Consciousness & the Computational Interface between Egocentric & AllocentricRepresentations Pete MandikAssociate ProfessorCoordinator, Cognitive Science LaboratoryChairman, Department of PhilosophyWilliam Paterson University, New Jersey USA
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Egocentric and Allocentric Neural Representations
1. What are mental representations?2. What are conscious mental states?
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What is the egocentric allocentric distinction?
ALLOCENTRICEGOCENTRIC
Self-specifying contents
Non-self-specifying contents
Online (sensorimotor) Offline (memory and planning)
Analog, isomorphism Conceptual, categorical
Info. encapsulation Inferential promiscuity
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Mental reps in folk-psychGeorge is opening the fridge because:George desires that he drinks some beerGeorge sees that the fridge is in front of himGeorge remembers that he put some beer in the fridge
George’s psychological states cause his behaviorGeorge’s psychological states have representational content
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2-D food finding
Sensors
Brain
Steering Muscles
2-Sensor Chemophile:
Steering muscles orient creature toward stimulus
Perception of stimulus being to the right fully determined by differential sensor activity
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1-D food finding
Sensor
Brain
Steering Muscles
1- Sensor “Lost” Creature
left/right stimulus location underdetermined by sensor activity
only proximity perceived
Adding memory can help
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Memory in Chemotaxis
Experimental Set Up 3 orientation networks: Feed-forward,
Recurrent, and Blind five runs each, for 240 million steps mutations allowed only for neural
weights fitness defined as lifetime distance Initial weights: Evolved CPGs with un-
evolved (zero weights) orienting networks
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What the representations are
States of neural activation embedded in structures isomorphic to structures of environmental states
Sensory statesMemory statesMotor-command states
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Against causal theories
Structure preserving representation schemes are more learnable/evolvable than non-structure preserving schemes
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Egocentric representations
The representations involved in minimally cognitive behaviors a solely egocentric
Egocentric representations are alone insufficient for consciousness
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Three Problems of Consciousness
What is state consciousness?(What makes a mental state conscious and not
unconscious?)
What is transitive consciousness?(What are we conscious of?)
What is phenomenal character?(What are qualia? What is “what it is like”?)
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The Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Consciousness
Consciousness consists in the interface between allocentric and egocentric coding schemes for perceptible features
Conscious states are hybrids of allocentric and egocentric representations and phenomenal character is determined by their contents and vehicular properties
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What is the progression of levels?Egocentric-to-Allocentric
transformations
Low-level (LGN and V1)Egocentric reps
Intermediate-level (IT and PP)Egocentric/Allocentric Hybrid reps
Highlevel (Frontal Cortex and Hippocampus)Allocentric reps
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Consciousness is not purely egocentric Patient DF’s visual form agnosia (Milner and
Goodale 1995)Bilateral ventral stream damage to area LO
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Consciousness is not purely egocentricPatient DF’s visual form agnosiaPerceptual consciousness of form and orientation
destroyed, but sensorimotor skill intact
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Consciousness is not purely egocentric
Visual consciousness is conceptually informed
Theory ladeness of perception
Dog Dog sniffing ground Dog’s butt facing
you Did I mention the
dog?
What is this a picture of?Hints:
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Consciousness is not purely allocentric
Thoughts alone have no phenomenal character:
“Pi is an irrational number”
“Natural selection depends on the variable inheritance of fitness”
“Democracy and capitalism are incompatible”
Apparent phenomenality of thought due to associated imagery (Jackendoff 1987)
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Consciousness is not purely allocentric
. . .this . . . this, . . . or this . . .
. . .but not this.
THREE HOUSES
Visual consciousness is never viewpoint independent. The contents are like. . .
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Pure Allocentric
Pure Egocentric
Retinocentric
Body-centered
Limited viewpoint invariance
Amodal Category knowledge
The Allocentric-Egocentric Interface
The reciprocally influencing representations jointly comprise a conscious state
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The need for recurrence:
TMS: feedback from area MT+/V5 to V1 necessary for visual awareness
Backward masking invokes feedforward activation but suppresses recurrence
Feedforward activation recorded in anesthetized animals
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State Consciousness
Conscious states are composed of mutually influencing egocentric and allocentric representations
Contra HO theories, metarepresentational states are unnecessary
Contra FO theories, involvement of higher-level states is necessary
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Transitive Consciousness
What we are conscious of are the contents of the allocentric-egocentric hybrid reps
Contra HO theories, contents need not include other mental states
Contra FO theories, contents need not exclude other mental states
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Phenomenal Character
What it is like to be in a conscious state is fully determined by the representational content of that state.