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¡'J4 HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVB RBSBARCH
6 •
Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
EGON G. GUBA
YVONNA S. LINCOLN
In Conclusion
The researcher-as-bricoleur cannot afford to be a stranger to any of theparadigms discussed in this part of the Handbook. He or she must understandthe basic ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of
each, and be able to engage them in dialogue (Guba, 1990). The differencesbetween paradigms have significant and important implications at the practical, everyday, empiricallev eL A resolution of paradigm differences, Guba and
Lincoln cogently note in Chapter 6, is most likely to occur "i f and whenproponents of these several [paradigms] come togethe r to discuss their differences, not to argue the sanctity of their views."
References
Burawoy, M. (1992). The exten ded caSe method. In M.
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Gamson, N. Gartrell, L. Hurst, C. Kurzman, L.
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phy unbound: Power and resistance in the modern
metropolis (pp. 271-290). Berkeley: Uníversity of
California Press.Carspecken, P. F., & Apple, M. (1992). Critical re
search: Theory, methodOlogy, and practice. In M.
D. LeCompte, W. L. Millroy, & J. Preíssle (&Is.),
The handbook of qualitative research in educa/ion
(pp. 507-554). New York: AcadelnÍc Press.Clough. P. T. (1993a). On .lhe brink of deconstructíng
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Clough, P. T. (l993b). Response to Smith. Sociological
Quarlerly, 34, 193-194.Collíns, P. H. (1990). Blackfeminisl /hought: Knowl
eelge, consciousness and the politics of empower
menl. New York: Routledge.Collins, P. H. (1992). Transforming the inner circle:
Dorothy Smith's challenge to socíological tbeory.Sociological Theory, 10, 73-80.
Franklin, S., Lury, C., & Stacey, J. (1991). FelnÍnismand cultural studies: Pasts, presents, and futures.Media, Culture & Society, 13, 171-192.
Giroux, H. (1992). Border crossings: Cultural workers
and the polities o/ education. New York: Routledge.Grossberg, L. (1989). The formations of cultural stud
ies: An American in Birmingham. Strategies, 2,114-149.
Grossberg, L. (1992). We golta get out of thi .. place:
Popular conservatism and postmodern culture.
New York: Routledge.
Guba, E. G. (1990). The alternative paradigm dialog. InE. G. Guba (Ed.), The paradigm dialog (pp. 1730). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Hall, S. (1992). Cultural studies and its theoreticallegacies. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, & P. A.
Treichler (Eds.), Cultural studies (pp. 277-294).New York: Routledge.
Mortis, M. (1988). Henry Parkes Motel. Cultural Stud
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Nelson, C., & Grossberg, L. (Eds.). (l988). Marxismand the interpretation o/ culture. Urbana: University of IlIinois Press.
Reinharz, S. (1992). Feminist methads in' social re-
search. New York: Oxford University Press.Roman, L. G. (1992). Tbe political significance of olher
ways oí narraling ethnography: A feminis! materialistapproach. In M. D. LeCompte, W. L. Millroy,& J. Preíssle (Eds.), The handbook of qualitative
research in educarion (pp. 555-594). New York:Academic Press.
Smith, D. E. (1992). Sociology from women's experience: A reaffirmation. Sociological Theory, 10,
88-98.Smith, D. E. (1993). High noon in Textland: A critique
of Clough. Sociological Quarterly, 34, 183-192.West, C. (1989). The American eva.<ion of phi/osophy.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.West, C. (1990). The new cultural polítics oí difference.In R. Fergason, M. Geverr, T. T. Minh-ha, & C.West (Eds.). Out rhere: Marginalization and con
temporary cultures (pp. 19-36). Cambridge: MIT
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modernism, and e/hnographic responsibility. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
IN this chapter we analyze four paradigms thatcurrently are competing, or have until recently competed, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice ininforrning and guiding inquiry, especially qualitativeinquiry: positivism, postpositivism, critical theoryand related ideological positions, and construclivism. We aeknowledge at once our own commitmentto conslructivism (which we earlier called "naturalistic inquiry"; Lineoln & Guba, 1985); Ihe readermay wish to take that faet into accounl in judgingIhe appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis.
Although the title of this volume, Handbook o[
Qualitative Research, implies that the term qualitative is an umbrella term superior to Ihe lerm para-
digm (and, indeed, Ihat usage is not uncommon), itis our position that it is a term Ihat ought to bereserved for a description of types of methods. From
our perspective, bothqua!itative and quantitativemethods may be u ~ . \ L ! l P p r o p r l a ~ l y wilh añy re:.
seárch jiaradljin:-QueJitions of melhod are s e c o n ~ dary to questions -of-paradigm,. ' i ! ' . ~ c h we deliñe as
basic be lief system or worldview tllálgliiill!:Hneinvestrg¡¡tlíf;'-ñot onWiñCl'roreen'f metliod buf in·óntOlogica1lylltídlipísteffiórogrcaIlYfuñdamentalways.
It is certairíly-ilíe 'case'ffiárintéresfln áliéñil¡i:rveparadigms has be en stimulated by a growing dissat
case for a renewed interest in qualitalive approaches,it became clear Ihat Ihe metaphysical assumptionsundergirding the conventional paradigm (the "received view") musl be seriously questioned. ThusIhe emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, theirassumplions, and the implicalions of Ihose assumplions for a variety of research issues, not on therelative utility of qualilative versus quantitativemethods. Nevertheless, as discussions of paradigms/methods over Ihe past decade have often begun with a consideralion of problems associatedwilh overquantification, we will also begin Ihere,shifting only later lo our predominant interes!.
