ExplainingGermany’srefugeepolicychangein2015usingKingdon’sMultipleStreamFramework;incomparisonwiththeNetherlands
APRIL26,2017
KathinkaLuisaGaessStudentnumbers1723820Supervisor:Prof.Dr.J.VoorhoeveSecondreader: Dr. A. AfonsoMasterThesisinPublicAdministrationSpecialization:InternationalandEuropeanGovernanceFacultyofGovernanceandGlobalAffairsUniversityofLeiden
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Executivesummary
ThisresearchexplorestheextenttowhichKingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)explains
thedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsduring2015.Both
countrieshadbeenconductingrestrictiveasylumpoliciesduringthepast20years.However, in
2015,atthepeakoftheEuropeanrefugeecrisis,Germanyabruptlytransformeditsapproachto
refugeesintoanopen-doorpolicywhiletheNetherlandscontinuedwithitsrestrictiveapproach.
This ledtoaremarkabledifference in thenumberofasylumseekersbothcountriesreceived in
2015;adivergencewhichservedasapointofdepartureforthisresearch.Thispapermainlyfocuses
on the case study ofGermany’s asylumpolicy. However,my findings are being compared to a
synchronicanalysisoftheDutchrefugeepolicybymycolleagueLuciaOverpelt.
Inordertoexplainthedifferentdevelopmentswithregardtopolicychange,Kingdon’sMultiple
StreamsFrameworkwasappliedtobothcases.However,throughoutthestudyitbecameapparent
thattheMSFshowsflawsinexplainingpolicychangeundercertaincircumstances.Hence,rather
thansimplyapplying themodel, thispaperalso tests themodel.TheMSFwasapplied to three
decisivepolicydecisionsoftheGermangovernmentin2015whichreflectapolicychange.Thedata
wascollectedwiththeapplicationoftheprocess-tracingmethod.
InmyGermancasestudy,thefindingsrevealedthattheMSFcanexplainthechangeinGermany’s
asylumpolicyonlytoa limitedextent.Althoughitcorrectlydescribesagendasetting,themodel
fails to consider important contextual circumstances and interrelationships. TheMSF does not
include decisionmaking in a crisis situation, nor does it consider policy-making in amulti-level
structure like the EU. Additionally, it fails to recognize that different actors, e.g. the German
Chancellor,influencethepolicy-makingprocessthroughtheirinteractionandverbalpower.After
comparingthosefindingstotheNetherlands,itbecameclearthatthemodelfailstoexplainsimilar
elementsfortheDutchcase,eventhoughtheNetherlandsexperiencedalowerlevelofcrisisand
nopolicychange.ThisledtotheconclusionthattheMSFdoesnotadequatelyexplainthedifference
intheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015,becauseitlackscrucial
factorsof contextand interactionwhicharenecessary tobe includedwhen researchingpolicy-
makingandpolicychangeinbothcasestudies.Therefore,itisrecommendedtoadjustthecurrent
MSFaccordinglyortodevelopanewmodelforpolicychangewhichtakesthemissingelements
intoaccount.
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DeclarationofAuthorship IherebydeclarethatthisMasterthesistitled‘ExplainingGermany’srefugeepolicychangein2015
using Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework; in comparison with the Netherlands’ has beendevelopedasafinalpaperforobtainingaMasterdegreeinPublicAdministrationattheUniversity
ofLeiden,theNetherlands.TheresearchprocesshasbeensupervisedbyProf.Dr.JorisVoorhoeve.
Iherebyconfirmthat IhaveauthoredthisMasterthesis independently;withoutexternalhelp. I
declare that the researchmaterialhasbeendulyaccredited in the reportand thatallpassages
whicharegenerallyorliterallyretrievedfrompublicationsandotherresourcesaremarkedassuch.
DenHaagApril26,2017
Dedicationandwordsofacknowledgement
Thisthesisisdedicatedtomyparents,StephanieandHanno.Forsupportingmeallmylifeandfor
havingsparkedandnurturedmypoliticalinterest.
IwouldliketothankKenvanMastrigtforsupportingme,bearingwithmeandbeingthereatany
moment; Lucia Overpelt for being a great partner in crime and for going through this process
togetherfromthebeginninguntiltheveryend;Prof.Dr.JorisVoorhoeveforinspiring,guidingand
supervisingmeinthisthesisprocess;VasileiosKarakasisforallthosehoursoftechnical,scientific
andmental support; StephanieGaess and JanetAnderson for borrowing their timeandbrains;
MartinaBelevaforallthosesharedlibraryandcoffeehours.LastbutnotleastIwouldliketothank
myfriendsandmysisterwhohavealwaysbeenpatientandsupportive.Thankyou.
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TableofContents.................................................................................................................................... 1
.................................................................................................................................... 1
.................................................................................................................................... 1 Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 2 Declaration of Authorship ................................................................................................................. 3 Dedication and words of acknowledgement ...................................................................................... 3 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... 6 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... 6
1. | Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 7 1.1. Thematic overview ............................................................................................................... 7 1.2. Methodological aspects ....................................................................................................... 9 1.3. Academic and societal relevance ......................................................................................... 9 1.4. A reader’s guide .................................................................................................................. 10
2. | Chapter 2: Situation Analysis ............................................................................... 12 2.1 How the crisis unfolded ....................................................................................................... 12
2.1.1 Causes and conflicts ....................................................................................................... 12 2.1.2 Reasons and motives to flee to Europe .............................................................................. 13
2.2 How the situation was managed at EU level ........................................................................ 14 2.3 Germany’s change of course in its refugee policy ................................................................ 15
2.3.1 History of migration flows and refugee policy in Germany ................................................ 16 2.3.2 Political actions and crisis management in summer 2015 ................................................... 17 2.3.3 Portrayal of the issue and the course of asylum policy ...................................................... 19 2.3.4 Different responses of civil society and politics to the government’s refugee policy ............. 20
2.4 Conclusions of the situation analysis ................................................................................... 21
3. | Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ........................................................................ 23 3.1. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework ............................................................................. 23
3.1.1. The framework in perspective ...................................................................................... 23 3.1.2. The three streams ....................................................................................................... 25 3.1.3. Policy windows and the role of coupling ....................................................................... 28
3.2. Literature Review .............................................................................................................. 29 3.2.1. The nature of policy change ........................................................................................ 30 3.2.2. Contextual factors: Decision making during times of crisis and in multi-level structures . 30 3.2.3. Participant interaction and verbal power in the political stream .................................... 34
3.3. Conclusion of the theory section ......................................................................................... 37
4. | Chapter 4: Data Collection and Methods ............................................................... 39 4.1. Key concepts, measurement and data sources .................................................................... 39 4.2. Research approach and design ........................................................................................... 40
5. | Chapter 5: Findings .............................................................................................. 43 5.1. Decision No. 1: The suspension of the Dublin System in Germany, August 21 – 25, 2015 ..... 45
5.1.1. Problem Stream ......................................................................................................... 45 5.1.2. Policy stream .............................................................................................................. 47 5.1.3. Political stream .......................................................................................................... 49 5.1.4. Conclusion political decision No. 1 ............................................................................... 50
5.2. Decision No. 2: The reallocation of refugees from Hungary to Austria and Germany – September 4, 2015 .......................................................................................................................... 52
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5.2.1. The time between decision No. 1 and No. 2 .................................................................. 52 5.2.2. Problem Stream ......................................................................................................... 53 5.2.3. Policy stream ............................................................................................................. 56 5.2.4. Political Stream .......................................................................................................... 58 5.2.5. Conclusion of political decision No. 2 ........................................................................... 60
5.3. Decision No. 3: The implementation of border controls; no sealing of the border – September 13 ................................................................................................................................. 62
5.3.1. The Problem stream .................................................................................................... 62 5.3.2. The Policy Stream ....................................................................................................... 65 5.3.3. The Political Stream .................................................................................................... 67 5.3.4. Concluding political decision No. 3 ............................................................................... 68
5.4. Conclusion of the Findings Chapter ..................................................................................... 70
6. | Chapter 6: Comparison of the German to the Dutch case ........................................ 74
7. | Chapter 7: Overall Conclusions ............................................................................. 79 7.1. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 79 7.2. Research limitations and recommendation for further research .......................................... 81
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 83 I. Scientific Sources .................................................................................................................... 83 II. Empirical Sources for Data of Analysis .................................................................................... 85
Appendices ................................................................................................................. 97 A. Additional literature ................................................................................................................ 97
a. Policy windows .................................................................................................................... 97 b. Framing ............................................................................................................................... 97
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ListofFiguresFigure1:Differentdevelopmentsofasylumpoliciesin2015............................................................8
Figure2:Structuraldesignofthethesis.............................................................................................9
Figure3:First-timeapplicationsin2015(EurostatinBBC,2016)....................................................12
Figure4:FundsforSyrianrefugeesinneighboringcountries(UNHighCommissionerforRefugees
inSly,2015)...............................................................................................................................13
Figure5:ImportantpoliticaldecisionsonGermany’srefugeepolicyinsummer2015..................19
Figure6:AMultipleStreamsModelofPolicymaking(Gagnon&Labonte,2013)..........................29
Figure7:Triangularrelationshipbetweenthemedia,politicalactorsandthepublic....................34
Figure8:ImportantpoliticaldecisionsonGerman’srefugeepolicyinsummer2015....................43
Figure9:AsylanträgeundEASY-Registrierungen:bluecolumnsindicateEASYregistrationsandred
columnsindicatethenumberofasylumapplications(BAMFinEngler,2016).......................44
Figure10:Whatoccupiedthepublicagenda?.................................................................................45
Figure11:PoliticaldecisionNo.1.....................................................................................................51
Figure12:AsylanträgeundEASY-Registrierungen:bluecolumnsindicateEASYregistrationsand
redcolumnsindicatethenumberofasylumapplications(BAMFinEngler,2016)................57
Figure13:PoliticaldecisionNo.2.....................................................................................................61
Figure14:WindowofopportunityindecisionNo.3........................................................................65
Figure15:PoliticaldecisionNo.3.....................................................................................................69
Figure16:Differentdevelopmentsofasylumpoliciesin2015........................................................75
Abbreviations AfD:AllgemeinefürDeutschland(AlternativeforGermany)
BAMF:BundesministeriumfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge(GermanMinistryofMigrationand
Refugees)
CDU:ChristlichDemokratischeUnionDeutschlands(ChristianDemocraticUnionofGermany)
CSU:ChristlichSozialeUnion(ChristianSocialUnion=BavarianChristianDemocrats)
EU:EuropeanUnion
MSF:MultipleStreamsFramework
PVV:PartijvoordeVrijheid(FreedomPartyoftheNetherlands)
SPD:SozialDemokratischeParteiDeutschland(SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany)
UN:UnitedNations
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1. |Chapter1:Introduction“Do not underestimate the urgency. Do not underestimate our imperative to act. Winter isapproaching–thinkofthefamiliessleepinginparksandrailwaystationsinBudapest,intentsinTraiskirchen,oronshoresinKos.Whatwillbecomeofthemoncoldwinternights?”–Jean-ClaudeJunker(Junker,J.-C.inStateoftheUnionspeech,2015)
1.1. Thematicoverview
TherefugeecrisiswasthemostdebatedtopicinGermanyin2015(Statistica,2016).Whilelivingin
theNetherlands,IbecameawarethatrefugeesarealmostinvisibleonthestreetsofDutchcities.
Oneofthereasonsisthat,in2015,theNetherlandsonlyreceived59.100refugeeswhichaccounts
for0,35%oftheirpopulation,whileGermanytookon890.000refugeesthataccountfor1,113%of
its population (Seiffert&Wormann, 2016).Despite their differences in size, both countries are
economicallywelloff,geographicallycloseandculturallysimilar(DNHK-A,2017;DNHK-B,2017).
Thisledtothelogicalassumptionthatbothcountrieswouldhandleanidenticalnumberofrefugees
percapita.Thefactthatthisisnotthecasesparkedmyinterestinthereasonsforthatremarkable
differenceinnumber.Additionally,myfellowstudent,LuciaOverpelt,developedaninterestinthe
waytheNetherlandsmanagedtherefugeecrisis.Thismotivatedustocomparethetwocountries.
Afterconductingsituationanalysesforbothcountrieswefoundrelevantpointsofcomparison:In
2015, the German government executed a welcoming refugee policy1 while the Netherlands
pursuedapolicyofdiscouragement.Aninterestingside-noteisthattheDutchpopulistpartywas
presentinparliamentduringtheyear2015asthethird-strongestparty.TheGermanpopulistparty,
incontrast,hadnotyetpassedits5%hurdletoenterparliament.Bothcountrieshadpursueda
similarasylumpolicy forthepast20yearsthatreducedthenumberofrefugeestoaminimum.
However,insummer2015,theGermangovernmentwentthrougharadicalshiftandtransformed
itsrefugeepolicyfromapolicyofdiscouragementintoapolicyofwelcome.TheNetherlands,on
theotherhand,stayedoncoursewiththeirrefugeepolicy.Thisremarkabledifferenceinasylum
policyofthetwocountriessparkedourinteresttowriteathesisonthequestionwhyonecountry
1 Pleasenote:Throughoutthepaper,IwillfocusonGermany’srefugee/asylumpolicy.Itconcernsthosepeoplewhoappliedforasylum,eveniftheyaredeniedsuch.Hence,Iwillnotfocusonthegeneralmigrationpolicy.Therefore,IdonotincludepeoplewhoenteredGermanyduetoreasonsotherthanasylum.
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changedandtheotheronepursueditspolicyapproachleadingtoasubstantialdifferenceinthe
numberofreceivedrefugees.
Figure 1: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015
The goal of this research is to explain the driving forces of policy change. In this regard, J.W.
Kingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(Abbrev.MSF),whichwehadelaboratelydiscussedthrough
ourMasters,appearedtobethemostsuitablemodel.Itdescribeshowandwhatkindofideasreach
thepoliticalagendaandcausepolicychange. Italsoexplores institutionsandagencythatplaya
roleinthepolicyprocess.Hence,ittriestoincludeavarietyofdimensions.Forthisreason,Iaimed
atapplying theMSF in regard to this case studybyusing themodelasaguideline formydata
collection. Throughout the research, it became clear that I had to shiftmy focus from ‘simply
applying’ the model to testing and potentially complementing the model. This is because
inconsistenciesweredetectedintheliteraturereviewandwhenapplyingthemodeltothecase.
BoththeoryandthefindingssuggestedaddingsupplementaryelementstotheKingdonmodelin
order to accurately describe policy change. In sum, the Kingdon model is adequate for data
collection,butneedsfurthertestingandcomplementaryelementstobefullyeffective.
The fundamental challenge was the design of a research which includes the following three
elements:Twosinglecasestudies,acomparisonbetweenthetwocasestudiesandaframework
that needs to be tested and potentially complemented. I decided to work with the following
researchquestions:TowhatextentdoesKingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)explainthe
differenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015?However,in
ordertoanswerthisquestion,thefollowingsub-questionhadtobeaddressedfirst:Towhatextent
doestheMSFexplainthepolicychangeinGermany?Usingtheseresearchquestionsasapointof
departure,IfirstmadeacasestudyforGermanywhichwasbasedonthesituationanalysisandthe
literature. ItestedthemodelonthreedecisivepolicydecisionstheGermangovernmenttookin
Asylumpolicyofdiscouragement
TheNetherlands:59.100refugees
Germany:890.000refugees
?Before2015 Endof2015
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2015.TheyreflectedachangeinGermany’sasylumpolicy.Meanwhile,Ialsohadtoaddinliterature
based on the findings. From the findings, I was able to answer the sub-question referring to
Germany.Subsequently,IcomparedmyfindingstoLuciaOverpeltwhodidasynchroniccasestudy
fortheNetherlands2.BasedonthecomparisonIwasabletoanswerthegeneralresearchquestion
anddrawconclusions.
1.2. Methodologicalaspects
Fromascientificpointofview,thestudyisofdescriptivenatureincludingexploratoryelements.
This isbecause the researchdocumentsacausalprocesswhilegeneratingnewquestions tobe
further researched. It reflects anunusual researchprocesswhich is partly deductive andpartly
inductive.ThisisduetothefactthatIapplytheorytestingaswellastheorygenerationwhileatthe
sametimegoingbackandforthbetweentheoryandfindings.Moreover,theresearchillustratesa
qualitativecasestudywhichincludesthecollectionofdatainformofprocesstracing.Thefindings
ofthesinglecasestudyarecontrastedwithLuciaOverpelt’s findings.Therefore,thispaperalso
includesacomparativeelementwhichenhancesthe lowexternalvalidityof theprocess-tracing
method.Finally, it is importanttohighlightthattheresearchisappliedtoarealistictimeframe.
ThedatacollectionincludesthetimefromAugust1untilSeptember17,2015.Inthisperiod,the
refugeecrisisemergedinGermanyandthethreeeventsofanalysisoccurred.
1.3. Academicandsocietalrelevance
Thisresearchwillacademicallycontributetoandbuilduponpublicadministrationandpublicpolicy
research inmultipleways. First, it attempts to explore and explain the driving forces of policy
changebyapplyingtheKingdonmodeltotheGermanrefugeepolicyinthetimeframementioned
2L.Overpelt’sresearchcanbefoundinthearchiveoftheUniversityofLeidenunderOverpelt,L.(2017).ExplainingchangeandstabilitywithMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)intheNetherlandsandGermanyduringthe2015refugeecrisis.UniversityofLeiden.
Figure 2: Structural design of the thesis
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above.ThisisthefirsttimetheKingdonmodelhasbeenappliedtothiscasewhichmakesitaunique
contributiontotheacademicfieldofpublicadministrationandpublicpolicy.Secondly,withthis
researchtheMSFisappliedtoacasewhichisembeddedintoacontextofcrisisandmulti-level
structures.Thisconnectsthemodeltoawideracademicspectrumthanjustlocalpolicy-makingas
donebyKingdon.Inregardstomulti-levelstructures,N.Zahariadishasdonerelevantpre-workby
applyingtheMSFtopolicy-makingwithintheEuropeanUnion(ZahariadisN.,2008).Myworktries
tobuildonhisinsightsbyreflectingacasestudyfromtheviewpointofamemberstate.Byapplying
amodelofpublicpolicytoacasethatisaffectedbycrisisandmulti-leveldiplomacy,Ialsoconnect
several academic fieldswith each other. Hence, the results of this researchmight not only be
relevant for public administration/policy scholars, but also to researchers focusing on crisis
management and multi-level diplomacy. Thirdly, the MSF, although discussed widely among
scholars,hasnotbeenfullyappliedtomanycasesyet(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Therefore,
thisresearchoffersanopportunitytorevealthetotalvalueofthemodel.Inaddition,thisstudy
includes a comparative element by being contrasted to a similar case study. This provides the
readerwithaninsightintoadifferentcase-studythatmadeuseofthesameresearchapproach.
OnehastoacknowledgetheactualityofthematterandthefactthatresearchontheEuropean
refugeecrisisisstillrelativelyyoungprovidesthetopicwithahighsocietalrelevance.Firstly,when
Istartedwiththispaper,notmuchresearchhasbeenpublishedontheEuropeanrefugeecrisis.In
fact,itwasarelativelyunexploredfield.Hence,thisstudycontributestothisexplorationprocess
andaddstoexistingresearchontheEuropeanrefugeecrisis.Secondly,althoughtherefugeeissue
isnotconsideredtobeacrisisanymore,itwillhavelong-termconsequencesformemberstates
thatreceivedahighnumberofrefugees.Also,untiltoday,theEUisstrugglingwithsettingupan
effectiverefugeepolicy.Ithasnotyetmanagedtoagreeonapermanentdistributionscheme.For
European policymakers, this researchmight be interesting to understandwhy some countries
pursueopen-borderandothercountriesrestrictiveapproachesinregardstotheirrefugeepolicies.
For German policy makers, this research might be valuable to understand why the German
governmentrespondedtotherefugeecrisisthewayitdid.Hence,Ibelievethetopichassocietal
impactonvariouspoliticallevels.
1.4. Areader’sguide
Thispaperisstructuredinthefollowingway:Chapter2servesassituationanalysiswhichprovides
backgroundtothewaythecrisisemergedandthewayitwasmanagedondifferentlevels.Italso
distils the three key policy decisions of the German government that reflect the change in
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Germany’srefugeepolicy.Chapter3referstothetheoreticalframeworkwhichisdividedintotwo
parts.ThefirstpartdescribestheMultipleStreamsFramework.Thesecondpartreflectsonthe
discussionof theMSF. Thereby, aspects thatwere apparent in the situation analysis aswell as
elementswhichdifferentscholarsdeemedasimportantinregardtotheMSFareincluded.Chapter
4describesthedatacollectionandthemethodology.Itexplainshowthekeyconcepts,thethree
streams, are measured and which data sources will be used. Additionally, I elaborate on the
researchapproachanddesign.Chapter5reflectsonthedatacollectioninwhichIapplytheMSFto
thethreekeydecisionsoftheGermangovernmentwiththehelpofprocesstracing.Inthisway,the
sub-researchquestionreferringtoGermanycanbeanswered.InChapter6,Icomparemyfindings
to Lucia Overpelt’s case-study findings. Here, I eventually answer themain research question.
Lastly,Chapter7concludesthepaperandprovidesresearchlimitationsandpotentialforfurther
research.
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2. |Chapter2:SituationAnalysisThischapterprovidesabriefoverviewofthe2015refugeecrisis,itscausesanditsmanagement.
This includesan insightonhowthecrisishasbeenhandledatEuropeanUnion levelandat the
Germangovernmentlevel. Inthisrespect, IwillanalysetheGermanchangeofcourseinasylum
policyonthebasisofthecountry’smigrationhistoryandthreedecisivegovernmentdecisionsin
2015.Iwillputthefocusonthegovernment’sportrayalofthecrisisandthecourseofitsasylum
policy.Subsequently,Iwillanalysedifferentresponsesofcivilsocietyandthepoliticalspheretothe
government’srefugeepolicy.Thus,thischapterservesasanoverviewbutalsoasabasisforthe
literaturereviewinthesubsequentchapter.
2.1 Howthecrisisunfolded
2015canbedescribedasayearinaveryviolenteracountingninewarsandcivilwarsintheMiddle
EastandtheNorthofAfrica(Cockburn,2015).Asaconsequenceofitsgeographicproximity,Europe
faceditsworstdisplacementcrisissinceWWIIwith1,000,573refugeesreachingitsshoresbysea
in2015(Clayton&Holland,2015).ThosepeoplefledtheircountriesduetoongoingwarsinSyria
and Iraq, aswell as conflicts and instabilities in countries likeAfghanistan, Eritreaor elsewhere
(UNHCR-B,2016).
2.1.1 Causesandconflicts
The three dominant population
groupswhowere fleeingare Syrians
ofwhomhalfamillionpeoplecrossed
the Mediterranean in 2015 and
accountfor50percentofallrefugees
coming to Europe; Afghans who
accountedfor20percentand Iraqis
forsevenpercent(Clayton&Holland,
2015).
By2015,Syriafounditselfinastateof
war formore than fouryearswithout
showinganysignoftermination(Kingsley,2015).People’slossofhopeintheirwar-torncountries
andthefailureofdiplomacytoendthewarscontributedto250.000casesofdeathand12million
displacedpeopleservingasthekeyreasonsforthewaveofrefugeestoEurope(Sly,2015;United
Figure 3: First-time applications in 2015 (Eurostat in BBC, 2016)
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Nations,2015).Thedestructionofallmeanstomakealiving,thecontinuationoftheconflictand
the IslamicState forcedhalfofSyria’s23millioncitizensto leavetheirhomes,with fourmillion
refugeesresidinginothercountriessuchasTurkey,Lebanon,Jordanandthememberstatesofthe
EuropeanUnion(Cockburn,2015;UNHCR-C,2016).
AfghansandIraqisalsofledtheircountriesduetoconflictandwar.TheUNHighCommissionerfor
HumanRightscharacterizedAfghanistanascaughtina“venomouscycle”ofviolence,becauseof
theintensificationofthewarafterthewithdrawalofmostinternationalforces(AlHussein,Z.R.in
Grossmann,2015,para.5).In2015,theAfghangovernmentclaimedthat80%ofthecountrywould
beunsafeduetoextremistgroupssuchastheTalibanandIS(Kingsley,2015).Thesamecanbe
observedinIraqwheretheIslamicStatehasprovokedthedisplacementof3,3millionpeopleasof
December31,2015duetoitscontrolofsubstantialterritoryandthespreadofitssectarianposition
(Cockburn,2015;InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre,2016).
2.1.2 ReasonsandmotivestofleetoEurope
ThereasonsandmotiveswhyrefugeesfromtheMiddleEaststartedcomingallthewaytoEurope
aremultiple.First,refugeesinSyria’sborderingcountriessuchasTurkey,JordanandLebanonhave
beenexperiencingasituationwithoutanyprospects.Theyareusuallynotrecognizedasrefugees.
