Exploring the prospects for collaborative transboundary water gov-
ernance in the Mackenzie River Basin, Canada
Working paper presented at the International Political Science Association 23rd
World Congress,
Montreal, QC, Canada – 24 July 2014
Michelle Morris
PhD Candidate
University of Waterloo
Department of Environment and Resource Studies
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 CANADA
Dr. Rob de Loë
Professor and University Chair in Water Policy and Governance
University of Waterloo
Department of Environment and Resource Studies
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 CANADA
© Morris, M. and de Loë, R.C., 2014
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1.1 Introduction
When political boundaries intersect water bodies, significant challenges can result for
governments, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), and industries that
manage, use and value water. Institutional fragmentation, conflicting values and uses of water,
sovereignty and power dynamics make transboundary water governance challenging. Climate
change, population growth and increasing industrial development further complicate water
management and create the need for adaptive and flexible approaches to governing
transboundary waters. These kinds of challenges exist to different degrees in international and
sub-federal transboundary water bodies throughout the world.
A number of principles have been identified to inform the creation of transboundary water
management agreements that may address some of the challenges associated with transboundary
water governance. Strong transboundary water management agreements include formalized
mechanisms for cooperation, data sharing, prior notification, monitoring, flexibility, public
involvement, dispute resolution, sustainable funding, and adequate ecosystem protection (Draper 2007; Green, et al. 2013; McCaffrey 2007; Muys, et al. 2007). Ideally, these governance
mechanisms also contribute to a basin-wide approach to governance (Grey and Sadoff 2003). A
basin-wide approach is desirable to coordinate between various jurisdictions, provide an
overarching perspective that extends beyond the vision of single jurisdictions and ensure
cumulative effects at the scale of the basin are considered. In large transboundary basins,
engaging with multiple local and regional governance activities within a transboundary basin can
contribute to a basin-wide perspective while respecting the autonomy of jurisdictions involved.
Implementing the ideal features of transboundary water management agreements requires
appropriate governance mechanisms, such as coordinating linkages among the multiple levels at
which water is governed in transboundary watersheds.
Collaborative processes of governance have been adopted at multiple levels in transboundary
basins around the world, including the Great Lakes Basin shared between Canada and the U.S.
(Akamani and Wilson 2011), the U.S. portion of the Columbia River (Cosens 2010; Heikkila and
Gerlak 2005), and the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia (Margerum 2008). Collaboration is a
form of governance that requires interdependent actors to “constructively explore their
differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”
(Gray 1989, 5). It is premised upon the fact that for many complex problems no single actor
possesses the necessary skills, resources, expertise or authority to solve problems (Bryson, et al. 2006). Collaboration encourages sharing resources and learning between state and non-state
actors even in contexts in which the stakes of decision making are high and where power
asymmetries exist (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, et al. 2012). In transboundary basins,
collaborative forms of governance are valued because they may enable more adaptive, inclusive
and flexible governance (Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008). There is a need, and a
desire, to engage with regional and local levels of governance to support feedback between them
so that transboundary water governance reflects the needs and priorities of local communities
(Cosens 2010); ideally, local and regional governance initiatives inform policy decisions and link
up with actors who have the authority to coordinate at the scale of the basin.
Scholars emphasizing power dynamics in transboundary water governance note that cooperation
may actually disguise marginalization (Zeitoun, et al. 2011). Therefore, collaboration may not
always be as positive as it seems. Power dynamics are an important concern in collaborative
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processes – but they have not been assessed in the collaboration literature to the extent evident in
the transboundary water governance literature. In transboundary contexts, the most effective uses
of power are often the least obvious (Zeitoun and Warner 2006); this consideration should also
inform assessments of power dynamics in collaboration. Although on the surface there may
appear to be cooperation, power dynamics may result in marginalization that undermines
cooperation and works against an inclusive, basin-wide approach. As such, it is important to
consider the specifics of cooperation to understand if all actors are having their needs met
through collaborative, basin-wide approaches to transboundary water governance.
In this paper, we explore two related questions: How do power dynamics impact different levels
of collaboration in transboundary water governance; and, what are the power-related constraints
and opportunities associated with a collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water
governance? We answer these questions using evidence from a preliminary analysis of several
cases of collaboration in Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin (MRB). These cases allow us to
explore the ways in which power dynamics may pose challenges to implementing transboundary
agreements, and to creating a basin-wide approach to governance.
The MRB drains approximately one fifth of Canada’s land mass. It is a jurisdictionally complex
basin in which territorial, provincial, federal and indigenous governments have important
responsibilities for water. The MRB is also ecologically complex; it has been described as one of
the largest intact ecosystems in North America (Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013). Numerous ENGOs are interested and involved in various aspects of governance for water
in this basin because of the immense ecosystem services it provides (Anielski and Wilson 2007;
WWF-Canada 2009). At the same time, the MRB is the site of increasing resource development
within Canada, including fossil fuel extraction and hydroelectric development. Development
pressures, coupled with social and environmental changes resulting from climate change, are
creating significant governance challenges in this basin (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012).
Six individual bilateral water management agreements are expected to be completed between the
provinces and territories that are part of the MRB by the end of 2014. These bilateral agreements
are being developed within a larger framework: the 1997 Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary
Waters Master Agreement (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). A basin-wide approach to
governance for water in this basin could help to ensure that the cumulative effects of
development and climate change inform management decisions. Furthermore, collaboration that
extends beyond consideration of flows and water quality at the border may be vital to ensuring
adequate protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in the basin and the ecological integrity
of the MRB (de Loë 2014).
Within the MRB, a number of collaborative forms of governance have been adopted at local,
regional and basin levels. Power dynamics between the provincial, territorial, federal and
indigenous governments, ENGOs organizations and industry actors, have important impacts on
the ways in which water is governed in this basin. They also speak to the kinds of issues that
actors involved in water governance may have to resolve or manage as the bilateral water
management agreements are implemented. Key pieces of evidence considered in this paper relate
to the actors present in collaborative processes, constraints on decision making and values that
influence decision-making in this basin.
We begin with a brief literature review to situate this research in the context of transboundary
water governance and collaborative environmental governance literatures. We then turn to
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methods used to inform this research, characteristics of the MRB and preliminary findings
related to the ways in which power dynamics impact collaboration for water governance in the
MRB. The paper concludes with observations regarding the implications for a collaborative,
basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance in the MRB.
