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Does Facebook Increase Political Participation? Evidence from a Field Experiment
Yannis Theocharis1
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
Will Lowe2 Princeton University
This is the accepted version of the manuscript published by Taylor & Francis in Information, Communication & Society on 17 December. The published manuscript is available online and can
be downloaded at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1119871
Abstract Duringthelastdecade,muchofpoliticalbehaviourresearchhascometobeconcerned with the impact of the internet, and more recently socialnetworking sites like Facebook, on political and civic participation.Althoughexistingresearchgenerallyfindsamodestlypositiverelationshipbetweensocialmediauseandofflineandonlineparticipation,themajorityofcontributionsrelyoncross-sectionaldatasothecausal impactofsocialmediauseremainsunclear.ThepresentstudyexamineshowFacebookuseinfluences reported political participation using an experiment. Werecruited young Greek participants without a Facebook account andrandomlyassignedasubsettocreateandmaintainaFacebookaccountforayear.InthispaperweexaminetheeffectofhavingaFacebookaccountondiversemodesofonlineandofflineparticipationaftersixmonths.WefindthatmaintainingaFacebookaccounthadclearlynegativeconsequencesonreportsofofflineandonlineformsofpoliticalandcivicparticipation.
politicalparticipation;experiments;politicalbehaviour;Facebook;socialmedia
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Introduction
During the lastdecade,muchpoliticalbehaviour literaturehasconsidered the impactof
newcommunication technologies,especiallysocialmediasuchasFacebookandTwitter,
onpoliticalparticipation.Manyresearchershavehopedthatasworldwideinternetaccess
broadens these technologies will help re-engage citizens in the democratic processes
(Dalton, 2008; Hay, 2007; Norris, 2002), for example by implementing more direct e-
democracythroughonlineplebiscites to therecreationofavirtualpublicsphere though
online consultations (Coleman and Blumler, 2009). New internet technologies will
complementsocialcapital(Wellmanetal.,2001),affectculturalvalues(Norris,2001),and
enhancecitizenengagementwithpolitics(Barber,1999;Etzioni,1993).
Inparticular, theheavilydigitalmedia-basedpresidential campaignofBarackObama in
2008waspromotedasaremedynotonlyfordecliningengagementwithelectoralpolitics
but also for the participatory decline that characterises direct action groups (Earl and
Kimport, 2011). Social media use would, it was argued, lower transaction costs by
removing obstacles to participation, generate new more efficient forms of bottom-up
organisationandcoordination,andcreatenewformsofparticipationtocomplementthe
existing repertoires (Bimber etal., 2005; Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010; Bennett and
Segerberg, 2013). This argument gained further support from the importantmobilising
rolethatsocialmediaplayedintheArabSpringandOccupyevents(HowardandHussain,
2013;Lynch,2011;Shirky,2011;TufekciandWilson,2012;Theocharisetal.2015).
Much research has been devoted to investigating the relationship between internet use
and political participation both before and since the arrival of social media. In general
results have been positive; a meta-analysis examining internet’s effects on political
participationhasfoundweakormodestlypositiverelationshipsbetweeninternetuseand
offline political participation under a range of operationalisations in cross-sectional
observational data (Boulianne, 2009). More recently, scholars have placed greater
emphasisonthemobilisingroleofpopularsocialmediaplatforms,suchasFacebook,on
offline political participation, while a number of studies have tried to tackle causal
questions through theuseof panel data (Dimitrova etal., 2014;Holt etal., 2013;Kahne
etal.,2013).Theresultshavegenerallybeenmixedwithsomestudiesfindingnoeffects,
otherstudiesfindingspositiveeffectsandstillothersfindingeffectsonlyoncivicbutnot
onpoliticalparticipation.Asarecentmeta-analysisbyBoulianneconcludes,"themetadata
demonstrate a positive relationship between social media use and participation
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(Boulianne, 2015, p.524). More than 80% of coefficients are positive". "However", the
author notes, "questions remain about whether the relationship is causal and
transformative. Only half of the coefficients were statistically significant. Studies using
panel data are less likely to report positive and statistically significant coefficients
between social media use and participation, compared to cross-sectional
surveys"(Boulianne, 2015, p.524). Importantly, Boulianne also notes that "In terms of
causal effects, few studies employ panel data and none of the studies employ an
experimentaldesign,whichwouldhelpestablishcausality"(Boulianne,2015,p.534).
Aimingtoprovidefirmerevidenceaboutsocialmedia’seffectsonparticipation,thisstudy
adopts an experimental approach. It tests the relationship between Facebook use and
mobilisation in a survey setting in which possession and maintenance of a Facebook
accountwas randomly assigned, and examined its effect on reported online and offline
political participation after six months. Taking into consideration recent research
suggestingthat,inadditiontoownershipofasocialmediaaccountthetypeofsocialmedia
use may decisively affect subsequent online or offline participation (Gil de Zuniga and
Valenzuela, 2010; Valenzuela, 2012; Bachmann and deZuniga, 2013; Holt etal., 2013;
Towner,2013;TangandLee,2013;Xenosetal.,2014),wealsopresentfindingsshowing
how intensity of Facebook use, embededness in online networks, and civic use of
Facebook affected online and offline participation patterns of the treatment group
participants. From the literature we expected that Facebook use would increase both
onlineandofflineengagement.Wealsoexpected that intensityofFacebookuse, greater
numberoffriends,beingexposedtomobilisinginformationandinteractingwithpolitical
contentpostedby friendsonFacebookwouldbepositively related topolitical and civic
participation. However, we find that, in this population, Facebook use leads to a
substantialdecline inreportedcivicandpoliticalparticipation.Ourpost-hocanalysison
the treatment group shows a similar story with the most common (Facebook-related)
antecedents of participation being negatively correlatedwith all forms examined in the
study. As the studywas conducted in Greece during one of themost turbulent periods
(socially, politically and economically) in its recent history (and thus in a context very
differenttotheonemostotherrelevantstudieshavebeencarriedout),wearguethatthe
politicalcontextmayhaveplayedacriticalroleinthewayFacebookaffectedparticipatory
patterns. To this end, we offer possible explanations, including that, rather than being
usedasatoolformobilisation,Facebookwasmostlyusedasatoolforentertainmentand
distractionfromthediresituationinwhichthevastmajorityofGreeksfoundthemselves
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in,orasatoolforfurtherdisillusionmentfrompoliticspromptingdisconnectionwiththe
political arena. In what follows we review the literature on social media’s impact on
political participation, outline our expectations and state our hypotheses. We then
elaborateonourresearchdesign,datacollectionandmeasures,andpresentourresults.