The Quantitative/Qualitative Distinclion
Historically, there has been a heavy emphasison quantification in science. Mathematics is oftentermed the "queen of sciences," and those seiences, such as physicsand chemistry, that lendthemselves especially well to quantificalion aregene rally known as "hard." Less quantifiable are
isfaelion wilh !he patent overemphasis on quantita nas, such as biology (although that is rapidlyN· 'DEN '1:;1--) o(¿ Y. (....'}l GeL J..) (-e.oU..) (.-(G,,",,) ~ k tive melhods. But as efforts were made lo build a changing) and particularly the social sciences, are
AUTHORS' NOTE: We are grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for their very helpful critiques of an earlicr~ í 2 w ~ . ~ e v - . d ~ k . - ~ : : draft of tbis chapter.-
J05
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106
referred to as "50ft," less with pejorative intent
than to signal their (putative) imprecision and
Iack of dependability. Scientific maturity is combelieved t&emerge as the degree of quan
found within a given field increases.
That this is the case is hardly surprising. The
"received view" of science (positivism, transformed
over the course of this century into postpositivism; see below) focuses on efforts to verífy (posi
tivism) or falsify (postpositivism) a priori hy
potheses, most usefully stated as mathematical
(quantitative) propositions or propositions that
can be easi1y convert ed into precise mathematical
formulas expressing functional relationships. For
mulaic precision has enormous utílity when the
aim of scicnce is the prediction and control of
natural phenomena. Further, there is already avail
able a powerful aITayof statistical and mathemati
cal models. Finally, there exists a widespread
conviction that only.quantitative data are ulti
valid, or of high quality (Sechrest, 1992).
Stuart Mili (1843/1906) is sald to have been
the first to urge social scientists to emulate theirolder, "harder" cousins, promising that ifhis advice
were followed, rapid maturation of these fields, as
wel! as their emancipation from th e philosophical
and theological strictures that limited them, would
fol!ow. Social scientists took this counsel to heart
(probably to a degree that would greatly surpriseMill if he were alive today) for other reasons as well.
They were the "new kids on the block"; if quantifi
cation could lead to the fulfillment of Mili' s prom
ise, status and political leverage would ac:crue that
would enormously profit the new practitioners. ]mi
tation might thus lead both to greater acceptance and
to more valid knowledge.
Critiques of the Received View
In recent years, however, strong counterpressures
against quantification have emerged. Two critiques,
one internal to the conventional paradigm (that is,
in terms of those metaphysical assumptioris thatdefine the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex
temal to it (that is, in terms of those assumptions
defining altemative paradigms), have been mounted
that seem not only to warrant a reconsideration of
the utility of qualitative data but to question the very
assumptions on which the putative superiority of
quantification has been based.
]nternal (Intraparadigm) Critiques
A variety of implicit problems have surfaced to
chaIlenge conventional wisdom; several of these are
described below.
MAJOR PARADlGMS AN D PERSPECTIVES
COn/ext stripping. Precise quantitative approaches
that focus on selected subsets of variables neces
sari1y "strip" from consideration, through appropriate controls or randomization, other variables
that exist in the context that might, if allowed to
exert their effects, great1y alter findings. Further,
such exclusionary designs, while increasing the
theoretical rigor of a study, detract from its relevanee, that is, its applicability or generalizability,
because their outcomes can be properiy applied
only in other similarly truncated or contextually
stripped situations (another laboratory, for exam
pIe). Qualitative data, it is argued, can redress thatimbalance by providing contextual information.
Exclusion ofmeaning and purpose. Human be
havior, unlike that of physical objects, cannot be
understood without reference to the meanings andpurposes attached by human actors to their activi
ties. Qualitative data, it is asserted, can provide
rich insight into human behavior.
Disjunction of grand theories with local con/ex/s: The e/ic/emic dilemma. The etic (outsider)
theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves
tigator (or the hypotheses proposed to be tested)
may have little or no meaning within the emie
(insider) view of studied individuals, groups, so
cieties. or cultures. Qualitative data, it is affirmed,are useful for uncovering emic views; theories, to
be valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such
grounding is particularly crucial in view of the
mounting criticism of social science as failing to
pro vide adequat e accounts of nonrnainstream lives
(the "other") or to provide the material for a
criticism of our own Westem culture (Marcus &
Fischer, 1986).
lnapplicability of general dala /0 individualcases. This problem is sometimes described as the
nomothetididiographic disjunction. Generaliza
tions, although perhaps statistically meaningful,
have no applicability in the individual case (the
fact. say. that 80% of individuals presenting givensymptoms have lung cancer is at best incomplete
evidence that a particular patient presenting withsuch symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data,
it is held, can help to avoid such ambiguities.
Exclusion of he discovery dimension in inquiry.Conventional emphasis on the verificalion of spe
cific, a priori hypotheses glosses over the source of
those hypotheses. usually arrived at by what is com
monly termed the discovery process. In the received
view only empiricaI inquiry deserves to be called
"science." Quantitative normative methodology isthus privileged over the insights of creative and
divergent thinkers. The cal! for qualitative inputs
is ex pected to redress this imbalance.
