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Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISIONJAIME ALFEREZ,
Petitioner,
- versus-
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and
PINGPING CO,Responde
nts.
G.R. No.
182301Present:
CARPIO,J.,Chairpers
on,
NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA,JJ.
Promulgated:
January31, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1]dated December 13, 2007 andResolution[2]dated March 4, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR No. 00300.
The facts of the case, as culled from
the records, are as follows:
Petitioner Jaime Alferez purchased
construction materials from Cebu ABCSales Commercial. As payment for the
goods, he issued three (3) checks for the
total amount of P830,998.40. However, the
checks were dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account. Petitioner
was thus charged with three (3) counts of
violation ofBatas
PambansaBilang(B.P.Blg.) 22 before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cebu City. The cases were
raffled to Branch 3 and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 40985-R to 40987-
R.[3] During the trial, the prosecution
presented its lone witness, privatecomplainant Pingping Co.[4]Thereafter,
the prosecution formally offered the
following documentary evidence:
1. BPI Check No.492089 dated 29 April1994 in the sum of P78,889.95;
2. BPI Check No.492010 dated 22 June1994 in the sumof P30,745.90;
3. BPI Check No.492011 dated 22 June1994 in the sumof P721,362.55;
4. The demand letterdated 7 July 1994addressed to petitioner;
5. The registry receipt ofthe Post Office;6. The face of the
Registry ReturnReceipt;
7. The dorsal side of theRegistry ReturnReceipt;
8. The Returned CheckTicket dated 23 June1994; and
9. The reason for thedishonor.[5]
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Instead of presenting evidence,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence[6]
on August 8, 2003, orapproximately ten (10) months after the
prosecution rested its case. Petitioner
averred that the prosecution failed to show
that he received the notice of dishonor or
demand letter.
On March 4, 2005, the MTCC
issued a resolution
[7]
denying petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence, and rendering
judgment finding petitioner guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, theCourt finds the accusedguilty beyond reasonabledoubt of the crime of
issuing bouncing checks asdefined and penalized underSection 1 of BatasPambansa Blg. 22 andhereby sentences theaccused the following:
1. To pay a fine ofPhp830,998.40and in case ofinsolvency tosuffer subsidiaryimprisonment;
2. To pay privatecomplainant thetotal face valueof the checks inthe amount ofPhp830,998.40
plus 1% interest
per monthbeginning from
the filing of thecomplaint.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
21, Cebu City. The RTC rendered
Judgment[9]affirming in toto the MTCC
decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied in an
Order[10]dated December 16, 2005. In the
same Order, the RTC modified the MTCCresolution by sentencing petitioner to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six
(6) months for each count of violation of
B.P Blg. 22, instead of fine as originally
imposed.
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the
matter to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In the
assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. It sustained
petitioners conviction as the elements of
the crime had been sufficiently established.
As to the service on petitioner of the notice
of dishonor, the appellate court pointed out
that petitioner did not testify, and that he
did not object to the prosecutions
evidence aimed at proving the fact of
receipt of the notice of dishonor.
Consequently, the registry receipt and the
return card adequately show the fact of
receipt. As to petitioners contention that
he was denied his right to present evidence
after the denial of his demurrer to
evidence, the CA held that there was nosuch denial since it was merely the
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consequence of the filing of demurrer
without leave of court. Finally, as to the
imposition of the penalty of imprisonment
instead of fine, the CA found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
since it was shown that petitioner acted in
bad faith.[11]
On March 4, 2008, the CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition anchored on the
following issues:
Whether the RegistryReceipt and RegistryReturn Receipt alonewithout presenting the
person who mailed and/orserved the demand letter issufficient notice of dishonoras required by BP 22.
Whether the filing of theDemurrer of (sic) Evidencewithout leave and denied bythe trial court is a waiver ofthe right of the petitioner(the accused before the trialcourt) to present hisevidence in support and torebut the evidence of therespondent particularly withrespect to the civil aspect of
the case.On the alternative (if the
petitioner is guilty),whether the accused shouldonly be mete[d] the penaltyof fine as imposed by thetrial court (MTCC).[12]
The petition is partly meritorious.
After a careful evaluation of the
records of the case, we believe and so hold
that the totality of the evidence presented
does not support petitioners conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 defines
the offense, as follows:[13]
Section 1. Checkswithout sufficient funds.Any person who makes ordraws and issues any check
to apply on account or forvalue, knowing at the timeof issue that he does nothave sufficient funds in orcredit with the drawee bankfor the payment of suchcheck in full upon its
presentment, which checkis subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank forinsufficiency of funds or
credit or would have beendishonored for the samereason had not the drawer,without any valid reason,ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punishedby imprisonment of not lessthan thirty days but notmore than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less thanbut not more than double
the amount of the checkwhich fine shall in no caseexceed Two HundredThousand Pesos, or bothsuch fine and imprisonmentat the discretion of thecourt.
The same penaltyshall be imposed upon any
person who, havingsufficient funds in or creditwith the drawee bank when
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he makes or draws andissues a check, shall fail tokeep sufficient funds or tomaintain a credit to coverthe full amount of the check
if presented within a periodof ninety (90) days from thedate appearing thereon, forwhich reason it isdishonored by the drawee
bank.
Where the check isdrawn by a corporation,company or entity, the
person or persons who
actually signed the check inbehalf of such drawer shallbe liable under this Act.