Hence,theyaredeniedtherighttoworkandtheirchildrenoftenarerefusededucation(Kingsley,
2015). In 2015, 400.000 refugee children in Turkey were not attending school (Human Rights
Watch, 2015). In addition, the UN experienced a huge shortfall in funding which significantly
reducedthehandoutstorefugeefamilies(seeFigure4).TheUNhasreceivedlessthan50%ofwhat
it needed to care for the refugeeswhich
presents itself, for instance, in the lackof
foodandhealthcareinLebanonandJordan
(Grant, 2015; Sly, 2015). This makes the
Middle East an unpleasant place to stay.
Therefore,manyrefugeesdecidedtomove
to Europe, and particularly Germany, to
securetheirentitledrightsunderthe1951
refugeeconventioninthehopeforabetter
lifeandfuture(Kingsley,2015).
Thishopehadbeenfurthertriggeredbytwofactors:Firstly,anopen-borderpolicycomingfrom
the German government signalled the suspension of the Dublin Regulations in August 2015. It
Figure 4: Funds for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Sly, 2015)
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impliedtheacceptanceofanyasylumapplicationcomingfromSyrians,eveniftheyhadappliedfor
asyluminotherEuropeancountriesbefore.Thissparkedabiggerwaveofrefugeearrivals,since
peoplenolongerfearedbeingarrestedinneighbouringHungary(Kingsley,2015).Additionally,the
morepeoplearrivedinGermany,themorepeoplewantedtofollowinordertoreunitewithfamily
membersorfellowcountrymen(Salloum,2015).Secondly,moreconvenienttravelrouteshadbeen
discovered (Kingsley, 2015). Initially, refugees started travelling to Europe via the Central
MediterraneanroutesailingfromLibyatoItaly.However,towardssummer2015,visarestrictions
in North Africa and the Libyan civil war complicated reaching the Libyan coast. Hence, people
realisedthatcrossingtheEasternMediterraneanintoGreeceandwalkingtheBalkanrouteseemed
acheaperandsaferoption.This increasedthenumberofpeople landing inGreecesignificantly
from43,000in2014tomorethan750,000in2015(Kingsley,2015;UNHCR,2016).Meanwhile,the
Balkanstatesfacilitatedeasiertravelthroughtheirterritory(Kingsley,2015).
ThelastreasonwhyrefugeesmadetheirwaytoEuropeneedstobeascribedtotheEuropeanUnion
itself.TheEUunderestimatedpeople’sdesperationandassumedthatrefugeeswouldneverdare
risktheirlivesandtotakethedangerousjourneytoEurope(Kingsley,2015;EuropeanUnion,2016).
OncerefugeesrealisedthatgainingasyluminEuropeiseasierthanexpectedtheysimplyforced
Europe’shandbyactuallymakingthejourneythemselves.Thiscausedadisorderlyprocessinwhich
anyonewasable toreachEuropeby joiningtheSyriantravellers. In themeantime,by failing to
relocateasignificantnumberofrefugeesfromTurkey,EuropeprovidedTurkeywithlittleincentive
tobetterprotectitsownborders(Kingsley,2015).Insum,theresultdemonstrated“aperfectstorm
inwhichrefugeeshavenoreasontostayput;MiddleEasterncountrieshavenoincentivetoprevent
themfromleaving;andEuropehasnomeansofblockingtheirpath”(Kingsley,2015,para.14).
2.2 HowthesituationwasmanagedatEUlevel
Inspring2015,theEUmemberstategovernmentsstartedtofeelasenseofurgencyafterbeing
surprisedbytheunprecedentednumberofmigrantsthatstartedtoshiftfromtheCentraltothe
EasternMediterraneanroute(EuropeanUnion,2016).InMay2015,theEUdecidedonaEuropean
agenda on migration underlying the need for better migration management and shared
responsibilities.Itidentifiedactionsandmeasuresintheareasof(I)incentivereductionforirregular
migration,(II)thesecuringofexternalbordersandsavingoflives,(III)astrongasylumpolicyand
(IV)anewpolicythatdefineslegalmigration(EuropeanCouncil,2016).Hence,theEUgovernments
experiencedaclearshiftintheirfocusfromsavinglivestowardshowtotreatpeoplethatactually
setfootonEuropeanterritory(EuropeanUnion,2016).
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However,rapidly,flawsofthepre-existingDublinRegulationsbecameobvious.Itputatremendous
burdenon first-entry countries such as Italy andGreecewhowere in chargeof processing the
majority of asylum applications. Soon the EU started to discuss burden sharing via reallocation
schemes(EuropeanUnion,2016).However,thisdividedtheunionintotwocamps.Ononeside,
onecouldfindamajorityoftheEasternmemberstateswhodonothaveatraditionoflarge-scale
immigrationandfearedalossofidentity.Ontheothersidewerethosewhofavouredamandatory
reallocationscheme.Thiswaslargelypreferredbythenorth-westerncountriessuchasGermany
whowerearguinginfavourofthefulfilmentofaninternationalhumandutyincludingthedefence
ofhumanrights(MerkelandLofveninMartinez,2015;Zafrini,2016).
Soon,theEUrealizedthatitneededtotakesomeurgentshort-termmeasurestocopewiththe
situation.Insummer2015,theunionfacedamassiverefugeeinfluxviatheGreekislands.Atthat
time,GermanyexperiencedthestrongestinfluxduetoitssuspensionoftheDublinRegulationfor
Syrians. It became clear that the voluntary reallocation scheme was not showing any effect.
Consequently, the Council decided upon themandatory reallocation of 40.000 (September 14,
2015) and laterof anadditional120.000migrants (September22,2015) from Italy andGreece
(EuropeanUnion,2016).However,thedecisiontoreallocate120.000migrantswasonlymadeafter
extensivediscussionsspreadovermonths,persuasionattemptsbytheEuropeanCommissionand
theeventualuseof themajorityvotingmechanism3 (Junker, J.-C. inStateof theUnionspeech,
2015;CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,2015).Theuseofmajorityvotesisconsideredtobehighly
unusualforsuchasensitiveissue(CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,2015).Thus,inthetimeframe
of this paper4 the EU coerced itsmember states into agreeing on the reallocation of 160.000
refugees;however,itfailedtomakememberstatesagreeonapermanentdistributionmechanism.
2.3 Germany’schangeofcourseinitsrefugeepolicy
Thissectionanalysesthechangeofcourse in theGermanasylumpolicybasedonthecountry’s
history in migration and refugee policy5 and three decisive government decisions in 2015.
Additionally, Iwill focuson the government’smotives and framingof the crisis and its refugee
3CzechRepublic,Romania,SlovakiaandHungaryvotedagainstmandatoryquotasandFinlandabstained.4Exceedingthetimeframeofthispaper:InSeptember,theurgencytoregaincontrolofexternalbordersandtheregistrationprocessofrefugeesbecameapparent.Therefore,theinstalmentofregistrationhotspotsandthedevelopmentofajointactionprogrammewithTurkeywereagreedupon(EuropeanUnion,2016).ThedealwithTurkeyenteredintoforceinMarch2016andincluded3billionofsupportfundingtoTurkey,aone-to-oneexchangemechanismwhichcomprisedthatrefugeesthatreachtheGreekislandsillegallyshouldbebroughtbacktoTurkeyinexchangeforregisteredrefugeesbeingsentbyTurkeytotheEU,andthedropofvisarequirementsforTurkishcitizenswithintheEU(ReimannA.etal.,2016).5 Pleasenote:Throughoutthepaper,IwillbefocusingonGermany’srefugee/asylumpolicy.Itconcernsthosepeoplewhoappliedforasylum,eveniftheyaredeniedsuch.Hence,Iwillnotfocusonthegeneralmigrationpolicy.Therefore,IdonotincludepeoplewhoenteredGermanyduetoreasonsotherthanasylum.
16
policy.Eventually,Iwillanalysethemostimportantresponsestothegovernment’srefugeepolicy
bythecivilsocietyandthepoliticalsphere.
2.3.1 HistoryofmigrationflowsandrefugeepolicyinGermany
InordertounderstandhowtheGermangovernmentmadeaU-turn in its refugeepolicy,some
brieffactsaboutGermany’smigrationhistoryandthedevelopmentofitsasylumpolicyneedtobe
highlighted. Although I do not focus onGermany’s generalmigration policy, I consider it to be
important to reflect on Germany’s overallmigration history as it is often linked to a country’s
refugee policy. The country experienced four crucial migration influxes since the WWII. First,
between1944and1948,12millionGermancitizensandethnicGermanshadtoleavetheirhomes
intheformerEasternpartsofGermanythatwereannexedbytheSovietUnionorPoland.They
wereforcedtofindahomeinGermanyorAustria.Germanystruggledwithreceivingandcaringfor
suchahighnumberof refugeesdue toachaoticpost-warsituationmarkedbydestructionand
poverty(Herm&Kubitza,2015).Thesecondwave,occurringbetween1955and1973,featured
economicmotives.Approximately2.6million‘guestworkers’fromGreece,Turkey,ItalyandSpain
wereinvitedtoparticipateintheeconomicriseofGermany(Katz,Noring,&Garrelts,2016).Third,
themostrecentimmigrationwaveGermanyexperiencedoccurredinthe90sduetotheendofthe
cold war and the German reunification (Oezcan, 2004). Between 1988 and 2003 threemillion
‘resettlers’6 returned to Germany. Its number peaked in the early 90s with 390.000 resettlers
arriving in 1992 alone (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016). In the same year, 438,190 asylum
applicationswerefiledmainlyfromcitizensoftheformerYugoslaviaandRomania(Bade&Oltmer,
2005).Thisnumbercomesclosetothe2015number.However,itisimportanttoconsiderthatonly
4,2%of the refugees in1992weregrantedasylumwhile around60%of the refugees in2015
receivedtheasylumstatus7(ProAsyl,2017;BundeszentralefürpolitischeBildung,n.a.).
From this time on, the German government frequently reformed its asylum lawwhich usually
concludedinitsintensificationandanever-decreasingnumberofrefugeesenteringthecountry.In
1992,thegovernmentdecidedupon‘theasylumcompromiseinordertodealwiththeimmigration
pressure and the social andeconomic challengesof the reunification,’. Itwas ground-breaking,
sinceitimplieddenyingasylumapplicationsfrom“safethirdcountries”(Katz,Noring,&Garrelts,
2016, p. 6). Additionally, a policy of discouragement was pursued which included the
6ResettlersareethnicGermanswhohadleftthecountryinordertomigratetotheformerSovietstatessincethe18thcentury(Katz,Noring,&Garrelts,2016)7Pleasenote:RefugeesfromSyria,IraqandEritreahadanalmost100%chancetobegrantedasylumin2015(ProAsyl,2017)
17
‘Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz’ in 1993. It resulted in asylum applicants receiving only a small
amountofmoneytomakealiving.Attimes,theamountwaslessthanthestandardunemployment
benefit (Heißler, 2015). Therefore, asylum numbers decreased substantially (Katz, Noring, &
Garrelts,2016).AnotherreasonforthedecreaseistheDublinRegulationwhichenteredintoforce
in 1997. Sincemost of the countries bordering with Germany were participants of the Dublin
Regulation,refugeesattemptingtoapplyforasyluminGermanycouldonlydosobyenteringthe
countrybyairplane.Consequently,since2004,only50.000peopleappliedforasyluminGermany
(Heißler,2015).
Inthepasttenyears,theGermangovernmentswayedbackandforthinitsrefugeepolicy.Once
the number of asylum seekers was perceived too low due to demographic deficits and labour
shortage the parliament agreed on the ‘Zuwanderungsgesetz’ in 2004. Together with better
conditionsforEUworkers,thelawalsorelaxedtherestrictionsofasylumrecognitionandimproved
thestatusofrefugeefamilies(Oezcan,2004;Heißler,2015).Forthisreason,thenumberofasylum
seekersstartedto increasesince2010.Especially refugees fromstates incrisissuchasSomalia,
Iraq,SyriaandAfghanistanmadetheirwaytoGermany.Oncethenumberwasperceivedastoo
high,thegovernmentdeclaredtheBalkanstates-Serbia,MacedoniaandBosniaHerzegovina-as
safecountriesinordertoterminatethestayofasylumseekersfromthesecountriesmorequickly
(Heißler, 2015). Hence, in the past 20 years, Germany represented a rather restrictive refugee
policy.Everyslightincreaseofasylumseekerswasfollowedbycontainmentmeasures.
During the2015 refugeecrisis, the fourthevent, theGermangovernment respondedunusually
late.Althoughlocalcommunitieshadalreadybeenwarninginwinter2015whiletransitcountries
startedpreparinginspring2015,theofficialsinBerlinrefusedtoundertakeaction.Forinstance,a
requestfromtheMinistryofMigrationtohireadditionalstaffinordertoquicklyprocessoldcases
wasdeclined(AmannM.etal.,2015).Thelow-migrationprofileGermanypursuedforthelast20
yearsaswellastheDublinRegulationmadeGermanyanalmostunreachablecountryforasylum
seekers.Thesefactorscontributedtothenon-preparednessoftheGermangovernmentinregard
tothisrefugeecrisis.
2.3.2 Politicalactionsandcrisismanagementinsummer2015
Insummer2015,Germanywasdriftingintoastateofcrisis.Ithadthehighestnumberofasylum
applicants ithadhadinmanyyearsaswellasthehighestnumber inEurope.Severalconditions
aggravated the situation. The Dublin Regulationwas starting to show flaws, because reception
countries let refugees pass without registration. Germany counted more than 1,000 refugees
18
enteringthecountrywithoutpermissiononasingledayinJuly.However,Germanauthoritieswere
nolongerallowedtosendasylumseekersbacktoGreeceasthecountrywasinsuchbadfinancial
condition. Moreover, via the Balkan route, affluent Germany and global suffering was linked
eventually(Alkousaaet.al,2016).ThoseconditionscausedahighamountofpressureonGerman
authorities. It led to the need to pursue actions that would change Germany’s refugee policy
eventually.
TheGermangovernmentreactedtotherefugeeinfluxwiththreedecisivemeasuresthatrepresent
awelcomingrefugeepolicyapproach(seeFigure5).Thesemeasuresareofgreatimportanceand
willbefurtheranalysedthroughoutthepaper.First,onAugust25,2015Germanysuspendedthe
DublinRegulationforSyrianrefugees.ItimpliedthatoncetheyreachedGermanground,refugees
wouldnotbesentbackimmediately.Thisdecisionwasmadepublicbyanaccidentaldocumentleak
ofanoverstretchedMinistryofMigration8(Abéetal.,2015).Theannouncementofthisdecision
triggeredawaveofenthusiasmamongstSyrianstotraveltoGermanyandamongnon-Syriansto
findwaysofhidingtheiridentities(WeltN24,2016;Alkousaaet.al,2016).Astheinfluxincreased
administrationsstartedtostruggleandneededtobeassistedbycivilsociety(Bochow,2015).This
iswhentheGermanChancellorreleasedherfamous“Wirschaffendas.”9statementonAugust31.
ItwasdebatedinthemediaaseitheranattempttotransformGermanyintoamoralsuperpower,
orasacompassionatestatementfreefromanytacticandcalculation(Abéetal.,2015).
Asaseconddecision,onSeptember4,GermanyandAustriajointlyagreedonabsorbingthousands
ofrefugeesthatwerestrandedinHungary(WeltN24,2016).Budapesthadturnedintoafavoured
travel stop for refugees fromwhich theywere unable to depart due to theDublin Regulation.
However,onAugust31,theHungariangovernmentallowedthefirsttrainstoleaveBudapestwith
thedestinationofMunich.TheAustrianandGermangovernmentcondemnedthisactionandurged
HungarytoadheretotheDublinrules(Kasparek&Speer,2015).Thus,communicationbetweenEU
member states seemed to be disturbed intentionally or unintentionally (ARD, 31.08.2015). On
September4,agroupofthousandrefugeeswhoweretiredofwaitinginBudapeststartedwalking
towardsAustriaalongthehighway.Itbecameknownasthe#marchofhope.Themediawereclosely
followingtheirwalkandreportedonthecircumstancesunderwhichthosepeoplehadtosleepon
thehighwayintherain(Domokos,2015).ThisputsufficientpressureonMerkelandtheAustrian
Chancellor Faymann toopen theborders.Hence,during theweekendof September4-6, trains
8Please note, throughout the paper, I will make use of the German abbreviation BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration undFlüchtlinge)whenreferringtotheMinistryofMigrationandRefugees9Translatedthestatementsignifies:„Wecandoit!“
19
beganofficiallydepartingfromBudapesttoGermany.Thatweekend,refugeesenteringGermany
amountedto20,000(Alkousaaet.al,2016).ThisdecisionwasframedasajointexceptiontoEUlaw
(StreiterandSteinmeierinPresse-undInformationsamtderBundesregierung,2015).However,it
turnedouttobeirreversibleleadingtoGermany’spermanentopen-borderpolicy.
The third political decisionwas a direct consequence of the second decision. Due to the open
borders,thenumberofrefugeesenteringGermanyincreasedsignificantly(Alkousaaet.al,2016).
ThecityofMunichhadtocarrythemainburdenandwasdependentonthehelpofthousandsof
volunteers.Atonepoint,thecity’smayorannouncedtheMunich’snearcollapse,becausethecity
was unable to accommodate any more refugees (Reiter, D. in ARD, 12.09.2015). German
government officials were forced to find a solution which should limit the influx. One of the
discussedoptionswas the sealing of the borders.However,Merkel decidednot to limit but to
deceleratetheinfluxby‘only’implementingbordercontrols.Thismeasurewouldnotturnrefugees
awaybutsendaclearsignalofGermanyremainingopentothem,instead(Alkousaaet.al,2016).
Concluding,thesethreepoliticalmeasuresinresponsetothe2015crisisclearlyreflectapolitical
change in Germany’s asylum policy. This open-door policy significantly contributed to the high
numberof890.000refugeesthatenteredthecountryin2015(deMaizèreinderSpiegel,2016).
2.3.3 Portrayaloftheissueandthecourseofasylumpolicy
ThecrucialpolicyactionstowardsawelcomingrefugeepolicystronglycentredaroundMerkel’s
opinion,assertivenessandcrisisperception.Merkelportrayedheractionswithargumentsbased
onvaluesandpracticalities.Sheregarded itas theGermans’moraldutytorepresentarefugee
welcomingcountry(MerkelinAnneWill,2015).Whenshewasaskedhowitfeelstobethefaceof
Figure 5: Important political decisions on Germany’s refugee policy in summer 2015
20
afriendlyGermany,sherespondedthatshewashappythatGermany,too,isnowacountrythatis
abletoprovidehopetopeopleabroad.Sheaddedthatwhenlookingatthecountry’shistory,that
thisissomethingofgreatvalue(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Here,thefeeling
ofguilt inrelationtotheGermanpastmighthaveplayedacrucialrole(Freedland,2015).Other
argumentationsforarefugeefriendlyattitudewereofpracticalnatureandderivedfromtheskills
shortage and the ageing of German society. Refugees were often framed as a boost for the
economy (Bundesregierung, 2016). In this regard, humanitarian and moral values as well as
practicalreasonsservedasjustificationfortheopen-borderpolicy.
The Chancellor, the media and the public opinion created what became known as the
‘Willkommenskultur’10.MerkelchosetoleadthesituationbysayingthatGermanyisabletocope
withthechallenge.Sheembodiedapositiveframingofthecrisisandhercrisismanagement.Inthis
regard, the famous ‘Wir schaffendas.’ statement,encouragingwords to theGermancitizens in
Sundayeveningprimetimeinterviews,aswellasvisitstorefugeecentresandselfiestakenwith
refugees reflected her personal and political attitude (Merkel, A. in summer press conference,
2015;Merkel inAnneWill,2015).Thepositiveportrayalof thechallengewasbackedupbythe
‘Willkommenskultur’Germanswereprovidingat train stations in the firstweeksof themassive
arrivals(Alkousaaet.al,2016).Also,themediaonlyreportedpositivelyontheatmosphereinthe
country (see findings).TheGermangovernmentexperiencedastrongboostofconfidence,as it
seemed,throughthefactthatagreatpartofthecountrywasreadyandwillingtojointlymanage
thesituation(Amannetal.,2015).Withthelegitimationofthepublicandthemedia,thecultureof
welcometurnedintoapolicyofwelcome.
2.3.4 Different responses of civil society and politics to the government’s refugeepolicy
Asthecrisis intensifiedtheGermangovernmentreceivedavarietyofresponsestotheirasylum
policycoursefromEuropeanandnationalpoliticalleaders,Germanpartiesandcitizens.
At theEuropean level,opinionsweredividedaboutGermany’spolicycourse.Ontheonehand,
particularlyEasternEuropeanmemberstatesopposedGermany’sattemptatanopen-doorpolicy.
Forinstance,theHungariangovernmentcondemnedGermany’ssuspensionoftheDublinsystem
anddeclaredthattherefugeecrisisneedstoberegardeda‘Germanproblem’(Orbán,V.,Schulz,
10 Translation: Culture of Welcome; The term describes the intercultural competence and openness of a society thatappreciates immigration and inclusiveness (Heckmann, 2012). Throughout this paper, I use the German term‘Willkommenskultur’,becauseeventheinternationalmediamadeuseoftheGermantermwhenreferringtotheGermancivilsocietywhichengagedintotherefugeematter.
21
M.inpressconference,2015).Also,GreatBritainwhichrefusedtocontributetoaEuropeanasylum
solutionandDenmarkwhichtemporarilysuspendeditstrainconnectionstoGermanybecamepart
oftheopposition(Amannetal.,2015;Abéetal.,2015).Ontheotherhand,neighbouringcountries
suchasFranceandAustriasupportedGermany’sopen-doorpolicyandcontinuedpromotingafair
European distribution system. In addition, the EU institutions supported Germany’s course.
However,theywereunabletodomorethanpersuadingastheirhandsweretiedduetothedivided
memberstates(Merkel,A.,Fayman,W.,Vučić,A.,Mogherini,F.inpressconference,2015).
Alsoonthenationallevel,acleardivisionofopinionsbecameapparent.Merkelreceivedcriticism
forhercoursefromcertainpoliticalactors.OnethatwentasfarasopposingherinpublicwasHorst
Seehofer,theBavariangovernorandleaderoftheCSU,theBavarianCDUsisterparty.Hepublicly
statedthatitwasamistaketocircumventtheEUasylumrulesanddemandedacaponrefugees
andthesealingoftheborders(WeltN24,2016).Furthermore,heaffrontedMerkelbyinvitingthe
HungarianPrimeMinister,ViktorOrbán,toBavariatodiscussthecrisis(Amannetal.,2015).Onthe
otherhand,MerkelreceivedsupportfromtherestofthegoverningcoalitionincludingtheChristian
andtheSocialDemocrats(Zeitonline,2015).Even,theLeftPartysawthenecessityofthepolitical
decisionsleadingtoanopen-doorpolicy(Gysi,G.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015,2015).
Another actor thatmade its voice heard was themedia. In the period during which themost
defining decisions were taken, the media solely reported positively on refugees and the
government’s decisions (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). Even the conservative and
sensationalistBILDnewspaperdidnotfindfaultwiththedecisiontosuspendtheDublinRegulation
forSyrians(Bild,2015).Thisattitudealsoseemedtoreflectintheoverallpublicopinionwhichwas
characterized by a compassionate and refugee welcoming civil society. The German
‘Willkommenskultur’wascelebratedinternationallyasTVpicturesofGermansgreetingrefugees
ontrainstationscirculated(AlJazeera,2016).Inthefollowingweeks,tenpercentoftheGermans
engaged in volunteering activities for refugee matters (Kamann, 2015). However, pictures of
burning asylum accommodations and right-wing protestors also circulated. These pictures
remindedpoliticiansofthefactthatasmallpartofGermanydoesnotagreewiththeasylumcourse
ofthegovernment(ARD,18.08.2015).Themediaandpoliticianssharplycondemnedthesepeople
andtheirmotives(Hollande,F.andMerkel,A. inpressconference,2015);(GauckinZeitOnline,
2015,para.1;Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).
2.4 Conclusionsofthesituationanalysis
In 2015, the refugee crisis surprised the European Union which had underestimated people’s
22
desperationandthecouragetorisktheirlivesbytakingthedangerousjourneytoEurope.Reasons
whypeoplefledfromcrisiscountriesintheMiddleEastandAfricatoEuropewerevarious.They
included an inhumane situation without prospects in the neighbouring countries, the German
suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrians, the discovery of the Balkan route and the
recognitionthatapplyingforasylumintheEUisrelativelyeasy.Thisputpressureontheunionto
implementnecessarymeasures. TheEU respondedwith the creationof a Europeanagendaon
migrationandshifted its focus fromsaving livestothetreatmentofpeoplethatset footonEU
territory.Due to the flaws in theDublinRegulations,member states engaged indiscussionson
burdensharingandpermanentreallocationschemes.Easternmemberstatesopposedpermanent
distribution schemes while Western member states favoured them. Due to those diverging
memberstateinterests,onlyareallocationof160.000refugeesfromItalyandGreecewasagreed
upon.Hence,noagreementonapermanentdistributionmechanismwasreached.