Thearticleconcludeswithadiscussionofthefindingsandtheirimplications.
PoliticalParticipation,theInternetandSocialMedia
Much research on political participation in the last decade has shown an increasing
detachment of citizens of Western countries from politics (Putnam, 2000; Dalton and
Wattenberg, 2000). Amidst pessimistic approaches about the future of representative
democracy,theroleoftheinternetinaffectingparticipatorybehaviourhasbecomecentral
in political participation debates. The literature reports mostly positive relationships
between internet use and different forms of civic and political participation (Bimber,
2001; Mossberger etal., 2008; Shah etal., 2005; Xenos and Moy, 2007; Bakker and
deVreese,2011;QuintelierandVissers,2008;Valenzuela,2012;Valenzuelaetal.,2009).
Indicatively, the internet’s positive influence on political participation has been
demonstratedbyameta-analysiswhich,examiningatotalof38studieswith166effects,
found that positive effects significantly outnumbered negative ones (Boulianne, 2009).
However, scholars have been reluctant to draw firm conclusions about the internet’s
mobilisingpotential.Notonlyhavemanyoftherelationshipsthesestudieshaverevealed
beentooweakanddrawnfromconveniencesamples,theyhavealsobeenoverwhelmingly
tackled with cross-sectional survey data which render the causal mechanisms unclear.
Moreovermost of these studies have demonstrated similar participatory inequalities as
those already in place offline (Schlozman etal., 2012; Xenos andMoy, 2007), providing
support to the so-called reinforcement theories that saw the internet as a tool thatwill
mainly empower those already politically engaged (Norris, 2001). Still, the fact that
researchexaminingthe internet’s impactonpoliticalparticipation in the less-interactive
pre-Web2.0erahasproducedagenerallyhopefulpictureaboutthemobilisingeffectsof
general internet use, strengthened hopes about the respective potential of the more
interactivesocialmediaplatforms.
The riseofWeb2.0and specifically socialnetworking sitesbroughtmoreopportunities
formobilisationthroughtheircapacity tosupport thewidespreaddiffusionof(political)
information across diverse networks of individuals. In addition, the radical lowering of
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opportunity costs for engaging with politics led to the widespread adoption of diverse
onlinerepertoires(Smith,2013).Thishasledtovariousconceptualdifficultiesasthereis
noconsensuswithregardstowhethersuchactscanbelegitimatelyconsideredasmodes
ofpoliticalparticipation.Oneofthemostimportantissuesintheliteraturehasthusbeen
theinvestigationofthemodeofonlineorofflineparticipationinfluencedbytheinternet.
Oser and colleagues (Oser etal., 2013) have found that online activism is itself a
distinctive typeofpoliticalparticipation Inadifferentstudy,Cantijoch(Cantijoch,2012)
found that internet usemay not have an impact on allmodes of political participation,
withuseofinternetmorefrequentlyleadingtoanincreasedlikelihoodtobecomeactivein
politicalprotest.Otherresearchershavealsofoundthattherearedistinctmodesofonline
participationthatarecomparabletoclassictraditionalofflinerepertoires,butalsoother,
more expressive social media-based and online-only activities that lack an offline
equivalent(GibsonandCantijoch,2013;HirzallaandVanZoonen,2010).
Research on social media’s effects has generally moved beyond the examination of the
internet as a uniform platform which can either mobilise or reinforce participation
(Norris,2001),placingmoreemphasis,andindeeddiscovering,thatthetypeofuse(Tang
andLee,2013;Towner,2013;GildeZunigaandValenzuela,2010;Bondetal.,2012),and
eventheplatform(BachmannanddeZuniga,2013),mattersforpoliticalmobilisation.In
anexperimentwith61millionpeople,Bondandcolleagues(Bondetal.,2012)foundthat,
on Facebook, mobilisation messages sent in social contexts (posted, for example, by
friendsor friendsof friends) can influencepolitical self-expression, information seeking
andevenvoting.Rojas andPuig-i-Abril found that informationalusesof ICTs (including
socialmedia) are significantly related to expressive participation onlinewhich “in turn
results to a host of traditional or offline civic and political participatory behaviours
indirectly through mobilization efforts” (Rojas and Puig-I-Abril, 2009, p.902). Gil de
Zuniga and Valenzuela (2010) also showed that network size and conversations with
weak tiesonlinearea strongpredictorof civicbehaviours.Facebookcombinesmanyof
themechanismsbywhichonlineactivityhasbeen theorised toaffectmobilisation, such
as: lowering thecostofparticipationandmakingengagementwith,andcommitment to,
causes easier and more flexible (Bimber etal., 2005; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Shirky,
2008); improving political knowledge by allowing constant access to a wider range of
news media (Chaffee and Frank, 1996; Scheufele, 2002); building and maintaining of
social capital by building new bridges among people, strengthening existing offline
relationships (Ellison etal., 2007; Gil de Zuniga and Valenzuela, 2010) and enabling
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individualstodevelopthenormsof trustandreciprocitythatarenecessaryforeffective
participationinpubliclife(KittilsonandDalton,2011).
