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Epistemic Evil
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Epistemic Evil:
A Third Problem of Evil
By
Joel Thomas Tierno
CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS PRESS
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This volume is dedicated to my parents,
JOSEPH,
DOLORES
AND JAMES,
with gratitude and love for too much to name.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................xi
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................1
PART I: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
CHAPTER ONE: ON GOD...............................................................................121. On the Concept ofGod ............................................................................ 12
2. A Qualification Concerning Gods Power ................................................13
3. Gods Character and the Character of the Creation...................................14
4. God and Good...........................................................................................15
CHAPTER TWO: THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
OF EVIL ............................................................................................................17
1. The Logical Formulation of the Problem of Evil ......................................17
2. The Evidential Formulation of the Problem of Evil..................................203. A Third Formulation of the Problem of Evil.............................................21
CHAPTER THREE: THE BEST-OF-ALL-POSSIBLE-WORLDS
HYPOTHESIS...................................................................................................24
1. A Modified Form of the Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis...........24
A. The Problem of Free Agents Other Than God......................................24
B. The Pluralistic Hypothesis....................................................................25
C. The Argument from the Universe as a Part of a Larger Whole ............25
D. The Argument from Gods Omnipotence.............................................25E. Summation............................................................................................26
2. Robert Adams on the Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis ...............273. Evaluating Adams Arguments .................................................................29
A. About Condition 3' ...............................................................................30
B. About Conditions 1 and 2.....................................................................31
C. About the Value of Grace.....................................................................33
4. Adams Argument in Application to This World......................................36
5. The Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis and the Problem of Evil...37
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Table of Contentsviii
CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTENSION AND EXTENSION
OFMORAL EVIL.............................................................................................. 39
1. Difficulties with Definitions of Moral Evil...............................................39
2. Toward a Definition of Moral Evil ...........................................................45
PART II: EPISTEMIC EVIL
CHAPTER FIVE: THE CLASSICAL LOCUS.................................................48
1. Descartes Formulation of the Problem of Erroneous Judgment ..............48
2. A Critique of Descartes Formulation of the Problem ..............................49
CHAPTER SIX: PARADIGMATIC CASES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL ..............52
CHAPTER SEVEN: EXAMPLES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL...............................59
1. The Cases
Case I: The Headmaster and the Pupil .......................................................59
Case II: The Graduate Student...................................................................61
Case III: The Couple and Their Automobile..............................................62
Case IV: The Doctor and His Patient.........................................................64Case V: The Marriage Proposal.................................................................65
Case VI: Choosing a Career.......................................................................66
2. The Significance of the Cases ...................................................................67
CHAPTER EIGHT: NATURAL EVIL AND EPISTEMIC EVIL ....................69
1. About Natural Evil....................................................................................69
2. The Analogy of Epistemic Evil to Natural Evil ........................................69
CHAPTER NINE: THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: PART 1 ..........71
CHAPTER TEN: MOTIVATION AND RESPONSIBILITY...........................77
1. Regarding Compulsory Theoretical Judgments ........................................77A. Natural Desires.....................................................................................77
B. Learned Desires....................................................................................81
C. Practical Circumstances........................................................................86
2. Regarding Compulsory Practical Judgments ............................................87
3. An Important Qualification Concerning Practical Judgments...................894. The Strength of Motivation.......................................................................92
CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: PART 2 ....94
CHAPTER TWELVE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL ........97
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Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil ix
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: DESCARTES APOLOGETICS.............................101
1. The Epistemological Argument ..............................................................103
2. Critical Analysis of the Epistemological Argument................................103
3. The Metaphysical Argument...................................................................1084. Critical Analysis of the Metaphysical Argument....................................109
5. A Complex Argument: Exposition and Critique.....................................110
6. The Psychological Argument..................................................................111
7. Descartes on the Source of Human Errors of Judgment
and How Such Errors May Be Avoided .................................................113
A. The Source of Human Errors of Judgment.........................................113
B. Descartes Method of Avoiding Error ................................................113
8. Critical Analysis of the Psychological Argument ...................................114
9. The Argument From Freedom of the Will ..............................................116
10. Critical Analysis of the Argument from the Freedom of the Will...........118
11. Another Complex Argument: Exposition and Critique...........................118
12. The Argument From Divine Liberty .......................................................120
13. Critical Analysis of the Argument from Divine Liberty .........................121
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONTEMPORARY APOLOGETICSAND EPISTEMIC EVIL .................................................................................125