1.2 Literature review
Basin-wide approaches to transboundary water governance are desirable for ecological,
economic and social reasons (Grey and Sadoff 2003). First, the hydrological boundaries often do
not match up with the political boundaries. This mismatch means that jurisdictions are not
obliged to take a holistic perspective regarding the multiple water and land uses that can impact
water quality and quantity, and particularly those that may impact a downstream jurisdiction.
However, jurisdictions may agree to align policies with their neighbors – or at least consider a
neighbouring jurisdiction’s interests when formulating domestic policy to avoid externalizing
environmental degradation downstream (Draper 2007; Gerlak, et al. 2009). Economic reasons
for a basin wide approach are mainly utilitarian; cooperation over water resource development
can yield mutual benefits and positive-sum gains. Oft-cited examples include US-Canada
cooperation over hydroelectric facilities and flood control in the Columbia River Basin (Cosens 2010; Giordano and Wolf 2003) and South Africa’s cooperation with Lesotho regarding
hydroelectric facilities in the Orange River Basin (Turton and Funke 2008). Undertaking joint
management may also help to avoid conflicts that could arise when new water uses or pressures
on water become apparent (Kliot, et al. 2001). In large basins, it may be difficult to include all
relevant interests at the scale of the basin, which necessitates a multi-level approach to basin-
wide management that considers the input of local and regional scales (Cosens 2010). Although
a basin-wide approach is desirable, it has also been elusive (Waterbury 1997). A number of
factors complicate achieving a basin wide approach, including power dynamics between
different actors involved in transboundary water governance.
Multiple forms of power can impact interactions over transboundary waters. Traditionally,
material capacity and geographic position have been central considerations (Dinar 2009). That is,
financial, technical, and military resources provide an advantage, as does where a particular
jurisdiction is located on a transboundary water body. An upstream jurisdiction has an advantage
relative to a downstream jurisdiction but financial and technical capacity also has an important
mediating role that impacts whether upstream advantage is used. For instance, a downstream
jurisdiction with superior financial and technical capacity may construct hydraulic infrastructure
before an upstream neighbour. Additional forms of power that impact transboundary water
governance include the role of dominant ideas and the ability to determine the scope of factors to
be considered in discussions about water governance (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Zeitoun, et al.
(2011) point out that less apparent exercises of power can limit the scope of discussions and
impose ideas about how water should be managed and valued, resulting in situations that, while
apparently cooperative (or collaborative), favour more powerful actors. Drawing on Gramsci’s
theory of hegemony and Lukes’ power theory, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) argue that a hydro-
hegemon, the most powerful state in a transboundary river basin, can set agendas, construct
knowledge, and sanction discourse about how transboundary waters should be governed in ways
that may undermine a less powerful jurisdiction’s interests.
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Scholarship concerned with power has contributed to important insights regarding transboundary
water governance, but it usually has a state-centred focus. As such, it has not addressed power
struggles within jurisdictions that can impact the positions jurisdictions assume in interactions
over transboundary waters (Suhardiman and Giordano 2012). Evidence suggests that struggles
over water that occur within and without jurisdictions are important considerations in the context
of transboundary water governance (Blatter and Ingram 2000). For instance, Feitelson (2002)
points out that dominant domestic discourse can shape policy preferences in transboundary
contexts. Conca (2006) demonstrates that international water discourses can influence domestic
strategies and that civil society can have an important role in constructing water discourses that
inform water policy within jurisdictions. Others reveal that domestic ENGOs play important
roles within states that can encourage more sustainable water management practices that
positively impact downstream communities (Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012). Non-state actors
such as ENGOs or industry groups may play critical roles in and at different levels that may
contribute to a basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance and should be
considered.
Power analysis of transboundary water governance has also focused on sovereign states in the
international system. There has been much less attention to the power dynamics between sub-
federal governments. Admittedly, there are important contextual differences between sub-federal
governments and sovereign states in the international system. For instance, threats of military
force are rare between sub-federal governments. However, military conflicts over water are also
very rare between sovereign states (Yoffe, et al. 2003). Anarchical conditions do not exist within
federal states as they do in the international context, but the presence of a federal government
does not necessarily prevent abuses of power or level power dynamics between sub-federal
governments. In federations such as Canada, where the federal government has assumed a non-
interventionist role regarding sub-federal policy matters in the environmental domain, provincial
and territorial governments view their environmental jurisdiction much like sovereign states.
There is value in exploring power dynamics within federal states and between the multiple, state
and non-state actors involved in governance for water, while recognizing the power dynamics
within countries are much different than between them.
The emerging literature that explores the role of multi-level, collaborative approaches to
transboundary water governance speaks to the roles of non-state actors in water governance.
Collaboration in transboundary water governance can take a variety of forms, such as joint
monitoring programs at the local level (Raadgever, et al. 2008), submitting recommendations to
government regulators, or becoming involved in basin-wide planning activities (Berardo and
Gerlak 2012). There are many different forms of collaboration that emphasize, to different
degrees, the role of the state, deliberativeness, and consensus-based decision-making (Booher
and Innes 2010; Leach 2006; Selsky and Parker 2005). Collaboration typically involves a variety
of state and non-state actors sharing resources, learning from one another, and working together
on shared problems. Collaborative environmental governance includes a normative commitment
to furthering social and ecological sustainability through deliberation and dialogue (Bäckstrand,
et al. 2010; Glasbergen 1998). Idealized forms of collaborative environmental governance are
expected to work well even in contexts in which the actors participating have much different
resources to participate, access to decision makers, and abilities to construct and impose
dominant ideas and values.
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The collaboration literature has assessed some power dynamics in collaborative processes, but
not in a systematic or theory-informed way. There has been some attention to framing (Gray
2004), resources and legitimacy (Purdy 2012) and other have raised questions about whether
collaboration is actually inclusive of marginalized interests (Kallis, et al. 2009). Evidence from
collaborations in South Africa, Canada and Australia suggest that the state is sometimes
unwilling to share its decision-making authority with collaborative groups (Mirumachi and van
Wyk 2010; Norman and Bakker 2009; Holley, et al. 2012). However, many authors assume that
well-managed collaborative process will resolve challenges of power dynamics (Innes and
Booher 2010; Purdy 2012). The extant literature evaluating power in transboundary water
governance suggests that it is necessary to investigate the ways in which power dynamics
manifest and impact multi-level collaborative processes.