Compe/ing P ~ r a d i g m s in Qualita/ive Research
External (Extraparadigm) Critiques
The intraparadigm problems noted aboye offer
a weighty challenge 10 conventional methodol
ogy, but could tie eliminated, or at least amelio
rated, by greater use of qualitative data. Many
critics of the received view are content to stop at
that point; hence many of the calls fm more qualitative ínputs have been Hmited to this methods
level accommodation. But an even weightier chal
lenge has been mounted by critics who have
proposed alterna/ive paradigms that involve notonly qualification of approaches but fu ndamental
adjustments in the basic assumptions that guide
inquiry altogether. Their rejection of the received
view can be justified on a number of grounds
(Bernstein, 1988; Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lin
coln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), but
chief among them are the following. 1
The theory-ladenness of faets. Conventional
approaches to research involving the verification
or falsification of hypotheses assume the inde
pendence of theoretical and observational lan
guages. If an inquiry is to b e objective, hypotheses
must be stated in ways that are independent of the
way in which the facts needed to test them are
collected. But it now seems established beyond ob
jection that theories and facts are quite in/e rdependen/-that is, that facts are facts only within sorne
theoretical frarnework. Thus a fundamental assump
tion of the received view is exposed as dubious. Ifhypotheses and observations are not independent,
"facts" can be viewed only through a theoretical
"window" and objectivity is undennined.
The underdetermination of theory. This prob
lem is also known as the problem of induction.
Not only are facts determined by the theory win
dow through which on e looks for them, but dif
ferent theory windows might be equally well sup
ported by the same set of "facts." Although it may
be possible. given a coherent theory, to derive by
deduction what facts ought to exist, it is never
possible, given a coherent set of facts. to arrive
by induction at a single, ineluctable theory. ]n
deed, it is this difficulty that led philosophers
such as Popper (1968) to reject the notion of
theory verifica/ion in favor of the notion of theory
falsifica/ion. Whereas a million white swans can
never establish, with complete confidence, the
proposition that all swans are white, one black
swan can completely falsify it. The historieal po
sition of science that it can, by its methods, ulti
mately converge on the "real" truth is thus brought
sharply into question.
The value-ladenness of ac/s. Just as theories
and facts are no t independent, neither are values
and facts. Indeed, it can be argued that theories
107 '
are themse)ves value statements. Thus putative
"facts" are viewed not only through a theory win
dow but through a value window as well. The valuefree posture of the rece/ved view is compromised.
The in/eraetive nature of the inquirer-inquired¡nto dyad. The received view of science piclures
the inquirer as standing behind a one-way mirror,
viewing natural phenomena as they happen and
recording them objectively. The inquiier (when
using proper methodology) does not influence the
phenomena or vice versa. But evidence such asthe Heisenberg uncertainty principie and the Bohr
complementarity principie have shattered that ideal
in the hard scíences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); even
greater skepticism must exist for the social sci
ences. ]ndeed, the notion that findíngs are created
through the interaction of inquirer and phenorne
non (which, in the social sciences, is usual
pie) is oflen a more plausible descriptíon
inquiry process than is the notion that findings are
discovered through objective observation "as they
really are, and as they really work."
The intraparadigm critiques, although expos
ing many inherent problems in the received view
and, indeed, proposing sorne useful responses to
them, are nevertheless of much less interest-<lr
weight-than the extraparadigm critiques, whichraise problems of such consequence that the re
ceived view is being widely questioned. Several
alternative paradigms have been proposcd. sorneof which rest on quite unconventional assump
tions. It is useful, therefore, to inquire about the
nature of paradigms and what it is that distin
guishes one inquiry paradigm from another.1 ·/1 .,'
"\. tTbe Nature of Paradigms
VeJ.-r. "1 ,-{,.'
Paradigms as Basic Belief Systems {¡'v1 .....,LBased on Ontological, Epistemological, .r::¡/and Methodological Assumptions
A paradigm may be viewed as a set oY basicbeliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates
or first principIes. ]t represents a worldview that
defines, for i15 holder, the nature of the "world,"
the individu al' s place in it, and the range of pos
sible relationships to that world and its parts, as,
for example. cosmologies and theologiesdo.2 The
beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be
accepted simply on faith (however well argued);
there is no way to establish their ultimate truth
fulness. lf there were, the phílosophical debates
reflected in these pages would have been resolved
millennia ago.
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109O8
Inquiry paradigms define for inquirers what it
is they are about, and what falls within and out.
side the limíts of legitimate inquiry. The basicbeliefs that define inquiry paradigms can be sumomarizéd by the responses given by proponents of
any given paradigm to three fundamental quesIions, which are interconnected in such a way thatthe answer given to any one question, taken in anyorder, constrains how the others may be answered.We have selected an order that we believe reflectsa logical (if not necessary) primacy:
l. The ontological queslion. Wbat is the formand nature of reality and, therefore, wbat isthere that can be known about it? For example,if a "real" world is assumed, then what can beknown about it is "how things really are" and"how things really work." Then only thosequestions that relate to matters of"real" existoence and "real" aetion are admissible; otherquestions, sueh as those coneeming matters of
aestheticor moral significance, fall outside the
realm oí legitimate scientific inquiry.
2. The epistefn{)logical queslion. Wbat is the
nature of the relationship between the knoweror would·be knower and wbat can be known?
Tbe answer Ihal can be given to this queslion is conslrained by the answer alreadygiven lO lhe ontological question; that is, notjusI any relationship can now be postulated.So if, for example, a "real" reality is assumed, tben the posture of the knower mustbe one of objecti ve detaehment or valuefreedom in order to be able to discover"how
tbings really are" and "how things reallywork." (Conversely, assumption of an ob
jectivist posture implies the existence of a"real" world to be objective about.)