1. Alvin Plantinga .......................................................................................125
2. Marilyn McCord Adams .........................................................................1323. Richard Swinburne..................................................................................143
4. John Hick ................................................................................................148
5. Bruce Reichenbach .................................................................................151
6. Summation ..............................................................................................157
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE THEODICEAN CONSEQUENCES
OF EPISTEMIC EVIL.....................................................................................158
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS.................................1611. Epistemic Evil Is Necessarily Associated with Future-Oriented
Judgments ...............................................................................................161
2. Epistemic Evil and Gods Obligation to Optimize Good........................164
3. Epistemic Evil and the Wrongful Actions of Others...............................165
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: THE RELATIVE INTRACTABILITY
OF EPISTEMIC EVIL.....................................................................................166
1. Moral Evil and Epistemic Evil................................................................166
2. Natural Evil and Epistemic Evil..............................................................167
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EPILOGUE......................................................................................................169
1. Is Epistemic Evil Logically Necessary?..................................................169
2. Is Epistemic Evil Related to the Existence of a Greater Good? ..............170
3. Is Epistemic Evil Related to the Nonexistence of a Greater Evil? ..........1704. Is Epistemic Evil a Consequence of the Defective Actions of Agents
Agents Other Than God? .........................................................................171
5. Summation ..............................................................................................171
NOTES.............................................................................................................172
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................176
INDEX.............................................................................................................179
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to recognize a debt of gratitude to several individuals who have
participated, at one point or another, in the extended process that has issued in this
essay: Thomas J. Donahue, Georges Dicker, Peter H. Hare, Richard T. Hull, the
late Richard R. LaCroix. Most especially, I would like to express my gratitude to
Gina M. Sully, who twice read earlier drafts of this manuscript and made
innumerable judicious suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
The first question is: What is a problem of evil? There has been some
disagreement about this. For the purposes of this inquiry, problems of evil arise
from apparent incongruities between the character of the alleged creator of the
universe and the observed character of the universe itself. The universe is purported
to be the work of a being without defect. The universe is observed to have certain
apparently defective features. It would seem that the universe ought not to havethese features if it is the work of such a being. Thus arise the problems of evil.
As used by moral and social philosophers, evilis opposed to morally good.The meaning of the term is slightly different in the context of the discussion of
the problem of evil. In that context, evil consists in the suffering of sentient
beings. Thus natural phenomena may be properly associated with evil in this
sense, though such phenomena are clearly not evil in the moral sense.
The features of the universe that are associated with problems of evil cause
the relevantly innocent to suffer. Who are the relevantly innocent? Individuals
are relevantly innocent with respect to a specific evil when there is no defect in
their conduct that accounts for their suffering that evil.
It might be objected that evils may be warranted by defects in agentsconduct that have no direct connection to those evils. It is not necessary that
there be some defect in our conduct which makes us liable to a specific evil for
that evil to be justified. This claim implies that our actions do not have to be
relevantly defective. My suffering in one context may be warranted by a wrong
that I have committed in some other context.
If God punishes in this way, he either does not intend punishment to serve an
educative function or does not understand punishment very well. If
transgressions and their punishments are thus uncoupled, people are unlikely to
associate them. The punishment is unlikely to be perceived as punishment. Thepossibility of learning anything specific from the punishment is thus effectively
eliminated.
The dominant analogy concerning the relation of God to human beings is that
of a profoundly concerned and caring parent to a somewhat wayward child. Do
loving parents administer painful punishments that are designed such that their
children are unable to learn from those punishments? No. To knowingly do sowould have to be considered cruel and abusive. It follows that administering
such punishments would signal either profound ignorance or a defect in the
character of the punisher. Profound ignorance is incompatible with Gods
omniscience. Defective character is incompatible with Gods omnibenevolence.
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Introduction2
In short, Gods cardinal attributes would be a barrier to his administering
punishments of this type.
A second difficulty arises for those who insist that the relevantly innocent do
not suffer unjustly. If no one who is relevantly innocent suffers unjustly thenevery specific instance of suffering is related to some failing of the sufferer.
Further, the suffering and the failing from which it arises are somehow
commensurate. This implies that the sum total of evil that individuals endure in
their lives is quantitatively proportionate to the sum total of the wrongs they
perpetrate. This notion is ludicrous. Experience refutes it. Profoundly evil
people often suffer relatively little. Joseph Stalin, one of the twentieth centurys
greatest butchers, basically had things the way the he wanted them throughout
his life. He suffered little physically and endured little frustration in the
execution of his political objectives. Other people perpetrate so much evil that
the claim that their suffering is quantitatively proportionate to the suffering they
cause is absurd. Adolph Hitler undoubtedly suffered in his life, but it cannot be
seriously supposed that the suffering he endured was proportionate to the
suffering he caused. The list of such persons is undoubtedly long. So is the list
of good people who have suffered greatly. Noted examples include Sir Thomas
More, Galileo, Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr.Finally, the claim that the relevantly innocent do not suffer violates the core
of Christian doctrine. Jesus is said to have been the innocent lamb who suffered
so that our sins may be forgiven. Here is a manson of God or otherwisewhosuffered greatly and did very little, if anything, wrong.