There are a number of different approaches to conceptualizing power within the social sciences.
In this paper, we conceive of power as the ability to make or prevent changes in policy or
practice. We are particularly interested in ways in which power contributes to or complicates
achieving a collaborative, basin wide approach to transboundary water governance. This ability
is informed by a number of different dimensions of power (Lukes 2005). In an observational,
decision-making dimension, power is exercised by securing policy preferences in decisions.
Several factors may contribute to an actor’s ability to prevail in decision-making in a
transboundary context, including technical and financial resources, geographic position, and
actors involved in making the decision. At a less apparent level, power’s second dimension can
be exercised to determine the scope of the decision-making agenda, for instance, by excluding
from consideration issues potentially harmful to a dominant actor’s interests. Determining the
scope of agenda, the sources of information used, whose rights are recognized and appealing to
international norms or external actors in collaborative processes are some of the ways that
bargaining power is operationalized. A deeper, more effective, and more difficult to identify use
of power is the ability to construct and impose values and ideas to prevent individuals or groups
from articulating policy preferences inconsistent with a dominant group’s interests. This form of
power can manifest in framing decision contexts or issues in ways consistent with a particular
agenda. We highlight indicators used to identify each dimension of power in Table 1. This
typology of power is consistent with what others have used to assess power in transboundary
contexts (Zeitoun and Warner 2006) and in natural resource management contexts (Caine and
Krogman 2010; Raik, et al. 2008).
1.3 Methods
We used a multiple case study approach to conduct this research. Using a qualitative, multiple-
case study design allowed us to evaluate the prospects for collaborative, basin wide approach to
transboundary water governance in the MRB because it allows for an in-depth exploration of
causation and a comparison between different cases (Gerring 2007; Yin 2003). We selected
cases according to several criteria. All cases are within the geographic boundaries of the MRB.
Second, the cases involved state and non-state actors in governance for water within MRB.
Finally, data accessibility and the willingness of key informants to participate was the final
criterion upon which the cases were selected for inclusion in this study. The cases that meet these
criteria are identified in Table 2 and include the Phase 2 Management Framework for the Lower
Athabasca River; the Peace-Athabasca Ecological Monitoring Program; the Slave River and
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Delta Partnership; and, the Mackenzie River Basin Board. They will be discussed in more detail
in Section 1.4.1.
Data sources included semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven individuals involved in
various aspects of governance for water in this basin. Interviews were conducted between August
2012 and May 2014. The second author’s involvement in the Northwest Territories’ Strategic
Advisory Group of Experts regarding transboundary negotiations provided access to a number of
senior officials within the government of the Northwest Territories, including the Minister of
Environment and Natural Resources and Finance. These key informants provided crucial
perspectives that informed this work. Others interviewed included individuals working within
industry, ENGOs, with provincial and territorial governments, and indigenous governments.
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed immediately following interviews. Interview
participants were provided with an opportunity to review the transcript to add or clarify any
points they desired. Other data sources used to inform this research include policy documents,
transcripts of regulatory hearings and published studies, which were reviewed to consider if and
how they revealed the power dynamics at play in various collaborative processes. Additional
sources of insight included personal observations made at meetings and regulatory hearings
attended by the first author.
We analyzed data using a framework developed from a synthesis of insights related to power
theory and empirical identifications of power in transboundary water governance and
collaboration (see Table 1). Indicators speak to the first, second and third dimensions of power,
which we refer to as material, bargaining and discursive power. Policy documents, press
releases, and interview transcripts were coded in using the qualitative data analysis software
NVivo, according to the indicators identified in Table 1. After we completed this stage, we
considered the results of coding and the potential implications for collaborative, basin-wide
approaches to transboundary water governance.
Table 1: Power indicators
Form Source Identification/Evidence
Material
power
Geographic position, financial and technical
capacity
Capacity to make and implement decisions
Participants invited/allowed to collaborate
Ability to prevail in decision-making
Gross Domestic Product, Population
Water infrastructure
Legislative and regulatory competence
Participant selection
Which actor prevails in decision making?
Bargaining
power
Ability to control decision-making agenda
Ability to control or determine information used
Legal rights & recognition
Support from external actors/international norms
Determine if all participants are satisfied with the
scope of the decision-making agenda
Identify the parameters of collaboration and how
information is obtained and processed
Recognition of legal rights
Appeals to legal norms or external institutions
Discursive
power
Ability to construct and represent a particular idea
or discourse about water should be managed and
valued
Ability to manage meanings or how a particular
problem is framed
Determine if there is a dominant representation of key
decisions
Idenitfy which actors are responsible for the dominant
representation
Determine whether actors contest the representation
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1.4 The Mackenzie River Basin, Canada
The MRB is a large, northward draining watershed (Figure 1). Its headwaters begin in the Peace
and Athabasca sub-basins, which emerge in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta,
respectively. The Peace and Athabasca Rivers meet at the Peace-Athabasca Delta in Alberta, a
UNESCO World Heritage Site and a RAMSAR wetland of international significance.
Approximately 80% of the delta is located within Wood Buffalo National Park (Prowse, et al. 2002). At the delta, the Peace River turns north to become the Slave River, which flows into the
Northwest Territories and discharges into Great Slave Lake. The Mackenzie River drains Great
Slave Lake’s northwestern corner, and receives flows from the Liard and Peel Rivers, which
flow from upstream British Columbia and the Yukon, respectively, before discharging into the
Arctic Ocean’s Beaufort Sea. The MRB contains numerous large freshwater lakes and boreal,
tundra and delta ecosystems. Deltas in the basin provide important staging and breeding grounds
for a significant number of migratory birds, including the endangered Whooping Crane, which
resides for part of the year in the Peace-Athabasca Delta (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2003).
The ecosystems in the MRB provide habitat for species including moose, caribou, beaver and
muskrat, which are important components of the traditional livelihoods of the basin’s indigenous
peoples. The MRB has been recognized for its international significance in an era in which
freshwater ecosystems are among the most rapidly degrading in the world (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013).
