GUIDELINES NO. AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 (Rev. 1)
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
CRITERIA FOR PLANNING , PREPAREDNESSAND
RESPONSE FOR NUCLEAROR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
AERB SAFETY GUIDELINES
GU
IDELIN
ES NO
. AER
B/N
RF/SG
/EP-5 (Rev. 1)
ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
AERB SAFETY GUIDELINES NO. AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 (Rev. 1)
CRITERIA FOR PLANNING , PREPAREDNESSAND
RESPONSE FOR NUCLEAROR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
Atomic Energy Regulatory BoardMumbai-400 094
India
October 2014
Price:
Order for this Guidlines should be addressed to:
Chief Administrative OfficerAtomic Energy Regulatory Board
Niyamak BhavanAnushaktinagar
Mumbai-400 094India
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FOREWORD
Activities concerning establishment and utilisation of nuclear facilities and use ofradioactive sources are to be carried out in India in accordance with the provisions ofthe Atomic Energy Act 1962. In pursuance of the objective of ensuring safety ofmembers of the public and occupational workers, as well as protection of environment,the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has been entrusted with the responsibilityof laying down safety standards and enforcing rules and regulations for such activities.The Board, therefore, has undertaken a programme of developing safety codes, safetystandards and related guides and manuals for the purpose. While some of thesedocuments cover aspects such as siting, design, construction, operation, qualityassurance and decommissioning of nuclear and radiation facilities, other documentscover regulatory aspects of these facilities.
Safety codes and safety standards are formulated on the basis of nationally andinternationally accepted safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specificequipment, structures, systems and components of nuclear and radiation facilities.Safety codes establish the safety objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilledto provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety guides elaborate various requirementsand furnish approaches for their implementation. Safety manuals deal with specifictopics and contain detailed scientific and technical information on the subject. Thesedocuments are prepared by experts in the relevant fields and are extensively reviewedby advisory committees of the Board before they are published. The documents arerevised when necessary, in the light of experience and feedback from users as well asnew developments in the field.
This ‘safety guidelines’ document provides criteria for establishing an emergencypreparedness and response plan for nuclear and radiation facilities to deal with nuclearand radiological emergency and supersedes the safety guide AERB/SG /HS-1(1992).This document provides reference levels, generic criteria, emergency action levels,and operational intervention levels including numerical values for these criteria forprotective actions and other response actions in the event of a nuclear or radiologicalemergency. This document also provides guidance dose value for protection ofemergency workers and the public in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.The criteria provided in this document calls for protective actions and other responseactions in precautionary action zone (PAZ), urgent protective action planning zone(UPZ), extended planning distance (EPD) and ingestion and commodities planningdistance (ICPD) which replace existing space-time domain.
Consistent with the accepted practice, ‘shall’ and ‘should’ are used in the document todistinguish between a firm requirement and a desirable option respectively. Appendicesare integral part of the document, whereas annexures, bibliography and referencesare included to provide information that might be helpful to the user. Approaches forimplementation different to those set out in the guidelines may be acceptable, if they
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provide comparable assurance against undue risk to the health and safety of theoccupational workers and the general public, and protection of the environment.
For aspects not covered in this ‘safety guidelines’, applicable national and internationalstandards, codes and guides, acceptable to AERB should be followed. Non-radiologicalaspects such as industrial safety and environmental protection are not explicitlyconsidered in this ‘guidelines’. Industrial safety is to be ensured through compliancewith the applicable provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Atomic Energy(Factories) Rules, 1996.
This ‘safety guidelines’ has been prepared by specialists in the field drawn from theAtomic Energy Regulatory Board, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Nuclear PowerCorporation of India and other consultants. It has been reviewed by the AdvisoryCommittee on Nuclear Safety.
AERB wishes to thank all individuals and organisations who have prepared andreviewed the draft and helped in its finalisation. The list of persons, who haveparticipated in this task, along with their affiliations, is included for information.
(S. S. Bajaj) Chairman, AERB
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DEFINITIONS
Absorbed Dose
The fundamental dosimetric quantity D is defined as:
D = dE/dm
where, ‘dE’ is the mean energy imparted by ionising radiation to the matter in a volumeelement and ‘dm’ is the mass of matter in the volume element. The energy can beaveraged over any defined volume, the average dose being equal to the total energyimparted in the volume divided by the mass in the volume. The SI unit of absorbeddose is joule/kg (J.kg-1), termed the gray (Gy).
Activity
The quantity ‘A’ for an amount of radionuclide in a given energy state at a given timeis defined as:
A = dN/dt
where ‘dN’ is the expectation value of the number of spontaneous nucleartransformations from the given energy state in a time interval ‘dt’. The SI unit ofactivity is the reciprocal of second (s-1), termed the Becquerel (Bq).
Anticipated Operational Occurrences
An operational process deviating from normal operation, which is expected to occurduring the operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of appropriate designprovisions, does not cause any significant damage to items important to safety, norlead to accident conditions.
Assessment
Systematic evaluation of the arrangements, processes, activities and related results fortheir adequacy and effectiveness in comparison with set criteria.
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)
A national authority designated by the Government of India having the legal authorityfor issuing regulatory consent for various activities related to the nuclear and radiationfacility and to perform safety and regulatory functions, including their enforcementfor the protection of site personnel, the public and the environment against undueradiation hazards.
Authorisation
A type of regulatory consent issued by the regulatory body for all sources, practicesand uses involving radioactive materials a nd radiation generating equipment (seealso “Consent”).
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Averted Dose
The dose prevented or avoided by the application of a protective measure or set ofprotective measures.
Clearance Levels
A set of values established by the regulatory body and expressed in terms of activityconcentrations and/or total activity, at or below which sources of radiation may bereleased from regulatory control.
Committed Effective Dose, E (τ)
The time integral of the whole body effective dose rate following an intake of aradionuclide. The quantity ‘E (τ)’ is defined as
E (τ) = ΣwT HT (τ)
where ‘HT (τ)’ is the committed equivalent dose to tissue ‘T’ over the integration time‘τ’. When ‘τ’ is not specified, it will be taken to be 50 years for adults and age 70 yearsfor intake by children.
Committed Equivalent Dose, H (τττττ)
The time integral of the equivalent dose rate in an organ or tissue following an intakeof a radionuclide. The quantity ‘H (τ)’ is defined as
t0+ τHT (τ ) = + ∫ T (t) dt
t0
where ‘t0’ is the time of intake, ‘ T (τ)’ is the equivalent dose rate at time ‘t’ in an organor tissue ‘T’ and ‘τ’ is the time elapsed after an intake of radioactive substances. When‘τ’ is not specified it will be taken to be 50 years for adults and age 70 years for intakeby children.
Competent Authority
Any official or authority appointed, approved or recognised by the Government ofIndia for the purpose of the Rules promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
Consent
A written permission issued to the ‘consentee’ by the regulatory body to performspecified activities related to nuclear and radiation facilities. The types of consentsare ‘licence’, ‘authorisation’, ‘registration’ and ‘approval’, and will apply accordingto the category of the facility, the particular activity and radiation source involved.
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Consentee
A person to whom consent is granted by the competent authority under the relevantRules.
Contamination
The presence of radioactive substances in or on a material/the human body or otherplaces in excess of quantities specified by the competent authority.
Decommissioning
The process by which a nuclear or radiation facility is finally taken out of operation ina manner that provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the workers, thepublic and the environment.
Decontamination
The removal or reduction of contamination by physical or chemical means.
Design
The process and results of developing the concept, detailed plans, supportingcalculations and specifications for a nuclear or radiation facility.
Design Basis Accidents (DBAs)
A set of postulated accidents which are analysed to arrive at conservative limits onpressure, temperature and other parameters which are then used to set specificationsto be met by plant structures, systems and components, and fission product barriers.
Deterministic Effects
A radiation effect for which generally a threshold level of dose exists, above which theseverity of the effect is greater for a higher dose.
Discharge (Radioactive)
Planned and controlled release of (gaseous or liquid) radioactive material into theenvironment.
Disposal (Radioactive Waste)
The emplacement of waste in a repository without the intention of retrieval or theapproved direct discharge of waste into the environment with subsequent dispersion.
Documentation
Recorded or pictorial information describing, defining, specifying, reporting orcertifying activities, requirements, procedures or results.
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Dose
A measure of the radiation received or absorbed by a target. The quantities termedabsorbed dose, organ dose, equivalent dose, effective dose, committed equivalent dose,or committed effective dose are used, depending on the context. The modifying termsare used when they are necessary for defining the quantity of interest.
Dose Limit
The value of the effective dose or the equivalent dose to individuals from controlledpractices that shall not be exceeded.
Early Protective Action
See “Protective Action”
Effective Dose
The quantity ‘E’ defined as a summation of the tissue equivalent doses, each multipliedby the appropriate tissue weighting factor:
E = ΣT WT HT
where ‘HT’ is the equivalent dose in tissue ‘T’ and ‘WT’ is the tissue weighting factorfor tissue ‘T’.
Effluent
Any waste discharged into the environment from a facility, either in the form of liquidor gas.
Emergency
A situation, which endangers or is likely to endanger safety of the site personnel, thenuclear/radiation facility or the public and the environment.
Emergency Alert
Declared abnormal condition with the possibility of leading to plant/site/off-siteemergency.
Emergency Exercise
A test of an emergency plan with particular emphasis on coordination of the manyinter-phasing components of the emergency response, procedures and emergencypersonnel/ agencies. An exercise starts with a simulated/postulated event or series ofevents in the plant in which an unplanned release of radioactive material is postulated.
Emergency Plan
A set of procedures to be implemented in the event of an accident.
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
Areas extending up to a specified distance around the plant, providing a basicgeographic framework for decision making on implementing measures as part of agraded response in the event of an off-site emergency.
Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ)
An area around a facility for which arrangements have been made to takeprecautionary urgent protective actions in the event of a nuclear or radiologicalemergency to reduce the risk of severe deterministic effects in public domain.Protective actions within this area are to be taken before or shortly after arelease of radioactive material or an exposure on the basis of the prevailingconditions at the facility.
Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone (UPZ)
An area around a facility for which arrangements have been made to takeurgent protective actions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergencyto avert doses in public domain in accordance with international safetystandards. Protective actions within this area are to be taken on the basis ofenvironmental monitoring or, as appropriate, prevailing conditions at thefacility.
Emergency Preparedness
The capability to take actions that will effectively mitigate the consequences of anemergency for human health and safety, quality of life, property and the environment.
Emergency procedures
A set of instructions describing in detail the actions to be taken by response personnelin an emergency.
Emergency Response Arrangements
The integrated set of infrastructural elements necessary to provide the capability forperforming a specified function or task required in response to a nuclear or radiationemergency. These elements may include authorities and responsibilities, organisation,coordination, personnel, plans, procedures, facilities, equipment or training etc.
Emergency Worker
A person having specified duties as a worker in response to an emergency.
Emergency workers may include workers employed both directly and indirectly byregistrants and licensees as well as personnel of responding organizations, such aspolice officers, firefighters, medical personnel, and drivers and crews of evacuationvehicles.
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Environment
Everything outside the premises of a facility, including the air, terrain, surface andunderground water, flora and fauna.
Equivalent Dose (HT, R)
The quantity ‘HT, R’ is defined as
HT, R = DTR WR
where ‘DTR’ is the absorbed dose delivered by radiation type ‘R’ averaged over atissue or organ ‘T’ and ‘wR’ is the radiation weighing factor for radiation type ‘R’.When the radiation field is composed of different radiation types with different valuesof ‘WR’ the equivalent dose is
HT = Σ WR DT, R R
Evacuation
The rapid, temporary removal of people from an area to avoid or reduce short termradiation exposure in an emergency.
Exclusion Zone
An area extending upto a specified distance around the plant, where no public habitationis permitted. This zone is physically isolated from outside areas by plant fencing andis under the control of the plant management.
Existing Exposure Situation
An existing exposure situation is a situation of exposure that already exists when adecision on the need for control needs to be taken.
Existing exposure situations include exposure to natural background radiation that isamenable to control; exposure due to residual radioactive material that arose frompast practices that were never subject to regulatory control or exposure due to residualradioactive material arising from a nuclear or radiation emergency after an emergencyexposure situation has been declared to be ended.
Exposure
The act or condition of being subject to irradiation. Exposure may be either external(irradiation by sources outside the body) or internal (irradiation by sources inside thebody). Exposure can be classified as either normal exposure or potential exposure;occupational, medical or public exposure; and in intervention situations, eitheremergency exposure or chronic exposure. The term ‘exposure’ is also used in radiationdosimetry to express the amount of ions produced in air by ionising radiation.
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Exposure Pathway
A route by which radiation or radionuclides can reach humans and cause exposure.
Extended Planning Distance (EPD)
Distance around a nuclear power plant within which arrangements are made to conductearly monitoring of deposition to determine areas warranting (1) evacuation within aday following a release or (2) relocation within a week to a month following a release.
Generic Criteria
Dose levels (projected dose, the dose that has been received or the residual dose) atwhich protective actions and other response actions are to be taken.
Intake
The process of taking radionuclide into the body by inhalation or ingestion, or throughthe skin, and the amount of given radionuclide taken in during a given period.
Ingestion and Commodities Planning Distance (ICPD)
The distance around a nuclear power plant for the area within which arrangements aremade, within hours of being notified by the nuclear power plant of the declaration ofa General Emergency, to: (a) place grazing animals on covered feed and protect drinkingwater supplies that use rainwater (e.g. to disconnect rainwater collection pipes); and(b) restrict consumption of local produce and non-essential food, milk from grazinganimals and rainwater until further assessments are performed.
Long Term Protective Action
See “Protective Action”.
Member of the Public
Any individual in the population except for one who is subject to occupational ormedical exposure. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the annual dose limitfor public exposure, the member of the public is the representative individual in therelevant critical group.
Mitigatory Action
Immediate action by the operator or other party:
(i) To reduce the potential for conditions to develop that would result in exposureor a release of radioactive material requiring emergency actions on or off thesite; or
(ii) To mitigate source conditions that may result in exposure or a release ofradioactive material requiring emergency actions on or off the site.
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Monitoring
The continuous or periodic measurement of parameters for reasons related to thedetermination, assessment in respect of structure, system or component in a facility orcontrol of radiation.
Nuclear or Radiation Emergency
An emergency in which there is, or is perceived to be, a hazard due to:
(i) The energy resulting from a nuclear chain reaction or from the decay of theproducts of a chain reaction; or
(ii) Radiation exposure.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle
All operations associated with the production of nuclear energy, including mining,milling, processing and enrichment of uranium or processing of thorium, manufactureof nuclear fuel, operation of nuclear reactors, reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel,decommissioning, and any activity for radioactive waste management and research ordevelopment activity related to any of the foregoing.
Occupational Exposure
All exposures of personnel incurred in the course of their work.
Occupational Worker
Any person, working full time or part time in a nuclear or radiation facility, who maybe employed directly by the “consentee” or through a contractor.
Off-site
Area in public domain beyond the site boundary.
Off-site Emergency
Accident condition/emergency situation involving excessive release of radioactivematerials/hazardous chemicals from the plant to the public domain calling forintervention.
Operation
All activities following and prior to commissioning performed to achieve, in a safemanner, the purpose for which a nuclear/radiation facility is constructed, includingmaintenance.
Observables/indicators
Observables/indicators are instrument readings or other parameters which provideinformation on the conditions on the scene.
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Plant Emergency
Declared emergency conditions in which the radiological/other consequences, confinedto the plant or a section of the plant, requiring immediate operator action.
Precautionary Action Zone
See “Emergency Planning Zones”
Precautionary Urgent Protective Action (PUA)
See “Protective Action”
Prescribed Limits
Limits established or accepted by the regulatory body.
Projected dose
The dose to be expected if no protective or remedial action is taken.
Protective Action
An action for the purposes of avoiding or reducing doses that might otherwise bereceived in an emergency exposure situation or an existing exposure situation.
Precautionary Urgent Protective Action (PUA)
A protective action in the event of a nuclear or radiation emergency whichmust be taken before or shortly after a release of radioactive material, orbefore an exposure, on the basis of the prevailing conditions to prevent or toreduce the risk of severe deterministic effects.
Urgent Protective Action (UPA)
A protective action in the event of an emergency which must be taken promptly(normally within hours) in order to be effective, and the effectiveness ofwhich will be markedly reduced if it is delayed.
Early Protective Action
A protective action in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency thatcan be implemented within days to weeks and still be effective. (Note: Themost common early protective actions are relocation and longer termrestrictions on consuming contaminated food).
Long Term Protective Action
A protective action that is not an urgent protective action. Such protectiveactions are likely to be prolonged over weeks, months or years. These includemeasures such as relocation, agricultural countermeasures and remedialactions.
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Quality Assurance (QA)
Planned and systematic actions necessary to provide the confidence that an item orservice will satisfy given requirements for quality.
Radiation Worker
Any person who is occupationally exposed to radiation, and who in the opinion of theregulatory body, should be subjected to radiation surveillance.
Radioactive Waste
Material, whatever its physical form, left over from practices or interventions for whichno further use is foreseen: (a) that contains or is contaminated with radioactivesubstances and has an activity or activity concentration higher than the level forclearance from regulatory requirements, and (b) exposure to which is not excludedfrom regulatory control.
Radiological Safety Officer (RSO)
Any person who is so designated by the employer and who, in the opinion of thecompetent authority is qualified to discharge the functions outlined in the RadiationProtection Rules, 2004.
Records
Documents, which furnish objective evidence of the quality of items and activitiesaffecting quality. They include logging of events and other measurements.
Recording Level
A level of dose, exposure or intake specified by regulatory body at or above whichvalues of dose, exposure or intake received by workers are to be entered in the individualexposure records.
Reference Level
Action level, intervention level, investigation level or recording level established forany of the quantities determined in the practice of radiation protection.
Relocation (Off-site Emergency)
The removal of members of the public from their homes, for an extended period ortime, as a protective action in a chronic exposure situation.
Residual Dose
The dose expected to be incurred in the future after protective actions have beenterminated (or a decision has been taken not to implement protective actions).
This applies in an existing exposure situation or an emergency exposure situation.
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Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
A document, provided by the applicant/consentee to the regulatory body, containinginformation concerning the nuclear or radiation facility, its design, accident analysisand provisions to minimise the risk to the public, the site personnel and the environment.
Safety Assessment
A review of the aspects of design and operation of a source which are relevant to theprotection of persons or the safety of the source, including the analysis of the provisionsfor safety and protection established in the design and operation of the source and theanalysis of risks associated both with normal conditions and accident situations.
Safety Code
A document stating the basic requirements, which must be fulfilled for particularpractices or applications. This is issued under the authority of the regulatory body andmandatory to be followed by the respective utilities.
Safety Guide
A document containing detailed guidance and various procedures/methodologies toimplement the specific parts of a safety code that are acceptable to the regulatorybody, for regulatory review. This is issued under the authority of regulatory body andis of non-mandatory nature.
Safety Manual
A document detailing the various safety aspects/instructions and requirements relatingto a particular practice or application, that are to be followed by a utility.
Site
The area containing the facility defined by a boundary and under effective control ofthe facility management.
Site Emergency
Accidental condition/emergency situation in the plant involving radioactivitytransgressing the plant boundary but confined to the site, or involving release ofhazardous chemicals or explosion, whose effects are confined to the site, with off-siteconsequences being negligible.
Siting
The process of selecting a suitable site for a facility including appropriate assessmentand definition of the related design bases.
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Source
Anything that causes radiation exposure, either by emitting ionising radiation orreleasing radioactive substances or materials.
Stochastic Effects (Radiation)
Radiation effects generally occurring without a threshold level of dose whose probabilityis proportional to the dose and whose severity is independent of the dose.
Urgent Protective Action (UPA)
See ‘Protective Action’
Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone (UPZ)
See ‘Emergency Planning Zones’
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SPECIAL DEFINITIONS(Specific for the Present Guidelines)
Emergency Action Level (EAL)
A specific, predetermined, observable criterion used to detect, recognize and determinethe emergency class.
Operational Criteria
Observables or values of measurable quantities to be used in the early phase of theresponse in a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to determine the need forappropriate protective actions and other response actions (Note: These includeoperational intervention levels (OILs), emergency action levels (EALs), specificobservables and other indicators of conditions on the site).
Operational Interventional Level (OIL)
A set level of a measurable quantity that corresponds to a generic criterion. OILs aretypically expressed in terms of dose rates or of activity of radioactive material released,time integrated air concentrations, ground or surface concentrations, or activityconcentrations of radio-nuclides in environmental, food or water samples. An OIL is atype of action level that is used immediately and directly (without further assessment)to determine the appropriate protective actions on the basis of an environmentalmeasurement.
General Emergency
An event resulting in an actual release, or substantial probability of a release, requiringimplementation of urgent protective actions off-site.
This includes : (i) actual or projected damage to the reactor core or largeamounts of spent fuel; or (ii) releases off-site resulting in doses exceedingintervention levels for urgent protective actions within hours.
When a general emergency is declared, urgent protective actions arerecommended immediately for the public near the facility.