Facebook’sMobilisingPotential
Facebook is predominantly a social networking site aimed at fulfilling social and
entertainment purposes. A number of studies have shown that it can satisfy people’s
entertainment and recreation needs (Ekstrom and Östman, 2013; Kahne etal., 2013),
enabling themto joingroupsandeventsrelated to theirpersonal interestsandhobbies,
upload their photos and videos, comment on, and chat with their friends. However,
Facebook has various embedded features that can make it a suitable venue for the
developmentofpoliticalattitudesandbehaviourseventothosepoliticallyuninterestedor
unaffiliated. Themost important of those is theNewsFeed timeline feature. Facebook’s
timelinestructureexposesuserstoamixedinformationenvironmentrangingfromsports,
movies, gossip,music and so on. This is important for the kind of ‘by-product’ learning
mechanism, which Chadwick, quoting Downs (Downs, 1957), argues can “soften
informationalinequalitiesbetweensocialgroups,ensurebroadpopularawarenessofkey
politicaleventsand,mostcrucially,spurustoactonthatknowledge,comeelectionday”
(Chadwick, 2012, p.41). Facebook is an ideal medium for fulfilling users’ informational
needs inthis fashion. Its integratedNewsFeedexposes,unintentionallyornot3,usersto
news sources, (political) opinions and potentiallymobilising information about political
events posted by friends. Early research has found that opinion expression and
conversation aboutpolitical affairs can lead tomobilisation and engagement inpolitical
activities(KatzandLazarsfeld,1955;Lazarsfeldetal.,1944).Recentstudies(Baum,2003;
Tewksbury etal., 2001; Morris and Morris, 2013) have corroborated the involuntary
learningeffectsofmassmediaandparticularlytheinternet.Moreover,despiterelyingon
aconveniencesampleofuniversitystudents,arecentstudyontheeffectsofFacebookon
participation has also confirmed that offline political participation is prominently
explainedbyexposuretosharedpoliticalinformationonFacebook(TangandLee,2013).
Whatismore,recentstudieshavealsoconfirmedthattheinternet–andespeciallysocial
3AccordingtoarecentstudybythePEWInternetandAmericanLifeProjectonly4percentofsocialmediausersblock,unfriend,orhidesomeonebecausetheydisagreedwithsomethingtheypostedaboutpolitics(http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_SNS_and_politics.pdf)
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media – is likely to trigger online political talk which is as conducive to political
engagementas interpersonaldiscussion (GildeZunigaandValenzuela,2010; Jungetal.,
2011;Rojas andPuig-I-Abril, 2009; Shah etal., 2005; Tewksbury etal., 2001). Based on
theseinsights,itbecomesapparentthatuseofFacebookmay,byvirtueoftheplatform’s
ownsocialisationlogicandtheembeddedfunctionspromotingit(e.g.liking,commenting,
sharing, starting a group), allow for the emergence of different uses that can lead to
differentmodesofparticipation.
Examining the impact of Facebook use on participation, several studies have generally
reportedpositiveeffects.ArecentstudybyEnjolrasandcolleagues(2013)foundthat,ina
protest context, links with information structures on social media exert a strong and
independenteffectonpoliticalmobilisation.Recent studiesusingpaneldatahave found
supportthatFacebookcanleadtoincreasedpoliticalactivity(Dimitrovaetal.,2014;Holt
etal.,2013),especiallywhentheyareusedforpoliticalnewsandvisitingpoliticalcontent
such as presidential candidates’ Facebookwebsites. It needs to be noted, however, that
these studies were conducted during election times and thus both interest in, and
attentionto,newsisheightened(DelliCarpiniandKeeter,1997).As isthecasewiththe
literature exploring the internet’s effect during the pre-Web 2.0 era, however, not all
research findings reveal positive effects. Zhang and colleagues (Zhang etal., 2009),who
looked specifically on the impact of socialmedia, found that despite that their usewas
significantly related to increased civic participation, there was no relationship with
political participation, a result corroborated by a recent study using panel data
(Theocharis&Quintelier,2015).Moreover,BaumgartnerandMorris(2010),contraryto
whatotherstudieshaveshown,foundthatthosewhorelyonsocialmediafornewswere
not more likely to participate in politics by traditional means. Extant research, thus,
provides inconclusive findings about the effect of Facebook on various forms of
participation, while notable is the small number of studies using longitudinal or
experimental designs to provide firmer support about the direction of causality
(Boulianne,2015).
FieldExperimentsasaMethodforTacklingFacebook’sEffectson
Participation
There is much ambivalence surrounding the direction of causality when it comes to
Facebook’s effects on different modes of participation. Nearly all studies presenting
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positiverelationshipsbetweenFacebookuseandparticipationarecross-sectional,soitis
hard to rule out the possibility of confounding factors that affect social media use and
participation.WenotethatpastexperimentstudiesontheeffectsofFacebookonpolitical
participationdonot address this issuedirectly (Bond etal., 2012).Bond and colleagues
looked at mobilisation of existing Facebook users, whereas we follow a different path.
RatherthanstudyingtheeffectofpoliticalinformationseenbyalreadyexistingFacebook
users,weconsidertheeffectsofbringingpeopleontotheFacebookplatformbyrecruiting
people who did not have a Facebook account at all. If people not already using the
platformhaveadistinctprofileofpoliticalparticipationtothosewhoselectontoit, then
we will identify a different causal effect that does not necessarily originate in the
informationexposuremechanismexploredbyBondandcolleagues.
