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FLOODING TASKFORCE
Report of the Flooding Taskforce on the
Fermanagh Flooding of November 2009
OFMDFM July 2010
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Flooding Taskforce is grateful to the people of Fermanagh who gave
freely of their time and energies to detail to us the impact the November 2009
flooding had on them, as well as sharing their wider views and concerns about
flooding in the Fermanagh area. Without the input of the local community
obtained through the evidence gathering sessions and the many written
submissions made, this report would not have been possible.
The Taskforce would also like to express its gratitude to Fermanagh District
Council for all of their help and advice and in particular for facilitating the
evidence gathering sessions in Enniskillen and Lisnaskea.
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CONTENTS
Page
1. Executive Summary 5
2. Introduction 11
3. Background 13
4. Methodology 16
5. Review of the Fermanagh Flooding by the Rivers 18 Agency of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
6. Taskforce Findings
(i) Impacts of the Flooding 21(ii) Issues Raised 30
7. Conclusions 58
8. Recommendations 61
List of Annexes
Annex 1 List of Taskforce members Annex 2 Data on levels of Lough Erne during 2009 Annex 3 Rivers Agency Report – Fermanagh Flooding of 2009
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Fermanagh Flooding of October 2009
1.1 During the course of late October and November 2009, County
Fermanagh experienced what for many was unprecedented levels of
rainfall. The result was that the area was subject to widespread
flooding, leading to significant disruption to life in the county at both
individual and community level.
The Flooding Taskforce
1.2 The impact of the floods was such that the Northern Ireland Executive
decided at their meeting on 3 December 2009 that a Flooding
Taskforce should be established to investigate the causes of the
flooding, identify lessons learned and consider measures required to
mitigate the impact of any future flooding.
1.3 This cross-departmental Taskforce gathered evidence from members
of the public in the affected areas, business people, local
representatives and stakeholder organisations. A number of evidence
sessions were held in Enniskillen and Lisnaskea so that the Taskforce
could hear at first hand about the impact of the flooding on local life in
Fermanagh. A significant number of written submissions detailing the
impact of the flooding and offering potential solutions to the problem
from a local perspective were also obtained from a wide range of
individuals, businesses and organisations. Furthermore the Taskforce
took full account of the issues identified by a Review of the Flood
Response conducted by the Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture
& Rural Development. This report is attached at Annex 3.
Key Findings
1.4 The evidence received by the Taskforce confirmed that the flooding
had presented very considerable challenges to the local population – difficulties in accessing homes, shops, schools, farmland and
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businesses; problems in caring for the vulnerable; public health
concerns; animal welfare issues; and wider economic impacts were all
reported in detail to the Taskforce. Potential longer term damage to
the Fermanagh area in terms of its reputation as a tourist destination, a
good place to do business, and even as a good place to live and raise
families was also identified by a number of those giving evidence.
1.5 It became apparent to the Taskforce that the flooding events had also
brought a strong sense of community spirit to the fore, with residents
displaying resilience and a readiness to help themselves and their
neighbours to deal with the worst effects of the floods. Without this,
and despite the considerable assistance and support provided by the
responding agencies, it is generally recognised that the impacts,
particularly at an individual level, could have been much worse.
1.6 While the consequences of the flooding were extensive and varied, the
residents of Fermanagh felt strongly that the main contributory factor to
the flooding was associated with the way in which the Lough Erne
system was managed, from the Upper Lough to the hydroelectric
power generating station at Ballyshannon. Section 6 of this report sets
out in detail how the system is managed by the Rivers Agency in the
North and by the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) in the South, and in
particular how this is achieved in such a way as to meet drainage
needs within the lough basin as well as the power generating
requirements of ESB.
1.7 It was equally clear that those who submitted evidence believed there
to be two potential solutions to the alleviation of the risk of future
flooding and the mitigation of the impacts of such events – namely that
the level of Lough Erne should be lowered (by up to 600mm / 2 feet);
and/or that a number of key pieces of roads infrastructure should be
raised to mitigate the effect of flooding of the surrounding lands.
Detailed discussion of both of these issues may be found in Section 6,and the outcome reflected in the report recommendations at Section 8.
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Conclusions
1.8 The Taskforce undertook a detailed analysis of all of the evidence
provided, the main conclusions arising from this were:
• The extensive flooding in Fermanagh during November 2009 had a
profound impact on the lives of local people.
• In light of the substantial and potentially long lasting consequences
from the flooding it is important that more is done to alleviate the
impact of future serious flooding in Fermanagh.
• The flooding was as a direct result of very heavy and persistent
rainfall in Fermanagh during October and November 2009 which
exceeded the drainage capabilities of the Erne System.
• The Erne System complies with recognised drainage standards and
it would not be economically or environmentally feasible to increase
the capacity of the system to a level where flooding from extreme
events, such as the November 2009 flooding, could be prevented.
Neither would it be feasible to significantly reduce existing water
levels, given the detrimental impact this would have on the natural
environment and on water based tourism.
• During October and November 2009 the Erne System was
managed by Rivers Agency and the Electricity Supply Board in
accordance with the Erne System Operating Regime. This Regime
was first developed in the 1950s and should now be the subject of
an in depth review to ensure that it adequately meets modern day
needs. As part of this review consideration should be given to the
feasibility of bringing forward the winter drawdown of Lough levels
to maximise storage.
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• Subject to sufficient funding being made available, the level of
investment in flood mitigation works in Fermanagh should be
enhanced to include works to key roads infrastructure to protect key
transport and access routes. In addition the feasibility of options for
a flood alleviation scheme to protect Derrychara Link, Enniskillen,
from inundation from Lough Erne should be examined.
• Flooding risk in Fermanagh cannot be eliminated completely.
• All organisations engaged in flood response and recovery must
ensure that their emergency plans and networks are maintained
and further developed to deal with the consequences of future
serious flooding.
• In order to minimise the impact of any future flooding, steps must be
taken to protect the delivery of essential services to local people
during times of flood. This will include carrying out a programme of
works to the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works to further protect
the supply of public drinking water in Enniskillen. In addition, all
organisations responsible for the provision of essential services to
the local community, especially emergency / health care, education
and refuse collection must ensure that robust contingency
arrangements are in place to protect the provision of these vital
services to areas affected by such flooding.
• It is vital that the local community is as prepared as possible to deal
with the consequences of any future flooding. The public must
have accurate information about flood risk in the area, know what to
do in a flood situation, and how to access help. An education and
public awareness programme should be developed to inform the
local community, including school children, about flooding in
Fermanagh and this should specifically include information on the
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Erne System.
Taskforce Recommendations
1.9 Following detailed examination of all the evidence adduced the
recommendations of the Flooding Taskforce are:
Management of the Erne System
• An in depth review of the Operating Regime for the Erne System
should be conducted to ensure that the arrangements and
parameters for the management of the Erne System are adequate
to meet modern day needs. The Lough Erne Management Co-
ordinating Committee and the Lough Erne Advisory Committee
represent all interests and activities associated with Lough Erne,
and so should be actively engaged in this review process.
Flood Mitigation
• Subject to sufficient funding being secured, a programme of road
improvement works should be undertaken to include all the roads
listed at Section 6 (paragraph 6.65) to reduce the likelihood of loss
of key transport and access routes.
• A feasibility study should be conducted to consider options for a
flood alleviation scheme to isolate Derrychara Link, Enniskillen,
from direct inundation by Lough Erne, so alleviating flood risk to the
area. In the interim, containment measures should be put in place
prior to the coming winter.
Essential Services
• A programme of work should be undertaken to improve the level of
protection from flood risk to the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works.
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• All organisations involved in the response to and recovery from the
November 2009 flooding in Fermanagh should maintain and further
develop their emergency planning arrangements and networks to
ensure they are as prepared as possible to deal with any future
serious flooding which may occur.
• All organisations responsible for the provision of essential services
to the local community, especially emergency / health care,
education and refuse collection must ensure that robust
contingency arrangements are in place to protect the provision of
these vital services to areas affected by serious flooding.
Communication and Public Awareness
• An education and public awareness programme should be
developed to inform the local community, including school children,
about flooding in the Fermanagh area and how to deal with it. This
should specifically include information on the Erne System.
Way Forward
1.10 Taskforce Ministers will present this report and associated
recommendations at the earliest opportunity to the Northern Ireland
Executive for its consideration. Relevant Departments and agencies
will then be commissioned to take forward the recommendations
agreed by the Executive.
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2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 In late October 2009 and for most of November the Erne catchment
experienced unprecedented levels of rainfall, both in terms of quantity
and duration. As the rain persisted it fell on what was already
saturated ground, resulting in extensive flooding across Fermanagh.
2.2 In response to the impact which this flooding had on the people of
Fermanagh, the Northern Ireland Executive agreed at its meeting on 3
December 2009 to establish a Flooding Taskforce to investigate the
circumstances of the flooding. The Terms of Reference for the
Taskforce were subsequently agreed in the following terms:
“FLOODING TASKFORCE – TERMS OF REFERENCE
PURPOSE
The Flooding Taskforce, established at the request of the NI Executive,
will investigate the Fermanagh flooding of November 2009 and
consider what further action is required by the NI departments (and
their sponsor bodies) to deal with the aftermath of the flooding and to
minimise the impact of future flooding.
The Taskforce will report its findings and make recommendations to
the NI Executive.
FORMAT & MEMBERSHIP
The Taskforce will:
• be convened on a task and finish basis;
• produce an interim report by the end of February 2010;
• include Ministerial representation as well as officials drawn from the
relevant NI departments; and
• be led by the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister.
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The secretariat for the Taskforce will be provided by Civil
Contingencies Policy Branch, OFMDFM.
ACTIONS
• To investigate the factors which contributed to the flooding, to
include those of cross-border significance.
• To arrange evidence gathering sessions involving a range of local
stakeholders.
• To consider how NI departments could assist in dealing with the
aftermath.
• To examine lessons learned in a cross-departmental context.
• To identify longer term planning issues, including the development
of a Flood Risk Management Plan for Fermanagh
• To consider preparations for possible measures to minimise the
impact of future flooding.”
2.3 The Taskforce is Chaired by the Office of the First Minister and deputy
First Minister, and membership comprises of the Executive Ministers
for Regional Development; Agriculture and Rural Development; the
Environment; and Enterprise, Trade & Investment, as well as senior
officials from key NI Departments and agencies. A full list of the
Taskforce membership may be found at Annex 1.
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3. BACKGROUND
3.1 The flooding in Fermanagh during November 2009 affected most of the
population of the county in some form or another. Some had to endure
only minor inconveniences, but for many others the social, economic
and environmental impacts were much more significant, both at
individual and community level. The level of impact experienced was a
consequence of an unprecedented level of rainfall during October and
November 2009, coupled with the particular topography and
demography of Fermanagh.
3.2 The bulk of the flooding occurred after 19 November 2009 owing to
inundation from Lough Erne. However, there was also flooding in the
Boho area from the 4 November 2009 which resulted from the
inundation of the natural floodplain of the Sillees River.
Fermanagh Profile
3.4 Fermanagh covers an area of 187,582 hectares, with a population of
some 57,600, 13,600 of whom live in the county town of Enniskillen.
The county has a population density of 31 persons per square
kilometre, compared to 119 persons per square kilometre for Northern
Ireland as a whole. Many of the residents therefore live in rural, often
remote, locations.
3.5 Agriculture represents a key sector in the economic profile of the
county, which also boasts a number of thriving businesses as well as a
healthy retail sector bolstered in recent times by an influx of trade from
across the border.
3.6 A major topographical feature of the region is that some 30% of
Fermanagh is covered with lakes and waterways. The River Erne and
associated loughs and channels are of particular significance in terms
of drainage in the area and consequently were a key focus for theTaskforce.
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The Erne System
3.7 The River Erne, which rises from Lough Gowna in County Cavan, flows
through County Fermanagh to the sea at Ballyshannon in County
Donegal. The river, which is some 100km long, drains an area of
around 4,350km2, of which 1,850km2 is in Counties Fermanagh and
Tyrone.
3.8 There are a large number of lakes in the catchment area upstream of
Enniskillen. The largest is Upper Lough Erne which has a surface area
of some 38km2. Water from the Upper Lough flows through the inter
lough channel to Lower Lough Erne, which has a surface area of
approximately 111km2. Sluice gates in the inter lough channel at
Portora are used to ensure that water levels do not fall too low in the
Upper Lough. The flow from the Lower Lough passes through the
Belleek Channel to Cliff where the first of two hydro-electric power
stations is located. This dam at Cliff controls the water levels in the
Lower Lough. A second hydro-electric power station is located
approximately 5km further downstream at Cathaleen’s Falls, more
commonly known as Ballyshannon.
3.9 Control of the water level in the Erne System is undertaken by the
Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, in
conjunction with the Electricity Supply Board in Ireland under the terms
of an agreement made in 1950 when the River Erne was harnessed for
hydroelectric power generation.
3.10 Each October, in preparation for the higher levels of rainfall during the
autumn and winter periods, the responsible agencies attempt to draw
the water level in both loughs down in order to maximise the storage
capacity within the system. When the amount of water in the loughs is
too great, it can be spilled at Cliff and then at Cathaleen’s Falls.
However, where rain is persistent a situation can be reached where the
inflow of water from the catchment into the loughs substantially
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exceeds the amount that can be conveyed by the channels and passed
through to the sea.
Why the Flooding Occurred
3.11 Fermanagh experienced an unprecedented level of rainfall totalling
336.8mm over the period 17 October 2009 to 27 November 2009. To
put this in context, the total rainfall for the month of November for the
county was recorded at 280mm, against the previous record of 191mm
(in 1939)1 and the long term average for the month of 103.25mm. This
level of rainfall over 41 days is well in excess of a 1 in 100 year rainfall
event, which means that there is a 1% chance of such an event
happening in any given year. Prior to this heavy rainfall, the lough was
successfully drawn down to its minimum level in early October 2009 in
order to maximise winter storage capacity – see paragraph 6.32.
3.12 However the heavy rain in mid to late October 2009 caused the ground
in the catchment to become saturated by early November. This
effectively meant that from early November all rain falling in the
catchment area ran off into the rivers and loughs.
3.13 The persistent rainfall caused water levels in the Erne System to rise to
the point where the recorded levels at Belleisle, Portora and Rosscor
were the highest since the current regime was introduced in the 1950s.
As the water levels in Lough Erne rose above the prescribed upper
limits the volume of water exceeded that which could be conveyed by
the channels to the sea. Consequently, extensive flooding occurred,
particularly around the Upper Lough. The actions taken throughout this
period by the agencies charged with managing the Erne system were
in accordance with the legislation.
1 Data supplied by the Met Office
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4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 The approach taken by the Taskforce to this initiative was dictated
largely by the clear need to engage directly with the people of
Fermanagh to hear at first hand about the impacts the flooding had at
both individual and community levels. It was therefore agreed at the
first meeting of the Taskforce in Enniskillen on 17 December 2009 that
the process should be informed by a series of evidence gathering
sessions to take place in Fermanagh, and that those sessions should
be open to the widest possible range of local people, community
representatives and organisations from the affected areas.
4.2 Accordingly, a total of six evidence gathering sessions took place
during January 2010. In addition to two public sessions in Enniskillen
and Lisnaskea, the Taskforce heard from local Fermanagh district
councillors; the Ulster Farmers Union; the Northern Ireland Agriculture
Producers’ Association; and representatives from the business and
commercial sectors in the county, including the Fermanagh Economic
Development Organisation. The evidence thus gathered was
augmented by a substantial body of written evidence provided to the
Taskforce during January 2010.
4.3 In addition, the Taskforce sought and received information from the
Electricity Supply Board. To supplement this, OFMDFM officials visited
the ESB power station at Cathaleen’s Falls, Ballyshannon on 9
February 2010 to learn at first hand about the operation of the power
station and the impact of ESB’s operational requirements on the
drainage of the Erne catchment and the wider management of the Erne
system. The Taskforce also received evidence from Waterways
Ireland on their perspective on the causes and effects of the November
flooding.
4.4 The work of the Taskforce in considering the causes and impacts of theflooding was closely linked to and informed by the review conducted by
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the Rivers Agency of the Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development - ‘Fermanagh Flooding of November 2009’, a summary of
key outcomes of which is at Section 5. The full Rivers Agency report is
annexed to this report at Annex 3. This review examined the
effectiveness of the multi-agency response of stakeholder
organisations to the flooding, which was central to managing the
effects of the flooding and its impact on the community. In relation to
that response it concluded that co-ordination and co-operation between
the various responders had been sound.
4.5 The subsequent analysis of the evidence collated led to the
identification of the range of impacts the flooding had on the local
community. In addition, the Taskforce distilled a number of proposals
from those directly affected as to how the impact of future flooding in
the area might be lessened. These proposals, which fall into four main
themes, were analysed in detail by the relevant government
departments and agencies, to establish their viability and potential
effectiveness to meet identified need. Consideration of these impacts
and proposals is at Section 6, with Taskforce conclusions at Section 7.
4.6 The final stage in the process was the production of a Taskforce
Report and its presentation to the NI Executive for their consideration
of the Taskforce recommendations, as detailed at Section 8.
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5. REVIEW OF THE FERMANAGH FLOODING BY THE RIVERS
AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
5.1 In addition to establishing a Flooding Taskforce, the Northern Ireland
Executive also decided at its meeting on 3 December 2009 that the
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development should carry out a
review of the response provided by Rivers Agency (RA) and its
partners to the flooding in Fermanagh.
5.2 Section 4 of this report has already alluded to the importance and
relevance of the RA Review to the work of the Taskforce, not least as a
source of expert evidence on the management of the Erne System.
Specifically, the RA Review Report outlines how the water
management system for Lough Erne was applied during the course of
the November 2009 flooding. It examines the response made by the
various flood response agencies, identifies lessons learned and makes
recommendations on how the multi-agency response might be
improved in the future. It also contains detailed statistics on water
levels to illustrate the effect of the heavy rain and the response made
by the managing agents to mitigate its effects on water levels in Lough
Erne.
5.3 The recommendations of the Rivers Agency Review Report are as
follows:
Control of Water Levels
• The operating regime, applied within the current legislation should
be reviewed by Rivers Agency and ESB to investigate if there is
any scope for improvement.
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• The performance of the existing regime which has been in place
since the 1950s should be reviewed. This will inform the need for a
review of the current legislation.
• Any further review of levels must take account of the environmental
designation, particularly on the Upper Lough. The Upper Lough is
a Special Protection Area (SPA) and a Special Area of
Conservation (SAC). The Habitats Directive, which is European
legislation, applies to SPAs and SACs. The Upper Lough also has
nine Areas of Special Scientific Interest (ASSIs) of which Belleisle,
Trannish and Crom are arguably the three most important. The
Upper Lough is also a RAMSAR site (a wetland site of international
importance designated under the Ramsar Convention 1975).
• Any review of levels must also take account of the navigational
interests which involve Waterways Ireland, (the responsible
authority for navigation within the Erne system). Water based
recreation and tourism generates vital income in Fermanagh.
Emergency Response
• It is recommended that all organisations involved in the response to
and recovery from the flooding in Fermanagh use the lessons learnt
from the review to further develop their own emergency planning
arrangements. Opportunity should also be taken to further develop
contact arrangements.
• A structured process should be established to carry out ‘desk top’
exercises every two to three years to ensure that agencies maintain
contact and co-ordination arrangements between each other.
• Facilities to obtain rainfall information for the whole catchment
should be examined.