Germany, too, found itself surprised and unprepared due to the previous adoption of a low
migration profile. The high refugee influx transformed the country into a state of crisis. As a
reaction,theGermangovernmentengagedinmeasuresthatreflectedanopen-doorpolicywhich
were justifiedwith argumentsbasedon values andpracticalities. In this context, threedecisive
policydecisionsreflectthegovernment’schangeofcourse:thesuspensionoftheDublinRegulation
for Syrian refugees, the absorption of the refugees inHungary, and the decision to implement
bordercontrolswithoutsealingtheborderforrefugees.Hence,Germanyrespondedtothecrisis
withapolicychange.
ChancellorMerkel significantly contributed to thepositiveportrayal of the crisis andher policy
approach and enjoyed support from a big part of German society and themedia. This helped
legitimizingasignificantpolicychangeawayfromthediscouragingasylumpolicyitpursuedforthe
past20years.However,theopen-doorpolicyalsoreceivedpubliccriticismfromwithinherparty.
Additionally, right wing protests and violence posed a strong contrast to the German
‘Willkommenskultur’thatwascelebratedinternationallyasGermanswelcomedandtookcareof
arrivingrefugeesontrainstations.Nevertheless,intheend,Mrs.Merkel’spolicyapproachallowed
for890,000registeredrefugeestoarriveinGermanyin2015.
23
3. |Chapter3:TheoreticalFramework
The theory section is composedof twoparts. First, Iwill explain indetail theMultiple Streams
FrameworkwhichservesasguidelineforthedatacollectionthatwillbeelaboratedoninChapter
5.Secondly,Iwillreviewtheliteraturethatadds,criticizesoremphasizesontheMSF.Theliterature
isbasedonthefindingsofthesituationanalysisandongeneraldebatescirculatingaroundtheMSF.
3.1. Kingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework
TheMultipleStreamFramework(abbrev.MSF)whichispartofJohnW.Kingdon’sagenda-setting
theory was originally published in 1984. It is regarded one of the most relevant and debated
theories of public policy (Baumgartner in Zahariadis N., 2016). For this paper, it serves as a
theoreticalguidelineforthedatacollectionwhichissummarizedinthefindingschapter.Generally,
themodelhasreceivedmuchappraisalaswellascritiqueandwastestedinavarietyofpolicyfields.
However,itisimportanttonotethatthenumberoftimesthefullmodelhasbeenappliedtoreality
issparse.AlthoughasignificantnumberofresearchershavereferredtoKingdon’sMSFtheyhave
usuallydonesoby identifying individualelementsof themodel (suchaspolicyentrepreneuror
window of opportunity) in order to provide background to their papers. However, researchers
rarely have applied those concepts directly. A significantly smaller number of researchers have
madeactualuseoftheelementsintheiranalysiswhileanevensmallernumberhasappliedthefull
MSFtopolicyanalysis(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Hence,Ialsohopetocontributetothebody
ofresearchbyapplyingthefullmodeltorealityascoherentlyaspossible.
For the case of the German refugee policy approach in 2015, theMSF has been chosen as a
frameworkfordatacollectionbutalsoasamodeltobechallengedandtested.Kingdonarguesthat
theMFSexplainshowandwhatkindofideasreachthepoliticalagendaandeventuallycausepolicy
change(Kingdon,2011).Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis(2013)addthatthemodelexploreswhichactors
participate during a window of opportunity, how issues are framed and how skilled policy
entrepreneurs politicallymanipulate the process. Thus, I expect themodel to help explain the
drivingforcesbehindthechangesinGermanasylumpolicy.Additionally,LuciaOverpeltandIwould
liketoexplorehowandwhytheGermanpolicyapproachdifferedtotheoneoftheNetherlands.
3.1.1. Theframeworkinperspective
WiththeMultipleStreamsFramework,Kingdonaimedatexpressingthechaoticandunpredictable
nature of the American public policy-making process while still carving out clear patterns. By
providingatooltounderstandtheagenda-settingprocess,theMSFexplainshowideasmoveupon
24
theagenda.ItspointofdepartureisCohen,MarchandOlsen’sGarbageCanModel(Kingdon,2011).
Itdescribeshowfourstreamsthathavealifeoftheirownrunthroughanorganization:Problems,
solutions, participants and choice opportunities. The moment a choice opportunity runs by
availableparticipants,problemsandsolutionsevokechange.Achoiceopportunitycanbeviewed
asagarbagecanintowhichavarietyofproblemsandsolutionsarecastoffbyparticipantsasthey
are generated (Cohen,March,&Olsen, 1972). TheMSF shows Kingdon’s attempt to apply the
GarbageCanModeltothepoliticalsetting.
According to Kingdon, there are two important factors that need to be considered when
investigatingwhichissuesarriveontheagendainthepublicpolicy-makingprocess:Processesand
participants.First,theMFSincludesthreeprocesses:Problems,policyproposalsandpolitics(see
Figure6).Theseareindependentstreamswhichdevelopinaccordancewiththeirownrulesand
dynamics. Despite their independence, there is a critical juncture at which the three streams
intersect.Thismeans that “aproblem is recognized,a solution isavailable, thepolitical climate
makesthetimerightforchange,andtheconstraintsdonotprohibitaction.”(Kingdon,2011,p.88).
Atthispoint,policyentrepreneurs,whohavedevelopedpolicyproposalsandwaitedforproblems
orchangesinthepoliticalstreamtocomealong,attachtheirsolutions.Consequently,thismight
evoke policy change. The opportunity for an entrepreneur to push a proposal is called ‘policy
window’. It isusuallyonlyopenforashorttimebeforeitclosesagain,sincepolicymakerssoon
focustheirattentiononsomethingelse(Kingdon,2011).Asasecondfactor,theroleofparticipants
inside11andoutside12thegovernmentneedstobehighlighted.Participantscanbeinvolvedinany
orinseveralstreamsoftheMSF.Kingdonemphasizesthatisimportanttomakeadifferentiation
betweenparticipantsandprocesses(Kingdon,2011).Ingeneral,itneedstobeacknowledgedthat
in other countries, different participantsmight be involved in thepolicy process than theones
KingdondefinedfortheAmericancontext.
TheMSFisbasedonthreeapproacheswhichincludethetracingoforiginsofinitiatives,rational
andcomprehensivedecisionmaking,andincrementalism.WiththetracingoforiginsKingdonwants
toillustratethattheproximateoriginofpolicychangevariesfromcasetocase.Duetoaninfinite
regress,anultimateoriginofanideaorproposalcannotbespecified.Additionally,topicsdonot
movefromparticipanttoparticipantwitharegularpattern.Hence,ifapersonwouldtraceback
thepathofaproposal’shistory,therewouldbenologicalplacetostoptheprocess(Kingdon,2011).
11Participants inside thegovernmentcomprise theadministration including thePresidentandstaff, civil servantsand theCongress(Kingdon,2011).12Participantsoutsidethegovernment includeinterestgroups;researchers,academics,consultants,foundationsandthinktanks;themedia;election-relatedparticipantsandthepublicopinion(Kingdon,2011).
25
Secondly,theapproachofcomprehensiveandrationaldecisionmakingshouldemphasizethefact
thatpolicymakersactuallydonotmakedecisionsrationally.Kingdonjustifiesthisbypointingout
theirfailuretodefinegoalsclearlyandtocomparealternativessystematically.Thisgoeshandin
handwithhisdenialofthefactthatpolicyproceedsinorderlystages.Heratherclaimsthatstreams
develop independentlyandare logicallycoequal (Kingdon,2011).Thirdly,Kingdonexpresseshis
disagreementwithCharlesLindblomwhoarguesthatpolicychangeoccursincrementally(Kingdon,
2011; Lindbloem, 1959). His study proves that agendas change in a discontinuous and non-
incrementalmanner(Kingdon,2011).Thesethreeelementsserveasbaselineforhismodel.
3.1.2. Thethreestreams
ThethreestreamsformthefundamentalsoftheMSF.Theyaremarkedbydifferentcharacteristics
andcomposedofdifferentfactors(seeFigure6).
3.1.2.1. Theproblemstream
Theproblemstreamdescribeshowconditionsreceiveattentionandsubsequentlytransforminto
politicalproblems.Problemsattract attentionofpeople in andaroundgovernmentby focusing
events,suchascrisesordisasters;byfeedbackofcurrentprogramsandbysystematicindicators
and indicator changes. Firstly, indicators refer to activities and events such as disease rates,
consumerprices, or highwaydeaths. Indicators aremostly assessed tounderstand aproblem’s
magnitude or to raise awareness of changes in a problem. Additionally, people around and in
governmentlookforchangesinindicators,becausetheymightrepresentachangeinasystem’s
state.Secondly,focusingeventsmightturnpeople’sattentiontoindicatorsorproblemsiftheyare
notself-evident.Forinstance,disastersorcrisesrepresentfocusingevents.Thirdly,feedbackserves
asamoreprogrammaticfactorthanindicators.Feedbackabouttheoperationofexistingprograms
that reach government officials often bring problems to their attention. Contents of feedback
messages can include the realisation that a programmes implementation does not squarewith
higherorlegislativeadministrativeintent;thefailuretomeetstatedgoals;thecostofaprogramme
orunanticipatedconsequencesofapublicpolicythatcomestotheattentionofdecisionmakers
(Kingdon,2011).
Some attention needs to be devoted to the way problems are defined. A condition does not
necessarilyhavetobeaproblem.Itmighttransformintoaproblemwhenpeoplestartbelieving
thattheyneedtodosomethingaboutit.Hence,conditionstranslateintoproblemswiththehelp
ofvalues,comparisonsandcategories.Peopledefineproblemsbycomparingtheircurrentsituation
26
withthevaluestheyhaveregardingmoreidealsituations.Amismatchbetweenone’sconception
of an ideal state and the observed conditions becomes a problem. Additionally, problems are
defined by the comparison people make about their own situation with other countries. For
instance, relative disadvantages and inequality might pose a problem. Lastly, the way people
categorize subjects defines problems. In that sense, struggle over a problem definition might
dependonthedefiningcategoriesandthewaytheywillbeused.Thisimpliesthatpeoplemightbe
unabletojudgeaproblembyitscategory,butacategorycanstructuretheperceptionpeoplehave
aboutaproblem(Kingdon,2011).
3.1.2.2. Thepolicystream
Thepolicystreamdescribespolicycommunitieswhichconcentrateongeneratingpolicyproposals.
Kingdonreferstothe‘primevalsoup’whenhedescribesideasfloatingaroundandfadinginthese
policy communities (Kingdon, 2011, p. 116). Existing and new ideas confront each other and
combineinvariousways.Ideasthatmeetcertaincriteriasurviveandturnintoimportantpolicies
asinanaturalselectionprocess(Kingdon,2011).
Someattentionneedstobepaidtotheroleofpolicycommunitiesandpolicyentrepreneurs.Firstly,
policycommunitiesconsistofintimatecyclesofspecialistsinacertainpolicyareawhoarescattered
bothwithin and outside government. They share a common concernwith one policy area and
interactwitheachother.Inpolicycommunities,intellectualpuzzlesanddilemmasarebeingsolved
andalternativesdevelopedbymuddling throughproposalsandproblems. Secondly, the roleof
policyentrepreneursistoadvocateforproposalsandideas(Kingdon,2011).Theydosobycrafting
meaningwhichtheydisseminatetopolicymakerstogainattentionandtomobilizesupport(Ackrill,
Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Whiletheydonotnecessarilyneedtobepartofapolicycommunity,they
arewillingtoinvesttheirresourcesinthehopeforafuturereturn.Theirgenerationofsolutions
canoccur intwoways:Theyeithersenseaproblemandadvocateasolutiontosolve it;orthey
become advocates for solutions and look for current problems to which they attach their pet
solutions.Hence,policycommunitiesandentrepreneursareessentialforthesuccessofapolicy
proposal(Kingdon,2011).
Policyentrepreneursmakeuseofavarietyof tactics toensure thesuccessfuladoptionof their
proposals.Themostimportantoneisthe‘softeninguptechnique’.Itinvolvesadvocatingfortheir
ideasinmanydifferentforumswhichsoftensupchangeresistantpolicycommunitiesandpublics
thatgetusedtonewideasandbuildacceptance.Whenanopportunityemergesthatallowsfor
pushing a proposal, theway has been paved.Without this procedure, a proposalmight fail to
27
succeed,evenwhenbeingpushedattherighttime(Kingdon,2011).Secondly,theirproposalswill
have an increased chance to survive whenmatching three criteria - technical feasibility, value
acceptability and anticipation of future constraints. Hence, a successful proposal is usually
softened-upandfulfilsthethreecriteria(Kingdon,2011).
3.1.2.3. Thepoliticalstream
Thepoliticalstreamconstitutesthebroaderenvironmentinwhichpolicyismade(Ackrill,Kay,&
Zahariadis,2013). It isassembledfrompartisan,electoralorpressuregroupfactors. Itsets itself
apartfromhappeningsinthepolicycommunitiesandfromtheproblemstream.Developmentsin
thepolitical streamaffect agendas,because theypossess thepower topushnew itemson the
agendawhileensuringthatotheritemsgetpostponed(Kingdon,2011).
Thefirstelementofthepoliticalstreamisthenationalmood13.Itispredicatedontheassumption
thatalargenumberofcitizensthinkalongthesamelines.Themoodcanchangefromtimetotime
and these changes can significantly impact on policy agendas and outcomes. Government
participants sense the nationalmood in order to promote items on their policy agenda and to
preventothersfrombecomingprominentbypushingthemintoobscurity.Therefore,changesin
thenationalmoodaffecttheadministration’ssuccessincreatingnewproposals.Themooddoes
not necessarily evolve from the masses, but can come from anywhere. For instance, social
movements can change the mood when being effectively organized and leaded. Successful
movements can spill into the general public and eventually have electoral impact. As a result,
politiciansoftenjumponthebandwagonwhichcanadduptothekindofshiftinthenationalmood.
Consequently,amoodshift canmakecertainproposalsviable thatwerenotviablebefore,and
outweighalternativeproposals(Kingdon,2011).
The second element of the political stream refers to organized political forces. Kingdonmainly
focusesoninterestgroups.However,intheGermansystem,partiesandtheirspokespersonswho
areoftenrepresentedaspoliticalelitesneedtobeincludedaswell.Theymightbemoreoutspoken
and influential inGermanythan intheUSbecausethemulti-partysystemallowsfortheirwider
involvementinthepolicy-makingprocess.Inthisconnection,HillcriticizesKingdonforunderplaying
thedimensionofpoliticsintheagenda-settingprocess(Hill,2013).Furthermore,isimportantto
understandthatthoseforcescreatetheenvironment inwhichpoliticaldecisionmakershaveto
balancebetweenthepro-andcontraargumentsonagivenproposalortheriseofanagendaitem.
13Pleasenote:Nationalmoodandpublicopinioncanbeusedinterchangeablythroughoutthispaper.
28
People around and in the government, sense the interplay of support and opposition through
communicationflows(Kingdon,2011).Whileinthepolicystreamconsensusismainlybuiltthrough
persuasion,thepoliticalstreamisdominatedbybargaining(Kingdon,2011).
Thethirdelementiscomposedofeventswithinthegovernmentsuchasturnoversofkeypersonnel
and questions of jurisdictions. The turnover of personnelmight lead to the generation of new
prioritiesonto theagenda.Thequestionof jurisdiction,on theotherhand, concerns itselfwith
constitutions,statueschartersandregulations.Inthisrespect,agendasettingisaffectedbytheturf
battlesofadministrativeagenciesandcommittees(Kingdon,2011).Concluding,thenationalmood,
politicalforcesandeventswithingovernmentcomposethepoliticalstream.
3.1.3. Policywindowsandtheroleofcoupling
Next, the role and functioning of policywindows and coupling needs to be explained. A policy
window is “the result of an iterative process between problems, solutions, actors and events.”
(Natali,2004,p.1080).Whenpolicywindowsopen,thecouplingofthethreestreamsismostlikely
tohappen.Hence,aproblemisdefined,asolutioniscreatedandpushedbyanentrepreneurand
a political change provides the right time for policy change. It describes the moment when
proposals are linked to political exigencies, and alternatives are introduced once the agenda
changes.Inthisrespect,itisimportanttorecognizethatthewindowisonlyopenforashorttime
periodduringwhich thedifferent streams joinandarecoupled.Thenentrepreneurspush their
problem conceptions, political forces andproposals into the choiceopportunity. Theoutcomes
dependonhowtheelementsaremixedandcoupled.Theagendaismorelikelytobeaffectedby
thepoliticalandtheproblemsstreamwhilethealternativesareinfluencedbythepolicystream.
Therefore,awindowopensbecauseofanewproblemwhichcapturesattentionorbecauseofa
shiftinthepoliticalstreamsuchasachangeofadministration,apoliticalturnoverorachangein
thenationalmood(Kingdon,2011).Itisimportanttobeawarethatwindowscanbeofpredictable
of unpredictable nature. In the unpredictable case the joining is accidental and forces the
governmenttomoveonedirectionortheother(Kingdon,2011).Hence,theappearanceofapolicy
windowcancausesignificantconsequences.
29
3.2. LiteratureReview
The intellectual impact of Kingdon’s agenda-setting theory has been discussed widely. Many
researchers(partly)appliedhismodelanddeemeditasausefultoolcompatiblewithavarietyof
policyarenas(Baumgartner,2015;Sabatier,2007).Nevertheless,itisarguedthatthemodellacks
clarityandinternalconsistency(Sabatier,2007).OnepossiblereasonisthatKingdononlyfocuses
ontheagenda-settingprocess intheUS.However,scholarsarguethatoneshouldnotholdthis
againsthim,becauseheprovidesageneral,usefultoolkittoexplaincontextualchange(Ackrill,Kay,
&Zahariadis,2013;Hill,ThePublicPolicyProcess,2013).CarineyandZahariadisperceivetheMSF
as a lens that explains US policy under the conditions of ambiguity. In their opinion its major
strength lies in providing an insight in interactions between institutions and agency (Cairney&
Zhariadis,2016).Inthisregard,themodelexplainsthewaythepolicyprocessworksin“’organized
anarchies’,where there isashifting rosterofparticipants,opaquetechnologies,and individuals
withunclearpreferences”(Cairney&Zhariadis,2016,para.1).
The literature review provides a discussion of elements of the MSF that seem to be relevant
accordingtothesituationanalysisandaccordingtoimportantscholarsinthefield.
Figure 6: A Multiple Streams Model of Policymaking (Gagnon & Labonte, 2013)
30
3.2.1. Thenatureofpolicychange
Atfirst,itiscrucialtoaddressageneraldebatesurroundingtheMSFthatisofimportancetothis
casestudy–thequestionswhetherpolicychangesoccurinanincrementaloranabruptmanner.
On the one hand, Lindblom claims that policy change occurs in small incremental steps. They
proceedfromsmall,marginaladjustmentsmadebypolicymakerswhosebehaviourhedescribes
as‘muddlingthrough’(Lindbloem,1959).Kingdonagreeswiththenon-rationaldecisionmaking,
butdisagreeswithLindblomonthefactthatpolicyproceedsinorderlystages.Hearguesthatthe
generationofalternativescanberegardedasanincrementalprocess,butthatthisdoesnotapply
toagendachangeswhichhappen inanon-incrementalanddiscontinuousway (Kingdon,2011).
ThisviewissupportedbyBaumgartnerandJoneswhoclaimthatpublicattentiontosocialissues
cannot be described as being incremental. Here, they refer to the public agenda which often
experiences dramatic sudden agenda changes evoked by negative feedback in agenda-setting
processesandpolitics.Withtheirtheoryof‘punctuatedequilibria’,theyclaimthatlargeshiftsoccur
inwhich the agenda is resetmore radically after it experiencedaperiodof stability andminor
adaptations(Jones&Baumgartner,2005).ThistheoryisdevelopedfurtherbyCapoccia&Kelemen
whorefertocriticaljunctures.Inthecontextofpath-dependentprocesses,criticaljuncturesare
short moments during which agent choices encounter an increased probability to affect the
outcome of interest. Hence, agents havemore freedom in decision-making. It is important to
recognizethatthedecisionsmadewithinacriticaljuncturemayevokeapath-dependentprocess
(Capoccia&Kelemen,2007).Thesituationanalysissuggeststhelikelihoodofacriticaljuncturein
combinationwithapath-dependentsequence;however,thedetailsneedtobeinvestigatedinthe
datacollectionprocess.
3.2.2. Contextual factors: Decision making during times of crisis and in multi-levelstructures
Whentherefugee influx increased inGermany, thegovernmentneededtomakedecisionsthat
wereaffectedbyacrisisandbymulti-leveldiplomacy.Thosecontextualfactorswhichinfluencethe
problemandthepolicystreamaredisregardedbytheMSF.
3.2.2.1. Decisionmakinginacrisismode
Acrisismightchangethenatureandoperationalproceduresofthepolicystream.Asthesituation
analysissuggestsGermanyfounditselfinacrisismode.Inhisbook,Kingdonreferstotheopening
ofpolicywindowsthroughcrises,buthedoesnotrefertothecircumstancesofpolicy-makingin
crisissituations.Rather,heassumesthatpolicyentrepreneursandpolicy-makershavesufficient
31
time to flesh out one ofmany solutions to a problem. However, according to literaturemore
complex policy windows such as those caused by a crisis might change the decision-making
proceduresandthereforethenatureofthepolicystreamasaprimevalsoupaswellasthenature
ofpolicyentrepreneurs.
Firstofall,itisimportanttodefinecrisisandthecircumstancesthataccompanythepeopledealing
withit.Acrisisis“aseriousthreattothebasicstructuresorthefundamentalvaluesandnormsof
asystem,whichundertimepressureandhighlyuncertaincircumstancesnecessitatesmakingvital
decisions.”(Rosenthal,Charles,&t'Hart,1989,p.10).Itiscomposedofthreeelements–threat,
uncertaintyandurgency.Threatalonedoesnotnecessarily leadtoaction(e.g.climatechange);
however, it is timecompression thaturges leaders toact.Timeconstraintsalsosignify that the
usual policy-making methods of debating and selecting the most suitable proposal cannot be
applied.Moreover,thefactthatdecisionsareoftenhighlyconsequentialwhileinvolvingdilemmas
anduncertaintiesaboutfuturedevelopmentsrequiresleaderstobediscrete.Furthermore,during
crises,citizenslookattheirleaders,becausetheyexpectthemtominimizethedamageofthecrisis
andeliminatethethreat(Boinetal.,2005).Thus,leadersfacetheresponsibility“tohelpsafeguard
societyfromtheadverseconsequencesofthecrisis”andguidethenationoutofthecrisis(Boinet
al.,2005,p.10).Thesecircumstancesforceleaderstoactquicklyandoftenonlyunderconsultation
ofaveryclosegroupofdecisionmakers(Boinetal.,2005).
This unusual manner of decision making contradicts the MSF model in three ways. Firstly, it
providespolitical leaderswithmorepowerthanindicatedbyKingdon.Inhisbook,Kingdononly
devotesasmallsectionto‘thepresident’.Inthisconnection,heindicatesthatthepresidentcan
settheagendasinglehandedlyandthathisbillstakethefirstspotinthequeue.However,healso
statesthatthepresidentisunabletodominatetheseriousalternativesandthereforetodetermine
thepolicyoutcome(Kingdon,2011).Though,literaturesuggeststhatleaderstakeonkeydecision
makingrolesduringcrises.Also,thesituationanalysismakesusbelievethatChancellorMerkel,as
aleader,hadacrucialroleinthepolicydebate.However,becauseKingdondoesnotrefertopolicy-
makingincrisissituations,heunderestimatesthepotentialpowerofpoliticalleaders.
Secondly,thereisreasontobelievethatpolicycommunitieshavealessimportantroleindecision
makingduringcrises.Thefactthatleadersneedtomakequickanddiscretedecisionsimpliesthat
alternativesarenotbeingchosenafterbeingdiscussed inofficial forumsorpolicycommunities
attendedbypolicyentrepreneurs.Ifthiswastrue,thenthepolicystreamasdescribedbyKingdon
mightnotapplytoacrisissituationliketheoneweareanalysing.