Againstthisbackgroundandespeciallyconsideringtheinteractiveandparticipatory(even
ifonlyexpressive)possibilitiesthatemergethroughsocialconnectionsonceonecreatesa
Facebook account, we expected that creating a Facebook account would lead to an
increase in one’s participation when compared with someone who does not have an
account.Asthisisanexperimentalstudywiththeaimoftestingtheindependenteffectof
havingaFacebookaccountonparticipationwedonotspeculateabouthowthe typesof
uses of Facebook that people may adopt after acquiring a Facebook account affect
participation (although, in our post hoc analysis, we do take into consideration how
different aspects of Facebook use that have proved influential in past research, like
intensity,networkembedednessandpoliticaluse,maybeaffectingthetreatmentgroup’s
participation patterns). Rather, by randomising ownership of Facebook account we are
interestedinwhetherownershipandmaintenanceofsuchanaccount(whichpresumably,
ifmaintained,willinvolvetypicalusesthatotherresearchhasshowntobeinfluential)is
causallyrelatedtomoreparticipation.
Given findings by extant research showing that online mobilisation can be medium-
specific(BestandKrueger,2005;Vissersetal.,2011)andthatonlineparticipationisitself
adistinctformofparticipation(Oseretal.,2013),weexpectthatFacebookusewillleadto
moreonlinepoliticalparticipation.Basedonrecentresearchonsocialmedia’simpacton
extra-institutionalparticipation (Cantijoch,2012;Valenzuela,2012),wealsoexpect that
Facebook’seffectwouldbemorepronouncedon formsofextra-institutionalrather than
traditionalformsofparticipation.Finally,asextantresearchsupportsthatthemoreopen
and collaborative online culture that social media allow for is more conducive to
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engagement in civic activities (Bennett, 2012;Kahne etal., 2013;Pasek etal., 2009),we
expectFacebookusewillleadtomoretomorecivicengagement.Inhypothesisform:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Use of Facebook leads to more offline participation
(traditional, civic and extra-institutional) and therefore Facebook users will
reporthigherofflineparticipationthannon-Facebookusers.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Use of Facebook leads tomore online participation and
therefore Facebook users will report higher online participation than non-
Facebookusers.
MethodandMeasures
Caseselection
ThedatareportedinthisstudywerecollectedinGreecein2011,aperiodofwidespread
social turbulence, as well as unprecedented political instability due to the debt crisis.
Greek citizens’ strong reaction to austerity packages led to the organisation of mass
demonstrations and strikes, occupations of public institutions, widespread civil
disobedience and vibrant internet activism. The chosen period is thus of particular
significance and relevance to the subject of research. This is not only because of the
intense social turbulence in Greece during that period due to the peak of the financial
crisis, but also because it was the period leading up to what ended up to be two
consecutive elections in less than two months. Unsurprisingly, given how unpopular
politicalparties-andvirtuallyanythingthathadtodowithpolitics-wasatthetime,these
elections saw by far the lowest electoral turnout for more than 50 years. Given how
critical these elections were4, this not only implied an increased overall mediation of
politicalissuesandpositionsthrougheverycommunicationchannelavailable–withsocial
media thought to be amajor avenue formassmobilisation (Kathimerini, 2011; Henley,
2012), but also a period in which higher involvement with, and exposure to, political
issueswas to be expected (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Increased involvement and
4Manyanalystsarguedthattheresultofthatelectionwoulddefinewhetherthecountrywentbankrupt,andconsequentlybeexpelledfromtheEurozone,orremainwithintheEuroeconomicarea.
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exposuretosuchavibrantandpolariseddiscussion,however,mayalsohaveresultedin
furtherdisillusionmentandevendisconnectwithpolitics.The lowelectoral turnoutand
thestrikingriseofprotestactivityduringtheentiredurationofthestudycertainlypoint
towardsthatdirectionandopenthedoorforcontext-basedinterpretationsofthestudy’s
findings.Despitepresentinganunusualcontext,andgiventheriseofsocialmedia-enabled
politicalactivitysincethen,weperceivethistime-frameasveryimportantfortheaimsof
this study which sought to test Facebook’s impact on political behaviour because the
circumstances and news reports imply intense use of social media platforms for
engagementwithpolitics.
Methodofrecruitmentandsampling
Between October 2011 and 2012 we commissioned a reputable independent Greek
researchagencytorecruit200peopleaged18-35(50percentfemale,50percentmale),
who did not have a Facebook account5. The participants were recruited using random
digitdialingfromPatras—thethirdlargesturbanareainGreece—andwerecontacted
fromSeptember1-6,2011andMarch1-6,2012.
Afteraskingthescreeningquestionsregardingtheparticipant’sageandwhethertheyhad
a Facebook account, the survey operators proceeded with the survey and, at the end,
asked the participants whether they would be interested in participating further.
Specifically, the survey operator asked the participants whether, in exchange for a gift
voucher from a popular electronics shop, they were willing to create and maintain a
Facebookaccountforayear,respondingtoasimilartelephoneinterviewsixmonthsafter
thatcall.Iftheparticipantaccepted,theoperatortooktheparticipant’sdetails,randomly
assigned them into the treatment (n=120)or control (n=80)6group, andasked tobe
notifiedofthetreatmentgroupparticipants’newlycreatedprofileonFacebookthrougha
Facebook message within two weeks. To ensure that participants would create and
5GreeceisamongtheleastsaturatedwithFacebookcountriesinEuropewitharound4millionusersandlessthan37percentpenetrationinthepopulation(http://www.checkfacebook.com).AstheagegroupofthehighestadoptionofFacebookinthecountryisthatof25-34,followedbythose18-24,wechosetofocusontheseagecategoriesaimingtocapturepeoplelikelytoadoptFacebookforthedurationofoursurvey.
