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Law and Ethics in Modern Jewish Philosophy: The Case of Moses MendelssohnAuthor(s): Marvin FoxSource: Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, Vol. 43 (1976), pp. 1-13Published by: American Academy for Jewish ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3622541 .
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LAW AND ETHICS IN MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY:
THE CASE OF MOSES MENDELSSOHN
by MARVINFox
BrandeisUniversity
Students of modern Jewish philosophical thought have rightlynoted the special concern which is given to ethics by Jewish phi-
losophers since the eighteenth century. Nathan Rotenstreich ex-presses the quality of this concern when he says, "What strikes
us as new is the insistence on the primacy of ethics in the sphere
of faith; traditional religion is divested of its beliefs in transcen-
dence, and pressed into the service of morality."l This insistence
on the primacy of ethics, and on the independent status of the
ethical, represents a radical departure in Jewish thought. It is a
position which is neither in harmony with the Biblical-rabbinictradition, nor with the main lines of medieval Jewish philosophy.Neither the Bible, nor the Talmud knows of an independent realm
of the ethical.2 Law and ethics are one, having a single source,
namely, divine commandment. God, the creator and master of
the world, has made his law known to man through the Torah
of Moses. It is His commandments which obligate us, and his
promise of reward and punishment which makes it prudent forus to observe His law. There is no distinction among the com-
mandments either as to source or authenticity, nor are they dis-
tinguishedby virtue of moral worth. The verse in the Torah which
commands us to love our neighbor, supposedlythe highest of moral
I Nathan Rotenstreich, Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times (New York,
1968),6.2 Those familiar rabbinicpassages which are regularlycited as evidence
that the rabbis recognizedthe independenceof the ethical, seem to me to
beseriouslymisinterpreted. or a discussionof thispoint,seemy "Maimonides
and Aquinason Natural Law," Dine Israel(Tel-AvivUniversity),III (1972),vi-ix.
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duties, s followed mmediately y anotherwhichprohibitskilayimandshaatnez.Therabbis,similarly,nstructus to be equallymeti-
culousin the observanceof all the commandments,ince we donot knowwhichmeritsa greateror lesserreward.3
It maybe thoughtthat the situation s differentwhen we come
to the medieval Jewishphilosophers.As is wellknown, Saadia
introducednto ourliteraturehe term"rational ommandments",and thereare those who suppose hatwe have here the beginningof an independent thic.4Careful tudywill show,as I havetried
to demonstratelsewhere,5hat we do not havein Saadiaan ethicbased on reason alone. This is not the place to argueout the
detailsof thatclaim.It is sufficient o takenote of theindisputablefact that Saadiahimself,despiteadmittedambiguitiesn his posi-
tion, consistently reatsthe commandments s divinelaw whose
bindingforce lies in their divine origin. He says explicitlythat
God first commandedus and in so doing, obligatedus to His
will. It was only afterwardswe were able to discover hat someof thesecommandments ad a basis in reason,6but they do not
haveindependent tatus.Moreover,amongthosecommandments
whichhe classifies s rational,not all,by anymeans,wouldqualifyas "ethical" n the usual modernsense.What is true of Saadia
is true of the other medievalJewishphilosophers, espite he ten-
dency of some modern thinkers o invokethe authorityof their
medievalpredecessorso justifyclaims hatJudaism ecognizes n
independent thicapartfromthe law.7
3 M. Abot,II, 1.4 SeferEmunotve-Deot, III, 1, 2, 3 andpassim.5 Cf. my "On the RationalCommandmentsn Saadia'sPhilosophy:A Re-
Examination,"n ModernJewishEthics:TheoryandPractice(Columbus,Ohio
StateUniversityPress, 1975),M. Fox (ed.), 174-187.6 Emunotve-Deot,III, 1; cf., IV, 1 (end).7 A strikingcase is that of HermannCohenwho is so concernedto estab-
lish the rationalityof the commandmentsas a fixed (and correct) doctrine
of the medieval Jewish philosophers,that he manages to close his eyes to
all the contraryevidence.As Leo Straussnotes in his IntroductoryEssay to
the English translationof Cohen's Religion of Reason, Cohen praises Ibn
Daud "who had assigneda verylow statusto the 'prescriptions f obedience'
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[3] LAWAND ETHICS N MODERN EWISH PHILOSOPHY
In contrastwith the classical and medievalposition, Jewish
thinkerssincethe 18thcenturyhavebeen inclined o treatethics
as an entity independentof the law and divinecommandment.Whateverpositivevaluethey may assign o divinecommandments
as revealed n the Torah,they do not generally onsider hem to
be a propersource or foundation or ethics.Moralprinciples,n
theirview, are knownindependentlynd aregroundedn human
reason.As MoritzLazarusput it, "Aninvestigation f theessence
and basis of the moral aw reveals hatJudaism verywherelearly
advances he thoughtthat not becauseGod has ordained t is alaw moral,but because t is moral,thereforehas God ordainedt.