3. The melhodological queslion. How can theinquirer (would-be knower) go about findingout w batever he or she believes can be known?Agaln, the answer lbat can be given to this
question is constrained by answers alreadygiven lo the firsttwo questions; Ihat is,nOI jusIany methodology is appropriate. For example,a "real" reality pursued by an "objective" inquirer manda es control of possible confounding faclOrs, wbether the methods are qualitalive (say, observational) or quantitative (say,analysis of covariance). (Conversely, selectionof a manipulative methodology-the experiment, say-implies the ability to be objectiveand a real world to be objective about.) Tbemethodological question cannot be reduced to
MAJOR PARADIGMS AN D PERSPECTIVES
a question of methods; methods must be titted to a predetermined methodology.
These three questions serve as the major fociaround wbicb we will analyze each of the four
paradigms lO be considered.
Paradigms as Human Construclions
We bave already noted that paradigms, as setsof basic beliefs, are not open to proof in anyconventional sense; tbere ís no way to elevate one
over another on tbe basis of ultimate, founda.
Iional critería. (We should note, however, thattbat state of affairs does not doom us to a radicalrelativist posture; see Guba, 1992.) In our opín·
ion, any given paradigm represenls simply the
most informed and sophisticated view that íls
proponents have been able to devise, given theway tbey have cbosen to respond to tbe threedefíníng questions. And, we argue, tbe seIS of
answers given are in all cases human construc-lions; that is, they are all inventions of the human
mínd and bence subject to human error. No construction is or can be íncontrovertibly right; advocates of any particular construction must relyon persuasivenessand ufility rather than proof narguing theír posilíon.
What is true of paradigms ís true of our analysesas welL Everything that we shall say subsequentlyis also a human constructíon: ours. The reader cannot be compelled to accept our analyses, or our
argumenlS, on the basís of incontestable logic or
indisputable evidence; we can only hope to be persuasive and to demonstrate the utilíty ofour positionfor, sayo the public policy arena (Guba & Lincoln,1989; House, 1977). We do ask the reader to suspend his or her disbelief until our argument is complete and can be judged as a whole.
The Basic Beliefs of Receivedand Alternative Inquiry Paradigms
We begin our analysis with descriptions of theresponses that we believe proponents of eachparadigm would make to the three questions out·
Iined aboye. Tbese responses (as constructed byus) are displayed in Table 6.1, whicb consists of
three rows corresponding to the ontological, epistemological, and metbodological questions, andfour columns corresponding to the four paradigmsto be discussed. The term positivism denotes the"received view" that has dominaled the formal
díscourse in the physical and social sciences forsorne 400 years. wbereas postpositivism repre-
T'Competing Paradigms in Qualilalive Resllarch
TABLE 6.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Altemative Inquiry Paradigms
ltem Positivism Postpositivism Critical Theory et al. Constructivism
Ontology naive realísm critical realísm historical realism relativism-local and"real" reality bul "real" realíty but only virtual reality shaped. specific constructedapprehendable imperfectly and by social, politíeal, realities
probabilis tícally cultural, economic,apprebendable elhnic, and gender
values; cryslaIlizedover time
--------------------------------------------Epislemo]ogy dualistl objectivis t; modified dualist l transactíonalJ transaclionallfindings true objectivisl; crilical subjectívisl; valuc subjectivist; created
traditioolcommuni ty; mediated findings findingsfindings probablytrue
Melhodology experímentalJ modified experi· dialogic/dialec lical hermeneuticalJdialeclicalmanipulalive; mental/manipulalive;veríficalÍon of crílical multiplism;hypotheses; chiefly falsificatíon of
quanlilative hypotheses; may
melhods include qualitativ emethods
sents efforls of Ihe past few decades to respond in
a Iimited way (that is, while remaining withinessentially tbe same set oí basic beliefs) to themosl problemalic Crilicisms oí positivismo The
term critical theory is (for us) a blanket termdenoting a sel of several a1temative paradígms,ínc!udíng additionally (but not Iimited to) neoMarxism, feminism, materialism, and participa·
tory inquiry. Indeed, critical theory may itself
usefully be divided into three substrands: poststructuralism, postmodernism, and a blending of
these Iwo. Whalever their differences, Ihe common breakaway assumption of all tbese varianl.
is that of the value-determined nature of inquiry
an epistemological difference. Our grouping of
Ibese positlons into a single category is a judg
ment call; we will not try lo do justice to theindividual poinl. of view. The term constructiv-ism denotes an aJternative paradigm wbose breakaway assumplion is Ihe move from ontologicalrealism lo onlological relativism. These positionswill become clear in tbe subsequent exposition.
Two important caveats need to be mentioned.First, altbougb we are inclined to believe Ihat theparadigms we are about lo describe can havemeaning even in the realm of tbe physical sciences, we will not defend that beliefhere. Aecordingly, our subsequent comments sbould be understood to be Iimited to tbe social scíences only.Second, we nole Ibat except for positivism, the
paradigms discussed are all still in formative stages;no final agreements have bren reached even among
tbeir proponents about tbeir definitions. mean·
ings, or implicatlons. Thus ou r discussion sbouldbe considered tentative and subject to further revigion and reformulation.