6Theunequalsplitbetweentreatmentandcontrolgroupswasdecidedbasedontheexpectationthatpanelattritionwouldbemuchhigherinthetreatmentgroupduetothetypeoftreatment.
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maintain a profile on Facebook, the agency sent the voucher details to the participants’
newly created Facebook profiles after the participants communicated to the agency
throughtheseprofiles.Thiswasalsothewayinwhichtheinitial(priortothetelephone
interview) subsequent communication with the survey participants took place for the
followupinterviewcall.Inthiswayweensuredthatthetreatmentgroupwereusingtheir
account.IntensityandtypeofusemadeoftheFacebookaccountweremeasuredthrougha
number of questions about intensity, number of friends acquired, andmore (see below
sectiononvariablesusedinposthocanalysis).Duringthecourseoftheexperimenttwo
control group members reported opening an account. They are excluded from this
analysis.
In thisstudywe focusat theeffectofhavingaFacebookaccountonparticipationat the
secondcontactpointwhenourrespondentshavemaintainedanaccount forsixmonths,
usingallrespondentswhocompletedWave2andcompliedwiththeinstructions(197of
200;onedrop-outandtwonon-compliers).Wedonothavestrongexpectationsaboutthe
timecourseofthemobilisationeffectswearestudying—itistheoreticallypossiblethat
effects on mobilisation are cumulative and more time is required to show a complete
effect,orthattheeffectappearsanddisappearsonaveryshorttimescale—however,we
expectthatsixmonthsshouldbealongenoughtoseetheeffectsofinterest.
Politicalparticipationmeasures
Weuse thedefinitionofpoliticalparticipationprovidedbyVerbaandcolleagues (Verba
etal., 1995, p.9), as an ‘activity that is intended to or has the consequence of affecting,
either directly or indirectly, government action’. However because different modes of
politicalparticipationmaynotonlybeusedbydifferentpeoplebutmayconstitutedistinct
types of engagementwith politics altogether (Cantijoch, 2012; Dalton etal., 2009; Oser
etal., 2013; Zukin etal., 2006), we distinguish analytically between online, offline,
traditional,civic,andextra-institutionalmodesofparticipationinadditiontoprovidinga
combinedmeasure.
We conceptualise offline political participation as having three components: traditional,
extra-institutional and civic participation. Traditional participation is participation
directlyattached to theelectoralprocess.Wemeasure thisusing theparticipation items
developedbyVerbaandNie (VerbaandNie,1972) thataskrespondents towhatextent
theyengagedinthelasttwelvemonthsinfivepredefinedpoliticalactivities.Theseinclude
votinginnationalelections,persuadingotherstovoteinelection,workingforapartyor
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politician, raising funds for a political party and attending political meetings. These
responsesscaletogether(Mokken’sH=0.52(s.e.0.061),Cronbach’salpha=0.52)sowefita
binaryItemResponseTheory(IRT)modelandusestandardisedpointestimatesfromthe
posteriordistributionoffactorscoresasourindex.
WeusedIRTmodelsbecausewewanttomodelourLikertandbinaryitemsinawaythat
does not, like Factor Analysis, assume Normally distributed items, but does maintain
Factor Analysis’ assumption of a continuous underlying factor and local item
independence. Mokken's H statistic allows us to test that levels of the items we think
measure the same construct are monotonically related, i.e. that they do form a scale.
HavingconfirmedouritemsscaletogetherwefitgeneralisedIRTmodelstomaximisethe
information we can extract7. One implication of using IRT models (or indeed Factor
Analysis) is that our underlying constructs have no natural scale so can be arbitrarily
normalised. We use this to present our results in standard deviations of responses,
therebyabstractingawayfromthedetailsofthebinary,Likert,orothertypesofitemswe
used.
Wemeasureextra-institutionalparticipationbyaskingrespondents towhatextent they
engaged in the last twelve months in five pre-defined political activities (Barnes etal.,
1979).Theseincludeworkingforapoliticalactiongroup,signingapetition,deliberately
buyingoravoidingbuyingcertainproducts,participatingindemonstrationsanddonating
money to causes. These items scale together (Mokken’s H=0.44 (0.047), Cronbach’s
alpha=0.64)andweremeasuredusingstandardised factorscores froman IRTmodel,as
describedabove.
Weconceptualisecivicparticipationas‘participationaimedatachievingapublicgood,but
through direct hands-onwork in cooperationwith others, such as volunteerwork in a
community’(Zukinetal.,2006,p.51)andmeasureitbyaskingrespondentstowhatextent
they engaged in the last twelve months in three pre-defined political activities. These
includeworking or volunteering for a community project,working or volunteering in a
non-political group (e.g., hobby club or reforestation team) and raising money for, or
participating in, charity activity (e.g., a charitymarathon). The responses scale together
7 NotethatsimilarresultscanbeobtainedbyapplicationofFactorAnalysis,providedthatweworkwithanappropriatetypeofitemcorrelationmatrix,e.g.polychroriccorrelationsforourLikertitems.Weprefertoworkwiththedatadirectly.)
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(Mokken’sH=0.52 (0.047), Cronbach’s alpha=0.68) andweremeasuredby standardised
factorsscoresfromanIRTmodel.
There is no standard battery of questions measuring online political participation, but
several scholars have attempted to construct suitable item sets (Bakker and deVreese,
2011) and scales tomeasure online participation (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013; Hirzalla
and Van Zoonen, 2010). Following this work we operationalise online political
participation using six pre-defined political activities. These include visiting the
government’s or a politician’s website, reacting online to content posted by such a
website,signinganonlinepetition,visitingsitesofpoliticalactiongroups,reactingonline
to content posted by such awebsite and creating a blog or a social network group for
politicalreasons.Theresponseswerescaledasbeforetocreateanormalisedmeasureof
onlineparticipation(Mokken’sH=0.47(0.063),Cronbach’salpha=0.76).