Gods willingness to permit the relevantly innocent to suffer requires
explanation. We would hardly select divine or Godlike as the appropriate
adjectives to characterize the behavior of parents who consistently fail to protect
their relevantly innocent children from easily avoided harms. Abusive, or at best
negligent, seem more fitting characterizations. Yet Gods creatures, even when
their behavior is relevantly unimpeachable, are frequently made to suffer harms
that God could easily prevent. Why does God not protect the relevantly innocent
from suffering? This is no merely theoretical question. Human history is atapestry heavily dappled with the blood, tears, and anguished cries of the
relevantly innocent. This demands explanation.
In addressing the existence of evil within the creation, philosophers and
theologians have traditionally distinguished between evil that has its source in
human action and evil that has its source in the natural world. The evil that hasits source in human action is called moral evil. It is said to be consequent upon
the intentional actions of free agents. Natural evil has its source within the
natural domain. It is said to follow from naturally occurring objects and
phenomena through the inevitable operation of natural laws.
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Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil 3
The classification of evils into moral and natural is widely regarded as
exhaustive. One aim of this essay is to demonstrate that this is not so. A third
form of evil will be discussed in detail below. I call this third form of evil
epistemic evil. It surfaces in the context of our effort to make correct judgments.It is ultimately rooted in our unavoidable ignorance of information we require to
make truthful judgments about the world in which we live and the best choices
about our own actions. Epistemic evil is associated with human action, but it
cannot be properly regarded as moral evil.
In Part I of this essay, various preliminary points of clarification and
foundational considerations are addressed that are relevant to the argument
regarding epistemic evil presented in Part II. Chapter 1 is devoted to discussion
of the concept ofGod. It is necessary to identify and briefly clarify the attributes
of God that provide the basis for problems of evil. This is the business of the
first section of Chapter 1. In the second section, I take a closer look at Gods
omnipotence and offer a clarification of what it means to say that God can do
whatever is logically possible. Finally, I consider the notion that Gods character
would be reflected in his creation. This notion is a presupposition of all
problems of evil and therefore deserves some consideration.
In Chapter 2, I begin by outlining and critiquing what is known as the logicalformulation of the problem of evil. Next, I consider a proposed reformulation of
the problem known as the evidential formulation of the problem of evil. I argue
that whereas the logical formulation of the problem is too strong, the evidentialformulation is unnecessarily weak. I defend an alternative conception of the
nature of problems of evil. I argue that problems of evil are best understood as
problems ofontological incompatibility. The hypothesis of an infinitely perfect
creator has existential implications. It has implications about the character of the
creation. Certain forms of evil in the creation cannot cohere existentially with an
infinitely perfect creator. Those who advance problems of evil contend that such
forms of evil actually exist.
Chapter 3 focuses on Robert Adams argument regarding the best-of-all-
possible-worlds hypothesis. I defend an importantly modified variant of thebest-of-all-possible-worlds hypothesis. I agree with Adams in rejecting the view
that God can create only one universe, that is, the best of all possible universes. I
nonetheless maintain that there are definite limitations upon the character of
Gods creation. Among these is a limitation regarding imperfections in the
universe insofar as God determines its character. In the final section of thischapter, I argue that the best-of-all-worlds hypothesis is not actually central to
those who advance problems of evil. Their arguments do not presuppose that
hypothesis.
In Chapter 4, the intension and the extension of the concept ofmoral evilarediscussed. I begin by noting that there are many definitions of moral evil in the
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literature. These definitions are shown to be extensionally as well as
intensionally divergent. In other words, these definitions are shown to diverge in
their comparative assessments of what count as moral evils. I then consider a
number of different specific actions in an effort to sufficiently sharpen theintension of the concept for the purposes of this inquiry. I close by arguing that,
contrary to the traditional view, there is evil within the human domain of the
universe that is not moral evil. More specifically, I argue that not all of the evil
consequent upon the intentional actions of free agents is moral evil. These
arguments set the stage for Part II of the essay.
In Part II, I formulate and defend the problem of epistemic evil. In Chapter 5,
the problematic of Descartes Fourth Meditation is outlined. This is the classical
locus for the inquiry into the theodicean significance of human errors of
judgment. I begin by briefly explaining how the problematic of the FourthMeditation emerges from the conclusions of the Third Meditation. I then explain
Descartes formulation of the problem of epistemic evil. Finally, I argue that
Descartes formulation of the problem is deficient in two related ways. The first
defect is that he treats all errors of judgment as if they are relevantly similar in
the context of this problem. That is a serious mistake. The second defect, which
follows from the first, is that Descartes formulates the problem of epistemic evil
universally. He wants to know why we should ever judge erroneously. The real
problem is why we should err under certain specifiable conditions. I try to
correct these deficiencies.In Chapter 6, I outline the character of paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil.