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Government Response
• Consideration should be given to establishing an agency to provide
a strategic overview to the management of flooding in Northern
Ireland, particularly in the medium to long term. This agency may
also be responsible for ensuring that all agencies and organisations
have adequate emergency arrangements and plans in place should
a similar flooding event occur in the future as will be required by the
Floods Directive within Flood Risk Management Plans.
• Planning Policies restricting developments in the floodplain should
be strictly applied to help eliminate the risk of property flooding
should a similar event occur in the future.
Improvement Works
• Consideration should be given to examining the viability of raising
critical roads.
• Rivers Agency and Roads Service should examine whether joint
improvements can be made to the Derrychara Link area.
Awareness
• Rivers Agency, in conjunction with ESB, should draw up a short
brochure explaining how the Erne system works and this should be
distributed to schools in Fermanagh. Rivers Agency should also
examine opportunities to add to previous presentations they have
given on the Erne system to improve public awareness.
The RA Review Report, the terms of which were agreed in February
2010, is reproduced in full at Annex 3 of this Taskforce Report.
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6. TASKFORCE FINDINGS
IMPACTS OF THE FLOODING
6.1 The November 2009 flooding in Fermanagh occurred against a
backdrop over the last two or three years of more frequent and more
severe flooding incidents both locally and across the region than had
previously been the norm. Flooding events in Belfast in 2007, and
more widely in August 2008, led to the evacuation of large numbers of
people from their homes, with significant damage to property, services
and infrastructure. While evacuation and property damage of this
magnitude was not a feature of the 2009 Fermanagh flooding, it
nonetheless had a profound and lasting impact on the people of the
county both at individual and community level. The true cost of the
floods may never be accurately determined, but it is clear that it was
significant.
6.2 It was also clear to the Taskforce that despite the co-ordinated
response by various agencies the impacts could have been very much
worse had it not been for the resilience of the local people, their
willingness to help themselves, help one another, and to make the best
of what was a very difficult situation for many.
6.3 For these reasons, it is important both to acknowledge and to record
the types of difficulties and concerns faced at this time, as well as the
impact that repeated flooding incidents of this nature might have on the
maintenance and future development of small rural, often isolated
communities in the county, the local economy, and the image and
viability of Fermanagh as a tourist destination. This section of the
report therefore records the evidence presented to the Taskforce
by local people about the problems they encountered, which
provided the information base to inform and help determine the
nature and extent of remedial work and arrangements required tohelp avoid or to mitigate the effects of future flooding in the area.
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6.4 The Taskforce heard from a broad spectrum of individuals and
community representatives, and it was clear from the evidence
provided that the flooding impacted on many aspects of life in the
county.
6.5 The main consequence of the November flooding however was the
loss of some key roads infrastructure which, given the topography of
the area, had a disproportionate effect on the community. This
resulted in a wide variety of impacts including isolation of families;
significant problems for people commuting to work and taking children
to school; problems for care and emergency workers accessing
vulnerable people; access difficulties for farmers in tending their
livestock; damage to agricultural land; and economic losses to the
business and commerce sectors arising from increased operating costs
and lost trade.
Figure 1. A number of key roads were flooded.
6.6 The prolonged duration of these impacts undoubtedly put an additional
strain on those directly affected. Many of those who gave evidence
mentioned the stress they had been under while dealing with the
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consequences of the flooding and the resultant hardship both in
economic and social terms that had been caused.
Social / Welfare Impacts
Access
6.7 A number of homes, mainly but not exclusively around the shores of
Upper Lough Erne, were entirely cut off by the flood water. Access to
these properties was possible only by tractor or boat, which carried its
own inherent dangers as it became increasingly difficult to determine
the path of lanes and roads when the flood waters rose. This caused
significant disruption to normal life for those involved.
Figure 2. Homes cut off by flood water.
6.8 It was reported that some entire families had to leave their homes for a
period of time, while others were separated with some family members
remaining behind in the home. There were other instances cited of
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individuals with care responsibilities for elderly relatives living nearby
being unable to make the necessary journey due to the height of the
flood waters.
Figure 3. Significant areas of countryside flooded.
6.9 Some of those in the affected areas mentioned that they had to leave
their cars some distance from their homes at the edge of the flood
waters, and before going to work each morning had to wade through
the flood, change their clothes at the car before driving to work, and
then repeat the process on the journey home.
Schools
6.10 Families also detailed the difficulties faced in taking children to nursery
groups and schools. While geographically separated from Lough Erne,
the hazards of having to take young children through flood water were
mentioned in particular by parents of children from Killyhommon
Primary School in Boho. Other problems encountered in this area
concerned children being subjected to long detours before reaching the
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school. In the case of the Moat Primary School, Lisnaskea, a
temporary school was established in the church hall in Teemore to
facilitate children who would otherwise have had to travel from
Teemore to Lisnaskea via a long detour considered too arduous for
such young children to make. The impact of this disruption to the
school system was all the more acute in light of the school transfer
tests taking place during November.
Care of the Vulnerable
6.11 There was real concern expressed about the difficulties experienced by
care workers accessing the homes of the vulnerable and the elderly
who relied on their assistance on a daily basis. Examples were given
of patients who, because of difficulties with the provision of their care,
had to be moved to alternative locations away from their familiar
surroundings. In one instance, this was achieved only with the most
extreme difficulty. In a similar vein, residents in rural locations
expressed concern about the ability of the emergency services to
access their homes had an emergency situation arisen during the
flooding.
Animal Welfare
6.12 Animal welfare concerns were raised by members of the farming
community who had experienced real and prolonged difficulties
providing feedstuffs and dealing with sick animals in areas cut off by
flood water. In one case, difficulties in accessing stock to provide
veterinary care were evident.
Public Health
6.13 The effects of the flooding and its duration raised some public health
concerns. Residents in some locations reported that no refusecollections were made by Fermanagh District Council during the
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flooding period. Farmers were concerned about delays in the
collection of dead stock due to the difficulties in collection lorries
gaining access to farms. Those from more built-up areas were
concerned about contamination of the flood water with sewage, given
that local people had no option but to wade through this on a regular
basis.
6.14 In rural areas, some slurry tanks were reported to have become
flooded, resulting in slurry mixing with the flood water.
Rural Communities
6.15 It was contended that the flooding, while worse than usual in
November, was something that occurred in Fermanagh on a fairly
frequent basis. Residents of the village of Boho, some six miles from
Lough Erne, raised concerns with the Taskforce about the long term
impact this could have on the viability of this small rural community.
6.16 The Taskforce heard evidence that both the nursery facility and the
primary school in Boho were accessible only with extreme difficulty for
a large part of November. Functions in the community centre also had
to be cancelled, which represented a significant loss of revenue for the
centre. In all three cases, concerns were expressed that if their
facilities developed a reputation for being difficult to access, and were
therefore unreliable, for example in terms of being able to provide an
appropriate level of schooling in the case of the Killyhommon Primary
School, then the public might be tempted to look elsewhere for school
placements or community activities. If this were to happen, the
damage to the community would be severe and lasting. These
concerns are likely to be reflected in other parts of the county.
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Economic Impacts
6.17 The significant access and travel problems experienced inevitably had
an economic impact for those affected, and the evidence provided by
all sectors bore this assertion out.
Farming Sector
6.18 The Taskforce heard evidence from farmers that animals that would
normally have been grazing outside had had to be housed early, so
depleting winter feed stocks which then had to be replaced at extra
cost to the farmer. Loss of revenue was reported from the inability of
milk tankers to get through the flood waters to make collections from a
dairy farm, and consequently milk output was lost. There were also
concerns expressed about potentially reduced productivity of summer
grassland as a result of land being under water for a significant period
of time.
Figure 4. Access issues for farmers.
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Commerce and Business Sectors
6.19 The commercial sector reported significant loss of trade due to reduced
footfall in Enniskillen and in surrounding towns such as Lisnaskea,
coupled with a concern that once customers had by necessity taken
their custom elsewhere they would not return. The reduction in the
number of shoppers was attributed to a variety of causes, including the
loss of key transport routes preventing people travelling to the usual
shopping destinations, the (associated) severe traffic congestion in
Enniskillen, and a widespread public perception that shops in the areas
worst affected by the flooding would not be open. It was felt by some
shop keepers that this perception may have been exacerbated by
media coverage that was considered by some to have overstated the
actual problems in the area. Traders at Derrychara Link Road reported
an average loss of turnover in the region of 60 - 90% as a
consequence of customers not being able to gain access to their
premises. They also held the view that ‘roads closed’ signage in the
vicinity of their retail premises gave the false impression to potential
customers that their businesses were closed due to the flooding.
Figure 5. Flooding at Derrychara Link
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6.20 There were significant concerns expressed about extra costs incurred
by the business sector due to increased travel to work time for staff –
some workers were forced to undertake detours of approximately
twenty miles. The taskforce heard that inward and outward deliveries
from business premises were similarly disrupted, with lengthy detours
adding significantly to fuel costs. On occasions, deliveries had had to
be aborted due to flood water levels. It was pointed out to the
Taskforce that the main route to Belfast and Larne via Lisnaskea
remained passable to large lorries, but had the situation worsened all
this heavy goods traffic would have had to pass through Enniskillen,
adding further to the already severe congestion and exacerbating
losses to this sector from missed delivery targets.
Figure 6. Challenges faced by local traffic.
6.21 It was estimated by representatives of the business and commerce
sector that on average the retail sector lost sales of around 15-20%;
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the distribution sector some 30%; the hospitality sector (which was
particularly affected by reduced cross-border trade) 35-50%; and
wholesalers around 20-25%. It was reported that while most locally
manufactured product was successfully delivered the real issue for the
manufacturing sector was higher costs, with a notable increase in
labour and fuel costs in particular.
Reputational Damage
6.22 Evidence provided to the Taskforce also identified the reputational
damage that flooding events such as these can have on the
Fermanagh area especially if, as has been the case in the last two to
three years in the Boho area, they occur on a regular basis. It was also
asserted that local entrepreneurs and inward investment projects alike
could potentially be deterred from establishing in Fermanagh if it were
to become known as an area that can at times be difficult to access, or
that is a relatively expensive area from which to do business.
6.23 Reputational damage is also a potentially significant problem for the
thriving local tourism industry, a key element of the economy in
Fermanagh worth some £33million per annum (2008). Facilities such
as the Share Centre near Lisnaskea suffered considerably during the
floods, both in terms of access to the site and the damage to buildings
and equipment by the flood waters. Although the flooding did not take
place during the shoulder or peak tourism periods, the Taskforce was
informed that cancelled bookings and/or loss of facilities have the
potential to impact on business viability in the longer term.
ISSUES RAISED
6.24 In addition to providing a detailed insight into the impacts and
consequences of the flooding from the perspective of those directly
affected, the evidence sessions also gave local people the opportunityto make suggestions regarding their perceptions of the causes of the
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flooding and potential improvement works which they felt would
mitigate the impact of future flooding.
6.25 The suggestions thus made centred around four main themes, namely:
¾ Management of the Erne System;
¾ Flood Mitigation;
¾ Essential Services; and
¾ Communication and Public Awareness
Each of these four themes is considered in detail below.
Management of the Erne System
6.26 There was a general belief evident among many of those giving
evidence to the Taskforce that the management of the Lough Erne
system should be pursued more proactively by the relevant agencies,
and that the statutory provisions of the Erne Drainage and
Development Act (Northern Ireland) 1950 which, inter alia, governs the
levels of the Lough, should be reviewed to ensure that they remained
relevant and adequate for current needs. More specifically,
representatives of the farming community requested that consideration
be given to lowering the levels of the Lough by 600mm (2 feet).
6.27 The power generation activities of the Electricity Supply Board at the
Ballyshannon and Cliff hydroelectric power stations were widely
queried in terms of any detrimental impact they may have on the quick
and efficient drainage of the Erne System.
6.28 Queries were also raised about the silting up of the Lough and therivers flowing into it, including the Finn, Sillees and Colebrooke, and
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there was a consensus that more dredging was required to improve
drainage and alleviate flood risk from Lough Erne. Coupled with this
however, there was a widely expressed perception that any such river
maintenance would be hampered by environmental considerations.
6.29 Given these concerns, it is important that there is a clear understanding
of the operating regime for Lough Erne, how it is implemented, and by
whom. The following section provides that information, thereby
addressing the issues raised by local people in this regard during the
evidence gathering sessions.
The Erne System and Operating Regime
6.30 The statutory arrangements for the operation of the Erne System are
set out in ‘The Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland)
1950‘. This legislation prescribed higher and lower water levels for the
loughs; trigger levels for control; and the extensive works required to
facilitate the Erne Summer Relief Scheme to improve drainage in the
area and give effect to the lowering of lough levels.
6.31 The works carried out in the 1950s entailed major improvements to the
inter-lough and Belleek channels and the construction of new dams
and hydro power stations at Cliff and Ballyshannon in County Donegal.
A new control structure was also constructed on the inter-lough
channel at Portora in Enniskillen, primarily to prevent the upper lough
draining down under the improved drainage regime. Each element of
the scheme was designed to accommodate sufficient flow so that,
combined with the storage in the system, flooding would occur only
during extreme rainfall events. Such events would have to be of
significant duration and would almost certainly be restricted to winter
when the impact on crops or livestock would be minimal.
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6.32 In terms of lough management, the statutory upper limit for the Lower
Lough is that it should not exceed 46.33 metres (152 feet) above
Ordnance Datum (OD) Poolbeg, Dublin1. There is no statutory upper
limit for the Upper Lough but the legislation states that the water level
should not, if reasonably preventable, exceed 46.94 metres (154 feet)
above OD Poolbeg in summer and 47.24 metres (155 feet) above OD
Poolbeg in winter.
6.33 The Rivers Agency and the Electricity Supply Board endeavour to
control the loughs within operational bands that have been set within
the wider legislative limits. Water levels are monitored daily and
regular contact is maintained between the Electricity Supply Board and
Rivers Agency. The operating regime adhered to has been agreed
with various interest groups since the 1950s. Essentially, water levels
are maintained at a level during the summer months to take account of
boating interests - these water levels are then lowered in October to
maximise storage prior to autumn/winter when rainfall is generally
greater. It is important to note that it is not always possible to draw
down the lough levels in October as this is dependent on rainfall,
although the minimum level (that is to say the statutory level in the
Upper Lough and the operational level in the Lower Lough) was
achieved in October 2009.
6.34 The outflow from the system is controlled at Cliff where some 230 m3/s
can be passed through the turbines. Additional flow of 100m3/s can be
passed through spillways which act as a safety valve and are designed
to accommodate a 1 in 10,000 year event ie the structure at Cliff (and
Cathaleen’s Falls) is capable of passing greater flows than can actually
be delivered by the channels.
6.35 Flow in the Belleek channel is determined by the head differential
between the lower lough and the water level immediately upstream of
1 To convert Poolbeg OD to Belfast OD deduct 2.82 metres (9.25 feet).
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the dam at Cliff. The water level at Cliff is drawn down to the lowest
possible level when it is required to maximise flows in the outfall
channel. When the lower lough is in the low to medium range the flow
produced in the channel can be accommodated through the turbines.
The Act defines trigger levels for spilling at Cliff and Cathaleen’s Falls -
the legislative trigger level is reached when the lower lough is within six
inches of its upper statutory limit and flow in the channel has
significantly exceeded the capacity of the turbines. Spilling could occur
earlier but this would have little impact on peak lough levels during
extreme events. Flow in the Belleek channel increases as the head
differential between the lower lough and Cliff increases.
6.36 The capacity of the channels, namely the inter lough channel and the
Belleek Channel, is the major restricting factor in the discharge of water
from the Erne System. Both have capacities that accommodate
sufficient flow under normal circumstances and this, combined with the
storage in the lough system, means that significant flooding occurs only
in extreme circumstances. Works to increase the capacities of the
channels would cost tens of millions of pounds and would not be
economically or environmentally viable.
6.37 In summary the design capacities of the power stations at Cliff and
Cathaleen’s Falls coupled with the spillage capacities at the dams are
such that they can effectively disperse the maximum amount of water
that can be conveyed to them through the Belleek Channel. In practice,
during the November flooding some 385m3/s were actually being
discharged from the system due to the unprecedented head differential
across the system.
6.38 It is worth noting that had the rainfall event of October and November
2009 occurred prior to the current regime being in place, lough levels
would have reached even higher levels.
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Operation of the Erne System in October – November 2009
6.39 The operation of the Lough Erne system during October and November
2009 is reported in detail in the Rivers Agency Report annexed to this
report, but it is important to outline here the chain of events which
occurred during that period, and what actions were taken to alleviate
the effects of the flood waters at each step.
6.40 Higher minimum lough levels are maintained during the summer
months to facilitate navigation and other interests. Levels are reduced
to the lowest achievable level from 1 October to allow for winter
storage. While this is not always possible due to autumn rainfall
patterns, it was achieved in October 2009 because the first half of the
month was virtually dry.
6.41 The overall rainfall in Fermanagh during October was only 1 % higher
than the Long Term Average for that month. However, it is important to
note that the bulk of the rainfall, some 95%, occurred after 16 October
2009.
6.42 From 1 October – 17 October 2009, which was the period just prior to
the persistent rainfall, lough levels were managed by opening the
gates at Portora fully from 1 October to assist in drawing down the
Upper Lough level to maximise winter storage. The gates were then
closed between 7 and 14 October to maintain the Upper Lough above
the minimum prescribed level and were then gradually opened again
from 14 October to control flows between the loughs.
6.43 From 18 October to 4 November 2009, which was a period of
persistent rain, the inflow to the Erne System exceeded the outflow and
the water levels in both loughs continued to rise. The gates at Portora
were fully opened on 25 October.
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6.44 On 4 November both loughs were below the targeted winter levels and
no flooding occurred other than from the Sillees River at Boho, which
was not caused by rising lough levels.
6.45 As conditions for spilling from the lough were reached on 5 November
2009 ESB in consultation with Rivers Agency commenced spilling at
Cliff from that date. With the gates at Portora open and spillage and
generation of power being undertaken to maximise possible outflow,
this had the desired effect of slowing down the rise of the water level in
the Upper Lough. Initially the spilling caused the levels in the Lower
Lough to reduce but then the rainfall intensified from the 14 November
with some 53.2mm recorded at Portora in the following five days.
Consequently the level of the Lower Lough started to rise again and
exceeded its upper limit on 19 November 2009 before peaking some
0.4m above this level on 27 November 2009.
6.46 The initial lowering of the Lower Lough eventually stabilised the level in
the Upper Lough just below the winter limit but the increase in intensity
of rainfall from 14 November caused the level in the Upper Lough to
rise sharply, eventually peaking on 26 November (some 1.03m above
the prescribed limit).
6.47 This sharp and exceptional rise in levels resulted in flooding, with
Roads Service reports indicating the occurrence of road flooding
mainly around the Upper Lough and the Boho area from 18 November
2009.
6.48 From 27 November 2009 both the Upper and Lower Lough levels
started to fall.
Reduction of Water Levels
6.49 The rationale for the Erne System and the current operating regime isthat it provides a suitable level of flood protection while considering and
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accommodating the widespread interests across the Fermanagh
community from farming to the water-based tourism industry. It also
takes into account the need to prevent exposure of building
foundations in Enniskillen.
6.50 Waterways Ireland (WI) is the navigation authority with the statutory
function to manage the navigation for the Upper Lough, Inter-lock
Channel and Lower Lough and is opposed to lowering of the summer
operational level of Lough Erne. Advice from WI indicates that any
significant lowering of water levels would have a severe impact on
facilities both public and private, and would in particular have a
catastrophic effect on boating related tourism activities with some
5,000 boats on Lough Erne and a further 7,000 on linked waterways.