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD ...................................................................................... i
DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................... iii
SPECIAL DEFINITIONS ........................................................................ xv
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 11.1 General ....................................................................... 11.2 Objective ...................................................................... 11.3 Scope ....................................................................... 1
2. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY ................................... 32.1 General ....................................................................... 32.2 Emergency Alert ........................................................... 32.3 Plant Emergency ........................................................... 32.4 Site Emergency ............................................................. 42.5 Off-Site Emergency ...................................................... 4
3. BASIC CONSIDERATION FOR EMERGENCYRESPONSE ....................................................................... 53.1 General ....................................................................... 53.2 Basic Consideration ..................................................... 53.2.1 Hazard Category of Nuclear and Radiation
Facility and Response Actions Based OnHazard Category .......................................................... 6
3.2.2 System of Protective Actions and Establishmentof Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) ............................ 7
3.3 Establishment of criteria .............................................. 8
4. SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE AND OTHER RESPONSEACTION ....................................................................... 104.1 General ....................................................................... 104.2 System of Protective and Response Actions ................ 104.3 Protection Strategy ....................................................... 114.4 Reference Dose Levels for Public ............................... 114.5 Implementation Protective Action and Other
Response Action ........................................................... 11
5. GENERIC AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA ........................ 135.1 General ....................................................................... 135.2 Generic Criteria ............................................................ 135.2.1 Generic Criteria to Avoid or Minimise Severe
Deterministic Effects .................................................... 14
5.2.2 Generic Criteria for Protective Actions andOther Response Actions to Reduce the Riskof Stochastic Effects in an Emergency ......................... 15
5.2.3 Generic Criteria for Food, Milk and DrinkingWater to Reduce the Risk of StochasticEffects in an Emergency .............................................. 15
5.2.4 Generic Criteria for Vehicles, Equipment andOther Items to Reduce the Risk of StochasticEffects in an Emergency .............................................. 16
5.2.5 Generic Criteria for Response Actions forCommodities and Food Traded Internationally ........... 17
5.2.6 Generic Criteria as a Target Dose for theTransition to an Existing Exposure Situation .............. 18
5.3 Operational Criteria ..................................................... 195.3.1 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) ................................. 195.3.2 Operational Interventional Levels (OIL) ..................... 215.3.2.1 General ....................................................................... 215.3.2.2 OIL1 Measured Value of Ground Contamination
for Urgent Protective Action ........................................ 215.3.2.3 OIL2 Measured Value of Ground Contamination
Calling for Early Protective Actions ............................ 225.3.2.4 OIL3 Measured Value of Ground Contamination
Calling for immediate Restrictions .............................. 235.3.2.5 OIL4 Measured Value of Skin Contamination ............ 245.3.2.6 OIL5 and OIL6 Measured Values of
Concentrations in Food, Milk or Water ....................... 255.3.3 Observables .................................................................. 26
6. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS ....... 276.1 General ....................................................................... 276.2 Guidance Values ........................................................... 27
APPENDIX-I HAZARD CATEGORISATION OF NUCLEARAND RADIATION FACILITIES ................................ 29
APPENDIX-II USE OF OILS FOR RESPONDING TO ANUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICALEMERGENCY ............................................................. 34
APPENDIX-III ADMINISTRATION OF STABLE IODINE .............. 40
APPENDIX-IV ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES FOREMERGENCY DECLARATION ANDPROTECTIVE ACTIONS ........................................... 41
APPENDIX-V RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATIONALINTERVENTIONAL LEVELS (OIL) ......................... 46
APPENDIX-VI (A) EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION ANDEMERGENCY CONDITIONS (EAL)FOR PHWR ......................................................... 53
APPENDIX-VI (B) EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION ANDEMERGENCY CONDITIONS (EAL)FOR LWR ............................................................ 62
APPENDIX-VII OBSERVABLES ON THE SCENE OFRADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY .............................. 79
ANNEXURE-I TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENTOF EMERGENCIES ARISING OUT OFNUCLEAR ACCIDENTS............................................ 81
ANNEXURE-II POST ACCIDENT EMERGENCYMANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC DOMAINAROUND FUKUSHIMA DAIICHINUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (FDNPP,JAPAN) USING SIMILAR SAFETYSTANDARDS .............................................................. 84
ANNEXURE-III CONCEPTUAL PLAN FOR ESTABLISHINGAREAS ON THE SCENE AND USING OILSFOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ..................... 86
REFERENCES ....................................................................... 90
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................... 91
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ....................................................................... 94
EXPERT COMMITTEE FOR PREPARATION OF CRITERIAFOR PLANNING PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FORA NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ............................ 94
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY (ACNS) ............ 95
PROVISIONAL LIST OF REGULATORY SAFETYDOCUMENTS ON EMERGECNY PREPAREDNESSAND RESPONSE ....................................................................... 96
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
Nuclear and radiation facilities are designed, constructed and operated withstringent regulatory and safety requirements. Adequate measures are in placeto deal with occurrence of extremely low probability events that may lead toaccidental release of radionuclides to the environment resulting in off-siteradiological consequences. The radiological impact due to the nuclear andradiological emergencies can be mitigated (minimised) through timelyimplementation of emergency preparedness and response actions.
1.2 Objective
Objective of this safety guidelines is to provide criteria for establishing anemergency preparedness and response plans at nuclear and radiation facilitiesto mitigate the radiological consequences following nuclear accident orradiological emergency situation.
1.3 Scope
This safety guidelines can be used for preparing an emergency preparednessand response plans for facilities such as:
(a) nuclear power plants;
(b) research/experimental reactors;
(c) fuel enrichment/fabrication;
(d) fuel reprocessing;
(e) radioactive waste management plants;
(f) use of radionuclide in medicine, research and industries; and
(g) any other facility as determined by AERB.
Scope of this safety guidelines is to provide criteria for establishing anemergency preparedness and response plans to facilitate effectiveimplementation of protective measures during a nuclear and radiologicalemergency situation. It provides basic consideration and goal for emergencyresponse action, criteria for hazard categorisation and hazard assessment ofnuclear and radiation facilities, system for protective actions, other responseactions, guidance on dose levels for emergency workers and the referencedose levels for emergency and post emergency existing exposure situation.
This safety guidelines also provides guidance for establishing operationalcriteria that include operational intervention levels (OILs), emergency action
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levels (EALs), specific observables and other indicators on the scene tofacilitate decision making process during an emergency situation.
This document may not be applicable to the emergency that may occur inpublic domain during transportation of radioactive materials. For suchemergencies, the document cited under reference titled safety code on‘Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Transport AccidentsInvolving Radioactive Material’ AERB/SC/TR-3 [9] is applicable.
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2. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY
2.1 General
The emergency situation of nuclear/radiation facilities (based on hazardcategory) is classified as (i) Emergency alert, (ii) Plant emergency, (iii) Siteemergency and (iv) Off site emergency. Declaration of an emergency in anyof these emergency classes should initiate a response that is considerablybeyond normal operations. Each class initiates distinctly different level ofresponse as indicated below.
Emergency classification is based on plant conditions called as EALs asdetailed in section 5.3.1 and Appendix VI-A&B
2.2 Emergency Alert
The licensee should identify the events and develop appropriate emergencyoperating procedures to mitigate the consequences. The licensee shoulddeclare emergency alert in the facility on occurrence of such events. Theemergency alert should be intimated to the regulatory body within 24 hours.In a multi-unit site, the emergency alert situation at one facility may have thepotential of affecting other facilities. The emergency response plan of eachunit should clearly indicate such events and response action to be followed atother facilities and adequate mechanism should exist for promptcommunication among the co-located facilities.
2.3 Plant Emergency
An approved plant emergency preparedness and response plan commensuratewith the hazard assessment of the facility should be in place prior to thecommissioning. The plan should be tested by periodic exercises. The responseplan should be reviewed and modified based on the experience with theapproval of the regulatory body. If the site is having more than one facility,the plant emergency declared at one facility should call for an emergencyalert or plant emergency for other facilities depending on the situation. The
Emergency alert Plant emergency Site emergency Off site emergency
Immediate actions to analyse the plant condition and mitigate the consequencesImmediate actions to protect those on-site
Prepare to take off-site protective action
Immediate protectiveactions in publicdomain
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criteria and conditions of such emergency situation should be clearly broughtout in the emergency preparedness and response plan of each facility. Theplant emergency should be intimated to the regulatory body immediately.The facility should suspend operation during plant emergency and resume/re-start operation only after obtaining clearance from the regulatory body.
2.4 Site Emergency
An approved site emergency preparedness and response plan should be inplace prior to the commissioning of the facility. The licensee shouldimmediately report the site emergency to the regulatory body with relevantdetails. The important plant parameters and site radiological conditionincluding radiation exposure status of the radiation/emergency workers shouldbe intimated to the regulatory body in regular intervals or as directed by theregulatory body. If the site emergency is declared in a multi-unit/multi-facilitysite, all the units/facilities in the site should be shutdown. The role andresponsibilities of the site emergency response team should be clearly definedin the response plan and tested periodically. The licensee should be responsiblefor implementing the remedial measures for mitigating the site consequences.The site emergency should be terminated under intimation to the regulatorybody. The facility should resume/re-start operation only after obtainingclearance from the regulatory body. The site emergency response plan shouldbe periodically tested and revised if required based on the experience.
2.5 Off-Site Emergency
An approved off-site emergency preparedness and response plan should bein place prior to the commissioning of the facility. The emergency responseplan should delineate the role and responsibilities of all involved agencies.The emergency response plan should be periodically tested and revised ifrequired based on the experience. The off-site emergency response plan shouldbe inline with the national/state/district disaster management plan and shouldhave approval of the state/district authorities.
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3. BASIC CONSIDERATION FOREMERGENCY RESPONSE
3.1 General
For successful implementation of emergency management programme thepractical goals of emergency response plan are to be clearly brought out. Toachieve these goals the inputs required should be specified and quantified.These goals and related inputs form the basis for emergency planning,preparedness and response. The objective of emergency response is to preventthe deterministic effects, limit the stochastic effects and reduce otherconsequences to the workers, public and environment.
3.2 Basic Consideration
The practical goals of emergency response plan in a nuclear and radiologicalemergency are
(a) regain control of the situation;(b) prevent or mitigate consequences at the scene;(c) prevent the occurrence of deterministic health effects in workers and
the public;(d) render first aid and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;(e) limit to the extent practicable, the occurrence of stochastic health
effects in workers and the population;(f) prevent to the extent practicable, the occurrence of non-radiological
effects on individuals and among the population;(g) protect to the extent practicable, property and the environment; and(h) prepare to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social
and economic activity.
To achieve the above goals following should be specified and quantified.
(i) hazard categorisation of the nuclear and radiation facility(ii) system of protective actions and emergency planning zones (PAZ,
UPZ and LPZ)(iii) establishment of criteria for undertaking protective measures
The emergency response plan should take into account the deterministiceffects, stochastic effects and socio economic consequences to the publicand environment. This is ensured by keeping residual doses well below thereference levels.
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3.2.1 Hazard Category of Nuclear and Radiation Facility and Response ActionsBased On Hazard Category
The nuclear and radiation facilities should be categorized into five categoriesbased on the nuclear and radiation related hazards for the purposes ofestablishing the emergency preparedness and response plan. Hazard categoriesI, II and III represent the decreasing levels of radiation related hazard. Hazardcategory IV involves transport of sources/orphan sources and category Vinvolves contamination at distant places from the accident. The stringency ofrequirements for emergency preparedness and response decrease fromcategory I to V. The licensee should carry out the hazard assessment of thefacility by analysing the hazards associated with facilities, activities or sourceswithin or beyond the site, on-site/off-site (refer Appendix-I)
Response actions based on Hazard category
(i) The licensee of a facility in hazard category I, II or III should makearrangements to ensure the safety of all persons on the site in theevent of a nuclear or radiological emergency. This should includearrangements: to notify people on the site of an emergency; for allpersons on the site to take appropriate actions immediately uponnotification of an emergency; to account for those on the site; tolocate and recover those unaccounted for; to take urgent protectiveaction; and to provide immediate first aid. The facility should providesuitable assembly points for all persons on the site and should beprovided with a sufficient number of safe escape routes, clearly anddurably marked, with reliable emergency lighting, ventilation andother building services essential to the safe use of these routes. Theescape routes should meet the relevant requirements for radiationzoning and fire protection and the relevant national requirementsfor industrial safety and security. Suitable alarm systems and meansof communication should be provided so that all persons present inthe facility and on the site can be warned and instructed, even underemergency conditions.
(ii) The licensee of a facility in hazard category I, II or III should ensurethe availability of means of communication necessary for protectiveactions to be taken within the facility and in the area controlled bythe operator and to off-site agencies with responsibility for takingprotective actions within the precautionary action zone and the urgentprotective action planning zone at all times. The response plan shouldtake into account the diversity of the methods of communicationselected.
(iii) State officials responsible for making recommendations/decisionson the protective actions in public domain within the precautionary
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action zone and/or the urgent protective action planning zone shoulddo so promptly upon the notification of a nuclear or radiologicalemergency.
(iv) The authorities under whose jurisdiction the precautionary actionzone and/or the urgent protective action planning zone fall shouldmake arrangements to take appropriate urgent actions promptly uponthe notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Thesearrangements should include arrangements for: taking appropriateactions for the protection of emergency workers; alerting permanent,transient and special population groups or those responsible for them;taking urgent protective actions; protecting supplies of food andwater; imposing restrictions on the immediate consumption ofproduce from farms or gardens and of locally produced milk;monitoring and decontaminating evacuees; caring for evacuees;alerting special facilities; and the control of access to and therestriction of traffic by air, water, road and rail. Arrangements shouldbe in place for co-ordinating with all the jurisdictions within anyemergency zone.
3.2.2 System of Protective Actions and Establishment of Emergency Planning Zone(EPZ)
System of protective action should be based on the projected dose and otherresponse action should be based on the actual dose received. This is furtherelaborated in chapter-4. For effective implementation of protective actionsthe area around the site is divided into following zones based on quantum ofrelease and atmospheric parameters:
(a) A precautionary action zone (PAZ), for facilities in hazard categoryI, for which arrangements should be made with the goal of takingprecautionary urgent protective actions, before a release ofradioactive material occurs or shortly after a release of radioactivematerial begins, on the basis of conditions at the facility (such as theemergency classification) in order to reduce substantially the risk ofsevere deterministic health effects. PAZ can extend up to 5 km.
(b) An urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), for facilities inhazard category I or II, for which arrangements should be made forurgent protective action to be taken promptly, in order to avert dosesin accordance with the prescribed level. UPZ can extend up to 16km.
(c) Long-term protective action planning zone (LPZ) is a pre-designatedarea around a facility which can extend up to 30 km and includes theurgent protective action zone. The LPZ is the zone where preparationsfor effective implementation of protective actions to reduce the risk
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of deterministic and stochastic health effects from ingestion ofcontaminated foodstuffs, either locally grown or sold in the affectedarea should be developed in advance.
The sizes of the zones specified above are for emergency preparedness. Duringactual emergency situation, for implementation of specific protectivemeasures, the size of PAZ, UPZ and LPZ may vary based on operationalcriteria. The arrangements should be made for extended planning distanceand ingestion and commodities planning distance within LPZ for takingappropriate protective measures depending upon operational interventionlevels in the affected area.
3.3 Establishment of Criteria
Criteria discussed here take into account the projected dose, averted doseand residual dose during an emergency.
Reference Levels: In emergency exposure situations, the reference levelsrepresent the levels of doses or risks, above which it is judged to beinappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur, and for which thereforeprotective actions should be planned and optimised. A reference level forprotection of public during emergency situation is set within an effectivedose range of 20-100 mSv, expressed in terms of residual dose, which includesdose contributions via all exposure pathways. The protection strategy shallbe optimised to reduce exposures below the reference level.
During emergency situation protective and other actions are undertaken toensure that the reference levels are not exceeded. The type and scale ofprotective and other actions undertaken in turn are based on:
(i) Generic Criteria : Generic criteria are set by considering two typesof the health consequences (i) severe deterministic effect and (ii)increase in stochastic effect. Generic criteria start at levels of dosethat are approaching the threshold for severe deterministic effects(could be as high as 1 Sv). Normally the generic criteria deal withestimated quantities such as projected dose and cannot be directlyseen or easily measured.
(ii) Operational Criteria : The generic criteria form the basis fordeveloping the operational criteria. Operational criteria include (i)emergency action levels (EAL) (ii) operational intervention levels(OIL) and (iii) observables (by operators or first responders); fordecision making on emergency categorisation and initiating theprotective actions. Operational criteria are established in advance(e.g control room indications, radiation and contamination levels inpublic domain etc.) by using the generic criteria and these arenormally the observables.
Thus the system of protective actions and other response actions in anemergency includes numerical values of generic criteria as well as of thecorresponding operational criteria that form the basis for decision making soas to ensure that the residual doses normally remain well below referencelevels.
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4. SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTION
4.1 General
The emergency preparedness and response plan needs to include the protectiveaction and other response action commensurate with the hazard assessmentof the facility. The protective action includes precautionary urgent protectiveactions (PUA), urgent protective actions (UPA) and other response actionsto prevent severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochasticeffects.
4.2 System of Protective and Response Actions
System of protective action should be based on the projected dose and otherresponse action should be based on the actual dose received. Typical protectiveaction and other response actions are provided in Table 1.
TABLE-1 : SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHERRESPONSE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY [1]
Types of possiblehealth consequences ofexposureSevere deterministiceffects (Generic criteriaare established at levelsof dose that areapproaching thethresholds for severedeterministic effects)
Increase in stochasticeffects
Basis for implementation of protective actions andother response actions
Based on projected doseImplementation ofprecautionary urgentprotective actions (e.gevacuation), even underadverse conditions, toprevent severe deterministiceffects
Implementation ofurgentprotective actions andinitiation of early protectiveactions (relocation and longterm restriction of consump-tion of contaminated food) toreduce the risk of stochasticeffects as far as reasonablypossible
Based on dose receivedOther response actionsfortreatment and management ofsevere deterministic effectsinclude immediate medicalexamination, consultation andtreatment as indicated,contamination control,decorporation where applicable,registration for long term healthmonitoring, and comprehensivepsychological counseling.Other response actions forearlydetection and effective manage-ment of stochastic effectsinclude screening based onindividual doses to specificorgans, considering the need forregistration for medical follow-up and counseling to allowinformed decisions to be madein individual circumstances.
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4.3 Protection Strategy
The protection strategy should include, but not be limited to the followingaspects:
(i) On the basis of the optimization of protection strategy and thereference level, generic criteria for particular protective actions andother response actions should be developed and included in theemergency preparedness and response plan of each facility and site.
(ii) The emergency preparedness and response plan should include thereference dose level for public.
(iii) Suitable remedial measures should be implemented to limit dose ofexisting exposure situation to less than 1 mSv per year (excludingexposure due to natural radiation).
(iv) Generic criteria for implementing precautionary urgent protectiveactions to prevent severe deterministic effects should be based onthe values specified in table 2.
4.4 Reference Dose Levels for Public
Reference dose levels for public are set typically between an effective dose20 mSv and 100 mSv, expressed in terms of residual dose, which includesdose contributions via all exposure pathways. During the emergency phase,a reference level between 20 and 100 mSv per year should be used toimplement protective actions driven by urgency, taking into account theprevailing conditions. The protection strategy should be optimized to reducethe exposures below the reference level. The regulatory body should beintimated for radiation dose level above 100 mSv during an emergencysituation. Once the emergency is over, a reference level for the existingexposure situations should be used between 1 and 20 mSv per year dependingupon the situation. Effort should be taken to reduce the radiation exposure.
4.5 Implementation of Protective Action and Other Response Action
The following possible impacts should be considered during the planningand implementation of protective actions and other response actions in anemergency:
(i) Development of severe deterministic effects.
(ii) Increase in stochastic effects.
(iii) Adverse effects on the environment and property.
(iv) Other adverse effects (e.g. psychological effects, social disorder,economic disruption).
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The following types of exposure should be taken into account in the planningand implementation of protective actions and other response actions in anemergency:
(i) The projected dose that could be prevented or reduced by means ofprecautionary urgent protective actions and urgent protective actions.
(ii) The dose that has been received, the detriment due to which may beminimised by medical actions and may be addressed by publicreassurance or counselling.
Precautionary urgent protective actions should be implemented on the basisof a substantial risk of a release or exposure under any circumstances, inorder to prevent the development of severe deterministic effects for veryhigh levels of dose (refer table 2; generic criteria for deterministic effects).The authorities should assess the potential of incidents such as acuteradioactive releases/exposure situation resulting events/accident consideringsingle or combination of facilities at the site and the assessment should betaken into account in the emergency preparedness and response plan.
If the risk of stochastic effects is the main concern and the risk of thedevelopment of severe deterministic effects is negligible, urgent and earlyprotective actions and other response actions, all of which are justified andoptimized and response action should be implemented to reduce the risk ofstochastic effects (table 3; generic criteria for stochastic effects). The licenseeshould assess the events/accidents considering single or combination offacilities at the site and the assessment should be taken into account in theemergency preparedness and response plan.
If the dose exceeds a particular generic criterion identified in Table 2 or 3,individuals should be provided with appropriate medical attention, includingmedical treatment, long term health monitoring and psychological counselling.
Medical actions should be initiated and performed on the basis of medicalsymptoms and observations. However, dosimetric information (e.g. basedon radiation survey data, dose measurements or dose calculations) can providea valuable input for determining the medical treatment.
Other response actions for early detection and effective management ofstochastic effects include screening based on individual doses to specificorgans, considering the need for registration for medical follow-up andcounselling to allow informed decisions to be made in individualcircumstances.
For all levels of dose that may result in an emergency exposure situation, theidentified responsible agency should inform the risk to the public and otherinvolved agencies including first responders.
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5. GENERIC AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA
5.1 General
Generic criteria are used in terms of dose that can be projected or dose thathas already been received. Use of generic criteria meets the need for a commonterm for the system of values that would be used as the basis for theimplementation of protective actions (e.g. evacuation or food replacement)and other response actions (e.g. medical follow-up).
Projected dose and dose that has been received are not measurable quantitiesand cannot be used as a basis for quick actions in an emergency. There is aneed to establish in advance operational criteria (values of measurablequantities or observables) as a surrogate for the generic criteria for undertakingdifferent protective actions and other response actions.
The operational criteria are values of measurable quantities or observablesthat include operational intervention levels (OILs), emergency action levels(EALs), specific observables and other indicators of conditions on the scenethat should be used in decision making during an emergency. The operationalcriteria can be used immediately and directly to determine the need forappropriate protective actions and other response actions. These operationalcriteria are used as ‘triggers’ at the early stage of an emergency.
5.2 Generic Criteria (GC)
Generic criteria should be established on the basis of generic optimisation inconsideration of the range of conditions that prevail in an emergency. Genericcriteria should be in terms of dose that can be projected or dose that hasalready been received. Generic criteria should be established for precautionaryurgent protective actions, UPA and early protective actions, as well as forother response actions that may be required in an emergency. Precautionaryurgent protective actions/Urgent protective actions (e.g. evacuation) shouldbe taken promptly (e.g. within hours) to be effective, because theireffectiveness will be reduced if there is a delay. Early protective actions canbe implemented within days or weeks to be effective. They can be long lasting,even after the emergency (e.g. temporary relocation). In no case the urgentprotective actions and early protective actions based on the generic criteriashould cause more detriment than they avert.
The generic criteria are provided for:
(a) Protective actions and other response actions that are expected to beundertaken under any circumstances to avoid or to minimize severedeterministic effects;
(b) Protective actions and other response actions that are taken toreasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects;
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(c) Restriction of trade if warranted; and
(d) Use as a target dose for the transition to an existing exposure situation.