32
Thirdly,connectedtobothpreviouspointsistheassumptionthatpoliticalleadersmightactaskey
decisionmakersandaspolicyentrepreneursatthesametime.Originally,policyentrepreneursare
thecrucialmeansofproducingactionwhilecraftingcontestablemeaningwhichtheydisseminate
topolicymakers(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).They influencepolicychangebychoosingthe
alternativesdecisionmakerscanpickfrom(Kingdon,2011).Whendecisionmakersbecomepolicy
entrepreneurs they potentially develop and choose their own policy solutions. In contrast to
Kingdon’sunderstanding,thismeansthattheypossessthepowertosteerthedirectionofpolicy
outcomes (Zahariadis N. , 2008). This option is widely discussed even in relation to non-crisis
scenarios.Accordingtoscholars,therearedifferentreasonswhythoserolescanblur.Ackrill,Kay,
&Zahariadis(2013)whoclaimthatEUdecision-makingtakesplaceinanenvironmentdominated
byambiguitysuggestthatpolicyentrepreneursmustbeseenintheircontextinordertoapprehend
theirinfluenceinpolicychange.Politicalactorsarerationalandself-determiningwhileoperatingin
particular contexts. For this reason, they might engage in “creative policy-making strategies”
(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013,p.14).Anotherreasonwhythelinebetweendecisionmakersand
policyentrepreneursmightblurisconnectedtothecrisisscenario.Certainpolicyissueswhichare
salientinpolicywindowsmightbesocomplexthattheydemandauniquesolutionanddonotleave
muchroomtomanoeuvreforentrepreneurialagency.Thesameappliestowindowsthatcreate
short-term,time-pressuredpoliticalagendas(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Inthisrespect,the
generalassumptionisthat‘somethingneedstobedone’(Ackrill&Kay,2011).Here,itisthenature
of thepolicywindow that forcesdecisionmakers to create and choose apolicy solutionwhich
makesthembecomepolicyentrepreneurs(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Hence,Ackrill&Kay
claim that the separation between policy entrepreneurs and decisionmakers as suggested by
Kingdon is too stark. They recommend to draw an analytical distinction between the policy
entrepreneurs as individuals and the process describing policy entrepreneurship (Ackrill & Kay,
2011).Whenconsideringpolicyentrepreneurshipasasetofbehaviours,ratherthanapermanent
characteristic,itallowsforbetterapprehensionofactionsmadeincertainpolicy-makingsituations
(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Concluding,thequestionwhetherthepolicystreamchangesits
natureundertheinfluenceofacrisisneedstobeaddressedintheresearch.
3.2.2.2. Multi-leveldiplomacy
Thesituationanalysis shows that thepolitical struggle related to the refugeecrisisdidnotonly
include the national decision-making level, but also the European level. However, Kingdon’s
frameworklackstheinclusionofmulti-levelstructuresandtwo-levelgames,sincepolicysolutions
are largely produced domestically in his framework (Cairney & Zhariadis, 2016). Hence, the
33
questionwhether outside factors and decisionmaking in the context of amulti-level structure
affectsthethreestreamsinthenationalsettingneedstobeaddressed.
Atthispoint,onemustacknowledgethatissuesaswellasresponsesinformofdecision-making
processeshavebecomemoreglobalsincethefirsttimetheMSFwaspublished.Inrespecttothe
refugeecrisis,Rosenauwouldarguethatitisatypicalexampleforanissuethatinterlinksdomestic
and international affairs and therefore requires global response. When dynamics such as the
occurrenceofwarsshift,thentheconsequencesofthosedevelopmentswillaffecteverylevelof
community–fromtheprovincialtotheinternationallevel(Rosenau,1995).Inthisrespect,modern
criseshavebecomeincreasinglycomplexbydisregardingcommonboundariesbutincludingdeep
additionalproblemsandprolongedimpacts(Rosenthal1998;‘tHartandBoin2001inBoin&t'Hart,
2003).Forthisreason,theyrequireresponsesinformofcontrolmechanismsthatreachbeyond
nationalboundaries.Thistranslatesintointernationalsystems,suchastheEuropeanUnion,which
diminishnationalentitiesandtheextensionoflocalmechanisms.Insum,whengovernmentscreate
nationalpolicies,theywillincreasinglyclashwithinternationalframeworkswhocreatepoliciesthat
lieoutsidethelegalstateframeworks(Rosenau,1995).Therefore,aglobalissuemightaffectthe
threestreamsofnationalpolicy-making.
AnothertheorythatsupportsRosenauisStephenson’sMulti-LevelGovernancetheory.Itregards
theEUasamultilevelstructureandreferstothenotionthatmemberstatesengageindispersed
policymaking activity which involves multiple actors (institutions and individuals) at different
political levels. Although there are geographical separation and spatial distinctions, there is an
intimateentanglementbetweentheinternationalandthedomesticlevelsofauthority.Atitsheart
liesthecommunityandself-governancewhicharerepresentedinpoliticalpartiesandthepublic
opinion(Stephenson,2013).Theseframeworksillustratetheinfluencesondecisionmakinginthe
EuropeanUnionon anational and an international level.However, theMSF remains limited in
specifyingthiscontextandthedescribedlinks(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).
Therefore, it also disregards policy practices, such as two-level games. They involve the
engagementofstaterepresentativesinnegotiationsattheinternationallevelinordertoreacha
tentativeagreement.Meanwhile,theyengageinseparatediscussionsatthenationallevelinorder
to decide whether to ratify the agreements. In addition, states can degrade or improve their
bargaining positions by offering small or large win-sets (Putnam, 1988). Thus, international
positionsareinfluencedbydomesticpoliticsandtheotherwayaround.Thismightbeanimportant
factorofconsiderationwhenapplyingtheMSF.
34
Inconclusion, ifdecisionmaking isembedded inaspecialcontextsuchasacrisissituationora
multi-levelstructure,itistobeexpectedthatthepolicystreamchangesitsoriginalnature.Towhat
extentandinwhatwaythisisthecaseneedstobeinvestigatedwithinthiscasestudy.Also,the
questions if and how those contexts affect the problem and the political stream should be
addressedbythisresearch.
3.2.3. Participantinteractionandverbalpowerinthepoliticalstream
Literature challenges Kingdon’s description of the political stream in several ways. To clarify,
Kingdon says that the political stream consists of shifts in the nationalmood, the influence of
political forces and political turnovers. In general, he refers to the institutional power of those
forces.However,scholarsbelievethatparticipantsinthepoliticalstreammightberatherpowerful
throughtheirverbalpowerandinteractionprocesseswitheachother.Boinetal.suggestthatin
crisissituationspoliticalactors14,massmediaandthecitizenryformatriangularrelationship(see
Figure7).Here,communicationbetweencitizensandgovernmentsismediatedandtransmittedby
massmedia in a contextwhere all other political actors try to persuademedia to convey their
opinionsandinformationtothepublic.Allconstituentsofthisrelationshipsend,receiveandabsorb
information on the crisis. This enhances their influence on theway the crisis is perceived and
managed.Thewaytheydosodependsontheirroleandpositionintheinstitutionalcontext(Boin
etal.,2005).Also,thesituationanalysissuggeststhatMerkel,themediaandthepubliccreatedthe
‘Willkommenskultur’by interactingwithandinfluencingeachother.Theirmutualagreementon
thesituationmostlikelylegitimizedMerkel’srefugeepolicyapproach.
Therearevarioustheoriesthatbuildonthistriangularrelationshipbydescribinghowthedifferent
participants interact with each other. They include discursive institutionalism, themobilization
modelandpolicyevaluation.Accordingtodiscursiveinstitutionalism,Kingdonfailstodescribehow
14includinggovernment,politicalpartiesaswellasnon-governmentalactorsandwhatKingdonreferstoasinterestgroups
Politicalactors Thepublic
Themedia
Issue
Figure 7: Triangular relationship between the media, political actors and the public
35
politiciansseektoinfluencethepublicopinionwhileatthesametimelookingforitsapproval.Itis
whatSchmidtcalls‘thecommunicativediscourse’(SchmidtV.A.,2008,p.310).Here,politicians
engagewiththegeneralpublicwiththepurposeofpresentation,legitimationanddeliberationof
political ideas. It is considered a mass process of public persuasion of political actors who
communicateandframetheprogramsandideasgeneratedamongpolicy-makers.Italsoinvolves
otheractors,suchasoppositionparties,activists,expertsandthemediawhocommunicatetheir
reactionstogovernmentpolicies.Meanwhile,thegeneralpublicrespondstothesuggestedpolicies
viagrass-rootsorganizationsandmobilizations,aswellasopinionpollsandsurveysetc.(Schmidt
V.A.,2008).ThemobilizationmodelofCobbetal.makessimilarassumptionsaddingthatpolicy
implementationisoftencontingentonbehaviourchangesandpublicacceptance(Cobb,Ross,&
Ross,1967).Inrespecttocrisissituations,Boinetal.saythatitisimportantthatpoliticalleaders
provide‘meaning’tothecrisisinawaythatthecrisismanagementeffortsareenhanced(Boinet
al.,2005,p.13).Inordertodoso,theymustbeperceivedasatrustworthyandcrediblesourceof
information.Onlywhentheyaretrusted,theirwordsandactionsareperceivedascompetentand
sincere(Boinetal.,2005).Again,thesituationanalysissuggeststhatespeciallyMerkelprovided
meaningtothecrisisinawaythatlegitimizedthechangeintheGermanrefugeepolicy.
Anotherformofinteractionnexttocommunicativediscourseispolicyevaluation.Itisdifferentto
what Kingdon calls policy feedback, because it can be highly subjective. Political actors embed
policyevaluation in the regularpolitical debateand include themedia and thewiderpublic. In
Germany policy evaluation can be observed in almost every 8 o’clock news show in form of
interviews or statements of politicians (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15). It usually focuses on
intendedresultsofpoliciesandtheirunintendedconsequenceandoften includespublicblame-
games (Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2007). This goes hand in hand with Stone’s conception that
politiciansusedifferentcausalexplanationstoassignresponsibilitytoproblems(Stone,2012).It
hasbeenobservedinthesituationanalysisonthenationallevelbetweenpoliticalpartiesandthe
government;andontheEuropeanlevelbetweenmemberstatesandtheEuropeaninstitutions.In
general,policyevaluationreferstotheattemptofpoliticalactorstopubliclyinfluencethepolicy-
makingprocess.
ThosemodelsrequiredeviationfromtheKingdonmodelinseveralways.First,withinthepolitical
stream,Kingdonreferstotheinstitutionalpowerthepublicopinionandpoliticalforcesexerton
theagendaandthepolicy-makingprocess.However,hedoesnotrefertotheverbalpowerandthe
interactionprocessesoftheseactors.Theaforementionedtheoriessuggestthattheverbalpower
36
andtheinteractionprocessesbetweenmedia,politicalactorsandthepublicmightplayacrucial
roleandshouldbetakenintoconsideration.
Thisrequiresthemediatoberegardedpartofthepoliticalstream.Accordingtotheory,themedia
mightserveasacrucialactorandmediatorinthepoliticalstreamwhileattemptingtoinfluence
occurrencesinthepolicystream.Also,thesituationanalysissuggeststhatthemediawereactively
participatinginthepoliticalprocess.AccordingtoKingdon,themediahavethepowertoaffectthe
publicagendaandshapeissues;however,healsostatesthatthemediaareunabletoaffectthe
policyagenda.Thisisduetothefactthatthatthemediaserveasmessengerandnotasshaperor
creator of messages by simply reporting on the processes in government. He denies their
independent effect on governmental agendas (Kingdon, 2011). In contrast, other researchers
attributemore importancetothemediaandrefertotheirverbalpower(Walgrave&vanAelst,
2006).For instance,Downs(1972)claimsthatthemedia influencetheextenttowhichan issue
wouldtracktheissue-attentioncycle.Moreover,Hillstatesthatthemethodsandtimingofproblem
reporting affect the political attention these problems receive. Additionally, he claims that the
mediashapeideasonthepolicyagendabypromotingsomeperspectivesandexcludingothersand
byhighlightingsimplerideasratherthanthemorecomplexones(Hill,2013).Baumgartnerbuilds
onthistheorybyarguingthateachtimemediainterestinatopicishigh,onecanexperiencesome
degreeofpolicychange(Baumgartner&Jones,2009).Thus,otherresearchersassignmorethan
just amessenger role to themediaby assuming their tactical reporting and framingof events.
Hence,duringtheresearch,ithastobeinvestigatedwhetherthemediaisanactiveparticipantin
thepoliticalstreamwhileexertinginfluenceonthepolicyagenda.
Thirdly,thepublicopinionmightbemorepowerfulthanindicatedbyKingdon.Heclarifiesthatthe
publicopinioncanindirectlythrustissuesontheagendabyencouragingvote-seekingpoliticiansto
engageintoatopic.Inaddition,hesaysthatpublicopinioncandirectgovernmentorconstrainthe
governmentfromcertainactions.Yet,hedoesnotdescribehowitisabletodoso.Kingdonalso
explainsthattherearelimitationstotheinfluenceofthepublicopinion,becauseimportantpolitical
spheresareinvisibletothepublic;andthepublicopinionisrarelyinformedenoughtoinfluencea
debate among policy specialists (Kingdon, 2011). However, the situation analysis raises the
assumption thatMerkelwas able tomake certain decisions, because her attitude towards the
refugeequestionreceivedsupportfromabigpartofthepublic(oftenreflectedinthemedia).Thus,
thepublicapprovalmighthavelegitimizedheractionsassuggestedbythemobilizationmodeland
communicativediscourse.
37
Thisisconnectedtothefourthpoint–thefactthatpoliticalactorsseektoinfluencepublicopinion
forvariousreasons.Kingdonsaysthatpoliticalactorstrytosensepublicopinion(Kingdon,2011).
Also,hestatesthatpublicopinion“may,insomeimportantrespects,beanechoofeventsatthe
governmental level” (Kingdon,2011,p.149);however,hedoesnot indicatethatpoliticalactors
activelyseektoinfluencepublicopinionfortheirpurposes.Yet,contemporaryliteraturebelieves
thatthisisthecase.Asstatedabove,crisismanagementliteraturebelievesthatifgovernmental
actors successfully frame the nature of a crisis, they hold the key to define the appropriate
resolutionstrategies.Forthisreason,theyneedtoinfluenceordirecttheopinionsandbehaviorof
the citizenry (Boin et al., 2005). Interestingly, the situation analysis suggests that this was
elaborately done by Chancellor Merkel. Communicative discourse and the mobilization model
describethesamephenomenonfornon-crisissituations.Evenregardinggenericpolicydecisions
political actors seek for agreement and approval of the public. This shows that Kingdonmight
underestimatethefactthatthepublicopinionispotentiallyshapedbypoliticalactorsinawaythat
theycanachievetheirgoals.Concluding,theinfluenceofverbalinteractionofdifferentparticipants
inthepoliticalstreamoneachotherandonthepolicydecisionsneedstobeinvestigatedduring
theprocess-tracingprocedure.
3.3. Conclusionofthetheorysection
The thorough explanation of the MSF shows that the model is elaborate, detailed and highly
abstract inmanyways reflecting on the chaotic and unpredictable nature of the public policy-
makingprocess.ThediscussionofthetheoryillustratedthepossibilitythattheMSFmighthaveto
beadjustedwhenbeingappliedtothecaseofthispaper.Severalelementsthatwerediscussed
needtobetakenintoconsiderationduringthedatacollectionprocess.
1. Thedebatewhetherpolicychangeoccursinincrementalwaysorinanabruptfashionthrough
punctuatedequilibriaorcriticaljuncturesincombinationwithapath-dependentdevelopment
needstobeaddressed.
2. Iwill need topayattention towhetherpolicy-making in the contextof a crisis changes the
natureofthepolicystream.Inthisregard,itisimportanttoconsiderthespecialcircumstances
ofurgencyanddiscretionunderwhichleadersneedtomaketheirdecisions.Therefore,italso
needstoberesearchedwhetherpolicycommunitiesreallyhavethechancetoinfluencethe
policy-makingprocess.Thisisconnectedtothequestionwhetherdecisionmakerscanactas
policyentrepreneursandwhetherpolicyentrepreneurshipshouldratherberegardedasaset
ofbehavioursthanasapermanentcharacteristic.
38
3. Decision making that is affected by global issues and multi-level structures also needs
examination.Next to crisis circumstances, this is an areawhichhas not been addressedby
Kingdon’sMSF.Theeffectofthosecontextualfactorsonthethreestreamsinanationalsetting
needstobeexplored.
4. Finally, the research needs to address the verbal power and the influence of interaction
betweendifferentparticipantsinthepoliticalstream.Thetheorythatthemedia,politicalactors
and the public form a triangular relationship which includes flows of communication,
interactionandinfluenceasdescribedbycommunicativediscourse,themobilizationmodeland
policyevaluationneedstobeexploredandspecified.Thisisalsoconnectedtothedebatewhich
rolethemediaplayinthepolicy-makingprocess.Additionally,Iwillhavetopayattentionto
thequestionswhetherthepublicopinionlegitimizesgovernmentalactionandwhetherpolitical
actorsactivelyinfluencepublicopinion.
InthefollowingchapterIwillexplainhowIwillcollectdatawiththeprocess-tracingmethodand
theKingdonmodelasabackbone.Forthedatacollectionitself,Iwillneedtopayattentiontowhat
other researchers have added to or criticized in regard to theMSFmodel. The results will be
recorded in the Findings Chapter which will conclude with a diagnosis on how well the MSF
describesthepolicychangeintheGermanrefugeepolicy.Subsequently,Iwillcomparemyresults
totheDutchcaseandseewhethertheyapplytoanothercasestudy.
39
4. |Chapter4:DataCollectionandMethods
Themodel I amgoing touse inorder to testwhetherand inwhatwaychangeoccurred in the
Germanrefugeepolicyin2015istheMultipleStreamsFramework.Thischapterdefineshowthe
threestreamsandtheincludingconceptsthatconstitutetheMSFwillbemeasuredandinwhich
dimension. I will base these indications on the definitions in the theory and in the literature
sections.Moreover,IwillindicatethedatasourcesthatIamgoingtouse.Eventually,Iwillelaborate
ontheresearchapproachanddesign.
Thethreestreamsarecomposedofdifferentelementswhichillustrateconceptsthatneedtobe
researched.Theirdefinitioncanbefoundinthetheorysection.
4.1. Keyconcepts,measurementanddatasources
The problem stream consists of indicators, focusing events and policy feedback. Also, theway
problemsaredefinedandframedbypolitical,governmentalandnon-governmentalactorsplaysan
importantrole.Atthisjuncture,Iwillpayattentiontowhethervalues,comparisonsorcategories
influencetheproblemdefinitionasKingdonsuggests. Iwill focusondefinite15anddesignative16
statementsofthoseactorsaccordingtoToulmin’s“classificationofthesortsofclaimsthatcanbe
madeinarguments”(Toulmin,1958,inDryzekandBerejikian,1993,p.51).Onesourceforthose
statementswillbetheARDeveningnews,Tagesschau,duetothefactthattelevisionisthemost
popularnewsmediumforGermans.TheTagesschauhasthehighestviewingratewith10million
viewersdaily(Tagesschau,2016;SchmidtH.,2015).Additionally,interviewsandpublicstatements,
pressreleasesandconferencesandpoliticaldebateswillserveasdatasources.
Furthermore,Iwillpayattentiontofocusingeventswhichgenerateattentionandpossiblycausea
window tobeopened.Also, indicatorswhichoftencomplement thoseeventswill be regarded,
becausetheyprovideanunderstandingofaproblem’smagnitude(Kingdon,2011).Iwilllookfor
thoseevents and indicators in theTagesschaunews17. TheTagesschau isusually veryaccurate,
timelyandpositionitselfasbeingindependentformpoliticalandeconomicinterest(ARD,2016).I
willanalyseeverynewsshowinthetimeframestatedbelow.Lastly,Iwillpayattentiontopolicy
feedbackwhichincludesthetechnicalproofthatapolicyprogrammedoesnotworkthewayitwas
intendedto.
15definitive=concerningthemeaningofterms16designative=concerningquestionsoffact17TheTagesschauisthenewsshowofGermany’sfirstpublicTVchannel,ARD.
40
Concerning thepolicy stream, Iwill considerpolicy communities andpolicy entrepreneurswho
develop ideas and push them at a window opening. They will be defined as political and
governmentalactors,suchastheChancellor’staffandministries,bureaucrats,politicalpartiesand
theirspokespeople,aswellasNGO’sandthinktanks ifavailable. Iwill focusontheir ideasand
suggestions that can illustrate policy solutions and alternatives. According to Toulmin, those
statementsshouldbeadvocative18andevaluative19(Toulmin,1958,inDryzekandBerejikian,1993).
Furthermore,as literaturesuggests Iwillalsopayattentiontothemulti-levelstructure.For this
reason,IwillincludetheEuropeanagendaandstatementsofEuropeanactorsincludingmember
state leaders inregardstoGermanyandtherefugeecrisis.Furthermore, Ineedtoconsiderthe
circumstancesofdecisionmakinginacrisismodeifapplicable.Toretrievethisdata,Iwillmakeuse
of theTagesschaunews, interviewsandpublic statements, press releases and conferences and
politicaldebates.
Withrespecttothepoliticalstream,Iwillconsiderthepublicopinion,statementsofpoliticalactors
andinterestgroups,mediainvolvement,turnoverofkeypersonnelandquestionsofjurisdiction.In
ordertosensethepublicopinion,Iwillpayattentiontoofficialpollsandmediareferencesto,for
instance,protests.Inordertoseewhetherliteratureisrightaboutthepresence,interactionand
influenceofthetriangularrelationship,Ineedtopayattentiontoacoupleoffactors.First,Iwill
analyseevaluativestatementsofpoliticalactorsandinterestgroupsinreferencetothesuggested
policysolutionorformerpolicieswhichshouldreflectpolicyevaluation(Toulmin,1958,inDryzek
andBerejikian,1993).Here,Ialsowatchoutforblamegamesamongpoliticians.Iwilllookforthem
inthemedia,debatesandpressstatements.Secondly,Iwillanalysethepresenceandtheroleof
themedia inthepoliticalstream.Here, Iwillpayattentiontowhetherandhowcommunicative
discourse20 occurs between themedia, the public andpolitical actors. Again, themedia, public
debatesandpress-statementswillserveassources.Inthisconnection,Iwillneedtofocusonthe
questionwhetherpoliticalactorsactivelyinfluencethepublicopinionandwhetherpublicopinion
legitimizesgovernmentalactioninreturn.
4.2. Researchapproachanddesign
ThisstudywillbeconductedasaqualitativecasestudywiththeGermanrefugeepolicyillustrating
thecaseofresearch.Withinthecase,theMSFwillbeappliedtothreemainpoliticaldecisionsthat
shouldreflecttheoverallchangethatGermanyexperiencedinitsrefugeepolicyin2015.Thus,the
18advocative=somethingthatshouldorshouldnotexist19evaluative=concernstheworthofsomethingwhichdoesorcouldexist 20asdefinedinliterature
41
three decisions occurring in a path-dependent fashion are the main reasons why Germany
absorbed890.000refugeesin2015.Generally,theMSFservesasskeletonstructureforgathering
researchdata.
Thestudyisdescriptiveincludingexploratoryelementsandaimsattestingandgeneratingtheory.
Firstly, thedescriptivenaturepredominates,because itdocumentsacausalprocess(clarifyinga
sequenceofstagesorsteps)andreportsonthecontextandbackgroundofasituation(Neuman,
2014). However, while exploring patterns of empirical facts, there is a great overlap between
descriptionandexploration(Toshkov,2016).SincetheMSFhasneverbeenappliedtotheGerman
refugeecrisis, thisresearchformulatesquestionsfor futureresearchandexploresnewterritory
(Neuman,2014).Ithasthereforeexploratoryelements.Secondly,itreflectsanunusualresearch
processwhichaimsattheorytestingandtheorygeneration.AtthebeginningoftheresearchIhad
plannedtosimplyapplytheMSFtothisparticularcase;however,throughouttheresearchprocess
the goal of applying themodel soon shifted to testing themodel. This is due to the fact that
inconsistenciesweredetectedintheliteraturereviewandwhenapplyingthemodeltothecase.
Thetheorytestingpart requiredadeductiveresearchapproach.However,since Ialsoaimedat
generatingtheorybypotentiallycomplementingMSF,theresearchispartiallyinductive.Thismixed
approachwillshowinconstantlygoingbackandforthbetweenempiricalfindingsandtheory.
Tolimittheresearch,Ihaveappliedarealistictimeframe.Thethreepoliticaldecisionsofanalysis
occurredbetweenAugust25andSeptember13,2015.Sourceswillbeanalysedindepthinthat
time-frame. However, in order to retrieve a coherent picture, the three decisions cannot be
detachedfromthebiggertimeline.TherefugeeissuestartedtooccupytheGermanpublicagenda
atthebeginningofAugust,2015.InAugust,therewasnosingledaywithoutnewsreportingonthe
refugeetopic(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15).Forthisreason,IwillcollectfindingsfromAugust
1untilSeptember17,2015.Thetimeframeofanalysisexceedsthelastdecision,becausepolitical
decisionsareoftenanalysedretrospectively.Inthisway,Imakesurenottomissoutonvaluable
information.