Accordingly, this Court has held
that the elements of the crime are, as
follows: (1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply on account
or for value; (2) the knowledge of themaker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor for the same reason had not thedrawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.[14]
In this case, the first and third
elements of the crime have been
adequately established. The prosecution,
however, failed to prove the second
element. Because this element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates
a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds under the following
circumstances:[15]
Sec. 2.Evidence ofknowledge of insufficient
funds. The making,drawing, and issuance of acheck payment of which isrefused by the drawee
because of insufficientfunds in or credit with such
bank, when presented
within ninety days from thedate of the check, shallbeprima facieevidence ofknowledge of suchinsufficiency of funds orcredit unless such maker ordrawer pays the holderthereof the amount duethereon, or makesarrangements for paymentin full by the drawee of
such check within five (5)banking days afterreceiving notice that suchcheck has not been paid bythe drawee.
In Suarez v. People,[16]which is on
all fours with the instant case, two
Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
were filed against petitioner therein. After
the prosecution presented its evidence,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
without leave of court on the ground that
no notice of dishonor had been sent to and
received by him. When the case reached
this Court, we acquitted petitioner on
reasonable doubt as there was insufficient
proof that he received notice ofdishonor. We explained that:
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The presumption ariseswhen it is proved that theissuer had received thisnotice, and that within five
banking days from itsreceipt, he failed to pay theamount of the check or tomake arrangements for its
payment. The full paymentof the amount appearing inthe check within five
banking days from notice ofdishonor is a completedefense. Accordingly,
procedural due process
requires that a notice ofdishonor be sent to andreceived by the petitioner toafford the opportunity toavert prosecution underB.P. Blg. 22.
x x x. [I]t is notenough for the prosecutionto prove that a notice ofdishonor was sent to the
petitioner. It is alsoincumbent upon the
prosecution to show that
the drawer of the checkreceived the said notice
because the fact of serviceprovided for in the law isreckoned from receipt ofsuch notice of dishonor bythe drawee of the check.
A review of therecords shows that the
prosecution did not provethat the petitioner receivedthe notice of dishonor.Registry return cards must
be authenticated to serve asproof of receipt of letterssent through registeredmail.[17]
In this case, the prosecution merely
presented a copy of the demand letter,
together with the registry receipt and the
return card, allegedly sent to petitioner.
However, there was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on
the registry return card.[18]Receipts for
registered letters and return receipts do not
by themselves prove receipt; they must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of
receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice
of dishonor.[19]To be sure, the presentation
of the registry card with anunauthenticated signature, does not meet
the required proof beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner received such notice.
It is not enough for the prosecution to
prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to
the drawee of the check. The prosecution
must also prove actual receipt of said
notice, because the fact of service providedfor in the law is reckoned from receipt of
such notice of dishonor by the drawee of
the check.[20]The burden of proving notice
rests upon the party asserting its
existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In
criminal cases, however, the quantum of
proof required is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there
should be clear proof of
notice.[21] Moreover, for notice by mail, it
must appear that the same was served on
the addressee or a duly authorized agent of
the addressee. From the registry receipt
alone, it is possible that petitioner or his
authorized agent did receive the demand
letter.[22] Possibilities, however, cannot
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Jaime Alferez is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. Blg.
22. However, the civil liability imposed on
petitioner is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice
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FIRST
DIVISION
FRANCISCO M. BAX,Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES and
ILYON INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 149858
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA,JJ.
Promulgated:
September 5, 2007
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1]are the Decision[2]of
the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2000
and its Resolution dated September 5, 2001 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23356 affirming in toto the
Decision dated December 14, 1998 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Pasig
City declaring petitioner guilty of nine (9)
counts of violations ofBatas Pambansa Bilang
22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
On August 16, 1994, Francisco M. Bax,
petitioner, was charged with violations of B.P.
22 (10 counts) before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 71, Pasig
City,[3]docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
14354 to 14363.
The Information in Criminal Case No.
14354 reads:
That on or about the
13th day of March 1994 in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and
issue to Ilyon Industrial
Corporation to apply on
account or for value the check
described below:
Check
No. : AGRO94438Drawn
against : United
Coconut Planters Bank
In the
amount : P47,250.00
Dated/Postdated :
March 13, 1994
Payablet
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o
:
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r
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l
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o
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.
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e
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a
n
said accused well knowing
that at the time of issue he did
not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank
for the payment in full of the
face amount of such check
upon its presentment, which
check could have been
dishonored for insufficiency
of funds had not the accused,
without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to Stop
Payment, and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor, the
accused failed to pay said
payee the face amount of the
said check or made
arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO
LAW.
Except as to the numbers and dates of
the other nine checks issued by petitioner, and
the reason for their dishonor (drawn against
insufficient funds), the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14355-14363 and the
above Information are similarly worded.
The facts are:
Sometime in October 1993, petitioner,for and in behalf of Vachman Industries, Inc.
(VACHMAN), purchased 80 metric tons of
chemical compounds, known as caustic soda
flakes, from Ilyon Industrial Corporation
(ILYON), respondent.
On December 6, 1993, ILYON
delivered 27 metric tons of caustic soda flakes
to petitioner. Again in January 1994, ILYON
delivered another 27 metric tons of caustic
soda flakes to petitioner. In payment therefor,
petitioner issued ten (10) checks amounting
to P464,750.00 in favor of ILYON.
Upon presentment of the checks to the
United Coconut Planters Bank for payment,
they were dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite ILYONs demand,
petitioner failed to make good the bounced
checks for the reason that he has been
encountering financial problems. As a result,
ILYON caused the filing of ten (10)
Informations against petitioner.
