in condemning abuses against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, while on the other,
they have praised Beijing’s efforts to suppress their equally Muslim community.
UN ACTIONS
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reviewed China’s periodic
report “on measures taken to implement the provisions of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” in August of 2018 (OHCHR, 2018).
China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Yu Kianhua, highlighted that
the changes to the Constitution in 2018 reflected “more fully the ethnic policy focused on ethnic
equality and solidarity.” The Principal Assistant Secretary added that a committee had been
setup “to coordinate and review the support for ethnic minorities” with a $500 million budget.
The Director of the Legal Affairs Bureau ended by assuring China “embraced the values of
tolerance and respect for cultural diversity” claiming that “every ethnic group shared the same
dignity and was entitled to its own cultural life, to practice its own religion and to use its own
language (OHCHR, 2018)”.
Committee Experts congratulated China for creating extraordinary prosperity, but
remained concerned over the growing inequality, particularly for the ethnic minorities. They
reminded China’s lack for “an anti-racial discrimination law and a national human rights
institution in line with the Paris Principle.” The biggest concern was on discrimination in
context of laws fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism. An expert said China had turned
Uyghurs communities into “something that resembled a massive internment camp shrouded in
secrecy, a ‘no rights zone’’’ (OHCHR, 2018).
U.N. Officials
UNHCR chief Michelle Bachelet asked China permission to access the region of
Xinjiang to verify allegations. She said the UNHCR intends “to carry out an independent
assessment of the continuing reports pointing to wide patterns of enforced disappearances and
arbitrary detentions (Nebehay, 2019).” China previously said it would welcome officials as
long as they did not intervene in “domestic matters.” Despite this, China said there is yet “to
define a time which is convenient to both sides” (Withnal, 2019).
However, the Under-Secretary for the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office,
Vladimir Ivanovich Voronkov, was allowed to visit Xinjiang in June of 2019. His spokesman
assured the office “worked to ensure that measures used to fight terror respected human rights.”
However, the UN Director for Human Rights Watch said the visit “risks confirming China’s
false narrative that this is a counterterrorism issue, not a question of massive human rights
abuses’’ (Withnal, 2019).
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
1. Cease immediately the “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism” in Xinjiang,
including the “fanghuiju” teams, “Becoming Family” and other compulsory programs
aimed at surveilling and controlling Turkic Muslims (Human Rights Watch, 2018).
a. Terminate the operation of the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), as
well as Fengcai, both functioning as apps aimed at violating the privacy of
individuals both as Chinese residents and visitors and targeting purported
suspicious subjects based on criteria established by the Chinese government
(Human Rights Watch, 2018).
b. Call for the Chinese state to disclose the current location and status of Uyghur
students, refugees and asylum seekers who returned to China over the past five
years under government demands (Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 2018).
c. Eliminate travel restrictions that disproportionately affect members of ethnic
minorities and return passports to Xinjiang residents (Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2018).
d. Cease the pressure on host governments to forcibly return Turkic Muslim
nationals abroad unless pursuant to an extradition request for legitimate law
enforcement purposes (Human Rights Watch, 2018).
2. Urge the Chinese Communist Party to establish independent national human rights
institutions that adapt to the principles stipulated in the Paris Principles, adopted by the
General Assembly in 1993 (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
2018). These institutions should be granted sufficient structural independence and
financial and human resources to fulfill the Principles’ goals of promoting human rights
‘’through education, outreach, the media, publications, training and capacity building’’
as well as by providing the Government with advice and assistance (‘’Paris Principles,’’
n.d.).
3. Encourage members of the Human Rights Council, and the General Assembly as a
multilateral body, to adopt similar measures to those established in the United States’
‘’Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2018’’, aimed at ‘’calling for an end to the
arbitrary detention, torture, and harassment of [Uyghur] communities inside and outside
of China’’ (U.S. Senate, 2018).
4. Review China’s ‘’National Human Rights Action Plans’’ for the 2016-2020 period,
which establish specific clauses that demand the government’s compliance with both
domestic and international human rights policies that have yet been unfulfilled and
defied by recent violations, including the detention of Muslim minorities in ‘’re-
education centres’’ (Office of the State Council, 2016).
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