Treatmentandcontrolvariables
The causal variable of interest is having andmaintaining a Facebook account. Although
thisisrandomised,samplingvariationinoursamplecangeneratecovariateimbalance,so
weperformouranalysiscontrollingforanumberofpossiblyconfoundingvariables.These
arethestandardpredictorsofpoliticalparticipationfromtheliterature: levelofpolitical
interest and ideological self-placement on a left-right axis (Norris, 2002; Verba etal.,
1995), but also postmaterialist orientations (Inglehart 1990) and membership in
associations (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). We also include control for age, gender and
highestlevelofcompletededucation.Inanattempttoimproveprecisionwealsoinclude
for each participation measure its pre-treatment value although our results are not
sensitivetothischoice.Mostresponseshadamissingnessrateof6percentorbelow,with
the exceptions of ‘did you vote in the last election’ (16.1 per cent missing), left-right
ideology on a 0-10 point scale (15.8 per cent missing), and income band (24 per cent
missing).Allmissingdataweremultiply imputed(usingtheAmelia IIpackage(Honaker
etal., 2011)).Unlessotherwise stated, allmodel results are constructedby combination
fromimputeddata(LittleandRubin,2002).
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Variablesusedinthepost-hocanalysis
Taking into consideration findings from previous research, in our post-hoc analysiswe
includedseveralitemsthat,withinthecontextofsocialmedia,havebeenfoundinfluential
forsubsequentengagementindifferenttypesofparticipation.Theseincludedintensityof
Facebookuse(Xenosetal.,2014),measuredthroughthe item‘approximatelyhowmuch
time do you spend on Facebook’ with possible answers ranging from ‘less than 10
minutes’ to ‘more than3hours’; networkembeddedness (Gil deZuniga andValenzuela,
2010), whichwasmeasured through the item approximately howmany friends to you
haveonFacebook,withpossibleanswersrangingfrom‘lessthan10’to ‘morethan300’;
exposuretopotentiallymobilisinginformation(TangandLee,2013)whichwasmeasured
through the item ‘please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements:duringthelastsixmonthsIhavereadinformationonFacebookaboutsocial
andpoliticalinitiativesinwhichIwouldliketoparticipate’withpossibleanswersranging
from‘stronglyagree’to‘stronglydisagree’;andinteraction,throughdiscussion,ofpolitical
content posted by friends on Facebook (Rojas and Puig-I-Abril, 2009), measured by
throughitem‘Duringthelast6months…Ihavecommentedonfriends’postsofpolitical
natureonFacebook’.
Results
Toestimate theeffectofFacebookwe ran t-tests comparing treatment to control group
outcomesforeacheachparticipationmeasure(traditional,civic,extra-institutional,online
andageneralparticipationmeasure)andlinearregressionsontreatmentconditionwith
controlvariablesincludingtheparticipant’spre-treatmentscoreontheresponsevariable.
Since treatment is randomly assigned we expect, and largely confirm, no significant
relationshipswiththecontrols.
Asacheckontherobustnesstofunctionalformassumptionsintheregressionanalysiswe
additionally estimated an average treatment effect (ATE) viamatchingusingpropensity
scores (Sekhon, 2011). We used one-to-one matching with a 0.1 standard deviation
callipertodiscardhard-to-matchcases.Thisledtoaround15unmatchedrespondentsfor
eachparticipationvariable.Intheresultstablesbelowthematchingestimate‘ATE’should
becomparedtotheregressiontreatmentcoefficient‘Facebook’.
15
We do not report average treatment effects on the treatment (ATT) and control group
(ATC) separately. These are not directly comparable to the regression coefficient on
treatment (but provide substantively the same result) and, predictably, scarcely differ
from the ATE due to the randomised design. It is important to note that our research
design targets an average treatment effect on the control group (ATC) for the Greek
population because our treatment assignment gives Facebook accounts to a random
subset of subjects that do not already have them, but does not remove accounts from
those that do, so it cannot provide information about ATE or ATT effects of Facebook
directly.Nevertheless,inouranalysisanATEisappropriate.
We show matching results for a one imputation rather than average models that are
constructed frompotentially different cases in each imputation. As far aswe are aware
thereiscurrentlynostandardmethodologicalguidanceforperformingmatchinganalyses
onmultiplyimputeddata.Standarderrorsandconfidenceintervalscomputationusethe
Abadie-Imbensmethodwhich takes intoaccountvariationdue tomatching (Abadieand
Imbens,2006).
TheregressionandmatchingmodelsresultsareshowngraphicallyinFigure1.Table1,2
and 3 show the effects of treatment onmeasures of reported participation. Dependent
variables are unit-normalised so the treatment coefficients should be interpreted as
effectsinstandarddeviationsofreportedparticipation8.
[Figure1andTables1,2,and3abouthere]
The overall picture is straightforward: all point estimates of treatment effects are
negative.Inmoredetail,startingwithofflineformsofparticipation,thepointestimateof
8For each reported participation type we construct what is effectively a weighted
aggregateofpossiblydifferentnumbersandtypesofitemssoitmakessensetonormalisethefactorscorestohavefixedvariance.Thisallowsustointerpretcoefficientsintermsofstandard deviations of response, abstracting from the details of our survey items. Byaggregatinginanyway,fromadditiveindexconstructiontotheIRTmodelswefithere,weshould,provided the itemsdoall tap the sameparticipation type, improve theaccuracyand efficiency of measurement. The price paid is that it is not easy to map back toparticular items. It is also not possible to directly compare levels of different types ofreported participation. To offset this disadvantage we also construct a generalparticipationmeasure.