Reduced recreational activity would cause economic decline in some
areas.
6.51 WI has assessed that the main impacts of lowering Lough levels would
be:
• the widespread fragmentation and isolation of navigational
infrastructure located around the mainland shore and on some
islands, as a result of inadequate depths for navigation in critical
areas;
• the need for dredging works in an environmentally sensitive area to
re-establish connectivity between channels which would introduce
significant financial demands. Where the extent of work required is
prohibitive, sections of the navigation may have to be abandoned
and access to the islands on the Upper Lough could be severely
restricted;
• the requirement to modify numerous public and private navigational
facilities (marinas, boat hire bases, slipways, jetties) developed
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since the Shannon – Erne Waterway was opened as the water-line
retreats. Public and private slipways on the Erne System, the
Woodford River (Shannon Erne Waterway) up to Lock 1 and on the
River Erne (and on any other tributaries that may have such
services) would be affected;
• changes to the navigation of the River Erne. The lowering of the
water level would create additional shallow areas which would
require navigation markers and possibly relocation of the existing
markers. Foalies Cut, which was opened at considerable expense
in the 1990’s would be affected and would have to be re-excavated
or abandoned. Abandonment would mean that boats would have
to travel around by Crom to travel from the River Erne and Quivvy
Waters to the Shannon – Erne Waterway. This detour would also
inconvenience future users of the Ulster Canal link to Clones;
• the lock at Enniskillen would require major works to ensure that
navigation is maintained to existing depths;
• there would be a direct impact on the Shannon-Erne Waterway up
to Lock 1 which is partially in Fermanagh and Cavan. The channel
would become shallower and dredging would therefore probably be
required up to Lock 1. The lock itself would be impacted as
lowering the water level in the lough would decrease the depth over
the lower sill and floor of the lock chamber - the navigation criteria
for this important link waterway would thus be affected. The lock
would have to be deepened to maintain the existing draft criteria;
• the public facilities by WI at Aghalane (jetty, slipway) would be
impacted and the slipway there would have to be modified. The
ground at the Aghalane facility is already very weak and the banks
of the river would be under threat at lower levels. This could
require major civil engineering works to stabilise the banks and
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excavate the bed in difficult conditions and would add further to the
maintenance requirement in the future; and
• the shallower depths of the loughs and rivers would lead to
increased aquatic weed growth which would restrict navigation and
create a significant maintenance burden in an environmentally
sensitive area.
6.52 The view that any reduction to the statutory levels would have a
detrimental effect on boating and water-related tourism was also
expressed by representatives of the Inland Waterways Association of
Ireland at the public evidence session on 11 January 2010.
6.53 Furthermore, Inland Fisheries of the Department of Culture Arts and
Leisure has advised that any significant lowering of levels could have a
detrimental impact on fish stocks and angling tourism, as low water
levels are generally much more detrimental to fish survival than high
levels. In addition the viability of existing fishing jetties would also be
compromised.
6.54 Rivers Agency has advised that it would be possible to draw Lough
levels down towards the lower statutory limits in the summer. This
would provide additional storage throughout the summer and would
increase the probability of having maximum storage available for the
winter period. However, this would increase the risk of extremely low
water levels should drought conditions arise, would severely damage
the water based leisure and tourism in the terms described above, and
would have a detrimental impact on the natural environment, the
importance of which has been recognised by environmental
designations around the Lough. Alternatively, the Agency has advised
that consideration could be given to bringing the winter drawdown
forward to improve the chances of achieving maximum storage.
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6.55 The Lough Erne Management Co-ordinating Committee is chaired by
Fermanagh District Council and comprises representatives from
government departments and public bodies with responsibilities and
interests in Lough Erne. The Lough Erne Advisory Committee
comprises representatives from a broad spectrum of user groups.
These two committees represent all interests and activities associated
with Lough Erne, and they should be actively engaged in any
consideration of change to water level management of the Erne
system.
Watercourse Maintenance and Dredging
6.56 The Rivers Agency inspects the Lough system and conducts essential
maintenance required to ensure free flow in accordance with the
arrangements set out in the Rivers Agency Watercourse Maintenance
Manual. The Agency also has an established maintenance cycle in
place for the Finn, the Sillees and the Colebrooke rivers, where
desilting is undertaken as required to facilitate drainage. The water
storage capacity between the upper and lower levels in the Lough
system is not affected by siltation, as any water displaced by siltation
or infilling during dry conditions would simply flow out of the Lough at
its outlet. The volume of storage in the Lough refers to the capacity to
hold water above the normal water level. Inflows in the Erne during
wet spells can greatly exceed the possible outflow, the net short term
result of which is that water levels will rise and the additional volume of
water will be stored in the Lough until the rain stops, the inflow reduces
to match outflow and the Lough returns to its normal dry weather level.
6.57 Much of the Lough, particularly the Upper Lough, is covered by natural
conservation designations, either as Natura 2000 Special Areas of
Conservation (SACs) or Special Protection Areas (SPAs) under the EU
Habitats Directive, and Areas of Special Scientific Interest (ASSIs)
under the Environment Order. It is important that all maintenancecarried out takes account of these designations. In addition, flood
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alleviation work could have the ecological impact of reducing fish
stocks, and could detrimentally affect angling tourism. Of particular
concern would be dredging of rivers that support trout spawning and of
lake margins that support pike and coarse fish spawning.
6.58 Given the varied ecological and environmental impacts Rivers Agency
has an in-house conservation team which provides advice on these
aspects of its routine maintenance programme. In addition, the Rivers
Agency consults the NI Environment Agency on the annual planned
maintenance programme. Because of this close liaison between the
two agencies and adherence to the legislative requirements, the NI
Environment Agency has not turned down any request from Rivers
Agency in relation to river / lough maintenance to reduce flood risk in
the past two years. In addition, Rivers Agency in consultation with the
NI Environment Agency has drawn up eight agreements in relation to
ten watercourses within the Lough Erne catchment area. The
Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure is also consulted by Rivers
Agency regarding possible impact on fish stocks.
6.59 Rivers Agency is not responsible for dredging works for navigation
purposes, which now rests with Waterways Ireland. Waterways
Ireland has confirmed that since it was established in 2000 it has not
carried out any dredging works on the Erne system but that some
isolated spots may require attention in the future to remove silt from the
navigation channel and restore navigation depth.
Flood Mitigation
6.60 As highlighted earlier in this report, the main impact of the November
2009 flooding was the loss of critical transport routes as a
consequence of flooded roads and the resultant severe congestion in
Enniskillen as traffic converged on the town as other routes became
impassable. Many of those giving evidence called for significantimprovements to the roads infrastructure to ensure that a number of
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key routes were kept open and passable.
6.61 The frequency of flooding in Fermanagh was also mentioned by some
of those giving evidence. In particular, the residents of Boho stated
their strongly held view that the Sillees River should be diverted via
Bunahone and Churchill into Lough Erne in an attempt to mitigate the
repeated flooding in the area. In a similar vein the traders at
Derrychara Link Road, Enniskillen, suggested that a dyke be erected to
protect the road from the frequent inundation from Lough Erne.
Roads Infrastructure
6.62 Over the course of the last ten years the Department for Regional
Development Roads Service has invested in excess of £200,000 in
managing flood risk in various areas of Fermanagh. In addition, in 2007
the agency contributed £180,000 to a £540,000 scheme (the remainder
was privately funded) to provide piled foundations for the roundabout at
Erneside Shopping Centre, Enniskillen to prevent progressive
settlement and reduce flood risk.
6.63 Some of the roads identified during the evidence gathering were
actually raised previously in an attempt to alleviate flooding. However,
there has been a tendency for the roads to sink back down to the
original level again as a consequence of poor underlying ground
conditions. For example, the Samsonagh Road has been raised on
three occasions in the last 15 years, most recently in 2009. In cases
such as this the additional weight of the material used to raise the road
accelerates future settlement. This is not always the case however -
the road at Cloghane Bridge for example was raised in around 2000
and has remained at its elevated level without subsequent problems.
6.64 Following the November 2009 flooding Roads Service carried out an
assessment of the merits of raising the various flood affected roads inthe area, including a comparison of the impact of such works so that in
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the event of specific additional funding being made available it can be
targeted at those projects that would yield most benefit. In the absence
of such funding, Roads Service has stressed that it cannot justify
diverting existing limited roads funding to elevate roads that are
vulnerable to flooding for a few days in the year but are otherwise in
reasonable condition, at the expense of other roads that are in poor
condition for 12 months in the year.
6.65 The assessment by Roads Service was based on a number of factors
– the cost of associated works; ground conditions; traffic volumes using
the road and inconvenience when closed. In the event of funding being
made available to alleviate hardship resulting from a similar flooding
event in the future, this prioritisation may be used as a guide to identify
those roads where the greatest benefit may be derived.
The schemes regarded by Roads Service as higher priority based on
the above factors are:
1. B127 New Bridge Road at Share Centre
This road carries approximately 3,000 vehicles per day and is a
strategic east-west link across Upper Lough Erne. It is used by many
businesses in the area and it is important that in the event of a similar
flood event such disruption should not be experienced.
2. Quay Pass at Erneside / Derrychara
This road leading to the Erneside area of Enniskillen is a major link for
retail shoppers and if closed can quickly cause gridlock across the
town. This is a concern for emergency services and results in a loss of
business trade. In November 2009 it was necessary to create a
temporary causeway to raise the road above the level of the flood
water when it became clear that pumping operations would eventually
fail. It is proposed that the final surfacing should be established at this
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level, raising footpaths and incorporating measures to prevent flood
inundation in a similar flood event.
3. B533 Wattlebridge Road at Derrykerrib
This is a major cross border arterial route for south Fermanagh,
carrying approximately 5,000 vehicles per day. It is also an east – west
link of particular importance to business traffic and cross-border
shoppers. It is proposed to raise the road sufficiently to prevent a
recurrence of the problems encountered in November 2009.
4. C436 Inishmore Road
This is also a key link road across the River Erne and used by many
commuters. Its closure, especially when other river crossings must also
be closed, causes major disruption to many road users. It is proposed
to have this short section of road elevated to prevent a recurrence.
5. B36 Monaghan Road, Roslea
This road frequently floods at a location close to the entrance into
Springdale Estate, as a result of water levels in the River Finn. The
only convenient diversion route is by unsuitable minor roads which
causes difficulty for road users.
6. Derrychara Link Road
This road was severely flooded during this period causing severe
disruption for those businesses located on the road. It also caused
considerable disruption to school transport services where access to
regular bus embarkation points was prevented. The relocation of these
services also adversely impacted on traffic around Enniskillen. In 2005
Derrychara Link Road was raised by up to 450mm - to a level
exceeding previous flood levels. Unfortunately the flood of 2009
significantly exceeded all previous floods and resulted in the road being
impassable for several weeks. The road is supported on a former lake
bed so ground conditions along the road are exceedingly poor, with theresult that adding additional weight is not considered a good use of
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funds. The estimated cost of piling the road is in excess of £1m, and
would not be cost effective.
It may be feasible to isolate the Derrychara / Erneside area from Lough
Erne in the event of a repeat flood event to prevent flood inundation of
the area. A feasibility study of this option by Rivers Agency and Roads
Service is proposed for 2011. In the meantime, some containment
measures are proposed prior to winter 2010.
7. The Sillees River (Boho Area)
The community of Boho, situated on the flood plain of the Sillees River,
is in a different situation to the other flooding locations. While the 2009
flood on the Erne system was a one in a hundred year event, the
Sillees River comes into flood most years - often on more than one
occasion. The flooding of surrounding roads has caused major
disruption, including the temporary closure of the local Primary School.
Some of the roads have previously been raised at locations prone to
flooding and have been successful, while others quickly settle back to
their ‘normal’ level. The Samsonagh Road has been raised on three
occasions in the last 15 years, most recently in 2009. It has always
been recognised that it was not feasible to raise the road sufficiently to
remain clear of all floods, such is the swell of the river at this point. The
works have however greatly reduced the number of days the road
proved impassable.
It is not considered feasible to raise the Samsonagh Road any further
at this stage. However, it is proposed to raise two sections of the
Lisdead Road and also the Crott Road and the Drumanure Road,
which are the main feeder roads to Killyhommen Primary School.
8. The Finn River (Newtownbutler Area)
The Finn River is also prone to come into flood most winters, affectinga number of roads in the border region south of Newtownbutler. In
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2009 as many as nine sections of public road were under water,
causing considerable hardship for the residents. It is proposed to raise
a number of the following roads where the greatest inconvenience was
experienced:
Cloncallick Road at Farmhill Cloncallick Road at Keelaghy Carra Road at Clonfad Teer Road at Teer Teer Road at Clonrye Derrykerrib Road near Derrykerrib Bridge Annies Bridge Road near the bridge Clonelty Road at Leitrim Clonkee Road at Cavanagh Drumboghanagh Road at Drumboghanagh Drumcrin Road at Clonshannagh.
9. Rossmacaffry Road
Although not a ‘through-road’ the Rossmacaffry Road serves
approximately 12 families and several farms/businesses. During the
2009 floods this road was flooded at three locations. The first two
locations were relatively shallow (approx 450mm) over a short length
but disrupted a large number of people. The third location was flooded
over 1 metre deep over a longer distance but inconvenienced fewer
people.
It is proposed to raise the level of the road at the first two locations, but
given the length and depth of road affected it is not cost effective to
raise the road at the third location. However, it is proposed to put in
place some measures to ease the inconvenience to users of this
section of the road in the event of any future flooding. Specifically, it is
proposed to create an earthen bund between the road and the river
where it runs close to the road to prevent the type of ‘cross current’ that
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was experienced during this flood. It is also proposed to plant a row of
trees along the verge at this location to serve as road markers.
10. Other roads
The following roads were also affected by flooding and will be
considered for treatment, subject to the availability of funding:
C448 Glennashaaver Road at Churchill
C431 Teemore Road at Derrymacausey
U9408 Kinmore Road
U9247 Innishrooske Road
U9445 Rossmacole Road
U8530 Drumanure Road
B81 Caldrum Road
U9249 Geaglum Road
U8183 Graffy Road
U9136 Ballyhoe Road
6.66 Traffic congestion in Enniskillen itself was greatly exacerbated by the
loss of key transport routes during the November flooding and so there
were calls during the evidence sessions for the construction of a
southern by-pass for Enniskillen to be completed by 2014. A proposal
for a southern by-pass road is included in the Department for Regional
Development’s Investment Delivery Plan for Roads 2008-2018 with
construction envisaged in the 2014 to 2018 timeframe. The route
selection process is currently underway and it is intended that the
Preferred Corridor for the proposed Southern By-Pass will be
announced later this year.
Drainage Infrastructure
6.67 The Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development,
has invested significantly in major flood alleviation and drainageinfrastructure schemes in the Fermanagh area. Examples include:
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• the Maguiresbridge Flood Alleviation Scheme (2001/02) - cost
£1.3 million;
•the Enniskillen, Drumgay Lake Drain (2004/05) - cost £450k;
• the Enniskillen, Killynure Lough Drain (2007/08) - cost £3 million.
6.68 In addition, approximately £1 million is spent annually on the
maintenance of assets, the regulation of watercourses and the
provision of advice to reduce flooding risk in Fermanagh.
6.69 The frequent flooding at Boho is a result of the Sillees River going out
of bank. The Sillees River rises in the hills north west of Derrygonnelly
and flows for the most part through a relatively flat valley to discharge
into the River Erne a short distance from Enniskillen. The river
catchment is a naturally scenic area. The upper few kilometres of the
river have a good hydraulic gradient but there is a stretch of the river
about 6 kilometres long with a very slack gradient (estimated at
1:6000). This causes a slow flow of river waters with the surrounding
land becoming inundated with floodwater on a regular basis and the
consequent problems of roads becoming impassable for a number of
days/weeks. The gradient over the final few kilometres of the river is
quite good and consequently the level of the Erne System has a
minimal effect on the rate of discharge.
6.70 The recurring flooding in the area is caused by a prolonged period of
rain or an intense short duration storm coinciding with already high
water levels. The frequency of these periods of flooding causes
serious disruption to the local community. Rivers Agency previously
conducted a feasibility study to investigate the potential to relieve the
flooding difficulties in the Boho area associated with the Sillees River.
Solutions to upgrade the watercourse and to divert headwaters into the
Lower Lough Erne were examined. It was concluded however that this
solution was not viable as the works involved would require extensive
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tunnelling in an area of porous limestone geology with costs in the
region of £6-10 million. However, as detailed at paragraph 6.65 it is
possible that works to the roads infrastructure in the Boho area could
be conducted to mitigate the impact of flooding in the area.
6.71 More widely, the Taskforce notes that Fermanagh is part of the North
Western River Basin District, and a Flood Risk Management Plan will
be developed for the entire River Basin District (RBD). As this is also
one of our two International RBDs this work will involve cross-border
co-ordination. It is envisaged that a sub-plan will be developed for
Fermanagh in the longer term.
Essential Services
6.72 There was considerable concern expressed by those who gave
evidence about the difficulties in ensuring emergency / health and care
services for vulnerable people; continued education provision for local
children; postal deliveries; and other essential services from locations
isolated by the flooding. Questions were asked about how the
responsible authorities would ensure the continued provision of such
services during times of severe flooding. In light of the problems with
service delivery, some residents and traders have requested a rebate
of their rates for the period of the flooding.
6.73 In addition, there were calls for remedial action to be taken in respect
of the resilience of the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works. This arose
from fears that the Treatment Works was almost overwhelmed by the
flooding and had this happened much of Enniskillen would have been
without drinking water.
6.74 Poor mobile phone coverage in rural areas was also mentioned in
terms of the safety of people necessarily travelling through the floods
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becoming stranded but unable to call for assistance due to poor phone
reception.
Emergency Services and Care of the Vulnerable
6.75 The NI Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) has contingency plans in
place for major flood events. All operational personnel have received
training in Level 1 Water Rescue Response and all front-line pumping
appliances carry water rescue equipment for initial response to
stabilise and/or rescue persons in distress. In addition, 48 personnel
have received specialist training to perform swift-water rescue
operations across NI in the event of flood emergencies.
6.76 The NIFRS also has a Specialist Rescue Team, acknowledged as one
of the premier specialist teams in Europe, and this team is capable of
performing high risk search operations and water rescue in all
conditions. This team is equipped with a range of water rescue boats,
rescue sleds and water rescue equipment in addition to high-risk
search equipment including night vision goggles, thermal imaging
search cameras and specialist GIS and mapping equipment.
6.77 The NIFRS was actively involved during the November 2009 flooding.
Members of the Specialist Rescue Team (full-time firefighters from
Belfast) were deployed to Fermanagh to stand-by in Lisnaskea Fire
Station for 6 days. During their time in Fermanagh they carried out a
number of reconnaissance and high-risk search operations. In
addition, all the fire stations in Fermanagh were called out to assist with
public safety, pumping out flooded property and generally providing a
reassuring presence in the areas worst affected.
6.78 The NI Ambulance Service (NIAS) deployed 4x4 vehicles to the
flooded areas to ensure that response times for the provision of 24/7
emergency medical care were met. In addition, a station officer in ahigh sided four wheel drive vehicle was temporarily moved into Omagh
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Station, to manage the situation as it changed on an hourly basis. An
Assistant Emergency Planning Officer was tasked to co-ordinate with
the Emergency Service partners and social services on patient rescues
and to participate in teleconferences with all responding agencies.