The applicable research method that is used for this purpose is process tracing. It builds on
mechanisticexplanationsthatidentifycausesandeffectsaswellasthecausalpathsthatlinkthem.
Ittriestoexplainhowthecauseinfluencestheeffect(policychange)“bytracingthelinksofthe
causalchainortheinteractionsoftheelementsofamechanisticmodel”(Toshkov,2016,p.150).
Causal paths usually specify a sequence of events because mechanisms often unfold in time
(Toshkov,2016).Bydisentanglingthedifferentmechanismsthatmightproduceachange inthe
42
dependentvariableprocesstracinghelpsformulatingexpectationsaboutintermediatestepsthat
takeplace in thecausalchainofevents (Bennett&George,2006).Additionally,process tracing
facilitates the definition of observable and fine-grained implications of causal processes and
outcome.Thisenables researchers to testmultiplehypothesesandestablishcausality (Panke in
Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). Therefore, the process-tracing method often avoids using
explanatoryhypothesesthatonlyinvestigateonecause-effectrelationship.
Theprocess-tracingmethod fits theapplicationof theMSFon the refugeecrisisdue tovarious
features itpossesses.Firstly,process tracingattempts to investigateanactor’s informationand
motivationandkeepsacloseproximitytothesubjects.Itaimsatinvestigatingwhatactorswant,
whatkindofideastheyhaveandwhattheircapabilitiesaretoachievetheirgoals.TheMSF,onthe
otherhand, is amodelwhich receives its input fromvarious actors and their actions (Toshkov,
2016).Inthisrespect,themodelandthemethodsuiteachother.Secondly,processtracingisalso
usedtorecovertheinstitutionalcontextwhileitreconstructsthechronologyofeventsthatleadto
anoutcomeofinterest.ThisisrelevantfortheMSFbecauseitmovesinstreamswhoareboundto
orinfluencecertaininstitutionalcontexts(Toshkov,2016).Additionally,timeplaysacrucialfactor
inregardtowhenpolicywindowsopenandstreamsarecoupledtoprovokepolicychange.Thirdly,
likethestructureoftheMSF,processtracingasksforflexibilitywhileincludingeventsandgeneral
facts.Furthermore,itmediatesbetweenstructureandagencyandshiftsbackandforthbetween
theabstractandtheconcretewhilebuildingexplanatoryaccounts (Toshkov,2016). In thisway,
process tracingnotonlyanswers ‘why’,butalso ‘how-come’questions (Panke inExadaktylos&
Radaelli,2012).Concluding,theapplicationofprocesstracingontheMultipleStreamsModel is
reasonable as it provides the model with enough space for research and interpretation while
accepting thatapolicychange roots inacombinationof factors thatneed tocometogether in
ordertoproduceaneffect.
However,whenapplyingprocesstracingtoasinglecasestudytheinternalvalidityishighwhilethe
external validity in regards to generalizations is limited. Thus, Panke recommends to conduct
additionalcasestudiesinordertomakegeneralizationspossibleandenhancethepositiveeffect
producedbythehighinternalvalidity(PankeinExadaktylos&Radaelli,2012).Thisincreasesthe
valueofcomparingmyresearchfindingstotheresearchfindingsintheDutchcasestudyconducted
byLuciaOverpelt.
43
5. |Chapter5:FindingsThefindingssectionreflectsthemainoutcomesoftheprocess-tracingprocedureofthethreekey
politicaldecisionsthatillustrateapolicychangeintheGermanrefugeepolicy(seeFigure8).The
goalistoanalysethedecisionsthroughthelensofachronologicalreconstructionincombination
withtheMultipleStreamsFramework.Inthisway,Ihopetoanswerthesub-researchquestionby
explaininghowandwhytheGermanrefugeepolicychangedin2015.
Beforestartingwiththeanalysisofthefirsteventitiscrucialtoprovidesomecontext.Although
thefirsteventhappenedtowardstheendofAugust,itisimportanttoacknowledgethattherefugee
debateslowlyconqueredtheGermanpoliticalagendaattheendofJuly.Afteranalysingmultiple
Tagesschaueditions itbecameclear that theGreekdebtcrisisextensivelyoccupied theagenda
beforethatpointoftime.Duetoitscomplexity,itdidnotleavespaceforanotherpoliticaltopicto
bedebated(Faigle,Polke_Majewski,&Angeloudis,2015).Ultimately,theinevitableagendashift
coincidedwiththeincreasingnumberofrefugeesenteringGermanyinthesummerof2015(see
Figure9).
Figure 8: Important political decisions on German’s refugee policy in summer 2015
44
Figure 9: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016)
ItisalsoimportanttorealizethatseveralissueswererunningonGermany'spublicagendaatthe
sametimeasthethreeeventsofanalysis(seeFigure10).Theydirectlyandindirectlyinfluenced
theseevents.OneofthemainhappeningsisthatfromJulyonrefugeeswereenteringtheEUin
highernumbersthanbefore(UNHCR-E,2017).Fromthatmoment,themediacoveredrefugees
andtheproblemsthey facedontheir route. Itprovidedthe impressionthat theGermanmedia
‘werewalkingwiththerefugees'.Coveragestartedwiththeproblemsthemaincrowdswerefacing
in Turkey andGreece (especially the island Kos). They continuedwith reports from the Balkan
route21untilthefirstmasseseventuallyarrivedinGermany(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15).Also,
thewaydifferentcountriesrespondedtothedifferentrefugeewaves,suchassuchastheborder
closinginMacedoniaandtheconstructionofawallinHungary,werecovered(ARD,21.08.2015;
Zeit, 2015). Once the media started focusing on Germany, the struggles faced by refugees,
municipalities, the state and its administrations and civil society were reported (ARD Archiv,
01.08.15-17.09.15).
Furthermore, the debate on whether and how the European Union could install a common
EuropeanasylumpolicyandreplacethedysfunctionalDublinRegulationwasadominanttopicon
the German public and political agenda during that time (Hollande, F. andMerkel, A. in press
conference, 2015). German politicians blamed the non-acting of the EU for the increasing and
uncontrolledinfluxofrefugeestoGermany(Gabriel,2015).Hence,theGermanandtheEuropean
21Macedonia,Serbia,andHungary
45
politicalagendawereinterlinkedinregardstotherefugeecrisis.Thisreflectsamulti-levelstructure
assuggestedbyliterature.
Eventually,aphenomenonthatincreasedwiththehighnumberofrefugeesenteringGermanywas
right-wing violence towards
refugees and refugee
accommodations. From January
until July 2015, 202 attacks have
beenrecorded.Thoseoccurrences
wereextensivelycovered,debated
and condemned in public (ARD,
19.08.2015;ARDArchiv,01.08.15-
17.09.15,2015). In general, those
issuesoccupyingthepublicagenda
influencedandoftenmergedwith
the political agenda. Therefore,
they affected the three decisions
ofanalysis(seeFigure8).
5.1. DecisionNo.1:ThesuspensionoftheDublinSysteminGermany,August21–25,2015
5.1.1. ProblemStream
Beforefocusingontheelementsoftheproblemstream,oneshouldpayattentiontothewaythe
problem was defined by various actors. The problem leading to the suspension of the Dublin
RegulationinGermanywasthattheGermanauthoritieswereoverwhelmedwiththeregistration
andadministeringofrefugees(Alkousaaet.al,2016).Thiscausedlongwaitingperiodsforrefugees
in respect to their registration and for those who waited for granted asylum (Merkel, ZDF-
Sommerinterview 2015; Amann et al., 2015; ARD, 11.08.2015, 2015). In return, this led to
overcrowdedasylumcentresandashortageofaccommodation.Additionally,asylumseekersthat
were denied asylum stayed in reception centres for longer than necessary (Herrmann in ARD,
23.07.2015;ARD, 27.07.2015;Der Spiegel, 2015). Theway theproblemwasportrayeddiffered
amongpoliticians.Forinstance,theHomeSecretaryindicatedthatGermanyischallengedbutnot
Figure 10: What occupied the public agenda?
46
overwhelmedwhileMerkelstatedthateverythingcanbemanagedtogether(deMaizèreinARD,
11.08.2015;Merkel,ZDF-Sommerinterview2015).However,ViceChancellorGabrielpursuedaless
positivestancebymakingclearthatGermanywasindangertounderestimateitsbiggestchallenge
since the reunification (Gabriel, 2015). Hereby, he made use of an element of comparison to
accentuatehisproblemdefinition.Thus,theproblemwasportrayedinmultipleways.
Whenanalysing theproblemstream,oneneeds topayattention to threedifferentelements–
policyfeedback,indicatorsandfocusingevents.Intheweeksthatprecededthepolicydecisionof
analysis,policyfeedbackincombinationwithpolicyevaluationaswellasindicatorsandfocusing
eventswerestimulatingthedebateonrefugeesuntilthepointthatrefugeesreplacedtheGreek
FinancialCrisisonthepoliticalagenda(Vornbäumen,2015).
Policyfeedbackandpolicyevaluationoccurredondifferentlevelsshowinghowtherefugeecrisis
wasacrossing-borderissueembeddedintoamulti-levelstructure.Inregardstotheinternational
sphere, themedia highlighted the clear failure of the Dublin regulation. It did so by extensive
reportingon indicators and small focusing events referring todrowning refugees, overcrowded
GreekislandsandoverwhelmedGreekadministrations(AmnestyInternational,2015).Lateron,this
turnedintothecoverageofchaoticsituationsinMacedonia,Serbia,andHungary.Inaddition,the
UN,NGO'sandGermanpoliticianscriticizedtheDublinRegulationandtheperceivedsilenceofthe
EuropeanUnion(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15,2015).Forinstance,Merkeldidnotonlymention
thatDublinisnotbeingreinforcedatthemoment,shealsomentionedthatDublinbecameinvalid
(Hollande,F.andMerkel,A.inpressconference,2015;Merkel,ZDF-Sommerinterview2015,2015).
OtherpoliticianssuchastheViceChancellorusedharshwordstodescribetheEU’sinactivityinthe
refugeecrisissuchthefactthattheEUseemstobein“wintersleep”(Gabriel,2015,min.00:13:00
–00:13:30).Ingeneral,Germanpoliticianstriedtoshiftresponsibilityintherefugeequestionaway
fromtheGermangovernmentandtotheEU.Hence,thisreflectedstoriesofblameinthecontext
of policy evaluation. This is a surprising finding as literature suggested policy evaluation to be
occurringinthepoliticalstream.
On the national level, policy evaluation in regards to the overwhelmed administrations also
occurredinformofpublicstatements.RefugeesfromtheBalkanstateswhoamountedto40%of
allasylumapplicationsuntilJulyoftenreceivedtheblameforthechaoticsituationinGermany,as
theirchanceforasylumwasfairlylow(ARD,23.07.2015;BundesamtfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge,
2015). For instance, the Home Secretary of Bavaria stated that the return of the Balkan state
refugeesistakingtoolongandthattheyareoccupyingtoomuchspaceinasylumaccommodations
47
(HerrmanninARD,23.07.2015).Otherpeopleinchargeofmunicipalitiesandcitiescomplainedthat
thesituationwashome-made;thatmunicipalitiesdidnothavesufficienttimetoprepare;andthat
thestategovernmentneededtoincreaseitssupporttremendously(KochinARD,12.08.2015;Jäger
inARD,26.07.2015).Thus,policyevaluationwasasignificantpartoftheproblemstream.
Indicatorsillustratedtheseriousnessofthesituation.Onecommonindicatorreferredtothewaves
of refugees of various origins that entered Germany at different times (ARD, 23.07.2015). For
instance,thefactthatGermanyhadregistered218.221refugeesfromJanuarytoJuly2015ofwhich
44.417 applications were Syrian received attention (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge,
2015).Anotheralarmingindicatorwasthat2.700refugeeswereregisteredonadailybasisinJuly
whichwasexpectedtoincreaseinAugust(ARD,19.08.2015).Additionally,NGOs,politiciansand
themediapaidattention to the indicatorsbypointingout that theconditionsandstandards in
Germanasylumaccommodationsweredecreasingandthatregistrationprocessesweretooslow
(ARD,07.08.2015).
Furthermore,ahighamountof focusingeventshappened in themonthsbefore the firstevent,
suchasthesinkingrefugeeboatsinfrontoftheGreekandtheItaliancoast(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-
17.09.15, 2015). However, only one focusing event opened thewindow of opportunity. This is
because it concretized that a big number of refugees would eventually cross the border into
Germany. It was August 19when the Home Secretary announced that Germanywould expect
800.000refugeeswithin2015.Additionally,heannouncedavarietyofmeasuresthatneedtobe
takeninordertoadministrateandaccommodatethishighnumberofrefugees(Maizière,2015).
Concluding,theHomeSecretaryandthisannouncementofurgencyopenedthewindowforthe
suspensionoftheDublinSystemthatonlyoccurredtwodaysafter.
5.1.2. Policystream
InregardstothesuspensionofDublin,thepolicystreamdevelopedinaratheruntypicaland‘non-
Kingdonlikefashion’.Thepolicyentrepreneurwhodraftedandinternallydistributedthedefining
memoonAugust21wasanemployeeoftheGermanMinistryforMigrationandRefugees(Wenzl,
2015).Thememosaid that theDublinRegulationwouldbesuspendedforSyrianrefugees.This
indicatedthattheplacewhereSyrianrefugeesenteredtheEUwillno longerbe investigatedby
Germanauthorities.Asaconsequence,Syrianscouldnotbesentbacktothosefirst-entrycountries.
Thememohadthepurposeofacceleratingregistrationprocessesinordertoprovidebureaucratic
relief(Abéetal.,2015).However,thedocumentwasdeterminedonlyforinternalpurposesand
notsupposedtoleaktothepublicasitdidfourdayslater.OnAugust25,thememoendedupin
48
theinboxoftheNGOProAsylwhoaskedBAMF22forthevalidationofthedocument.Asareaction,
theministry tweeted “Weareatpresent largelyno longerenforcing theDublinprocedures for
Syriancitizens(BAMFinAbéetal.,2015,para.25).Asajustification,theministrystatedthatthis
yeartheyhadnotbeenoperatingaccordingtoDublin forquitesometime (Ata inTagesspiegel,
2015).Anothertruthwasthattheministrywascompletelyoverstretchedandno longerableto
tracebackrefugees’countriesoforigin.Inthisregard,theannouncementoftheexpected800.000
refugeestriggeredBAMF’sshort-termreaction(Alkousaaet.al,2016).Thus,inthiscasetherewas
nopolicycommunitydiscussingdifferentalternatives.Rather,thesolutionhasbeenpulledoutof
thehatinastateofadministrativestruggle.Inthiscase,thepolicyentrepreneuractedasadecision
makerassuggestedbyliterature.
Politicalleadersletthedecisionpass.TheHomeSecretarytriedtocontroldamagebyjustifyingthat
theactionwas‘just’aguidelinefortheadministration(deMaizèreinAbéetal.,2015).However,
neitherhenorMerkelwhosaidthepreviousdaythatDublinshouldbeputbackintoforcetriedto
reversethisadministrativedecision.ApossibleexplanationwhyMerkeldidnotreversethepolicy
decisionmightbeherangertowardsright-wingattacksonrefugeesandrefugeecentresthathad
happenedinHeidenauacoupleofdaysinadvance.TheFrenchPresidentHollandeindicatedthat
thishappeningwasawake-upcallforbothMerkelandhimtoclarifywhatasylumlawmeansin
democraticcountries(Hollande,F.andMerkel,A.inpressconference,2015).
TheKingdonmodelstatesthatinordertochooseasolutiontoaproblemalternativesneedtobe
considered.Sincethisdecisionhasnotbeendiscussedwidelyinthepublicandpoliticalsphereitis
embeddedinaratheruntypicalpolicystream.Nevertheless,ithasbeenacceptedasaquickand
temporalsolutiontorelieveadministrations.Otheralternativesthatwerebeingdebatedshould
haveunburdenedGermanadministrationsinthelongrun.Oneofthemwasthesuggestiontotreat
Balkan refugees differently which should accelerate the returns to their home countries. For
instance,itwassuggestedtonotdistributethemtothemunicipalitiesatallbutletthemstayinthe
firstreceptioncentres.Thisshouldacceleratetheprocessofreturn(HerrmanninARD,23.07.2015;
deMaizèreinARD,14.08.2015).Anothersolutionwhichwasappliedincludeddeterrencevideosof
theGermangovernmentincooperationwiththeBalkanstategovernments.Theconcretegoalof
this campaign was to reduce the number of the unpromising asylum applications from those
countries(BundesministeriumdesInnern,2015).Otheralternativesincludedthemobilizationofall
employee resources for the Migration Ministry, more capacity for first reception and more
22 BAMF=AbbreviationBundesamtfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge(MinistryforMigrationandRefugees).
49
accommodationpossibilities (Merkel,2015).Eventually, leadingGermanpoliticians,butalsothe
FrenchpresidentdemandedacommonEuropeanasylumpolicywhichshouldincludethecommon
definitionofsafecountries;moreandeffectiveregistrationcentresinItalyandGreeceandafair
distributionschemewithinEurope (Hollande,F.andMerkel,A. inpressconference,2015).This
shows how policy-making was embedded in a multi-level structure. However, one needs to
acknowledgethatthesemeasureswouldhavenotbeenabletomeettherequiredurgencyinthe
waytheDublinsuspensiondid.
5.1.3. Politicalstream
In the political stream, the public opinion and the media took a refugee-friendly stance and
positivelyinfluencedthesuspensionoftheDublinRegulationforSyrians.InAugust,60%ofGerman
citizens(morepeoplethaninJuly)believedthatGermanyisabletomanagethelargenumberof
incoming refugees (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., 2015). This coincided with the majority
agreeingwithGermanybeinganimmigrationcountry.44%evensaidthattheywouldnotmindif
thenumberwouldrisefurtherwhileonly11%believedthattherewerealreadytoomanyrefugees
inthecountry.Furthermore,40%ofthequestionedcitizensindicatedthattheywouldbewillingto
voluntarily engage for refugees (Stern, 2015). These numbers clearly indicate a high level of
toleranceandsolidarityoftheGermanpopulationtowardsrefugees.Also,thepoliticalcourseof
MerkelandtheCDUreceivedsupportwith42%ofthecitizensspecifyingthattheywouldre-elect
the CDU at this moment of time while voting for Merkel as the most popular politician
(ForschungsgruppeWahlene.V.,2015).
Thisattitudewasreflectedandstimulatedfurtherbythemedia.Notonlydidthemediareporton
allindicatorsandfocusingeventsinrelationtorefugeesandtheirsufferingwithinandoutsideof
thecountry,butalsodidtheydosowithextendedcoveragetimesandoverallpositiveframingof
therefugeeissue.TheTagesschaustartedtoreportextensivelyonrefugeesinJulyandcontinued
reportingonrefugeesonadailybasisinAugust(Tagesschau,2016;ARDArchiv,2015).
Themedia’spositiveframingoftherefugeeissuecanbeobservedinmediacontentwhichreflected
solidaritywithrefugeesorcondemnedtheEUfornon-action.Additionally,theyclearlydenunciated
right-wingattacksonrefugees(ARD,22.08.2015).Whenalarmingnewshadtobereported,such
astheHomeSecretary'sannouncementofexpected800.000refugees,themediawouldcontrast
themwithpositivenewsandindicators.Forinstance,themediahighlightedhowGermanymakes
6,5MrdEuroprofitannuallythroughtaxespaidbymigrants(ARD,19.08.2015).Inrespecttothe
suspensionofDublin,eventheconservativeBILDnewspaperremainedpositive.Theintroductory
50
linesofthearticlethatreferredtoBAMF’sTwitterannouncementregardingtheDublinsuspension
stated:“140characterstowardsthefuture”(Bild,2015,para.1).Hence,themediaapprovedon
thisparticularpoliticaldecision.
Othermeasures themedia took in order to transmit a positive imageof refugees included the
reporting of personal refugee stories. Also, they provided a platform for people who speak in
defence of refugees (and against right-wing violence), such as UNHCR, NGO’S, politicians,
volunteersandprominentpeople(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15,2015).They,therefore,steered
thepolicydebateandnurturedcommunicativediscourse.Concluding, themediaandthepublic
opinionformedaunityintheirpositiveattitudetowardsrefugees.Theyinfluencedandpositively
evaluatedrefugee-friendlypoliticaldecisionssuchasthesuspensionoftheDublinSchemewhich
illustratesthepowerfultriangleBoinetal.referto.
5.1.4. ConclusionpoliticaldecisionNo.1
ThewaythispoliticaldecisiondevelopedcanonlypartlybeexplainedbytheMSF.Therearetwo
factorsthatcorrespondedwiththemodel:First,Kingdonsaysthatpolicychangeispossiblewhen
thethreestreamsarecoupledduringtheopeningofawindowofopportunity.TheGermanHome
Secretaryopenedthiswindowwiththeannouncementof800.000expectedrefugees.Second,the
agenda-setting process was influenced by occurrences in the problem stream. However, the
problemstreamwasnotonlyshapedbyindicators,focusingeventsandpolicyfeedback,butalso
bytheextensivereportingandpublicdiscussionsofthoseeventsinformofproblemdefinitionand
policy evaluation. This included several actors on multiple levels proving that the issue was
embeddedintoamulti-levelstructureasindicatedbyliterature.Additionally,alargeportionofthe
Germanpublicwasopenforsuchapolicychangeastheyshowedsolidarityandtolerancetowards
refugees. This was again supported by refugee-friendly media reporting who also provided a
platform for political actors to trigger communicative discourse. The country’s general positive
attitude towards refugeesmight havemotivatedMerkel to giveher blessing to thedecision to
suspendDublinforSyrians.Thus,thetriangularrelationshipbetweenpoliticians,themediaandthe
public described by theory does exist and surprisingly occurs in the political, as well as in the
problemstream.Anotherunexpected factorwasthe inducementof theDublinsuspensionbya
spontaneousadministrativedecisionfromaministryandnotthroughanelaboratedebateinpolicy
communities.ThisisparadoxicaltotheMSF,sinceitunderminestheoriginalcharacterofthepolicy
stream.However,itfitsthechaoticsituationGermanyanditsadministrationsfoundthemselvesin.
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5.2. DecisionNo.2:ThereallocationofrefugeesfromHungarytoAustriaandGermany–September4,2015
5.2.1. ThetimebetweendecisionNo.1andNo.2
Thepoliticaldecisionsofanalysiscannotstandalone,sincetheyareconnectedthroughaseriesof
path-dependentevents.Therearetwotime-spansthatareimportanttoconsider.First,thereisthe
timebetweenAugust25(thedateofthesuspensionofDublin)andAugust31,thedatewhenthe
Hungarianprimeminister allowed the first trainswith refugees to depart towards theAustrian
border.Inthistime,manyfocusingeventsoccurred:
• August26:MerkelvisitsarefugeeaccommodationinHeidenau,theplacewheretheright-wing
riotshappenedacoupleofdaysearlier.Hergoalistoshowsolidaritywithrefugeesandtoset
aclear signagainst right-wingattacks.Whenshestepsoutofhercar, right-wingprotestors
heavilyinsulther.Avideoofthoseinsultscirculatesinthemedia.Lateron,itbecameknown
thatthoseinsultsconcernedMerkeldeeplyandthatthiswasthemomentinwhichshestarted
treatingtherefugeeissuewithfirstpriority(Austetal.,2015;Alkousaaet.al,2016;Salloum,
2015).
• August27:Onthisday,atruckofasmuggler isfoundontheAustrianhighway. Itcarries71
deadrefugeesthatsuffocatedinthetruck.Thiseventdeeplyshockspoliticiansandthepublic
inGermany(Presse-undInformationsamtderBundesregierung-C(27.8.2015)).
• August29:ThemediastartexcessivelyreportingonthesituationattheBudapestKeletitrain
stationwheremoreandmorerefugeesarrive.Theyrefusetoregisterastheyareplanningto
continuetheirtraveltothewest.TheHungarianpolice,however,preventsthemfromtraveling
further.Thisleadstothetrainstationsturningintoinhumanemassdormitories.Protestsand
clasheswiththepoliceincreasefromdaytoday(ARD,29.08.2015,ARDArchiv,201523).
• August30:TheHungariangovernmentannouncesthattheterminationoftheprovisionalfence
to the Serbian border. However, refugees still find ways to overcome the hindrance (ARD,
30.08.2015).