16
the effect of Facebook is negative on both traditional and extra-institutional forms of
politicalparticipation,thoughnotsignificantlyso,andwefindnosupport forH2.This is
surprising considering the large amount of studies that have demonstrated positive
effects, even weak or modest ones. Civic engagement is the only offline participation
variableuponwhichFacebookeffects are statistically significant.This stands inmarked
contrasttoKahneandcolleagues’(Kahneetal.,2013)andHoltandcolleagues’(Holtetal.,
2013) positive findings which were also derived from panel data. Moving to online
participation, our findings show the treatment has, again, a negative effect on online
politicalparticipation9.
The last Table (3) shows the results for a combined, ‘general political participation’
variableconstructedfromscaledfactorscoresusingbothofflineandonlineparticipation
items.Thefindingsareconsistentwiththepreviousmodelsandpredictablymoreprecise.
Theoverallmessage fromtheanalysis is thatacquisitionanduseofaFacebookaccount
leadstolowerlevelsofreportedpoliticalandcivicengagement.
What about the type of Facebook use? Previous empirical work has shown that it is
actually theways inwhichoneusesFacebook thatmay result tomoreparticipation.As
alreadydiscussed,fourofthemostprominentmobilisationmechanismswereexaminedin
thetreatmentgroup.Table4offersacorrelationbetweenourmaindependentvariables
and four independent variables used to measure intensity of use, size of Facebook
network,exposuretomobilisinginformationandusingFacebookforpoliticalpurposes.As
canbeseenintheTable,withtheexceptionofusingFacebookforpolitical/civicpurposes,
all other variables are weakly negatively correlated with all forms of participation.
Facebook network size and receiving mobilising information on Facebook are both
negatively and statistically significantly correlated with engaging in traditional acts.
Facebookuseforpolitical/civicpurposesistheonlyvariablethatispositivelycorrelated
with diverse forms of engagement, and is statistically significantly correlated with
traditional and online engagement. Although obviously no causal claims can be made
basedonthisanalysis,theeffectsgenerallycomplementtheoverallpicturethatacquiring
aFacebookaccountofferslittleconcreteparticipatorybenefits.
9Theeducationvariablealsogeneratesstatisticallysignificanteffects.Therearetoofewcasestoconfidentlydistinguishsubgroupeffects,althoughhigherlevelsofeducationcorrelateweaklywithlargerdropsinreportedparticipation.
17
[Table4abouthere]
Discussion
“Our sense is that the hyperbole surrounding newWeb developments (Web2.0) as they relate to citizenship may be just that—hype. In fact, it isreminiscentofearlierhopesfor‘‘Web1.0,’’andbeforethat,television,andevenearlierdevelopmentsinmasscommunicationsTechnology”
(BaumgartnerandMorris,2010,p.38)
Inoneof thefewstudies findingnosignificanteffectsofsocialmediauseonpolitical
participationandpoliticalattributessuchaspoliticalknowledge,BaumgartnerandMorris
urgedforcautionwheninterpretingthemobilisingpotentialofsocialmediaplatformslike
Facebook. Our study intended to contribute to a better understanding of the causal
relationship between digital media and participation, a question that has been at the
forefrontof thedebateon the internet’spotential since themediumwaspopularised in
thelate1990s.Muchofinternetandpoliticsliteraturehasbeenconcernedwiththeeffect
of digital media use on participation during the last decade yielding altogether more
positive than negative relationships (Boulianne, 2009) despite the lack of consistent
measures (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013). Yet, as many scholars have noted (Boulianne,
2009, 2015;Dimitrova etal., 2014;Kahne etal., 2013; Shah etal., 2005), panel data are
bettersuitedfortacklingthiscausalquestion,andthesehavebeeninshortsupply.
OurstudycontributestothedebateprovidingevidenceshowingthatuseofFacebook,by
far themost popular socialmedia platformwithmore than 1 billion users, has a clear
negativeeffectonparticipation.Thefindingsaddscepticismaboutthepotentialofsocial
networking sites to affect participation; Facebook use not only fails to influence
engagement in a number of classic and widely used political and civic participation
repertoires,butaffectsthemnegatively.Perhapsthemosttroublingresultinourstudyis
thedemonstrationofanegativerelationshipinallformsofparticipation,ratherthan–as
isusuallyargued—inofflinehigh-costformsofengagement.Thisshouldraisetheoretical
concerns that go beyond the saturated ‘slacktivism’ and ‘clicktivism’ debates abound in
mainstreammedia(Gladwell,2010;Morozov,2009).
The starkness of our study’s counter-intuitive main finding invited us to search for
explanations through more subtle paths that could convincingly explain it. What
differentiates this study from studies that use panel data and find positive effects on
18
political and civic engagement is not only that itwasnot conductedduring an electoral
campaign(Dimitrovaetal.,2014;Holtetal.,2013),orwithasampleofschoolchildrenor
adolescents(Kahneetal.,2013;Theocharis&Quintelier,2015),butthatthisstudymakes
useof a randomisedexperimental designwhich requires frompeoplewhodon’t have a
Facebook profile to create andmake use of one. An important distinctionwas also the
contextinwhichthestudytookplace.Indeed,asourfindingsechoearlystudiesreporting
theinternetasatoolthatcontributestosocialisolationandfurtherdisengagement(Kraut
etal.,1998;NieandErbring,2000)duetotheentertainmentfunctionsofthemedium,we
find that a convincing explanationmay lie on Facebook’s recreation and entertainment
capacities.