We will first look down the coJumns of Table
6.1 to iIlustrate the positions of each paradigm
with respect to Ihe three questions. f ollowing witha look across rows to compare and contrasl thepositions of the paradigms.3 Limitations of space
make it impossible for us to develop our assertions in any depth. Tbe reader will be able to findother evidence. pro and con, in other chapter. of
this volume. particularly in Chapters 7-11.
Intraparadigm Analyses(Columns of Table 6.1)
Column 1: Positivism
Ontology: realism (commonly called "naive realism"). An apprehendable reality is assumed loexist, driven by immutable naturallaws and mechanisms. Knowledge of the "way things are" is con·
ventionally summarized in the form of time· andcontext-free generalizations, sorne of which take
tbe form of cause-effect laws. Research can, in
principIe, converge on the "true" slale of affairs.The basic posture of the paradigm is argued to be
both reductionist and deterministic (Hesse. 1980).
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110 II I
Epistemology: Dualistand objectivist.The investigator and the investigated "object" are assumed tobe independent entitíes, and the investigator to becapableof studying the object without influencing itor being influenced by it. When influence in eitherdirection (threats to validity) is recognized, or evensuspected, various strategies are followed to reduceor eliminate it. lnquiry takes place as through aonc-way mirror. Values and biaSes are preventedfrom influencing outcomes, so long as the prescribed procedures are rigorously followed. Repli
cable findings are, in faet, "true."
Methodology: Experimental and manipulative.
Questions andJor hypotheses are stated in propositional form and subjected to empirica) test toverify them; possible confounding conditions mustbe carefully controlled (manipulated) to preventoutcomes from being improperly influenced.
Column 2: Postpositivism
Ontology: Critical realismo Reality is assumed to
exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable because ofbasically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of
phenomena. The ontology is labeled as critical realism (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because of the pos
ture of proponents that claims about reality must besubjected to tbe widest possible critical examinationlO faeilítate apprehendíng reality as c10sely as possible (but never perfectly).
Epistemology: Modified dualist/objectivist. Dualism ís largely abandoned as nOI possible to maintaín, but objectivity remains a "regulatory ideal";special emphasis is placed on external "guardians" of objectivity such as critical traditions (Dothe findings "fit" witb preexisting knowledge?) andthe critical community (such as editors, referees,and professional peers). Replicated findings areprobably true (but always subject to falsification).
Methodology: Modified experimental/manipu-lotive. Emphasis is placed on "critical multiplism"
(a refurbished version of triangulation) as a wayof falsifying (rather than verifying) hypotheses.The methodology aíms 10 redress sorne of theproblems noted aboye (intraparadigm critiques)by doing inquiry in more natural s ettings, collecting more situational information, and reintroducing discovery as an elemenl in inquiry, and, in thesocial sciences particularly, soliciting emic viewpoints to assist in determíning the meanings andpurposes that people ascribe to their actions, aswell as to contri bu e to "grounded theory" (Glaser& Strauss, 1967; SlrausS&:c"óf6íñ;l':l90). Allthese aíms are accomplished largely Ihrough theincreased utilization of qualitative techniques.
MAJOR PARADIGMS AN D PERSPECTlVES
Column 3: Critical Theoryand Related Ideological Positions
Ontology: Historical realismo A reality is assumed to be apprehendable that was once plastic,but thal was, over lime, shaped by a congeries of
social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, andgender factors, and then crystallized (reified) intoa series of structures that are now (inappropriately) taken as "rea!," that is, natural and immutableo For all practical purposes the structures are
"real," a virtual or historical reality.
Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist.
The investigator and tbe invesligated object areassumed to be inleraetively linked, with the values of the investigator (and of situated "others")inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings aretherefore value medíated. Note that Ihis p o s t u r ~
~ ¡ ; t i v e l y c h a l l e n g ~ ~ . . t r r u ! i l i Q ! ! ! í d l S t i n c t i o n b e ~ \ \ I ~ l l Q . n t o l o g y . J l J l d e ¡ : ú J ¡ ~ ~ ; w h a ~ ~ c a ñ b e f ; I ! Q W . J l . ine,!I!i9.ªWyjntertwjned wílli t ~ i Q ! i : r -!S!!.on b ~ _ a particular investig.ª\.Qr,.-lI1ldJ¡p < ! ~ r ~ 9 J $ O I & P : Tfleaash ed line separating tneonlological and epistemological rowsof Table 6.1 is intended to reflect this fusiono
Methodology: Dialogic and díalectica/. The transactional nature of inquiry requires a dialogue be
tween the investigator and the subjects of theinquiry; Ihat dialogue must be diale ctical in natureto transform ignorance and misapprehensions (accepting historieally medialed structures as immutable) into more informed consciousness (seeinghow the structures might be ehanged and comprehending Ihe actions required to effect change), or,as Giroux (1988) puts it, "as transformative intellectuals, ' .. lo uncover and excavate those formsof historical and subjugated knowledges that pointto experiences of suffering, conflict, and colIective struggle; . . . to link the nolion of historicalunderstanding to elements of critique and hope"(p. 213). Transformational inquirers demonstrate"transformational leadership" (Burns, 1978).
(For more discussion of critical theory, see the
contri):¡utions in this volume by Olesen, Chapter9; Stanfield, Chapter 10; and Kincheloe&MeLaren,Chapter 8.)