Secondly, there is the time-spanbetweenAugust 31 and September 4, thedateof the second
event.Thehappeningsinthistimewillbedescribedintheproblemstream.
23Time-spantolookupinarchive:August29–September4
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5.2.2. ProblemStream
TheproblemstreamadvancingdecisionNo.2ismainlydefinedbyproblemdefinitionandpolicy
evaluationaswell as focusingevents.Problemdefinitionandpolicyevaluationoccurredon the
nationalandtheinternationallevelreflectingmulti-leveldiplomacy.Governmentswhosecountries
wereaffectedbytherefugeecrisisdefinedthesituationinrespecttotheirowncountryaswellas
inrelationtoEuropewhichoften includedtwo-levelgames.TheEUandvariousmemberstates
wereconfrontedwithnegativepolicyevaluation includingstoriesofblame. In theseweeks, the
disputebetweenthedifferentgovernmentsandtheEUwasfrequentlymadepublic.Inthecontext
ofpressconferences,communicativediscoursewashighlyvisible.Atthispoint,itisimportantto
clarifythatthesituationinHungarywasasymbolforthenon-functioninganddisagreementabout
EUasylumpolicy.
ThereweretwodifferentperspectivesreflectingthesituationonaEUlevel.Theperspectivewhich
wasstronglysupportedbyGermany,AustriaandFranceandtheEUinstitutionsincludedtheview
thatDublinIIIisnotworkingandthattheEU,asa“communityoffate,responsibilityandlaw”needs
toinstallanewasylumpolicythatincludesfairdistributionquotas(Merkel,A.inspeechinAustria,
2015, para. 7; Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). At this juncture, the Austrian
ChancellorprovidedHungarywithindirectpolicyevaluationbyclaimingthattheconstructionof
wallsandwatchtowerscannotbecommonground(Merkel,A.,Fayman,W.,Vučić,A.,Mogherini,
F.inpressconference,2015).Atthebeginningofthearguments,Merkelandheralliesstatedthat
theothercountriesneedtobe‘convinced’(Merkel,A.,Fayman,W.,Vučić,A.,Mogherini,F.inpress
conference,2015).Themoretimewentby,themorethreatsinformoftwo-levelgamescouldbe
identifiedintheirargumentation.Forexample,MerkelindicatedthatiftheEUfailsintherefugee
question,Europe’sconnectionwiththeUniversalHumanRightswillbedestroyed.Also,shesaid
thatSchengenwillbequestionedifnoagreementonafairquotacanbereached(Merkel,A. in
summerpressconference,2015).Additionally,theViceChancellorwarnedEasternEuropeanstates
that if they continue rejecting burden sharing, Europe’s financial planning needs to be altered
(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Ingeneral,thissideusedstoriesofblameby
accusing the Eastern European countries for obstructing the way to a fair solution based on
solidarity.
Theother side’s argumentationwas ledby theHungarianprimeminister, ViktorOrbán,whose
countryfacedaprecarioussituationwithabignumberofrefugeesbeingstuckinBudapest.Heand
hisgovernmentalsoinvolvedstoriesofblame.Forinstance,HungarymadeGreeceandBrussels
54
responsiblefornotdoingenoughtoprotecttheEuropeanborderswhichiswhyHungaryhadto
takeoverthetask(Szijjártó,2016).OrbánalsoclaimedthattheEUwasnotdealingwithaEuropean
butaGermanproblem,sincealltherefugeeswanttogotoGermany.Generally,hearguedthathe
was just fulfillinghisEuropeandutieswhileprotectingSchengen (Orbán,V., Schulz,M. inpress
conference, 2015). His views received support from other Eastern European states (ARD,
04.09.2015).
OntheGermanlevel,Merkelengagedintocommunicativediscoursewhenaddressingtherefugee
crisisinpublic.However,shenevermadeuseoftheterm‘crisis’whenaddressingtheissue(Merkel,
A. in summer press conference, 2015). Rather, she framed the refugee crisis to be a “huge
challenge”whichcanonlybemasteredwhenGermanyactsinaccordancetoacommonwilland
when breaking new ground (Merkel in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung-B
(27.08.2015),para.6).SheindicatedthatflexibilityshouldnowdominateGermanthoroughness.
This also served as justification of the suspension of the Dublin system Germany was heavily
attacked for. In this time,Merkelalso releasedher famous ‘Wirschaffendas.’ statementwhich
became her personal slogan for her crisismanagement approach (Merkel, A. in summer press
conference,2015).Here,Merkelclearlyprovidedmeaningtothecrisisinordertoeventhepath
forhercrisismanagementsolutionsassuggestedbyBoinetal.
TheChancellormadeuseofallelementsofproblemdefinitionaccordingtoKingdon.Thoseinclude
values, categories and comparisons. Firstly, Merkel justified here humanitarian thinking and
(future)actionswith thehelpof theBasicConstitutionalLawwhichsheportrayedasaGerman
value system. It includes the right for political asylum and the respect of dignity of all persons
(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Also,shereferredtoChristianvalueswhenmaking
thatargument(Merkel,A.,Sommaruga,S.inpressconference,2015).Secondly,Merkelmadeuse
ofcomparisonsinordertodefinetheproblem.Forinstance,shecomparedthe‘darkpast’ofthe
countrywiththecurrentstateofbeing“acountryofhopeandchance”(Merkel,A.insummerpress
conference, 2015,para. 11). Further, sheequated the current situationwith formerprecarious
situations such as the Greek debt crisis or the reunification which Germany had successfully
managed.ShedidsoinordertoindicatethatGermanyisa‘strongcountry’whichisabletodeal
withchallenges(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Eventually,sheandothermembers
ofthegovernmentmadeuseofcategoriesbydrawingaclearlinebetweenthosewhobelievein
thehumanitariansolutionsuchasthevolunteersandNGO’S;and“thedarkersideofGermany”
referringtotheright-wingprotestors (Gauck inZeitOnline,2015,para.1).Thoseshouldnotbe
followed,becausetheydonotsupportandworkagainsttheappropriatevaluesystem(Merkel,A.
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insummerpressconference,2015).Concluding,Merkelbecamethemouthpieceofahumanitarian
treatmentofrefugees(Hassel,T.inTagesschau,2015).Withherencouragingspeeches,sheasked
theGermancitizenstofollowherexampleandlead.Also,sheindirectlyaskedforpublicapproval
ofherpolicydecisionsassuggestedbycommunicativediscourse,themobilizationmodelandcrisis
managementliterature.Inthatrespect,sheuseduntypicalwordsforherstylesuchas‘beingproud’
ofhercountry(Merkel,SommerpressekonferenzvonBundeskanzlerinMerkel,2015).Inaddition,
the media supported Merkel by commenting that she developed a political vision and finally
showedsomeleadership(Lautenbeck,R.inTagesschau,2015).This,demonstratestheinteraction
ofthetriangularrelationshipbetweenpoliticalactors,themediaandthepublic.
As mentioned above, this problem stream is quite elaborate including many path-dependent
focusingeventscloselysucceedingeachother.TheseeventsincreasedthepressureontheEU(and
Germany),becausetheyhappenedinsuchasorttime-spanandwithinEUborders.Amongstthose
eventswere two that opened the policywindowwhich enabled the decision forGermany and
AustriatoabsorbtherefugeesfromHungary.Thefirstfocusingeventwas,accordingtoOrbán,a
direct consequence of Germany suspending the Dublin Regulation. On August 29, Hungary
suddenlydecidedtoallowhundredsofrefugeestotravelbytraintoAustria(Glass,S.inTagesschau,
2015).TheHungariangovernmentjustifiedthisactionwithtwostatements:Firstly,itclaimedto
have misunderstood the German decision to suspend Dublin and assumed that Germany was
planning on offering asylum to all refugees (Rüger, T. in Tagesschau, 2015). This shows that
communicationbetweenEUmemberstateswasintentionallyorunintentionallydisturbed(ARD,
31.08.2015).Secondly, itblamedGermanyforthechaoticsituation,sincetheDublinsuspension
causedhopeandpressureamongrefugeestofindawaytoGermany(Rinke,2015).Thefactthat
Hungarywasoverwhelmedwiththenumberofrefugeesenteringtheircountryandthefactthat
they were harshly criticized for their border policy was left unmentioned (Verseck, 2015).
Concluding,thiswasthefirstattempttoopenapolicywindowandatthesametimethereason
whythefollowingeventhappened.
The second focusing event which eventually led to political decision No. 2 was caused by the
refugeesthemselves.AfterGermanyandAustriaurgedOrbántorefrainfromlettingrefugeespass
andadheretotheDublinrules,heorderedtocloseoffthetrainstationsforrefugeesagain.Atthis
moment, therewere still ca.3.000 refugeesnearby the station inBudapest (Kasparek&Speer,
2015).OnSeptember3,refugeeswerebeingtoldthattheycouldtaketheregionaltrainstowards
theborder;however,thefirsttrainwasstoppedinBicske,23kmawayfromBudapest.There,the
policetriedtoforcetherefugeesoffthetrainand intoregistrationcentres.Whenthismessage
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spread,nomorerefugeestriedtoentertrainsinBudapest(Kasparek&Speer,2015).However,in
BisckeandinBudapestrefugeesstartedtoprotest.OnSeptember4,around1.000refugeeswho
felt frustrated about the Hungarian authorities decided to takematters into their own hands.
Togethertheystartedwhatbecameknownasthe#marchofhope.Underpoliceescort,acrowdof
refugeesleftBudapestandstartedwalkingonthehighwaytowardsthe180kmdistantAustrian
border(ARD,04.09.2015).Theywereaccompaniedbythemediawhoensuredthatthepicturesof
refugeeswalkingnexttospeedingcarsspreadrapidly(Domokos,2015).Concluding,thiswasthe
daywhenthousandsofrefugeesforcedtheirwayintotheheartofEuropeandopenedtheirown
policywindow.
5.2.3. Policystream
InthenightofSeptember4,themediareportedonrefugeessleepingonthehighwaywithoutany
shelter.Thatnight,MerkelandFaymann,whoactedaspolicyentrepreneurs,agreedtoopentheir
countrybordertothoserefugees.BeforeMerkelmadeherfinaldecision,sheliaisedwiththeVice
Chancellor,theForeignMinisterandherHomeSecretary.ShealsocalledtheheadoftheCSUparty
andBavarianPrimeMinisterSeehoferwho,sheknew,mighthaveopposedherdecision.However,
accordingtomediasources,sheonlytriedtoreachhimonceanddecidedtogoaheadwiththe
decisionwhenhedidnotanswerhisphone(Abéetal.,2015;Austetal.,2015).Thiscanberegarded
as the ideal moment within the open policy window, since those whose agreement Merkel
appreciatedagreedand thosewhomighthaveopposedherplanwerenotconsulted.After the
decisionwascommunicatedtoOrbán,hecooperatedbysendinghundredsofbusseswhobrought
therefugeestotheAustrianborder(Austetal.,2015).Inthefollowingdays,thousandsofrefugees
arrivedatthetrainstationsofViennaandMunich(Kálnoky,2015).
Twothingsshouldbehighlighted inregardstothisdecision.First,thedecisionwasmadeunder
immensetimepressurebetweenleaderswhodidnotconsultwithanypolicycommunities.Again,
thisunderminesKingdon’snotionofthepolicystream.Secondly,thisdecisionwasframedasaone-
timedecision;however,thiswasnotthecase.Thenextmorning,themediausedheadlinessuchas
“the night inwhich the gate to Europewas burst open” (Kálnoky, 2015, para. 1). TheGerman
governmentendeavouredtoensurethathiswasauniqueeventbydescribingthesituationasa
resolutionofanemergencyandbyemphasizingthatDublinisstillvalid(StreiterandSteinmeierin
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2015). Nevertheless, this decision was
irreversibleandshowedthateventshadtakenapath-dependentcourse. ItopenedtheGerman
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bordertomanymorerefugees(seeFigure12)anddeterminedthenewcourseofGerman’srefugee
policyforthenextmonths(Kálnoky,2015).
Furthermore,thedecisiontoopenthegateswasasymbolforthefailureofinternationalpartiesto
discuss alternatives. In the days before the incident, politiciansmade increasingly use of press
conferencesinordertorepresenttheirpositionsandtoargueopposingpartiesinpublic.Hence,
communicativediscourseaswellaspolicyevaluationembeddedinamulti-levelstructureplayeda
crucial role. I first reflect on the discussions in the European and subsequently in the German
politicalsphere.
Ontheonehand,Germanyanditsalliesagreedthataquicksolutionwhichwouldenablerefugees
tomakeuseoftheirrighttoreceiveprotectionwasneeded(MerkelinPresse-undInformationsamt
derBundesregierung,2015).Theirpreferredsolutionwasa fair,EU-widequotasystem.Besides
that, they agreed that Greece and Italy can no longer be left alone and that the European
registrationsystemneedstobeexpanded(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Onthe
otherhand,Hungaryanditsalliesopposedrefugee-friendlymeasures.Notonlydidtheywantto
indicatetorefugeesthattheyshouldstayinTurkey,becauseitisasafecountry;butalso,didthey
wanttomakeborderprotectionapriority.Inthisregard,theyportrayedtheconstructionofawall
astheprotectionofSchengenandDublin.Furthermore,theyopposedaquotasystem,becauseit
wouldattractmorerefugees(Orbán,V.,Schulz,M.inpressconference,2015).
Figure 12: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016)
58
The EU,who started engaging in the discussions late sidedwithGermany and its allies. Schulz
engagedintopolicyevaluationbyarguingthatHungaryisnotpursuingaconstructiveapproachto
problemsolving.Healsoclaimedthatitcanhardlybeaproblemtodistribute400.000–500.000
refugeesunder507billionpeoplewho live in28member states (Orbán,V., Schulz,M. inpress
conference,2015).JunkerandTusksuggestedmorecarefulmeasuresbyproposingthereallocation
of 100.000 – 120.000 refugees (Schulz and Junker in ARD; 03.09.2015). It is interesting, that
European leaders found themselves arguing against Hungarywho claimed to uphold European
regulations.Inthisregard,thefundamentalquestionwaswhetherhumanitarianvaluesshouldbe
prioritizedoverthecommonlyagreedrulesoftheEU.
5.2.4. PoliticalStream
Aswiththepreviousevent,mediaandthepublicopiniondominatedthepoliticalstream.However,
thistimealsoreactionstothepolicydecisionofpartiesandinterestgroupsneedtobeconsidered.
Again,policyevaluationcanbeobservedinthisstream.
The media were positive-minded in their reporting on refugees before and after the political
decision.Ontheonehand,theyfollowedtheoccurrencesintheproblemstreamclosely.Onthe
otherhand,theybecameadvocatesforrefugeesbyfocusingonthefollowingpoints:Firstly,they
attemptedtoconnecttopeople’senseofsolidaritybyrepresentingthehumanfaceofrefugees
andreflectingonthedestiniesoftheirfamilies.Forinstance,themediaextensivelyreflectedon
the story of the small, Syrian boy, Aylan, who was found drowned on a Turkish beach (ARD;
03.09.2015).Secondly,themediaengagedincharitymeasures.Forinstance,theTagesschauasked
fordonations for refugees ineveryeveningnews shows fromAugust27on (ARD,27.08.2015).
Thirdly,themediaalsoprovidedaplatformtointroducevolunteersandtheirworkandreflecton
the ‘Willkommenskultur’ in the country (ARD, 05.09.2015; Querner, 2015). Especially after the
decisiontoabsorbtherefugeesfromHungary,themediareportedonthemanyvolunteerswho
providedrefugeeswithfirstaidandcareonGermany’strainstations(ARD,05.09.2015).Chancellor
Merkel encouraged themedia to continue their style of reporting, since the portraying of role
modelswouldencouragemorecitizens tohelp (Merkel,A. in summerpressconference,2015).
Also,via themediasheandherministers repetitivelyaddressedthegreatdeedsofcivil society
(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Thisclearlyprovesthepresenceofthepowerful
trianglebetweenthemedia,politicalactorsandthepublicasindicatedbyliterature.Fourthly,the
mediaexpressedtheiroutrageattheEU’snon-actingandattheinhumanetreatmentofrefugees
bycertaincountries(ARD,30.08.2015;Hassel,T.inTagesschau,2015).Hence,themediadidnot
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only reportpositivelyon refugeesbut alsoencouraged the ‘Willkommenskultur’ and supported
Merkel’shumanitariansolutionapproach.
Themedia’spositivitytowardsrefugeesandpoliticaldecisionsreflectinghumanityandsolidarity
alsoshowedinthepublicopinion.22%ofGermancitizensclaimedthatGermanyshouldtakeon
more refugeesand37% indicated tobepleasedwith thecurrentnumber.88%expressed their
willingnesstoengagepersonallyforrefugees.Moreover,92%ofthecitizensagreedwithMerkelby
preferringaEuropeanquotasystem.Also,85%favouredlegalimmigrationpossibilitiestoprevent
thedangerousseatravels(ARD,03.09.2015).Insum,theGermanpublichadanoverallpositive
attitudetowardsrefugeesatthetimeofthedefinedpoliticaldecisiononSeptember4.Thismight
haveencouragedMerkelintakingthisdecisivedecision.
WhenanalysinginterestgroupopinionsbeforeSeptember4,onebecomesawarethattherewere
twosidespresentinthepublicsphere.Ontheonehand,therewerethosewhowereinlinewith
themediaandthepublicopinionbyholdingapositiveattitudetowardsrefugees.Forinstance,the
socialdemocraticpartyinvitedhundredsofvolunteerstotheirheadofficeinBerlinasasymbolfor
the“friendlyGermany”(Gabriel inARD,29.08.2015,min:00:04:54).Also,representativesofthe
CatholicChurchmadetheirvoicesheard inthemedia.TheyaddressedEuropeanpoliticswhich,
accordingtothem,needtochangeitsgoalorientationandensurethatnoonediesattheEuropean
borders(Marx,2015).Ontheotherhand,therewereafewright-wingprotestorsandextremists
who achieved media coverage due to violent attacks on refugee accommodations (ARD,
18.08.2015).Eveniftheycannotbeseenasanofficiallyorganizedinterestgroup,theystillreceived
a largeamountofpublicattentiondue to theirbehaviourand the fact that theyposedasharp
contrasttothe‘Willkommenskultur’.
Eventually,sincetherewasnotimeforpoliticalactorstodebatethedecisiontoabsorbrefugees
fromHungaryinadvance,oneneedstopayattentiontothewayitwasdiscussedretrospectively.
Thereweretwopositionswhoexpressedtheirviewinformofpolicyevaluation.Ontheonehand,
therewerethosewhosupportedthedecisionoftheChancellor,suchasthecoalitionpartnerSPD
(Zeitonline,2015).Ontheotherhand,therewerethosewhocriticizedthedecision,suchasthe
CSU leader, Seehofer,whowasnot consultedbefore thedecision to absorb the refugees from
Hungary. He declared the next day that the Chancellor had “decided in favour of a vision of a
differentGermany”(Abéetal.,2015,para.52).Further,theCSU,asajointentity,declaredthatthe
decisionwaswrong andwould send an incorrect signal to Europe. In their view,Germanywas
unabletoabsorbmorerefugees(dieWelt,2015).ThefactthattheownsisterpartyopposedMerkel
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inpublicandthereforetryingtodividethepartyacquiredanewdimensionfortheChancellor(Abé
etal.,2015).However,thenon-inclusionoftheCSUinthispoliticaldecisionmighthaveenabled
thedecisiontobetakeninthisparticularway.
Insum,thepoliticalstreamreflectsamultitudeofopinionsonMerkel’shumanitarianrefugeepolicy
approach.Also,inthisstreampolicyevaluationisconsciouslyusedbyvariousactorstoinfluence
eachother.Nevertheless,thefactthatMerkelhadthebackofthemedia,abigpartofthepublic
opinion,andthecoalitionpartnermighthavemadetakingthispoliticaldecisioneasier.
5.2.5. ConclusionofpoliticaldecisionNo.2
Thedecisiontoabsorbthestrandedandbadlytreatedrefugees inHungarywasahumanitarian
decisionbasedonwhatMerkeldefinedtobeGermanandEuropeanvalues.Connectedthrough
manypath-dependentfocusingevents,thisdecisioncanberegardedasalogicalconsequenceof
thefirstadministrativedecisiontosuspendtheDublinRegulation.Inadomino-likefashionthings
tookitscourseandreceiveditsfinalpushthroughViktorOrbánwhosenttrainstoGermanyand
playedacat-andmousegamewiththerefugeesinhiscountry(ARD,04.09.2015,2015).Once,they
couldnotbearitanymore,theydecidedtomarchtowardstheborderandforcedtheopeningofa
policywindow.Merkelwhofoundherselfinthepositionthatheralliesandclosestministersagreed
while her opponentswere absent only had to ‘push through’ at the rightmoment in time. By
absorbing the refugees from Hungary, she opened the German border. Again, we observe a
decisionthatwasnotbasedonthereflectionofapolicycommunitybutbasedontimepressure
andtheconsultationofafewindividuals.Additionally,thedisputebetweenEasternandWestern
member states shows that the issuewas embedded into amulti-level structure and therefore
sensitivetoexternalforces.Two-level-games,policyevaluationandcommunicativediscoursewere
usedtoinfluenceopposingactorsortheownpublic.Inregardtotheownpublic,itisimportantto
highlight that Merkel showed determined leadership. She portrayed the crisis and her crisis
managementapproachinawaythatexpressedconfidencethatthiscrisis ismanageable.Atthe
sametime,shemotivatedcitizenstoparticipateincrisismanagementmeasures.Additionally,she
benefittedfromandpraisedasupportingmediacoverage.Inreturn,theoverallpositiveattitudein
thecountrymighthavemadeMerkelfeellegitimizedtopursuewiththebolddecisiontoabsorb
therefugeesfromHungary.
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5.3. DecisionNo.3:Theimplementationofbordercontrols;nosealingoftheborder–September13
Afterthesecondevent,refugeesarrivedinGermanyinlargenumbers.Professionalaidstructures
wereunabletokeepupandthereforeneededassistanceofthecivilsociety.Thepicturesinthe
(inter-)national media showed thousands of citizens applauding the arrivals of refugees and
deliveringfirstaidatGermantrainstations.Thetime-spanbetweenthesecondandthethirdevent
wasninedays.
5.3.1. TheProblemstream
Theproblemstreaminthiseventwasdominatedbyproblemdefinitionsandoccasionsofpolicy
evaluationaswellasindicatorsthatoftenoccurredintheformoffocusingevents.
Atthisphase,problemdefinitionandpolicyevaluationinGermanywashighlyinfluencedbythe
debateonwhetherthedecisiontoabsorbtherefugeesfromHungarywasthe‘right’decision.The
personwhowasportrayinghimselfasabigopponentofMerkel’sdecisionwasHorstSeehofer.He
wassupportedbyhisfellowCSUpartymembers.Inpublicstatements,heexpressedthatMerkel’s
decisionwasabigmistake,thatthe“plugcannotbeputbackonthebottle”andthathewould
inviteViktorOrbántofindacommonsolutiontotheproblem(SpiegelOnline,2015,para.1).Clearly,
thiswasanattempttopubliclyaffrontMerkelwhocriticisedOrbánforhistreatmentofrefugees.
Nevertheless,Merkel also received support for the decision from her own party, the coalition
partnerSPD,theGreenaswellastheLeftParty(Gysi,G.andOpermann,T.inDeutscherBundestag,
09.09.2015).
Ingeneral,politicianspraisedthe‘Willkommenskultur’andpromotedGermany’sabilitytomanage
thesituationsuccessfully.Inthisregard,valueswereoftenusedtodefinethesituation.TheGreen
PartydescribedtheGermans’willingnesstohelpasa“SeptemberFairytale”(Göring-Eckardt,K.in
DeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015,p.11614).Politiciansdidnothesitatetoverbalizethattheyare
‘proud’oftheircounty–astatementthatishighlyunusualforGermanpoliticians(Göring-Eckardt,
K.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015;Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2016).Also,
consideringthecountry’shistory,MerkelappreciatedthefactthatpeopleconnectedGermanyto
hope(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Furthermore,sheboldlyaddressedher
criticsbysayingthatGermanywouldnolongerbehercountryifshehadtoapologiseforshowing
afriendlyfaceinanemergencysituation(Faymann,W.,Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).In
ordertosupportherpointofview,shevisitedaregistrationcentre inBerlinwhileminglingand
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takingselfieswithrefugees(Austetal.,2015;ARD,10.09.2015,2015).Thoseselfieswerepicked
up by the national and international Twitter community. In this regard,Merkel embodied the
‘Willkommenskultur’.ShedidnotstoprepeatingthatGermanywillbeabletomanagethissituation
(Gabriel, S. &Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). During the budget week, theMinister of
Financesupportedhereffortby indicatingthatGermany isabletomasterthesituationwithout
accumulatingdebts(ARD,08.09.2015).