ArivaltheorytotheonethatseesFacebookasamobilisingfactorforengagementisone
that sees it as a de-mobilizing force whose functions distract the users’ attention from
politics.Althoughourdatasetdidnot includevariables for testing thispossibility, this is
farfromanexoticspeculation.FromPostman’sdystopianwarningsinAmusingOurselves
toDeath (Postman,1985) toNorrisand Jones’ (1998)concerns thatrecreationalusesof
theinternetmayerodepublicinvolvement,thepossibilityofusingtheinternetpurelyasa
methodofdistractingoneself fromhasalwaysbeenvisible.That the situation inGreece
duringthetime inwhichthestudywasconductedwaschallengingformostGreeks,and
downright dire for many, reinforces the idea that Facebook may have been a way of
escaping everyday struggles by disassociating oneself from, rather than engaging with,
politics. Political communication literature has long emphasised that media can be a
sourceofentertainment thatoffersmomentsofescapismfromthestrugglesofdaily life
(LazarsfeldandMerton,1948).Empiricalresearchhasalsosupportedthisidea.Inastudy
ontheeffectsofEastGermans’exposuretoWestGermantelevisionontheirsupportofthe
EastGermancommunistregime,KernandHainmueller(2009)foundevidenceconsistent
with the theory that television was primarily used as a source for entertainment and
distractionthatmadelifeundercommunismmorebearable.Itisthusplausibletosuggest
that, intheworstdaysofthecrisisinGreece,Facebookplayedasimilarlyentertainment
roleindemobilisingratherthanamobilisingthepopulation.
There is also a different, and almost contrary, interpretation. One of the major
characteristics of the time period in which the study was conducted was the strong
polarisationamongthepublicopinionregardingthepaththecountryshouldtake.Atthe
time ofwriting, Greece is undergoing a very similar and probably evenmore turbulent
periodduringwhichthepopulation, facingbankclosuresandcapitalcontrols, is fiercely
19
dividedoverareferendumtoapproveordisapprovetheinternationalcreditors’package
ofausteritymeasures.Oneofthemostmajorconcernsvoicedinthemainstreammediaat
the time – and consistently since - is the effect of polarisation on social media which
createsanincisive,uncivil,andoftendeleteriousatmosphere,likenedbythemajorGreek
newspaper Kathimerini to a “civil war” (Kathimerini, 2015). A number of studies has
shownthatincisiveanduncivildiscussionsonsocialmediahaveanegativeeffectnotonly
ontheattitudesandbehavioursofthosewhoengageinthediscussionitself(Hwangetal.,
2008),butalsoadisillusioningeffecttothosewhoattend(Andersonetal.,2013).Withthe
discussionragingonFacebook,withaccusations frombothsupportersandcriticsof the
government,andwithrowsbetweenfriendsandacquaintancesattheirpeak,itisfarfrom
implausible that using the platformmay have led to disaffection with politics. Such an
explanationisalsofirmlygroundedinexistingliterature. Inarandomisedexperiment in
which a subset of “internet-less” people in Tanzania, prior to the presidential election
were assigned to the “internet use” treatment group which was given access to the
internet,Bailard(2012)foundthattheinternetinfluencedindividuals’perceptionforthe
fairnessoftheelectionnegatively.WeagreewithBailard’sstatementthattheinternet’s--
andinourcaseFacebook’s--effectsmaybeheavilycontextuallydependent.Thisstudy’s
surprising results do not, thus, call only for a replication of our design in a different
context,butalsoopensupanewandexcitingavenueforfurtherresearchonsocialmedia
thattakescontextualfactorsintogreaterconsideration.
PuttingasidetheexplanationsofFacebook’snegativeeffects,themainimplicationofthis
study is that increased caution should be exercised when it comes to statements and
assumptions about the direction of causality that underlies the relationship between
socialmedia use and participation. This research underlines the need formore studies
with longitudinal and experimental designs exploring the relationship between digital
mediaandparticipationandthemechanismsofinfluence.
Finally, there are two limitations to the study: first, the sample size is relatively small.
Thus,whilewe canbe fairly confidentofourgeneral findingswedonothave sufficient
precision tocompareeffect sizes fordifferentparticipationmeasures.Second,whileour
itemsdoscaletogetheraspredictedbytheoryandconfirmedbyMokken’smeasures,they
are not particularly strong. In particular the weaker scales are thosemeasuring offline
participation,whichmayexplain the imprecise results. If this is the case,weshouldnot
readtoomuch intothenon-significanceof therelevanttreatmentcoefficients; forallwe
knowtheeffectsmaybeasrobustlynegativeastheonlinemeasuresorunaffectedbythe
20
manipulation. Another limitation of the experimental design is that we do not get
informationabouttheparticularmechanismsthatmaybecausingnegativeeffects.Thisis
astraightforwardconsequenceoftherandomisedexperimentaldesign.
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Acknowledgment: The authors would like to thank the participants of the "Social Media and Political Participation" panel of the 2014 EPSA General Conference, as well as the participants of the "Experimental Research" panel of the 110th APSA Annual Meeting for commenting on earlier versions of this paper. Yannis Theocharis would especially like to thank Jan W. van Deth for his advice, ideas about the study’s design and his support, as well as to acknowledge the financial contribution of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. Yannis Theocharis is Research Fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim. His research interests are in political behaviour, new media, social networks, and social capital. Will Lowe is Senior Research Specialist in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. He is a political methodologist focusing on quantitative political text analysis.
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Table 1: Models of offline participation modes. For each mode, model 0 is equivalent to a t-test of difference of means, model 1 is a linear regression, and model 2 is the ATE from a matching analysis using propensity scores.
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Table 2: Models for offline and online modes. For each mode, model 0 is equivalent to a t-test of difference of means, model 1 is a linear regression, and model 2 is the ATE from a matching analysis using propensity scores. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Models for all measures combined. For each mode, model 0 is equivalent to a t-test of difference of means, model 1 is a linear regression, and model 2 is the ATE from a matching analysis using propensity scores. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Correlation table of modes with attributes of the treated group.
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Figure 1: Estimated treatment effects by dependent variable for regression and matching analyses.