These generic criteria shall be optimised for taking appropriate protectiveactions and other response actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency.The situation is ‘Safe’ when the generic criteria in table 2 and table 3 are notprojected or received, since no protective actions and other response actionsare justified to reduce the risk of severe deterministic effects or stochasticeffects.
5.2.1 Generic Criteria to Avoid or Minimise Severe Deterministic Effects
Generic criteria for acute doses for which protective actions and other responseactions are expected to be undertaken under any circumstances to avoid or tominimise severe deterministic effects are provided in table 2. This tableprovides generic criteria along with examples of protective actions andresponse actions for developing a protection strategy and operational criteriafor effective implementation of protective actions and other response actionsto avoid or to minimise severe deterministic effects.
TABLE 2 : GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ACUTE DOSES FOR WHICHPROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSEACTIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANYCIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID OR TO MINIMISESEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS [1]
Examples of protective actions and otherresponse actions
If the dose is projected:- Take precautionary urgent protective actions
immediately (even under difficult conditions)to keep doses below the generic criteria
- Provide public information and warnings- Carry out urgent decontaminationIf the dose has been received :- Perform immediate medical examination,
consultation and indicated medical treatment- Carry out contamination control- Carry out immediate decorporation (if
applicable)- Carry out registration for long term health
monitoring (medical follow-up)- Provide comprehensive psychological
Counseling
Generic criteria
External acute exposure (<10 hours)Whole Body (bone 1 Svmarrow)
Skin 10 Sv to 100 cm2
Internal exposure from acute intake(Delivered in 30 days)Thyroid 2 Sv
Lung 30 Sv
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5.2.2 Generic Criteria for Protective Actions and other Response Actions to Reducethe Risk of Stochastic Effects in an Emergency.
Table 3 provides generic criteria for use in developing a protection strategyand operational criteria for effective implementation of protective actionsand other response actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects in a nuclearor radiological emergency.
TABLE 3 : GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ANDOTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN EMERGENCYEXPOSURE SITUATIONS TO REDUCE THE RISKOF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS [1]
Examples of protective actions andother response actions
Urgent protective actions :Iodine thyroid blockingUrgent protective actions :Sheltering; evacuation; decontamination;restriction on consumption of food, milkand water; contamination control;public reassuranceEarly protective actions :Temporary relocation; decontamination;replacement of food, milk and water;publicreassurance
Screening based on equivalent doses tospecific radiosensitive organs (as a basisfor medical follow-up), counseling
5.2.3 Generic Criteria for Food, Milk and Drinking Water to Reduce the Risk ofStochastic Effects in an Emergency
Table 3A provides generic criteria for developing a protection strategy andoperational criteria for effective implementation of protective actions andother response actions to reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effectsfrom ingestion of food, milk and drinking water in a nuclear orradiological emergency.
Generic criteria
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take urgent protectiveactions/Protective actions and other response actionsThyroid dose 50 mSv in the
first 7 daysWhole body dose 100 mSv in the
first 7 days
Whole body Dose 100 mSv perannum
Dose that has been received and that exceeds the following generic criteria : Take longerterm medical actions to detect and to effectively treat radiation induced health effectsWhole body dose 100 mSv in a
month
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Generic criteria of 1/10 of the generic criteria for early protective actionsand other response actions given in table 3 is established for food, milk anddrinking water restrictions to ensure that the dose from all exposure pathways,including ingestion, will not exceed the generic criteria for early protectiveactions and other response actions given in table 3.
TABLE 3A : GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK ANDDRINKING WATER TO REDUCE THE RISK OFSTOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN EMERGENCY [2]
Examples of protective actions andother response actions
Stop consumption and distribution of non-essential food, milk and drinking water.Replace essential food, milk and drinkingwater as soon as possible or relocate thepeople if replacements are not available.Estimate the dose of those who may haveconsumed food, milk and drinking waterthat may result in a dose exceeding thegeneric criteria to determine if medicalcounselling and follow-up is warranted inaccordance with table 3.
Generic criteria
Projected dose from ingestion of food, milk and drinking water that exceeds thefollowing generic criteria : Take protective actions and other response actions as justifiedWhole body dose 10 mSv per annum
HFetus 10 mSv for the fullperiod of in uterodevelopment
5.2.4 Generic Criteria for Vehicles, Equipment and Other Items to Reduce the Risk ofStochastic Effects in an Emergency
Table 3B provides generic criteria for determining a protection strategy andoperational criteria for effective implementation of protective actions and otherresponse actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects from the use of vehicles,equipment and other items from an area affected by a nuclear or radiologicalemergency.
Generic criteria of 1/10 of the generic criteria for early protective actions and otherresponse actions given in table 3 is established for vehicles, equipment and otheritems from an affected area to ensure that the dose from all exposure pathways,including use of such vehicles, equipment and other items, will not exceed the genericcriteria for early actions given in table 3 for a member of the public.
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TABLE 3B : GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENTAND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OFSTOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN EMERGENCY [2]
Examples of protective actions andother response actions
Stop non-essential use.
Use essential vehicles, equipment andother items from an affected area untilreplacements are available if: (a) use willnot result in doses exceeding the genericcriteria in table 3 for a member of thepublic or the guidance values in table 10for the emergency workers and helpers inan emergency, and (b) actions are taken toreduce the dose to the user as an emergencyworker, helper in an emergency or amember of the public, as appropriate.Estimate the dose of those emergencyworkers, helpers in an emergency andmembers of the public who may have useda vehicle, equipment and other item froman affected area that may result in a doseexceeding the generic criteria for whichmedical counselling and follow-up iswarranted in accordance with table 3
Generic criteria
Projected dose from the use of vehicles, equipment or other items from an affectedarea that exceed the following generic criteria : Take protective actions and otherresponse actions as justified.Whole body dose 10 mSv per annum
HFetus 10 mSv for the fullperiod of in uterodevelopment
5.2.5 Generic Criteria for Response Actions for Commodities and Food TradedInternationally
Table 3C provides generic criteria for the resumption of international trade. Thegeneric criteria for commodities and food traded internationally that could containradioactive material as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency are establishedat 1/100 of the generic criteria given in table 3 for early protective actions and otherresponse actions to ensure that the dose to the public will be a small fraction.
Exceeding the generic criteria in table 3C does not mean that the commodities andfood are unsafe in terms of the radiation induced health effects. Commodities andfood are to be considered unsafe in terms of the radiation induced health effects onlyif the generic criteria in table 2 or 3 are projected to be exceeded.
For food traded internationally that could contain radionuclides as a result of a nuclearor radiological emergency, the operational criteria (guideline levels) as published bythe Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission shall be used.
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TABLE 3C : GENERIC CRITERIA FOR RESPONSE ACTIONS FORCOMMODITIES AND FOOD TRADEDINTERNATIONALLY [2]
Generic criteria
Projected dose from commodities that exceed the generic criteria : Take responseactions to restrict international trade.Whole body dose 10 mSv per annum
HFetus 10 mSv for the fullperiod of in uterodevelopment
5.2.6 Generic Criteria as a Target Dose for the Transition to an Existing ExposureSituation
Generic criteria shall be established for use as a target dose for theimplementation of protective actions and other actions aimed at enabling thetransition to an existing exposure situation. The criteria shall be establishedat 1/5 of the generic criteria for the early protective actions and other responseactions given in Table 3 and are provided below:
(a) an effective dose of 20 mSv per annum; and
(b) an equivalent dose to a fetus of 20 mSv for the full period of in uterodevelopment.
The decision to terminate the emergency phase and the concurrent transitionto an existing exposure situation shall be taken after: (a) justified actionshave been taken to reach the target dose and it has been confirmed that furtherimplementation of actions to reach the target dose will do more harm thangood; (b) confirmation that the source of exposure is fully characterized forall members of the public living normally in the area; (c) the exposure situationis understood and remains stable; (d) any restrictions on normal livingconditions are limited and provisions are in place to confirm compliancewith such restrictions.
Any further reduction of the dose to a member of the public below the targetdose used for deciding on the transition to an existing exposure situationmay do more harm than good.
Examples of other response actions
Restrict non-essential international trade.
Trade essential commodities untilreplacements are available if: (a) trade isapproved with the receiving state; (b) tradewill not result in doses that exceed thegeneric criteria given in table 3 for thepublic; (c) actions are taken to control theuse and reduce the dose to the member ofthe public.
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Event specific conditions may warrant modification of the generic criteria.The system of generic criteria and operational criteria is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. System of generic criteria and operational criteria.
5.3 Operational Criteria
The operational criteria are values of measurable quantities or observablesthat include operational intervention levels (OILs), emergency action levels(EALs), specific observables and other indicators of conditions on the scenethat may be used in decision making during an emergency. The operationalcriteria can be used immediately and directly to determine the need forappropriate protective actions and other response actions. These operationalcriteria are used as ‘triggers’ at the early stage of an emergency.
Precautionary urgent protective actions, as applicable and urgent protectiveactions should be taken on the basis of pre-calculated operational criteria(e.g radioactive releases, exposure etc). The majority of urgent protectiveactions and early protective actions are also implemented on the basis of pre-calculated operational criteria. However, if the characteristics of an emergencydiffer from those assumed in the calculations of operational criteria, the criteriashould be recalculated. Methods for the recalculation to address prevailingconditions in an actual emergency should be established during the planningphase.
5.3.1 Emergency Action Levels (EAL)
The EAL are the specific, predetermined, observable operational criteria usedto detect, recognize and determine the emergency class of an event at facilitiesin hazard categories I, II and III. The EALs are used for classification and fordecisions on the implementation of precautionary urgent protective actionscorresponding to a particular emergency class. These criteria should be
Operational criteria
GenericCriteria
Emergency ActionLevels (EALs)
Operational Inter-ventional Levels (OILs)
Observables/Indicators
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predefined. The emergency preparedness and response plan should includethe EALs of the respective facilities. There are two different types of EAL:
(i) Symptom based EAL. Symptom based EAL are site specificinstrument readings (e.g. reactor coolant system pressure higher/lower than a certain level) or other observable or quantifiablethresholds (e.g. failure of emergency power supply systems asindicated by a specific parameter).
(ii) Event based EAL are more subjective criteria requiring the judgementof the operating staff. An example of an event based EAL would be‘fire detected in an area containing vital safety systems’.
When possible, symptom based EALs should be used because they make theclassification process more timely and less subject to error. For facilitieswhere safety significant systems are monitored by means of instruments andalarms, a large fraction of the EALs may be symptom based in nature, whereasclassification procedures for simple facilities with few instruments will consistalmost exclusively of event based EALs. The following guidelines should beused while developing EALs:
(a) Site-specific classification procedure should be designed for prompt(to be completed in a few minutes) and easy use during an event.
(b) To ensure that the classification procedures are usable under accidentconditions;
(c) The performance of the instruments during an emergency shouldalso be considered in developing the EALs.
(d) The site-specific EALs system should be tested/validated duringexercises and walk-through sessions to ensure it is usable by theassigned control room staff under emergency conditions.
The EALs and corresponding procedures should be revised based onoperational experience and feedback from exercises. The licensee shouldmake arrangements for the prompt identification of an actual or potentialnuclear or radiological emergency and determination of the appropriate levelof response. Any conditions that would warrant the use of emergency operatingprocedures (EOPs) should be classified as an emergency alert and wouldtrigger a predetermined emergency response at the site.
Once conditions of actual or imminent core damage exist, a transition fromthe domain of emergency operating procedures to the domain of emergencymanagement guidelines should take place. To ensure a consistent andcoordinated response to accident conditions, the emergency operatingprocedures and accident management guidelines should be integrated intothe plant emergency response plan.
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Plant conditions in the emergency operating procedures and accidentmanagement guidelines should provide clear inputs for accident classificationfor declaring appropriate emergency action levels (EALs).
Similarly, it should be ensured that there are no conflicts between accidentmanagement guidelines and severe accident management guidelines.
5.3.2 Operational intervention levels (OIL) : For Radionuclide Deposition,Personal/Individual Contamination and Contamination of Food, Milk andWater
5.3.2.1 General
OILs are expressed in terms of dose rates or of activity of radioactive materialreleased, time integrated air concentrations, ground or surface concentrations,or activity concentrations of radionuclides in environmental, food or watersamples. OILs can be measured by means of instruments in the field or canbe determined by means of laboratory analysis or assessment. OILs arecategorised into OIL1 to OIL6 and indicate decreasing order of severity ofemergency situation.
OIL is a type of action level that can be used immediately and directly todetermine the appropriate protective actions. The OILs are used with theother operational criteria (EALs and observables) to determine appropriateprotective actions and other response actions.
The appropriate protective action should be promptly invoked if OILs areexceeded, but the action will not normally be taken if the levels are notexceeded. OILs should be developed based on the site specific condition ifrequired and should be included in the emergency preparedness and responseplan.
Arrangements should be made for promptly assessing the results ofenvironmental monitoring and monitoring for contamination on people inorder to decide on or to adapt urgent protective actions to protect workersand the public, including the application of operational intervention levels(OILs).
For effective emergency response actions arrangement should exist to revisethe OILs as appropriate based on the conditions prevailing during theemergency with intimation to the regulatory body.
5.3.2.2 OIL1 - Measured Value of Ground Contamination for Urgent ProtectiveActions
OIL1 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for:
Urgent protective actions (e.g. evacuation) to keep the dose to any
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person living in a contaminated area below the generic criteria forurgent protective actions provided in table 3;
Medical actions, as required, because the dose received by evacueesmay be above the generic criteria for medical actions provided intable 3.
TABLE 4 : TYPICAL VALUES OF GROUND CONTAMINATION FORURGENT PROTECTIVE ACTIONS (OIL 1) [1]
OIL value
Environmental measurementsGamma (γ) 1000 µSv/h at 1mfrom surface or a source2000 counts/s direct beta (β)surface contaminationmeasurement50 counts/s direct alpha (α)surface contaminationmeasurement
Response action (as appropriate) if theOIL is exceeded
- Immediately evacuate- As an alternate provide substantial shelter- Provide for decontamination of evacuees- Consider providing iodine thyroid
blocking- Avoid inadvertent ingestion- Stop consumption of local produce,
rainwater and milk from animals grazingin the area
- Register and provide for a medicalexamination of evacuees
- If a person has handled a source with adose rate equal to or exceeding 1000 µSv/h at 1m, provide an immediate medicalexamination
OIL
OIL1
5.3.2.3 OIL2 - Measured Value of Ground Contamination Calling for Early ProtectiveActions
OIL2 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for early protectiveactions to keep the dose for one year to any person living in the area belowthe generic criteria for taking actions to reasonably reduce the risk of stochasticeffects provided in Table 3.
23
TABLE 5 : TYPICAL VALUES FOR GROUNDCONTAMINATION CALLING FOR EARLYPROTECTIVE ACTIONS (OIL 2) [1]
OIL value
Environmental measurementsGamma (γ) 100 µSv/h at 1mfrom surface or a source200 counts/s direct beta (β)surface contaminationmeasurement10 counts/s direct alpha (α)surface contaminationmeasurement
Response action (as appropriate) if theOIL is exceeded
- Immediately evacuate- Consider providing iodine thyroid
blocking- Stop consumption of local produce,
rainwater and milk from animals grazingin the area until they have been screenedand contamination levels have beenassessed using OIL5 and OIL6
- Temporarily relocate those living in thearea; before relocation, reduce inadvertentingestion; register and estimate the doseto those who were in the area to determineif medical screening is warranted;relocation of people from the areas withthe highest potential exposure shouldbegin within days
- If a person has handled a source with adose rate equal to or exceeding 100 µSv/hat 1m, provide medical examination andevaluation; any pregnant women who havehandled such a source should receiveimmediate medical evaluation and doseassessment
OIL
OIL2
5.3.2.4 OIL3 - Measured Value of Ground Contamination Calling for ImmediateRestrictions
OIL3 is a measured value of ground contamination calling for immediaterestrictions on the consumption of leaf vegetables, milk from animals grazingin the area and rainwater collected for drinking to keep the dose to any personbelow the generic criteria for taking the urgent protective actions provided intable 3.
24
TABLE 6 : TYPICAL VALUES OF GROUND CONTAMINATIONCALLING FOR IMMEDIATE RESTRICTIONS ONCONSUMPTION OF FOOD (OIL 3) [1]
OIL value
Gamma (γ) 1 µSv/h at 1mfrom surface20 counts/s direct beta (β)surface contaminationmeasurement2 counts/s direct alpha (α)surface contaminationmeasurement
Response action (as appropriate) if theOIL is exceeded- Stop consumption of non-essential local
produce, rainwater and milk from animalsgrazing in the area until it has beenscreened and contamination levels havebeen assessed using OIL5 and OIL6
- Screen local produce, rainwater and milkfrom animals grazing in the area out to atleast 10 times the distance to which OIL3is exceeded and assess samples using OIL5and OIL6
- Consider providing iodine thyroidblocking for fresh fission products and foriodine contamination if replacement foressential local produce or milk is notimmediately available
- Estimate the dose of those who may haveconsumed food, milk or rainwater from thearea where restrictions were implementedto determine if medical screening iswarranted
OIL
OIL3
5.3.2.5 OIL4 - Measured Value of Skin Contamination
OIL4 is a measured value of skin contamination calling for performingdecontamination or providing instructions for self-decontamination and forlimiting inadvertent ingestion so as:
To keep the dose due to skin contamination to any person below thegeneric criteria for taking urgent protective action (table 3);
To initiate medical treatment or screening, as required, because thedose received by any person may exceed the generic criteria formedical actions (table 3).
25
TABLE 7 : TYPICAL VALUES OF SKIN CONTAMINATIONCALLING FOR PERFORMING DECONTAMINATIONOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION (OIL 4) [1]
OIL value
Gamma (γ) 1 µSv/h at 10 cmfrom the skin1000 counts/s direct beta (β)skin contaminationmeasurement50 counts/s direct alpha (α)skin contaminationmeasurement
Response action (as appropriate) if theOIL is exceeded
- Provide for skin decontamination andreduce inadvertent ingestion
- Register and provide for a medicalexamination
OIL
OIL4
Beta monitors should detect both high and low energy beta emitters. Instrumentcoefficient (IC = Axη) in (counts/s x cm2)/Bq of contamination monitorsshould be greater than or equal to 1 (for high energy beta), 0.2 (for lowenergy beta) and 0.5 for alpha emitters suitable for contamination monitor.Where A is area (cm2) of detector and η is efficiency of detector (cps/Bq).
5.3.2.6 OIL5 and OIL6- Measured Values of Concentrations in Food, Milk orWater
OIL5 and OIL6 are measured values of concentrations in food, milk or waterthat warrant the consideration of restrictions on consumption so as to keepthe effective dose to any person below 10 mSv per annum. OIL values forrestriction of food, milk or water is given in tables 8 and 9 for decidingresponse action if the OIL is exceeded. If more than one radionuclide ispresent then the rule of mixtures should be applicable and the sum of thefraction of the actual concentration of each radionuclide to the specified OILshould be less than one.
TABLE 8 : SCREENING OILs FOR FOOD, MILK AND WATERCONCENTRATIONS (OIL 5) [1]
Skin contamination
OIL value
Gross beta (β): 100 Bq/kgOrGross alpha (α): 5 Bq/kg
Response action if the OIL is exceeded
Above OIL5 : Assess using OIL6
Below OIL5 : Safe for consumption duringthe emergency phase
OIL
OIL5
Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/Kg) Radionuclide OIL6 (Bq/Kg)H-3 2x105 Cr-51 8x105
C-14 1x104 Mn-54 9x103
F-18 2x108 Fe-59 9x103
Na-24 4x106 Co-60 8x102
Zn-65 2x103 Sr-90 2x102
Rb-87 2x103 Y-90 9x104
Ru-106 6x102 Zr-95 6x103
Sb-122 2x105 Nb-95 5x104
Sb-124 5x103 Tc-99 4x103
La-140 2x105 Tc-99m 2x108
Ce-144 8x102 I-131 3x103
Ir-192 8x103 I-132 2x107
Th-232 4.0 I-133 1x105
U-232 20 I-134 2x108
U-233 100 I-135 2x106
U-235 2x102 Cs-134 1x103
U-238 100 Cs-137 2x103
Pu-238 50 Tl-204 3x103
Pu-239 50 Pb-210 2.0Pu-240 50 Po-210 5.0Pu-241 4x103 Ra-224 2x103
Am-241/Be-9 50Pu-239/Be-9 50
26
TABLE 9 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD,MILK AND WATER CONCENTRATIONS FROMLABORATORY ANALYSIS (OIL 6) [1]
5.3.3 Observables
For emergencies in hazard category I, II & III, the typical observables can bea major fire incident affecting safety systems, major earthquake, loss of coolantaccident (LOCA), station blackout, etc.
For emergencies in hazard category IV, observable on the scene could beradiation symbol on damaged container.
27
6. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS
6.1 General
An emergency worker is a person having specified duties as a worker inresponse to an emergency who might be exposed while taking responseactions. Emergency workers may include those employed by registrants andlicensees as well as personnel from response organizations, such as policeofficers, fire-fighters, medical personnel, drivers and crews of evacuationvehicles.
6.2 Guidance Values
Guidance values should be established for managing, controlling andrecording the radiation dose of emergency workers for different types ofresponse activities and should be included in the emergency preparednessand response plan. In setting the guidance values of dose for emergencyworkers the contribution to doses via all exposure pathways should be takeninto account.
Pregnant female workers should be excluded from emergency duties. Thefollowing guidance values should be used for the protection of emergencyworkers responding to an emergency;
TABLE 10 : GUIDANCE VALUES FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS
TasksLife saving actions
Actions to prevent severedeterministic effects and actionsto prevent the development ofcatastrophic conditions that couldsignificantly affect people and theenvironmentActions to avert a large collectivedose
Guidance valueEffective Dose <500 mSvThis value may be exceeded undercircumstances in which(a) the expected benefits to others clearly
outweigh the emergency worker’s ownhealth risks, and
(b) the emergency worker volunteers to takethe action and understands and acceptsthis health risk
Effective Dose < 500 mSv
Effective Dose < 100 mSv
28
Life saving actions resulting in doses that approach or exceed the thresholdfor severe deterministic effects should be considered only if (a) the expectedbenefit to others would clearly outweigh the emergency worker’s own riskand (b) the emergency worker volunteers to take the action, and understandsand accepts the risk associated with the response activities.