6.79 The Western Health and Social Care Trust experienced difficulties
during the flooding in gaining access to vulnerable people in the
community. The Trust maintains various lists on which vulnerable
clients are noted and these are held by the relevant Directorate
Managers and can be accessed when required. During the
Fermanagh flooding a daily review of vulnerable clients within the
affected area took place. The Trust has reviewed its Major Emergency
Plan and awareness sessions for those staff with roles to play within a
major emergency and exercises to test the revised Plan are proposed
for later in the year. In the event of an emergency occurring in the
community, depending on the type of incident and the people involved,
the Trust will appoint a designated senior member of staff as a contact
point within the Trust. During the Fermanagh flooding a senior
member of staff participated in multi-agency Task Force meetings. The
Trust will also appoint a designated senior member of staff in the
locality of the incident, as it did during the Fermanagh Flooding, to
ensure the safe removal of vulnerable people. Trust staff will liaise and
work with the NIAS and NIFRS (and other agencies as appropriate) to
ensure that for its client groups, it could utilise any relevant externally
held and managed equipment. The Trust is currently exploring an
initial Memorandum of Understanding with the British Red Cross and is
continuing to work closely with NIAS and NIFRS and local Councils in
multi-agency planning groups to ensure preparedness. In addition, the
Trust has appointed a full-time Emergency Planning Officer to help with
all aspects of emergency preparedness.
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Supply of Potable Water
6.80 Northern Ireland Water (NIW) owns and operates the Killyhevlin Water
Treatment Works and has advised that they closely monitored the
levels in Lough Erne from mid-November onwards as they rose above
the Upper Lough Erne winter limit. On 20 November 2009 the levels
were only 75mm lower than the Clear Water Tank overflow level and
predicted to rise further. Significant ingress of water was visible into
the basement of the plant through ducts where seals were leaking due
to the excessive head of water. Without intervention there was the
distinct possibility of plant closure and the loss of the water supply to
Enniskillen and surrounding areas. Consequently, NIW took steps to
protect the works from the developing situation and successfully
managed through the period of the flood to ensure that output was
maintained. NIW intend to implement a programme of work during
2010 to remove the temporary works where appropriate and install
permanent infrastructure to allow future extreme flood events to be
better managed.
Education Provision
6.81 Contingency arrangements for the education of children in Teemore
were put in place when the Western Education and Library Board
(WELB) in conjunction with the Moat Primary School, Lisnaskea
established a temporary school in a local church hall while the main
route from Teemore to Lisnaskea was impassable due to flooding. The
WELB has confirmed that it has robust emergency and contingency
plans in place to facilitate the continuation of education provision within
WELB schools during any future serious flooding event.
Refuse and Fallen Animal Collections
6.82 In terms of industrial and commercial refuse collection the Departmentof the Environment (DOE) has advised that the timely collection of
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refuse from domestic and industrial premises during prolonged and
severe flooding would, in accordance with the relevant legislation, be
the responsibility of local authorities and private sector waste
operators. Accordingly, it is for local authorities to address the risk of
flooding and the impact on waste into their contingency arrangements.
The Department and the NI Environment Agency (NIEA) maintain close
contact with councils and will monitor the effectiveness of their
contingency arrangements in the event of further flooding, with a view
to issuing further guidance if necessary. The DOE, through NIEA,
would have a role to play in considering possible variations to waste
management permissions, authorisations or exemptions for waste
collectors and operators to allow timely collection, temporary storage
and movement of waste. This would have to be decided on a case by
case basis at the time, with the aim of minimising the impact on the
environment.
6.83 Fermanagh District Council has a Corporate Business Continuity Plan
detailing how the Council will respond in a major disruption to services,
and it has identified refuse collection as one of its priority areas in
these circumstances.
6.84 The Department for Agriculture and Rural Development has advised
that it received anecdotal evidence from the rendering plants which
dispose of fallen animals that there was no increase in the number of
fallen animals received during the flood period or immediately
afterwards, which suggests that this was not a significant problem.
However, it is acknowledged that individual farmers may have had
problems in having their fallen animals collected.
Mobile Phone Coverage
6.85 The Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment (DETI) has
advised that mobile phone coverage is poor in parts of Fermanagh as aconsequence of a combination of factors including topography, which
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limits the range of the cellular masts, and the low population density
which makes the area commercially unattractive to the private sector
mobile phone companies. There is no legal obligation to provide a
universal mobile phone service.
6.86 However, as part of current DETI plans to put increased pressure on
the regulator and mobile phone companies to improve coverage, and
separate to the work of the Flooding Taskforce, the Minister for
Enterprise, Trade and Investment has written to the communications
regulator OFCOM about mobile phone coverage in rural areas
generally.
6.87 OFCOM is currently undertaking research into this issue in conjunction
with interested stakeholders, including the mobile phone industry, to
scope creative solutions. However, providing improved mobile phone
coverage in Fermanagh is likely to require very substantial investment,
the extent of which is not yet known although each new mast can cost
£100,000. There may also be continued local resistance to the
construction of additional masts.
6.88 Given that there is no legal requirement for mobile phone companies to
provide universal coverage and that technically this would be both
difficult and very expensive to achieve it is unlikely that the mobile
operators would be able to justify the cost of providing complete
coverage of Fermanagh.
Refund of Rates
6.89 The Rates Collection Agency of the Department of Finance and
Personnel has advised that in terms of domestic rates there is no
provision within rating legislation to remit or reduce rating liability
unless the ratepayer finds himself/herself with a reduced income, in
which case he/she may be eligible for low income rate relief or rate
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rebate as part of Housing Benefit.
6.90 In terms of business premises, the Hardship Relief Scheme which
came into effect from 31 December 2005 allows the Department to
reduce rates to assist a business recover from a temporary crisis,
financial or otherwise as a result of exceptional and unforeseen
circumstances. The flooding in Fermanagh during November 2009
would fall into this category. However, it is extremely difficult to qualify
for this relief because the ratepayer must prove financial hardship,
which goes beyond calculation of loss and consideration must be given
to whether the ratepayer is in a financial position to recover.
6.91 In terms of the farming sector, as agricultural land and buildings are not
rated any rate relief would not benefit this sector.
Communication and Public Awareness
6.92 In terms of the response to the flooding the view was expressed that
there could have been better communication between the responding
organisations and the public. There were calls for arrangements to be
put in place to ensure the provision of adequate and timely information
to the public and that the responding organisations should ensure that
the public can access relevant officials at all times.
6.93 Some local traders accused the media of presenting a picture of a
‘siege mentality’ in the press and that this had discouraged trade by
giving potential customers that it was not ‘business as usual’. The view
was expressed that better liaison was required with the media to
prevent this from happening.
6.94 It was recognised by some of those giving evidence that there was a lot
of conjecture within the local community about the reasons for theflooding and what might feasibly have been done to prevent or alleviate
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it. In light of this it was suggested that an education programme on
Lough Erne and the management of the Erne System should be
developed and delivered to the local community, including school
children.
Public Contact Arrangements
6.95 Rivers Agency has advised that it assumed the lead role in dealing in
communications during the response to the flooding, giving some
thirteen interviews to television and radio and issuing thirty-two press
statements. The Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development also
gave six interviews and made three press statements. Roads Service
also participated in interviews and issued statements particularly in
regard to road closures. The Fermanagh Office of the Rivers Agency
received some 100 calls from the public seeking advice or information
about lough levels.
6.96 The Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) for the Western Group of
councils, in liaison with Fermanagh District Council’s Emergency
Planning Implementation Group, played a pivotal coordination role
during the flooding, including facilitating and chairing a co-ordinating
group via daily conference calls with all relevant agencies. The daily
conference calls proved to be a useful tool in keeping all organisations
up to date on the current status of the flooding, and ensured that the
public had access to the full range of advice and assistance available.
They also ensured that a co-ordinated response was provided to any
requests for information or assistance from those affected by the
flooding. The EPO prepared and issued press statements on behalf of
the multi-agency response group.
Media Liaison
6.97 In terms of dealing with traders’ concerns about media portrayal of asiege mentality during the flooding, the Executive Information Service,
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OFMDFM has advised that as was the case here key cohesive
communication messages should be developed as early as practicable
during the flooding incident and agreed with all stakeholders to ensure
commonality of communication. Those being interviewed and
providing information to the media could then actively promote and
reinforce the positive message that the town is open for business.
Raising Awareness about the Erne System
6.98 The Western Education and Library Board has indicated that it would
welcome working with Rivers Agency to prepare an educational
advisory teaching pack for schools on the Erne System. This will
facilitate the introduction and explanation of this subject within teaching
programmes for Fermanagh schools.
6.99 The Rivers Agency has already agreed to present to interested groups
on the operation of the Erne system and is considering the possibility of
drawing up a short brochure explaining how the Erne System works for
distribution in schools.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 It was clear that the extensive flooding in Fermanagh during November
2009 had a profound impact on the lives of those local people directly
affected at the time. Furthermore, the potential lasting impact of future
flooding was recognised.
Impacts of the Flooding
7.2 The large volume of evidence received graphically illustrated the very
considerable difficulties experienced in accessing homes, shops,
schools, farmland and businesses; problems in caring for the
vulnerable; public health concerns; animal welfare issues and wider
economic impacts. The potential for lasting damage from future
flooding to the viability of rural communities; the reputation of
Fermanagh as a tourist destination, and as a good place to do
business, was also evident. Given such substantial and potentially
long lasting consequences it is important that more is done to alleviate
the impact of future serious flooding in Fermanagh.
Management of the Erne System
7.3 In preparing for the future, it is important to be clear about why the
flooding occurred. Put simply, the flooding was as a direct
consequence of the very heavy and persistent rainfall in Fermanagh
during October and November 2009 which caused the volume of water
flowing into the Erne System to exceed that which could be stored and
discharged to the sea. It is of particular note that while the October
2009 rainfall was around average for the month, 95% of that rain fell
after 16 October.
7.4 The fact that the flooding occurred does not mean that the Erne
System itself is inadequate or that it was not properly managed at the
time of the flooding. The Erne System complies with the standards set
in the legislation. These standards establish a level of protectionagainst the likely or anticipated level of flooding for the area. It is
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possible that this level will be exceeded during extreme events and this
is what happened in November 2009. It would not be economically or
environmentally feasible to increase the capacity of the existing system
to a level where flooding from such extreme events could be
prevented. Neither does the balance of argument support the proposal
put forward by some residents to lower the existing Lough levels, given
the detrimental impact this would have on the natural environment and
on water-based tourism.
7.5 DARD Rivers Agency and the Electricity Supply Board managed the
System during October and November 2009 in accordance with the
Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland) 1950 and the
parameters of the Operating Regime applied under the Act. However,
given the impact of the November flooding event, an in depth review of
the Regime should be conducted to ensure that it adequately meets
modern day needs. This review should include the feasibility of
bringing forward the winter drawdown of Lough levels to maximise
storage.
Flood Mitigation
7.6 In recent years there has been investment in flood mitigation works to
protect people and property in Fermanagh. However, these works
should be enhanced to further alleviate the impact of serious flooding in
the area. This enhancement should, subject to sufficient funding being
made available, include works to key roads infrastructure (as detailed
at paragraph 6.65) in order to protect important transport and access
routes and to mitigate disruption in the Boho area. In addition the
feasibility of options for reducing flood risk at Derrychara Link,
Enniskillen should be examined.
Essential Services
7.7 Even though steps are taken to alleviate flooding risk in Fermanagh, it
cannot be prevented altogether and from time to time some flooding islikely to occur. Established practice is that areas prone to flooding are
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not developed. It is important that this practice should be maintained in
order to manage residual flood risk. In addition, while the efforts of the
responding organisations involved in dealing with the aftermath of the
November flooding are fully recognised, it is imperative that emergency
planning arrangements and networks are maintained. These should be
further developed where necessary to ensure that leadership
responsibilities are clear and fully understood in respect of future
flooding emergencies.
7.8 In mitigating the impact of future flooding on people’s daily lives steps
must be taken to protect essential service provision. This will include a
programme of works at the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works to
protect the public drinking water supply in Enniskillen. In addition,
steps must be taken to ensure robust contingency arrangements for
the continued provision of emergency / health care, education and
refuse collection are in place.
Communication and Public Awareness
7.9 Finally, it is key that the local community is as prepared as possible to
deal with any future flooding. It is important that the public have
accurate information about flood risk in the area, know what to do in a
flood situation and how to access help. All agencies involved in
managing flood risk and responding to flood emergencies should
continue in their efforts to provide easily understandable and
accessible information to the public in advance of and during flood
emergencies. In addition, current public concerns and misconceptions
about the Erne System must be addressed. This can best be done
through the provision of an education programme for local school
children, presentations and talks to local interest groups, and the
production of an Erne System information leaflet for distribution to
households in the Fermanagh area.
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 After examining all the evidence provided and considering the detailed
assessment of this evidence by the appropriate NI departments and
agencies the Flooding Taskforce has made the following
recommendations for action by the end of 2011. It is recommended
that:
Management of the Erne System
• An in depth review of the Operating Regime for the Erne System
should be conducted to ensure that the arrangements and
parameters for the management of the Erne System are adequate
to meet modern day needs. The Lough Erne Management Co-
ordinating Committee and the Lough Erne Advisory Committee
represent all interests and activities associated with Lough Erne,
and so should be actively engaged in this review process.
Flood Mitigation
• Subject to sufficient funding being secured, a programme of road
improvement works should be undertaken to include all the roads
identified in Section 6 paragraph 6.65 to reduce the likelihood of
loss of key transport and access routes.
• A feasibility study should be conducted to consider options for
reducing flood risk at Derrychara Link, Enniskillen. In the interim,
containment measures should be put in place prior to the coming
winter.
Essential Services
• A programme of work to be undertaken to improve the level of
protection from flood risk of the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works.
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• All organisations involved in the response to and recovery from the
November 2009 flooding in Fermanagh should maintain and further
develop their emergency planning arrangements and networks to
ensure they are as prepared as possible to deal with any serious
future flooding which may occur.
• All organisations responsible for the provision of essential services
to the local community, especially emergency / health care,
education and refuse collection must ensure that robust
contingency arrangements are in place to protect the provision of
these vital services to areas affected by serious flooding.
Communication and Public Awareness
• An education and public awareness programme should be
developed to inform the local community, including school children
about flooding in the Fermanagh area and how to deal with it. This
should specifically include information on the Erne System.