My objective is to give a detailed characterization of the errors of judgment thatlie at the heart of this problem. In this context, five variables are considered. The
first is the conditions that motivate the judgment. The second is the
consequences of the agents previous judgments and actions. The third is the
deliberative procedure the agent employs in arriving at the judgment. The fourth
is the quality of the agents judgmentit must be substantively incorrect. The
fifth is the impact of the judgmentit must have significant adverse
consequences for the human beings that are affected by it. Through thisdiscussion, the essential nature of epistemic evil is brought to light. The
judgments associated with epistemic evil concern matters that agents cannot bereasonably criticized for judging. These judgments are made through procedures
that agents cannot be reasonably criticized for employing. These judgments are
substantively incorrect. The errors involved in these judgments lead to human
suffering.
In Chapter 7, several examples of epistemic evil are discussed in
considerable detail. The aim here is to give the reader a sense of the sorts of
judgments that are connected with this form of evil. Though the examples aretied to particular cultural and historical institutions, circumstances, and artifacts,
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similar examples can surely be found from every age and every culture. The
essential point is that these judgments are commonplace. There is nothing
extraordinary about them. Everyone has suffered, at one time or another, from
epistemic evil. This form of evil is more pervasive than either moral evil ornatural evil, and that is no small claim.
In Chapter 8, epistemic evil is compared to natural evil. The aim is to show
that these two forms of evil are analogous in certain important ways. I begin by
briefly characterizing natural evil. I define natural evil as suffering consequent
upon natural objects and phenomena and the inevitable operations of natural
laws. I then argue that paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil and the most
disturbing cases of natural evil are alike in that the people involved cannot be
reasonably blamed for bringing about the suffering that they endure. The
relevant instances of natural evil and epistemic evil seem to be connected with
the world as we find it. There is no clearly identifiable means available to those
involved through which they could reliably circumvent the evil.
Chapter 9 addresses the issue of where the responsibility for epistemic evil
lies. I begin by distinguishing two forms of responsibility for acts of erroneous
judgment: motivational responsibility and methodological responsibility.
Motivational responsibility focuses on the reasons the agent passes judgmentupon the subject of the error. Methodological responsibility focuses on the
reasons the agents judgment is erroneous. Factoring these two forms of
responsibility together, we arrive at a four-category classification of erroneousjudgments. In the first category are acts of judgment such that the agent is
neither motivationally responsible for the act of judgment nor methodologically
responsible for the error of judgment. In the second category are acts of
judgment such that the agent is motivationally responsible for the act of
judgment but not methodologically responsible for the error of judgment. In the
third category are acts of judgment such that the agent is not motivationally
responsible for the act of judgment, but is methodologically responsible for the
error of judgment. In the final category are acts of judgment such that the agent
is motivationally responsible for the act of judgment and methodologicallyresponsible for the error of judgment.
This discussion of responsibility carries through Chapters 10 and 11. Chapter
10 carefully examines different types of judgments, different forms of
motivation, and different degrees of motivation. First, I discuss theoretical
judgments, and then I discuss practical judgments. Under each of theseheadings, judgments motivated by natural desires, by learned desires, and by
practical circumstances are considered in detail. In the third section of the
chapter, I offer an important qualification regarding practical judgments based
on the fact that human beings enter into relations of opposition in which it isimpossible for everyone to succeed. The chapter ends with a discussion of
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different strengths of motivation. Here I deal with the significance of the
distinction between judgments we are compelled to make by the forms of
motivation that have been discussed earlier in the chapter and judgments that we
are merely disposedto make by those forms of motivation.In Chapter 11, I argue that the hypothetical nature of the relation between the
creator and the creation that is characteristic of Judaeo-Christian theism entails
that God shares a measure of the responsibility for some of the errors of
judgment discussed in Chapter 10. God has created the world in which the
agents who make these errors live and judge. He has created the agents
themselves. He bears a measure of responsibility for their motivations. He bears
a measure of responsibility for the information that is available to them. He
bears a measure of responsibility for limits in their powers to organize and
utilize that information in the process of arriving at their judgments. The finalresult is that people are motivated to judge when they cannot judge both rightly
(employing a reliable procedure) and correctly (making the substantively correct
judgment).