After hearing or on March 27, 1998,
the MeTC rendered a Decision finding
petitioner guilty as charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, in
view of all the foregoing, the
Court hereby renders
judgment finding the accused,
Francisco Bax, GUILTY ofthe crime of Violations of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
(10) counts, and accordingly
sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6)
months in each case and to
pay the offended party the
sum of P464,750.00, the
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amount of all the ten (10)
checks and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the RTC, Branch
70, Pasig City, presided by Judge Pablito
Rojas, rendered a Joint Decision
dated December 14, 1998 affirming with
modification the MeTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the
Decision of the Court a quo is
hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) accused is
ACQUITTED in Criminal
case No. 14354;
(b) the sentence
imposed on accused in
Criminal Case Nos. 14355 to
14363 of six (6) months
imprisonment for each is
hereby increased to ONE (1)
YEAR in each case; and
(c) the total amount
of indemnity to be paid by the
accused to the complainant-
corporation is PHP
417,500.00.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal,[4]the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23356 rendered its Decision
on December 19, 2000 affirming in totothe
RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution
datedSeptember 5, 2001.
Hence the instant petition.
The basic issue is whether the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Solicitor General contends that
the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming
the RTC Joint Decision sustaining that of the
MeTC because all the elements of violation of
B.P. 22 are present in each case. Petitioner,
on the other hand, maintains that since he did
not receive a written notice of dishonor, not all
the elements of the offense have been
established by the prosecution. Accordingly,
he should be acquitted.
We agree with petitioner.
It is settled that factual findings of the
trial court are accorded great weight, even
finality on appeal, except when it has failed to
appreciate certain facts and circumstanceswhich, if taken into account, would materially
affect the result of the case. This exception is
present here.[5]
Section 1 of B.P. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks
without sufficient funds. - Any
person who makes or draws
and issues any check to applyon account or for value,
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knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than
thirty days but not more than
one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than
double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no
case exceed Two hundred
thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
The same penalty
shall be imposed upon any
person who having sufficientfunds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes
or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) daysfrom the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee
bank.
Where the check is
drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person
or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of
such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.
Thus, the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements of the offense:
(1) the making, drawing,
and issuance of any
check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue
there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the
payment of such check
in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent
dishonor of the checkby the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not
the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.[6]
We find that the prosecution failed toprove the second element.
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punished thereunder not only
that the accused issued a
check that is dishonored, but
that likewise the accused has
actually been notified in
writing of the fact of
dishonor. The consistent rule
is that penal statutes have to
be construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor
of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
Since petitioner did not receive a
written notice of dishonor of the checks,
obviously, there is no way of determining
when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2
of B.P. 22 would start and end. Thus, the
prima facie evidence of petitioners knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the
time he issued the checks did not arise.[11]
We thus find that the prosecution
failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner is guilty of violations of
B.P. 22.
However, petitioner should pay the
face value of the nine (9) dishonored checksplus legal interest. It is well settled that the
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where such acquittal is based on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, since only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases.[12]
We however modify the award of
petitioners civil liability to ILYON
from P417,500.00
to P425,250.00. In Criminal Case No.
14354, petitioner was acquitted by the RTC
since the reason for the dishonor was his stop
payment order to the drawee bank to enable
VACHMAN to reconcile its accounts with
ILYON. Hence, only the face value of the
remaining nine (9) checks should be included
in the computation of petitioners civil
liability. Each check has a face value
of P47,250.00 which, if we multiply by nine,
yields P425,250.00.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
Francisco M. Bax is acquitted in Criminal
Cases Nos. 14355 to 14363 for violations of
B.P. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered, however, to pay the offended party,
ILYON, the face value of the nine (9) checks
in the total amount of P425,250.00 with 12%
interestper annum from the filing of the
Informations until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149261 : December 15, 2010]
AZUCENA B. CORPUZ, PETITIONER,
VS. ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO,
RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is a rule too firmly established that the"determination of probable cause for the filingof an Information in court is an executivefunction, one that properly pertains at the firstinstance to the public prosecutor and,ultimately, to the Secretary ofJustice."[1] "judicial review of the resolution ofthe Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction considering that the fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated tothe executive branch in the determination ofprobable cause during a preliminaryinvestigation."[2]
Challenged in the present petition for reviewon certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt is the Decision[3] dated July 27, 2001 ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. SP No.56434 denying petitioner's petitionforcertiorari.
The controversy has its root in an affidavit-complaint[4] filed with the City Prosecutor'sOffice of Makati City by Assistant SolicitorGeneral Roman G. del Rosario accusing hereinpetitioner Assistant Solicitor General AzucenaB. Corpuz for Libel. In said complaint,respondent claimed that petitioner's June 13,1997 memorandum was maliciously issued
without any good intention but to discredit andcause dishonor to his good name as a
government employee. He insisted that theimport of the memorandum affected hiscredibility and the performance of his officialfunctions as Assistant Solicitor General amongothers.
After the preliminary investigation,Investigating Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata (Prosecutor Ata) issued on November 21,1997, a Resolution making the followingfindings and recommendation:
We find the words "x x x, there is no suchthing as 'palabra de honor as far as ASG delRosario is concerned,' x x x contained in thememorandum dated June 13, 1997 issued byrespondent, defamatory as it imputes a kind of
detect on complainant's part which tends todiscredit his integrity as an Assistant SolicitorGeneral and the other functions he [holds].Malice is thus presumed from the defamatoryimputation. Moreover, the respondent'sdisposition of having addressed theMemorandum not only to the Solicitor Generalbut to all Assistants [sic] Solicitors] Generalreveals the absence of good intention on herpart in making the imputation. There was,therefore, undue publication of the libelousMemorandum as in fact, the same was
received and read by the officers concerned.
In line, the evidence has sufficientlyestablished a probable cause to indictrespondent with the crime of libel, andaccordingly, [the] undersigned respectfullyrecommends that the correspondinginformation be filed in Court[5]
What transpired then were the followingevents and proceedings. On December 8,1997, the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati
City approved the Resolution of ProsecutorAta. Accordingly, an Information for libel wasfiled against petitionerwith the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakati City.