Not by divinecommanddoes the moralbecome aw, but because
its contentis moral, and it would necessarily, ven without an
ordinance,become aw,thereforet is enjoinedby God."8Lazarus
goes on to arguethat all ethicsis autonomous,and could,there-
fore, never derive from a heteronomousdivine commandment.
What is of specialinterest is not the fact that a 19th centuryGermanJewishthinker reflects the deep influence of Kantian
ethics, but rather that he makes a strong point of insistingthat this is the lesson that Judaismhas always taught,and that
he reads biblical and rabbinicstatements so as to make them
conformto this interpretation. hus,he feels no hesitationabout
asserting hat, "Moralitywas not createdby the Sinaiticcode; it
as distinguished rom 'the rationalprinciples'...,Cohen ignoresthe fact that
Ibn Daud says also - and this he says at the very end of his Emunah
Ramah - that the 'prescriptions of obedience' are superior to the
rational ones since they call for absolute obedience and submission
to the divine will or for faith." In his Philosophieund Gesetz(p. 56), Strauss
notes in the work of Julius Guttman the same tendencyto argue that the
medieval Jewishphilosophers dentifiedOffenbarungswahrheitith Vernunft-wahreit.Both Guttman and Cohen managedto close their eyes to the texts
which establish the contrarywith respect to ethics. They also ignored the
inner logic and the structureof the arguments,all of which make clear that,in the strict sense of the term "rational",there are no rational command-
ments accordingto the main tradition of medieval Jewishthought.8 Moritz Lazarus,The Ethics of Judaism(Philadelphia, 1900), v. I, 111-
112.
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springs from its own and from man's peculiar nature. It could
therefore be said, as it was, that 'Abraham observed all moral
laws.' Reason was the source of his ethical instruction." We needonly note that the text of the Mishnah in question reads that,
"Abraham observed the entire Torah before it was given." For
Lazarus it is apparentlyso clear that the moral law is independentthat he distorts a totally unambiguous statement to conform to
his views by identifying kol ha-Torahkulah with "all moral laws".9
The first great representative of modern Jewish thought was
Moses Mendelssohn, and it is to his treatment of the status ofethics that we turn as our model case. Mendelssohn, as we know,
was anxious to preserve the position of the law which he himself
observed faithfully. At the same time, he was deeply affected by
the dominant ideas of the German Enlightenment, among them
the belief that all men must be granted equal status as moral
agents, a status which should in no way be determined by reli-
gious faith. Mendelssohn set himself the task of bringing togetherclassical Judaism and the Aufkldrung, seeking to guarantee the
particularity of Judaism without compromising in any way the
humanistic universalism which he most admired in the philoso-
phers of his time. To achieve this goal Mendelssohn adopted his
famous slogan that Judaism is not revealed religion but revealed
legislation. According to him, the metaphysical truths on which
Judaism rests are not peculiar to that one faith, nor are theyknown by way of divine revelation.They are eternalverities,known
by way of unaided human reason, and, as such, are equally avail-
able to all men, in all times and places. What is, however, peculiar
to Judaism is the special legislation which is contained in the com-
mandments of the Torah. We must ask exactly what he believes
9 Ibid., 118. The reference s to M. Kiddushin, V, 14. This portion of the
mishnah,as we have it in our printedtexts, is actuallynot partof the original
text, but is an addition from a beraita,as Albeck points out in the notes to
his edition. See also, Albeck'snotes for other sourcesfor the same aggadah.