In Chapter 12, I discuss the consequences of epistemic evil for human
beings. My aim is to show that epistemic evil has seriously harmful effects. This
discussion anticipates the objection that erroneous judgments which cannot be
systematically avoided do not lead to significant human suffering and, therefore,
are normatively insignificant. In the course of this discussion, I identify six
categories of judgment that differ from one another in terms of their objects.First, there are judgments regarding the natures of the entities that populate the
world in which we live and act. Second, there are judgments concerning self-regarding ends. In other words, judgments regarding what, if it is procured, will
promote our welfare or happiness. Third, there are judgments concerning self-
regarding means. In other words, judgments regarding how to get what we want.
Fourth, there are judgments concerning what will be beneficial to othersother-
regarding ends. Fifth, there are judgments concerning how to realize other-
regarding ends. Finally, there are purely theoretical judgments. I argue that
every one of these forms of erroneous judgment often has significant adverseconsequences for the human beings that are affected by them.
In Chapter 13, Descartes apologetics regarding human errors of judgmentare considered. Descartes offers five arguments regarding such errors. The first
is the epistemological argument. According to this argument, our finite powers
of comprehension are insufficient to properly understand human errors of
judgment. The second is the metaphysical argument. This argument is related to
the epistemological argument, but differs from it by specifying the exact nature
of the limitation in human reason that accounts for our inability to understand
human error. The problem is that understanding human error requires aperspective that comprehends the totality of Gods creation. Human reason,
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Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil 7
being finite and limited, cannot gain such a perspective. The third argument is
thepsychological argument. According to this argument, the human capacity for
error is a contingent consequence of the relations between two human faculties:
the will and the understanding. The important point, according to Descartes, isthat both of these faculties are perfectly adequate to their proper purpose. We
have received no faculty from God that is inherently defective. The fourth
argument is the argument from free will. According to this argument, human
errors of judgment, insofar as they depend upon God, are consequent upon a
perfection in our nature. It follows that human error is actually evidence of
Gods perfection. He empowers us to err through a misuse of our capacity to
judge freely. Human errors of judgment result from the abuse of a faculty which
was bestowed so that we might judge both freely and aright concerning those
matters that fall within the range of our comprehension. God cannot make us
free and simultaneously withhold from us the capacity for error. By giving us
the power to judge freely he makes us more rather than less perfect creatures.
The fifth argument is the argument from divine liberty. According to this
reasoning, Gods control over the creation is absolute and free. It follows that
God can have no obligations in relation to the creation. Consequently, evil,
including epistemic evil, requires no specific explanation. When an agentspower within a given domain is absolute and free, that agent never has to
explain anything he or she does within that domain. In the course of Chapter 13
all of these arguments are critically evaluated and found to be wanting.In Chapter 14, I outline the positions of some the leading contemporary
apologists. Because I have argued that paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil and
the most troubling instances of natural evil are importantly analogous, I focus on
apologetics concerning natural evil. Specifically, I consider arguments offered
by Alvin Plantinga, Marilyn McCord Adams, Richard Swinburne, John Hick,
and Bruce Reichenbach. After thorough, and I hope faithful, expositions of their
arguments, I carefully critique each argument as an explanation of natural evil.
Finally, I consider how these apologetics apply to epistemic evil. In each case, I
find serious problems with the arguments of these apologists in relation tonatural evil. I also find that these arguments have little, if any, force in relation
to epistemic evil.
Chapter 15 focuses on the theodicean consequences of the inquiry. What
follows from the arguments that I have made regarding erroneous judgments
that cannot be systematically avoided in terms of the plausibility of the claimthat the universe issues from the creative activity of a being without defect? In
other words, what does this inquiry indicate concerning the Judaeo-Christian
creation hypothesis? I conclude that cases of erroneous judgment that cannot be
systematically avoided, and the suffering consequent upon those cases, providestrong prima facie evidence against the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis.
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Introduction8
The burden of proof falls to the theists. If the errors of judgment involved in
paradigmatic instances of epistemic evil are compatible with theism, it is
incumbent upon theists to show this. I can imagine no way that this might be
done.In Chapter 16, I anticipate several objections that may be raised against my
argument. The first objection is that epistemic evil is inevitably associated with
future-oriented judgments. If this is true, it is beyond Gods power to do
anything about such evil. The second objection is that the world is better off
containing epistemic evil than it would be if it did not contain epistemic evil.
This is the familiar gambit of asserting that what appears evil from a limited
perspective, is actually good for a perspective that comprehends the totality of
being and all of the relations between its parts. The third objection is that the
conditions which lead to epistemic evil actually result from the decisions and
subsequent actions of agents other than God.
The argument of Chapter 17 is that the epistemic problem of evil is the most
intractable of the three major problems of evil. Though I think that there are
serious problems with apologetics regarding both natural evil and moral evil,
there are at least initially plausible explanations of both of these forms of evil.