The MRB’s ecological complexity is matched by its jurisdictional complexity. There is
overlapping and fragmented jurisdiction for water in this basin. The provinces and territories
have the majority of decision-making authority for water in Canada; they are responsible for
water allocation, land use planning and energy development. Canada’s federal government also
has important water related responsibilities for fisheries, navigation, and federal lands in the
MRB. In addition to the provincial and federal governments, indigenous governments also have
important rights and responsibilities to water in Canada (Phare 2009). Some indigenous
governments in the MRB have historic treaties with the Crown, such as Treaty 8 First Nations,
while others such as the Sahtu Dene, Inuvialuit and Gwich’in, have modern land claim
agreements; both forms of agreement are constitutionally protected, meaning that indigenous
governments must be considered in discussions of water governance in Canada.
For over three decades the basin governments have been encouraged to negotiate bilateral water
management agreements (Mackenzie River Basin Committee 1981). The jurisdictions did
complete the Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement (the Master
Agreement) in 1997, which articulated a number of non-binding principles to guide governance
in the basin, including cooperation, sustainability, ecosystem integrity, the prevention of harm
and jurisdictional autonomy (Government of Canada, et al. 1997). The Master Agreement also
contained provisions for the creation of bilateral water management agreements, but they were
not immediately forthcoming after the agreement was signed in 1997. Key decision-makers
within the basin have uneven levels of satisfaction with the way that the Master Agreement has
been implemented; the government of the Northwest Territories, the most downstream
jurisdiction, has been advocating for a renewed commitment to implementing the Master
Agreement and has prioritized completing bilateral water management agreements (de Loë and
Morris 2014). Bilateral water management agreements are intended to encourage cooperative
watershed management and sustain the ecological integrity of the MRB by establishing specific
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commitments related to water consumption, flows, quality, groundwater, and aquatic ecosystem
health (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2009). The bilateral water management agreements will be
crucial to implementing the Master Agreement and contributing to a basin-wide perspective on
governance in the MRB (Saunders 2012).
Figure 1: The Mackenzie River Basin
Industrial developments in upstream jurisdictions British Columbia and Alberta, coupled with
climate warming, are key drivers of change in the MRB (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012).
Changes in the timing of freeze-up, thaw and peak river flows have been observed in the MRB
and are anticipated into the future (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012). Freshwater supplies in
many of the MRB’s sub-basins are expected to decline as a result of climate warming (Wolfe, et
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al. 2011), which may also pose challenges for the industries and communities that depend upon
current supplies of water. Hydroelectric development and fossil fuel mining in upstream
jurisdictions British Columbia and Alberta, respectively, are among the most significant
industrial developments in the MRB. Two existing hydroelectric facilities operated by a crown
corporation, BC Hydro, on the Peace River in BC, provide approximately 30% of the province’s
generation capacity (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2003). When British Columbia constructed
the W.A.C. Bennett Dam in 1968, environmental changes observed over 1000km downstream at
the Peace-Athabasca Delta encouraged governments to coordinate and communicate regarding
planned development (Creery 1979). Currently, many downstream residents, including
indigenous peoples with rights to fish, trap and hunt in the Peace-Athabasca Delta, are concerned
that upstream flow regulation has been a contributing factor in a multi-decadal drying event
experienced in the Peace-Athabasca Delta (Carver 2012). However, others suggest climactic
factors rather than upstream flow regulation are the main contributors to changes experienced in
the delta (Wolfe, et al. 2008). Regardless of the cause, the Peace-Athabasca Delta, which is an
important area in which indigenous peoples exercise their treaty rights, will continue to be a
source of concern. In fact, B.C. Hydro is currently proposing to construct a third dam
downstream its existing facilities on the Peace River, which has resulted in significant local and
downstream concern.
Oil sands mining within Alberta is another major industrial project in the MRB. The Athabasca
sub-basin in Alberta contains the world’s third largest proven oil reserve (Alberta Energy 2014).
To date, oil sands mining has converted over 600km2 of boreal forest into open-pit surface mines
(Jordaan 2012). The majority of oil sands mining is expected to take place using in-situ steam
assisted gravity drainage. Surface and in-site has resulted in the fragmentation of terrestrial
ecosystems but it has also impacted water resources within the Athabasca sub-basin. The nature
and extent of pollution resulting from oil sands mining is currently a matter of scientific debate.
Recent studies have linked oil sands mining with the presence of contaminants downstream,
including mercury, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and arsenic (Kelly, et al. 2009; Kelly, et
al. 2010; Kurek, et al. 2013). Others, however, suggest that contaminants attributed to oil sands
mining are deposited via natural sources in the air and water (Hall, et al. 2012; Wiklund, et al. 2012). Numerous downstream communities in Alberta and the Northwest Territories are
concerned about the risks posed by upstream oil sands mining.
A number of multinational oil companies have invested in mining Alberta’s oil sands, including
Total, Shell, Suncor, Canadian Natural Resources Limited and Imperial Oil. The scale of
investment in and production from the oil sands is staggering. Within the past decade,
approximately $100 billion has been invested in developing oil sands, a figure that is expected to
more than triple within twenty-five years (Burt, et al. 2012). Within ten years, oil sands mining
is expected to double production from 1.8 to 3.6 billion barrels of oil per day (Burt, et al. 2012).
The stakes of development are quite different for the actors involved in governance for water in
the MRB. Upstream jurisdictions such as British Columbia and Alberta (which is downstream of
British Columbia but upstream of the Northwest Territories) have interests at stake in developing
resources within their territories according to the internal policy agendas. The downstream
Northwest Territories is also interested in resource development, but is concerned with the
impacts of upstream developments, and with its relationships to Aboriginal partners1 in the
Northwest Territories. The Northwest Territories’ ability to achieve its policy objectives, as
stated in its Northern Voices, Northern Waters watershed stewardship strategy, “the waters of the
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Northwest Territories will remain clean, abundant and productive for all time” (Government of
the Northwest Territories 2010), is contingent upon effective transboundary water governance
and its relationship with its upstream neighbours. British Columbia has advantage relative to
Alberta and the Northwest Territories on the Peace-Slave Rivers, while Alberta has advantage
relative to the Northwest Territories on the Athabasca-Slave portion of the basin. Upstream
advantage is bolstered with significant material and technical resources; British Columbia and
Alberta are by far the more populous provinces and territories in the MRB. In 2011, the
provinces of B.C. and Alberta had populations of 4.4 and 3.6 million, respectively, whereas the
NWT had 41 462 inhabitants (Statistics Canada 2012a); Alberta and B.C. had GDPs of $295 and
$217 billion, respectively whereas the NWT’s was $4.7 billion (Statistics Canada 2012b).
