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7/28/2019 Election Laws Digest

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NORJANNAH D. PACATUA

ELECTION LAWS CASE DIGEST / SATURDAY 11:00-12:00 noon

1.)DOMINO VS COMELEC

FACTS:

DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence

requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. On 6

May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO

disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district ofSarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the

cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental

Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted

but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution

disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of

the Provincial Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest

number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province

of Sarangani. On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its

decision dated 29 May 1998. Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer

for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. Thecandidate who gathered the second highest number of votes intervened in the

case and said that she should be declared as a winner since Domino was

disqualified from running for the position.


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ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City

declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,

conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on

Elections.

b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district

for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and

c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for

the disqualification of petitioner.

HELD:

a. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province

of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC

cannot be sustained.

The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its

jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani,

approved and ordered the transfer of his voters. It is not within the competence of

the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a

resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion

cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or

to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in whichhe is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification.

b. No. He did not meet the residency requirement.


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A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be

deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of

domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of

domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In

other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non

revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an

indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the

residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The lease

contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a

change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to

reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required toprove abandonment of ones original domicile (Ilocos Sur to Quezon City).

While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from

the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he

sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997,

and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by

reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one

year residency requirement under the Constitution..

c.DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition

is bereft (lacking) of merit.

The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction

over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does notautomatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be

proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a

member of the House of Representatives.


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Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the

Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a

member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the

Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a

candidate.

It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest

number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is

disqualified.

In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their

expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and

elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in theelection for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally

guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or

plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a

constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots

that they do not choose him.

The petition of Domino is denied. The resolution of the COMELEC en banc is

affirmed.


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2.)JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., et. al. vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXASII, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA

FACTS:

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of

the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the

administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza,

Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons

move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party. On

March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference, but, when convened,

the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant andelected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately

filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections

claiming that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National

Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not

properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution,

party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on

November 30, 2007. Petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO

and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting

respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the

holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of

petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly

did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the

amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons

term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in aholdover capacity until new officers were elected. Both sides of the dispute came to

this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court

issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilons petition and denying that of

petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had

jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had


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been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP

president was to end only on November 30, 2007. Subsequently, the LP held a

NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired.

Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new

LP president.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas

election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s

expulsion from the party.

HELD:

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not

have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.

Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference

from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only

when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The validity of

respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC

had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing

authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective

positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue

certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is

the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld

Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s

expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications onthe COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the

Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s

expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party

membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the

limited scope of its power over political parties. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the


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petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18,

2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

3.)ALDOVINO VS COMELEC

FACTS:

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for

having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction. The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that

preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspendedpublic official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term

should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive

terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September

2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively

suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,

however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he

resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007

election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners

Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)

sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the

ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for

a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of

the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled

against the petitioners and in Asilos favor in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. Itreasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render

complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the

Sandiganbayan had ordered.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not preventive suspension of an elected local official is an

interruption of the three-term limit rule; and Whether or not preventive suspension is

considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

HELD:

NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes

the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no

more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in

Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word

"term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law

describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a

qualified interruption.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the

disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the

public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public

official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and

executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the

disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three

consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully

served three consecutive terms). The petitioner vacated his post a few months

before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance

with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and

thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. "Interruption" of a

term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves

no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have

involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective


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interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its

strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous

stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary

renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an

interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that

preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an

elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot

simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in

office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the

office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials

continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the

authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

4.)NICOLAS-LEWIS VS COMELEC, GR no. 162759 August 4, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship

under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among

others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought

registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter only to be advised by the

Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the

Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to

vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement

prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different

Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as

the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certainindividuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Prodded for

clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal

vs. COMELEC on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:Faced

with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the

COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,


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petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and

mandamus. A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30,

2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for the denial of the petition.

As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said

elections.On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a

Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas

Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do

so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the

petition moot and academic. The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG

pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as

petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and

transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety ofallowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections,

however, remains unresolved.

ISSUE:

whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or

reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter

under R.A. 9189.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so

holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act

No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the

right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, theOverseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.