There does not appear to be any comparably plausible explanation of epistemicevil. It is very difficult to understand what can be gained by the existence of
errors of judgment that cannot be systematically avoided and that lead to
significant impoverishment of the human condition.In the Epilogue, I apply the conception of problems of evil developed in
Chapter 2 to the problem of epistemic evil. I argue that epistemic evil is not
logically necessary. I argue that epistemic evil is not related to the existence of a
greater good. I argue that epistemic evil is not related to the non-existence of a
greater evil. I close by arguing that human beings have a legitimate right to
complain about the inadequacy of their received faculties in relation to the
judgments that are necessary or warranted given the character of their received
situations.
The ultimate aim of this essay is to demonstrate that the supposition that Godhas created the universe leads to a serious problem. It produces a form of
inconsistency. The inconsistency emerges when we compare the character of the
universe as it is revealed through observation and personal experience to what
we would expect the universe to be like if it were the handiwork of an infinitely
perfect creator. It turns out that the universe has surprising defects. Suppose itcan be established that there are harms human beings endure that cannot be
properly related to defects in their actions. It would follow, on the Judaeo-
Christian creation hypothesis, that there are defects within the creation that
cannot be adequately explained without reference to the actions of God. Thisleads to a problem of evil. Justifying the claim that there are such defects within
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Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil 9
the creation is the burden you inherit when you attempt to establish a problem of
evil. Meeting that burden is the central business of this essay.
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PART I
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
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CHAPTERONE
ON GOD
The first section of this chapter is devoted to clarification of the concept of
Godas far as such clarification is necessary for the purposes of this inquiry. Inthe second section, I devote special attention to the practical implications of
Gods omnipotence. In the third section, I discuss the notion that Gods nature is
reflected in the creation. In the final section, I consider a possible objection to
the argument of the third section.
1. On the Concept ofGod
As the use of the proper name Godimplies, the line of reasoning developed
below is directed against the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis. Some points
of clarification are in order before the argument proceeds. First, my
understanding of the relevant features of the Judaeo-Christian concept of God
should be specified. Second, the basis for the assumption that God's characterwould be revealed in his creative works should be supplied.
The proper name Godis generally used to refer to an infinitely perfect being
that has created the universe out of nothing (ex nihilo). Gods infinite perfection
is taken to imply that he lacks no consistently conceivable perfection compatible
with his spiritual nature. Stated positively, God possesses infinitely, completely,
or in the most perfect form possible, all those perfections that can apply to aspiritual being. This abstract notion of infinite perfection is somewhat slippery.
Attributing specific characteristics to God concretizes it. Three of these
characteristics are considered his cardinal attributes. These characteristics are
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.
God's omnipotence implies that he can do anything that can be consistently
conceived. The only states of affairs that God cannot make actual involvecontradictions in their conception. Such states of affairs could never truly be
states of affairs. They are impossible states of affairs. Power is limited by
possibility. What is beyond possibility is not potentially actual. Gods inability
to actualize what is not potentially actual is no real inability at all. When it is
said that God cannot do the impossible, it does not follow that there is
something that God cannot do. Practically, this conception of Gods power
implies that God can do whatever he wills as long as it does not involve acontradiction. All logically possible states of affairs are actually possible for
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God. This is an extreme claim. It may be open to serious challenges. Still, it is
characteristic of Judaeo-Christians to make this claim.
God's omniscience implies that he has actual knowledge of every potential
object of knowledge. God knows everything that can be known. Morespecifically, Gods omniscience implies that he possesses: (i) perfect and
complete knowledge of physical reality or what exists, (ii) perfect and complete
knowledge of normative reality or what is good and right and what is evil and
wrong, (iii) perfect and complete practical or instrumental knowledge; that is,
knowledge of how to achieve what he intends, (iv) perfect and complete
theoretical knowledge or knowledge of mathematical, logical, and scientific
truth, and (v) perfect knowledge of every immediate or direct consequence of
each action he takes. It follows, from a practical point of view, that God knows
how to do whatever he wills without doing anything that he does not will, unless
doing the former without the latter would involve a contradiction.
It might be suggested that the qualification, unless it would involve a
contradiction, is superfluous. The argument would be that God never wills the
contradictory. But this is not at all obvious. On the contrary, it seems that there
might be cases in which, in a certain sense, God unwillingly brings about certain
states of affairs. There might be evils that God brings about because those evilsare associated with the minimally defective means to procuring greater goods or
averting greater evils. God does not positively will these evils. He would prefer
to bring about the greater goods or avert the greater evils without bringing aboutthese evils. He simply cannot do so. If there are such evils, it is perfectly natural
to say that there is a sense in which they are against Gods will. God would
prefer that these evils not exist. He simply cannot bring it about that they do not
exist without also bringing it about that the greater goods to which they are
connected do not exist.