Emergency workers who undertake response actions having the potential ofradiation doses expected to exceed 50 mSv should be clearly informed inadvance of the associated health risks, as well as of available protectivemeasures, and should be trained to the extent possible the actions that theymay be required to take. The voluntary basis for response actions by theemergency workers should be addressed in the emergency response plan.
Emergency workers should be given appropriate medical attention. The dosesreceived and information concerning the consequent of health risks shouldbe communicated to the workers. Female workers who are aware that theyare pregnant should be encouraged to notify the appropriate authority andshould be excluded from emergency duties.
The operational guidance provided to emergency workers should be basedon measurements of radiation (e.g. as displayed on an active or self-readingdosimeter). The dose from intake or skin contamination should be limited bymeans of the use of protective equipment, the use of stable iodine prophylaxisand the provision of instructions concerning operations in potentiallyhazardous radiological conditions. Available information about the radioactiveconditions on the site should be used in aiding decisions on the appropriateprotection of emergency workers.
When undertaking intervention, all reasonable efforts should be made to keepdoses to workers below 100 mSv, except for life saving actions in whichevery effort should be made to keep doses below guidance dose value (500mSv) in order to avoid deterministic effects on health. In addition, workersundertaking actions in which their doses may approach or exceed guidancedose level should do so only when the benefits to others clearly outweightheir own risk.
Once the emergency phase of an intervention is over, workers undertakingrecovery operations, such as repairs to the facility and buildings, wastedisposal or decontamination/remediation of the site and surrounding areashould be subject to the system of occupational protection requirements andprocedures.
Workers should not normally be precluded from incurring further occupationalexposure because of doses received in an emergency exposure situation.However, qualified medical advice should be obtained before any such furtherexposure if a worker who has undergone an emergency exposure receives adose exceeding ten times the maximum single year dose limit or at the worker’srequest.
29
APPENDIX - I
HAZARD CATEGORISATION OF NUCLEAR ANDRADIATION FACILITIES
I-1 General
The potential of nuclear and radiation emergencies depends on the natureand scope of the facility. The emergency preparedness and responseinfrastructures/system can be optimised by categorising the facilities basedon the nuclear and radiation related hazards and preparing the preparednessand response plan in-line with the hazard categories of the facilities.
I-2 Hazard categorisation of nuclear and radiation facilities
The nuclear and radiation facilities should be categorized into five categoriesbased on the nuclear and radiation related hazards for the purposes ofestablishing the emergency preparedness and response plan. Typical hazardcategorisation of nuclear and radiation facilities is given in Table 11.
Hazard categories I, II and III represent the decreasing levels of radiationrelated hazard. Hazard category IV involves transport of sources/orphansources and category V involves contamination at distant places from theaccident. The stringency of requirements for emergency preparedness andresponse decrease from category I to V.
The licensee should carry out the hazard assessment of the facility by analysingthe hazards associated with facilities, activities or sources within or beyondthe site, on-site/off-site. The assessment should also include the following:
events and the associated areas for which protective actions arerequired; and
actions that would be effective in mitigating the consequences ofsuch events.
TABLE 11 : CATEGORISATION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIATIONFACILITIES BASED ON HAZARD POTENTIAL
30
Hazardcategory
I
II
III
Criteria
Facilities, such as nuclear power plants, forwhich on-site events (including very lowprobability events) are postulated that couldgive rise to severe deterministic health effectsoff the site, or facilities for which such eventshave occurred in similar facilities.Off-site: Emergencies involving severe core
damage have the potential to causesevere and even fatal deterministiceffect.
On-site: Emergencies involving severe coredamage, doses sufficient to resultin and even fatal deterministiceffect.
Facilities, such as spent fuel pool storage andsome types of research reactors, for whichon-site events are postulated that could giverise to doses to people off the site that warranturgent protective action, or facilities forwhich such events have occurred in similarfacilities.Off-site: Potential for doses in excess of
generic criteria (GC) if fuel coolingis lost.
On-site: Potential for doses in excess ofgeneric criteria (GC) if fuel coolingis lost.
Facilities, such as industrial irradiationfacilities, for which on-site events arepostulated that could give rise to doses thatwarrant or contamination that warrantsurgent protective action on the site, orfacilities for which such events have occurredin similar facilities. Off-site: No potential fordoses in excess of generic criteria (GC)Onsite: Potential for doses in excess ofgeneric criteria (GC) is possible.
Typical example of facilities
Nuclear power plants (>100MWth), freshly discharged spentfuel pool storage
Spent fuel pool storage, reactors< 100MWth
Industrial irradiationfacilities
Sealed source manufacturing Hospitals Radiopharmaceutical
manufacturing Teletherapy High and medium dose rate
brachytherapy Fuel fabrication
31
Hazardcategory
IV
V
Criteria
Activities that could give rise to a nuclear orradiological emergency that could warranturgent protective action in an unforeseeablelocation. These include non-authorisedactivities such as activities relating todangerous sources obtained illicitly. Theyalso include transport and authorisedactivities involving mobile dangeroussources such as industrial radiographysources, nuclear powered satellites or radiothermal generators. Hazard category IVrepresents the minimum level of hazard,which is assumed to apply for all states andjurisdictions.Lethal dose is possible for persons handlingsources.Preparedness for events in hazard categoryV is intended for providing promptrestrictions on food, water or products inaccordance with standards.Off-site:deposition or contaminated material
may lead to dosses in excess.On-site: Risk would arise from unknowingly
brining radioactive material.
Typical example of facilities
Dangerous sources; Transport of radioactive or
fissile material; Severe overexposure. Mobile radiography source
Accidents in category I and IIresulting into contamination atdistant place.
In case of facilities belonging to hazard category I, II or III, a comprehensivesafety analysis should be carried out to identify all sources of exposures andto evaluate the radiation doses that could be received by workers at thefacility and the public, as well as the potential effects on the environment.The hazard/safety analysis should examine the event sequences that may leadto an emergency situation. On the basis of this analysis, the emergencypreparedness and response plan should be established.
The licensee should carry out the hazard assessment of the facility and theemergency response plan of the facility should meet the potential of hazardarising from that facility. If more than one facility is located in a particularsite, the hazard assessment should consider the consequences due to thecombination of all the facilities and the emergency preparedness and responseplan should meet such consequences.
The nature and extent of emergency arrangements for preparedness andresponse should be commensurate with the magnitude and nature of the hazardassociated with the facility or activities. All postulated events should be
32
considered in the hazard assessment, including emergencies involving acombination of nuclear or radiological events and conventional emergenciessuch as an earthquake. The hazard assessment should also consider andidentify the populations at risk and to the extent practicable, the likelihood,nature and magnitude of the various radiation related hazards.
In a hazard assessment, facilities, sources, practices, on-site areas, off-siteareas and locations should be identified for which a nuclear or radiologicalemergency could warrant:
(a) Precautionary urgent protective action to prevent severedeterministic health effects by keeping doses below those for whichintervention would be expected to be undertaken under anycircumstances;
Urgent protective action to prevent stochastic effects to the extentpracticable by averting doses, in accordance with prescribedstandards;
(b) Agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures to ingestion andlonger term protective measures, in accordance with establishedstandards; or
(c) Protection for the workers responding (undertaking an intervention),in accordance with established standards.
Non-radiological hazards (such as the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6)or other hazardous chemicals) to people on and off the site that are associatedwith the practice should be identified in the hazard assessment.
Locations at which there is a significant probability of encountering adangerous source that has been lost, abandoned, illicitly removed or illicitlytransported should also be identified in the hazard assessment.
Licensee of a facility or practice in hazard category I, II, III or IV shouldensure that adequate arrangements are made for identifying a situation thatwarrants emergency response and generating adequate information promptlyand communicating it to the responsible authorities, for:
(a) the early prediction or assessment of the extent and significance ofany unplanned discharge of radioactive substances to the environmentor exposures;
(b) rapid and continuous assessment of the nuclear or radiologicalemergency as it proceeds; and
(c) determining the need for protective actions for the public andworkers.
33
Declaration of a particular class of emergency at a facility or practice inhazard category I, II, III or IV should promptly initiate appropriate level ofco-ordinated and pre-planned emergency response action on and off the site.The responsibilities and initial response actions of all response organisationsshould be defined for each class of emergency.
For facilities in hazard category I and II the hazard assessment shoulddemonstrate, for the range of postulated emergencies, that identification,notification, activation and other initial response actions can be performedin time to achieve the practical goals of emergency response. To perform theabove response actions, the response organisations should have sufficientpersonnel available.
34
APPENDIX - II
USE OF OILS IN RESPONDING TO A NUCLEAR ORRADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
II-1 General
For the purposes of describing the use of the OILs, nuclear or radiologicalemergencies resulting in contamination can be of three types:
(a) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of alarge area (hundreds of square kilometres) with the possibleinvolvement of a large number of people; that is, contamination ofan area is so large, that in order to be effective, implementation ofurgent protective actions and early protective actions should beperformed in two phases: first, urgent protective actions (e.g.evacuation) are taken, followed by early protective actions (e.g.relocation). An emergency of this type could occur at nuclear facilitiessuch as nuclear power plants that are in hazard category I or II.
(b) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination of amoderate area (tens of square kilometres) with the possibleinvolvement of a large number of people; that is, contamination ofan area small enough that urgent protective actions and earlyprotective actions can be effectively performed at the same timewithout the need for a phased response. An emergency of this typecould be the result of an explosion of a radiological dispersal deviceor could be caused by a damaged dangerous radioactive source.
(c) A nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in contamination ofsmall areas and/or with the possible involvement of a small numberof people; that is, contamination of small areas that can easily andquickly be isolated, with the involvement of a small number of peoplewho can all be decontaminated and medically assessed by usingavailable resources, without causing any major disruptions. This typeof emergency includes those confined to a single room or a singlespill. For this type of emergency, the response involves isolating thepotentially contaminated area and decontaminating all those involvedwithout necessarily using the OILs.
II-2 Responding to a nuclear radiological emergency that results incontamination of a large area
The process of assessing and responding to an emergency of this type, startswith the first protective actions being taken on the basis of conditions observed
35
on the scene or on the basis of an emergency classification before data fromradiological monitoring become available (figure 2).
Within hours, areas where ground deposition levels exceed or are likely toexceed OIL1, the default OIL should be identified and the appropriate urgentprotective actions should be taken such as evacuation, stopping theconsumption of local produce and medical evaluation of evacuees.
Within hours, actions should also be taken to reduce the consequences ofcontamination for those people who were in the area where OIL1 wasexceeded. If OIL4 is exceeded, the evacuees should be monitored anddecontaminated (if these actions can be carried out promptly). If monitoringand decontamination are not immediately possible, the evacuees should bereleased and instructed to take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, and toshower and change their clothing as soon as possible. OIL4 levels may bevery difficult to detect under emergency conditions. Therefore, any personwho may have been contaminated, including those who were monitored andhad contamination levels below OIL4, should take actions to reduceinadvertent ingestion, and should shower and change their clothing as soonas possible.
36
Figure 2 : Process of assessment of a nuclear or radiologicalemergency resulting in contamination of a large area
Take action basedon observations and
classificationsbefore monitoring
OIL1exceeded
OIL2exceeded
OIL3exceeded
Sample food, milkand water far
beyond where OIL3is exceeded
OIL5&6exceeded
Take longer term actionbased on criteria
developed with stake-holders after assessment
of conditions
Take OIL6 food andmilk response
actions
Take OIL3 food,milk and water
response actions
Take OIL2 earlyresponse actions
Take OIL1urgent
responseactions
Immediatedecontamination
possible
Monitor anddecontaminateevacuees using
OIL4
Release evacuees withinstruction to control
ingestion and todecontaminate when
possible
The dose to evacuees should also be evaluated and the medical actions asappropriate based on the dose received should be taken.
Within a day, the areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL2should be identified and early protective actions should be taken such asstopping the consumption of locally produced vegetables and milk andcommencing the process of implementing temporary relocation. Relocationshould be accomplished within a week.
Yes
No
No
NoYes
Yes
Yes
Yes
37
Within days, the areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL3should be identified and actions should be taken to stop consumption of locallyproduced vegetables and milk, and of rainwater collected for drinking, untilthey have been screened and analysed. Within a week, food, milk and watershould be screened and analysed, possibly out to a distance of more than 100km, and actions should be taken to restrict consumption of food, milk andwater with concentrations of radionuclides in excess of OIL5 and OIL6.
Within days, the mixture of the radionuclides over the affected area shouldbe determined and the OILs being used to make decisions should be revised,if required. Any recommendation to the public to take any protective actionsshould be accompanied by a plain language explanation of the criteria. Afterthe emergency is over, further actions should be taken on the basis of criteriadeveloped after careful assessment of conditions and in consultation withinterested parties.
II-3 Responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting incontamination of a moderate area
The process of assessing and responding to a nuclear or radiologicalemergency resulting in contamination of a moderate area through theimplementation of protective actions are taken on the basis of conditionsobserved on the scene or on the basis of an emergency classification beforedata from radiological monitoring become available (Figure 3).
Within hours, areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL2should be identified, and the appropriate urgent protective actions and earlyprotective actions should be taken where OIL2 is exceeded. The dose toevacuees should also be evaluated and any medical actions if required shouldbe taken.
Evacuees should be monitored and if OIL4 is exceeded, the evacuees shouldbe decontaminated promptly. If monitoring and/or decontamination are notimmediately possible, the evacuees should be released and should beinstructed to take actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, and to shower andchange their clothing as soon as possible. OIL4 levels may be very difficultto detect under emergency conditions. Any person who may have beencontaminated, including those who were monitored and had contaminationlevels below OIL4, should therefore take actions to reduce inadvertentingestion, and should shower and change their clothing as soon as possible.
Within days, areas where ground deposition levels exceed default OIL3 shouldbe identified and actions should be taken to stop the consumption of rainwaterand locally produced vegetables and milk until they have been screened andanalysed. However, if only limited amounts of food (e.g. fruit and vegetablesfrom local gardens) and non-essential food could have been affected, thisstep may be omitted, and instead restrictions should be placed on the
38
consumption of all the food that could be contaminated until it can be screenedand analysed.
Finally, food, milk and rainwater should be screened and analysed, out to adistance of several kilometres, and actions should be taken to restrict theconsumption of food, milk and rainwater having concentrations ofradionuclides in excess of OIL5 and OIL6.
Within days, the mixture of radionuclides over the affected area should bedetermined and the OILs being used to make decisions should be revised, ifwarranted.
Any recommendations to the public to take any protective actions should beaccompanied by a plain language explanation of the criteria.
Figure 3 : Process of assessment of a nuclear or radiological emergencyresulting in contamination of moderate area
Take action based onobservations and
classifications beforemonitoring
OIL2exceeded
OIL3exceeded
Sample food, milkand water far
beyond where OIL3is exceeded
OIL5&6exceeded
Take longer term actionbased on criteria
developed with stake-holders after assessment
of conditions
Take OIL6 food andmilk response
actions
Take OIL3 food,milk and water
response actions
Take OIL1urgent &
OIL2 responseactions
Immediatedecontamination
possible
Monitor anddecontaminateevacuees using
OIL4
Release evacuees withinstruction to control
ingestion and todecontaminate when
possible
Yes
No
No
NoYes
Yes
Yes
No
39
After the emergency is over, further actions should be taken on the basis ofdose criteria developed after careful assessment of the conditions and inconsultation with the interested parties.
40
APPENDIX - III
ADMINISTRATION OF STABLE IODINE
III-1 Administration of stable iodine means oral intake of KIO3 tablets.Administration of KIO3 tablets should be done as follows:
(a) All individuals above the age of 12 years :
170 mg (KIO3) - as soon as possible
85 mg (KIO3) - second and third day only;
170 mg (KIO3) - repeat after two weeks, if required (based onassessment).
(b) Pregnant women and children of age 3 to 12 years;
50 % of quantities given in (a)
(c) Children under the age of 3 years :
25% of quantities given in (a) above.
III-2 Time of administration of stable iodine is important for thyroid dose reduction.The reduction factors are given below:
TABLE 12 : TIME OF ADMINISTRATION AND DOSEREDUCTION
Time of stable iodineadministration
Before exposure1 hr after exposure6 hrs after exposure1 day after exposure
Dose reduction%
1008050
negligible
III-3 For inhalation exposure, decision should be taken to administer stable iodineas soon as possible depending on the assessed potential and estimated quantityof radio-iodine release.
III-4 Administration of stable iodine prior to intake through ingestion route is aseffective as for inhalation route.
41
APPENDIX - IV
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES FOREMERGENCY DECLARATION AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
EXAMPLE-1
IV-1.0 Accident: Core meltdown and containment failure
IV-1.1 Use of operational criteria: For emergency classification and protectiveactions
Observables: Observations by operator
Emergency action levels (EALs): Exceeds as defined in the EAL for PHWR/PWR for off-site emergency
Operational intervention levels (OILs): Radiological monitored data aroundthe site
IV-1.2 Declaration of the emergency:
General emergency/off-site emergency based on observables and EALs
IV-1.3 Initiation of protective actions:
(a) Precautionary urgent protective actions: Based on substantial riskanalysis (predefined) having potential to cause severe and even fataldeterministic effect, certain actions should be implemented urgentlybefore the release. These precautionary urgent protective actionsinclude sheltering, evacuation, restriction of consumption of food,milk and water; public reassurance. The PAZ size will depend onrisk analysis. The suggestive size can be 2 km around site and 5 kmdownwind direction.
(b) Urgent protective actions: Based on projected dose and OIL1levels.
(i) Gamma (γ) 1000 μSv/h at 1 m from surface or a source
(ii) 2000 counts/s direct beta (β) surface contaminationmeasurement
If the risk of stochastic effects is the main concern and the risk of thedevelopment of severe deterministic effects is negligible, urgent andearly protective actions and other response actions, all of which arejustified and optimized, should be implemented. These actions mustbe taken promptly (normally within hours) in order to be effective,
42
and the effectiveness of which will be markedly reduced if it isdelayed. These are evacuation, decontamination of individuals,sheltering, respiratory protection, iodine prophylaxis and restrictionof the consumption of potentially contaminated foodstuffs. Thesuggestive size of UPZ can be 16 km around site.
(c) Skin Contamination: OIL4
(i) Gamma (γ) 1 μSv/h at 10 cm from the skin
(ii) 1000 counts/s direct beta (β) skin contamination measurement
(iii) 50 counts/s direct alpha (α) skin contamination measurement
- Provide for skin decontamination and reduce inadvertentingestion
- Register and provide for a medical examination
(d) Protective actions based dose received: If the dose exceeds aparticular generic criterion identified in table 2 or 3, individualsshould be provided with appropriate medical attention, includingmedical treatment, long term health monitoring and psychologicalcounselling. Other response actions for treatment and managementof severe deterministic effects should include immediate medicalexamination, consultation and treatment as indicated, contaminationcontrol, decorporation where applicable, registration for long termhealth monitoring, and comprehensive psychological counselling.
IV-1.4 Termination of urgent protective actions and early protective action:
This shall be initiated when the projected dose is within or below referencelevel.
(a) Reference level for protection of people during emergencysituation
Residual dose (which includes dose contributions via all exposurepathways): Protective actions should be optimised for highest plannedresidual dose in the band of 20 to 100 millisieverts (mSv) of projecteddose. To the extent possible the residual dose should be close to 20mSv.
IV-1.5 Long term protective action (OIL5 & OIL6):
Long term protective action is a protective action that is not an urgentprotective action. Such protective actions are likely to be prolonged overweeks, months or years. These include measures such as relocation,agricultural countermeasures and remedial actions.
43
Long term health monitoring of the persons affected should be carried out,such as to provide advanced medical care, to reduce their concern with regardto their health status and to advance scientific knowledge.
(a) Long term health monitoring is always justified at levels of doseabove the thresholds for deterministic effects.
(b) Justification of long term health monitoring at levels of dose belowthe thresholds for deterministic effects requires proper identificationof populations at higher risk of developing radiation induced cancers.
(c) Reference levels for protection of people after emergency situation:People living in long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accidentor a radiation emergency
Even after the radiation source is under control, contaminated areasmay remain. Authorities will often implement all necessary protectivemeasures to allow people to continue to live there rather thanabandoning these areas. In this case, reference levels in the band of1 to 20 mSv per year, with the long-term goal of reducing referencelevels to 1 mSv per year are recommended.
EXAMPLE-2
IV-2.0 Accident: LOCA and containment intact
IV-2.1 Use of operational criteria: for emergency classification and protectiveactions
Observables: Observations by the operator
Emergency Action Levels (EALs): EALs are exceeded as defined in theEAL for PHWR/PWR for off-site emergency
Operational Intervention Levels (OILs): Radiological monitored dataaround the site
IV-2.2 Declaration of the emergency:
Declaration of general emergency/off-site emergency should be based onobservables and EALs.
IV-2.3 Initiation of protective actions:
(a) Precautionary urgent protective actions: Based on substantial riskanalysis (predefined): No substantial risk off-site.
No precautionary urgent protective actions required.
44
(b) Urgent protective action: Based on projected dose and OIL3 levels.
(i) Gamma (γ) 1 μSv/h at 1 m from surface or a source
(ii) 20 counts/s direct beta (β) surface contamination measurement
If the risk of stochastic effects is the main concern urgent and earlyprotective actions and other response actions, all of which are justifiedand optimised, should be implemented. These actions must be takenpromptly (normally within hours) in order to be effective, and theeffectiveness of which will be markedly reduced if it is delayed.These are evacuation, decontamination of individuals, sheltering,respiratory protection, iodine prophylaxis and restriction of theconsumption of potentially contaminated foodstuffs.
(c) Skin Contamination: OIL4
(i) Gamma (γ) 1 μSv/h at 10 cm from the skin
(ii) 1000 counts/s direct beta (β) skin contaminationmeasurement
(iii) 50 counts/s direct alpha (α) skin contaminationmeasurement
- Provide for skin decontamination and reduce inadvertentingestion
- Register and provide for a medical examination
(d) Protective actions based dose received: If the dose exceeds a particulargeneric criterion identified in Table 2 or 3, individuals should be providedwith appropriate medical attention, including medical treatment, long termhealth monitoring and psychological counselling. Other response actions fortreatment and management of severe deterministic effects should includeimmediate medical examination, consultation and treatment as indicated,contamination control, decorporation where applicable, registration for longterm health monitoring, and comprehensive psychological counselling
IV-2.4 Termination of urgent protective actions and early protective action:
When the projected dose is within or below reference level termination ofurgent protective actions and early protective action shall be initiated.