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ANNEX 1
List of Taskforce members
Bruce Robinson Head of the NI Civil Service (Chair)
Noel Lavery Office of the First Minister and deputy First
Minister (OFMDFM) (Deputy Chair)
Michelle Gildernew MP MLA Minister for Agriculture & Rural
Development
Arlene Foster MLA Minister for Enterprise, Trade and
Investment
Conor Murphy MP MLA Minister for Regional Development
Edwin Poots MLA Minister for the Environment
Keith Jagelman OFMDFM (Secretary)
Philip Mehaffey Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture
and Rural Development (DARD)
Wendy Johnston DARD
Wesley Shannon Department of the Environment
Brian Daly Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure
Owen Doody Western Education and Library Board
Dave Foster Northern Ireland Environment Agency
Mike Beare Department of Finance and Personnel
Andrew Elliott Department of Health, Social Services and
Public Safety
Brendan Duffy Western Health and Social Care Trust
Pat Doherty Roads Service, Department for Regional
Development
Gordon Smyth NI Water
Mervyn Adair Social Security Agency
Paul Major Northern Ireland Housing Executive
Julie Cuming OFMDFM
John Murphy OFMDFM
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ANNEX 2
Lough Levels, Gate State and Discharge at cliff for the period
1 May 2009 to 31 December 2009
UpperLough Portora Lower Lough
TotalDischarge
At Cliff RainfallBelleisle u/s d/s Roscor Gate state Spilling m3/s Portora
1/5/2009 46.54 46.26 46.19 46.21 Fully open No 106.54 5.4
2/5/2009 46.56 46.25 46.18 46.18 Fully open No 166.58 1.4
3/5/2009 46.51 46.22 46.16 46.10 Fully open No 182.00 2.6
4/5/2009 46.51 46.18 46.13 46.12 Fully open No 102.04 3.2
5/5/2009 46.48 46.20 46.14 46.12 Fully open No 116.54 8.8
6/5/2009 46.56 46.30 43.22 46.24 Fully open No 63.33 9.67/5/2009 46.66 46.40 46.30 46.33 Fully open Yes 195.86 4.4
8/5/2009 46.67 46.34 46.25 46.23 Fully open Yes 285.91 12
9/5/2009 46.75 46.27 46.19 46.17 Fully open Yes 282.75 6.2
10/5/2009 46.77 46.21 46.14 46.10 Fully open Yes 276.35 2.6
11/5/2009 46.72 46.13 46.08 46.03 Fully open Yes 231.79 0
12/5/2009 46.64 46.06 46.03 46.00 Fully open Yes 200.58 0
13/5/2009 46.54 46.02 46.00 45.97 Fully open Yes 200.40 0
14/5/2009 46.45 45.98 45.96 45.90 Fully open Yes 129.08 1.2
15/5/2009 46.38 46.03 46.00 45.96 Fully open No 71.42 9.6
16/5/2009 46.39 46.03 46.00 45.99 Fully open No 92.79 7.5
17/5/2009 46.42 46.07 46.04 46.04 Fully open No 83.17 7.6
18/5/2009 46.43 46.12 46.07 46.02 Fully open No 80.96 6.419/5/2009 46.45 46.14 46.09 46.07 Fully open No 84.13 1
20/5/2009 46.47 46.16 46.11 46.09 Fully open No 88.71 1
21/5/2009 46.47 46.18 46.13 46.11 Fully open No 83.17 1
22/5/2009 46.47 46.19 46.13 46.13 Fully open No 108.29 1.2
23/5/2009 46.45 46.17 46.12 46.12 Fully open No 125.67 1.6
24/5/2009 46.47 46.14 46.09 46.08 Fully open No 179.63 5.6
25/5/2009 46.43 46.08 46.05 46.02 Fully open No 174.08 0
26/5/2009 46.37 46.05 46.02 45.94 Fully open No 163.92 1
27/5/2009 46.33 46.02 46.00 45.93 Fully open No 126.17 4.2
28/5/2009 46.30 46.01 45.99 45.94 Fully open No 53.75 2.4
29/5/2009 46.26 46.01 45.99 45.98 Fully open No 61.71 0
30/5/2009 46.22 46.04 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 59.00 0
31/5/2009 46.20 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 63.21 0
1/6/2009 46.17 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 56.00 0
2/6/2009 46.15 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 20.29 0
3/6/2009 46.13 46.07 46.04 46.02 Fully open No 11.92 0
4/6/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 12.83 0
5/6/2009 46.14 46.12 46.08 46.04 Fully open No 13.08 0
6/6/2009 46.15 46.10 46.07 46.03 Fully open No 10.67 0
7/6/2009 46.15 46.11 46.07 46.06 Fully open No 12.83 1
8/6/2009 46.15 46.11 46.07 46.07 Fully open No 14.58 0
9/6/2009 46.14 46.11 46.08 46.07 Fully open No 37.50 0
10/6/2009 46.13 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 25.50 011/6/2009 46.13 46.10 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 25.50 0
12/6/2009 46.12 46.07 46.05 46.05 Fully open No 23.33 0
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13/6/2009 46.10 46.07 46.05 46.05 Fully open No 24.90 4.2
14/6/2009 46.09 46.08 46.05 46.03 Fully open No 16.79 3.4
15/6/2009 46.11 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 28.00 0.4
16/6/2009 46.10 46.09 46.04 46.04 Fully open No 26.67 0
17/6/2009 46.09 46.09 46.06 46.02 Fully open No 24.29 22.8
18/6/2009 46.15 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 22.21 0.4
19/6/2009 46.15 46.12 46.08 46.03 Fully open No 27.45 0.4
20/6/2009 46.16 46.12 46.08 46.04 Fully open No 24.88 0.8
21/6/2009 46.16 46.13 46.09 46.05 Fully open No 20.86 0.2
22/6/2009 46.15 46.12 46.08 46.03 Fully open No 27.83 0.2
23/6/2009 46.15 46.11 46.07 46.07 Fully open No 61.45 0.2
24/6/2009 46.12 46.08 46.05 46.04 Fully open No 62.54 0
25/6/2009 46.08 46.05 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 89.88 0
26/6/2009 46.04 46.00 45.98 45.98 Fully open No 12.21 0
27/6/2009 46.02 46.00 45.99 45.97 Fully open No 13.21 0
28/6/2009 46.02 46.00 45.98 45.98 Fully open No 13.17 0
29/6/2009 46.01 46.01 45.99 45.97 Fully open No 0.92 0
30/6/2009 46.02 45.99 45.98 45.98 Fully open No 0.92 01/7/2009 46.03 46.02 46.01 45.98 Fully open No 0.92 0
2/7/2009 46.04 46.04 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 0.92 7.8
3/7/2009 46.06 46.05 46.03 46.01 Fully open No 0.92 3.2
4/7/2009 46.08 46.06 46.03 46.03 Fully open No 8.17 15
5/7/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.06 Fully open No 9.08 19.4
6/7/2009 46.21 46.15 46.11 46.10 Fully open No 37.58 0
7/7/2009 46.28 46.17 46.12 46.11 Fully open No 94.21 0
8/7/2009 46.28 46.16 46.12 46.08 Fully open No 113.00 1.2
9/7/2009 46.24 46.12 46.08 46.04 Fully open No 116.00 0.2
10/7/2009 46.20 46.07 46.04 46.01 Fully open No 121.46 0
11/7/2009 46.13 46.02 46.00 45.97 Fully open No 23.54 0
12/7/2009 46.08 46.05 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 28.00 7.613/7/2009 46.09 46.06 46.03 46.03 Fully open No 57.04 1
14/7/2009 46.10 46.06 46.04 46.02 Fully open No 26.67 6
15/7/2009 46.12 46.08 46.06 46.03 Fully open No 23.75 2.8
16/7/2009 46.15 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 23.50 0.4
17/7/2009 46.14 46.14 46.10 46.05 Fully open No 26.58 0.6
18/7/2009 46.17 46.12 46.08 46.06 Fully open No 54.75 0
19/7/2009 46.14 46.12 46.09 46.03 Fully open No 54.04 2
20/7/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 56.38 1.2
21/7/2009 46.11 46.05 46.03 46.06 Fully open No 111.88 2.4
22/7/2009 46.10 46.04 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 56.13 6.4
23/7/2009 46.08 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 60.46 0.824/7/2009 46.10 46.06 46.03 45.97 Fully open No 56.92 9.4
25/7/2009 46.11 46.04 46.02 46.01 Fully open No 23.67 0.2
26/7/2009 46.11 46.06 46.03 46.04 Fully open No 25.37 11.2
27/7/2009 46.14 46.10 46.07 46.06 Fully open No 62.42 1
28/7/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.07 Fully open No 60.63 1
29/7/2009 46.19 46.09 46.06 46.03 Fully open No 88.37 3.6
30/7/2009 46.19 46.04 46.01 45.97 Fully open No 140.75 2
31/7/2009 46.16 45.97 45.96 45.95 Fully open No 79.79 0.4
1/8/2009 46.13 45.98 45.98 45.93 Fully open No 28.83 10
2/8/2009 46.13 46.02 46.01 45.98 Fully open No 23.92 4.2
3/8/2009 46.14 46.04 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 24.21 8.8
4/8/2009 46.18 46.10 46.06 46.01 Fully open No 56.12 10.25/8/2009 46.19 46.08 46.05 46.06 Fully open No 57.71 0.2
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6/8/2009 46.17 46.08 46.05 46.04 Fully open No 65.96 0
7/8/2009 46.16 46.07 46.05 46.03 Fully open No 59.79 0.4
8/8/2009 46.13 46.06 46.04 46.00 Fully open No 28.25 0
9/8/2009 46.13 46.07 46.05 46.02 Fully open No 21.13 0.2
10/8/2009 46.11 46.08 46.05 46.02 Fully open No 56.54 2.2
11/8/2009 46.11 46.04 46.02 45.99 Fully open No 38.17 0.2
12/8/2009 46.09 46.07 46.04 45.98 Fully open No 23.25 0.2
13/8/2009 46.10 46.05 46.03 46.01 Fully open No 25.96 0.4
14/8/2009 46.09 46.04 46.02 46.02 Fully open No 25.96 1
15/8/2009 46.14 46.10 46.07 46.03 Fully open No 21.63 16.2
16/8/2009 46.15 46.11 46.08 46.05 Fully open No 31.08 1
17/8/2009 46.19 46.13 46.09 46.08 Fully open No 42.46 5.6
18/8/2009 46.20 46.11 46.07 46.08 Fully open No 79.79 8
19/8/2009 46.21 46.13 46.09 46.07 Fully open No 57.83 4
20/8/2009 46.35 46.17 46.13 46.12 Fully open No 101.21 20.8
21/8/2009 46.50 46.21 46.16 46.15 Fully open No 123.33 1.6
22/8/2009 46.50 46.19 46.13 46.13 Fully open No 166.38 0.4
23/8/2009 46.56 46.18 46.13 46.13 Fully open Yes 219.66 2224/8/2009 46.92 46.27 46.20 46.17 Fully open Yes 287.25 28.4
25/8/2009 46.91 46.22 46.16 46.11 Fully open Yes 269.18 1.6
26/8/2009 46.90 46.19 46.13 46.06 Fully open Yes 255.83 9.2
27/8/2009 46.91 46.14 46.09 46.02 Fully open Yes 228.09 0.2
28/8/2009 46.88 46.17 46.12 46.02 Fully open Yes 209.83 12
29/8/2009 46.89 46.17 46.11 46.03 Fully open Yes 193.21 2.4
30/8/2009 46.83 46.16 46.10 46.05 Fully open Yes 194.13 0.4
31/8/2009 46.83 46.16 46.11 46.07 Fully open Yes 200.38 16.8
1/9/2009 46.89 46.17 46.15 46.11 Fully open Yes 182.75 6.4
2/9/2009 46.87 46.18 46.12 46.07 Fully open Yes 210.78 0
3/9/2009 46.82 46.16 46.11 46.03 Fully open Yes 204.77 11.8
4/9/2009 46.80 46.14 46.10 46.02 Fully open Yes 199.86 15/9/2009 46.75 46.11 46.07 45.98 Fully open Yes 206.67 1.8
6/9/2009 46.69 46.06 46.04 45.97 Fully open Yes 213.76 4.6
7/9/2009 46.67 46.05 46.02 45.85 Fully open Yes 172.15 6
8/9/2009 46.65 46.09 46.06 46.03 Fully open No 114.42 7.6
9/9/2009 46.66 46.12 46.08 46.05 Fully open No 130.29 0.8
10/9/2009 46.62 46.14 46.09 46.07 Fully open No 115.21 0.2
11/9/2009 46.57 46.14 46.09 46.06 Fully open No 112.63 0
12/9/2009 46.52 46.15 46.09 46.06 Fully open No 118.04 0.2
13/9/2009 46.46 46.14 46.09 46.05 Fully open No 116.25 0.2
14/9/2009 46.41 46.12 46.08 46.05 Fully open No 74.58 0
15/9/2009 46.36 46.14 46.10 46.05 Fully open No 100.54 016/9/2009 46.32 46.10 46.07 46.04 Fully open No 126.75 0
17/9/2009 46.28 46.05 46.03 45.99 Fully open No 115.17 0
18/9/2009 46.23 46.03 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 23.29 0
19/9/2009 46.17 46.04 46.04 46.00 Fully open No 25.63 0.4
20/9/2009 46.17 46.06 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 25.04 0
21/9/2009 46.16 46.08 46.05 46.04 Fully open No 24.63 1.4
22/9/2009 46.16 46.09 46.06 46.05 Fully open No 26.29 4.8
23/9/2009 46.17 46.11 46.08 46.06 Fully open No 48.04 0.4
24/9/2009 46.16 46.09 46.06 46.05 Fully open No 61.04 1
25/9/2009 46.15 46.07 46.04 46.03 Fully open No 60.79 0
26/9/2009 46.13 46.04 46.03 45.99 Fully open No 64.46 0
27/9/2009 46.10 46.03 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 61.54 028/9/2009 46.07 46.01 46.00 45.94 Fully open No 64.13 0
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29/9/2009 46.06 46.00 45.99 45.93 Fully open No 59.75 0
30/9/2009 46.04 45.98 45.97 45.90 Fully open No 61.96 0
1/10/2009 46.02 45.96 45.96 45.90 FO No 115.10 0
2/10/2009 45.97 45.88 45.89 45.83 FO No 118.20 0.2
3/10/2009 45.92 45.86 45.88 45.80 FO No 59.30 1.4
4/10/2009 45.90 45.82 45.84 45.78 FO No 55.90 0.2
5/10/2009 45.88 45.80 45.84 45.77 FO No 100.90 0
6/10/2009 45.82 45.75 45.79 45.68 FO No 134.20 0.2
7/10/2009 45.78 45.66 45.72 45.62 FO No 114.80 0.2
8/10/2009 45.81 45.80 45.66 45.53 FC 10.00 No 29.60 0.2
9/10/2009 45.86 45.87 45.60 45.53 FC No 12.80 0.2
10/10/2009 45.89 45.88 45.62 45.52 FC No 25.10 7.8
11/10/2009 45.92 45.90 45.64 45.49 FC No 25.90 0.2
12/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.60 45.48 FC No 49.30 0.4
13/10/2009 45.96 45.95 45.57 45.45 FCFC1&2,3&4
No 31.80 0
14/10/2009 45.98 45.97 45.56 45.42 1'Open
FC1&2,3&4
No 12.80 0.2
15/10/2009 45.97 45.92 45.57 45.43 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4
No 11.80 1.8
16/10/2009 45.95 45.92 45.57 45.44 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4
No 12.30 0
17/10/2009 45.96 45.91 45.58 45.45 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4
No 11.70 0.2
18/10/2009 45.93 45.91 45.57 45.45 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4
No 13.80 0.8
19/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.57 45.46 1'Open1,2,3,4 Open 2'
No 12.00 6.8
20/10/2009 45.99 45.98 45.58 45.50 12.00 No 24.70 5.2
21/10/2009 46.02 45.91 45.61 45.52 1,2,3,4 Open 2'1,2,3,4 open 4'
No 59.75 4.6
22/10/2009 46.03 45.92 45.63 45.54 12.30 No 59.79 20
23/10/2009 46.23 45.87 45.70 45.61 1,2,3,4 open 4' No 120.96 12
24/10/2009 46.23 45.86 45.69 45.65 1,2,3,4 open 4' No 78.88 5.4
25/10/2009 46.40 46.05 45.83 45.74 FO 10.00 No 81.00 21.8
26/10/2009 46.40 45.89 45.89 45.80 FO No 168.92 1.4
27/10/2009 46.37 45.90 45.90 45.87 FO No 78.63 5.6
28/10/2009 46.37 45.95 45.94 45.87 FO No 157.62 5.8
29/10/2009 46.35 45.92 45.92 45.86 FO No 143.25 0.2
30/10/2009 46.31 45.91 45.91 45.86 FO No 124.33 3.231/10/2009 46.47 45.96 45.95 45.87 FO No 168.79 19
1/11/2009 46.50 46.02 46.00 45.88 FO No 162.12 14.4
2/11/2009 46.76 46.11 46.07 46.01 FO No 150.88 6.4
3/11/2009 46.82 46.15 46.10 46.03 FO No 185.38 6.4
4/11/2009 46.95 46.27 46.19 46.14 FO No 178.54 16.4
5/11/2009 47.11 46.46 46.35 46.26 FO Yes 227.37 7.8
6/11/2009 47.19 46.39 46.29 46.26 FO Yes 296.63 6.2
7/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.30 46.30 FO Yes 293.04 5.8
8/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.31 46.28 FO Yes 317.50 4.8
9/11/2009 47.19 46.35 46.25 46.24 FO Yes 310.46 0.2
10/11/2009 47.22 46.36 46.27 46.21 FO Yes 306.15 11.2
11/11/2009 47.19 46.32 46.23 46.17 FO Yes 291.58 0.212/11/2009 47.17 46.29 46.21 46.15 FO Yes 298.23 8.4
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13/11/2009 47.25 46.30 46.21 46.15 FO Yes 295.80 10.4
14/11/2009 47.24 46.32 46.23 46.14 FO Yes 294.65 11.6
15/11/2009 47.29 46.29 46.20 46.13 FO Yes 293.86 0
16/11/2009 47.30 46.30 46.21 46.14 FO Yes 299.02 15.2
17/11/2009 47.42 46.40 46.29 46.24 FO Yes 310.36 9.2
18/11/2009 47.52 46.44 46.33 46.27 FO Yes 314.73 17.2
19/11/2009 47.69 46.50 46.36 46.31 FO Yes 313.33 13.8
20/11/2009 47.93 46.60 46.45 46.37 FO Yes 334.95 14
21/11/2009 48.03 46.61 46.45 46.44 FO Yes 336.65 0.6
22/11/2009 48.08 46.64 46.48 46.47 FO Yes 353.21 5.4
23/11/2009 48.15 46.76 46.58 46.55 FO Yes 355.17 17.6
24/11/2009 48.19 46.82 46.62 46.62 FO Yes 377.13 9
25/11/2009 48.25 46.90 46.69 46.68 FO Yes 377.50 6.6
26/11/2009 48.27 46.92 46.71 46.72 FO Yes 374.90 3.2
27/11/2009 48.24 46.93 46.72 46.73 FO Yes 386.60 3.8
28/11/2009 48.21 46.92 46.71 46.73 FO Yes 375.80 0.4
29/11/2009 48.14 46.92 46.71 46.71 FO Yes 372.80 0.2
30/11/2009 48.06 46.86 46.67 46.67 FO Yes 368.20 01/12/2009 48.01 46.79 46.60 46.65 FO Yes 365.20 0.2
2/12/2009 47.97 46.77 46.59 46.61 FO Yes 357.30 6.2
3/12/2009 47.85 46.72 46.56 46.55 FO Yes 353.10 1.8
4/12/2009 47.76 46.66 46.51 46.52 FO Yes 346.40 1.6
5/12/2009 47.72 46.64 46.49 46.48 FO Yes 344.30 8
6/12/2009 47.76 46.60 46.46 46.47 FO Yes 342.30 5.6
7/12/2009 47.69 46.60 46.45 46.45 FO Yes 339.90 2.2
8/12/2009 47.62 46.54 46.41 46.42 FO Yes 336.10 0.6
9/12/2009 47.56 46.51 46.38 46.37 FO Yes 329.50 4
10/12/2009 47.47 46.47 46.35 46.33 FO Yes 327.30 0.6
11/12/2009 47.36 46.42 46.31 46.27 FO Yes 317.00 0.8
12/12/2009 47.24 46.34 46.25 46.20 FO Yes 308.70 0.213/12/2009 47.13 46.28 46.20 46.13 FO Yes 292.10 0.2
14/12/2009 47.02 46.22 46.15 46.05 FO Yes 283.10 0.2
15/12/2009 46.91 46.13 46.08 45.99 FO Yes 229.40 0.8
16/12/2009 46.80 46.09 46.05 45.97 FO No 194.00 0
17/12/2009 46.69 46.06 46.03 45.94 FO No 193.80 0.2
18/12/2009 46.60 46.01 45.98 45.91 FO No 190.80 0.2
19/12/2009 46.50 45.96 45.95 45.86 FO No 183.40 0.2
20/12/2009 46.41 45.81 45.91 45.80 FO No 190.70 1.8
21/12/2009 46.33 45.85 45.86 45.76 FO No 163.00 2.6
FO Gates closed
22/12/2009 46.26 45.80 45.82 45.71 to 6' Open 1600 No 180.20 423/12/2009 46.19 45.81 45.76 45.67 All 6' Open
6' Open FullyNo 188.10 3.6
24/12/2009 46.12 45.74 45.71 45.60 Closed 10.00am No 165.90 0
25/12/2009 46.17 46.13 45.61 45.48 Fully Closed No 164.80 0
Fully Closed All26/12/2009 46.24 46.20 45.53 45.38 Opened 2' at 14.30 No 129.10 0.2
27/12/2009 46.24 46.02 45.52 45.30 All Open 2' No 130.50 6
28/12/2009 46.24 46.03 45.47 45.30 All Open 2' No 87.70 0
1 & 2 Open 2' 2 &29/12/2009 46.21 46.00 45.46 45.30 3 Open 3' at 12.00
1 & 4 Open 2' 2 &No 116.50 0
30/12/2009 46.16 45.82 45.45 45.28 3 Open 3' No 73.10 0.2
68
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1 & 4 Open 2' 2 &31/12/2009 46.23 45.89 45.48 45.32 3 Open 3' No 53.80 4.2
LEGEND
FO = FULLY OPEN
FC = FULLY CLOSED
69
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ANNEX 3
RIVERS AGENCY REPORT – FERMANAGH FLOODING
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FERMANAGH FLOODINGOF NOVEMBER 2009
Prepared by:-
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Rivers Agency Hydebank 4 Hospital Road BELFAST BT8 8JP January 2010
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CONTENTS PAGE NO
1. Executive Summary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 – 2 2. Introduction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 – 4 3. Background .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 – 8 4. Preparedness .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 – 15 5. Influencing factors .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16 6. Response .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 – 20 7. Communications with the press and public .. .. .. .. .. .. 21 – 22 8. Flooding from the Sillees River .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 – 24 9. Aspects which worked well .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25 – 27 10. Challenges .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28 – 29 11. Suggestions for further improvements .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30 12. Lessons learnt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31 13. Conclusions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32 – 33 14. Recommendations .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 – 35
Annex 1 List of Participants at Structured Debrief
Annex 2 Aspects which worked well (Record of structured debrief)
Annex 3 Challenges (Record of structured debrief)
Annex 4 Improvements (Record of structured debrief)
Annex 5 Lessons Learnt (Record of structured debrief)
Annex 6 Tables and Hydrographs
Annex 7 Photographs
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Review of the Response to Flooding in Fermanaghin November 2009
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 The flooding in Fermanagh in November 2009 was an extreme event as a
result of persistent rainfall throughout late October and November 2009.
The water levels in Lough Erne reached record levels.
1.2 Only 3 properties were flooded but many more were isolated by the
floodwaters and rural life was severely disrupted as roads became impassible.
Vast areas of farmland were inundated although few stock were in the fields.
1.3 Water levels in the Loughs were drawn down in early October 2009 to
increase storage capacity for the autumn and winter months and spilling of
water at Cliff and Ballyshannon was carried out in accordance with legislation.
1.4 Co-ordination and communication between the different organisations
involved worked well and substantial efforts were made to try to minimize the
disruption to the public.