God's omnibenevolence implies that his will is free from defect or perfectly
good. The will to do evil is wholly absent in God. God always aims at good and
seeks to avoid evil. He always acts with the intention of bringing about as much
good relative to evil as he can in the specific situation. It is contrary to Godsnature to opt for an alternative that is inferior to another alternative open to him.
God is a good optimizer.
2. A Qualification Concerning Gods Power
Some complications arise concerning Gods power. There are states of affairs
that are logically possible in one sense that God cannot bring about. Consider
the existence of Mount Everest. There is no contradiction involved in the notion
of a universe without this mountain. God could bring about a universe just likethis one except that it lacks Mount Everest. Mount Everest is a contingent being.
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The claim Mount Everest does not exist is not a logically contradictory claim.
We cannot be sure that it is false without having knowledge of the world. The
claim Mount Everest never existed is also not logically contradictory. There is
surely something strange about this proposition, but it is not logicallyincoherent. Again, knowing this claim is false requires information about the
world. Once Everest is actual, however, God cannot subsequently bring about
the state of affairs that it never existed. The propositions Everest once existed
and Everest never existedare inconsistent. These propositions cannot both be
true. The first proposition is, as a matter of contingent fact, true. It follows that
no one is in the position of being able to make the second proposition true. That
is not logically possible. The claim that God can bring it about that what now
exists never existed, implies that God can do the logically impossible. We can
know that this claim is incorrect without knowing anything about the world. So,
then, the claim What now exists cannot be made to have never existed is a
logical truth. One does not need to know anything about the world to know that
this claim is true. So, God cannot bring it about that a contingent state of affairs
that has become actual should subsequently cease to have ever been actual.
Mount Everest falls within the extension of the class of things that now exist.
Adding the factual premiseEverest exists to our logical truth, we can derive theconclusion that it is false Mount Everest never existed. So there are many states
of affairs that do not involve a contradiction in their conceptionfor example,
that Mount Everest never existedthat God cannot bring about. These are statesof affairs such that, as a matter of contingent fact, bringing them about would
involve doing what cannot be consistently conceived. Thus, there are many
states of affairs that are consistently conceivable when considered in and of
themselves that, as a matter of contingent fact, would imply the inconceivable if
they were to be made actual. God cannot make these perfectly conceivable
states of affairs actual.
3. Gods Character and the Character of Gods Creation
Epistemic evil has its foundation in the recognition of an apparent incongruity
between the alleged character of the creator and the observable character of the
creation. All problems of evil presuppose that the character of the creator should be
reflected in the character of the creation. Is this presupposition justified? It is.
From God's omnipotence, it follows that God has the power to achieve
whatever he wills as long as he does not will the inconceivable. From God's
omniscience, it follows that God knows how to achieve whatever he wills and,
unless it would involve a contradiction, only what he wills. From the former fact
about God's power coupled with the latter fact about God's knowledge, itfollows that whenever God acts he achieves what he wills and only what he
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wills unless he wills the inconceivable. Within the boundaries of logical
possibility, there is a perfect alignmenta one-to-one correspondence
between what God intends and the consequences of his actions. This
correspondence supplies the basis for the contention that God's character wouldbe reflected in the created universe. That the universe is, as far as possible, free
of contingent evil not logically connected to Gods good purposes follows from
this fact coupled with God's omnibenevolence. Gods omnibenevolence implies
that, all other things being equal, he never prefers an act that issues in a greater
evil to an act that issues in a lesser evil.
4. God and Good
It is possible to object to the claim that Gods omnibenevolence has
existential implications for the creation. The suggestion that Gods actions could
have significant theodicean implications presupposes that there is a basis for
moral value independent of God. This basis provides an independent standard
for judgments of moral value. This standard can therefore be employed in
evaluating the moral quality of Gods acts.
The argument that the character of the creator does not create constraints on
the character of the creation could be premised upon the notion that there is no
basis for moral value independent of God. It would follow that there is no
standard for judgments of moral value that can be meaningfully applied to
Gods actions. If there is no such standard, then it is nonsense to claim that any
act of God's, regardless of its impact upon the character of the creation, is
morally defective. Ruling out such evaluative judgments implies that God's
character places no limits upon the character of the creation. Any claim to the
effect that some feature of the creation entailed a defect in the creator would be
groundless.This result follows if good is defined in terms of what God wills. It also
follows if the qualities good and bad cannot be properly applied to the actions of
God. On the first view, the sole necessary and sufficient condition in light ofwhich states of affairs are good and actions are right is that they accord with
Gods will. The claim that some feature of the creation is good would therefore
reduce to the claim that God willed it. Since God is omnipotent he cannot be
coerced. It would follow that Gods acts are right in virtue of the fact that they
are Gods acts. It would also follow that the states of affairs that God brings into
being are good in virtue of the fact that God has brought them into being.