Petitioner's appeal from the prosecutor'sresolution was not given due course by NCRRegional Prosecutor/Chief State ProsecutorJovencito R. Zuo on March 10, 1998. [6] Hermotion for reconsideration was likewisedenied on September 8, 1998.[7] Petitionerappealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ)assailing the resolution of the City Prosecutor's
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Office of Makati City. On August 17, 1999,the DOJ Secretaiy considered the appeal as asecond motion for reconsideration andresolved to deny the appeal with finality.[8]
Petitioner then elevated the matter via apetition for certiorari before the CAcontending that the public prosecutors gravelyabused their discretion in finding a prima faciecase of libel against her and exceeded theirjurisdiction when her appeal from theresolution of the City Prosecutor's Office ofMakati City was not given due course.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 27, 2001, the CA issued its herein
assailed Decision[9]
denying the petition. Itfound that the petitioner failed to clearly showexceptional circumstances to justify her resortto the extraordinary remedy of the writofcertiorari. The appellate court likewisefound petitioner's assertions that thememorandum is a privileged communicationwhich was issued without malice are mattersof defense which should be properly discussedduring trial. The CA disposed the matter inthis wise:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse ofdiscretion, amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part of public respondents,the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The unsuccessful quest by petitioner to reversethe resolutions of the City Prosecutor's Officeof Makati City, the Chief State Prosecutor, theDOJ Secretary and the CA did not hamper herstruggle. Petitioner is now before us via the
instant recourse ascribing to the CA thefollowing assignment of errors:
1. (In) concluding that the findings of theMakati City Prosecutor in the preliminaryinvestigation are essentially factual in nature,and that in assailing such findings petitioner israising questions of fact;
2. (In) holding that petitioner's arguments thatsubject memorandum is a privilegedcommunication and that there is absence ofmalice in the issuance thereof being matters ofdefense should be resolved by the trial court,
and
3. (In) ruling that the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari is not available since other remediesare obtainable with the trial court.[11]
Per directive[12] of the Court, respondent filedhis Comment[13] to the Petition on December12, 2001. On January 30, 2002, the Courtrequired petitioner to file her reply,[14 ]whichshe complied with on April 30,2002.[15] Pursuant to our Resolution datedJune 3, 2002[16] the parties submitted theirrespective memoranda.
Significantly, in her Reply,[17] petitioner madean absolute turnaround and manifested that she
is not assailing in the instant petition thefollowing findings of the Prosecutor: First, thatmalice is presumed from the defamatoryimputation. Second, that the subjectmemorandum was addressed not only to theSolicitor General but also to all the AssistantSolicitors General who received and readthem. Third, that the words "there is no suchthing as 'palabra de honor' as far as ASG delRosario is concerned" imputes a kind of defecton respondent tending to discredit his integrityas an Assistant Solicitor General and the other
functions he holds.
Petitioner expressly concedes that the mainissue in the present petition is whether the CAcorrectly ruled that no grave abuse ofdiscretion was committed by the Assistant CityProsecutor in concluding that her findingshaveprima facie established the elements oflibel despite their not being in accordance withlaw and jurisprudence on the matter.
Petitioner avers that there are no findings of
facts to support the conclusion that theelements of libel exist. She also points out thatthe findings of the prosecutor are not sufficientto constitute probable cause.
Our Ruling
The contentions of petitioner are devoid ofmerit.
We have examined the records of the case andhave found no such error much less abuse ofdiscretion committed by the prosecutor and theC A justifying a reversal of their resolutions
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since their unanimous findings of probablecause for libel against petitioner are based onlaw, jurisprudence and evidence on records.
"Probable cause, for purposes of filing acriminal information, has been defined as suchfacts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has beencommitted and that respondent is probablyguilty thereof."[18] A finding of probable causeneeds only to rest on evidence showing thatmore likely than not a crime has beencommitted and was committed by the suspect.It "need not be based on clear and convincingevidence of guilt, neither on evidenceestablishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt anddefinitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt."[19]
A prosecutoralone determines the sufficiency of evidencethat will establish probable cause justifying thefiling of criminal information againstthe respondent since the determination ofexistence of a probable cause is the function ofthe prosecutor. Judicial review is allowed onlywhere respondent has clearly established thatthe prosecutor committed grave abuse ofdiscretion.[20]
"Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is
an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power dueto passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or awhimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise ofpower that amounts to an evasion or refusal toperform a positive duty enjoined by law or toact at all in contemplation of law." Petitionermiserably failed to establish the existence ofany of these exceptional circumstances towarrant further calibration of the parties'evidence presented during the preliminaryinvestigation.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, we findthat in arriving at their unanimous conclusionthat probable cause for libel exists, theprosecutor and the Secretary of Justice hadclearly determined and carefully deliberatedon the factual and legal antecedents of thecase. The resolution of the prosecutor assustained by the Secretary of Justice and theCA shows that it squarely addressed and tookinto consideration all the arguments andevidence submitted. The evidence before theprosecutor served as basis in arriving at herfindings of fact.
As defined in Article 353 of the Revised PenalCode, the crime of libel has the followingelements:
1. imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real orimaginary or any act, omission, condition,status or circumstance;
2. the imputation must be malicious;
3. it must be given publicity; and
4. the victim must be identifiable.
As extant from the resolution of theprosecutor, the presence of these elements wasduly established during the preliminary
investigation stage clearly showingprimafacie a well-founded belief that a crime of libelhas been committed and that petitionerprobably committed it. It must be stressed thatan accusation is not synonymous with guilt.That is why a trial has to follow, precisely todetermine the guilt or innocence of theaccused.