In addition to the differences between provincial and territorial governments there are also
significant historical inequities resulting from Canada’s colonial relationship with indigenous
peoples. This historical injustice has played out in various ways in governance for water in the
MRB, such as through devaluing or failing to recognize traditional ecological knowledge in
management discussions (Stevensen 2012). There are also significant differences between the
ENGOs and industry actors participating in governance for water in the basin. For instance,
multinationals such as Shell and Suncor and others have significantly more resources at their
disposal to fund technical studies and participate in governance activities than ENGOs dependent
on donations for funding. These are some of the surface differences between the different groups
participating in governance; a more nuanced discussion will be presented in the next section of
this paper.
1.4.1 Collaboration in the MRB
Various kinds of collaborative activities take place in the MRB. Table 2 identifies the four
collaborations we discuss in this paper. In this section, we will briefly discuss the purpose,
composition and activities of the four cases of collaboration we analyzed. We will then turn to
the preliminary findings of our power analysis, followed by a conclusion which explores the
implications for a collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance in the
MRB.
1.4.1.1 The Peace Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program
The Peace Athabasca Delta Ecological Monitoring Program (PADEMP) was formed in 2008 at
the leadership of Parks Canada, the federal agency with jurisdiction in Wood Buffalo National
Park, and the chair of PADEMP. Parks Canada was a logical choice to lead the group because
the majority of the Peace-Athabasca Delta falls within Wood Buffalo National Park, which has
the Athabasca River as its eastern border. PADEMP was formed in recognition that there was a
need for consistent, ecosystem-based monitoring that included local residents in determining
monitoring priorities. Further, the conveners of PADEMP recognized that collecting baseline
information about the state of the delta would be critical to measure the extent of future changes
anticipated as a result of climate change, hydroelectricity generation and oil sands mining. From
the very early stages, indigenous partners were included because Parks staff wanted to design the
program with them, rather than inviting them to participate as an afterthought.2 PADEMP has
developed its monitoring and reporting programs based on western science and traditional
ecological knowledge. The group includes representation from 11 indigenous partners, 4 federal
agencies, the government of the NWT and the government of Alberta, as well as two ENGOs,
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WWF-Canada and Ducks Unlimited. Key work undertaken by PADEMP includes relationship
building between the partners, collecting and synthesizing existing information on the delta,
work on developing a Vulnerability Assessment Report for the Peace-Athabasca Delta and
coordinating activities with other monitoring groups in the area (Macmillan 2013).
1.4.1.2 The Slave River and Delta Partnership
The Slave River and Delta Partnership (SRDP) was created in 2010 as a part of the NWT’s water
stewardship strategy and to address local community concerns about the impacts of upstream
developments on ecosystem health. Specific goals of the SRDP include supporting community-
based ecosystem monitoring and including traditional and local knowledge (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development Canada and Government of the Northwest Territories 2012). Local
community members had been concerned for many years about the impacts of development such
as pulp mills and hydroelectric facilities and more recent developments taking place in Alberta’s
oil sands.3 The SRDP was modeled on PADEMP as a community based model that has
incorporating local traditional knowledge as a key criterion of success.4 The SRDP includes local
indigenous governments, members of the public and a research institute and is open to anyone
who wants to participate. Members of the SRDP help to determine key monitoring priorities and
also undertake monitoring. To date, monitoring has focused on water quality, fish health and
general aquatic ecosystem health.
1.4.1.3 The Phase 2 Framework Committee
The Phase 2 Framework Committee (P2FC) was formed in 2008 to provide the government of
Alberta with recommendations for cumulative oil sands water withdrawals for the Lower
Athabasca River. Several regulatory hearings had highlighted the need to develop an
environmental flow policy for the Athabasca River, and the P2FC was created to address that
need. The P2FC included representation from Total, Shell, Canadian Natural Resources Limited,
Imperial Oil, Suncor and Syncrude, the federal government, the province of Alberta, one Metis
and one First Nations group and three ENGOs (Ohlson, et al. 2010). It produced non-consensus
recommendations to the government of Alberta in 2010. It also identified knowledge gaps and
developed an adaptive management strategy that has informed ongoing monitoring in the
Athabasca River. Although its specific recommendations have not yet been implemented it has
been used to inform the development of Alberta’s surface water quantity framework, which is
part of the Lower Athabasca land use plan, part of the Alberta government’s province-wide land
use planning strategy.5
1.4.1.4 The Mackenzie River Basin Board
The Mackenzie River Basin Board (MRBB) is the oldest of all of the collaborative groups we
studied. It was formed in 1997 through the Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters
Master Agreement, which also details the key roles and responsibilities of the MRBB. Key roles
include coordinating information sharing among jurisdictions, developing state of the
environment reports and including traditional knowledge and communicating with indigenous
peoples in the basin in culturally appropriate ways. The MRBB has 13 members – one
representative per province and territory, one Aboriginal member per province and territory, and
three representatives from the federal government from all three provinces, the two territories
and the federal government as well as five Aboriginal members. To date the MRBB has
12
produced two State of the Aquatic Ecosystem Reports, a Bi-lateral Water Management Guidance
Document, and a report on best practices in incorporating traditional knowledge into
environmental monitoring and assessments. It has also supported the development of bilateral
water management agreements and completed early work on developing a hydrology model of
the basin.