However,thepartiesweredividedonthequestionwhetherthegovernmentfollowedagoodpath
in regards to itsasylumpolicyandcrisismanagement. Increasingcriticismcame fromthe state
ministers and communities. They felt blindsided by the government who decided to open the
borderswithoutanywarningorpreparationtime(Lewntz,R. inAustetal.,2015).Similarly, the
leaderoftheGreenPartycriticizedthecountry’sunpreparedness.Sheaccusedthegovernmentof
havingoversleptthelastmonths,althoughtherefugeeinfluxwasforeseeable(Göring-Eckardt,K,
in ARD, 08.09.2015). She also pointed out that the government should be ashamedbecause it
wouldneverbeabletomanagethesituationwithoutthetremendoushelpofthecivilsociety.In
her view, the government found itself in a ‘policy crisis’ which was caused by the failure and
sluggishnessoftheadministrations(Göring-Eckardt,K.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015).Thus,
problemdefinitionwasoftenconnectedtonegativepolicyevaluation.
OntheEuropean level,Merkel,Gabrieland Junker, thePresidentof theEuropeanCommission,
providedpolicyevaluationtothosememberstateswhoshowedthemselvesunwillingtoagreeon
aquotasystem.Withthehelpoftwo-levelgamesGabrielindicatedthatopenborderswerethebig
economicadvantageforEasternEuropeanstates;however,Germanywouldreconsiderpromoting
openbordersiftheburdencontinuesconcentratingononlythreecountries(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,
A. inpressconference,2015). Inthisrespect,MerkelposedthecrucialquestionofhowEurope
shouldoperatewhenfacingissuesthatconcernhumanvalues.Sheexpressedtheneedtodefine
the‘Europeanspirit’(Faymann,W.,Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Inherargumentation,
she received support from Junker in his State of the Union speech on September 9. Without
pointingfingers,heclaimedthattheUnionisnotingoodshape.Healsoclarifiedthatfeardoesnot
help,butthattheEUshouldrathertakedetermined,boldandconcertedaction.This,accordingto
him,wouldbedonebestbyaquick instalmentof a fairquotamechanism.At this juncture,he
providedseveralargumentsbasedonvaluesandcomparison:
1) TheEUshouldactaccordingtohistoricalfairness,asalmosteverymemberstatehadbeenexperiencingrefugeesinthepastduetowar,religiousorpoliticalpersecution,dictatorshiporoppression.
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2) Europeisthemoststableandwealthycontinent.3) Thenumberof refugees is low in comparison towhatother countries suchas Lebanon
receive.4) Thecrisiswillnotberesolvedinnearfutureanddesperatepeoplewillalwaysovercome
wallsandfences(Junker,J.-C.inStateoftheUnionspeech,2015).
Whenlookingatwhatcausedthepolicywindowtoopeninthispoliticaldecision,focusingevents
andindicatorsneedtobeconsidered.Fromthedayonoftheborderopening,Germanyfaceda
tremendousincreaseinrefugees.MostofthemleftHungaryafterMerkelhaddecidedtoopenthe
borders (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Meanwhile, the BAMF was said to be “drowning in asylum
applications”24 (ARD; 10.09.2015, min: 00:04:45). At that point of time, 250.000 unprocessed
applicationswerepiledupwhichalsomeantthatthepeoplewhofiledapplicationswereoccupying
spaces in the first-reception centres (ARD; 10.09.2015).Meanwhile, trains were bringingmore
refugeesintothecountry.TheHomeSecretaryexpressedthatthespeedoftheinfluxwastoohigh
andthatdecelerationisurgentlyneeded(deMaizèreinARD,11.09.2015).TheCityofMunichwas
concernedthemostduetoitsgeographicproximitytoAustria.Fordays,thecitywassuccessfully
copingwithtenthousandrefugeesarrivingonadailybasis,becauseofthemanyvolunteersand
improvisationalmeasures.ItsrepresentativesaddressedadirectappealtotheChancellorandthe
otherfederalstatestonotleaveMunichtoitself(Blume-BeyerleinARD,06.09.2015).Themayor
complainedthatittooktoomuchtimeandefforttoconvincetheotherfederalstatestotakeon
refugees(ReiterinARD,13.09.2015).FortheweekendofSeptember12,thecityexpected50.000
newarrivals(ARD,11.09.2015).OnthisSaturday,Munich’smayorsentanSOSindicatingthatthe
city’s capacities are reached and thatMunichwas about to face a collapse (Reiter, D. in ARD,
12.09.2015).Thiswasthemomentthatopenedthepolicywindow(seefigure14).
24InformalsourcesindicatedthattheBAMFchefwashopelesslyoverwhelmed(ARD;10.09.2015).AnindicationthatthismightbetruecouldbehisdismissalthatfollowedonSeptember17th(BundesministeriumdesInnern,2015).
65
WindowofopportunityfordecisionNo.3
Figure 14: Window of opportunity in decision No. 3
5.3.2. ThePolicyStream
Oncethepolicywindowhadopened, itonly tooktheGermangovernment24hours todiscuss,
decideuponandimplementdecisionNo.3,theinstalmentofbordercontrols.AfterMunich’sSOS
call, the leadingpoliticianswere forced to act quickly. TheBavarian InteriorMinistermade the
suggestion of temporary border controls (Alkousaa et. al, 2016; Seehofer, H. in SpiegelOnline,
2015).SeehofersupportedhissuggestionandurgedtheChancellorandherclosestministers25to
execute(Hermann,J.andSeehofer,Hinpressconference,13.09.2015).Inthiscase,theBavarian
politiciansservedaspolicyentrepreneurs.ThesolutionwassupportedbytheheadoftheGerman
federalpolicewhohadpreparedimplementationplansbasedonaformerG7summitthatrequired
border controls.Healso favouredplans to seal theborderby sending refugeesback toAustria
(Romann, D. in Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Merkel and her closest ministers agreed on the
implementationofborder controls, but theChancellor insistedon the fact that asylumseekers
couldcontinueentering thecountry (Alkousaaet.al,2016).Ata laterpointof time, shewould
arguethat itwas impossible toclosetheborders.Otherwise,sheexplained,onewouldhaveto
builda3000-kmfencearoundthecounty(Merkel,2015).Ingeneral,thisdecisionwhichwasmade
inafewhoursandonlyamongasmallcircleoftoppoliticiansclearlyreflectsdecisionmakingina
crisismode.
25ThecallwasattendedbyMerkel,Seehofer,theViceChancellor, theHomeSecretaryandtheMinisterofForeignAffairs(SpiegelOnline,2015).
66
On September 13, theHome Secretary announced thatGermany introduces temporary border
controls26 with a focus on the German-Austrian border and immediate effect (de Maizère in
Salloum,2015).HealsocalledonallEuropeanmemberstatestoadheretotheDublinRules.He
justifiedthedecisionwithseveralarguments.First,therewasaclearneedtolimittheinfluxand
allowadministrationsandthecivilsocietytocatchtheirbreath.Secondly,Germanyhadtoreturn
toorderlyproceduresduetosecurityreasons.Thirdly,thedecisionservedassignaltoEuropethat
burden sharing is extremely necessary (deMaizère, T. in press conference, 13.09.2015, 2015).
Clearly, deMaizère engaged in communicative discourse by publicly justifying this decision to
multipleparties.
It is importanttoconsiderthatthedecisionwasmadeonedaybeforetheEUHomeSecretaries
metinBrusselstodiscussandvoteonJunker’splantoredistribute160.000refugeesfromItalyand
Greece(ARD,13.09.2015).TheBavarianMinisterofInteriorconfirmedthatthedecisionshouldalso
serve as political leverage formember states to accept Junker’s plan (Herrmann, J. in Salloum,
2015).Additionally,theEUandGermanyconfirmedthatMerkelhadconsultedwithJunkeronthe
borderclosing.Junker’sapprovalshowedthatheregardedtheGermanpolicydecisionasastrategic
leverageforhisownplan(ARD,13.09.2015).Hence,two-levelgamescanclearlybedetectedatthis
pointintime.
OnaGermanlevel,theBundestag(whichreunitedafteritssummerbreak)attemptedactingasa
policycommunitybydebatingmeasurestosolvethecurrentsituation.Besidesthemanylong-term
measuressuchas theneed for integration lawsandan increasedbudget for themunicipalities,
short-term solutions were being discussed. For instance, the government was asked to solve
structuralproblemsfirst,becausevolunteersmightbecometiredandthenationalmoodmightshift
(Gysi,G.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015).TheGreenPartysuggestedemployingmoredecision
makers who could process asylum applications (Göring-Eckardt in Deutscher Bundestag,
09.09.2015).Inthisrespect,theCDUproposedtodelegatepeoplefromthecustomsorthenational
employmentagency to theBAMF (ARD;10.09.2015).Meanwhile,Bavariademanded thatother
federal states takeonmore refugeesand thata seconddistributionpost shouldbe installed in
LowerSaxony(ARD,12.09.2015).However, thosedebatedshort-termmeasureswereunableto
prevent the city ofMunich fromcollapsing. In theend, thedefiningdecision leading toborder
controlswasnotbeingdebatedandagreeduponbyapolicycommunity.Instead,asmallgroupof
top-levelpoliticianstookthedecisionunderenormouspressureaspredictedbycrisisliterature.
26 Note that the Schengen agreement allows for temporary border controls in situations when public order is severelythreatened(Abéetal.,2015;Alkousaaet.al,2016)
67
5.3.3. ThePoliticalStream
Inthelightoftheevents,thepoliticalstreamwasheavilydominatedbytheinfluenceofpolitical
parties,interestgroupsandthemediawhoexertedpolicyevaluationandcommunicativediscourse.
Partiesandinterestgroupsexpressedamultitudeofopinionsonthedecisiontoimplementborder
controls.Ontheonehand,theGreenandtheLeftPartycriticizedthedecision.TheGreenParty
claimed that the government used the decision to distract from its own failure to support the
municipalitiesproperlyintermsoffinances,accommodationsandacceleratedprocedures(Göring-
Eckardt,K.inGathmann,2015).Theyclaimedthatbordercontrolsdonotsolvetheissuesathand,
becauserefugeesstillneedtobecaredfor.Rather,therootcausesofflightneedtobecombated
(Gysi,G.inGathmann,2015).Thedebatesshowedaclearformofnegativepolicyevaluation.
On the other hand, the decision to implement border controls was supported by various
participants.Thegoverningparties,CDU/CSUandSPD,indicatedthatitsendsanimportantsignal
totheEU(Seehofer,H. inSpiegelOnline,2015).Furthermore,itwasreasonedthatthedecision
allowedGermanytoreturntoarule-basedsystemandthatmunicipalitiesreceivedamomentof
urgentbreak(Bouffier,V.andGabriel,S.inARD,14.09.2015).Also,thetradeunionofthepolice
expressedtheirreliefregardingthedecelerationoftheinfluxandtheenhancedstateofsecurity
(GdPinSpiegelOnline,2015).Eventually,theEUinterpretedthedecisionassupportfortheJunker
plan. According to them,when even the strongest country reaches its limits, it shows that the
burdencannotbedistributedonjustafewshoulders(ArminStauthinTagesschau,2015).Insum,
manystatementsandopinionswereexpressedintheframeofcommunicativediscourse.
In contrast, the media opposed border controls and advocated a humanitarian and solidary
solution. Not only did they portray the implementation of border controls as a sign of
powerlessnessandgovernmentfailure;butalso,didtheyblamethegovernmentforanineffective
BAMFandforhavingleftalonethemunicipalitiesfortoolong.Accordingtothemedia,Schengen
wasaniconoftheEuropeanideaandopenbordershadbeenpraisedasoneofthemostimportant
accomplishmentsofthememberstates(ARD,13.09.2015).Acommentatorstatedthatthecurrent
picturesshowingbordercontrolsandbarbedwiresare“explosivedevicesforthefreedomandthe
trustintheEU.”(Preiß,M.inARD,14.09.2015,min:00:17:55).Themediasentoutaclearwarning
byindicatingthatthedecisionendangerstheuncomplicatedcoexistenceamongneighbours(ARD,
14.09.2015).Inthisregard,themediaclearlyprovidedpolicyevaluationtotheGermangovernment
whileenteringthepoliticaldialoguewithanownvoice.
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Moreover, themedia took an equally negative stance onHungary and the EuropeanUnion. In
respect toHungary, they indicated that thecountrywould treat refugeesas criminalsopposing
Humanvalues(ARD,08.09.2015;ARD,14.09.2015,2015).ReferringtotheEU,themediastated
that the union had not been seen that estranged for a long time (ARD, 09.09.2015). Also, the
Commission was blamed, because it had not done a thorough job as guard of the contracts.
Accordingtothemedia,EuropeanpoliticsshouldbecreatedinBrusselsfirstandforemost(Krause,
R.D.inARD,09.09.2015).Thus,themediaclearlyengagedinpolicyevaluationonmultiplelevels.
However,themediareportedpositivelyonthecultureofwelcome.Fordays,theyshowedpictures
ofthemanyvolunteersatMunichtrainstationandatdifferentplacesofthecountry(Austetal.,
2015;ARD,05.09.2015;ARD,06.09.2015).Theyalsoprovidedinteractivemapswithlocalinitiatives
inGermanyandencouragedtoparticipateincivilsocietyactivities(ARD,07.09.2016).Eventually,
theyreportedonpro-refugeedemonstrationsinGermanyandalloverEurope(ARD,12.09.2015).
Through their reporting, theynurtured the ‘Willkommenskultur’ and gave the impressionof an
overallrefugee-friendlyGermanpublic.
5.3.4. ConcludingpoliticaldecisionNo.3
Thedecisionwhichincludedtheintroductionoftemporarybordercontrolsandtheretentionof
openbordersforasylumseekerswasofhumanitarianandadministrativenature.Itreinforcedthe
twodecisionsmadebeforeand illustrated theconsequenceofapath-dependentdevelopment.
RefugeesthatfeltmistreatedinHungarymadeuseoftheopportunitytotraveltoGermanywithout
hindrances (policy decision No. 2). This led to the increase of refugees forcing the German
government into decision No. 3. The main factors leading to the opening of a policy window
includedanincreasingrefugeeinfluxtoBavaria,aslowdistributiontootherfederalstatesandan
ineffectiveBAMFwhich led to theeventual collapseof thecityMunich.At thispoint,Germany
officiallyfounditselfinastateofcrisis.Oncetheseverityofthesituationwasrecognized,Bavarian
politiciansonlyhadto‘push’theirsolution,thebordercontrols,whichwaseventuallyagreedupon
byMerkelandasmallcircleoftopministers.However,Merkel,forherpart,madesurethatthe
borders stayed open. In the days before this decision she had positioned herself towards a
humanitariansolutionbypromotingandsupportingtheWillkommenskultur.Consideringthepolicy
stream,itisimportanttoacknowledgethatthepolicycommunitieshadnoeffectonthisdecision.
Rather,thedecisionwasmadeundertimepressureamongasmallgroupoftop-levelpoliticians.It
was justified to thepublic in formofcommunicativediscourse.Also, it servedas leverage fora
distributionquotaonEU levelandthereforeclearlysymbolizedtwo-levelgamesandmulti-level
69
diplomacy.Participantsinthepoliticalstreamshoweddividedopinionsonthedecision.Especially
themedia expressed its criticism by engaging in policy evaluation. However, the decision was
supportedbythemostimportantministers,bothcoalitionpartiesandtheEuropeanCommission
whichmadeitsdeploymenteasier.Concluding,thisdecisionwasadministrative,becauseithelped
regulatingtherefugeeinflux;andhumanitarian,becausethebordersofGermanystayedopenfor
asylumseekers.
Figure 15: Political decision No. 3
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5.4. ConclusionoftheFindingsChapter
Thefindingschapterillustratedtheresultsofthedatacollectionwhichincludedtheapplicationof
theKingdonmodeltothreeimportantpoliticaldecisionsreflectingGermany’sturninitsrefugee
policy.Now,severalconclusionscanbedrawninrespecttowhethertheMSFexplainsthepolicy
changeinGermany.Whenaddressingtheresearchsub-question‘TowhatextenddoesKingdon’s
MSFexplainthechangeinGermany’sasylumpolicy?’,theanswerneedstobe‘toalimitedextent’.
First, Iwill illustratethestrengthswhicharefollowedbythe inconsistenciesofthemodelwhen
appliedtotherealityofthiscasestudy.
Clearly, the three political decisions that were taken in a three-week time span reflect critical
junctureswithpath-dependentconsequencesassuggestedbyCapoccia&Kelemen.Aselaborated
above,criticaljuncturesaremomentsduringwhichthechoicesmadebyagentsfaceaheightened
probability to influencetheoutcomeof interest.Thesechoicesusuallyevokeapath-dependent
development.ThefirstcriticaljuncturereflectedtheaccidentalsuspensionoftheDublinsystem.
Here,BAMFmadeanadministrativedecisionthatinitiatedthecourseofGermany’srefugeepolicy
leadingto890.000registeredrefugeesin2015.Thisdecisioncausedanincreaseofrefugeesmaking
theirwaytoEuropeandeventuallyGermany.Othercountries,suchasHungarychoseadifferent
course in the refugee crisis by trying to make refugees feel as uncomfortable as possible. In
accordancewiththeoverallvaluesetofitscitizensandthemedia,theGermanChancellorhadno
otheroptionthantakingdecisionNo.2–theabsorptionoftherefugeesofHungary.Thisdecision,
beingofhumanitariannature,was irreversibleandopenedGermany’sborder tomanymore to
come. Even at the point of Munich’s collapse and many critics complaining, the Chancellor
acknowledgedthatclosingtheborderisnotanoption.Toeasehercritics,shetookdecisionNo.3
andimplementedbordercontrols;however,shedecidedtonotsealtheborderandtograntentry
to those inneed.These threeeventsheraldedasubstantial change inGermany’sasylumpolicy
fromapolicyofdiscouragementtoanopen-doorpolicy.Consequentially,itledto890.000asylum
applicantsthroughout2015.Thus, itcanbesaidthat incrisissituations,policychangedoesnot
happen incrementally;but ratherabruptasdescribedbyKingdon. In thiscase,wewereable to
observehowabruptchangemanifests itself inadomino-like, irreversibledevelopmentincluding
morecriticaljuncturesalongtheway.
TheMSFsucceedsinservingasatoolwhichfacilitatesdatacollectioninthefieldofagenda-setting
andpolicy-making.Inthisregard,theproblemstreamisaccuratelydescribedincludingitselements
of focusingevents,policy feedbackand indicators. Itprovidesaclearpictureonhow issuesare
71
defined, turn intoproblemsand reach importanceon the agenda. Furthermore, policywindow
openingswhichfacilitatepoliticalactorstoenactchangecanbeobservedaswell.Additionally,the
model helps capturing an unsteady environment in which factors and actors within the three
streamsattempt to influenceeachotherand thedirectionofpolicy change.However, theway
Kingdondescribesthemtodosoandthewayhedescribespolicychangetooccurdoesnotapply
totherealityofthiscasestudy. Infact,thenatureofthepolicystreamandthepoliticalstream
differs to theoriginalMSF. This is becauseKingdondisregards certain circumstanceswhich are
presentinthiscasestudy.
ThefirstcircumstancethatisnotaddressedbyKingdon’sMSFisdecisionmakinginacrisismode.
The three policy decisions of analysis confirm crisis management literature by indicating that
decisionsoftenneedtobemadeundertimeconstraintsandunderdiscretion.Allthreepolitical
decisionsweremadeby(individual)actorsundertimeconstraintsanddiscretion.This illustrates
thatthreeelementsinthepolicystreamchangetheirnatureincomparisontothedescriptionof
Kingdon’sMSF. Firstly, the basic element of the policy stream, the policy communities, which
developanddebateproposalsthatarepickedandpushedbypolicyentrepreneurs,doesnotapply.
Eveniftheyareavailable,theymightnotbeconsulted.Thisisbecauseincrisissituations,timeand
discretionforcedecisionmakerstoadopttheroleofpolicyentrepreneursthemselves.Thisrelates
to the second aspect which shows the need to regard policy entrepreneurship as a behaviour
pattern,ratherthanadistinctcharacteristic.Thus,thenatureofpolicyentrepreneurshipchanges.
Thirdly,oneneedstorecognizethatincrisissituations,decisionmakersaremorepowerfulthan
originallystatedbyKingdon.Infact,theyareabletoinfluencethedirectionofpolicychangethe
wayMrs.MerkeldidindecisionNo.2.ThisisacrucialdifferencetoKingdonwhoattributesthis
kindofpowertothepolicyentrepreneursbehindthedecisionmakers.Hence,theseelementsshow
thatKingdondisregardsthespecialcircumstancesofdecisionmakinginacrisismodeinhismodel.
Secondly,anothercircumstancethatKingdonfailstoincludeisthefactthatdecisionmakingmight
beembeddedintomulti-levelstructures.InhisMSF,policysolutionsareproduceddomestically.
Thismightbeduetothefactthatwhenhefirstpublishedhismodel,globalizationwasnotadvanced
yetandintergovernmentalresponsestoglobalissueswerelesscommon.However,anissuethat
crossesborders suchas the refugee crisis requires the responseof several countries and/oran
organ like the European Union. The research shows that the German, the European and the
memberstates’agendaswerecloselyintertwined.Additionally,politicalleadersframedproblems
andevaluatedpoliciesreferringtoandblamingeachother.Therefore, institutionalcomplexities
thatcomewithmulti-levelstructures,aswellasdiplomaticcomplexitiessuchastwo-levelgames
72
need to be added to theMSFwhen applying it to a crossing-border issue. This influences the
occurrencesintheproblemstreamandchangesthecharacterofthepolicystream.
Thirdly,Kingdondisregardstheverbalpowerandinteractionprocessesbetweenpoliticalactors,
the media and the public and the influence they might have on policy decisions. Crisis
communicationliteratureandthecasestudyshowthatthosethreeparticipantsformatriangular
relationship.Viathisrelationship,theysharecommunicativediscourseorpolicyevaluationcontent
andinfluenceeachother.Inthisrespect,itisimportanttohighlightthatthemediaarenotjusta
shaperofmessagesasdefinedbyKingdon.Forinstance,themediatookanopenstanceagainstthe
German government by criticizing the border controls. They also provided negative policy
evaluationtotheEUfortheirnon-action.Additionally,thepro-refugeeatmospherethemediaand
thepubliccreatedwasespeciallystrongandevenpraisedbytheChancellor.Merkel,forherpart,
wasanextraordinarydominantpoliticalactorinthetriangle.Shedidherbesttoadoptaleadership
stylewhichprovidedmeaningtothecrisisandrepresentedthe‘Willkommenskultur’.Assuggested
bycrisiscommunicationliterature,sheclearlytriedtoconvincepublicopinionofherhumanitarian
crisismanagementapproach. In return,shereceivedsupport fromthepublicwhichmighthave
madeherfeellegitimizedtopursueheractionsassuggestedbycommunicativediscourseandthe
mobilizationmodel.Thisclearlychangestheoriginalcharacterofthepoliticalstream.
Yet,a ratherunexpected findingwas that thepublic formof informationandopinionexchange
betweenthethreepartieswaspresent inallstreams-sonotonly inthepoliticalstream.Policy
evaluation and communicative discoursewas found in the problem stream in formof problem
definitions;inthepolicystreaminformofdiscussionofalternativesandinthepoliticalstreamin
form of evaluative statements of policies. Unfortunately, this research is limited and therefore
unable to indicate a degree of influence these actors and processes have on policy decisions.
However, this triangular relationship proved to be difficult to be applied to theMSF as it was
constantlycrossingthebordersofthestreamsthereforeconnectingthem.Hence,thereisreason
to assume that the streams do not run independently, but are being connected through the
interactionofparticipants.
Concluding, although this case study reflects abrupt change, Kingdon’s MSF is very limited in
explainingthepolicychangeinGermany.Itisrecommendedtoadjustthemodelwhenapplyingit
tothecontextsofcrisesandmulti-levelstructures.Additionally,theverbalpowerandtheeffect
participantsof the triangular relationshiphaveoneachotherandon thepolicy-makingprocess
73
needs to be investigated further27. Here, especially the role of charismatic leaders should be
analysedin-depth.
27Formoreresearchlimitations,pleasehavealookatChapter7.
74
6. |Chapter6:ComparisonoftheGermantotheDutchcase
Sofar,IhaveansweredthequestiontowhatextenttheMSFexplainstheGermanchangeinasylum
policy.However,inordertoanswertowhatextenttheMSFexplainsthedifferenceintheasylum
policyapproachesofGermanyand theNetherlands in2015, theGerman situationneeds tobe
comparedtotheDutchcasewhichwasresearchedbyLuciaOverpelt.