Petitioner further contends that thememorandum is covered by the protectivemantle of privileged communication under the
first exception enumerated under Article354, viz:
1. A private communication made by anyperson to another in the performance of anylegal, moral or social duty.
Petitioner's argument is essentially evidentiaryin nature and a matter of defense that must bepresented and heard during the trial of thecriminal case. Whether the subjectmemorandum is a privileged communication is
a question which requires an examination ofthe parties' evidence. Being a matter ofdefense, the tenability of her challenge needsto be tested in the crucible of a full-blown trialwhere she can prove her Innocence if herdefense be indeed true than at the preliminaryinvestigation level. It must be stressed that thisCourt cannot assess the merit of the said claimas it is not a trier of facts.
All told, the undisputed facts of the casenegate any showing of grave abuse ofdiscretion or manifest error on the part of thepublic officers concerned considering their
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finding of probable cause to indict petitioner issupported by the evidence on record. "[C]ourtsshould give credence, in the absence of a clearshowing of arbitrariness, to the findings anddetermination of probable cause byprosecutors in a preliminary investigation."[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition ishereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27,2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 56434 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 139292. December 5, 2000]
JOSEPHINEDOMAGSANG, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by the RegionalTrial Court of Makati, Branch 63, of havingviolatedBatas Pambansa ("B.P.")Blg. 22(Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on eighteen (18)counts, and sentenced to "suffer the penalty ofOne (1) Year imprisonment for each count(eighteen [18] counts)." Petitioner waslikewise ordered to pay the privatecomplainant the amount ofP573,800.00.[1]The judgment, when appealedto the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No.18497), was affirmed in toto by the appellate
court.It would appear that petitioner
approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, anAssistant Vice President of METROBANK, toask for financial assistance. Garciaaccommodated petitioner and gave the latter aloan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange,petitioner issued and delivered to thecomplainant 18 postdated checks for therepayment of the loan. When the checks were,in time, deposited, the instruments were all
dishonored by the drawee bank for thisreason: Account closed. The complainantdemanded payment allegedly by calling uppetitioner at her office. Failing to receive anypayment for the value of the dishonoredchecks, the complainant referred the matter tohis lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner aletter of demand but that the latter ignored thedemand.
On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged against petitioner before theRegional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. TheInformation read:
"That on or about the 24th day of June,1991, in the Municipality of Makati, MetroManila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously makeout, draw and issue to complainant IgnacioH. Garcia, Jr., to apply on account or forvalue the dated check/described below:
"CheckNo. : 149900
DrawnAgainst : TradersRoyal Bank
In the Amountof : P50,000.00
Dated/Postdated : June24, 1991
Payableto : Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr.
"said accused well knowing that at thetime of issue thereof, she did not havesufficient funds in or credit with thedrawee bank for the payment in full ofthe face amount of such check uponits presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety(90) days from the date thereof wassubsequently dishonored by thedrawee bank for the reason
`ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despitereceipt of notice of such dishonor, theaccused failed to pay said payee theface amount of said check or to makearrangement for full payment thereofwithin five (5) banking days afterreceiving notice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal
Cases No. 92-4466 to No. 92-4482, inclusive,similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 92-
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4465 except as to the dates, the number, andthe amounts of the checks hereunder itemized-
"CheckNumber Dated/Postdated
AmountTRBNo. 161181 July18, 1991 P6,000.00TRBNo. 149906 July24, 1991 3,000.00
No. 182074 July30, 1991 29,700.00
No. 182084 August30, 1991 9,300.00
No.182078 September 15,1991 6,000.00
No.161183 September 18,1991 6,000.00
No.161177 September 18,1991 100,000.00
No.182085 September 30,1991 9,000.00
No.182079 October 15,1991 6,000.00
No.182086 October 30,1991 10,500.00
No.182080 November 15,1991 6,000.00
No.182087 November 30,
1991 11,400.00No.182081 December 15,1991 6,000.00
No.182082 December 15,1991 100,000.00
No.182088 December 30,1991 12,000.00
No.
182089 December 30,1991 100,000.00
No.182090 December 30,1991 100,000.00"[3]
were also filed against petitioner. The caseswere later consolidated and jointly tried
following the "not guilty" plea of petitionerwhen arraigned on 02 November 1992.
On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed ademurrer to the evidence, with leave of court,premised on the absence of a demand letterand that the checks were not issued as paymentbut as evidence of indebtedness of petitioneror as collaterals of the loans obtained bypetitioner. Opposed by the prosecution, thedemurrer was denied by the trial court. In thehearing of 17 February 1994, petitioner,
through counsel, waived her right to presentevidence in her defense. Relying solely thenon the evidence submitted by the prosecution,the lower court rendered judgment convictingpetitioner. The decision, as heretofore stated,was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in itsdecision of 15 February 1999. Reconsiderationwas also denied in the resolution, dated 09July 1999, of the appellate court.
Hence, the instant petition wherepetitioner raised the following issues for
resolution by the Court -
"1. Whether or not an alleged verbaldemand to pay sufficient to convict herein
petitioner for the crime of violation of B.P.Blg. 22;
"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court ofAppeals committed reversible error whenit affirmed the judgment of convictionrendered by the trial court, on the ground
that a written notice of dishonor is notnecessary in a prosecution for violation ofB.P. Blg. 22, contrary to the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court inthe case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274SCRA 572; (and)
"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court ofAppeals erred in considering the allegedwritten demand letter, despite failure of the
prosecution to formally offer the same."[4]
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The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22"Bouncing Checks Law," provide:
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficientfunds. Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on accountor for value,knowing at the time of issuethat he does not have sufficient funds in orcredit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon itspresentment, which check is subsequentlydishonored by the drawee bank forinsufficiency of funds or credit or wouldhave been dishonored for the same reasonhad not the drawer, without any validreason, ordered the bank to stop payment,
shall be punished by imprisonment of notless than thirty days but not more than one(1) year or by fine of not less than but notmore than double the amount of the checkwhich fine shall in no case exceed TwoHundred Thousand pesos, or both suchfine and imprisonment at the discretion ofthe court.