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5.)BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

FACTS:

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-

List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)

before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of

the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC

is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the

Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." BANAT filed a petition for certiorari

and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a

motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, BayanMuna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its

decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60

because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act

No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration

during the proceedings of the NBC.

ISSUES:

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in

these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments

set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),

Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for

one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
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5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in

the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from

participating in the party-list elections?

HELD:

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes

garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes

garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list

candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, thepercentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the

difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and

the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of

the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share

in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of

the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We

distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.

Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each

qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from

participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution

clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections

through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission

voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative thereservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that

participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.

No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the

party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is

manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and


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R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially

legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent

violation of the Constitution and the law.

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.

COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation

of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded

by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of

Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major

political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct

congruence with theirs, hence, There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list

parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This isborne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were

initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear

expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major

political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162

parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50.

These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes

counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties

(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an

average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of

the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat

that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In

contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of

the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people atthe time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through

the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In

ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and

powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who

have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow


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major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will

surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray

the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of

the party-list system.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a

threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was

explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate

concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a

minimum vote requirement is needed

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as afallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose

chances are very low, from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their

seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the

elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree

their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an

appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and

those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to

represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament

through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and


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7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be

represented.

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the

party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative

districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote

requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable

changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution,

because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that

Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely providesa ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law,

R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the

constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling

completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down

the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an

inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this

Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of

statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a

constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

6.)G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec / G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved

the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,

in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private

respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the


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marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-

marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec

acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

HELD:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of

other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is

involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it

justiciable.

2. Political partieseven the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections

subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the

statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified

from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of

Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,

regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon theComelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and

underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the

party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list

system.


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3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of

respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations

was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier

of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the

law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the

law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that

the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party

lists.

7.)JOSE B. AZNAR, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIOMARIO RENNER OSMEA,

FACTS:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea

filed his certificate of candidacy with theCOMELEC for the position of

Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.2)

On January 22 , 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as i ts

incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with theCOMELEC a petition for the

disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly

not a Filipinocitizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.3)

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a

Certificate issued by the thenImmigration and Deportation CommissionerMiriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is

anAmerican and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.

B-21448 and Immigrant Cer tificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued

at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").4)


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During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained

that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that heis the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio

D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that heis a

holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on

March 25, 1987; that he has beencontinuously residing in the Philippines since

birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months;and that he has

been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.5)

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the

petition for disqualification for not havingbeen timely filed and for lack of

sufficient proof that pr ivate respondent is not a Fi lipino citizen. Hence,

thepetition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by

acquiring dual-citizenship?

HELD:

Supreme Court dismissed petition for certiorari upholding

COMELECs decision. The petitioner fai led to present direct proof that

private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes

provided for under C.A. No. 63 . these are : (1 ) by naturalization in a foreign

country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath

of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From

the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose hisPhilippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by

any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.In the instant case, private

respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the

United States. He is holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has

continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to


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the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent

remains a Filipino andthe loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an

American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an

American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of

Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he

is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.

Indeed, th ereis no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;

truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.

When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine

citizenship must be "express", it stands toreason that there can be no such

loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express"or "implied".


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8.) TABASA vs. CA G.R. No. 125793

FACTS:

Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old (minor), his father, Rodolfo Tabasa,

became a naturalized citizen1 of the United States.

By derivative petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

On August 3, 1995 Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a

balikbayan for one year.

After that petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID

on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay,Aklan. Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.

Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law

and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996. On the same day, Tabasa was

accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative

Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:

1. That on 3 August 1995, Tabasa arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as

a balikbayan;

2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General

of U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport had been revoked

by the U.S. Department of State;

3. Hence, Tabasa is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be

summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by

then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.On May 29, 1996 - BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the

United States. US Consul filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport


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the Tabasa on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has

been issued against him, and that the Tabasas passport has been revoked.

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary

Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order Tabasa alleged that he was not

afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by

immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of

the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to

admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant

because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a)

of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due

to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.

On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of

the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and

restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID

presented Tabasa before the CA. On June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten

(10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be

considered submitted for decision. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration

granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond.

On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had

acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171, and that

because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the

respondent Bureau.