1.5 Construction of properties on higher ground significantly reduced the number
of properties flooded.
1.6 Works to significantly increase the capacity of channels and control structures
are not economically viable.
1.7 Rivers Agency in partnership with ESB will review operational arrangements
within the existing legislation and also review the performance of the existing
regime since its introduction in the 1950s.
1.8 Roads Service will examine the viability of raising critical roads including
those at Boho where flooding from the Sillees River occurs.
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1.9 All agencies will draw on the lessons learnt from this event and seek
improvement in all areas of Emergency Response including communication
with the public.
1.10 Consideration should be given to establishing an agency to provide a strategicoverview to the management of flooding.
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Due to persistent rainfall throughout late October and November 2009 water
levels in Upper and Lower Lough Erne rose above prescribed upper limits and
extensive flooding occurred in Fermanagh particularly around the area of theUpper Lough.
This report outlines the current water management system for Lough Erne,
and how this was applied during the event. It also examines the response by
different agencies to the flooding event and makes recommendations for
improvements in the future.
2.2 A meeting to review the multi agency response to the flooding in Fermanagh
was held in Enniskillen on 19 January 2010. The debrief was facilitated and
chaired by Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.
Fermanagh District Council hosted the meeting. A list of attendees is
included in Annex 1.
In advance of the debrief all responders were asked to re-examine their
preparedness and response to the flooding event and to submit a short
overview to Rivers Agency.
This report reflects both the inputs from these overviews and points raised
during the debrief. This document will be fed into the Fermanagh Task Force
to assist it in its deliberations. The Task Force, led by OFMDFM, aims to
produce an interim report by the end of February 2010.
2.3 The report considers two separate flooding events in Fermanagh in November
2009. Whilst the main elements of this report are related to the flooding post
19 November 2009 as a result of outflow from Upper and Lower Lough Erne,
some reference is made to the situation at Boho which was as a result of
inundation of the natural floodplain of the Sillies River on 4 November
(See Photograph 1 – Section 8).
More detail on the Sillees flooding is referenced in Section 8 page 24.
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2.4 The purpose of holding a review both from Rivers Agency perspective and the
other responders is to try to capture any lessons learnt and for each
organisation to then apply these points to further develop their own
emergency planning arrangements for the future.
2.5 Participants at the review represented a wide range of public organisations, all
of whom had been involved in the response to the flooding event or whose
services had been impacted upon as a result of the flooding.
The review did not take evidence from members of the public as this falls
within the Terms of Reference of the Fermanagh Task Force. However some
statutory authority representatives at the structured debrief had been presentat the evidence gathering sessions.
2.6 The fundamental principles of emergency management are that processes
are followed which assess, plan, prepare and respond to events and that the
various activities of the responding organisations are joined up and co-
ordinated to provide a service to those affected by an incident.
2.7 Any lessons learnt are detailed in this report and recommendations made as
to how these should be taken on board.
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3. BACKGROUND
3.1 There was limited control over water levels in Lough Erne and regular flooding
occurrences until the Government interceded in 1941. However the World
War II flying boat base on the Lower Lough made it necessary for levels to bekept up and while local farmers accepted this, they continued to press for a
drainage scheme.
In October 1947 the Prime Minister announced that cross border negotiations
had started and the Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland)
1950 was passed on 27 June 1950. This legislation and corresponding
legislation in the south defined the current responsibilities of Rivers Agencyand Electricity Supply Board (ESB) with respect to the management of water
levels within the Erne System.
3.2 The River Erne, which rises from Lough Gowna in County Cavan, flows
through County Fermanagh and to the sea at Ballyshannon in County
Donegal. The river, which is some 100km long, drains an area of around
4,350km2, of which 1,850km2 is in Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone.
There are a large number of lakes in the catchment area upstream of
Enniskillen. The largest is Upper Lough Erne which has a surface area of
some 38km2. Discharge from the Upper Lough passes through the inter
lough channel to Lower Lough Erne (Surface Area approximately 111km2)
and onwards through the Belleek Channel to Cliff where the first of two power
stations is located. The second power station is located approximately 5km
downstream at Cathaleens Falls (more commonly known as Ballyshannon).
Sluice gates, (which can be used to control the water level in the Upper
Lough) are located at Portora (See Map 1 and Photograph 2 at end of this
section) in the inter lough channel. These are used primarily to maintain water
in the Upper Lough above the lower prescribed limit.
The water level of the Loughs is drawn down in October each year in order tomaximise storage capacity in the Loughs to cope with the expected increase
in rainfall during the autumn and winter months.
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The Loughs provide storage in the system which is particularly important
during winter as rainfall generally increases. When inflow is too great water
can be spilled at Cliff (usually during the winter) and if inadequate to sustain
Upper Lough levels it can be held up by closing the Portora gates. Whererain is persistent a situation can be reached, as was the case in this instance,
where the inflow of water from the catchment into the Loughs substantially
exceeded the amount that could be conveyed by the channels and passed
through the system to the sea.
The Erne catchment has a slow response to rainfall due to its size and
the number of lakes and prolonged periods of rain give rise to floodingdue to high lough levels. This is different from an urban area and the
floods of June 2007 and August 2008 where periods of heavy rainfall
over a relatively short period of time caused widespread flooding across
the province.
Flooding was mainly restricted to the Upper Lough area in November
and early December 2009. This is because the Upper Lough is small
with relatively low lying ground adjacent whereas the Lower Lough is
three times the size with higher ground surrounding the Lough.
3.4 As a result of the Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland)
1950 extensive works were undertaken on the Erne System which included:
• Deepening 6.4km of channel from Lower Lough Erne to Belleek
• Deepening 18.4km of channel between Upper and Lower Lough Erne
• Removal of the sluice gates at Belleek and regulation of the flow at Cliff
• Construction of a new control structure with navigation lock to facilitate
passage of boats at Portora, Enniskillen
• Construction of a new dam and hydro power station at Cliff
• Construction of a new dam and hydro power station at Cathaleens Falls
(Ballyshannon)
• Total power output 65Mw of hydro power.
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3.5 The Agreement enshrined in the 1950 Act set statutory water levels for Lower
Lough Erne to Ordnance Datum (OD) at Poolbeg, Dublin as follows:-
Lower Lough: Not to exceed 46.33m (152 feet) or fall below 44.81m (147feet)
No absolute statutory upper level was set for the Upper Lough but the
following was included:
(a) “during the period from April to September inclusive the water level of
the Upper Lough, shall not, as far as reasonably preventable, exceeda level of 154 feet above OD” (46.94m).
(b) “during the period from October to March inclusive the water level of the
Upper Lough shall not, as far as reasonably preventable, exceed a
level of 155 feet above OD” (47.24)m.
In addition the inter lough Channel was not to fall below 150 feet (45.72m).
Effectively the limit of the inter lough channel determines the lower limit of the
Upper Lough. The level at Cliff cannot be drawn below 143 feet (43.59m)
although the realistic minimum level is 144 feet 4 inches (44.0m).
During an extreme event ESB is obliged to maintain the level at Cliff at
43.59m (143 feet) and it is the limiting capacity of the Belleek Channel which
has the main influence on the level within the Lower Lough. In practice the
minimum level for Cliff is 44.0m (144 feet 4 inches) as below this level the
increase in discharge of water achieved in the Belleek Channel is minimum,
around 5.0m3 /s and as discharge increases this is reduced. In addition as the
level approaches 44.0m (144 feet 4 inches) or below, the discharge becomes
hydraulically unstable and it becomes difficult to maintain a steady headrace
at Cliff.
To convert Poolbeg OD to Belfast OD it is necessary to deduct 9.25 feet
(2.82m).
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For convenience upper limits for the Loughs are summarised at top of pages
11 to 13.
The Agreement also states that between October and March when the waterlevel of the Upper Lough has risen to 154 feet above OD and is in the opinion
of a Rivers Agency Engineer or an ESB Engineer likely to rise above 155 feet
OD, then the water level of the Lower Lough (if it is above 151.5 feet above
OD) shall as rapidly as reasonably practicable be reduced by ESB to
such a level no lower than 151.5 feet above OD. This is to ensure that the
water level of the Upper Lough may be prevented from rising above or be
brought down to 155 feet above OD.
‘As rapidly as reasonably practicable’ effectively means that water should be
directed through the turbines to generate hydroelectric power and the
spillways at Cliff and Ballyshannon utilised to dissipate the maximum flow that
the Belleek channel can accommodate.
Water levels within the Erne system are monitored daily and regular
contact is maintained between Rivers Agency and ESB. Met Office and
Met Éireann rain forecasts and weather warnings provide essential
information and are a vital tool in the decision making process.
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LOWER LOUGH ERNE
MAP 1
CLIFF
BALLYSHANNON
INTER
LOUGH
CHANNEL
UPPER
LOUGH
ERNE
9
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To prevent level of Upper Lough falling below 150ft to• clay foundations in Enniskillen• navigation & boating interests
PHOTO 2 – Sluice gates at Portora
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Lower Lough – Not to exceed 46.33m (152 feet)Upper Lough – No statutory upper limit
Not, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 46.94m (154 feet) – summerNot, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 47.24m (155 feet) – winter
4. PREPAREDNESS
4.1 Navigation and other interests require higher minimum lough levels
during the summer months but the intention is always to try to reduce
levels to the lowest achievable level from 1 October to allow for winter
storage. While this is not always possible due to autumn rainfall
patterns, in October 2009 it was achieved as the first half of the month
was virtually dry.
The rainfall in October was 101% in County Fermanagh compared to the
Long Term Average. 125mm was recorded at Portora against an average of
117.45mm (See Table 2). Only 5% of October’s rainfall fell up to 16
October 2009. 95% of this rainfall fell after the 16 October 2009.
4.2 Lough Levels – period prior to persistant rainfall
1 October – 17 October 20094.2.1 The gates at Portora were fully open on 1 October to assist in drawing down
the Upper Lough level to maximise winter storage. They were closed
between 7 and 14 October to maintain the Upper Lough above the minimum
prescribed level and were gradually opened from 14 October to control flows
between the loughs. .
Date Upper Lough Lower Lough
1 October 46.02m (151 feet)
7 October 45.78 (150 feet 2 inches)
45.9m (150 feet 7½ inches)
45.62m (149 feet 8 inches)
4.3 Lough Levels – period with persistent rain prior to spilling(18 October – 4 November 2009)
4.3.1 Inflow to the system exceed outflow and both loughs continued to rise. The
gates at Portora were fully opened on 25 October.
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Lower Lough – Not to exceed 46.33m (152 feet)Upper Lough – No statutory upper limit
Not, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 46.94m (154 feet) – summerNot, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 47.24m (155 feet) – winter
4.3.2 On the 4 November both loughs were below the targeted winter levels and no
flooding was occurring other than from the Sillees River at Boho which is notcaused by rising lough levels.
Date Upper Lough Lower Lough
18 October 45.93m (150 feet 8 inches)
4 November 46.95 (154 feet 1 inch)
45.45m (149 feet 1 inch)
46.14m (151 feet 5 inches)
4.4 Lough Levels - period prior to peak when spilling(5 November – 27 November 2009)
4.4.1 Conditions for spilling were reached and ESB in consultation with Rivers
Agency commenced spilling at Cliff on 5 November.
4.4.2 With the gates at Portora open and spillage and generation of power being
undertaken to maximise possible outflow, this had the desired effect ofslowing down/stablising the rise of the water level in the Upper Lough.
Reference Hydrograph 1 which illustrates the slowing of the rate of rise
between Points A and B. Point C illustrates the lowest level reached on
7 October and Point D illustrates the peak reached on 26 November
2009.
4.4.3 Spilling initially caused the levels in the Lower Lough to reduce between
Points A and B on Hydrograph 2 but rainfall intensified from the 14 November
and 53.2mm was recorded at Portora in the following five days. The Lower
Lough started to rise again and exceeded its upper limit on 19 November.
(Point C Hydrograph 2) before peaking some 0.4m above this level on
27 November (Point E).
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Lower Lough – Not to exceed 46.33m (152 feet)Upper Lough – No statutory upper limit
Not, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 46.94m (154 feet) – summerNot, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 47.24m (155 feet) – winter
4.4.4 The initial lowering of the Lower Lough eventually stablised the level in the
Upper Lough just below the winter limit but the increase in intensity of rainfallfrom 14 November caused the level to rise sharply eventually peaking on
26 November some 1.03m above the prescribed limit (Point D Hydrograph 1)
4.4.5 Reports from Roads Service covering 15-16 November 2009 indicated there
was no road flooding in Fermanagh although heavy rain had caused road
flooding in other parts of the North. By 18 November reports from Roads
Service were starting to indicate road flooding around the Upper Lough mainlyand the Boho area.
From 27 November 2009 both the Upper and Lower Lough levels started to
fall.
Date Upper Lough Lower Lough
5 November 47.11m (154 feet 7 inches)
14 November 47.24m (155 feet)
26 November 48.27m (158 feet 4 inches)
46.26m (151 feet 9 inch)
46.14m (151 feet 5 inches)
46.72m (153 feet 3½ inches)
4.5 Sandbag Stores and Pumps
4.5.1 As is normal prior to any anticipated flooding, Rivers Agency replenished
sandbag supplies in both Fermanagh and Omagh, and several thousand
sandbags were available for delivery and placement. Pumps were checked to
ensure that they were in good working order. Grilles and culverts were also
checked and cleared.
4.6 Contact with Others
4.6.1 Regular contact was maintained prior to the event with staff in ESB. This is
normal practice in management of the Lough Erne levels.
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4.6.2 On 2 October 2009 an email was sent to Waterways Ireland advising that as it
was October, Rivers Agency would be seeking to reduce the water levels in
the Loughs to provide storage for winter rains and that the control structure
and lock gates at Portora would be adjusted accordingly. Waterways Ireland
is the navigation authority for the Erne System.
Further contact was made with Waterways Ireland on 4 November to advise
them of the rising lough levels. Fermanagh District Council was also alerted
by telephone in early November that Rivers Agency was becoming concerned
by the rising levels in the loughs and of the distinct possibility of flooding,
particularly around the Upper Lough and Enniskillen itself.
In mid-November contact was also made with Roads Service specifically in
relation to the strong possibility of flooding.
4.6.3 Fermanagh District Council was contacted by Rivers Agency on 16 November
2009 and advised that the caravan park at Lisnaskea was in danger of
flooding. The Caravan park was sub-let but contact was made with the
leasee which allowed the caravans to be moved out to safety.
Contact was also instigated on 18 November with the Western Group
Emergency Planning Co-ordinator to advise about the strong possibility of
extensive flooding.
The Emergency Planning Co-Ordinator relayed this information to Fermanagh
District Council. On 19 November a telephone conference call was held
between Rivers Agency, Roads Service and Fermanagh District Council. An
Emergency Planning Implementation Group meeting, with representation from
each council department, was held in the Council offices and each
department ensured that Business Continuity Plans were up to date.
On Friday 20 November Castle Parks Centre, Lisnaskea was organised as
temporary provision for Share Centre residents.
The Emergency Planning Co-Ordinator contacted all relevant organisations as
listed in Annex 1. This also included the Met Office and Marine Coastguard
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Agency. A telephone conference call pool was organised to ensure that a co-
ordinated multi-agency response to the situation was followed. This
conference call arrangement was continued over the weekend and allowed
each organisation to inform each other what their response capacity was and
other proposed actions they were planning to take.
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5. INFLUENCING FACTORS
5.1 The major influencing factor in the flooding event was the amount of rain that
fell from mid-October through to late-November 2009. Between 17 October
and 27 November 2009 336.8mm of rain were recorded at Portora. Duringthis period, 15 November 2009 was the only day when no rain was recorded.
For the month of November the rainfall was recorded as 226.40mm against a
long term average of 103.25mm (See Table 2 – Rainfall records from 1988).
The rain in late October and November 2009 in Fermanagh was a rainfall
event well in excess of a 1 in 100 year event. A 1 in 100 year event means
there is a 100 to 1 chance in any one year of an occurrence happening.
5.2 The heavy rain in mid to late October 2009 caused the ground in the
catchment to become saturated by early November. Met Éireann’s website
confirms this. This effectively meant that from early November all rain falling
in the catchment ran off into the rivers and loughs.
5.3 The other major restricting factor during the flooding event is the capacity of
both the inter lough channel which connects the Upper Lough to the Lower
Lough and the Belleek Channel. These are sized to accommodate sufficient
flow, that when combined with storage in the lough system, significant
flooding only occurs during extreme events.
A similar restriction occurs in the channel through Belleek which runs towards
Cliff.
The Cliff dam controls the water levels in the Lower Lough. The design
capacity of the power station combined with spillage can effectively disperse
the maximum amount of water that can be conveyed by the Belleek Channel.
All these restrictions means that, between spillage and water required for
generation, the amount of water that could normally be discharged is 330m3 /s.
At some stages during the flooding event 385m3 /s were being discharged dueto the unprecedented head differential across the system.
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6. RESPONSE
6.1 Telephone Calls
6.1.1 During November telephone calls were received by the three drainage
agencies as detailed below:-
Organisation Calls received fromFlooding Incident Line
Calls received directlyinto offices
Rivers Agency 18
Road Service 44
NI Water 6
TOTAL 68
29
43
15
87
Some of the calls were related to flooding from the Sillees River.
In addition to the above approximately 100 calls were received by Rivers
Agency from the public seeking advice on the levels within the Loughs.
The total calls requesting assistance was less than 200. In an urban area in a
large flooding event this figure would be much higher. This low level of calls
may be attributable to the resilience of the existing population in and around
the Lough.
6.2 Sandbags and Pumping
6.2.1 As part of the response several hundred sandbags were delivered to two
nursing homes and left on site although they were not required to be placed
as the homes did not flood.
Fermanagh District Council technical staff worked with Translink and the
Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) to ensure that the Bus
Depot did not become impassable and also that the Lakeland Forum car park
could be kept partially open. Fermanagh District Council employed
approximately six tonnes of sandbags and a portable water pump to ensure
the flood levels were kept to a minimum. The NIFRS also deployed a
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pumping appliance to aid this process. Fermanagh District Council also
negotiated with the business owners in the Derrychara link to provide
pedestrian access to the worst affected properties from Tesco end of the Link.
Signage and pedestrian guard rails/crowd control barriers were used to
enable this.
Sandbags were also delivered by Rivers Agency and Roads Service to
Quay Pass (near Erneside Shopping Centre) and placed. On Friday 20
November one pump was delivered to the site and by Tuesday 24 November
2009 this had been increased to five pumps. By Tuesday 24 November 2009
it had become evident that pumping alone would not keep the road open.
Therefore between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning over 700 tonnesof stone and bitmac were brought in by Roads Service to raise the road level.
The principle objective of the works was to avoid traffic gridlock in the town.
The roads between Derrylin and Lisnaskea and at Carrybridge, which are the
only two east-west crossing points on the Upper Lough, were not passable to
normal traffic. The main roads through Enniskillen became the alternative
shortest route for commuters. If Quay Pass had closed traffic would have had
to go through Gaol Square and Derrychara Road junctions. This would have
caused the Wellington Road and Dublin Road to be grid locked and in
addition would have created a major problem for Blue Light services to
respond to any other emergency.
6.2.2 A similar exercise was considered but ruled out on the Derrychara Link road
as it was impracticable to isolate the area to allow pumping.