Table 2: Collaboration in the MRB
Collaboration Purpose Membership
Peace-Athabasca Delta Ecological
Monitoring Program
2008-current
Develop an integrated ecological
monitoring program to measure,
evaluate and communicate the state
of the Peace-Athabasca Delta
Designed to incorporate traditional
knowledge and western science
Government of the Northwest
Territories, Government of Canada
Local college
First Nations & Metis groups
Local citizens
Slave River and Delta Partnership
2010-current
Community-based monitoring of
the Slave River and Delta
Designed to address community
concerns about ecosystem health,
integrate traditional and local
knowledge and science
Government of Canada,
Government of the Northwest
Territories, Government of Alberta
WWF-Canada and Ducks
Unlimited
11 local First Nations & Metis
groups
Phase 2 Framework Committee
2008-2010
Designed to make
recommendations for cumulative
water withdrawal rules for oil sands
mining facilities for the Lower
Athabasca River
Government of Canada,
Government of Alberta
Regional Municipality of Wood
Buffalo
Fort McKay First Nation, Fort
Chipewyan Metis
WWF-Canada, Alberta Wilderness
Association, South Peace
Environmental Society
Shell, Syncrude, Suncor, Total and
Canadian Natural Resources
Limited
Mackenzie River Basin Board
1997-current
Coordinate information exchange,
complete State of the Aquatic
Ecosystem Reports, recommend
water quality and quantity
objectives, integrate traditional
ecological knowledge, encourage
the completion of bilateral water
management agreements
Government of Canada,
Government of Alberta,
Government of the NWT,
Government of British Columbia,
Government of Saskatchewan,
Government of Yukon
5 Aboriginal members
1.4.2 Power analysis
In this section, we detail key preliminary findings of our power analysis. We do not provide a
comprehensive consideration of all aspects of power identified in the framework that guided this
power analysis, but instead focus on power dynamics particularly pertinent to adopting a
collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance. Power dynamics were
evident in the participants who participated in each collaborative, the scope of the agenda of
collaboration, and the values informing management decisions in the MRB.
13
1.4.2.1 Material power
Informants who participated in the P2FC process were the only respondents who indicated they
had adequate resources to carry out their work.6 The P2FC was primarily funded by industry and
had a budget of $4.6 million (Cumulative Environmental Management Association 2010), which
enabled the group to hire facilitators, undertake technical studies and support travel to and from
meetings. The P2FC’s budget stands in stark contrast to the MRBB’s operating budget at $280
000, which several informants suggested is contributing to the MRBB’s ineffectiveness in the
basin.7 Although the government of the Northwest Territories has been advocating for increases
to funding for several years8, the jurisdictions have been unable to agree on an acceptable
funding arrangement (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2013). Participants in PADEMP and SRDP
noted that financial capacity is an issue for all of the partners in the program.9 Financial
constraints require some creativity in terms of acquiring resources to conduct monitoring.
PADEMP, for instance, has struggled to secure year to year funding, making long-term planning
quite difficult.10
The SRDP and PADEMP address funding deficiencies by pooling resources
conduct joint monitoring when it is feasible to do so.11
Given their geographic proximity, shared
commitment to incorporating traditional ecological knowledge and overlapping membership, the
SRDP and PADEMP are better able to cooperate than some of the other collaborative activities
currently existing in the basin.
While adequate funding is necessary it is far from sufficient to secure the participation of all
actors who have an interest at stake in a particular collaboration. In the case of the P2FC, many
First Nations opted out because of perceived problems with the industry-funded group. This was
a deficiency that several interviewees noted12
; the perspectives of many of the local First Nations
were not presented within the P2FC process. Instead, First Nations provided their input via a
separate consultation with the province of Alberta.13
This is in stark contrast to the PADEMP and
the SRDP, which have prioritized including local indigenous peoples. For instance, participants
representing First Nations and Metis report being much more comfortable with the PADEMP
model than others models existing in the basin.14
PADEMP, however, is not inclusive of all
actors in the basin. PADEMP has not invited industry to participate, despite the fact that industry
may be able to supplement PADEMP’s resources. Reasons for excluding industry are complex.
One key informant reported that an industry presence may discourage participants from sharing
information freely for fear that industry will use discussions within PADEMP to inform their
own agendas. Another concern the interview respondent reported was that PADEMP members
wanted to set objectives for the group and provide a good basis for protecting the ecological
integrity of the PAD before inviting industry.15
There was a concern that industry may influence
the process in a way that weakens or limits the scope of PADEMP’s objectives and that would be
undesirable.
Additional notable absences within PADEMP include the province of BC and BC Hydro, which
have important roles as flow regulators on the Peace River. The province of BC has not been
invited to participate in PADEMP.16
However, British Columbia has a historical pattern of
declining to become involved in any official discussions about the Peace-Athabasca Delta; this
pattern has persisted for several decades, since the construction of the first dam on the Peace
River. After the W.A.C. Bennett Dam was constructed in 1968, the province of Alberta and the
federal government undertook a series of technical studies to try to rehabilitate the delta without
the involvement of BC (Prentice, et al. 1998). In 1989, an interjurisdictional agreement was
struck to investigate the state of the Peace, Athabasca and Slave River systems. The governments
14
of the NWT, Alberta and Canada participated in this study but British Columbia did not
(Northern River Basins Study Board 1996). As an upstream jurisdiction, British Columbia has
significant capacity to alter the flows of the river and its absence in these interjurisdictional and
collaborative forums is notable. Given its upstream position, from a strictly self-interested
perspective, British Columbia may not view participating in discussions about the Peace-
Athabasca Delta as within its interests. However, it is necessary to contribute to a basin-wide
approach to governance. In the future, it may be necessary for British Columbia or BC Hydro to
participate in PADEMP.
Key informants involved in the MRBB reported that the composition of the group has an
important impact on the ways in which it works. Although the MRBB provides equal
membership for the provinces and territories and includes representation for indigenous peoples,
several informants reported that the MRBB’s majority composition of bureaucrats has created
challenges, particularly for adopting a basin-wide perspective.17
A former Executive Director
reported that at times representatives of the various provinces and territories struggled with
considering the interests of the basin as a whole as opposed to their individual jurisdiction’s
interest.18
Other key informants noted that giving the Board more independence from
governments may be necessary for the MRBB to adopt a basin-wide perspective.19
1.4.2.2 Bargaining power
The ability to set the agenda is a significant source of power. There are many factors that
contribute to agenda setting including the nature of the information used and considered in
discussions of governance, the extent to which existing or claimed rights are recognized and the
interests at stake in each discussion. Agenda setting can determine which information is
considered relevant, whose rights and recognized and which interests are protected.