(a) Reference level for protection of people during emergencysituation
Residual dose (which includes dose contributions via all exposurepathways): Protective actions should be optimised for highest planned
45
residual dose in the band of 20 to 100 millisieverts (mSv) of projecteddose. To the extent possible the residual dose should be close to 20mSv.
IV-2.5 Long term protective action: OIL5 and OIL6 A protective actions that isnot an urgent protective action. Such protective actions are likely to beprolonged over weeks, months or years. These include measures such asrelocation, agricultural countermeasures and remedial actions.
Long term health monitoring of the persons affected should be carried out,such as to provide advanced medical care, to reduce their concern with regardto their health status and to advance scientific knowledge.
(a) Long term health monitoring is always justified at levels of doseabove the thresholds for deterministic effects.
(b) Justification of long term health monitoring at levels of dose belowthe thresholds for deterministic effects requires proper identificationof populations at higher risk of developing radiation induced cancers.
(c) Reference levels for protection of people after emergency situation:People living in long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accidentor a radiation emergency
Even after the radiation source is under control, contaminated areasmay remain. Authorities will often implement all necessary protectivemeasures to allow people to continue to live there rather thanabandoning these areas. In this case, reference levels in the band of1 to 20 mSv per year, with the long-term goal of reducing referencelevels to 1 mSv per year are recommended.
46
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM
LABORATORY ANALYSIS
RadionuclideH-3Be-7Be-10C-11C-14F-18Na-22Na-24Mg-28Al-26Si-31Si-32P-32P-33S-35Cl-36Cl-38K-40K-42K-43Ca-41Ca-45Ca-47Ni-63Ni-65Cu-64Cu-67
OIL6 (Bq/kg)2 X 105
7 X 105
3 X 103
2 X 109
1 X 104
2 X 108
2 X 103
4 X 106
4 X 105
1 X 103
5 X 107
9 X 102
2 X 104
1 X 105
1 X 104
3 X 103
3 X 108
NA3 X 106
4 X 106
4 X 104
8 X 103
5 X 104
2 X 104
4 X 107
1 X 107
8 X 105
RadionuclideSc-44Sc-46Sc-47Sc-48Ti-44V-48V-49Cr-51Mn-52Mn-53Mn-54Mn-56Fe-52Fe-55Fe-59Fe-60Co-55Co-56Co-57Co-58Co-58mCo-60Ni-59Sr-89Sr-90Sr-91Sr-92
OIL6 (Bq/kg)1 X 107
8 X 103
4 X 105
3 X 105
6 X 102
3 X 104
2 X 105
8 X 105
1 X 105
9 X 104
9 X 103
3 X 107
2 X 106
1 X 104
9 X 103
7 X 101
1 X 106
4 X 103
2 X 104
2 X 104
9 X 107
8 X 102
6 X 104
6 X 103
2 X 102
3 X 106
2 X 107
47
Zn-65Zn-69Zn-69mGa-67Ga-68Ga-72Ge-68Ge-71Ge-77As-72As-73As-74As-76As-77Se-75Se-79Br-76Br-77Br-82Rb-81Rb-83Rb-84Rb-86Rb-87Sr-82Sr-85Sr-85mSr-87m
2 X 103
6 X 108
3 X 106
1 X 106
2 X 108
1 X 106
3 X 103
5 X 106
6 X 106
4 X 105
3 X 104
3 X 104
4 X 105
1 X 106
4 X 103
7 X 102
3 X 106
5 X 106
1 X 106
8 X 107
7 X 103
1 X 104
1 X 104
2 X 103
5 X 103
3 X 104
3 X 109
3 X 108
Y-87Y-88Y-90Y-91Y-91mY-92Y-93Zr-88Zr-93Zr-95Zr-97Nb-93mNb-94Nb-95Nb-97Mo-93Mo-99Tc-95mTc-96Tc-96mTc-97Tc-97mTc-98Tc-99Tc-99mRu-97Ru-103Ru-105
4 X 105
9 X 103
9 X 104
5 X 103
2 X 109
1 X 107
1 X 106
3 X 104
2 X 104
6 X 103
5 X 105
2 X 104
2 X 103
5 X 104
2 X 108
3 X 103
5 X 105
3 X 104
2 X 105
2 X 109
4 X 104
2 X 104
2 X 103
4 X 103
2 X 108
2 X 106
3 X 104
2 X 107
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY
ANALYSIS (Contd.)
48
Ru-106Rh-99Rh-101Rh-102Rh-102mRh-103mRh-105Pd-103Pd-107Pd-109Ag-105Ag-108mAg-110mAg-111Cd-109Cd-113mCd-115Cd-115mIn-111In-113mIn-114mIn-115mSn-113Sn-117mSn-119mSn-121mSn-123Sn-125
6 X 102
1 X 105
8 X 103
2 X 103
5 X 103
5 X 109
1 X 106
2 X 105
7 X 104
2 X 106
5 X 104
2 X 103
2 X 103
7 X 104
3 X 103
4 X 102
2 X 105
6 X 103
1 X 106
4 X 108
3 X 103
5 X 107
1 X 104
7 X 104
1 X 104
5 X 103
3 X 103
2 X 104
Sb-126Te-121Te-121mTe-123mTe-125mTe-127Te-127mTe-129Te-129mTe-131Te-131mTe-132I-123I-124I-125I-126I-129I-131I-132I-133I-134I-135Cs-129Cs-131Cs-132Cs-134Cs-134mCs-135
3 X 104
1 X 105
3 X 103
5 X 103
1 X 104
1 X 107
3 X 103
2 X 108
6 X 103
4 X 108
3 X 105
5 X 104
5 X 106
1 X 104
1 X 103
2 X 103
NA3 X 103
2 X 107
1 X 105
2 X 108
2 X 106
1 X 107
2 X 106
4 X 105
1 X 103
3 X 108
9 X 103
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY
ANALYSIS (Contd.)
49
Sn-126Sb-122Sb-124Sb-125Ba-133mBa-140La-137La-140Ce-139Ce-141Ce-143Ce-144Pr-142Pr-143Nd-147Nd-149Pm-143Pm-144Pm-145Pm-147Pm-148mPm-149Pm-151Sm-145Sm-147Sm-151Sm-153Eu-147
5 X 102
2 X 105
5 X 103
3 X 103
9 X 105
1 X 104
4 X 104
2 X 105
3 X 104
3 X 104
5 X 104
8 X 102
6 X 105
4 X 104
6 X 104
8 X 107
3 X 104
6 X 103
3 X 104
1 X 104
1 X 104
3 X 105
8 X 105
2 X 104
1 X 102
3 X 104
5 X 105
8 X 104
Cs-136Cs-137Ba-131Ba-133Eu-156Gd-146Gd-148Gd-153Gd-159Tb-157Tb-158Tb-160Dy-159Dy-165Dy-166Ho-166Ho-166mEr-169Er-171Tm-167Tm-170Tm-171Yb-169Yb-175Lu-172Lu-173Lu-174Lu-174m
4 X 104
2 X 103
1 X 105
3 X 103
2 X 104
8 X 103
1 X 102
2 X 104
2 X 106
9 X 104
3 X 103
7 X 103
7 X 104
7 X 107
6 X 104
5 X 105
2 X 103
2 X 105
6 X 106
1 X 105
5 X 103
3 X 104
3 X 104
4 X 105
1 X 105
2 X 104
1 X 104
1 X 104
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY
ANALYSIS (Contd.)
50
Lu-177Hf-172Hf-175Hf-181Hf-182Ta-178aTa-179Ta-182Hg-194Hg-195Hg-195mHg-197Hg-197mHg-203Tl-200Tl-201Tl-202Tl-204Pb-201Pb-202Pb-203Pb-205Pb-210Pb-212Bi-205Bi-206Bi-207Bi-210
Eu-148Eu-149Eu-150bEu-150aEu-152Eu-152mEu-154Eu-155W-178W-181W-185W-187W-188Re-184Re-184mRe-186Re-187Re-188Re-189Os-185Os-191Os-191mOs-193Os-194Ir-189Ir-190Ir-192Ir-194
2 X 104
9 X 104
3 X 106
4 X 103
3 X 103
4 X 106
2 X 103
1 X 104
2 X 105
1 X 105
2 X 104
1 X 106
3 X 103
2 X 104
3 X 103
1 X 105
5 X 105
7 X 105
8 X 105
2 X 104
8 X 104
1 X 107
7 X 105
8 X 102
2 X 105
6 X 104
8 X 103
6 X 105
2 X 105
2 X 103
3 X 104
2 X 104
1 X 103
1 X 108
6 X 104
5 X 103
2 X 102
2 X 107
8 X 105
1 X 106
2 X 106
1 X 104
5 X 106
3 X 106
2 X 105
3 X 103
2 X 107
1 X 103
2 X 106
2 X 104
2.02 X 105
7 X 104
8 X 104
3 X 103
1 X 105
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY
ANALYSIS (Contd.)
51
Pt-188Pt-191Pt-193Pt-193mPt-195mPt-197Pt-197mAu-193Au-194Au-195Au-198Au-199Th-227Th-228Th-229Th-230Th-231Th-232Th-234Pa-230Pa-231Pa-233U-230U-232U-233U-234U-235U-236
6 X 104
9 X 105
8 X 104
3 X 105
3 X 105
2 X 106
1 X 108
8 X 106
1 X 106
2 X 104
3 X 105
5 X 105
9 X 101
2 X 101
8.05 X 101
2 X 106
4.08 X 103
5 X 104
2 X 101
3 X 104
8 X 102
2 X 101
1 X 102
2 X 102
2 X 102
2 X 102
Bi-210mBi-212Po-210At-211Ra-223Ra-224Ra-225Ra-226Ra-228Ac-225Ac-227Ac-228Pu-242Pu-244Am-241Am-242mAm-243Am-244Am-241/Be-9Cm-240Cm-241Cm-242Cm-243Cm-244Cm-245Cm-246Cm-247Cm-248
2 X 102
7 X 107
5.02 X 105
4 X 102
2 X 103
2 X 102
2 X 101
3.03 X 103
5.07 X 106
5 X 101
5 X 101
5 X 101
5 X 101
5 X 101
4 X 106
5 X 101
4 X 103
3 X 104
5 X 102
6 X 101
7 X 101
5 X 101
5 X 101
6 X 101
1 X 101
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY
ANALYSIS (Contd.)
APPENDIX - V (CONTD.)
RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OPERATION INTERVENTION LEVELS(OILs)
TABLE 13 : RADIONUCLIDE SPECIFIC OILs FOR FOOD, MILKAND ATER CONCENTRATIONS FROM LABORATORY
ANALYSIS (Contd.)
U-238Np-235Np-236lNp-236sNp-237Np-239Pu-236Pu-237Pu-238Pu-239Pu-240Pu-241
1 X 102
7 X 104
8 X 102
4 X 106
9 X 101
4 X 105
1 X 102
2 X 105
5 X 101
5 X 101
5 X 101
4 X 103
Bk-247Bk-249Cf-248Cf-249Cf-250Cf-251Cf-252Cf-253Cf-254Es-253Pu-239/Be-9
2 X 101
1 X 104
2 X 102
2 X 101
4 X 101
2 X 101
4 X 101
3 X 104
3 X 101
5 X 103
5 X 101
52
53
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (A
)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E
Glo
bal p
ower
(AP)
incr
ease
lead
ing
toau
to a
ctua
tion
of P
SSor
SDS-
1 or
SSS
or
SDS-
2 on
neu
troni
cpa
ram
eter
s (Li
n N
,Lo
g ra
te)
AP/
DP
(Pre
-trip
alar
m),
AP/
DP
mor
eth
an o
ne d
ecad
e- O
ccur
renc
e of
unin
tend
ed re
acto
rpo
wer
rise
/crit
ical
ityor
;- A
P-D
P>4%
FP(a
larm
)and
man
ual/
auto
act
uatio
n of
SSS
/SD
S-2
----
-
----
-
----
-
----
-
----
-
----
-
1.R
EA
CT
IVIT
Y A
ND
PO
WE
R D
IST
RIB
UT
ION
AN
OM
AL
IES
(a)
Unc
ontro
lled
reac
tivity
add
ition
toth
e co
re d
urin
g po
wer
ope
ratio
ns b
yan
y m
eans
such
as u
ncon
trolle
dw
ithdr
awal
of a
djus
ters
/ZC
C fo
rla
rge
reac
tors
, los
s of
reac
tor
regu
latio
n, m
al-o
pera
tion
ofm
oder
ator
pur
ifica
tion
syst
em o
rhe
avy
wat
er a
dditi
on r
esul
ting
inde
crea
se in
bor
on c
once
ntra
tion
orpr
ecip
itatio
n of
gad
olin
ium
poi
son
etc.
(LO
RA
)(b
)D
urin
g S/
D c
ondi
tion
failu
re to
mai
ntai
n re
acto
r in
long
term
subc
ritic
al st
ate
due
to d
ecre
ase
inbo
ron
conc
entra
tion
(or a
ny o
ther
neut
ron
pois
on) i
n m
oder
ator
sys
tem
54
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E
Aut
o ac
tuat
ion
ofre
acto
r trip
on
neut
roni
c pa
ram
eter
(Log
rate
, Lin
N) w
ithau
to in
itiat
ion
ofLO
CA
sign
al
Aut
o ac
tuat
ion
ofre
acto
r trip
on
proc
ess
para
met
ers (
PHT
low
pres
sure
/sto
rage
tank
low
leve
l) w
ith a
uto
initi
atio
n of
LO
CA
sign
al
Con
ditio
n B
and
appe
aran
ce o
f pum
pro
om p
ress
ure
very
high
and
initi
atio
n of
ECC
S lig
ht w
ater
inje
ctio
n.
-C
ondi
tion
B a
ndap
pear
ance
of p
ump
room
pre
ssur
e ve
ryhi
gh a
nd-
Initi
atio
n of
EC
CS
light
wat
er in
ject
ion.
Con
ditio
n C
with
cont
ainm
ent
impa
irmen
t or
cond
ition
B a
ndfa
ilure
of E
CC
S or
cond
ition
C w
ithm
ultip
le ra
diat
ion
mon
itors
of R
Bsh
owin
g >1
00 ti
mes
incr
ease
(per
sist
ent)
in ra
diat
ion
field
s.C
ondi
tion
B a
ndfa
ilure
of E
CC
S or
cond
ition
C w
ithco
ntai
nmen
tim
pairm
ent
orco
nditi
on C
with
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs o
f RB
show
ing
>100
tim
esin
crea
se (p
ersi
sten
t)in
radi
atio
n fie
lds.
Con
ditio
n B
and
failu
re o
f EC
CS
with
loss
of
mod
erat
or h
eat s
ink
or m
ultip
lera
diat
ion
mon
itors
of R
B sh
owin
g>
1000
tim
esin
crea
se(p
ersi
sten
t) in
radi
atio
n fie
lds.
Con
ditio
n B
and
failu
re o
f EC
CS
with
loss
of
mod
erat
or h
eat s
ink
or m
ultip
lera
diat
ion
mon
itors
of R
B sh
owin
g>1
000
times
incr
ease
(per
sist
ent)
inra
diat
ion
field
s.
2.D
EC
RE
ASE
IN P
HT
SY
STE
M IN
VE
NT
OR
Y(a
)R
uptu
re a
t any
loca
tion
of P
HT
syst
em p
ipin
g of
a si
ze b
igge
r tha
ndo
uble
end
ed la
rges
t fee
der p
ipe
and
incl
udin
g up
to d
oubl
e en
ded
guill
otin
e br
eak
of b
igge
st p
ipin
g in
the
syst
em (L
arge
bre
ak L
OC
A)
(b)
Rup
ture
at a
ny lo
catio
n of
PH
Tfe
eder
s (sm
all L
OC
A)
55
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y Ale
rtD
ecla
re p
lant
Dec
lare
site
Dec
lare
off
-site
emer
genc
y if
emer
genc
y if
em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
(c)
Failu
re o
f coo
lant
cha
nnel
clo
ser
plug
lea
ding
to e
ject
ion
of fu
elbu
ndle
s fr
om c
oola
nt c
hann
els
and
cons
eque
ntia
l LO
CA
(Sm
all L
OC
A)
(d)
PHT
syst
em le
ak c
oupl
ed w
ith th
efo
llow
ing
i.Le
ak in
to c
onta
inm
ent
Aut
o ac
tuat
ion
ofre
acto
r trip
on
proc
ess
para
met
ers(
PHT
low
pres
sure
/sto
rage
tank
low
leve
l) w
ith a
uto
initi
atio
n of
LO
CA
sign
al
- Sha
rp d
rop
in P
HT
stor
age
tank
leve
l and
beet
le a
larm
- Inc
reas
ing
trend
inst
ack
loss
; and
- Aut
o ac
tuat
ion
ofre
acto
r trip
; and
- Aut
o in
itiat
ion
ofPH
T fa
st c
ool d
own
and
smal
l lea
kha
ndlin
g sy
stem
Con
ditio
n B
and
appe
aran
ce o
f pum
pro
om p
ress
ure
very
high
and
-initi
atio
n of
ECC
S lig
ht w
ater
inje
ctio
n.
Con
ditio
n B
and
failu
re o
f any
of t
hem
itiga
ting
syst
ems ;
- Sm
all l
eak
hand
ling
syst
em; o
r- C
onta
inm
ent b
ox u
p
Con
ditio
n C
with
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs o
f RB
show
ing
>100
tim
esin
crea
se (p
ersi
sten
t)in
radi
atio
n fie
lds..
Con
ditio
n C
with
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs o
f RB
show
ing
>100
tim
esin
crea
se (p
ersi
sten
t)in
radi
atio
n fie
lds.
Con
ditio
n C
with
cont
ainm
ent
impa
irmen
t or
cond
ition
B a
ndfa
ilure
of E
CC
Sw
ith L
oss o
fm
oder
ator
hea
t sin
kor
mul
tiple
radi
atio
n m
onito
rsof
RB
show
ing
>100
0 tim
esin
crea
se (p
ersi
sten
t)in
radi
atio
n fie
lds.
----
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
56
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y Ale
rtD
ecla
re p
lant
Dec
lare
site
Dec
lare
Off
-site
emer
genc
y if
emer
genc
y if
em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
ii.SG
tube
rupt
ure
(e)
Failu
re o
f Shu
tdow
n co
olin
g sy
stem
pum
ps to
rem
ove
deca
y he
at.
Sha
rp d
rop
in P
HT
stor
age
tank
leve
l and
shar
p, in
crea
se in
SG
feed
wat
er a
ctiv
ity;
and
auto
act
uatio
n of
reac
tor t
rip; o
r Aut
oin
itiat
ion
of P
HT
syst
em fa
st c
ool d
own
and
smal
l lea
kha
ndlin
g sy
stem
All
SGs o
n ei
ther
side
are
not f
illed
from
seco
ndar
y si
de le
adin
gto
loss
of t
herm
osi
phon
ing
whe
n PH
Tsy
stem
is in
clo
sed
cond
ition
and
fai
lure
to e
stab
lish
forc
edci
rcul
atio
n fo
r 30
min
utes
Con
ditio
n B
and
pers
istin
g ve
ry h
igh
activ
ity in
SG
feed
wat
er sy
stem
; and
activ
ity r
elea
se to
envi
ronm
ent t
hrou
ghun
auth
oris
ed ro
ute
viz
ASD
Vs
Con
ditio
n B
and
failu
re to
inje
ctem
erge
ncy
feed
wat
erto
SG
s or
failu
re to
re-e
stab
lish
forc
edci
rcul
atio
n a
nd P
HT
heat
up
lead
ing
toop
enin
g of
relie
fva
lves
(PH
T st
orag
eta
nk R
V-/IR
V/B
CD
)
----
--
Exte
nded
failu
re to
esta
blis
h co
reco
olin
g ei
ther
by
forc
ed c
ircul
atio
n or
by th
erm
o-sy
phon
ing.
----
--
----
--
57
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E
Con
ditio
n B
cont
inui
ng fo
r 6m
inut
es a
nd in
itiat
ion
of c
rash
coo
l dow
nan
d fir
e w
ater
inje
ctio
n in
to S
Gs
Con
ditio
n B
and
inab
ility
to p
utem
erge
ncy
feed
wat
eran
d/fir
e w
ater
in S
G.
Leak
is n
on-is
olab
le;
Inab
ility
to in
ject
emer
genc
y fe
edw
ater
into
SG
sfo
llow
ing
cond
ition
B o
r con
ditio
n C
exte
ndin
g fo
r > 8
hrs
or In
itiat
ion
of s
mal
lbr
eak
LOC
A th
roug
hPH
T re
lief r
oute
(PH
T st
orag
e ta
nkRV
/IRV
/BC
D)
Con
ditio
n C
with
initi
atio
n of
sm
all
brea
k LO
CA
thro
ugh
PHT
relie
f rou
te(P
HT
stor
age
tank
RV-/I
RV/B
CD
)
----
-
----
-
----
-
----
-
3.FA
ILU
RE
OF
EL
EC
TR
ICA
L A
ND
PR
OC
ESS
SY
STE
MS
(a)
Stat
ion
blac
k ou
t
(b)
Rup
ture
at a
ny lo
catio
n of
any
pip
ein
act
ive
proc
ess w
ater
syst
em/
Act
ive
proc
ess w
ater
coo
ling
syst
em
(c)
Rup
ture
in m
oder
ator
syst
em p
ipe.
Cla
ss-I
V p
ower
supp
lyfa
ilure
and
Cla
ss-I
IIPo
wer
Sup
ply
not
rest
ored
on
auto
Inab
ility
to p
ut fi
rew
ater
in S
/D H
X
Incr
ease
in tr
itium
DA
C>1
000
in ac
cess
ible
area
sor
sect
ion
of R
B fo
r mor
eth
an a
day
; or
tri
tium
rele
ase
from
the
rea
ctor
buil
ding
exc
eeds
>10
tim
es
of
the
dail
yte
chni
cal
spec
ific
atio
nlim
its
58
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E4.