Column 4: Constructivism
Ontology: Relativist. Realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mentalconstructions, socially and experientially based,local and specific in nature (although elementsare often shared among many índividuals andeven across cultures), and dependent for theirform and content on the individual persons or
Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
groups holding the c o n s l r u c t i o n s . ~ C o n s t r u c t i o n s are ! 1 º - t I 1 ) J ? r ~ 9 r l e s s "true," in any ~ ~ s e n s e , hu t sjrn12ly more oi less informed am!lofsoj:ili.hticáted. Coñiliructions are alterable, as are their associated "realities." Thispo sili on should be'4is
-Uriguished from both nominalism and idealism(see Reese, 1980, for an explicalion of these sev
eral ideas).
Epístemology: Transactional and subjectivist.
The investigator and the object of investigation
are assumed to be interactively linked so that the"findings" are lite rally created as the investigation proceeds. The conventional distinction beIween ontology and epislemology disappears, asin the case of critical theory. Again, the dashedline of Table 6.1 reflects this fact.
Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical.The variable and personal (intramental) nature of
social construclions suggests thal individual constructions can be elicited and refined only throughinleraction between and among investigator andrespondents. These varying constructions are interpreted using conventional hermeneutical techniques, and are compared and contrasled througha dialectical interchange. The final aim is to distilla consensus construction that is more informedand sophisticated than any of the predecessor
constructions (including, of course, the etic construction of the investigator).
(For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt.
Chapter 7, this volume.)
Cross-Paradigm Analyses
(Rows of Table 6.1)
Having noted briefly the positions that proponents of each paradigm might take with res pect tothe three paradigm-defining questíons, it is usefulto look across rows to compare and contrast thosepositions among the several paradigms.
Ontulogy
Moving from left to right across Table 6.1, we
note the move from
1. positivism's position of naive realism, as
suming an objective external reality upon
which inquiry can converge; to
2. postpositivism' s critical realism, which still
assumes an objective reality bul grants that
it can be apprehended only imperfectly and
probabilistically; to
3. critical theory's historical realism, which
/' assumes an apprehendable reality consist
ing of historieally situated structures that
are, in the absence of nsight, as Iimiting and
confining as if they were real; to
4. constructivism's relativism, which assumes
multiple, apprehendable, and somelimes con
flicting social realilies thal are the products
of human intellects, but that may change astheir constructors become more informed
and sophisticated.
lt is the ontological position that most differentiatesconslructivism from the olher three paradígms.
Epistemology
We note the move from
L positivism's dualist, objectivist assumption
that enables the investigator to determine
"how things really are" and "how things
really work"; to
2. postpositivism's modified dualistlobjectivist
assumption that ít is possible to approximate
(but never fully know) reality; to
3. critical theory' s transactionalisubjectivist as
sumption that knowledge is value mediated
and hence value dependent; to
4. constructivism's somewhat similar but broader
transaetionallsubjectivist assumption that sees
knowledge as created in interaction among
investigator and respondents.
1t is their epistemological positions Ihat most differentiale critical theory and constructivism from
the other two paradigms.
Methodology
We note the move from
1. positivism's experimentallmanipulative meth
odology that focuses on verification of hy
potheses; to
2. postpositivism's modified experimental!
manípulative methodology invested in crilical
multiplism focusing on falsification of hy
potheses; lo
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MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
TABLE 6.2 Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical issues
lssue Positivism Postposirivism Crilical Theory el al. Constructivism
Inquiry aim explanation: prediction and control critique and trans' understanding;formation; restitulion reconstructionand emancipation
Nature of verified hypotheses nonfalsified hypoth strueturallbistorieal individual reconstructionsknowledge established as faelS eses that are probable insights eoalescing atound
or laws faets or laws consensus
Knowledge accretion-"building doeks" adding to historieal revjsionism: more informed andaceumulation "edifice of knowledge"; generalizations generalization by sophistieatedand eause-effeet liakages similarity reconstructíons;
viearious experienee
Goodness or eonventional henehmarks of "rigor": historieal situatedness ; trustworthiness andqualíty eriteria inlemal and externa! validity, reliabílity, erosion of ignoranee authentieity
and objeetivily and misapprehensions;aetion stimulus
Values excluded-influenee denied incIuded-formative
Ethies extrinsie; ti1l toward deception intrinsje; moral tjlt intrinsk; process tUI
toward revelati on toward revelation;special problems
Voiee "disinlerested scientist" as informer of "transformative "passionate participant"decision makers, poliey makers. and change intellectual" as as faeilitator of multi
agents advocate and activist voiee reconstruelion
Trmning lechnícal and technical; quantitative resociaJization; qualitative and quantítative;quantitatíve ; and qualitati ve; history; vaJues of altruism and empowermenlsubstanti ve theories substantive theories
Accommodation commensurable incommensurable
Hegemony in CQntrol of publieation, funding, seeking reeognition and inputpromotion, and tenure
3. critical theory' S dialogic/dialectical melhodology aimcd at the reconslruclion of previously held constructions; to
4. constructivism's hermeneuticldialectic meth
odology aimed at the reconstructionof previously held constructions.
lmplications of
Each Paradigm's Position on Selected Practical Issues
(Rows of Table 6.2)
Differences in paradigm assumpt ions cannot bedismissed as mere "philosophical" differences;
implicitly or explicitly, these positions have important consequences for the practical conduct of
inquiry, as well as for the interpretation of findings and policy choices. We have elected to discoss these consequences for ten salient issues.