In the cases of the P2FC, PADEMP and the MRBB, several interviewees reported that they were
unsatisfied with the collaborative group’s scope. The P2FC, for instance, conducted its
deliberations and made its recommendations assuming a high growth scenario for oil sands
mining. A respondent working within the ENGO sector reported that this was a deficiency of the
process because scaling back the growth of Alberta’s oil sands industry was plausible and
desirable from the ENGO’s perspective.20
However, the scope of the decision-making agenda
was set by the province of Alberta and was not a topic of discussion within the P2FC (Ohlson, et
al. 2010).
In the case of PADEMP, key informants reported that determining PADEMP’s mandate was one
of the most difficult decisions the group had to make.21
Some members felt that PADEMP
should play an activist role within the basin and provide advice to governments regarding
necessary measures to protect the health of the Peace-Athabasca Delta. Some government
members, however, were wary of participating in a group that would make recommendations to
government and so resisted PADEMP assuming that role. As a result, PADEMP has played an
information generating and dissemination role instead of an advocacy role, which some members
feel may be necessary to protect the delta.22
The MRBB’s mandate was determined by the 1997 Master Agreement. However, according to
several key informants, the ways in which the governments have implemented that agreement
with respect to the MRBB’s role has been inconsistent with the agreement’s original intent. The
MRBB has arguably not come close to approaching the limits of its mandate, which could
15
include advocating for a basin-wide perspective in management decisions within the provinces
and territories to enable ecological integrity and cooperative management (Donihee, et al. 2000).
Instead, the MRBB has played a facilitating and coordinating role, much like PADEMP. The
Master Agreement states that the MRBB can recommend uniform water quality and quantity
objectives to the jurisdictions, a role it has not assumed to date. One respondent representing
Alberta reported that the MRBB should not even be thinking about policy within jurisdictions.23
This perspective suggests that some of the jurisdictions may not be willing to allow the MRBB to
play the role that its original negotiators envisioned. Indeed, an individual involved in the
original negotiations of the Master Agreement noted that the cooperative intergovernmental era
in which the Master Agreement was negotiated does not currently exist in the context of the
MRB.24
1.4.2.3 Discursive power
Our preliminary findings regarding discursive power are less solid than findings related to
bargaining power and material power. Here we offer tentative findings. Throughout the interview
process it became apparent that there are contrasting visions for ecological integrity,
sustainability and energy development within the basin. It was also evident that although
collaborative processes are locally important to many of the actors involved, key decisions
regarding the fate of the MRB are not made in collaborative forums. Consistent with the each
jurisdiction’s desire to ensure its autonomy to make resource development decisions within its
own territory, key decisions are made within jurisdictions and not in multi-actor,
interjurisdictional processes. The challenge is that these decisions may be made in a piecemeal
fashion, without considering how each decisions contributes cumulatively to impacts within the
MRB.
In this section, we present an initial analysis of arguments made to support or justify resource
management decisions within the MRB. This analysis reveals a preference for economic growth
and associated benefits over core principles related to ecological integrity and sustainable water
management articulated in the Master Agreement. This is complemented by what we heard in
interviews. For instance, one interviewee from the NWT noted that challenging the economic
models underpinning hydroelectricity development and oil sands mining in the upstream
jurisdictions is not an option that is available to them.25
Adopting a basin wide perspective with
that is consistent with the Master Agreement may require a more ecologically sensitive approach
to decision-making in the basin.
Regulatory approvals, such as the most recently approved surface mine in Alberta’s oil sands,
suggest that the values and benefits associated with expanding development prevail over
environmental values. In December 2013, Shell Canada’s proposal to expand the Jackpine Mine
in Alberta’s oil sands received final approval. The Joint Review Panel (2013, 2) that
recommended conditional approval to the governments noted that, “the Project, in combination
with other existing, approved, and planned projects, would likely have significant adverse
cumulative environment effects on wetlands; traditional plant potential areas; old-growth forests;
wetland-reliant species at risk and migratory birds; old-growth forest-reliant species at risk and
migratory birds; caribou; biodiversity; and Aboriginal traditional land use . . . rights, and
culture.” The panel also noted that many of these effects would be irreversible and Shell’s
mitigation plan was inadequate. This is by definition unsustainable. However, despite these
impacts, approving the project was justified because of the “significant economic benefits”
16
anticipated to accrue to Alberta and Canada resulting from increasing oil sands mining (Joint
Review Panel 2013, 2).
Similar arguments are made in support of BC’s proposed third dam on the Peace River, which, if
approved, would be constructed to maximize storage provided by the two existing dams. The
Joint Review Panel charged with reviewing the potential economic, environmental, social,
cultural and heritage impacts of the dam noted that it will provide clear economic benefits
resulting from BC’s increased ability to benefit from energy at relatively low cost and from the
employment opportunities for individuals, small businesses and indigenous peoples in the local
area. It also noted that the area in which the project would proceed “is currently undergoing
enormous stress from resource development . . . combined with past, present and reasonably
foreseeable future projects [the Project] would result in cumulative effects on fish, vegetation
and ecological communities, wildlife, current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes,
and heritage” (Joint Review Panel 2014, v). The Joint Review Panel did not make a clear
recommendation for approval or rejection but did suggest a number of conditions for project
approval. The province of BC will issue its decision later in 2014. However, BC Hydro’s
proposed rationale for the project is very clear: the cumulative environmental impacts are
justified in light of the economic benefits anticipated from building the dam (BC Hydro 2013).
In both of these cases, upstream provinces, with the federal government, have the authority to
accept or reject energy developments. Downstream jurisdictions can intervene in regulatory
proceedings and engage in discussions with provincial decision-makers but they do not hold a
veto on development decisions. Some observers suggest that an interjurisdictional discussion to
determine an appropriate pace of development and regulations for extractive and hydroelectric
industries will be a necessary component of effective transboundary water governance in the
MRB moving forward (Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy 2013). A key informant
suggested that for governance in the basin to be effective, the jurisdictions must change from
viewing economic development and ecological integrity as necessarily at odds and ensure that
development occurs within a context in which necessary measures to protect ecosystems are in
place. Adopting such an approach will likely meet with the entrenched preference for proceeding
with development regardless of environmental impacts if the economics benefits are perceived as
sufficient.