If, as the second view implies, the notions of good and bad do not apply to
the actions of God, then God is outside the moral domain. Applying evaluative
terms to his actions would therefore involve a category mistake. The claims thatresult from such mistakes are literally nonsense.
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Both of these views imply that nothing can be inferred about Gods character
from the existence of needless and pointless suffering in the creation. On the
first view, the claim that God is omnibenevolent, although it sounds significant,
is practically and existentially vacuous. Gods omnibenevolence collapses intoGods omnipotence. It adds nothing substantive to the concept of God. God
remains absolutely unconstrained in terms of what he can will and what he can
do. On the second view, the claim that God is omnibenevolent involves a
category mistake. Referring to Gods actions as good is like referring to dreams
as green or theories as aerodynamic.
I think neither of these views is tenable. For the purposes of the present
inquiry, full-blown critical discussions of these views are not required. I
presuppose they are both false. The plain fact is that the vast majority of Judaeo-
Christians do contend that their god is omnibenevolent. When they claim that
their god is omnibenevolent, they do take themselves to saying something about
God that is both meaningful and important. If they are right, then these two
views are wrong. If they are wrong, then their god is not the true god.
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CHAPTERTWO
THE PROPERFORMULATION
OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Two conceptions of the problem of evil are critically examined in this chapter.
They are the logical formulation of the problem and the evidential formulation of
the problem. I ultimately offer a third formulation of the problem that I think is
preferable to either of these formulations.
1. The Logical Formulation of the Problem of Evil1
In the logical formulation, the problem of evil is treated as a problem of
internal inconsistency. As J. L. Mackie put it:
God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be
some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them
were true the third would have to be false. But at the same time all three areessential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once
must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.2
The problematic claims are God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, andEvil
exists. Mackie argues that these claims form an inconsistent triad. He contends
that this inconsistency can be demonstrated if we add a few additional
premises or quasi-logical rules regarding the proper meaning and use of the
termsgood, evil, and omnipotence.One difficulty with Mackies formulation is that he does not appreciate the
relevance of Gods omniscience to the problem of evil. God must have completeand perfect factual knowledge to ensure that he is aware of all the features of
existence. Without such knowledge he might be wholly unaware of some evils.
God must also have complete and perfect normative knowledge so that he will
recognize evils (events that involve suffering) as evil (states of affairs that are
disvaluable). Without such knowledge he might not know that some contingent
feature of what exists ought to be eliminated. Finally, God must have complete
and perfect practical or instrumental knowledge. He must know how to bring
about any logically possible state of affairs. Without such knowledge God may
both recognize an evil and have the power to eliminate it but lack knowledge ofhow to do so. Gods infinite perfection, understood as implying his three
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cardinal attributes, is crucial to the proper formulation of the problem. Mackies
version of the problem might be reformulated such that the following set of
propositions is said to be inconsistent:
1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is omniscient.
3. God is omnibenevolent.
4. There is evil in the universe.
The unstated presupposition that permits the inference of Gods non-existence
from 1 through 4 above is as follows:
5. No evil can exist in the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-
benevolent being.
This presupposition is problematic. Even an infinitely perfect being is limited
by the laws of logic. It seems that a number of forms of evil can exist in the
creation of an infinitely perfect being as a result of this limitation. Before
delineating these forms of evil, it is best to clarify the logical terrain. We areraising a logical question when we inquire into the forms of evil that are
possible in the creation of an infinitely perfect being. We are seeking logically
possible forms of evil. The question of whether or not there are any instances ofthese forms of evil is irrelevant. Raising this factual question demonstrates a
failure to grasp the logical geography. Those who advance the logical problem
of evil contend that the claims Evil exists and God is infinitely perfect are
logically inconsistent. To refute this claim, it is sufficient to point out that there
are forms of evil that could exist under the supposition that the creator is
infinitely perfect.
Among the evils that can exist in the creation of an infinitely perfect being
are evils that are:
a. logically necessary such that the act of creating a universe withoutthem could not be consistently conceived.
To create any universe without these evils would involve a contradiction. God
cannot accomplish the contradictory. Therefore, God cannot eliminate such evilsfrom the universe. Again, the claim is not that there are any such evils. The
point is that such evils could exist in the universe even if it were the creation of
an infinitely perfect being. As long as the universe was at least potentially good
on the whole, it could contain such evils and be the work of God.