Atthisjuncture,itisimportanttorememberthecommonpointofdeparture-thecircumstance
thattworelativelysimilarcountriespursuedadifferentasylumpolicycoursein2015.Despitethe
size,bothcountries seemed relativelyequal in termsofeconomy, cultureandgeographywhile
pursuing a similar discouragingmigration policy during the past 20 years. However, when the
refugeesknockedonEurope’sdoorsin2015turningpartsofthecontinentintoacrisisarea,the
commonpathoftheDutchandtheGermanasylumpolicystartedtodivide.TheDutchcontinued
their policy of discouragement leading to the reception of 59.100 refugees in 2015; while the
Germansstartedpursuinganopen-borderpolicyleadingtothereceptionof890.000refugeesin
2015.InthehopetounderstandthedrivingforcesofthisdevelopmentKingdon’sMSFwasapplied
tobothcases.Thisfinalsectionofthethesiswillcomparetheresultsofbothcasesandeventually
answertheresearchquestion:‘TowhatextentdoesKingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)
explainthedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015?’
Tostartwith,itisimportanttomentionthatintheresearchedtimeframe,bothcountriesfaced
differentpolicy-makingconditions.Firstly,bothcountriesfoundthemselvesatdifferentlevelsof
crisis. From July on, the refugee influx into Germany increased significantly which forced the
Germangovernmentaswellascivilsocietytooperateinacrisismode.Theamountandthepace
offocusingeventsthatcausedahighamountofdecisionswhichneededtobetakenevokedan
abrupt policy change. Itmanifested itself in the three decisive policy decisions analyzed in this
paper.ThosedecisionsopenedtheGermanborderto890.000refugeesin2015.TheNetherlands,
ontheotherhand,perceivedtheircountrytobeinastateofcrisis;however,thecrisiswasona
muchlowerlevelthaninGermany(Overpelt,2017).Thiswasduetothefactthatthenumberof
incoming refugees was comparatively low and decision makers still had the time to work out
strategicpatternsofaction.
Anotherdifferenceinpolicy-makingconditionsbothcountriesfacedisrelatedtothedegreeofthe
citizens’ government support. TheGerman government’s refugee-friendly actions found crucial
supportbythemediaandthepublic.IntheNetherlands,however,thecultureofwelcomewasnot
75
aspronouncedasinGermany.Infact,societywasmuchmoredividedabouttherefugeequestion.
Thismighthavedifferentreasons.First,theDutchgovernmentavoidedtoundertakeboldactions
as the right-wing party, PVV28, which was part of the opposition mobilized and gained voters
(Overpelt,2017).However,inGermany,theright-wingparty,AfD29,hadnotmadeitintoparliament
yetandwasnofactorofhindrance.ThecriticsMerkelfacedfromwithinherownpartyhadless
effectsincetheydidnotdeprivevotesfromheratthispointoftime.Second,Merkeladopteda
moreproactiveleadershipstyleintherefugeecrisisthanherDutchcounterpart,MarkRutte.Not
onlydidhewaitamonthbeforespeakingoutonthecrisisbutalsodidhedeclineparliamentarian
debatesandassignedproblemsolvingresponsibilitytotheEU.ThisledtothefactthattheDutch
public perceived their PrimeMinister as invisible (Overpelt, 2017).Merkel, on the other hand,
embodiedahumanitarianrefugeepolicyapproach.BasedonconstitutionalandChristianvalues
she‘instructed’hercountryonhowtomanagethecrisis.OtherthanMarkRutte,shedidnotlet
herself being intimidated by opponents, but rather represented the ‘Willkommenskultur’. Her
authenticity and charisma contributed to the country’s unity in this debate. Concluding, the
different policy-making conditions both countries faced as well as the fact that one country
experiencedabruptchangeandtheotheronestabilityquestiontherelevanceofthecomparison.
Figure 16: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015
Nevertheless,eveninthosetwodivergingcasestudies,similaritieswerefoundwhenapplyingthe
Kingdonmodel.ConcerningthestrengthsoftheMSF,bothstudiesconcludedthatthemodelisa
valuablestartingpointforresearchingthepolicy-makingprocessandagoodtooltounderstand
agendasetting.Consideringthepolicy-makingprocess,bothstudiesfoundthatthemodelcaptures
anunsteadyenvironmentincludingamultitudeofinfluencingfactorsandtheconnectedambiguity
28PartijvoordeVrijheid29 Abbrev:AllgemeinefürDeutschland
Asylumpolicyofdiscouragement
TheNetherlands:59.100refugees
Germany:890.000refugees
Stability
Before2015 Endof2015
76
(Overpelt,2017).Inregardtoagendasetting,Iclaimedthatthemodelfacilitatesunderstandingon
how issues reach importance on the agenda. L. Overpelt (2017) indicated that it explains how
attentionincreasesinreferencetoanissue.Sinceagendasettingusuallyevolvesfromtheproblem
stream, both studies experienced the problem stream to be accurately described by Kingdon.
Hence, he correctly describes the circumstances which cause a problem to reach the political
agendaandpotentiallychangeapolicy.
However,wealsofoundcommoninconsistencieswhenapplyingtheMSFtothetwocasestudies.
LikeintheGermancase,theMSFcannotfullyexplainthesituationintheNetherlands.Oneofthe
mainreasonsisthefactthattheMSFdoesnotapplytopolicy-makinginacrisissituation.Although
thecrisisintheNetherlandswasmuchlessadvanced,itstillposedsimilarpolicy-makingpatterns.
Inbothcountries,decisionmakersdidnotconsultpolicycommunitiesforpossiblesolutions.For
Germany, thiswas the case because decisionmakers had towork under time pressure and in
discretion; for theNetherlands, thiswas thecasebecause thegovernmentgenerallyholds“the
power of initiative” (Overpelt, 2017, p. 41). For this reason, both cases undermine the original
natureofthepolicystream.SimilarlytoGermany,decisionmakersintheNetherlandsturnedinto
policyentrepreneurswhopushedtheirfavouritepolicysolutions(Overpelt,2017).Hence,inboth
countries decision makers were able to influence the direction of policy change. This finding
contradicts Kingdon by illustrating that decision makers possess more power than originally
assumedandbyshowingthatwecannotmakeaclearseparationbetweenpolicyentrepreneurs
anddecisionmakers.AtthispointitisinterestingtomentionthattheGermanleadersmadeuseof
that power to radically transform the refugee policy while the Dutch leaders pursued the
maintenanceofstability.ThiscouldbeduetothefactthattheDutchwerestilltryingtocontrolthe
crisiswhiletheGermans,beingunabletocontrol,werereactingtothecrisis.Insum,theneedto
adjusttheMSFtodecisionmakinginacrisismodebecomesevenmoreapparentafterfindingthe
samepatternsinpolicy-makingintheGermanrefugeecrisiscomparedtoanevenlowerlevelof
crisisintheNetherlands.
Anothercommon inconsistencythatwas foundwhenapplyingtheMSF is the fact thatKingdon
ignoresmulti-levelstructures.TherefugeecrisisbeganinthecountrieswithEUoutsideborders.
From there, it quickly advanced tobecominga crisis of thewhole EuropeanUnionas refugees
forced their way towards the Western member states. Germany and the Netherlands, who
experienced a significant increase of refugees in the summer of 2015, had to deal with the
treatmentofthecrisisonanationalandonaEuropeanlevel.Whiletryingtofindnationalsolutions
totherefugeeinflux,bothcountriesengagedwith,blamedandassignedresponsibilitytotheEU
77
withdifferentpurposes.TheGermanpoliticalactorsmadeuseofpolicyevaluationandtwo-level
games inorderto increasethepressureonthememberstatesandtheEUinstitutionstofinda
commonsolution;theNetherlandsreferredtotheEUtojustifyitsownreluctancetotakeaction.
In this respect, the national problem aswell as the policy streamswere being influenced by a
crossing-bordercrisisandtheinstitutionalcomplexitiesthatcomewiththetreatmentofit.Hence,
multi-levelstructuresneedtobeincludedintotheMSFwhenpolicy-makingconcernsacrossing-
borderissueandrequiresanintergovernmentalresponse.
Lastly,bothcasestudiesconfirmedthatthetriangularrelationshipbetweenthemedia,thepublic
andpoliticalactorsinfluencesthepolicy-makingprocess.Inbothcasestudies,themediaweremore
influentialthansuggestedbyKingdon.Also,thepublicopinionprovedtobemorepowerful.Itis
assumedto legitimize (inGermany)orprevent (in theNetherlands)decisionsofpoliticalactors.
Therefore,politicalactorsmadeuseofpolicyevaluationandcommunicativediscoursetoinfluence
andtoenterintopublicdialoguewithotherpoliticalactors,themediaandthepublic.Especially
theGermanChancellormadeuseofthispublicformofinteractioninordertoprovidemeaningto
the crisis and to promote her crisis management approach. Merkel proved to be a dominant
political actor and therefore strong participant in the triangular relationship. The Netherlands
illustrate a good example for what happens when the political leader does not engage in this
relationship.Notonlydid theotherparticipants in the triangle criticizeRutte for keepinga low
profile,butalsodidhisabsenceofferGeertWilderstoadoptamoredominantstanceandtohinder
policychange(Overpelt,2017).Inmystudy,Iclaimthatthistriangularrelationshipoperatesinand
connectsall threestreams.Unfortunately,bothstudieswereunable to indicatehowstrongthe
influenceofthattriangularrelationshipis.Thisofferspotentialforanadditionalstudy.
Concluding,thelackofvitalelementsofcontextandinteractionintheMSFmakesitimpossibleto
explainthedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofthetwocountries.Thetwocasestudies
turned out to be very different in nature, due to different levels of crisis and policy-making
conditionsaswellasdivergingdegreesofpolicychange.However,thecasestudycomparisonwas
very relevant inorder toclarify thatevenunderdifferentcircumstances theMSFmissescrucial
elementsthatmightinfluencepolicy-makingandpolicychange.Inthisrespect,themodellacksthe
inclusion for decisionmaking in a crisismode; policy-making in amulti-level structure and the
inclusionoftheinfluencetheverbalinteractionofthemedia,thepublicandpoliticalactorshave
on thepolicyprocess. This changes theoriginal characterof thepolicyand thepolitical stream
significantly. Therefore, the researchquestion ‘Towhat extentdoesKingdon’sMultiple Streams
Framework (MSF) explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the
78
Netherlandsin2015?’hastobeansweredasfollows:TheMSFdoesnotexplainthedifferencein
asylum policy approaches because it lacks crucial factors of context and interaction both case
studiesareaffectedby.
79
7. |Chapter7:OverallConclusions7.1. Conclusions
This paper aimed at investigating the extent to which Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework
explainsthedifferenceinasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015.The
point of departure was a remarkable difference in the way the Netherlands and Germany
approachedandhandledtherefugeecrisisin2015.Bothcountriespursuedasimilardiscouraging
migration policy during the past 20 years. However, when the refugee crisis reachedWestern
Europe in late summer 2015, Germany decided to pursue an open-border policy under the
leadershipofMerkelwhiletheNetherlandscontinuedhandlingasylumwithrestriction.Thisledto
the fact that Germany had accommodated 890.000 refugees and theNetherlands only 59.100
throughout2015.Inordertoresearchthedrivingforcesofthisdivergentdevelopment,Kingdon’s
MSFwasusedasatheoreticalguidelineandabackboneforthedatacollection.Sincethisresearch
only includedacasestudyonGermany, thedata for thecomparisonwith theNetherlandswas
retrievedfromLuciaOverpeltwhodidasynchroniccasestudyfortheNetherlands30.
After reviewing the literature and collecting data with the process-tracing method and in
accordance to Kingdon’sMSF, the sub research question ‘Towhat extend does Kingdon’sMSF
explain the change in Germany’s asylum policy?’ had to be answered as follows: Although the
Germancase illustratesabruptpolicychangeasfavouredbyKingdon,theMSFwasonlyableto
explainthechangeofGermany’srefugeepolicytoaverylimitedextent.
Variousreasonsexplainthisconclusion:TheMSFaccuratelyportraystheagenda-settingprocessin
the problem stream. So, the circumstanceswhich cause a problem to reach andmove up the
politicalagendaandpotentiallychangeapolicyiscorrectlydescribed.Themodelalsoadequately
predictsthatpolicychangeoccursabruptly.Furthermore,itsucceedsincapturinganunpredictable,
ambiguouspolicy-makingenvironment.Therefore,itprovidesscholarsinthisunsteadyfieldwith
anopportunitytostructuretheirdata.However,theGermancasestudyshowsthatthepolicyand
thepoliticalstreamcanbeofdifferentcharacterthanoriginallydescribedbyKingdon.Thisisdue
tothefactthatthemodeldisregardsimportantfactorsofcontextandinteraction.
30 L.Overpelt’sresearchcanbefoundinthearchiveoftheUniversityofLeidenunderOverpelt,L.(2017).Explainingchangeand stability with Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) in the Netherlands and Germany during the 2015 refugee crisis.UniversityofLeiden.
80
ThiscasestudyshowsthattheMSFdisregardstwocrucialcontextualfactors.Firstofall,theMSF
doesnotincludedecisionmakinginacrisissituation.Thecasestudyshowsthatinacrisismode
decisionmakersoftendevelopandchoosetheirownpolicysolutions,becausetheyactundertime
constraintsanddiscretion.ThiscontradictstheMSFintwoways.Ontheonehand,decisionmakers
do not consult with policy communities to find the right solution but rather draft a solution
themselves.Thus,whatKingdondescribesas thebasicelementof thepolicystream, thepolicy
community,doesnotapply.Ontheotherhand,decisionmakersoperateaspolicyentrepreneurs.
Therefore,theterm‘policyentrepreneurship’shouldratherrefertoabehaviourpatternthantoa
characteristicassuggestedbyKingdon.Additionally,decisionmakersactingaspolicyentrepreneurs
have more power than expected by Kingdon. This is because they create and pick their own
solutionsandarethereforeabletosteerthedirectionofpolicychange.Anothercontextualfactor
Kingdonmisses ispolicy-making inmulti-level structures.The refugeecrisis is a crossing-border
issue demanding an intergovernmental response. Therefore, institutional and diplomatic
complexitiesthatcomewithexternalfactorsandplayers,suchastheEU,needtobeincludedinto
theproblemandthepolicystream.
Second,theMSFmissesacrucialelementofinteraction.Itdisregardstheinfluenceofverbalpower
andinteractionprocessesbetweenpoliticalactors,themediaandthepubliconthepolicy-making
process. Those three actors form a triangular relationship in which they share communicative
discourseandpolicyevaluation.IntheGermancase,thethreeactorsusedthisformofinteraction
inordertocreateandnurturethe‘Willkommenskultur’.EspeciallytheChancellorwasadominant
participantofthetriangle.Sheadoptedaproactiveleadershipstylewhichprovidedmeaningtothe
crisisandjustifiedherhumanitarianrefugeepolicyapproach.Theopenformofinteractionofthose
participantsdoesnotonlyinfluencethepolicy-makingprocessbutalsochangestheoriginalnature
of thepolitical streamandconnectsall threestreams.Therefore, it isassumable that thethree
streamsdonotrunasindependentlyasindicatedbyKingdon.Insum,thiscasestudydetectedthat
the MSF misses crucial elements that influence or change the three streams. This makes an
adequateapplicationoftheKingdonmodeltothecasesubstantiallydifficult.Hence,theMSFcan
explainthepolicychangeinGermanytoaverylimitedextendonly.
AftercomparingthosefindingstotheDutchcase,itbecameclearthatthetwocasestudiesdiffer
greatly due to unlike levels of crisis, policy-making conditions and degrees of policy change.
Germanyfounditselfinacrisismode.UnderthecharismaticleadershipofAngelaMerkelandthe
influenceofthe‘Willkommenskultur’thecountryabruptlychangeditsrefugeepolicyfromapolicy
ofdiscouragementtoanopen-borderpolicy.TheNetherlands,whoexperiencedacrisisonalower
81
scale,decidedforstabilityandthereforepursued itspolicyofdiscouragement.Despiteofthese
majordifferences,thecomparisonstilldisclosedmajorsimilaritiesintheapplicationoftheMSF.
Bothstudiesdeemedthemodeltobeausefultooltoresearchagendasettingandpolicy-making.
However,bothstudiesarrivedatthefindingsthatKingdonmissescrucialelementsofcontextand
interactionwhichchangetheoriginalnatureofthepolicyandthepoliticalstream.Context-wise,
theMSFfailstoincludedecisionmakinginacrisismodeandpolicy-makinginamulti-levelstructure.
In respect to interaction, it disregards the influenceof the verbal power and interactionof the
media,thepublicandpoliticalactorshavethroughoutthedifferentstreamsandthereforeonthe
policyprocess.Thus,theoverallresearchquestion‘TowhatextentdoesKingdon’sMultipleStreams
FrameworkexplainthedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlands
in2015?’needstobeansweredasfollows:TheMSFfailstoexplainthedifferenceintheasylum
policyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015.ThisisduetothefactthattheMSF
lacks elementswhich are necessary to be includedwhen researching policy-making and policy
changeinbothcasestudies.Therefore,itisrecommendedtoadjustthecurrentMSFaccordingly
ortodevelopanewmodelforpolicychangethatincludesthemissingelements.
7.2. Researchlimitationsandrecommendationforfurtherresearch
Beforeclarifyingtheresearch limitations indetail, it is importanttopointoutthatthisresearch
discoveredandhighlightedsomemissingelementsoftheKingdonmodel.Basedontheseelements,
itrecommendstoadjusttheKingdonmodelordevelopanentirelynewmodelthatincludesthese
factors.However,asalimitationthisresearchdoesnotexplainhowanadjustedoranewmodel
hastolooklike.Furthermore,itneedstobeemphasizedthattheMSFoffersabroadspectrumof
dimensionsthatcanbeexplored.Therefore,thisresearchneedstobelimitedatvariouspoints.I
would like tohighlight themainareasof limitationandprovide recommendation forexpansion
possibilitiesofthisresearch.
Firstly,consideringthecasestudythisresearchislimitedintime.Thisresearchfocusesonthethree
weeksinlatesummer2015.Idecidedforthistimeframebecausethoseweretheweeksinwhich
thecrucialpolicydecisionsweremadethatledtothe890.000refugeesin2015.Iamfullyaware
thattheatmosphereinthecountryshiftedlaterintheyearandthatthetimeperiodafterwardsis
influencedbydifferent factors, suchase.g. the riseof the right-wingpartyAfD.Toexpand the
research in time and to investigate if policy-making within the refugee policy field changes
throughouttimeandunderdifferentcircumstances(e.g.anon-crisismode)seemstobeavaluable
extensionofthisresearch.
82
Secondly,Istronglyrecommendapplyingmorecasestudiesinregardstocrisissituationsand/or
multi-levels structures building on this research. In that way, an adjustment of theMSF or an
entirelynewmodelforpolicy-makingunderthosecircumstancescanbedeveloped.
Thirdly,theroleoftheactorsthatareassignedimportancetowithinthiscasestudyneedstobe
further explored. For instance, the role of ChancellorMerkel in the refugee crisis needs to be
furtherresearched.Here,itisrecommendedtoconsultleadershiptheoriesincludingMaxWeber’s
typeofcharismaticauthority(Weber,1958).Furthermore,theexactinfluenceofthemediaonthis
particular policy change needs to be further investigated. An elaborate media study is
recommended. Additionally, the effect participants of the triangular relationship have on each
other and on the policy-making process needs to be researched. This study explored that the
triangularrelationshipexertspoweronthepolicy-makersandthedecisionstobetaken;however,
itdoesnotprovetowhatextentitdoesso.Hence,furtherresearchisneededinconnectiontothis
particular case study. Findings of such additional research could then be included into similar
studieswithdifferentcases.
Fourthly,anotherfieldthatshouldbelookedintoistheroleofframinginthepolicy-makingprocess.
Thisresearcharrivesattheassumptionthatframing(donebyvariousactors)couldinfluencethe
policy-makingprocess.However,thisneedstobeembeddedinanown,mostlikelyquantitative,
research.
Withthisthesis,IhopethatIcontributedtoanexcitingfieldofresearchwhileraisingnewquestions
forthefuture.
- WORDCOUNT:28.717includingin-textreferences-
83
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Appendices
A. Additionalliterature
a. Policywindows
Another important debate aroundMSFmodel addresses the question howpolicywindows are
being opened. According to Kingdon, policy windows open due to a new problem capturing
attentionorbecauseofachangeinthepoliticalstream,suchasachangeinthenationalmode,a
politicalturnoverorachangeinadministration(Kingdon,2011).However,thepoliticaldecisions
mentioned in the situation analysis indicate that certain actorsmight be able to influence the
opening of a window. This theory has first been expressed by Natali who argued that policy
entrepreneursareabletohelpopenwindows(Natali,2004).Further,theideahasbeendeveloped
byCram(1997)andCorbett(2005).Cramarguesthatonekeyskillofpolicyentrepreneurs isto
facilitate the emergence of a window. At this juncture, she especially refers to the European
Commission which does not just passively wait but actively engage in encouraging a window
emergence inorder topush itspreferredproposal (Cram,1997).Corbettclaimsthatwithin the
Commissionpolicyentrepreneursareabletoopenpolicywindows.He,therefore, locatespolicy
entrepreneursinhigherlevelsofgovernmentthanKingdondoes(Corbett,2005).Inthisregard,the
distinctionbetweenpolicymakersandpolicyentrepreneursbecomesblurred(Ackrill&Kay,2011).
Iwillelaboratemoreonthisinthediscussionofthepolicystream.
b. Framing
Whatexactlycomposesverbalpower?Onepossiblewayistoevaluatesymbolicdevicesinpolitics.
A symbol is anything that represents something else. Itsmeaning depends on theway people
interpret,respondtoanduseit.Symbolsarefundamentalfeaturesofpoliticaldiscourse.Inproblem
definition, they function as strategicweapons in away that politicians can attract support and
persuadedoubtersbyshapingtheirperceptionsandsuspendingcriticism.Hence,theyaremeans
ofcontrolandinfluence.Theyarecollectivelygenerated,maintainedandchanged(Stone,2012).
Moreover,symbolshaveemotiveandcognitivefunctionswhiletransmittingaclearbutsimplified
message(ElderandCobb,1983,inSabatier,2007).Symbolsthatderivefromanation’scoreidentity
aremorelikelytotriggeranemotivepoliticaldiscourseratherthanarationalone.Ingeneral,the
construction of identity summarized in symbols serves as an important political action guide.
(ZahariadisinSabatier2007).
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Political symbolic devices are stories, synecdoche’s and metaphors. Narrative stories serve as
principalmeansforthedefinitionandcontestationofpolicyproblems.Themostcommonstory
themesarechangeandpower.Storiesofchangeincludestoriesofdeclineandrise.Storiesofpower
includestoriesofhelplessnessandcontrol(Stone,2012).Especiallyintimesofcrises,policymakers
wanttotellstoriesofcontrol(Boinetal.,2005).Storiesofdeclinewhichfosteranxietyandstories
ofcontrolwhichcommunicatehopeareoftenwoventogetherasinthestoryofdeclinesettingthe
impetusforthestoryofcontrol.Synecdoche’sarefiguresofspeechthatrepresenttypicalcasesof
largerproblems.Metaphorswhichcomparetwothingsonthesurfaceoftenimplyaprescription
for action and a larger narrative story (Stone, 2012). Concluding, those symbolic elements are
commonfeaturesofframing.
Anotherfeatureofframingisambiguity.ZahariadisclaimsthattheMSFimpliespolicy-makingunder
ambiguity(Sabatier,2007).Ambiguityisafeatureofthehumanconditionwhichdescribesthestate
of thinking in many ways about the same phenomena or circumstances (Feldmann, 1989, in
Sabatier, 2007; Stone, 2012). It enables decision makers to clothe their actions in different
meanings. It is often better suited than precision, because being ambiguous about intentions
facilitatesapolicymakerwithroomtowiggleinthefuture.Furthermore,“theambiguityofsymbols
helpstransformindividualstrivingsintocollectivedecision.”(Stone,2012,p.182).Zahariadisadds
that manipulation, by providing meaning, identity and clarification, is the effort of controlling
ambiguity.Politicalmanipulationisregardedtobemorethanidentityconstructionandpersuasion.
Itincludesthegenerationoffactstochangeminds(ZahariadisinSabatier,2007).Inthisrespect,
Stonesclaimsthatfactsaresociallyconstructedandinterpretative.Theyareusedbypoliticalactors
tostrategicallyachievetheirinterests(Stone,2012).Zahariadisconcludesthattheapplicationofa
framingstrategycombinedwithinstitutionsandpolicywindowschangethemeaning,contextand
policiesovertime(ZahariadisinSabatier,p.70).He,therefore,clearlystatesthatframingcanput
weightonthestreamswhicheventuallymightleadtopolicychange.