RA
DIA
TIO
N L
EV
EL
S(a
)Lo
ss o
f spe
nt fu
el c
oolin
g du
ring
FT o
pera
tion
(b)
Loss
of c
oolin
g to
spen
t fue
l bay
bund
les
Loss
of s
pent
fuel
cool
ing
duri
ng
FT
oper
atio
nle
adin
g to
per
sist
ent
FTro
om h
igh
radi
atio
n al
arm
Loss
of c
oolin
g of
spe
ntfu
el f
or m
ore
than
48
hrs
as id
entif
ied
by a
nyof
the
follo
win
g :
- Low
flow
ala
rm- S
FSB
wat
er le
vel L
Oal
arm
on
CO
IS- B
ay w
ater
O/L
tem
pe-
ratu
re h
igh.
(50
degC
) or
- Con
tinuo
us d
rop
infu
el p
ool w
ater
leve
l
Pers
iste
nce
ofco
nditi
on B
. and
-RB
exh
aust
act
ivity
high
ala
rm/a
ctua
tion
of R
B b
ox u
p lo
gic
Loss
of c
oolin
g of
spen
t fue
l for
mor
eth
an 7
day
s (Ti
me
tobo
il) le
adin
g to
wat
erte
mpe
ratu
re to
rise
to10
0 de
gree
Cor C
ontin
uous
dro
p in
fuel
poo
l wat
er le
vel
due
to a
ny re
ason
.
Con
ditio
n B
and
cont
ainm
ent
impa
irmen
t (fa
ilure
of c
onta
inm
ent
isol
atio
n lo
gic/
com
pone
nt) l
eadi
ngto
act
ivity
rele
ase
tosi
te e
nviro
nmen
t and
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs o
f RB
show
ing
>100
incr
ease
(per
sist
ent)
in ra
diat
ion
field
sC
ondi
tion
C a
ndre
leas
e of
act
ivity
mor
e th
an te
n tim
esof
lim
its th
roug
hst
ack
rout
e. o
rm
ultip
le ra
diat
ion
mon
itors
of S
Bsh
owin
g >1
00 ti
mes
incr
ease
(per
sist
ent)
in ra
diat
ion
field
s.
----
-
----
-
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
59
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E(c
)R
uptu
re o
f rad
ioac
tive
liqui
d st
orag
eta
nks/
stor
age
tank
dyk
esR
uptu
re o
f rad
ioac
tive
liqui
d st
orag
e ta
nks/
stor
age
tank
dyk
es.
Rup
ture
of
radi
oact
ive
liqui
dst
orag
e ta
nks/
stor
age
tank
dyk
es re
sulti
ngin
spill
age
ofra
dioa
ctiv
e w
ater
outs
ide
dyke
are
a.
----
---
---
Occ
urre
nce
of se
ism
icev
ent b
ased
on
seis
mic
alar
m (g
roun
dac
cele
ratio
n ve
ry h
igh;
or n
otifi
catio
n re
ceiv
edfo
r tsu
nam
i for
coa
stal
site
Occ
urre
nce
of t
urbi
nebl
ade
failu
re l
eadi
ng t
ofir
e an
d el
ectri
cal p
ower
lost
to
m
ajor
sa
fety
rela
ted
equi
pmen
ts.
Abn
orm
al r
ains
in a
ndar
ound
the
site
; or
Occ
urre
nce
of se
ism
icev
ent o
f >O
BE
leve
lan
d au
to/m
anua
lR
eact
or tr
ip.
Turb
ine
blad
e fa
ilure
lead
ing
to o
il/H
2 fir
e.
Occ
urre
nce
of fl
ood
insi
de p
lant
are
aseq
ual t
o or
mor
e th
an
Occ
urre
nce
of se
ism
icev
ent o
f equ
al to
or
mor
e th
an S
SE le
vel
----
-
- Flo
od le
vels
exc
eed
desi
gn b
asis
lead
ing
to -
Impa
ired
Incr
ease
in ra
diat
ion
fiel
ds
to
1µSv
/har
ound
site
bou
ndar
yan
d co
ncur
renc
e of
seis
mic
eve
nt
----
-
----
-
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
5.N
AT
UR
AL
CA
LA
MIT
Y, F
IRE
, SE
CU
RIT
Y A
ND
OT
HE
R E
VE
NT
S(a
)Se
ism
ic e
vent
(b)
Turb
ine
failu
re le
adin
g to
mis
sile
bein
g th
row
n of
f
(c)
Floo
d ev
ent
60
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E
(d)
Cyc
lone
eve
nt
(e)
Dam
failu
re le
adin
g to
loss
of
ultim
ate
heat
sink
----
-
----
-
----
-
The
wat
er b
ody
near
the
site
at d
ange
r lev
el; o
rfa
ilure
of p
ipe
or ta
nk in
the
plan
t lea
ding
tolo
calis
ed fl
oodi
ng
Adv
isor
y is
sued
by
met
eoro
logi
cal
depa
rtmen
t hig
h w
ind
spee
ds a
roun
d th
e si
te
Dam
failu
re le
adin
g to
failu
re o
f pla
nt m
ake
upw
ater
.
Des
ign
basi
s flo
odle
vel d
ue to
any
reas
on.;
orup
stre
am d
am fa
ilure
,pr
ecip
itatio
n be
yond
the
drai
nage
cap
acity
lead
ing
to fl
oodi
ng o
fpl
ant a
reas
Cyc
lone
hits
the
site
;an
d In
terr
uptio
n in
off-
site
pow
er su
pply
;or
mov
emen
t of
stat
ion
pers
onne
l is
affe
cted
Exte
nded
failu
re o
fm
ake
up w
ater
syst
eman
d de
crea
se in
sto
red
func
tions
of s
afet
ysy
stem
s i.e
.-EC
CS,
Emer
genc
y A
C p
ower
supp
ly o
r em
erge
ncy
feed
wat
er su
pply
for
a pr
olon
ged
perio
dflo
od w
ater
show
sra
dioa
ctiv
eco
ntam
inat
ion
mor
eth
an 1
00B
q/kg
of
gros
s be
ta o
r 5B
q/kg
of g
ross
alp
ha.
Cyc
lone
hits
the
site
;an
d Im
paire
dfu
nctio
ns o
f saf
ety
syst
ems l
ike
ECC
S,Em
erge
ncy
AC
pow
ersu
pply
or e
mer
genc
yfe
ed w
ater
supp
ly fo
ra
prol
onge
d pe
riod.
----
-
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
61
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
cond
ition
sE
mer
genc
y al
ert
Dec
lare
pla
ntD
ecla
re si
teD
ecla
re o
ff-s
iteem
erge
ncy
ifem
erge
ncy
if e
mer
genc
y if
AB
CD
E
(f)
Fire
in m
ain
cont
rol r
oom
, tur
bine
,re
acto
r and
con
trol b
uild
ing,
(g)
Oth
er e
vent
s suc
h as
airc
raft
atta
ck,
mis
sile
cra
sh, e
xplo
sion
, ent
ry o
fto
xic/
flam
mab
le g
ases
in v
ital a
reas
(h)
A lo
cal s
ocia
l dis
turb
ance
cau
sing
abse
nce
of st
atio
n st
aff f
or sa
feop
erat
ion
of t
he p
lant
.
----
-
----
-
----
-
Pers
iste
nt fi
re in
turb
ine
build
ing
oper
atin
g flo
or,
insi
de p
ump
room
,co
ntro
l roo
m, c
ontro
leq
uipm
ent r
oom
, ser
vice
build
ing,
con
trol
build
ing
Mov
emen
t of p
lant
pers
onne
l to
and
from
the
plan
t/col
ony
isin
terr
upte
d
wat
er in
vent
ory
ofem
erge
ncy
mak
e up
pond
;Fa
ilure
of s
afet
ysy
stem
s due
to fi
re; o
rif
ther
e is
a c
hanc
e of
inte
rrup
tion
in c
ore
cool
ing;
or c
ontro
lro
om b
ecom
esun
inha
bita
ble
due
tosm
oke/
fire
Maj
or fi
res,
num
ber
of p
lant
per
sonn
el g
etin
jure
d lo
ss o
f pow
ersu
pply
, fai
lure
of
safe
ty sy
stem
sEx
tend
ed a
bsen
ce o
fac
cess
of k
ey p
lant
man
agem
ent
pers
onne
l
----
-
----
-
----
-
APP
END
IX -
VI (
A) (
CO
NTD
.)TA
BL
E 1
4 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
PH
WR
62
APP
END
IX -
VI (
B)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Failu
re t
o fu
lly s
hut
dow
n(in
crea
sing
neu
tron
flux)
3 as
part
of
norm
al s
hutd
own
with
suf
ficie
nt h
eat r
emov
alav
aila
ble
(ulti
mat
e he
at si
nkav
aila
ble
and
suff
icie
nt)
Vess
el w
ater
leve
lde
crea
sing
ove
r a lo
nger
time
perio
d th
an e
xpec
ted
whi
le sy
stem
s are
resp
ondi
ng a
s de
sign
ed
Failu
re to
scra
m w
hen
abov
e 5%
pow
er [o
r ins
ert
site
spec
ific
pow
er le
vel]
and
abno
rmal
con
ditio
nsin
dica
te th
at a
n au
tom
atic
or m
anua
l scr
am is
nece
ssar
y
Vess
el w
ater
leve
l is o
r is
proj
ecte
d to
be
belo
w to
pof
act
ive
fuel
Failu
re to
scra
m w
hen
abov
e 5%
pow
er [o
rin
sert
site
spec
ific
pow
erle
vel]
and
abn
orm
alco
nditi
ons
indi
cate
that
an
auto
mat
ic o
r man
ual
scra
m is
nec
essa
ry
Vess
el w
ater
leve
l is o
r is
proj
ecte
d to
be
belo
w to
pof
act
ive
fuel
for m
ore
than
10
min
Failu
re to
scra
m w
hen
abov
e 5%
pow
er[o
rin
sert
site
spec
ific
pow
er le
vel]
2 and
any
of
the
follo
win
g:- P
ress
uris
ed w
ater
reac
tor n
egat
ive
cool
ing
mar
gin.
o
r- V
esse
l wat
er le
vel
belo
w to
p of
activ
e fu
el
or
- Maj
or (1
00-1
000
times
) inc
reas
esin
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs
or- O
ther
indi
catio
n of
actu
al o
rimm
inen
t cor
eda
mag
eVe
ssel
wat
er le
vel i
s, or
is p
roje
cted
to b
e, b
elow
top
of a
ctiv
e fu
el fo
rm
ore
than
15
min
Failu
re to
sto
p nu
clea
rre
actio
n1
Inad
equa
te c
ore
cool
ing
- ves
sel l
evel
4
CR
ITIC
AL
SAFE
TY
FU
NC
TIO
N I
MPA
IRM
EN
T
63
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
----
---
---
----
-
Vess
el w
ater
leve
l is o
r is
proj
ecte
d to
be b
elow
top
of a
ctiv
e fu
el a
nd a
nyof
the
follo
win
g:- V
esse
l inj
ectio
n ra
te le
ssth
an [u
se c
apac
ity v
ersu
spr
essu
re c
urve
s of
oper
atin
g pu
mps
]or
- Maj
or (1
00- 1
000
times
) inc
reas
es in
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rsor
- Oth
er in
dica
tions
of
imm
inen
t or a
ctua
l cor
eda
mag
eN
ote:
Imm
inen
t rea
ctor
cool
ant s
yste
m o
rco
ntai
nmen
t bou
ndar
yfa
ilure
mig
ht b
eco
nsid
ered
as
addi
tiona
lcr
iteria
.5
Not
es a
bout
leve
lm
easu
rem
ent:
- Pre
ssur
ised
wat
erre
acto
r pre
ssur
izer
leve
ls m
ay n
ot b
e va
lidin
dica
tors
of v
esse
lw
ater
leve
l und
erac
cide
nt c
ondi
tions
- Pre
ssur
ised
wat
erre
acto
r wat
er le
vels
mea
sure
d in
the
vess
elca
n ha
ve c
onsi
dera
ble
unce
rtain
ties
(30%
)an
d sh
ould
onl
y be
used
for t
rend
asse
ssm
ent
- Boi
ling
wat
er re
acto
rhi
gh d
ry w
ell
tem
pera
ture
and
low
pres
sure
acc
iden
ts(e
.g. L
OC
As)
can
caus
e th
e w
ater
leve
l to
read
err
oneo
usly
hig
h
64
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Cor
e ex
it th
erm
ocou
ple
read
ing
grea
ter t
han
370o C
Una
vaila
bilit
y of
the
norm
al f
eed
wat
er s
yste
mfo
r dec
ay h
eat r
emov
al7
Pres
suriz
ed w
ater
rea
ctor
-pr
imar
ysys
tem
pre
ssur
e an
dte
mpe
ratu
re
indi
cate
nega
tive
cool
ing
mar
gin
onth
e ba
sis
of F
ig. 7
for
mor
eth
an 5
min
Not
e: N
egat
ive
cool
ing
mar
gin
is re
ad a
s so
on a
sth
e sy
stem
tem
pera
ture
ishi
gher
than
the
satu
ratio
nte
mpe
ratu
re a
t the
set
pres
sure
of t
he re
acto
rco
olan
t sys
tem
safe
tyva
lves
.11
Cor
e ex
it th
erm
ocou
ple
read
ing
grea
ter t
han
500o C
Act
ual f
ailu
re o
r pro
ject
edlo
ng te
rm fa
ilure
of t
heab
ility
to re
mov
e de
cay
heat
to th
e en
viro
nmen
t
----
-
Cor
e ex
it th
erm
ocou
ple
read
ing
grea
ter t
han
650o C
Act
ual f
ailu
re o
r pro
ject
edlo
ng te
rm fa
ilure
of t
heab
ility
to re
mov
e de
cay
heat
to th
e en
viro
nmen
t,po
tent
ially
aff
ectin
g th
eab
ility
to p
rote
ct th
e co
re
Pres
suris
ed w
ater
reac
tor
- neg
ativ
e co
olin
g m
argi
non
the
basi
s of
Fig
. 7 fo
rm
ore
than
15
min
[or
inse
rt si
te sp
ecifi
c tim
eth
at c
ore
dam
age
ispo
ssib
le fo
llow
ing
a lo
ssof
coo
lant
acc
iden
t]
Cor
e ex
it th
erm
ocou
ple
read
ing
grea
ter t
han
800o C
----
-
Pres
suris
ed w
ater
reac
tor
- neg
ativ
e co
olin
g m
argi
non
the
basi
s of
Fig
. 7or
prim
ary
syst
emte
mpe
ratu
re e
xcee
ds sc
ale
for m
ore
than
15
min
[or
inse
rt si
te sp
ecifi
c tim
efo
r co
re d
amag
efo
llow
ing
a lo
ss o
fco
olan
t acc
iden
t]an
d an
yof
the
follo
win
g:- v
esse
l inj
ectio
n ra
te le
ssth
an w
ater
loss
due
tode
cay
heat
boi
l off
[use
Inad
equa
te c
ore
cool
ing
- cor
ete
mpe
ratu
re6
Inad
equa
te c
ore
cool
ing
- dec
ay h
eat
rem
oval
(con
side
ring
the
oper
atio
ns o
fpu
mps
, pip
ing,
hea
tex
chan
gers
, hea
t sin
ks,
pow
er su
pply
, aux
iliar
yflu
id)
Pres
suris
ed w
ater
reac
tor -
abno
rmal
prim
ary
syst
emte
mpe
ratu
rein
adeq
uate
cor
eco
olin
g)N
ote:
Tem
pera
ture
shou
ld b
e m
easu
red
inth
e ve
ssel
. Mos
tpr
essu
rized
wat
erre
acto
rs h
ave
core
exi
tth
erm
ocou
ples
tom
easu
re te
mpe
ratu
res
in th
e ve
ssel
. Use
the
65
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
AC
or D
C p
ower
nee
ded
for
oper
atio
n of
safe
ty sy
stem
s
----
-
----
-A
ctua
l or p
roje
cted
loss
of A
C o
r DC
pow
er
Fig
. 8 a
nd c
apac
ityve
rsus
pre
ssur
e cu
rves
of
oper
atin
g pu
mps
]9
or- V
esse
l wat
er le
vel
belo
w to
p of
activ
e fu
elor
- Maj
or (1
00- 1
000
times
) inc
reas
es in
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rsor
- Oth
er in
dica
tions
of
actu
al o
rimm
inen
t cor
eda
mag
eN
ote:
Imm
inen
t rea
ctor
cool
ant s
yste
m o
rco
ntai
nmen
t bou
ndar
yfa
ilure
mig
ht b
eco
nsid
ered
as
addi
tiona
lcr
iteria
.10
Act
ual o
r pro
ject
ed lo
ssof
all
AC
or D
C p
ower
aver
age
of th
e hi
ghes
tfo
ur c
ore
exit
ther
moc
oupl
e re
adin
gs.
If th
ere
is w
ater
flow
,th
e ho
t leg
tem
pera
ture
(Tho
t) co
uld
be u
sed
ifco
re e
xit t
herm
o-co
uple
s ar
e no
tav
aila
ble,
alth
ough
this
indi
catio
n is
less
prom
pt.8
For b
oilin
g w
ater
reac
tors
ther
e ar
e no
inst
rum
ents
that
prov
ide
a va
lid r
eadi
ngof
cor
e te
mpe
ratu
re.
Loss
of A
C o
r DC
pow
er so
urce
s
66
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
and
thei
r sup
porti
ngsy
stem
sis
lost
or r
educ
ed to
a s
ingl
eso
urce
----
-
need
ed fo
r ope
ratio
n of
safe
tysy
stem
s and
thei
rsu
ppor
ting
syst
ems f
orm
ore
than
30
min
[or
inse
rt si
tesp
ecifi
c tim
ere
quire
d to
unc
over
thec
ore]
need
ed fo
r ope
ratio
n of
safe
ty sy
stem
s and
thei
rsu
ppor
ting
syst
ems i
slik
ely
for m
ore
than
45
min
[or i
nser
t site
spec
ific
time
requ
ired
toun
cove
r cor
e fo
r mor
eth
an 1
5 m
in]
Loss
of a
ll A
C o
r DC
pow
er n
eede
d fo
r saf
ety
syst
ems o
pera
tion
and
any
of th
e fo
llow
ing:
- Ves
sel w
ater
leve
lbe
low
top
of a
ctiv
e fu
elor
- Maj
or (1
00- 1
000
times
) inc
reas
es in
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs
o
r- O
ther
indi
catio
n of
actu
al o
rimm
inen
t cor
eda
mag
e
67
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Con
ditio
ns w
hich
are
not
unde
rsto
od a
nd w
hich
coul
d po
tent
ially
aff
ect
safe
ty sy
stem
sU
nrel
iabl
e fu
nctio
ning
of
seve
ral
safe
ty
syst
emin
stru
men
ts o
r con
trols
in th
eco
ntro
l roo
m f
or m
ore
than
15 m
in
----
-
Una
vaila
bilit
y of
safe
tysy
stem
inst
rum
ents
or
cont
rols
in th
e co
ntro
lro
om fo
r mor
e th
an 1
5 m
inan
d m
ajor
tran
sien
t in
prog
ress
----
-
Una
vaila
bilit
y of
safe
tysy
stem
inst
rum
ents
or
cont
rols
in th
e co
ntro
lro
om fo
r mor
e th
an 1
5m
in a
nd m
ajor
trans
ient
inpr
ogre
ss p
oten
tially
affe
ctin
g th
e ab
ility
topr
otec
t the
cor
e
----
-
Una
vaila
bilit
y of
safe
tysy
stem
inst
rum
ents
or
cont
rols
in th
e co
ntro
lro
om a
nd re
mot
e co
ntro
llo
catio
ns a
nd a
ny o
f the
follo
win
g:- V
esse
l wat
er le
vel
belo
w to
p of
activ
e fu
el
or
- Maj
or (1
00- 1
000
times
) inc
reas
esin
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs
or
- Oth
er in
dica
tions
of
imm
inen
t ora
ctua
l cor
eda
mag
e
Con
diti
ons
of
anun
know
n ca
use a
ffect
ing
safe
ty sy
stem
s
Loss
of o
r deg
rade
dco
ntro
l of s
afet
ysy
stem
s inc
ludi
ng p
ost-
acci
dent
inst
rum
enta
tion12
68
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Act
ual o
r pr
edic
ted
failu
res
leav
ing
only
one
tra
in t
opr
even
t cor
e da
mag
e, s
pent
fuel
dam
age
or a
maj
orre
leas
e
131 I
conc
entra
tion
is g
reat
erth
an [i
nser
t site
spec
ific
valu
e 10
0 tim
es th
ete
chni
cal s
peci
ficat
ions
or
othe
rope
ratio
nal l
imits
]
----
-
131 I
conc
entra
tion
is g
reat
erth
an [i
nser
t site
spec
ific
valu
e 12
0 tim
es th
ete
chni
cal s
peci
ficat
ions
or
othe
r op
erat
iona
l lim
its]
Failu
re o
f an
addi
tiona
lsa
fety
syst
emco
mpo
nent
will
resu
lt in
unc
over
ing
of th
e co
re o
r spe
nt fu
el
131 I
conc
entra
tion
is g
reat
erth
an [
inse
rt s
ite s
peci
ficva
lue
indi
catin
grel
ease
of
20%
of t
he g
ap in
vent
ory]
Loss
for
mor
e th
an 4
5m
in o
f al
l th
e sy
stem
sre
quir
ed t
o pr
otec
t th
eco
re o
r sp
ent
fuel
[or
inse
rt s
ite s
peci
fic t
ime
requ
ired
to u
ncov
er c
ore
for
mor
e th
an 1
5 m
in]
131 I
co
ncen
trat
ion
isgr
eate
r th
an
[inse
rt s
itesp
ecifi
c val
ues f
or re
leas
eof
10%
of c
ore i
nven
tory
]
Maj
or in
crea
sed
risk
ofda
mag
e to
thec
ore
orsp
ent f
uel
Not
e: C
ore
dam
age
can
occu
r if t
he c
ore
isun
cove
red
for m
ore
than
15
min
.H
igh
131 I
conc
entra
tion
in th
e pr
imar
y co
olan
tN
ote:
Coo
lant
sam
ples
shou
ld n
ot b
etak
en if
they
will
resu
lt in
hig
hin
divi
dual
dos
es.