TIle entries in Table 6.2. which consists of fourcolumns corresponding to the four paradigms andten rows corresponding to the ten issues, summarize our interpretation of the major implications.The reader will note Ihat the firsl four issues(inquiry aim, nature of knowledge. knowledgeaccumulation, and quality criteria) are among thosedeemed especially important by positivists andpostpositivists; they are therefore Ihe issues on
which alternative paradigms are most frequentlyattacked. The fifth and sixth (values and ethics)are issues taken seriously by all paradigms, although conventional and emergent responses are
Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
quite different. Finally, the last four issues (voice.training, accommodation, and hegemony) are thosedeemed especially important by alternative proponents; they represent areas on which the received view is considered particularly vulnerable.The entries in the tabie are based only in part on
positions, given that nol ail issues haveaddressed by all paradigms' proponents. In
sorne cases, therefore, we have supplied entriesthat we believe foilow logically from the basicmetaphysical (ontological, epistemological. andmethodologieal) postures of tbe paradigms. To
take one example, the issue of voice is rarelyaddressed directly by positivists or postpositivists,but we believe the entry "disinlerested scientist"is one that would be given by those proponentswere they to be challenged on this matter.
An immediately apparent difference between Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the formercase it was possible to make a distinct entry for everycell, in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerableoverlap within rows. particularly for the positivistand postpositivist colurnns. Indeed, even for thoseissues in which the entrles in those two columns aredifferent, the differences appear to be minor. Incontrasto one may note the major differences foundbetween Ibese two paradigms and the criticallheoryand constructivist paradigms, which tend a1so todiffer among themselves.
We have formulated the issues as questions,which follow.
Row 1: What isthe aim or purpose of inquiry?
Positivism and postpositivism. For both theseparadigms the aim of inquiry is exp/anatíon (vonWright. 1971), ultimately enabling the predíction
and control of phenomena. whether physical or
human. As Hesse (1980) has suggested, the ultimatecriterion for progress in these paradigrns ís that the
of "scientists" to predict and controlimprove over time. The reductionism and
determinism implied by this position should be
noted. TIle inquirer is cast in the role of "expert," a
situation thal seems to award speeial, perhaps evenunmerited. privilege to the ínvestigator.
Critical theory. 1J!e aim of inquiry is the cri·lique and transformation of the socIal, pohhcaJ,
'culturaI,'eeonOmíc,eiliñ1C, and'geñdersti:uctllfes"that constfattt áñdexplOit h í f i ñ a ñ 1 d ñ ~ men! in eonfrontl1tlon, evén coriflict. T n é c r n e ~ri'on for progréss is tnat overiímé,Í'estrfútion aride'mancipatían sbouldoccúillnd persisto Advocacy'
a e t W i l l m ~ r e k ~ r c o ~ e e t s . : r ~ ~ j n c ¡ u i : e ¡ ' i i é . a S ~ llt"t!oterrole- '!ir ifI!fig.fi:anof l ! f . U I ~ l o r .J2..1!:F!y mg
• that the iii(jüTrer u n g ! l ! . ~ t 1 l l l 1 1 u . priori .Vf.hªt trliñS:'formations are n e e d e ~ : . l J , ~ we should note (hit
sorne of the more radical slances in the eri ticali stcamp hold that judgment about needed transformations should be reserved to those whose livesare most affected by transformations: the inquiryparticipants themselves (Uneoln, in press).
Constructivism. TIle aim of inquiry is under-
. tooding aOO¡:e.cQnstrnciionof ilie coñs1ñiCtioñsiliit¡¡eopIe (including theiñqUlfér)iñíiiruíylíOla,w.iruñgtoward"corisensus bu! stiTr open tó ti-ew iiiterpretá
. tioos asipJ.9:rJll!ltlOl)an4sophisticáiTóii'íiñprove. 'I'lfecriterion for progress is thai' overum'!,'evetyone
forrnulates more informed and sophisticated constructions and becomes more aware of the contentand meaning of competing constructions. Advocacyand activism are also key concepts is this view. Theinquireris cast in the role ofparticípant and facílitatorin this procesS. a positioo that sorne critics havefaulted on tbe grounds that it expands the ínquire:r' srole beyond reasonable expectations of expertise andcompetence (Carr & Kemrnis. 1986).
Row 2: What is the nature of knowledge'?
Positivism. Knowledge consists of verifíed hypotheses that can be accepted as facts or laws.
Pos/positivismo Knowledge consists of nonfalsified hypotheses that can be regarded as probablefacts or Jaws.
Critical theory. Knowledge consists of a seriesof structurallhistórical insights that wíll be trins:
"form¡:d as time·-passes.' T r ! ! ! l s f o t m a t ¡ o l í s " o ~ m when i¡moranee and misapprehensions
COTUilructivísm. Knowledge consists of thoseC O I . 1 ~ ~ ! V < < < t . i o n s . about"WfÍtcli fhere is relatívecon-~ at Íea'si"só"tñe"iñóvernent toward consensus) among those competent (and, in the case
of more arcane material, trusted) to interpret thesubstance of the construction. Multiple "knowl,
.illl¡es'':'cao
coexist when equally'compeienT(or
trusted) interp,reters q ¡ j - ª i i e ~ , . and/or c1epéndingon social. polítical, cultural; economic, ethnié,a,nd genderráctors tha(differentiate the interpret¡;u..Ihese constructions are subject to continuousrevision, with changes most Iikely to occur whenrelatively different constructions are brought intojuxtapositíon in a dialectical context.