Any study of the passage makes it clear beyond any possible dispute that
Lazarus'reading is tendentious and forces the text to conform to a pre-
conceptionwhich it in no way fits.
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[5] LAW AND ETHICS IN MODERNJEWISH PHILOSOPHY
to be the status of ethics, and how he relates moral principles to
the law.
Since the law, which Mendelssohn believes to be directly re-
vealed, includes all the so-called moral commandments, we might
suppose that he would classify ethics as part of the special legis-lation given to the Jewish people. Obviously, this would be im-
possible for him since it would entail that morality was not avail-
able to us through human reason alone, and that the Jews have
access to the saving power of the ethical commandments in a way
that is closed to other people. In fact, Mendelssohn argues that
reason alone is the ground of our moral obligation and the source
of our knowledge of the ethical. This argument takes two forms;one is a systematic philosophic discussion in which the positionis set forth and defended, and the other, an appeal to the Noahide
laws as evidence from within the Jewish tradition itself that there
is a natural moral law.
The philosophical discussion occurs in Mendelssohn's prize-
essay, "Abhandlung iber die Evidenz in Metaphysischen Wissen-
schaften" of 1764. The fourth section of this essay deals with
evidence for the fundamental principlesof ethics.10 Mendelssohn
begins with the confident assertion that, "It is not difficult to
show that one can demonstrate the general principles of ethics
with geometric rigor and force.'11 He cites as his authority a
statement from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, a statement
which, like his own, only asserts that there is a rational natural
moral law, but does not prove it. It is clear, as Altmann pointsout in his superb study of the early Mendelssohn,12 that Men-
delssohn is reflectinghere the thought of John Locke among others,
10Moses Mendelssohn,GesammelteSchriften,Jubilaumsausgabe,Vol. 2,315-330. For extended discussions of this essay, see Alexander Altmann,
Moses MendelssohnsFruhschriften ur Metaphsik (Tiibingen, 1969), Ch. 5,
esp. 341-391, which deal with "Evidenz in der Sittenlehre,"and Alexander
Altmann,MosesMendelssohn, Biographical tudy(Philadelphia,1973), 125-130.
11 Ibid.,315.12 Op. cit., 341.
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6 FOX [6]
andit maybe instructiveo note thatthoughLockerepeats everal
timeshis claimthat morals are mathematically emonstrable, e
neveractuallyoffers ucha demonstration.Unlikehispredecessors,Mendelssohndoes attempt o demonstrate is claim,or, at least,to show how such a demonstrationwould proceed.The details
of that demonstrationie beyond the limits of our presentdis-
cussion.What we need to know is only that he emergeswith a
'Law of Nature'that reads, "Makeyour own inner and outer
condition,and that of your fellow-man, n properproportion,
as perfectas you can."13 He believeshimself to have provedby severalargumentshat this is a universalmorallaw, applyingwith equalforce to all men,and bindingthem by virtue of their
rationality.
Among his argumentss one which claims to show that this
principle s in full accordwith God's will, but this does not lead
to theconclusion hatwe areobligated o observe hislawbecause
it is God's command.Rather, t is God's commandbecauseHe,in His very nature,is only capableof willingwhat is best, and
we, who are rationalbeings,are, in turn,boundto seek what is
best.As Altmannexpressest, thisargument"proceededrom the
assumptionhat God created he world for a purpose.SinceGod
could have createdonly from wisdomand goodness,his designcould have been none otherthan the perfectionof his creatures.
Hence the 'lawof nature'agreedwith the designof God, andwewere imitatorsof God wheneverwe made ourselvesor others
moreperfect."14So far we have in Mendelssohn n ethicwhichis rationaland
autonomous.As rational, t is knowableby everyman who takes
the troubleto reflect.As autonomous, t is independentof any
externalsource of authority,sanction,or command.It accords
with God's will, but it is not commandedby God in the sensethat it is imposedupon man from without.It is true that Men-
13 "Machedeinenund deinesNebenmenschennnernund aussernZustand,
in gehorigerProportion,so vollkommen,als du kannst," Gesam.Schr.,Jub.
A., vol. 2, 317.14 Altmann,MosesAlendelssohn, 27.