6.3 Conference Calls
6.3.1 From 20 November right through to and including 9 December 2009 a daily
telephone conference call was held at noon each day and the following
organisations participated:-
BT
Emergency Planning Co-ordinator Western Group of CouncilsFermanagh District Council
Marine Coastguard Agency
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Northern Ireland Ambulance Service
NIE
Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service
Northern Ireland Housing Executive
NI WaterPolice Service of Northern Ireland
Rivers Agency
Roads Service
Western Education and Library Board
Western Health and Social Care Trust
During the telephone conference call each day organisations were updated onthe situation and daily actions were allocated to each appropriate
organisation.
6.3.2 Meetings were held and chaired by Fermanagh District Council or the
Emergency Planning Co-ordinator on 23, 25 and 27 November 2009 and 2
December. These meetings were also attended by Western Health and
Social Care Trust, Rivers Agency, Police Service for Northern Ireland, Roads
Service, NI Water and Northern Ireland Ambulance Service. The meetings
were arranged for 10am so that any actions could be relayed to the other
organisations on the daily telephone conference call at 12pm.
These meetings highlighted that due to the rurality of the area and the fact
that some families were “cut off” that distribution of essential supplies may
become an issue. On 27 November Fermanagh Council delivered food
supplies to one family and Rivers Agency offered to provide staff and boats to
carry food and supplies to any member of the public due to the extreme
nature of the event.
6.4 Aerial Photographs
Aerial photographs were taken of the extent of the flooding on three dates
throughout November 2009. The area around the Sillees River was flown on
9 November and the area around Upper Lough Erne particularly was flown on20 and 26 November 2009. 20 November was the date that roads were
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starting to become impassable and 26 November was when the levels in the
Loughs peaked.
These were available to all participants to target assistance to those cut off by
floodwaters. Aerial photography is important in identifying the extent offlooding for historical records and future developments and will aid in the
delivery of the EU Floods Directive.
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7. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC
7.1 More than 50 media queries and interview requests relating to the November
2009 flooding were dealt with by the Minister for Agriculture and Rural
Development and Rivers Agency officials prior to and for the duration of the
flooding event. Similarly Department of Regional Development (DRD)
Officials dealt with more than 20 media queries and interview requests.
These are summarised in the table below.
Type ofmediaoutlet
Number ofRiversAgency
statements
issued
Number ofRiversAgency
interviews
completed
DARDMinister
interviews
Number ofDRD
statementsissued
Television 2 5 3 -
Radio 6 8 3 -
Dailynewspaper
12 2 1 7
Regionalnewspapers
12 1 2 6
Sub Total 32 16 9 13
TOTAL: 75
Number ofDRD
interviewscompleted
4
6
-
-
10
The content of the statements and interviews were tailored to individual
requests but typically included the following information:
- explanation of the Erne system and the rainfall event
- advice to the public on what to do in the event of the flooding and relevant
contact numbers, for example, Flooding Incident Line
- update on Lough levels and current flooding situation
- details of work that Rivers Agency and others were undertaking to help
alleviate flooding
In addition Fermanagh District Council, Rivers Agency and the Western
Health and Care Trust jointly released two press releases.
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The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Minister,
Michelle Gildernew MP, MLA, visited Fermanagh on 24 November to see the
extent of the flooding. Furthermore the Minister returned to Fermanagh on
27 November with the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness MP, MLA to
again see the situation first hand and to meet with local people. Thesemeetings were also attended by senior officials from Rivers Agency.
The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Arlene Foster MLA and the
First Minister Peter Robinson, MP, MLA visited the area on 28 November
2009 to assess the situation.
The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Minister also made astatement to the Assembly on 30 November 2009 concerning the flooding in
Fermanagh.
As the flooding event moved from the response to the recovery phase,
Fermanagh District Council assumed the lead role from Rivers Agency and
this was formally handed over on 4 December 2009.
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8. FLOODING FROM THE SILLEES RIVER
8.1 Flooding from the Sillees River around Boho occurred in early November
2009. (See Photograph 1 overleaf) The flooding, which happens regularly in
times of heavy rainfall, inundates farmland and roads which are constructedacross the natural floodplain of the river. No property was flooded but local
road communication was extremely difficult and affected access for primary
school children attending Killyhommon Primary School at exam time.
8.2 Feasibility studies to try to resolve the problem have been undertaken by
Rivers Agency, most recently in 2008. Solutions to upgrade the watercourse
and options to divert headwater into Lower Lough Erne were examined.Conclusions were that the costs of diverting headwaters were prohibitive
because works would require extensive tunneling in an area of porous
limestone. Works were estimated to cost of the order of £6m to £10m well in
excess of the benefit afforded, primarily due to the alleviation of road flooding.
No cost beneficial scheme re-routing the line of the river is feasible.
8.3 The Sillees catchment is a natural and beautiful area and extensive
engineering works would cause considerable modification to a natural river. It
is likely this would raise considerable environmental opposition if proposed.
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PHOTO 1 – Out of bank and road flooding at Sille
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9. ASPECTS WHICH WORKED WELL
9.1 Aspects which worked well, identified at the structured debrief and attributed
to different organisations, are detailed in Annex 2. The comments received
from the various organisations were collated as follows:- Preparedness,Communication, Co-ordination, Response and Information to the Public and
the Media.
9.2 Preparedness
9.2.1 Agencies were able to instigate contingency plans as the conference calls had
given warning of extensive flooding. Fire and Rescue Service had been able
to maintain operational response to fires and rescues and had relocated itsSpecialist Rescue Team to Lisnaskea.
ESB had been able to maintain water levels at Cliff at 44m (144 feet 4 inches)
throughout the duration of the flooding event, to maximise flow accrued
through the system.
Western Education and Library Board was able to utilise other premises so
pupils attending Moat Primary School in Lisnaskea and who lived on the
western side of Upper Lough Erne were able to be facilitated resulting in only
one school day being lost throughout the period of the flooding. Pupils
attending other schools in the Lisnaskea area who were unable to get to
school were able to be facilitated by their schools through use of Internet
access. (Staff and pupils had to make extraordinary efforts to achieve this).
Rivers Agency put staff on call and ensured sufficient supplies of sandbags
were available.
9.3 Communication between organisations
9.3.1 Overall communications between the different organisations/agencies worked
very well. A number of responders found the daily conference calls which
updated water levels in the loughs and road closures particularly useful.
These conference calls highlighted the fact that the BT Network in Fermanaghwas working well. This had been a concern as the number of telephone calls
from the public seeking assistance was low.
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9.4 Co-ordination
9.4.1 Many organisations stated that co-ordination between the different agencies
had been very good. Notification of the possibility of widespread flooding had
allowed Fire and Rescue Service to liaise and establish the level of additionalresources that were available from southern colleagues in Belturbet,
Ballyconnell and Clones.
9.4.2 The conference call arrangements were highlighted by a number of
organisations as an effective means of sharing information and being kept up
to date on the situation.
9.4.3 NI Water was able to take pro-active measures at Killyhevlin Water Treatment
Works as result of the provision of water levels and prediction data from
Rivers Agency. If the Treatment Works had flooded, there would have been
the potential for a pollution incident on the Lough and the water supply to
Enniskillen and the surrounding area would have seen substantial disruption.
Rivers Agency had previously given advice on construction levels for the
Treatment Works as part of the Planning process.
9.5 Response
9.5.1 Staff goodwill was commended by participants where it was noted that local
staff had worked long hours to assist in the response. It was recognised that
good local knowledge had been of invaluable assistance and Fermanagh
District Council noted that where a problem had been identified prompt action
was taken to try to alleviate it. Roads Service noted that although its
resources had been stretched, it had managed to borrow signs indicating
flooding and road closures from other depots to ensure that all key flooding
locations had been signed to alert the public to the danger.
9.5.2 ESB recorded that they had managed unprecedented water discharges
through Cliff and Ballyshannon.
9.6 Information to the Public and the Media9.6.1 The fact that timely information was provided to the media was seen as a
success. The DARD Minister and Rivers Agency had responded to more
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than 50 media requests. This included participating in TV and radio
interviews.
The First and Deputy First Ministers and the Enterprise, Trade and Investment
Minister also visited the area.
Roads Service had regularly updated the traffic watch website with the lists of
roads that were impassable and DRD officials also responded to more than
20 media requests including broadcast interviews.
9.7 It should also be noted that in areas close to Upper Lough Erne, farming
neighbours helped each other and assisted in transporting children to schooland delivering of groceries.
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10. CHALLENGES
10.1 Comments relating to future challenges were also collated and grouped into
the same five categories, namely Preparedness, Communication, Co-
ordination, Response and Information to the Public and the Media.
10.2 Preparedness
10.2.1 The Emergency Planning Co-ordinator noted that wider issues had arisen that
are not currently covered in the multi agency flood plan.
Housing Executive will review its plans if a housing estate was to be flooded.
10.3 Communication within and between organisations
10.3.1 Although communications between the different responders had worked well
the Ambulance Service believed that dissemination of information internally
could be reviewed to seek improvement.
The Education and Library Board stated that they had made available canoes
and inflatables complete with trained staff and this facility while not needed
during this event, could be put to use in future incidents. Therefore an
inventory of these resources should be made available and included in an
area Flood Plan.
10.3.2 BT noted that interaction between the Council, Rivers Agency and themselves
was verbal. A short written situation report may have been useful.
Housing Executive suggested that it needs to explain its statutory role to offer
temporary accommodation in these situations more widely including that
payment is required.
10.4 Co-ordination
10.4.1 It was noted that although co-ordination was very good between the different
agencies there maybe should have been a round table meeting between all
those involved rather than just the core responders eg Housing Executive, BTand NIE should also have been included.
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10.4.2 The issue of possible over dependence on local knowledge was raised and
the PSNI mentioned that at the very early stages of the incident there were no
lines of responsibility on who should take the lead.
Western Health and Social Care Trust highlighted that there was someconfusion with clarity of roles particularly internally.
10.5 Response
10.5.1 Roads Service, Western Health and Social Care Trust and the PSNI all
mentioned that their own vehicles had limitations in working in floodwaters.
More access to 4 x 4 vehicles would have been useful.
10.5.2 The Emergency Planning Co-ordinator noted that identification of vulnerable
people had not been carried out until 25 November 2009. Education and
Library Board recorded that although not many houses had been flooded,
several were cut off and they had no immediate specific details or locations on
the pupils affected.
10.6 Information to the Public and the Media
10.6.1 Rivers Agency suggested that there was some public misperception regarding
the operational restrictions of Lough Erne, particularly in relation to the
drawing down of Lough levels.
10.6.2 There was a general feeling that more single multi-agency press releases
should have been issued on behalf of the wider group of agencies involved.
Emergency Planning Co-ordinator mentioned that a public relations role may
be required from the Council to ensure that the public are made aware of the
prolonged nature of the floods and precautions to take.
Flooding Incident Line (FIL) mentioned that more promotion of the Flooding
Incident Line number was required.
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11. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS
11.1 Local Resilience Fora were identified as having a key role in future
arrangements. The only current forum in place is Belfast Resilience Forum
which is led by the PSNI and the Council and whose members includerepresentatives from all appropriate public sector organisations and the
voluntary sector.
11.2 Several organisations highlighted that improved public relations/
communications would help develop multi-agency relationships for any future
events.
11.3 The possibility of a central location for a co-ordination centre should be
explored.
11.4 The majority of the organisations believed it would be beneficial to have a
lead agency for co-ordination of widespread flooding events. This role had
initially been filled by Rivers Agency and at recovery phase had been passed
to Fermanagh District Council.
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12. LESSONS LEARNT
12.1 A number of lessons learnt were mentioned including the benefits of local
knowledge and early identification of a lead agency.
12.2 The historical high levels of the Upper Lough, in particular,prior to the ‘Erne
Summer Relief Scheme’ in the 1950s, has restricted development in the
floodplain. Recent Planning policy has also restricted developments and
these combined, significantly reduced the likelihood of flooding of property.
12.3 The importance of a pro-active approach and early communication with the
media was acknowledged.
12.4 The social impact of a flood of this magnitude was mentioned as well as the
benefits in the inter agency co-operation.
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13. CONCLUSIONS
13.1 The flooding event in Fermanagh was as a consequence of persistent rainfall
from mid-October through November 2009, with 336.8mm of rain falling in this
timeframe. The water level in the Upper Lough peaked at 48.27m (158 feet5 inches). This was the highest level recorded since the Erne Drainage
Scheme was completed, some 0.5m above the previous record.
13.2 Bearing in mind that the rainfall event was well in excess of a 1 in 100 year
event and taking account of the lough records, this flooding event was
extreme. There is also no doubt that if the lough levels had not been drawn
down in early October 2009 that more extensive flooding would haveoccurred.
13.3 Water level control was exercised in accordance with the current legislation.
13.4 Co-ordination and co-operation between the different responders was sound.
13.5 This type of event is only likely to happen in winter during periods of persistent
rainfall. There are few animals or crops in the field at this time of the year.
13.6 Two houses and the Share Centre were actually flooded, although a
significant number of properties were cut off for a period of weeks. Whilst the
Western Health and Social Care Trust has a record of vulnerable people, a
more systematic record of establishing which homes are cut off should be
examined.
13.7 The number of houses flooded was relatively low, partially due to the
application of Planning policy which restricts carrying out development in the
floodplain. The floodplain is normally defined as the extent of land that would
be flooded by a 1 in 100 year flood event. Many of the houses in Fermanagh
are sensibly sited on higher ground, some of which predate the 1950s
Drainage Scheme, which considerably lowered Lough levels.
13.8 The response to this type of extensive flooding is limited as placing of
sandbags is not a viable option to contain the rising lough levels. The focus
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should be to protect critical infrastructure and keep the road network open as
far as possible. In this case at an early stage there was good co-ordination
between all the responding agencies.
13.9 Flooding in the area of the Sillees River happens more regularly but no costbeneficial scheme to re-route the river is available. Roads Service may wish
to consider raising the roads locally to help access but it is appreciated that
ground conditions pose difficulties.
13.10 To significantly increase the capacity of the system the inter lough and
Belleek channels would require major works and subsequent loss of land due
to channel widening. Costs of at least £20 million could be anticipated asthere are extensive areas of rock in the channel.
13.11 The Structured Debrief itself was worthwhile and all participants engaged in a
positive manner. The points made by organisations should assist them in the
further development of their emergency arrangements.
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14. RECOMMENDATIONS
Control of Water Levels
14.1 The operating regime, applied within the current legislation should be
reviewed by Rivers Agency and ESB to investigate if there is any scope forimprovement.
14.2 The performance of the existing regime which has been in place since the
1950s should be reviewed. This will inform the need for a review of the
current legislation.
14.3 Any further review of levels must take account of the environmentaldesignation particularly on the Upper Lough. The Upper Lough is a Special
Protection Area (SPA) and a Special Area of Conservation (SAC). The
Habitats Directive, which is European legislation, applies to SPAs and SACs.
The Upper Lough also has nine Areas of Special Scientific Interest (ASSIs) of
which Belleisle, Trannish and Crom are arguably the three most important.
The Upper Lough is also a RAMSAR site.
14.4 Any review of levels must also take account of the navigational interests
which involve Waterways Ireland, (the responsible authority for navigation
within the Erne system). Water based recreation and tourism generate vital
income in Fermanagh.
Emergency Response
14.5 It is recommended that all organisations involved in the response to and
recovery from the flooding in Fermanagh use the lessons learnt from the
review to further develop their own emergency planning arrangements.
Opportunity should also be taken to further develop contact.
14.6 A structured process should be established to carry out ‘desk top’ exercises
every two to three years to ensure that agencies maintain contact and co-
ordination arrangements between each other.
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14.7 Facilities to obtain rainfall information for the whole catchment should be
examined.
Government Response
14.8 Consideration should be given to establishing an agency to provide a strategicoverview to the management of flooding in Northern Ireland particularly in the
medium to long term. This agency may also be responsible for ensuring that
all agencies and organisations have adequate emergency arrangements and
plans in place should a similar flooding event occur in the future as will be
required by the Floods Directive within Flood Risk Management Plans.
14.9 Planning Policies restricting developments in the floodplain should be strictlyapplied to help eliminate the risk of property flooding should a similar event
occur in the future.
Improvement Works
14.10 Consideration should be given to examining the viability of raising critical
roads.
14.11 Rivers Agency and Roads Service should examine whether joint
improvements can be made to the Derrychara Link area.
Awareness
14.12 Rivers Agency, in conjunction with ESB, should draw up a short brochure
explaining how the Erne system works and this should be distributed to
schools in Fermanagh. Rivers Agency should also examine opportunities to
add to previous presentations they have given on the Erne system to improve
public awareness.
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ANNEX 1
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT STRUCTURED DEBRIEF
Electricity Supply Board (ESB) Fermanagh District Council (FDC) Flooding Incident Line (FIL) Northern Ireland Ambulance Service (NIAS) Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) Northern Ireland Water (NIW) Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Rivers Agency (RA) Roads Service (RS) Western Group of Councils - Emergency Planning Co-Ordinator(Western Group EPCO) Western Education and Library Board (WELB) Western Health Trust (WHSCT) In addition although not able, to attend the debrief written comments were receivedfrom:-
BT (BT) Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE)
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Annexes 2 to 5 record the comments received from different
organisations at the structured debrief
ANNEX 2
ASPECTS WHICH WORKED WELL
PREPARDNESS
• Kept water levels at Cliff down at 44.0m AOD for the duration of the flood event(ESB)
• Contingency planning to enable operational response to fires and rescuesmaintained as far as possible during the flooding period (NIFRS)
• Draw down of water levels in loughs had already been carried out in preparation(Rivers Agency)
• Planning policy PPS15. Although many roads closed and properties had beencut-off, very little properties actually flooded. (Rivers Agency)
• Plans in place to closely monitor the weather conditions and numbers of faultscaused by flooding. Local incident centre based at Lackaboy Industrial Estate inEnniskillen can be escalated within less than an hour. We also have contactnumbers for local boat owners who are agreeable to help if and when required.(NIE)
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ANNEX 2 cont’d
COMMUNICATION
• Daily updates, conference calls and allocation of actions (Western Group EPCO)
• Regular updates from Roads Service detailing roads closed due to flooding(NIFRS)
• Internal communications worked well (WHSCT)
• Good communication between all agencies (NIHE)
• Prompt communication with Emergency Planning coordination from local council(WELB)
• Daily water level updates from Rivers Agency (WELB)
• Daily weather forecasts (WELB)
• Road service updates (WELB)
• Road closure updates from Roads Service (PSNI)
• Updates on what roads closed was essential for core business (NIAS)
• Updates on the state of the BT network in the Fermanagh area, includinginformation on any cable faults, together with general level of customer faultreports. Joan expressed some concern that as the council was not receivingmany telephone calls from the public, there may be a problem with the telephonenetwork. I assured her that this was not the case. (BT)
• Participation in a number of conference calls during the flooding and raised aconcern about whether or not the telephone exchange in Enniskillen was indanger of flooding. If this had happened, this would have had a potentiallycatastrophic effect on communications in the Fermanagh area. Happily this didnot occur and thanks to an on-site meeting with the Rivers Agency we were able
to have reassurance on this important subject. (BT)
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ANNEX 2 cont’d
CO-ORDINATION
• Prompt action from Friday 20th. (Western Group EPCO)
• Notification and all agencies aware of problems over the weekend prior toMonday 23rd (Western Group EPCO)
• Good local knowledge of responding agencies – Rivers Agency, NIFRS andCouncil (Western Group EPCO)
• Cross border liaison with resources in Belturbet, Ballyconnell and Clones (NIFRS)
• Lines available 24hours every day to take calls from public, raising incidents thentransfer to relevant flooding responding agency (Flooding Incident Line)
• No difficulty dealing with volume of calls. 44 incidents recorded in Fermanagh(Flooding Incident Line)
• Liaison with NIAS, NIFRS, PSNI and Rivers Agency good (WHSCT)
• Willing co-operation of all agencies to share information and participate inconference calls (Fermanagh District Council)
• Conference calls were very successful (NIHE)
• Provision of water levels and predictions from Rivers Agency to allow pro-activeresponse to events at Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works (NIW)
• Notification and coordination and effective action by Emergency Planning group(WELB)
• Local knowledge invaluable (WELB)
• Daily conference call (WELB)
• On site coordination between PSNI, Roads Service and Rivers Agency (WELB)
• Daily interagency conference call (PSNI)
• Anticipation of daily effects and consequences (PSNI)
• Boat deployments in conjunction with NIFRS (PSNI)
• Interagency communication and partnership working through daily teleconference(NIAS)
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ANNEX 2 cont’d
RESPONSE
• Managed unprecedented discharges through the stations (ESB)
• Forward deployment to County Fermanagh of NIFRS specialist rescue team(NIFRS)
• In spite of the volume of flooding locations that able to manage to place roadsigns to the key floods to alert the public to the danger (Roads Service)
• Good local knowledge of area staff (Rivers Agency)
• Good local knowledge of managers (WHSCT)
• Local knowledge was imperative (Fermanagh District Council)
• Where a problem had been identified prompt action was taken to try to alleviatethe problem. eg pumping at Derrychara Link, Bus depot (Fermanagh DistrictCouncil)
• Staff were prepared to take whatever action was required to assist (NIHE)
• Made provision for temporary accommodation for 10 families (NIHE)
• Provided permanent accommodation for one family (NIHE)
• Contractor put on standby and available if required (NIHE)
• Positive action by school principals resulted in net loss of only one school day(WELB)
• Community action including parents in Teemore, Lisnaskea, Roslea and Boho(WELB)
• NIE had only one fault in Fermanagh which was most likely caused by theflooding. On 23 November 2009 a fault on an underground electricity cable in theShore Rd area of Enniskillen caused 135 customers to lose supply at 13:25. Themost likely cause was water damage. Repairs were completed & suppliesrestored to 135 customers by 16:00 and remaining three customers by 04:10 on24 Nov. (NIE)
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ANNEX 2 cont’d
INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS
• Number of media requests received many with tight deadlines. RA respondedwith timely information, tailored to each request. (Rivers Agency)
• RA facilitated numerous requests for interviews – TV, radio, press, all whilecontinuing to respond operationally to the actual event (Rivers Agency)
• DARD Minister also attended and gave interviews (Rivers Agency)
• Traffic watch website was regularly updated with roads deemed impassable(Roads Service)
Joint press releases were circulated by Rivers Agency, WHSCT and FermanaghDistrict Council.