"The same penalty shall be imposed uponany person who having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when hemakes or draws and issues a check, shallfail to keep sufficient funds or to maintaina credit to cover the full amount of thecheck if presented within a period ofninety (90) days from the date appearingthereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank.
"Where the check is drawn by acorporation, company or entity, the personor persons who actually signed the checkin behalf of such drawer shall be liableunder this Act.
"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge ofinsufficient funds.The making, drawingand issuance of a check payment of whichis refused by the drawee because ofinsufficient funds in or credit with such
bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shallbeprima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unlesssuch maker or drawer pays the
holderthereof the amount due thereon, ormakes arrangements for payment in full bythe drawee of such checkwithin five (5)
banking days after receiving notice thatsuch check has not been paidby thedrawee.
"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules ofevidence.It shall be the duty of thedrawee of any check, when refusing to paythe same to the holder thereof upon
presentment, to cause to be written, printedor stamped in plain language thereon, orattached thereto, the reason for drawee's
dishonor or refusal to pay thesame: Provided, That where there are nosufficient funds in or credit with suchdrawee bank, such fact shall always beexplicitly stated in the notice of dishonoror refusal. In all prosecutions under thisAct, the introduction in evidence of anyunpaid and dishonored check, having thedrawee's refusal to pay stamped or writtenthereon, or attached thereto, with thereason therefor as aforesaid, shall beprima
facie evidence of the making or issuanceof said check, and the due presentment tothe drawee for payment and the dishonorthereof, and that the same was properlydishonored for the reason written, stampedor attached by the drawee on suchdishonored check.
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order tostop payment, the drawee shall state in the
notice that there were no sufficient fundsin or credit with such bank for the paymentin full of such check, if such be thefact."[5](Underscoring supplied.)
The law enumerates the elements of thecrime to be (1) the making, drawing andissuance of any check to apply for account orfor value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue hedoes not have sufficient funds in or credit withthe drawee bank for the payment of the checkin full upon its presentment; and (3) thesubsequent dishonor of the check by the
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drawee bank for insufficiency of funds orcredit or dishonor for the same reason had notthe drawer, without any valid cause, orderedthe bank to stop payment.[6]
There is deemed to be aprima
facie evidence of knowledge on the part of themaker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency offunds in or credit with the drawee bank of thecheck issued if the dishonored check ispresented within 90 days from the date of thecheck and the maker or drawer fails to paythereon or to make arrangement with thedrawee bank for that purpose. The statute hascreated theprima facie presumption evidentlybecause "knowledge" which involves a state ofmind would be difficult to establish.[7]Thepresumption does not hold, however, when the
maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays theholder thereof the amount due thereon ormakes arrangement for payment in full by thedrawee bank of such checkwithin 5 bankingdays after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee bank.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals,[8]this Courtexplained:
x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearlyprovides that this presumption arises notfrom the mere fact of drawing, making andissuing a bum check; there must also be ashowing that, within five bankingdaysfrom receipt of the notice of dishonor,such maker or drawer failed to pay theholder of the check the amount duethereon or to make arrangement for its
payment in full by the drawee of suchcheck.
It has been observed that the State, underthis statute, actually offers the violator `acompromise by allowing him to performsome act which operates to preempt thecriminal action, and if he opts to perform itthe action is abated. This was also
compared `to certain laws allowing illegalpossessors of firearms a certain period oftime to surrender the illegally possessedfirearms to the Government, withoutincurring any criminal liability. In this
light, the full payment of the amountappearing in the check within five banking
days from notice of dishonor is a`complete defense. The absence of a
notice of dishonor necessarily deprives anaccused an opportunity to preclude acriminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins thata notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demandand the basic postulates of fairnessrequirethat the notice of dishonor beactually sent to and received by her toafford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[9]
In the assailed decision, the Court ofAppeals predicated the conviction of petitioner
on the supposed fact that petitioner wasinformed of the dishonor of the checks throughverbal notice when the complainant had calledher up by telephone informing her of thedishonor of the checks and demandingpayment therefor. The appellate court said:
"The maker's knowledge of theinsufficiency of his funds is legally
presumed from the dishonor of his check(People vs. Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The
law does not require a written notice of thedishonor of such check.
"In the instant case, appellant hadknowledge that her checks weredishonored by the bank when complainantGarcia made several oral demands uponher to pay the value of the checks in theamount of P573,800.00. Despite saiddemands, appellant failed and refused to
pay the same. Moreover, complaining
witness further testified that his lawyermade a written demand upon appellant butthe latter ignored said demand (tsn., May27, 1993, pp. 13-14). In this connection,appellant waived her right to presentevidence or rebut complainant's testimonythat he made oral demands upon appellantto make good the dishonored checks andhis lawyer wrote her a demand letter.
"Likewise, appellant did not object to the
admission of the complainant's testimonywith regard to the written demand by
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7/28/2019 Crimpro Cases.docx
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No.182082 December 15,1991 100,000.00
No.182088 December 30,
1991 12,000.00No.
182089 December 30,1991 100,000.00
No.182090 December 30,1991 100,000.00"[17]
or the sum of P563,800, has yet to be madegood by petitioner. This amount, with 12%legal interestper annum from the filing of theinformation until the finality of this decision,must be forthwith settled.