On August 7, 1996 Decision, denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he

had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship asprovided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen

by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no

evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or

economic necessity, as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing

the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit


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does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for

petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968.

CA concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to

avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America.

The court ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA

8171.

HELD:

RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriat ion of Filipino Women Who Have

Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,

was enacted on October 23, 1995. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated

under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his

Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is

available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of

political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born

Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship

due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his

repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a

situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a

naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino willallow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine

citizenship on his children ofjus sanguinis or blood relationship.

To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the

time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.


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He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on

Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation

pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) Applicants for repatriation

are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth

certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.These

requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the

applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine

citizenship. What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he

registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil

Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such

registration. At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue ofthe June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA

8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance

according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. Thus, petitioner should have instead

filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.

Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State.

This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides

that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State

has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements

for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets

the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will

be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like

petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in

rejecting the petition for repatriation.


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9.)CO vs. HRET

FACTS:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and

a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional

election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates

who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the

petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second

district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not anatural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of

Northern Samar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the

Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,

Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in

1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court

an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the

private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted

there during those elections.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino

mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both


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considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than

merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the

Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a

house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should

live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require

him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount

to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet

the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

10.)Jacot vs. Dal GR NO. 179848

FACTS:

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from

running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007

National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal

renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who

became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to

reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE:

Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as

a vice-mayor?

HELD:

No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for

all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation

of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or

reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek


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elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than

one citizenship.

11.)AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SATAO, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC),

FACTS :

On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification

as a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its

petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the

Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Courtin the case ofAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec(Bagong

Bayani case)[6] for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the

party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat re-organized itself in order that it will

comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court[7] in the said

case.

The Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered

as an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as

identified under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). Further, the Comelec

held that AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the cla ssification

of regular members just to convince us that it is now cured of its defect.

Aklat filed aMotion for Reconsideration.The Comelec denied the motion in

its questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on three grounds, namely: the

petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 forregistration of party-list organizations; the petition was not one for re-qualification as

Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having failed to meet the eight-

point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and that its decision

not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid, the

Comelec being in the best position to make such a determination.


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In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions

for registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90)

days before the elections. I t therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth

(90th) day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its

petition. Hence, its petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within

the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No. 6320[12] which requires the filing of

such petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A.

7941.

It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in

the Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000persons who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has

established information and coordination centers throughout the country for the

benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory

workers including fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from

Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously

de-registered by the Comelec.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition

for re-qualification.

HELD:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that the Comelec did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. According tothe OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict with and is, in fact, germane to the

purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of the authority granted to the

Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the deadline for filing petitions for

registration under the party-list system on September 30, 2003. In line with the

purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized sectors to actively participate in


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legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to evaluate all petitions for

registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to the end that only

those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system. Besides,

Republic Act No. 8436[13] allows the Comelec to change the periods and dates

prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to ensure their accomplishment.

The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to

comply with the provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the

petition was not properly verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador

Buhain, the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,

was duly authorized by Aklat to verify or cause the preparation and filing of the

petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat was registered with the Securities andExchange Commission only on October 20, 2003, a month before it filed its petition

for re-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period of at least one (1) year

prior to the filing of the petition as required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The

OSG also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition with the documents

required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and

members particularly showing that the majority of its membership belongs to the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track record

or summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors of society.

Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are

invariably known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as

re-organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book publishers, and

publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural

communities, farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the

period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period

beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed. Furthermore, the

documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.


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Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and

amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:

Sec. 5. Registration

Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats petition

on the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it

was Aklat which asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized

and is now applying for re-qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply

with the guidelines set forth in the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot

be faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any evidence in Aklats petition to

the contrary, that Aklat is not an organization representing the marginalized andunderrepresented sectors, but is actually a business interest or economic lobby

group which seeks the promotion and protection of the book publishing industry.

Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact,

four (4) of Aklats six (6) incorporators[14] are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.[15] This

substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed

re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really

changed its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing

industry.

The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled The

Facts About Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain

general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the

youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These general

statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani casefor screening party-list participants, i.e., that the political party, sector, organization

or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified

in Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its constitution,

articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record

that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.