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[7] LAW AND ETHICS IN MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
delssohnacknowledgeshat individualpracticaldecisionscannot
be made with the same geometriccertainty hat he ascribes to
the generalprinciple,but this is, at worst, a practicaldifficultythat does not affect his generaltheoreticalposition. Moreover,he believesthat even this practicaldifficulty s largelyresolved
through he assurance hat our naturalgood sensewill lead us to
makecorrectpracticaldecisionsn line with the naturalmoral aw.
When we turn to the internalJewish reatmentof this themein
Mendelssohn'shoughtwe encounterveryseriousdifficulties, nd
we becomeawareof the graveproblems n his philosophical x-
position, as well. The Jewishcounterpartof the rational moral
law is, in his view, the seven commandments f the Noahides.
In his correspondencewith Lavater,Mendelssohn xplicitly den-
tified the Noahide laws with the law of nature.15Presumably,
then, these seven commandments re the basic rules of an auto-
nomous rationalethic,the verysame rules which he had asserted
in his prize-essay ould be demonstratedwith the rigorof a geo-metricproof.Whoeverobserves heseis one of the hasideiummot
ha-olamandis assuredof salvation.Now we mustask, as hardly
any commentator eems to have done, just what sense can be
madeout of theclaimthatthe Noahide aws arerationally emon-
strable. Even if we grant to Mendelssohnhis claimed'law of
nature',namely,that we ought alwaysto seek to makeourselves
and othersas perfectas possible,we cannotsee how it would lead
us to the sevenNoahide commandments.What,for example, s
the relationshipbetweenhumanperfectionand not eatinga limb
torn from a livinganimal?Or, how do we move from the prin-
ciple of seekinghuman perfection o the rule that homosexual
relationsare forbiddenon pain of death,or that sexualrelations
with one's sister are similarly orbiddenand on pain of the same
penalty?Two thingsbecome clear once we raise such questions.First, we now see that we have no idea of what it is that Men-
delssohnmeans by "perfection", nd,second, whateverhe does
mean we see no way to move from his theoryof perfection o
15 Jub. A., vol. 7, 11.
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the specific commandments addressed to all mankind under the
Noahide rubric.
In his 'geometric proof' Mendelssohn has given us little morethan some verbal sleight of hand. He argues that the only true
desire of a rational being can be its own perfection, hence, it is
a rule of reason that we must always seek our own perfection.Unless the idea of 'perfection' has some content, the statement
is a mere tautology. Yet, if we ask what is its content, we are met
either by silence, or by the repetition of moral commonplaces.
When we confront the specific case in which Mendelssohn offers
us an accurate description of the content of a rational moral life,
namely, in the case of the Noahide commandments, we find it
impossible to relate these in any necessary way to the idea of
human perfection.Mendelssohn was deeply disturbedby the fact that Maimonides
had insisted in his Mishneh Torah, that those who observe the
Noahide commandments are truly meritorious, i.e. worthy of olam
ha-ba, only if they observe them out of the faith that they were
commanded by God through Moses.16 Maimonides is saying that,
however pre-Sinaitic generations may have known of the seven
commandments, after the revelation at Sinai the Torah is the
only source through which these commandmentsare known. Men-
delssohn views this as a terrible kind of insularity and lack of
tolerance. It seems to make the salvation of all men dependent
on a particular revelation and to deprive all those who happen
not to know of the revelation at Sinai of any opportunity for
final bliss. In his famous letter to Rabbi Jacob Emden,17 Men-
delssohn pleads with him to clarify this totally unacceptable ruling
of Maimonides. He understandscorrectly that Maimonides makes
this ruling because he holds that moral principles are not subject
to any kind of rational demonstration and that, in fact, they have
16 M.T., H. Mekkhim, VIII, 11. For a discussion of this passage, see
Steven S. Schwarzschild,"Do Noachites have to Believe in Revelation?"
JQR, 57, 4 (April, 1962)and my papercited in note 2 above.17 Jub.A., vol. 16, 178f.