- Use
onl
y co
ncen
-tra
tions
from
sam
ples
take
n af
ter t
he st
art o
fth
e ev
ent
- Coo
lant
con
cen-
tratio
ns m
ay n
ot b
ere
pres
enta
tive
- Ass
umes
the
core
may
not b
e co
olab
le a
fter
10%
mel
t
LO
SS O
F FI
SSIO
N P
RO
DU
CT
BA
RR
IER
S
69
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Prim
ary
syst
em le
ak ra
te fo
rm
ore
tha
n 15
min
gre
ater
than
2%
of n
orm
al fu
ll po
wer
feed
wat
er fl
ow17
(for
boi
ling
wat
er r
eact
or r
efer
to
the
reac
tor
cool
ant
inve
ntor
yco
ntro
l sy
stem
) [i
nser
t si
tesp
ecifi
c in
dica
tors
— a
s an
alte
rnat
ive,
ref
eren
ce t
ono
rmal
cha
rgin
g flo
w m
ight
be m
ade]
[Ins
ert s
ite sp
ecifi
cre
adin
gs fr
om p
ost a
ccid
ent
sam
plin
g sy
stem
indi
catin
gre
leas
e of
0.5
% o
f gap
inve
ntor
y]
----
-
[Ins
ert
site
sp
ecif
icre
adin
gs
from
post
acci
dent
sam
plin
g sy
stem
indi
catin
g re
leas
e of 1
% o
fga
p in
vent
ory]
Prim
ary
syst
em l
eak
for
mor
e tha
n 15
min
requ
iring
all
norm
al
and
high
pres
sure
em
erge
ncy
core
cool
ant s
yste
ms t
o m
aint
ain
prim
ary
syst
em w
ater
leve
l[i
nser
t si
te
spec
ific
indi
cato
rs]
[Ins
ert
site
sp
ecif
icre
adin
gs
from
po
stac
cide
nt
sam
plin
gsy
stem
13in
dica
ting
rele
ase
of 2
0% o
f gap
inve
ntor
y14]
Prim
ary
syst
em le
akre
quiri
ng a
ll no
rmal
and
high
pre
ssur
e em
erge
ncy
core
coo
lant
syst
ems t
om
aint
ain
prim
ary
syst
emw
ater
leve
l15 a
nd a
nyof
the
follo
win
g:- I
njec
tion
into
the
vess
el le
ss th
an t
here
quire
d ra
te fo
und.
or- V
esse
l wat
er le
vel
belo
w to
p of
act
ive
fuel
and
decr
easi
ng
or
- Maj
or (1
00- 1
000
times
) inc
reas
es in
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs
Con
firm
ed c
ore
dam
age
Prim
ary
syst
em le
ak
70
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Pres
suriz
ed w
ater
reac
tor:
prim
ary
syst
em le
ak to
the
seco
ndar
y sy
stem
requ
iring
cont
inuo
us o
pera
tion
ofm
ore
than
the
usua
llyop
erat
ing20
char
ging
pum
psto
mai
ntai
n pr
imar
y sy
stem
wat
er le
vel B
oilin
g w
ater
reac
tor:
mai
n st
eam
isol
atio
n va
lve
failu
rew
ithou
t los
s of i
nteg
rity
ofst
eam
pip
ing
to tu
rbin
e an
d/or
con
dens
er21
----
-
----
-
Prim
ary
syst
em le
akdi
rect
ly to
atm
osph
ere18
or
Pres
suriz
ed w
ater
reac
tor:
sign
ifica
nt le
ak fr
om th
epr
imar
y to
the
seco
ndar
ysy
stem
19
o
r- O
ther
indi
catio
ns o
fim
min
ent o
r act
ual c
ore
dam
age
Not
e: Im
min
ent
cont
ainm
ent
boun
dary
failu
re m
ight
be
cons
ider
ed a
s an
addi
tiona
l crit
erio
n16.
Prim
ary
syst
em le
akdi
rect
ly to
the
atm
osph
ere
and
any
ofth
e fo
llow
ing:
- Pro
ject
ed o
r con
firm
edve
ssel
wat
er le
vel b
elow
top
of a
ctiv
e fu
el
or
- Maj
or (1
00- 1
000
times
) inc
reas
es in
mul
tiple
radi
atio
nm
onito
rs
or
- Oth
er in
dica
tion
ofac
tual
or i
mm
inen
t cor
eda
mag
e
Prim
ary
syst
em le
akdi
rect
ly to
atm
osph
ere,
such
as:
- Pre
ssur
ised
wat
erre
acto
r: st
eam
gene
rato
r tub
e ru
ptur
e- B
oilin
g w
ater
reac
tor:
mai
n st
eam
isol
atio
nva
lve
failu
re o
utsi
de o
fco
ntai
nmen
t- A
leak
with
a fa
ilure
of th
e co
ntai
nmen
t to
achi
eve
isol
atio
n- A
pla
nt w
ith n
oco
ntai
nmen
t
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
71
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
RA
DIA
TIO
N L
EV
EL
SEf
fluen
t mon
itor r
eadi
ngs f
orm
ore
than
15
min
gre
ater
than
[in
sert
site
spe
cific
list
of e
fflu
ent
mon
itor
s an
dre
adin
gs in
dica
ting
50 ti
mes
the
rele
ase
limits
]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
0.10
m
Sv/h
po
tent
iall
yla
stin
g se
vera
l hou
rs
Efflu
ent m
onito
r rea
ding
s for
mor
e th
an 1
5 m
in g
reat
erth
an [
inse
rt s
ite s
peci
fic li
stof
eff
luen
t m
onit
ors
and
read
ings
ind
icat
ing
100
times
the
rele
ase
limits
]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
0.50
m
Sv/h
po
tent
iall
yla
stin
g se
vera
l hou
rs
Efflu
ent m
onito
r rea
ding
sfo
r mor
e th
an 1
5 m
ingr
eate
r tha
n [i
nser
t site
spec
ific
list o
f effl
uent
mon
itors
and
read
ings
indi
catin
g th
at in
4 h
ours
the
off-s
ite d
oses
will
be
grea
ter
than
0.1
0 of
the
inte
rven
tion
leve
ls fo
rur
gent
pro
tect
ive
actio
ns,
assu
min
g av
erag
em
eteo
rolo
gica
lco
nditi
ons]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
1 m
Sv/h
pot
entia
llyla
stin
g se
vera
l hou
rs
Efflu
ent m
onito
rre
adin
gs fo
r mor
e th
an15
min
gre
ater
than
[ins
ert s
ite sp
ecifi
c lis
tof
effl
uent
mon
itors
and
read
ings
indi
catin
g th
atin
1 h
our
the
off-s
itedo
ses w
ill b
e gr
eate
rth
an th
e in
terv
entio
nle
vels
for u
rgen
tpr
otec
tive
actio
ns,
assu
min
g av
erag
em
eteo
rolo
gica
lco
nditi
ons]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
10
mSv
/h
Efflu
ent r
elea
se ra
tes
grea
ter t
han
100
times
the
rele
ase
limits
and
any
othe
r ind
icat
ion
ofac
tual
cor
e da
mag
e
Hig
h ra
diat
ion
leve
ls in
the
cont
rol r
oom
or
othe
r are
as re
quiri
ngco
ntin
uous
acc
ess
for
safe
ty sy
stem
ope
ratio
nan
d m
aint
enan
ceN
ote:
Inco
nsis
tent
mon
itor r
eadi
ngs
coul
dre
sult
from
inco
mpl
ete
72
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
1 m
Sv/h
pote
ntia
llyla
stin
g se
vera
l hou
rs
Con
tain
men
t rad
iatio
n le
vels
incr
ease
mor
e th
an 0
.10
mG
y/h
[or i
nser
t site
spec
ific
read
ing
indi
catin
g re
leas
e of
grea
ter
than
10%
coo
lant
inve
ntor
y]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
5 m
Sv/h
pot
entia
llyla
stin
g se
vera
l hou
rs
Con
tain
men
t rad
iatio
n le
vels
incr
ease
mor
e th
an 0
.50
mG
y/h
[or i
nser
t site
spec
ific
read
ing
indi
catin
g re
leas
e of
grea
ter
than
50%
coo
lant
inve
ntor
y]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
10
mSv
/hpo
tent
ially
last
ing
seve
ral
hour
s
Con
tain
men
t ra
diat
ion
leve
ls g
reat
er th
an 1
Gy/
h[o
r in
sert
sit
e sp
ecif
icre
adin
g in
dica
ting
rele
ase
of g
reat
er t
han
1% g
apin
vent
ory]
Rad
iatio
n le
vels
gre
ater
than
100
mSv
/hpo
tent
ially
last
ing
seve
ral h
ours
and
any
othe
r ind
icat
ion
of a
ctua
lco
re d
amag
eC
onta
inm
ent r
adia
tion
leve
ls g
reat
er th
an 5
Gy/
h [o
r ins
ert s
ite sp
ecifi
cre
adin
g in
dica
ting
rele
ase
of g
reat
er th
an20
% g
ap in
vent
ory]
mix
ing,
a fa
iled
mon
itor o
r irr
adia
tion
from
a c
onta
min
ated
syst
em n
earb
y.M
onito
rs m
ay sh
owhi
gh, l
ow o
r cen
trera
nge
if th
ey fa
il.R
eadi
ngs c
an b
eco
nfirm
ed u
sing
han
dhe
ld m
onito
rs o
utsi
deth
e ar
ea.
Hig
h ra
diat
ion
leve
ls in
area
s re
quiri
ngoc
casi
onal
occ
upan
cyto
mai
ntai
n or
con
trol
safe
ty sy
stem
s
Elev
ated
con
tain
men
t(f
or b
oilin
g w
ater
reac
tors
, dry
wel
l)22
radi
atio
n le
vels
Not
e: In
cons
iste
ntm
onito
r rea
ding
scou
ldre
sult
from
inco
mpl
ete
73
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Mul
tiple
pla
nt ra
diat
ion
mon
itors
sho
w a
nun
plan
ned
or u
npre
dict
edin
crea
se b
y a
fact
or o
f 100
or m
ore
Am
bien
t dos
e ra
tes a
t or
beyo
nd th
e si
te b
ound
ary
grea
ter t
han
10µS
v/h
[or
inse
rt si
te sp
ecifi
c re
adin
gin
dica
ting
100
times
the
Mul
tiple
pla
nt ra
diat
ion
mon
itors
sho
w a
nun
plan
ned
or u
npre
dict
edin
crea
se b
y a
fact
or o
f 100
or m
ore
and
trans
ient
is in
prog
ress
Am
bien
t do
se r
ates
at
orbe
yond
the
site
bou
ndar
ygr
eate
r th
an 1
0µSv
/h [
orin
sert
site
spe
cific
rea
ding
indi
catin
g 10
0 tim
es th
e
Mul
tiple
pla
nt r
adia
tion
mon
itor
s sh
ow
anun
plan
ned
or u
npre
dict
edin
crea
se b
y a
fact
or o
f 100
or
mor
e an
d a
maj
ortr
ansi
ent
is i
n pr
ogre
sspo
tent
ially
aff
ectin
g th
eab
ility
to p
rote
ct th
e co
reA
mbi
ent
dose
rat
es a
t or
beyo
nd t
he s
ite b
ound
ary
grea
ter t
han
0.1
mSv
/h [o
rin
sert
one
tent
h of
the
site
spec
ific
oper
atio
nal
Mul
tiple
pla
nt ra
diat
ion
mon
itors
sho
w a
nun
plan
ned
orun
pred
icte
d in
crea
se b
ya
fact
or o
f 100
or m
ore
and
any
othe
r ind
icat
ion
of a
ctua
l cor
e da
mag
e
Am
bien
t dos
e ra
tes a
t or
beyo
nd th
esite
bou
ndar
ygr
eate
r tha
n 1
mSv
/h [o
rin
sert
the
site
spec
ific
oper
atio
nal i
nter
vent
ion
mix
ing
or a
faile
dm
onito
r or i
rrad
iatio
nfr
om a
con
tam
inat
edsy
stem
nea
rby23
.M
onito
rs m
ay sh
owhi
gh, l
ow o
r cen
trera
nge
if th
ey fa
il.R
eadi
ngs c
an b
eco
nfirm
ed u
sing
han
dhe
ld m
onito
rs o
utsi
deth
e co
ntai
nmen
t.U
npla
nned
incr
ease
inpl
ant r
adia
tion
leve
ls
Hig
h am
bien
t dos
e rat
esat
or
bey
ond24
the
site
boun
dary
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
74
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
back
grou
nd]
back
grou
nd]
inte
rven
tion
le
vel
for
evac
uatio
n; se
e Pr
oced
ure
B1 in
Ref
. [10
]]
leve
l for
eva
cuat
ion;
seeP
roce
dure
B1
in R
ef.
[10]
]
Secu
rity
even
t with
pot
entia
lto
aff
ect
safe
ty s
yste
mop
erat
ion,
or
un
cert
ain
secu
rity
cond
ition
s
Fire
or e
xplo
sion
pot
entia
llyaf
fect
ing
area
s co
ntai
ning
safe
ty sy
stem
sTo
xic
or fl
amm
able
gas
es in
the
plan
t
Plan
t can
be
cont
rolle
d fr
omem
erge
ncy
cont
rol r
oom
Maj
or n
atur
al e
vent
s th
atth
reat
en t
he p
lant
suc
h as
:-Ev
ents
bey
ond
the
desi
gn
----
-
----
-
----
-
----
-
Maj
or n
atur
al e
vent
sre
sulti
ng in
dam
age
orim
paire
d ac
cess
to sa
fety
Secu
rity
even
t res
ultin
g in
dam
age o
r im
paire
d ac
cess
to sa
fety
syst
ems
----
-
Flam
mab
le
gas
conc
entra
tions
that
pre
vent
cont
rol o
r m
aint
enan
ce o
fsa
fety
sy
stem
s
Nei
ther
the
mai
n co
ntro
lro
om n
or th
eem
erge
ncy
cont
rol r
oom
is h
abita
ble
Maj
or n
atur
al e
vent
sre
sulti
ng in
dam
age
orim
paire
d ac
cess
to sa
fety
Secu
rity
even
t re
sulti
ngin
los
s of
the
abi
lity
tom
onit
or
and
cont
rol
safe
ty fu
nctio
ns n
eede
d to
prot
ect t
he c
ore
----
-
----
-
----
-
----
-
Secu
rity
even
t (in
trude
ror
mal
icio
us a
ct)
Fire
or
ex
plos
ion
(inc
ludi
ng
turb
ine
failu
re)
Toxi
c or
fla
mm
able
gase
s in
clud
ing,
for
boili
ng w
ater
rea
ctor
s,hy
drog
en i
n th
e dr
yw
ell25
Evac
uatio
n of
the
mai
nco
ntro
l roo
m26
Maj
or n
atur
al d
isas
ter
such
as:
- Ear
thqu
akeSE
CU
RIT
Y E
VE
NT
S, F
IRE
S, E
XPL
OSI
ON
S, T
OX
IC G
AS
RE
LE
ASE
S, N
AT
UR
AL
AN
D O
TH
ER
EV
EN
TS
75
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
basi
s of
the
plan
t- E
vent
s re
sulti
ng in
actu
al
o
r
pote
ntia
llo
ss o
f acc
ess t
o th
e si
tefo
r a
long
per
iod
of ti
me
Even
ts re
sulti
ng in
act
ual o
rpo
tent
ial l
oss
of c
omm
uni-
catio
ns to
the
site
for a
long
perio
d of
tim
eA
bnor
mal
con
ditio
ns th
atw
arra
nt o
btai
ning
imm
edia
te a
dditi
onal
assi
stan
ce fo
r the
on-
site
oper
atio
ns st
aff
or
Abn
orm
al c
ondi
tions
that
war
rant
incr
ease
dpr
epar
edne
ss o
n th
e pa
rt of
off-
site
off
icia
ls
syst
ems a
nd/o
r dec
ay h
eat
rem
oval
syst
ems o
raf
fect
ing
thei
r lon
g te
rmop
erat
ion
----
-
Con
ditio
ns th
at w
arra
ntpr
epar
ing
the
publ
ic to
impl
emen
t urg
ent
prot
ectiv
e ac
tions
o
rC
ondi
tions
that
war
rant
taki
ng p
rote
ctiv
e ac
tions
on th
e si
te
----
-
----
-
Con
ditio
ns t
hat
war
rant
taki
ng u
rgen
t pr
otec
tive
actio
ns o
ff th
e si
te
- Tor
nado
- Flo
od- H
igh
win
ds- V
ehic
le o
r airc
raft27
cr
ash
- Hur
rican
e- T
suna
mi
- Sto
rm su
rge
- Low
wat
er le
vel
- Lig
htni
ng s
trike
28
Loss
of
com
mun
icat
ions
Plan
t shi
ft su
perv
isor
’sop
inio
n
syst
ems a
nd/o
r dec
ay h
eat
rem
oval
syst
ems o
raf
fect
ing
thei
r lon
g te
rmop
erat
ion
----
-
Con
ditio
ns th
at w
arra
ntta
king
pro
tect
ive
actio
ns a
tth
e pl
ant
or
Abn
orm
al c
ondi
tions
that
war
rant
incr
ease
d pr
epar
ed-
ness
on
the
part
of o
ff-s
iteof
ficia
ls
76
APP
EN
DIX
- V
I (B
) (C
ON
TD
.)TA
BL
E 1
5 : E
ME
RG
EN
CY
CL
ASS
IFIC
ATIO
N A
ND
EM
ER
GE
NC
Y A
CT
ION
LE
VE
LS
(EA
L) F
OR
LW
R
For
the
follo
win
g en
try
Dec
lare
an
aler
t if :
Dec
lare
pla
nt e
mer
genc
y if
Dec
lare
site
em
erge
ncy
ifD
ecla
re o
ff-s
ite/
cond
ition
sge
nera
l em
erge
ncy
ifA
BC
DE
Loss
of a
bilit
y to
mai
ntai
nw
ater
leve
l abo
ve sp
ent f
uel
orD
amag
e to
spen
t fue
lor
Loss
of a
bilit
y to
mai
ntai
npo
ol w
ater
tem
pera
ture
belo
w 8
0°C
29
Wat
er l
evel
bel
ow t
op o
firr
adia
ted
fuel or
Rad
iatio
n le
vel i
n po
ol a
rea
grea
ter t
han
20 m
Gy/
h
Wat
er l
evel
bel
ow t
op o
firr
adia
ted
fuel or
Rad
iatio
n le
vel i
n po
ol ar
eagr
eate
r tha
n 30
mG
y/h
Full
y dr
aine
d po
olco
ntai
ning
mor
e tha
n on
eth
ird o
f a
core
rem
oved
from
the
rea
ctor
with
inth
e pa
st 3
yea
rsor
Rad
iatio
n le
vel
in p
ool
area
gre
ater
than
3 G
y/h
Abn
orm
al r
efue
lling
or
spen
t fue
l con
ditio
ns
SPE
NT
FU
EL
PO
OL
EV
EN
TS
1.‘S
top
nucl
ear r
eact
ion’
is a
gen
eral
term
that
incl
udes
‘rea
ctor
scr
am’,
whi
ch is
use
d on
ly fo
r the
inse
rtion
of c
ontro
l rod
s int
o th
e re
acto
r.
2Fa
ilure
to s
cram
the
reac
tor i
s us
ually
eva
luat
ed if
reac
tor p
ower
is g
reat
er th
an 5
% a
nd c
ondi
tions
indi
cate
that
scr
am is
nec
essa
ry (s
afet
ysy
stem
s are
usu
ally
capa
ble o
f rem
ovin
g he
at fo
r the
hea
ting
rate
at le
ss th
an 5
% o
f nom
inal
pow
er).
For s
ome p
lant
s, di
ffer
ent,
plan
t spe
cific
valu
es s
houl
d be
use
d.
3In
crea
sing
neu
tron
flux
is a
n ex
plic
it sy
mpt
om th
at th
e re
acto
r is n
ot fu
lly sh
ut d
own.
4In
adeq
uate
cor
e co
olin
g is
cha
ract
eriz
ed b
y th
ree
kind
s of e
ntry
con
ditio
n: v
esse
l lev
el, c
ore
tem
pera
ture
and
dec
ay h
eat r
emov
al c
apab
ility
.Th
ese
cond
ition
s are
val
id fo
r bot
h pr
essu
rized
wat
er re
acto
rs a
nd b
oilin
g w
ater
reac
tors
, and
are
put
bef
ore
the
prim
ary
syst
em te
mpe
ratu
re,
whi
ch is
rele
vant
for p
ress
uriz
ed w
ater
reac
tors
onl
y.
5In
the
even
t of c
ore
dam
age,
the
stat
us o
f the
reac
tor c
onta
inm
ent s
yste
m a
nd th
e co
ntai
nmen
t bar
riers
will
gre
atly
aff
ect t
he m
agni
tude
of t
here
leas
e of
fiss
ion
prod
ucts
.
77
6El
evat
ed c
ore
exit
tem
pera
ture
is a
dire
ct s
ympt
om o
f cor
e co
olin
g de
grad
atio
n. T
here
fore
, thi
s sy
mpt
om is
use
d as
an
entry
con
ditio
n fo
rin
adeq
uate
cor
e co
olin
g. T
he c
ritic
al w
ater
tem
pera
ture
abo
ve w
hich
liqu
id w
ater
can
not e
xist
irre
spec
tive
of s
yste
m p
ress
ure
is 3
70°C
;65
0°C
is a
val
ue u
sual
ly u
sed
for i
nade
quat
e co
re c
oolin
g in
em
erge
ncy
proc
edur
es a
nd in
dica
tes t
hat s
team
–Zr r
eact
ion
will
star
t to
prod
uce
hydr
ogen
; 800
°C in
dica
tes c
ore
dam
age
that
star
ts a
t a c
ore
tem
pera
ture
of a
bout
120
0°C
.
7N
orm
al fe
ed w
ater
is u
sed
for h
eat r
emov
al in
thes
e m
odes
. If n
orm
al fe
ed w
ater
is n
ot a
vaila
ble,
the
alte
rnat
e w
ater
sour
ces s
houl
d be
use
dfo
r ste
am g
ener
ator
feed
ing.
8T ho
t pro
vide
s a
back
up f
or th
e co
re te
mpe
ratu
re s
ince
the
flow
thro
ugh
the
core
can
not r
eadi
ly b
e co
nfirm
ed a
nd T
hot c
hang
es a
re d
elay
edre
lativ
e to
the
core
exi
t tem
pera
ture
.
9Th
is p
rovi
des a
mor
e ac
cura
te d
escr
iptio
n of
the
phen
omen
a in
side
the
reac
tor v
esse
l.