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ANNEX 3 CHALLENGES
PREPAREDNESS
• Need to review and be better prepared should one of NIHE housing estates be
flooded, - lucky this time (NIHE)
• The usefulness of the multi-agency flood plan – Centered around opening restcentre and administration financial assistance scheme. A lot of wider issues thanthose stipulated within the plan (Western Group EPCO)
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ANNEX 3 cont’d
COMMUNICATION
• How to disseminate information internally, lots of info received daily (NIAS)
• Not good at alerting other agencies to resources available eg outdoor equipment,Canadian canoes, inflatable’s and trained staff (WELB)
• Improve communications, what NIHE can and can’t do. Not everyone knows roleand how the NIHE can help and statutory duty to supply temporary housing(NIHE)
• Not prompt relaying of information from Hydrometrics (Rivers)
• The interaction between BT, the council and Rivers Agency was verbal. A regularshort situation report from BT possibly would have been more useful orappropriate. (BT)
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ANNEX 3 cont’d
CO-ORDINATION
• Very dependant on local knowledge, over reliance on local contacts with controlcentre out in Knockbracken, Belfast (NIAS)
• Early stages of incident no clear lines of responsibility on who should take lead(PSNI)
• No clear contact person for initial alert – Who should it go to internal (WHSCT)
• Some confusion with clarity of roles (WHSCT)
• Conference pool should have met particularly on the 23/11/09. Although coregroups met in council offices there should have been a regular round tablemeeting of conference pool (Western Group EPCO)
• Should have had a central location for a coordination centre. Maybe council / PSNI with maps / internet accessibility. Core groups could then meet at any stage(Western Group EPCO)
• Quicker contact with Local Government Division at DOE to ensure council areaware of cost recovery issues eg work men diverted to other duties, as overtimenot included (Western Group EPCO)
• FIL should have been invited on conference call (Western Group EPCO)
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ANNEX 3 cont’dRESPONSE
• Poor access to 4x4 vehicles. Shogun not effective in floodwaters (PSNI)
• Disproportionate reliance upon a small group of officers internally (WELB)
• Not many houses were flooded but several cut-off. No specific details of pupilsaffected, names, location etc (WELB)
• Could have had better initial response, mobilisation to address emergencysituation never previously encountered at Killyhevlin WTW (NIW)
• Accessibility of vehicles – Unable to use vehicles / offers of help because of risksinvolved. (WHSCT)
• Over reliance on a small number of local staff (Rivers)
• Limitations on their own vehicles to work in floodwaters (Roads)
• Lack of training on staff for boat handling (Roads)
• Identification of vulnerable people not carried out until Wednesday 25th (WesternGroup EPCO)
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ANNEX 3 cont’d
INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS
• No press release response / strategy for all agencies (PSNI)
• Better promotion of 0300 2000 100 number (FIL)
• Dual numbers still in existence with FIL number and individual floodingresponders (FIL)
• Review ability to respond during the early stages of the flooding period toquestions from members of the public on flood related queries that didn’t fallwithin the remit of NIFRS (NIFRS)
• More proactive approach would have helped in regard to public relations / issuingof press statements including cross border eg Cavan was also in flood (ESB)
• Knee jerk reaction to queries. For regular queries one statement would havecovered all (ESB)
• Consider a single website where statements from RA, ESB, Waterways Irelandetc could be uploaded (ESB)
• There was some incorrect local understanding in relation to the operation ofLough levels. This could have resulted in some incorrect reporting in the mediafrom uninformed sources. (Rivers)
• Only 2 joint press releases issued between Rivers, Roads and WHSCT. Shouldhave been a single multi agency press release made on behalf of the group.(Western Group EPCO)
• Council officers should have been out on the ground eg when the food deliverywas made to ensure press where aware of the ongoing work of FermanaghDistrict Council in response to the situation. (Western Group EPCO)
• Collective need for multi-agency perspective to ensure public where aware of theextent of the prolonged nature of the floods to ensure public self help (Western
Group EPCO)
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ANNEX 4 IMPROVEMENTS
WESTERN GROUP EPCO
• Conference pool should have physically met on the 23 November 2009. Coregroups met it may have been more productive to organise a regular meeting oflarger conference pool
• Councils should have been more PR savvy, eg only 2 joint press releases issued.Should have a single multi agency press release / statement. Council PR officesshould have been out on the ground, council should have attended delivery offood as they were involved in getting a lot of the background work done
• Consideration should be given to the central location for a coordination centre,with sufficient ITC capabilities, maps etc and location for core groups to meet.
• Expectations of roles and responsibility of council’s roles. Council participation inRally Ireland, and various table tops previously gave them a perspective of whatresources and actions may be required.
• Flooding Incident Line should have been on the conference call
ESB
• More proactive approach would have helped in regard to public relations / issuingof press statements including cross border
• Consider a single website were statements from RA, ESB, Waterways Ireland etccould be uploaded
NIFRS
• Consider indentifying lead before flooding started
ROADS
• Better PR. Traders at Quay Road complaining that raising of road was increasingrisk of them flooding when not the case
FIL
• Identify of Government Lead for coordination of widespread flooding
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ANNEX 4 cont’d
• Better and more frequent communication. Develop policy and protocol on crossagency / organisation communication
RIVERS
• Regular exercises / networking for maintaining contacts established during theflooding
WHSCT
• Training / increased awareness on roles and responsibilities both internally andexternally
• Further develop multiagency relationships that have now been established duringflooding
• Contact numbers need to be more accessible. Both internal leads and multiagency contacts
FERMANAGH DISTRICT COUNCIL
• Improve PR / Communications
• Clarification of roles and responsibilities and expectation of other agencies
NIHE
• Improve PR / Communications
• Clarification of roles and responsibilities
• Action taken was reactive. What can some agencies do to be more proactive
• What practical work can be done to prevent or minimize the same happeningagain
NIW
• Coordinated approach on communication to general public, close down publicspeculation
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ANNEX 4 cont’d
WELB
• Formalisation of the inter agency group for the area along the lines of localresilience forum. This would ensure future emergencies could be responded to
effectively
PSNI
• Communications, with interagency meetings starting earlier in anticipation of theproblem
NIAS
• Early identification of lead agency
• Creation of a multi agency control room with maps, communications, IT resourcesand would allow face to face contact
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ANNEX 5 LESSONS LEARNT
NIAS
• Early identification of Lead
PSNI
• Someone identified to take lead and setup coordination centre
NIHE
• More proactive role
RIVERS
• Appreciation of DLO and local knowledge, benefits and cooperation
ROADS
• Cost implications to raise roads
NIFRS
• Role of subgroup
ESB
• Be prepared
WESTERN GROUP EPCO
• Multi agency PR / Media strategy required to get message to the public
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ANNEX 6
Tables and Hydrographs
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Upper Lough Portora Lower Lough Total Discharge
Belleisle u/s d/s Roscor Gate state Spilling At Cliff m3/s
1/10/2009 46.02 45.96 45.96 45.90 FO N
2/10/2009 45.97 45.88 45.89 45.83 FO N
3/10/2009 45.92 45.86 45.88 45.80 FO N
4/10/2009 45.90 45.82 45.84 45.78 FO N
5/10/2009 45.88 45.80 45.84 45.77 FO N
6/10/2009 45.82 45.75 45.79 45.68 FO N
7/10/2009 45.78 45.66 45.72 45.62 FO N
8/10/2009 45.81 45.80 45.66 45.53 FC 10.00 N
9/10/2009 45.86 45.87 45.60 45.53 FC N
10/10/2009 45.89 45.88 45.62 45.52 FC N11/10/2009 45.92 45.90 45.64 45.49 FC N
12/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.60 45.48 FC N
13/10/2009 45.96 45.95 45.57 45.45 FC N
14/10/2009 45.98 45.97 45.56 45.42 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N
15/10/2009 45.97 45.92 45.57 45.43 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N
16/10/2009 45.95 45.92 45.57 45.44 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N
17/10/2009 45.96 45.91 45.58 45.45 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N
18/10/2009 45.93 45.91 45.57 45.45 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N
19/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.57 45.46 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N
20/10/2009 45.99 45.98 45.58 45.50 1,2,3,4 Open 2' 12.00 N
21/10/2009 46.02 45.91 45.61 45.52 1,2,3,4 Open 2' N
22/10/2009 46.03 45.92 45.63 45.54 1,2,3,4 open 4' 12.30 N
23/10/2009 46.23 45.87 45.70 45.61 1,2,3,4 open 4' N
24/10/2009 46.23 45.86 45.69 45.65 1,2,3,4 open 4' N
25/10/2009 46.40 46.05 45.83 45.74 FO 10.00 N
26/10/2009 46.40 45.89 45.89 45.80 FO N
27/10/2009 46.37 45.90 45.90 45.87 FO N
28/10/2009 46.37 45.95 45.94 45.87 FO N29/10/2009 46.35 45.92 45.92 45.86 FO N
30/10/2009 46.31 45.91 45.91 45.86 FO N
31/10/2009 46.47 45.96 45.95 45.87 FO N
1/11/2009 46.50 46.02 46.00 45.88 FO N
2/11/2009 46.76 46.11 46.07 46.01 FO N
3/11/2009 46.82 46.15 46.10 46.03 FO N
4/11/2009 46.95 46.27 46.19 46.14 FO N
5/11/2009 47.11 46.46 46.35 46.26 FO Spilling 227.37
6/11/2009 47.19 46.39 46.29 46.26 FO Spilling 296.63
7/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.30 46.30 FO Spilling 293.04
8/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.31 46.28 FO Spilling 317.50
9/11/2009 47.19 46.35 46.25 46.24 FO Spilling 310.46
10/11/2009 47.22 46.36 46.27 46.21 FO Spilling 306.15
11/11/2009 47.19 46.32 46.23 46.17 FO Spilling 291.58
12/11/2009 47.17 46.29 46.21 46.15 FO Spilling 298.23
13/11/2009 47.25 46.30 46.21 46.15 FO Spilling 295.80
14/11/2009 47.24 46.32 46.23 46.14 FO Spilling 294.65
15/11/2009 47.29 46.29 46.20 46.13 FO Spilling 293.86
16/11/2009 47.30 46.30 46.21 46.14 FO Spilling 299.02
17/11/2009 47.42 46.40 46.29 46.24 FO Spilling 310.36
18/11/2009 47.52 46.44 46.33 46.27 FO Spilling 314.73
19/11/2009 47.69 46.50 46.36 46.31 FO Spilling 313.33
20/11/2009 47.93 46.60 46.45 46.37 FO Spilling 334.95
21/11/2009 48.03 46.61 46.45 46.44 FO Spilling 336.65
22/11/2009 48.08 46.64 46.48 46.47 FO Spilling 353.21
23/11/2009 48.15 46.76 46.58 46.55 FO Spilling 355.17
24/11/2009 48.19 46.82 46.62 46.62 FO Spilling 377.13
25/11/2009 48.25 46.90 46.69 46.68 FO Spilling 377.50
26/11/2009 48.27 46.92 46.71 46.72 FO Spilling 374.90
27/11/2009 48.24 46.93 46.72 46.73 FO Spilling 386.60
28/11/2009 48.21 46.92 46.71 46.73 FO Spilling 375.80
29/11/2009 48.14 46.92 46.71 46.71 FO Spilling 372.80
30/11/2009 48.06 46.86 46.67 46.67 FO Spilling 368.20
1/12/2009 48.01 46.79 46.60 46.65 FO Spilling 365.20
2/12/2009 47.97 46.77 46.59 46.61 FO Spilling 357.30
3/12/2009 47.85 46.72 46.56 46.55 FO Spilling 353.10
4/12/2009 47.76 46.66 46.51 46.52 FO Spilling 346.40
5/12/2009 47.72 46.64 46.49 46.48 FO Spilling 344.30
6/12/2009 47.76 46.60 46.46 46.47 FO Spilling 342.30
7/12/2009 47.69 46.60 46.45 46.45 FO Spilling 339.90
8/12/2009 47.62 46.54 46.41 46.42 FO Spilling 336.10
9/12/2009 47.56 46.51 46.38 46.37 FO Spilling 329.50
10/12/2009 47.47 46.47 46.35 46.33 FO Spilling 327.30
11/12/2009 47.36 46.42 46.31 46.27 FO Spilling 317.00
12/12/2009 47.24 46.34 46.25 46.20 FO Spilling 308.70
13/12/2009 47.13 46.28 46.20 46.13 FO Spilling 292.10
14/12/2009 47.02 46.22 46.15 46.05 FO Spilling 283.10
15/12/2009 46.91 46.13 46.08 45.99 FO Spilling Stopped 9.00 229.4016/12/2009 46.80 46.09 46.05 45.97 FO
17/12/2009 46.69 46.06 46.03 45.94 FO LEGEND
18/12/2009 46.60 46.01 45.98 45.91 FO FO = FULLY OPENFC = FULLY CLOSED
TABLE 1 - LOUGH LEVELS, GATE STATE AND DISCHARGE AT CLIFF
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
JAN 182.70 86.30 143.30 109.20 82.00 146.50 140.40 167.80 73.90 33.00 FEB 118.70 105.40 208.50 56.30 92.30 31.70 107.60 132.50 132.60 136.10 MAR 143.60 140.40 72.80 127.60 139.30 70.40 155.30 135.60 49.70 48.90 APR 36.20 100.90 71.50 122.00 108.70 126.10 103.20 33.10 55.90 50.50 MAY 66.30 32.00 47.60 8.70 43.80 79.20 39.60 69.80 58.00 76.90 JUN 33.60 33.50 133.80 99.40 30.90 79.10 67.40 26.40 59.80 97.30 JUL 172.00 28.70 50.80 65.60 89.70 125.70 77.20 89.10 86.90 100.20 AUG 126.00 100.80 115.10 35.90 195.90 75.70 72.10 7.20 128.80 73.80 SEP 125.00 59.20 53.90 51.60 80.70 79.20 71.30 80.10 48.90 49.50 OCT 122.20 145.60 204.50 93.50 90.10 17.00 53.20 193.30 158.80 90.00 NOV 49.10 55.90 67.00 141.90 158.20 46.80 90.90 137.40 123.00 98.90 DEC 92.30 74.40 134.00 164.10 89.80 222.00 152.80 52.50 63.20 138.20 TOTAL 1267.70 963.10 1302.80 1075.80 1201.40 1099.40 1131.00 1124.80 1039.50 993.30
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 JAN 154.10 74.50 90.40 138.70 91.60 101.40 149.20 59.00 159.80 175.80 FEB 86.80 136.70 55.80 235.80 75.80 47.00 44.60 33.60 77.20 56.60 MAR 62.00 69.80 64.90 89.90 67.80 74.60 77.60 110.20 75.00 142.00 APR 94.10 105.20 93.20 106.60 61.60 68.30 93.00 60.60 51.60 63.00 MAY 65.20 60.30 60.90 163.80 122.00 48.40 99.60 135.20 80.70 19.60 JUN 64.30 48.90 64.60 120.80 87.90 113.30 54.80 30.00 78.50 72.20 JUL 55.70 62.50 66.10 78.50 101.40 90.90 37.20 61.00 144.90 97.40 AUG 112.40 116.10 109.90 50.60 18.00 67.60 87.40 74.60 73.40 158.60 SEP 130.10 115.70 54.80 46.90 71.90 83.40 88.20 128.40 54.00 106.00 OCT 36.30 177.30 89.00 204.30 39.90 114.00 111.10 128.40 60.00 156.20 NOV 126.90 134.90 74.10 155.10 117.20 53.80 61.20 97.40 53.60 54.60 DEC
247.20 121.90 92.40 95.40 80.00 100.30 84.60 162.50 114.40 71.20 TOTAL 1235.10 1223.80 916.10 1486.40 935.10 963.00 988.50 1080.90 1023.10 1173.20
TABLE 2 - YEARLY RECORD OF RAINFALL SINCE 198
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Point B
Point C
HYDROGRAPH 1 - UPPER LOUGH LEVELS FROM JULY
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Point A
Poin
HYDROGRAPH 2 - LOWER LOUGH LEVELS FROM JU
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ANNEX 7
Photographs
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PHOTO 3 – Property cut-off in Upper Lough
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PHOTO 4 – Road flooding near Lisnaskea
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PHOTO 5 – Flooding at Share Centre, Lisnaske
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PHOTO 6 – Inter lough channel at Bellanaleck
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I n t e
r l o u g h
C h a n n e
l
PHOTO 7 – Line of Inter lough Channel
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PHOTO 8 – Flooded roadway, Derrychara Link
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PHOTO 9 – Flooding at Enniskillen
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PHOTO 10 – Belleek channel
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PHOTO 11 – Power station and spillway at Cliff
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PHOTO 12 – Sluice gate spillway at Ballyshann
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