WHEREFORE, the decision of theCourt of Appeals is MODIFIED. PetitionerJosephine Domagsang is acquitted of the crimecharged on reasonable doubt. She is ordered,however, to pay to the offended party the facevalue of the checks in the total amount ofP563,800.00 with 12% legal interest,perannum, from the filing of the informationsuntil the finality of this decision, the sum ofwhich, inclusive of the interest, shall be
subject thereafter to 12%,perannum, interestuntil the due amount is paid. Costs againstpetitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[11] SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence.Itshall be the duty of the drawee of any check, whenrefusing to pay the same to the holder thereof uponpresentment, to cause to be written, printed or stamped inplain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason fordrawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided,That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit withsuch drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitlystated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In allprosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidenceof any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee'srefusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attachedthereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shallbeprima facie evidence of the making or issuance of saidcheck, and the due presentment to the drawee forpayment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same wasproperly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, thedrawee shall state in the notice that there were nosufficient funds in or credit with such bank for thepayment in full of such check, if such be the fact.
SECOND DIVISION
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HUN HYUNG PARK,
Petitioner,
- versus -
EUNG WON CHOI,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 165496
Present:
QUISUMBING,J., Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
February 12, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assailsthe Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutionsdated May 20, 2004[1]and September 28,
2004[2]
in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissinghis petition and denying reconsiderationthereof, respectively.
In an Information[3]dated August 31,2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, wascharged for violationofBatas Pambansa Blg.22, otherwise knownas the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuingon June 28, 1999 Philippine National Bank
Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28,1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which wasdishonored for having been drawn againstinsufficient funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, withthe assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. Following the pre-trialconference, the prosecution presented itsevidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case,respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to File Demurrer to Evidence to which heattached his Demurrer, asserting that theprosecution failed to prove that he received thenotice of dishonor, hence, the presumption ofthe element of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds did not arise.[4]
By Order[5]of February 27, 2003, theMetropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati,Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissedthe case. The prosecutions Motion forReconsideration was denied.[6]
Petitioner appealed the civilaspect[7]of the case to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, contending that thedismissal of the criminal case should notinclude its civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003,Branch 60 of the RTC held that while theevidence presented was insufficient to proverespondents criminal liability, it did not
altogether extinguish his civil liability. Itaccordingly granted the appeal of petitioner
and ordered respondent to pay him the amountof P1,875,000 with legal interest.[8]
Upon respondents motion for
reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside itsdecision and ordered the remand of the case tothe MeTC for further proceedings, so that thedefendant [-respondent herein] may adduceevidence on the civil aspect of thecase.[9] Petitioners motion forreconsideration of the remand of the casehaving been denied, he elevated the case to theCA which, by the assailed resolutions,dismissed his petition for the followingreasons:
1. The verification and
certification of non-forum
shopping attached to the
petition does not fully
comply with Section 4, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules
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of Court, because it does not
give the assurance that the
allegations of the petition are
true and correct based on
authentic records.
2. The petition is not
accompanied by copies of
certain pleadings and other
material portions of the
record, (i.e., motion for leave
to file demurrer to evidence,
demurrer to evidence and the
opposition thereto, and the
Municipal [sic] Trial Courts
Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 294690) as would
support the allegations of the
petition (Sec. 2, Rule
42, ibid.).
3. The Decision
dated September 11, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court
attached to the petition is an
uncertified and illegible
mere machine copy of the
original (Sec. 2, Rule
42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed
to implead the People of
the Philippines as party-
respondent in the petition.[10]
In his present petition, petitionerassails the above-stated reasons of theappellate court in dismissing his petition.
The manner of verification forpleadings which are required to be verified,such as a petition for review before the CA ofan appellate judgment of the RTC,[11]isprescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rulesof Court:
Sec.
4. Verification. Except when
otherwise specifically required bylaw or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by
an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that theallegations therein are true and
correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to
be verified which contains a
verification based on
information and belief, or upon
knowledge, information and
belief, or lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.[12] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Petitionerargues that the word or isa disjunctive term signifying disassociationand independence, hence, he chose to affirm inhis petition he filed before the court a quo thatits contents are true and correct of my own
personal knowledge,[13]and not on the basis
of authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondentcounters that the word or may be interpreted
in a conjunctive sense and construed to meanas and, or vice versa, when the context of
the law so warrants.
A reading of the above-quoted Section4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be
verified under either of the two given modes orunder both. The veracity of the allegations ina pleading may be affirmed based on eitherones own personal knowledge or on authentic
records, or both, as warranted. The use of thepreposition or connotes that either source
qualifies as a sufficient basis for verificationand, needless to state, the concurrence of bothsources is more than sufficient.[14] Bearingboth a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, thisparallel legal signification avoids aconstruction that will exclude the combination
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of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of anyone of the alternatives standing alone.[15]
Contrary to petitioners position, the
range of permutation is not left to the pleaders
liking, but is dependent on thesurroundingnature of the allegations which may warrantthat a verification be based either purely onpersonal knowledge, or entirely on authenticrecords, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent,authentic records as a basis for verification
bear significance in petitions wherein thegreater portions of the allegations are based on
the records of the proceedings in the court oforigin and/or the court a quo, and not solely onthe personal knowledge of the petitioner. Toillustrate, petitioner himself could not haveaffirmed, based on his personal knowledge, thetruthfulness of the statement in hispetition[16]before the CA that at the pre-trialconference respondent admitted havingreceived the letter of demand, because he(petitioner) was not present during theconference.[17] Hence, petitioner needed torely on the records to confirm its veracity.
Verification is not an empty ritual or ameaningless formality. Its import must neverbe sacrificed in the name of mere expedienceor sheer caprice. For what is at stake is thematter of verity attested by the sanctity of anoath[18]to secure an assurance that theallegations in the pleading have been made ingood faith, or are true and correct and not
merely speculative.[19]
This Court has strictly been enforcingthe requirement of verification andcertification and enunciating that obedience tothe requirements of procedural rules is neededif fair results are to beexpected therefrom. Utter disregard of therules cannot just be rationalized by harking onthe policy of liberal construction.[20] While the
requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, itdoes not make it less a rule. A relaxed
application of the rule can only be justified bythe attending circumstances of the case.[21]
To sustain petitioners explanation that
the basis of verification is a matter of simplepreference would trivialize the rationale and
diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It wouldplay on predilection and pay no heed inproviding enough assurance of the correctnessof the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA indismissing the petition that the petition wasnot accompanied by copies of certainpleadings and other material portions of therecord as would support the allegations of the
petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to FileDemurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidenceand the Opposition thereto, andthe MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissingthe case) petitioner contends that thesedocuments are immaterial to his appeal.