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[9] LAW AND ETHICS IN MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
no truth-value.Consequently,unless one can depend on revelation,
there is no source for morality except social convention. Men-
delssohn's response is that, contra Maimonides, he has "clear andsound demonstrations concerning good and evil, right and wrong,beautiful and ugly, showing that they are all truly rational prin-
ciples." To our sorrow, neither in this letter, nor elsewhere in his
writings, does he set forth for us these demonstrative principles.If the Noahide commandmentsare examples of what Mendelssohn
considers to be rationally demonstratedmoral rules, he completely
fails to show how he arrives at the conclusion that they are, in
fact, rationally demonstrable.
Similarproblems are present throughout his discussion of these
topics in his Jerusalem. On the one hand, he wants to preservehis theory of a natural moral law which is accessible to all men
by way of their unaided reason. At the same time, he wants to
insure the position of Jewish law as the specially revealed legis-
lation directed to the Israelites. He never addresses himself to theobvious puzzle, namely, that the revealed law also contains ethical
prescriptions which he considers, at the same time, to be part of
the natural moral law. Why are they, then, even included in the
revealed law, and what is their status? Are they specially revealed
legislation, or are they natural law? To this there is an implicit
reply when Mendelssohn contends that "natural laws are nothing
but the expression of the divine will," and that for one who under-
stands this "the moral teachings of reason will be as sacred... as
those of religion."18 Surely, in this context "divine will" cannot
mean that which has been specially revealed at Sinai. If it does,
then we have lost the concept of natural law. If it does not, then
there is no significant sense in which the natural law can be spokenof as revealingthe divine will. We are back to the empty argumentthat we noted earlier, namely, that the natural law must coincide
with God's will since both direct man to what is best.
Yet, based on this kind of argument Mendelssohn goes even
I8 Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem and Other Jewish Writings, tr. and ed.
by Alfred Jospe (New York, 1969), 34.
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further.He strongly nsists that withoutthe conviction hat God
is the foundationof the moral law there can be no truemorality
at all. "WithoutGod, Providence,and a future life," he says,"love of man is nothingbut a congenitalweakness,and humani-
tarianism ittle more than a chimera nto which we try to trick
each other so that the simpletonmay get into troublewhile the
quick-wittedcan enjoy himself at the other'sexpense."19Here,the full depthof the difficultyn whichMendelssohn as trappedhimself is exposed,and his rational ndependent thicsseems lost
completely.It is true that he claims that God, Providence,andthe futurelife are all principlesof reason whose realitycan be
demonstrated.f, however,no mancan be virtuousunlesshe has
first come to know these truths of reason,then mankind as a
wholeis in no bettercondition hanif theywererequiredo know
the Noahidelaws by way of revelation.Whatproportionof men
can one reasonably xpectto workout for themselves,or to fol-
low throughthe effortsof others,demonstrationsoncerning he
existenceand natureof God, the workingsof divineProvidence,and theimmortality f the soul? Sucha conceptionof the natural
moral law solves none of the problems o whichit was directed.
It is notdifficulto see whatmovesMendelssohno thesepatentlyuntenablepositions.He cannotallow a natural aw without God
or he will makeall religionsuperfluous.He cannotallowrevealed
religionwithoutnatural aw, or he willbetray he liberalhumani-
tarianism o whichhe is committed. n bringing hemtogetherhe
has attempted o saveboth ethicsand the law. He hopes to pro-vide us with an independent thic,yet at the sametime, show it
to be intimatelyconnectedwith divinelaw. In the narrowsense,this is the divine aw of the Jewishrevealtion. n the widersense,it is the divine awwhich
everyman can
presumablyome to know
by his unaidedreason.Thoughwe may sympathizewith his ob-
jective,we cannotescapethe conclusion hat Mendelssohnailed
oncehe separated thics rom the law.
Maimonides, he greatestof the Jewishmedievalphilosophers,
I9 Ibid., 38.
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[11] LAW AND ETHICS IN MODERNJEWISH PHILOSOPHY
is completelyclear about these issues. He deniesthat we can
discernanythingat all aboutGod's ultimatepurpose n the world,
in fact, he even denies that the notion of ultimatedivinecosmicpurposecan be made intelligible.He also sees that there is no
independent ationalfoundation or morality.He concludes hat
"allthat existswas intendedby Him... according o His volition.
And we shall seek for it no cause or other final end whatever.