10In
the
even
t of c
ore
dam
age,
the
stat
us o
f the
reac
tor c
oola
nt sy
stem
and
con
tain
men
t bar
riers
will
gre
atly
aff
ect t
he m
agni
tude
of t
he re
leas
eof
fiss
ion
prod
ucts
.
11If
ade
quat
e co
olan
t inj
ectio
n flo
w c
anno
t be
esta
blis
hed
to r
esto
re c
ore
heat
rem
oval
, the
rea
ctor
coo
lant
sys
tem
liqu
id s
tarts
to b
ecom
esa
tura
ted.
If th
e sy
stem
tem
pera
ture
is h
ighe
r tha
n th
e sa
tura
tion
tem
pera
ture
at t
he se
t pre
ssur
e of
the
reac
tor c
oola
nt sy
stem
safe
ty v
alve
s,th
is p
reve
nts f
urth
er p
ress
uriz
atio
n of
the
reac
tor c
oola
nt sy
stem
.
12Sa
fety
syst
em c
ontro
l cap
abili
ty c
an b
e ei
ther
deg
rade
d or
com
plet
ely
lost
; bot
h ca
ses a
re re
flect
ed. U
nrel
iabl
e fu
nctio
ning
of s
ever
al sa
fety
syst
em i
nstru
men
ts o
r al
arm
s an
d un
avai
labi
lity
of s
afet
y sy
stem
ins
trum
ents
or
cont
rols
are
con
side
red.
Pos
t-acc
iden
t in
stru
men
tatio
npr
ovid
es th
e es
sent
ial i
nfor
mat
ion
to su
ppor
t saf
ety
syst
em o
pera
tion
and
cont
rol.
13R
efer
ence
to a
faile
d fu
el m
onito
r in
a pr
essu
rized
wat
er re
acto
r and
off
-gas
mon
itor i
n a
boili
ng w
ater
reac
tor i
s rep
lace
d by
refe
renc
e to
apo
st-a
ccid
ent s
ampl
ing
syst
em.
14Th
e ga
p in
vent
ory
is th
e am
ount
of f
issi
on p
rodu
cts
in th
e fu
el p
in g
ap d
urin
g no
rmal
ope
ratio
ns.
15Th
e crit
erio
n w
as re
plac
ed b
y th
e sam
e req
uire
men
t use
d fo
r site
area
emer
genc
y to
refe
r to
the l
eak
rate
inst
ead
of th
e (pr
evio
usly
mis
lead
ing)
oper
atio
nal c
ore
cool
ing
syst
em.
16In
the
case
of a
loss
of c
oola
nt a
ccid
ent a
nd c
ore
dam
age,
the
stat
us o
f the
con
tain
men
t bar
rier w
ill d
irect
ly a
ffec
t the
mag
nitu
de o
f the
fiss
ion
prod
uct r
elea
se.
17Le
ak ra
te w
ith re
spec
t to
norm
al fe
ed w
ater
flow
for n
orm
al fu
ll po
wer
ope
ratio
n is
use
d in
stea
d of
leak
rate
with
resp
ect t
o th
e nu
mbe
r of
oper
atin
g pu
mps
. Suc
h le
ak r
ate
spec
ifica
tion
bette
r co
vers
the
conc
ern
durin
g a
loss
of
cool
ant a
ccid
ent (
i.e. t
o en
sure
suf
ficie
nt c
ore
cool
ing)
. For
som
e pl
ants
, the
leak
rate
sho
uld
also
be
dete
rmin
ed o
n th
e ba
sis
of th
e no
rmal
cha
rgin
g flo
w ra
te.
78
18 A
ny si
gnifi
cant
prim
ary
leak
dire
ctly
to th
e at
mos
pher
e w
ill c
ause
rele
ases
of f
issi
on p
rodu
cts t
o th
e en
viro
nmen
t, an
d it
is n
eces
sary
tota
ke im
med
iate
act
ions
to st
op th
e le
ak.
19Fo
r pre
ssur
ized
wat
er re
acto
rs, a
sign
ifica
nt p
rimar
y sy
stem
to se
cond
ary
syst
em le
ak c
ould
cau
se re
leas
es o
f fis
sion
pro
duct
s to
the
envi
ronm
ent,
and
it is
nec
essa
ry to
take
imm
edia
te a
ctio
ns to
stop
the
leak
.
20 F
or p
ress
uriz
ed w
ater
reac
tors
, a p
rimar
y sy
stem
to se
cond
ary
syst
em le
ak a
t a ra
te a
bove
the
norm
al c
harg
ing
syst
em c
apab
ility
can
quic
kly
caus
e re
leas
es o
f fis
sion
pro
duct
s to
the
envi
ronm
ent,
and
it is
nec
essa
ry to
take
app
ropr
iate
act
ions
to st
op th
e le
ak.
21 F
or b
oilin
g w
ater
reac
tors
, fai
lure
of t
he m
ain
stea
m is
olat
ion
valv
e w
ithou
t los
s of i
nteg
rity
of st
eam
pip
ing
to th
e tu
rbin
e an
d/or
cond
ense
r cou
ld c
ause
ear
ly re
leas
es o
f fis
sion
pro
duct
s to
the
envi
ronm
ent,
and
it is
nec
essa
ry to
take
app
ropr
iate
act
ions
to st
op th
e le
ak.
22Fo
r boi
ling
wat
er re
acto
rs, t
he d
ry w
ell i
nste
ad o
f the
con
tain
men
t is m
ore
appr
opria
te.
23R
adia
tion
from
a c
onta
min
ated
syst
em n
earb
y co
uld
also
aff
ect t
he ra
diat
ion
mon
itors
insi
de th
e co
ntai
nmen
t.
24A
mbi
ent d
ose
rate
is u
sual
ly m
easu
red
at th
e si
te b
ound
ary.
How
ever
, if a
ny m
easu
rem
ent o
f am
bien
t dos
e ra
te b
eyon
d th
e si
te b
ound
ary
isav
aila
ble,
it c
an b
e us
ed fo
r the
pur
pose
of t
his
EAL.
25Fo
r boi
ling
wat
er re
acto
rs, h
ydro
gen
conc
entra
tion
in th
e dr
y w
ell c
ould
incr
ease
, whi
ch c
an c
ause
sign
ifica
nt d
amag
e in
the
even
t of
igni
tion.
26In
the
case
of t
he n
eed
to e
vacu
ate
the
mai
n co
ntro
l roo
m, t
he a
bilit
y to
con
trol t
he p
lant
is a
ffec
ted
(the
seve
rity
of th
e si
tuat
ion
depe
nds
on th
e pl
ant d
esig
n). I
f the
em
erge
ncy
cont
rol r
oom
is u
sed
for p
lant
con
trol,
an a
lert
is th
e ap
prop
riate
EA
L; if
bot
h th
e m
ain
cont
rol
room
and
the
emer
genc
y co
ntro
l roo
m a
re a
ffect
ed a
nd th
e pl
ant h
as to
be
cont
rolle
d by
alte
rnat
ive
mea
ns, a
site
are
a em
erge
ncy
is th
eap
prop
riate
EA
L.
27A
n ai
rcra
ft cr
ash
coul
d al
so c
ause
seve
re d
amag
e to
the
plan
t and
redu
ce p
lant
safe
ty.
28 L
ight
ning
strik
es c
ould
als
o ca
use
seve
re d
amag
e to
the
plan
t and
redu
ce p
lant
safe
ty.
29H
igh
tem
pera
ture
in th
e sp
ent f
uel p
ool i
s a
resu
lt of
the
degr
adat
ion
of h
eat r
emov
al fr
om th
e sp
ent f
uel,
and
this
tem
pera
ture
sho
uld
also
be u
sed
as a
n ad
ditio
nal s
ympt
om o
f abn
orm
al re
fuel
ling
cond
ition
s or
spe
nt fu
el c
ondi
tions
.
79
APPENDIX- VII
OBSERVABLES ON THE SCENE OFRADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
VII-1 General
In radiological emergency, initial response is to be carried out based onindications of the hazards such as labels, signs or placards indicating thepresence of a hazardous material, the appearance of medical symptoms inexposed individuals or readings from specialised instruments.
VII-2 Observables in radiological emergency
In a radiological emergency, the inner cordoned area is where protectiveaction is implemented to protect responders and the public. Initially the sizeof the area is determined on the basis of information that can be directlyobserved (e.g. markings on container/flask/scene). The size of the area maybe expanded on the basis of dose rates and environmental measurement OILs(see sec. 5.3.2) when these data become available. Table 16 providessuggestions for the approximate radius of the inner cordoned area. The actualboundaries of the safety and security perimeters should be defined in such away that they are easily recognisable (e.g. by roads) and should be secured.However, the safety perimeter should be established at least as far from thesource as is indicated in the table until the radiological assessor has assessedthe situation.
TABLE 16 : SUGGESTED RADIUS OF THE INNER CORDONEDAREA (SAFETY PERIMETER) IN A RADIOLOGICALEMERGENCY (CONTD.)
Initial inner cordoned area(safety perimeter)
30 m radius around the source
100 m radius around the source
300 m radius
400 m radius or more to protectagainstan explosion
Situation
Initial determination - OutsideUnshielded or damaged potentiallydangerous sourceMajor spill from a potentiallydangerous sourceFire, explosion or fumes involving adangerous sourceSuspected bomb (possible radiologicaldispersal device), exploded orunexploded
80
1000 m radius
Affected and adjacent areas (includingfloors above and below)Entire building and appropriate outsidedistance as indicated above
Wherever these levels are measured
Conventional (non-nuclear) explosionor a fire involving a nuclear weapon(no nuclear yield)
Initial determination - Inside a buildingDamage, loss of shielding or spillinvolving a potentially dangerous sourceFire or other event involving a potentiallydangerous source that can spreadradioactive material throughout thebuilding (e.g. through the ventilationsystem)
Expansion of safety perimeter based on radiological monitoringOIL1 and OIL2 from Table 4 & 5
TABLE 16 : SUGGESTED RADIUS OF THE INNER CORDONEDAREA (SAFETY PERIMETER) IN A RADIOLOGICALEMERGENCY
81
ANNEXURE - I
TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OFEMERGENCIES ARISING OUT OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
AI-1 Introduction
The general objectives of emergency planning and management are to reducethe risk of health effects owing to radiation exposure or mitigate theconsequences of the accident.
These objectives are accomplished by implementation of timely emergencyresponse using the tools such as reference levels, generic criteria andoperational criteria derived from generic criteria. The important protectiveactions as a part of emergency response are, in the early phases of an accident(mostly precautionary in nature), sheltering, evacuation, iodine prophylaxis,and control of access. In the later phase, foodstuff restrictions and relocationfor example are relevant protective actions.
AI-2 Phases of Emergency Response Based on Time of Radioactivity Releaseafter a Nuclear Accident
Emergency response undertaken by the authorities (figure AI-1) is oftendivided into three phases: a pre-release phase, a release phase with a timescale of hours/days and a post-release phase with a time scale of weeks/months/years, depending on the nature of the release.
In the early stages of an accident, the plume exposure pathways includinginhalation are most likely to dominate, although deposition of short-lived γ-emitting radionuclides could result in significant external exposuresfrom the ground. In later stages, when the release contains particulates, thedominating pathways will include ingestion of contaminated food, and externalradiation from deposited radionuclides.
Exp
osur
e ra
te
Time after start of accident
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Fig. AI-1. Time phases of a nuclear accident involving atmospheric releasesof radioactive materials. During the release phase the exposurepredominantly stems from the plume exposure pathways (a). In the post-release phase the exposure is dominated by the ground deposition pathway(b), the exposure rate is relatively low while the exposure time may be verylong.
At the onset of the accident, decisions are necessarily based on very limitedinformation and the operational criteria e.g. plant conditions (EALs) orenvironmental dose rate measurements (OIL) act as important decision aidingtools. As the accident evolves, management decisions will be based on morecomplete picture of the accident and its off-site radiological consequences.While the accident assessment is a probabilistic endeavour the uncertainty inthe assessment constantly decreases. With time a more complete picture ofthe accident emerges and the decision on implementation of protectivemeasures is based directly on an estimate of the residual doses.
AI-3 Tools for Emergency Management
Reference Levels : In emergency exposure situations, the reference levelsrepresent the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriateto plan to allow exposures to occur, and for which therefore protective actionsshould be planned and optimised. Reference levels for protection of publicduring emergency situation are set within an effective dose range of 20- 100mSv, expressed in terms of residual dose, which includes dose contributionsvia all exposure pathways. The protection strategy shall be optimized to reduceexposures below the reference level.
Fig. AI-2. Reference levels in emergency exposure situation and existingexposure situation.
During emergency situation emergency response actions (protective and otheractions) are undertaken to ensure that the reference levels are not exceeded.The type and scale of protective and other actions undertaken in turn arebased on:
(i) Generic Criteria : Generic criteria are set by considering two typesof the health consequences (i) severe deterministic effect and (ii)increase in stochastic effect. Generic criteria start at levels of dosethat are approaching the threshold for severe deterministic effects
100 mSv
20 mSv
1 mSv
Emergency Exposure Situation
Existing Exposure Situation
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(could be as high as 1Sv). Normally the generic criteria deal withestimated quantities such as projected dose and can not be directlyseen or easily measured.
(ii) Operational Criteria : The generic criteria form the basis fordeveloping the operational criteria. Operational criteria include (i)emergency action levels (EALs) (ii) operational intervention levels(OILs) and (iii) observables (by operators or first responders); fordecision making on emergency categorisation and initiating theprotective actions. Operational criteria are established in advance(e.g control room indications, radiation and contamination levels inpublic domain etc.) by using the generic criteria and these arenormally the observables.
Thus the system of protective actions and other response actions in anemergency include numerical values of generic criteria as well as of thecorresponding operational criteria that form the basis for decision making inan emergency so as to ensure that the residual doses normally remain wellbelow reference levels.
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ANNEXURE - II
POST ACCIDENT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INPUBLIC DOMAIN AROUND FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (FDNPP, JAPAN)USING SIMILAR SAFETY STANDARDS
AII-1 Introduction
In the year 2011, serious external events (earth quake followed by tsunami)resulted in prolonged interruption of core cooling and spent fuel cooling atFukushima Daiichi Plants which ultimately led to release of large quantitiesof radioactive materials from the plants.
AII-2 Implementation of Protective Actions
The Japanese authorities initiated and implemented precautionary urgentprotective actions/urgent protective actions based on plant conditions aloneto prevent severe deterministic health effects and to minimise stochastic effecton similar lines as prescribed in this document.
Further, to mitigate the consequences of the accident, actions taken byauthorities i.e. restriction/control on food stuff, temporary relocation, liftingof restriction etc were also based on similar safety guidelines.
Use of safety standards such as IAEA GSR part-7 (revised GS-R-2), GS-G2,GS G2.1, GSR-part-3 (revised BSS) etc. (on which this document is alsobased) has amply demonstrated the effectiveness of this guidance in an actualemergency situation.
Using this kind of guidance, the actions taken to protect the public (evacuationand sheltering) significantly reduced the radiation exposures that would haveotherwise been received. More than 95% of the members of public receiveddoses well below 10 mSv as against the reference level of 20 mSv to 100mSv. Thus, the exposure received by japanese population was low, leadingto correspondingly low risks of health effects later in life.
Some of the actions taken by the authorities consistent with this guidance arereproduced below:
(i) Precautionary urgent protective actions (evacuation, sheltering) basedon EALs (March 11 to March 15, 2011 in 20 km downwind sectorfrom FDNPP [viz. Minami Soma (N24)] before release ofradioactivity.
(ii) Urgent protective actions (foodstuff and water restrictions) basedon EALs & OILs (March 16 to March 23, 2011).
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(iii) Early protective actions (preparation for temporary relocation) basedon OILs (March 16 to March 23, 2011).
(iv) Use of OILs for evacuation and classification of new emergencyzones [rearrangement of area, termination of area].
(v) Transition from emergency exposure situation to existing exposuresituation
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ANNEXURE - III
CONCEPTUAL PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING AREAS ON THE SCENEAND USING OILS FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
AIII-1 Introduction
Radiation and radioactive substances have many beneficial applications,ranging from power generation to uses in medicine, industry and agriculture.The radiation risks to workers, the public and to the environment that mayarise from these applications have been assessed and controlled by regulatingthe practices. Also, regulations are in place to prevent accidents and to respondto emergencies so as to mitigate any harmful consequences.
Initially, the first responders/local emergency services (e.g. medical, lawenforcement agency and fire brigades) may use the following indications toidentify the possible potential radiological emergency:
(a) Suspected or actual bomb.
(b) Credible threats or threatening messages.
(c) Device that appears intended to spread contamination.
(d) Signs of possible contamination (e.g. spill).
(e) Gamma dose rates: > 100 μSv/h at 1 m from object or at 1m abovethe ground.
(f) Medical symptoms of radiation injuries (such as burns without anapparent cause).
(g) Building/area marked with the radiation symbol.
(h) Results of assessment of a radiological assessor.
(i) Neutron radiation.
(j) Dangerous source that is lost, stolen, damaged, in a fire, leaking,or potentially involved in a terrorist act or explosion.
The initial response is carried out based on indications of the hazards such aslabels, signs or placards indicating the presence of a hazardous material, theappearance of medical symptoms in exposed individuals or readings fromspecialized instruments. Indications of a dangerous source are:
(a) A heavy container with the radiation symbol.
(b) Item with labels pertaining to radioactivity.
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(c) Item with transport UN numbers or markings.
(d) Device used for cancer treatment (teletherapy or brachytherapy).
(e) Radiography cameras or sources.
(f) Well logging sources used in drilling operations.
(g) Dangerous quantity of material (> D-value), as assessed by aradiological assessor.
AIII-2 Use of Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) for EmergencyManagement
In case of a radiological emergency, to prevent the severe deterministic effects,the response actions can include:
(i) immediate medical examination,
(ii) consultation and treatment
(iii) contamination control,
(iv) administration of de-corporation agents where applicable,
(v) registration for long term health monitoring, and
(vi) comprehensive psychological counselling.
Similarly some of the early and other response actions to minimize thestochastic effects can include:
(i) relocation
(ii) long term restriction of consumption of contaminated food
(iii) screening based on individual doses to specific organs,
(iv) considering the need for registration for medical follow up
As the situation becomes clearer with time following actions are to beconsidered:
(i) Determining the boundary of the inner cordoned areaambient dose rate of 100 μSv/h at 1 metre> 1000 Bq/cm2 gamma/beta deposition> 100 Bq/cm2 alpha deposition(temporary relocation (30 mSv averted in 30 days))
(ii) For determining if skin and clothing decontamination is warranted> 1 μSv/h at 10 cm> 10000 Bq/cm2 beta/gamma contamination> 1000 Bq/cm2 for alpha emitters
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(iii) Screening of groups and locations> 100 μSv/h at 1 metre
(iv) Equipment or vehicle contamination criteriaambient dose rate at 10 cm:
Use of equipment or vehicle for response activities only> 1 μSv/h and < 10 μSv/hAllow use of equipment or vehicle for critical response activitiesonly> 10 μSv/h and < 100 μSv/hIsolation of equipment or vehicle and use only with approval ofradiological assessor> 100 μSv/h
(v) Ban on consumption of food, water, milk as per OILs
(vi) Follow up
Decontamination of soil, building etc.Termination of radiological emergency and restoration of normalcy
AIII-3 Conceptual Plan for Establishing Areas for Radiological EmergencyManagement
The conceptual plan for establishment of inner cordon area, outer cordonarea and emergency resource facilities for management of radiologicalemergency is given in figure AIII-1.
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94
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
EXPERT COMMITTEE FOR PREPARATION OF CRITERIAFOR PLANNING, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
Dates of meeting: July 8, 2011 September 8, 2011September 29, 2011 November 15, 2011December 19, 2011 October 1, 2012March 15, 2013 March 19, 2013March 21, 2013 July 24, 2013September 19, 2013 April 10, 2014
Members and Invitees of Working Group:
Shri P.R. Krishnamurthy (Convener) : AERB
Shri P.S. Nair : AERB (Former)
Shri S.A. Hussain : AERB (Former)
Shri A.P. Garg : AERB
Shri George Thomas : AERB (Former)
Shri M.P. Sharma : NPCIL
Shri S.K.Pawar (Member-Secretary) : AERB
Shri Shyam Vyas (Permanent Invitee) : AERB
Dr. Rajvir Singh (Invitee) : BARC
Dr. P.Vijayan (Invitee) : AERB
Shri M.Rama Somayajulu (Invitee) : NPCIL
Shri K. Venkataramana (Invitee) : NPCIL
Shri Vipin Chander (Invitee) : AERB
Shri Rahul Dhoke (Invitee) : AERB
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY (ACNS)
Date of meeting: March 6, 2014
Members and Invitees of ACNS:
Dr. Baldev Raj (Chairman) : IGCAR (Former)
Shri S.A. Bharadwaj : NPCIL (Former)
Shri K.K. Vaze : BARC (Former)
Shri S.G. Ghadge : NPCIL
Shri Rajnish Prakash : HWB
Dr. P.Chellapandi : IGCAR
Dr. D.N. Sharma : BARC
Prof. J.B. Doshi : IIT, Bombay (Former)
Shri R. Bhattacharya : AERB
Shri S.A. Hussain : AERB (Former)
Shri A.J. Gaikwad : AERB
Shri K. Srivasista (Member-Secretary) : AERB
PROVISIONAL LIST OF REGULATORY SAFETYDOCUMENTS ON EMERGECNY PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE
Safety Series No. Title
AERB/SG/EP-1 Preparation of Site Emergency Preparedness Plans forNuclear Installations
AERB/SG/EP-2 Preparation of Off-Site Emergency Preparedness Plansfor Nuclear Installations
AERB/SG/EP-3 Preparation of Site Emergency Preparedness Plans forNon-Nuclear Installations
AERB/SG/EP-4 Preparation of Off-Site Emergency Preparedness Plansfor Non-Nuclear Installations
AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 Criteria For Planning, Preparedness and Response forNuclear or Radiological Emergency
AERB/SG/O-6 Preparedness of the Operating Organisation forHandling Emergencies at Nuclear Power Plants
AERB/SC/TR-3 Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness forTransport Accidents Involving Radioactive Material
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AERB SAFETY GUIDELINES NO. AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 (Rev. 1)
Published by : Atomic Energy Regulatory BoardNiyamak Bhavan, AnushaktinagarMumbai - 400 094INDIA. BCS