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12.)Tecson vs. Commission on Elections / GR 151434, 3 March 2004Facts:

On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic

of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the

2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to

be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or

"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be

Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA

04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to

deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ

made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be

a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were

foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,

was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,

Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have

transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an

alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two

assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez

before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had

existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23

January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or

on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was

denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier

assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with

Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition

likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or

any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC

resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR

161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and


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asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only

the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue

on the case.

Issue:

Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the

offcie of the President of the Philippines.

Held:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may

be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a

registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the

election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately

preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include

"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any

act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and

year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935

Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,

jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinishad been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli andjus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With

the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.

Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the

primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the

parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the

marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with

some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ

were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3)

Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

(4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11

September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F.


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Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of

Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The

documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during

the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may

not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the

evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he

cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate

of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus

Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,

notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position

and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material

misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must notonly be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

13.)CODILLA SR. VS DE VENECIAFACTS:

Petition for mandamus to compel De Venecia to proclaim Codilla as the duly

elected Congressman of 4th District of Leyte. Codilla (incumbent Mayor of Ormoc)

and Locsin (incumbent Representative) are both candidates for the Representative

of the 4th District of Leyte in the 2001 elections. Josephine De La Cruz - a registered

voter then filed a petition for Disqualification against Codilla for indirect solicitation

of votes, prohibited by section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC

(Division) delegated the hearing and reception of the evidence of such case to the

Regional Director. Election times came, and yet still no hearing from the Regional

Director. When it was apparent that Codilla garnered the most votes, Locsin

intervened in the DQ case, and filed an urgent motion to suspend proclamation.Codilla was not served with the Motion.

COMELEC issued an order suspending the proclamation due to the

seriousness of the allegations. Again, Codilla was not served with a summons to air

his side and provide contrary evidences. Although Codilla filed a petition to lift the


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suspension, COMELEC nevertheless issued a Resolution finding Codilla guilty of

indirect solicitation.

As a result, COMELEC disqualified Codilla and considered votes cast for him

as stray even though such resolution is still not yet final. Locsin was proclaimed the

winner and assumed her seat in Congress as the Representative. Codilla then

seasonably filed an MR to COMELEC (En banc), which reversed the Division

Resolution. Locsin then questioned jurisdiction of COMELEC , stating that it was the

HRET who has jurisdiction over the case now that she has assumed the post. De

Venecia concurs with COMELEC, but since Locsin said in one of her privilege

speeches that she will not obey the COMELEC reversal, he said that it was up to the

SC to decide on the matter. Thus, the petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of

jurisdiction to review its validity.

HELD:

The Proclamation of Locsin is void. The petitioner was denied due processduring the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.

The Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division disqualifying the petitioner is not

based on substantial evidence. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division

cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on

affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the

COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the

affiants. Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation ofrespondent Locsin was done with undue haste. The COMELEC Second Division

ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the

proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the

opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial

Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution


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excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin

received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was

proclaimed.

Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the

COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the

afternoon of June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait accompli.

Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass

and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due

process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is

deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights

is void.

The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and

respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. As previously stated, the

disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process

and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the

petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division

to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this

basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of

votes. The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of

the petitioner cannot be considered "stray." Respondent Locsin, as a mere second

placer, cannot be proclaimed.

14.)LOONG vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 93986, DECEMBER 22, 1992FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin Loong filed with the COMELEC his COC for the position

of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on

February 17, 1990 (January 15, 1990 being the last day of filing their COC); he

prayed that the petition be dismissed alleging that it has never been a practice of

Muslims to register a birth of child before the LCR; that prior to the election, he


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consulted his mother about his true age and assured that his correct birthdate is July

4, 1954; that COMELEC has no jurisdiction since under Section 78 of the OEC, it

should have been filed within 5 days following the last day for the filing of the COC;

that the period has already prescribed

Respondent Nurhussein Ututalum and Alim Bashir- filed a petition before the

COMELEC to disqualify Loong on the ground that the latter made a false

representation in his COC as to his age, said petition was filed on March 5, 1990 (16

days after the election and 49 days from the date that Loong filed his COC); that

although the period has already prescribed, there is still cause of action on the

petition since under Section 3,Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure it states

that the petition to disqualify a candidate on the grounds of ineligibility shall be filed

any day after the last day for filing of COC but not later than the date of

proclamation, hence, since there was no proclamation of winner yet when the

petition was filed, the petition deserves a merit

COMELECheld that the petition was timely filed applying sections 6 and 7

of RA 6646 and section 2, rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states

that the petition to deny course to or cancel a COC must be filed within 5 days

following the last day of the filing of the COC

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition to cancel the COC of Loong was filed within the

period prescribed by law.