Justas we do not seek for the end of His existence... so do we
not seekfor the final end of His volition,according o whichall
that has been and will be produced n time comes into beingasit is."20All we cando, then,is recognize hat the commandments,like all existence,have their sourcein the divinewill, and that
for this reasonalone,we are boundby them. We can, of course,make effortsto understandhem, as Maimonidesdid, from our
own humanperspective.At best, they may seem reasonable o
us in lightof our ownunderstandingf man'shighestpossibilities.
They can, however,never be rationallydemonstrated.Theycon-tinue to obligateus, reasonableor not, only becausethey have
beencommandedby God.
Spinoza,whomWolfsonhasaptlycalled he last of themedievals
and the first of the moderns,also deniedany notion of divine
purpose,and with it all claimsthat thereis a transcendentGod
who commandsus. There is no room for such a God in a sys-
tem whichprovidesfor only a singleunified orderof beingandconceivesGod as deus sive natura.Strictlyspeaking, or Spinozawhatever s is what ought to be, because n this purelynatural
world one cannot distinguishbetweenis and ought, surelynot
on a cosmic scale.Even on the level of personalhumanexistence
there is no morallaw as such. "Good" s definedby Spinozaas
"that whichwe certainlyknow to be usefulto us" and the evil
as that "whichwe certainlyknow to be a hindrance o us in the
attainmentof the good."21Whatemerges s not a conceptionof
20 Maimonides,Guideof the Perplexed,tr. S. Pines (Chicago, 1963), III,
13,454455.21 Spinoza,EthicsIV, Defs. 1, 2.
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morality rooted in notions of duty or obligation, but rather a
purely naturalistic scheme in which, as one contemporary com-
mentator puts it, "Man is part of Nature, and therefore the moralistmust be a naturalist; ...We cannot be other than what we are,
and our whole duty and wisdom is to understand fully our own
imperfections, and, havingunderstood, to acquiesce;man'sgreatest
happiness and peace of mind comes only from this full philoso-
phical understanding of himself."22
Mendelssohn, one of the first modern Jewishphilosophers,strug-
gles to retain features of both Maimonides' and Spinoza's worlds.Unlike Maimonides, and in a way closer to the Jewish norm, he
affilms the notion of divine purpose in creation. Like Maimonides,
he holds that God commands us, but unlike him, he believes that
these commands come to us not only through revelation, but also
through the natural law which expresses the divine purpose, and
is addressed to all men. In affirmingnatural law, he comes close
in certain ways to Spinoza whom he ciiticized so severely. How-ever, it is only a closeness in terminology, but not in substance.
For even natural law, in Mendelssohn's system, is connected to
and derives fiom God's purposes, the very notion of which is in-
admissible for Spinoza. In revelation Mendelssohnfindsthe groundof his Judaism, and in nature the ground of his morality. He
brings them together in such a way as to naturalize revelation,
at a certain point, and to deify nature, at another. He sacrificesthe claiity and internal consistency which both Maimonides and
Spinoza achieved, each in his own way. This is the overly high
price he pays in order to be able to live in the world of modern
thought which Spinoza opened up, while still nurturinghis roots
in the pre-modern Jewish world which Maimonides typifies.The problematicswith which Mendelssohn struggledbecame the
center of concern for much Jewish philosophy since his time. It
is a mark of the modern situation that Jewish thinkers feel con-
strained to come to terms with the conflict between Jewish par-
ticularismand Jewishuniversalism.They do so by addressingthem-
22 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (Pelican Books, 1951), 121.
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[13] LAW AND ETHICS IN MODERNJEWISH PHILOSOPHY
selves to the problem of the relation of ethics and the law. David
Neumark may have been right when he criticized Lazarussharply,
saying that it is wrong to speak about a humanistic ethic from aJewish perspective, since "according to the view of Judaism there
is no place for an ethic that does not derive from divine com-
mandment."23 His criticism of Lazarus can serve as a critiqueof a whole school of modern Jewish philosophy, beginning with
Moses Mendelssohn in the 18th century, and ending with some
of our contemporaries.
23 David Neumark, "Mussar ha-Yahadut," Ha-Shiloah, VI (1899), 91.
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