Contrary to petitioners contention,
however, the materiality of those documents isvery apparent since the civil aspect of the case,
from which he is appealing, was likewisedismissed by the trial court on account of thesame Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that hesubsequently submitted to the CA copies ofthe enumerated documents, save fortheMeTC February 27, 2003 Order, asattachments to his Motion forReconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that thepetition must be accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate original or true copies of thejudgments or final orders of both lowercourts, certified correct by the clerk ofcourt.[22]
A perusal of the petition filed beforethe CA shows that the only duplicate originalor certified true copies attached as annexes
thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Ordergranting respondents Motion for
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Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTCOrder denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The copy of the September11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitionerprayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true
copy and is not even legible. Petitioner laterrecompensed though by appending to hisMotion for Reconsideration a duplicateoriginal copy.
While petitioner averred before theCA in his Motion for Reconsideration that theFebruary 27, 2003 MeTC Order was alreadyattached to his petition as Annex G, Annex
G bares a replicate copy of a different order,
however. It was to this Court that petitionerbelatedly submitted an uncertified true copy ofthe said MeTC Order as an annex to his Replyto respondents Comment.
This Court in fact observes that thecopy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May5, 2003, which petitioner attached to hispetition before the CA is similarly uncertifiedas true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC wereadverse to him even with respect to the civilaspect of the case, petitioner was mandated tosubmit them in the required form.[23]
In fine, petitioner fell short in hiscompliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42,the mandatory tenor of which isdiscerniblethereunder and is wellsettled.[24] He has not, however, advanced anystrong compelling reasons to warrant arelaxation of the Rules, hence, his petitionbefore the CA was correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools
designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the
rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows arelaxation in the application of
the rules, this we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion
for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules appliesonly in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy
administration of
justice.[25](Emphasis supplied)
As to the third reason for the appellatecourts dismissal of his petition failureto implead the People of the Philippines as aparty in the petition indeed, as petitionercontends, the same is of no moment, he havingappealed only the civil aspect of thecase. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminalaction, this Court ruled:
Unless the offended
party waives the civil action or
reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal
action, there are two actions
involved in a criminal case. The
first is the criminal action for the
punishment of the offender. The
parties are the People of
the Philippines as the plaintiffand the accused. In a criminal
action, the private complainant is
merely a witness for the State on
the criminal aspect of the
action. The second is the civil
action arising from
the delict. The private
complainant is the plaintiff and
the accused is the
defendant. There is a merger of
the trial of the two cases to avoidmultiplicity of
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suits.[26] (Underscoring
supplied)
It bears recalling that
the MeTC acquitted respondent.[27]
As a rule,a judgment of acquittal is immediately finaland executoryand the prosecution cannotappeal the acquittal because of theconstitutional prohibition against doublejeopardy.
Either the offended party or theaccused may, however, appeal the civil aspectof the judgment despite the acquittal of the
accused. The public prosecutor has generallyno interest in appealing the civil aspect of adecision acquitting the accused. The acquittalends his work. The case is terminated as far ashe is concerned. The real parties in interest
in the civil aspect of a decision are the
offended party and the accused.[28]
Technicality aside, the petition isdevoid of merit.
When a demurrer to evidence isfiled without leave of court, the whole case issubmitted for judgment on the basis of theevidence for the prosecution as the accused isdeemed to have waived the right to presentevidence.[29] At that juncture, the court iscalled upon to decide the case including itscivil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civilliability by a separate civil action has beenwaived or reserved.[30]
If the filing of a separate civil actionhas not been reserved or priorly instituted orthe enforcement of civil liability is not waived,the trial court should, in case of conviction,state the civil liability or damages caused bythe wrongful act or omission to be recoveredfrom the accused by the offended party, ifthere is any.[31]
For, in case of acquittal, the accusedmay still be adjudged civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carrywith it the extinction of the civil action where(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubtas only preponderance of evidence is required;(b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liabilityof the accused does not arise from or is notbased upon the crime of which the accusedwas acquitted.[32]
The civil action based on delict may,however, be deemed extinguished if there is afinding on the final judgment in the criminalaction that the act or omission from which thecivil liability may arise did not exist.[33]
In case of a demurrer to evidencefiled with leave of court, the accused mayadduce countervailing evidence if the courtdenies the demurrer.[34] Such denial bears nodistinction as to the two aspects of the casebecause there is a disparity of evidentiaryvalue between the quanta of evidence in suchaspects of the case. In other words, a courtmay not deny the demurrer as to the criminal
aspect and at the same time grant the demurreras to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so farpresented is not insufficient to prove the crimebeyond reasonable doubt, then the sameevidence is likewise not insufficient toestablish civil liability by mere preponderanceof evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence sofar presented is insufficient as proof beyondreasonable doubt, it does not follow that thesame evidence is insufficient to establish apreponderance of evidence. For if the courtgrants the demurrer, proceedings on the civilaspect of the case generally proceeds. Theonly recognized instance when an acquittal ondemurrer carries with it the dismissal of thecivil aspect is when there is a finding that theact or omission from which the civil liabilitymay arise did not exist. Absent suchdetermination, trial as to the civil aspect of the
case must perforce continue. Thus this Court,in Salazar v. People,[35]held:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/165496.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/165