1.5 Implications: the prospects for a collaborative approach to trans-boundary water governance in the Mackenzie River Basin
Given the kinds of collaborative activities currently occurring in the MRB there is clearly an
appetite for collaboration in this basin. Collaborative groups may have a more formalized role to
ensure that local concerns are considered at the scale of the basin as the bilateral water
management agreements are completed. Based on evidence we collected regarding collaboration
in this basin we offer some preliminary observations regarding power-related challenges to
adopting a collaborative, basin-wide approach to transboundary water governance.
First, it is absolutely necessary that the basin jurisdictions and participants in collaborative
processes commit early to involving indigenous governments in governance in the basin.
Indigenous governments have constitutionally protected rights to water and rights that are
untested in the courts that make them essential decision-makers in the context of governance for
water in the MRB (Phare 2009). The recent decision of Canada’s Supreme Court, which linked
17
Aboriginal title to a specific land area in British Columbia, only reinforces the critical role of
Canada’s Indigenous peoples (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44). A
commitment to collect and use traditional knowledge in a way that informs monitoring priorities
and respects traditional knowledge is vital. The MRBB has historically struggled with
incorporating traditional knowledge and values (Mackenzie River Basin Board 2012) but has
recently directed much of its energy to improving its efforts in this regard. PADEMP proves it is
possible to do this work. Moving this work forward and scaling it up to the basin scale is
desirable.
Including and considering the interests of upstream jurisdictions will continue to be necessary.
However, it is also necessary for upstream jurisdictions to be sensitive to the perceived and real
impacts of their development activities. British Columbia’s historic unwillingness to engage in
any official discussions about the Peace-Athabasca Delta has created mistrust with many of the
downstream communities. However, the tide may be turning. In its submissions to the Joint
Review Panel in January 2014, BC Hydro indicated that it is willing to discuss the prospects of
providing pulse flows to recharge the Peace-Athabasca Delta with the province of Alberta. The
extent of these discussions is currently unclear but the Joint Review Panel reviewing BC’s
proposed dam recommended moving these discussions forward (Joint Review Panel 2014).
Broadening the parameters of these discussions to include local indigenous governments, Parks
Canada, and the government of the Northwest Territories would be a huge benefit to a basin-
wide approach to governance in the MRB.
Sharing decision-making authority or encouraging greater independence in multi-actor multi-
jurisdictional forums such as the MRBB and PADEMP will likely continue to be a challenge.
Even when institutions are designed to enable active roles in governance, political will can
render them relatively ineffective. Arguably the MRBB could play a much greater role in the
basin than it has to date, and its ability to do so is dependent on the extent to which governments
involved are willing to modify the current arrangement. The bilateral agreements may encourage
a more active engaged role for the MRBB but it is worth noting here that the existence of an
agreement does not ensure its implementation; the jurisdictions unwillingness to fully implement
the Master Agreement for over 17 years proves this point. Good intentions can be watered down
as other priorities take precedence. However, enabling a more inclusive approach to governance
that involves local communities, such as the PADEMP and SRDP, may help to ensure that
political priority does not wither away. Several key informants involved in these programs that
they were empowering the local community concerned with downstream contamination and
many of them continue to engage in regulatory hearings to provide their perspectives.
Participants may hold governments accountable to their own commitments.
A shift in perspective from prioritizing jurisdictional autonomy to considering sustainable water
management and ecological integrity will be necessary moving forward. Given the values
uncovered in our preliminary review of the justification of development decisions, this will
continue to be a challenge. However, participants in groups such as PADEMP and the SRDP
may encourage decision-makers to consider a more holistic perspective that prioritizes ecological
integrity. The information they generate may be used to inform development decisions and will
provide a necessary basis with which to measure change in the region and a platform from which
each participant can advocate for a basin-wide approach.
18
The institutional infrastructure to adopt a multi-level, basin-wide approach to transboundary
water governance in the MRB exists. Political will and prioritization is necessary to fulfill the
promise of the Master Agreement, to effectively implement the upcoming bilateral water
management agreements and to empower collaboration in the basin. Whether the jurisdictions
will capitalize on this opportunity to develop a more collaborative, basin wide approach to
transboundary governance remains to be seen. Certainly, challenges associated with inclusive
participation, agenda setting and values will remain. However, we remain optimistic that,
although governance in this basin will be far from simple or easy, it may more effectively
address the concerns of basin residents through collaborative processes occurring at multiple
levels in the basin. It may not be possible to level power asymmetries but revealing them is an
important first step to working well despite them.
19
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1 Canada’s Constitution Act uses the term ‘Aboriginal’ to identify three distinct indigenous groups within
Canada: Inuit, First Nations and Metis. Elsewhere in this paper we use the terms ‘indigenous peoples’ or ‘indigenous
governments’. We use the term Aboriginal where it is locally appropriate. For instance, in many official government
documents the term Aboriginal is used. 2 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013. 3 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013. 4 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013. 5 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014; Confidential interview A, 16 January 2014. 6 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014; Confidential interview A, 16 January 2014; Confidential interview
B, 16 January 2014; Confidential interview, 28 January 2014 7 Confidential interview, 8 August 2012; Confidential interview, 5 September 2012; Confidential interview,
13 September 2012. 8 Confidential interview, 13 August 2012; Confidential interview, 5 September 2012. 9 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013; Confidential interview, 30 October 3013; Confidential interview,
31 October 2013; Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 10 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013. 11 Confidential interview, 24 October 2013; Confidential interview 30 October 2013. 12 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014; Confidential interview B, 16 January 2014. 13 Confidential interview, 13 January 2014. 14 Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 15 Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 16 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013. 17 Confidential interview, 8 August 2012; Confidential interview, 28 August 2012. 18 Confidential interview, 28 August 2012. 19 Confidential interview, 5 September 2012; Confidential interview, 13 September 2012. 20 Confidential interview B, 16 January 2014. 21 Confidential interview, 30 October 2013; Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 22 Confidential interview, 22 April 2014. 23 Confidential interview, 13 August 2012. 24 Confidential interview, 7 August 2012. 25 Confidential interview, 15 November 2013.