HELD:

No. The petition was filed beyond the period prescribed by law

The age requirement to be qualified to run as V-Governor for autonomous region is

at least 35 years old under RA 6734.

Section 78 of the OEC, it states that


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Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy

may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material

representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The

petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the

filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and

hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

In this case, clearly, the petition filed by the private respondents was filed beyond

the 25-day period prescribed under Section 78 of the OEC.

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate

fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the

Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless

as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a

petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of

the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the

Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the

election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of

disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with

the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten

(10)days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be

stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made

only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code,

through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who

would want the disqualification of the candidate committing themisrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap

between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is

made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time

when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called

"gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the


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candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the

results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate,

that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission

sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, it

unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the

legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of

protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen

in Section 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the

need to remedy this so-called "procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribed what

the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether

the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the

Legislature to decide and remedy.

15.)FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC / GR No. 87193, JUNE 23, 1989FACTS:

Petitioner Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of

Sorsogon on 1988; he admitted that he was naturalized in the US but pleaded

special and affirmative defense that he had sought American citizenship only to

protect himself against President Marcos; that he forced upon himself as a means of

survival against the unrelenting persecution; that he is a Filipino citizen since his

naturalization was not impressed with voluntriness; that he returned after the EDSA

Revolution to help restore democracy; that in his oath in his COC that was a natural-

born Filipino should be a sufficient act of repatriation

Respondent League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by Salvador

Nee Estuye filed a petition before the COMELEC for the Annulment of Frivaldos

election and proclamation on the ground that he is not a qualified since he was not

a Filipino citizen prior to the election

Solicitor General supported respondents argument that Frivaldo is disqualified

since he was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his

naturalization as an American citizen; that his election did not cure the defect


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because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, LGC and

the OEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his

election on Janurary 18, 1988.

HELD:

No. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of the 1988 election,

hence, he is disqualified.The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution

that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution

"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local

Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a

citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is

running.

In his COC, he described himself as natural-born Filipino, omitting mention of any

subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows that he was naturalized as a

citizen of the US in 1983, such evidence was not denied by him. However, he

interposed that he was naturalized as a measure to protect himself from the former

dictator.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies

of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof

he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his

naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally

unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as

Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it


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necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their

cherished status as Filipinos. . The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of

those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine

citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case is not applicable in the case at bar. That case is not

relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the

nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in

the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its

national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of

the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can

decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section

1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its

law who are its nationals."

Frivaldos claim for repatriation: If he really wanted to disavow his American

citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in

accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.

473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of

Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He contends that by simply filing his

certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered

Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions

surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the

Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that

the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or

judicial proceedings. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements

and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or

assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required

qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. This Court will not permit

the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing

exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the


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people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting

public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the

people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,

especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was

qualified. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe

his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to

any other state.

16.)Labo, Jr. vs. COMELECFACTS:

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted

Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being

bigamous.

Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained

an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status

from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration

and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has

not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of

the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an

Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to

prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws

of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted

Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath

includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of

Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis

Lardizabal, filed a petition forquo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from

holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's

proclamation as Mayor be annulled.


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ISSUES:

1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?

2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?

3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?

4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the

elections, replace him?

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition forquo warranto was filed on time.

Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first

considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require

the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal

immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day

period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial

decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.

2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes

specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express

renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support

the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine

citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of

Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.

Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual

citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to

national interest.

The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically

divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had

automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino


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citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian

citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.

The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a

Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally

baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be

reversed because the doctrine ofres judicata does not apply to questions of

citizenship.

3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a

qualified voter when he was elected.

4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume

the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of

Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead,

the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

17.) G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 / MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO,

and BONCODIN, respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a

declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting

Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the

instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly

presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering

that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said

law.

Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:


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(1)That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are

immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing

an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the

residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;

(2)That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the

winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the

President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII,

Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-

President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and

(3)That Section