Row 3: How does knowledge accumulate?
Positivism a nd postpositivism. Knowledge accumulates by a process of accretion. with eacb
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MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES
faet (or probable fact) serving as a kind of build ity (paralleling internal validity), transferabilitying block that, when placed into its proper niche, (paralleling external validíty), dependabiliJY.(paraladds lo the growing "cdifice of knowledge." Whcn leling relíability), and confirmability,(parallelingthe facts take the fonn of generalizations or cause objectivity)(Guba, 19i1l; Lincoln & Guba, 1985);cffect linkages, they may be used most efficientiy !l_nd the authellticity criteria of ! ~ r n e s s , Q . t \ t Q l Q i i -for prediction and control. Generalizations may ' - (enlarges personal constructions),then be made, with predictable confidence, to a educative authenticity (leads to improved underpopulation of settings. standingof constructions of others), catalytic authen
~ c l t t (stimulates to action), and ~ c t i c a l authenticityCritical t h e o r y . ~ ~ Q . a e _ < ! ~ not aecumu (empowers action) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The
latein an . a l : > s o , ! \ J t ~ . s ~ e ! l § \ ! ; " g . ! l . b S : I , If.]i;o\\ítª1íiJ.- former set represents an early effort 10 resol ve the
changes through a dialectical process ofhistorical quality issue for constnlctivism; although theserev!s ion th1:!n01'!rtnííOl1sly ¿roaes' ignó¡'ance ana. criteria have been well r e c e i v e d , J h ( \ i ~ p ª r . \ i l l ~ l í ) l g l m ¡ s a p p r e h e n s l o n s ~ ilñd eÍllarges more inforI]:lI;d 10 positivist criteria, makes them·suspect. The
i ! } s i 1 t ~ ~ Generalization can occur when the mix latter set overlaps to sorne extent those of criticalof social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, theory but goes beyond them, particularly the twoand gender circumstances and values ls similar of ontological authenticity and educative authenacross settings. ticity. The issue of quality criteriajn constructiy
ism is neverthelessn()Lwelbesolved,and further
Constructivism. KnowledgeacC\lmlllates only in isñeede;f '
a relative sense through the formation of ever moreinfonned a'nd sÓjJhisticated constnlctlóm; vii
henneneuticalldialectical p r o C e s s ; ~ 5 ' ~ i Y m : g . c o n ~ Row 5: What is thestruc(il)ilS aléoroúgl/r1íílojuxtaposition. One im role of values in inquiry?portant mechanism foilfimstei' 9 ~ d g e fromone settlllg to another is the provision of vicárious Positivism and postpositivism. In both theseexperience, often supplied by.case study reports (see paradigms values are specífically excluded; in
Stake, Chapter 14, this volume). deed, Ihe paradigm is claimed to be "value free"by virtue of its epistemological posture .valuesare seen as confounding variables thal cannot be
Row 4: What criteria are aJlowed a role in a pulatívely objective inquiryappropriate for judging the (even when objectivity is, in the case·of postpogoodness or quality of an inquiry? sitivism, but a regulatory ideal).
Positivism and postpositivism. The appropriate Critical theory and constructivism. In both thesecriteria are the conventional benchmarks of "rigor": paradigl1ls ~ y a l u e s . ha.ve.pr.tde . 2 f . 1 Ü ª t ¡ ~ ; t l l . e , j i : : A t ' e " internal validity (isomorphism of findings with seen as ineluctable in, Jlhaping (in the.case.,j)f
reality), external validity (generalizability), reli collstructivis!!l, cre¡¡tin,g) jnq¡¡inou! clllJll;s. Furability (in the sen se of stability), and objectivity Ihermore, even if it were possible, excluding val(distanced and neutral observer). These criteria ues would not be countenanced. To do so woulddepend on the realist ontological position; with be inimical to the interests of the powerless andout the assumption, isomorphism of findings with of"at-risk" audíences, whose original (emic) con
reality can have no meaning, sttict generalizabíl structions deserve equal consideralion with thoseity to a parent population is impossible, stability of other, more powerful audiences and of thecannot be assessed for inquiry into a phenomenon inquirer (etic). Constructivism, which sees the
if the phenomenon itself can change, and objec inquirer as orchestrator and facilitator of the inti vity cannot be achieved because there is nothing quiry process, is more líkely to stress this point
from which one can be "distant." than is critical theory, which tends to cast the
inquirer in a more authorilative role.Critical theory. -Ihe a p p r o p r i a t e ¡ ; : ¡ j ~ l i ª l l ! e his
t q r i c a l s i t \ l . ª ~ n e s s of lbe joqujO( (j.e., that ¡Úifesaccount of the social, political, cultural, economic, Row 6: What is theethnic, and gender antecedents of the studied situ place of ethics in inquiry?ation), ,the extent to which the inquiry acts lO erodeignorance and misap{lnih'énSlolis,an¡¡-¡iie extenfiO Positivism alld postpositivism. In both thesewhich it provides a stimulus ' t O i i é t i ó n ~ - i h a i T s , to the paradigms ethics is an important considerati on,
- 1 í ; ¡ ¡ J r s f o r n m t i o ñ - o f t h é - ~ x i s t i ñ g s¡¡:¡¡¿¡¡¡¡'e. and it is taken very seriously by inquirers, but it
is extrillsic to the inquiry process itself. HenceConstructivism. Two sets of criteria have been ethical behavior is formally policed by external
proposed: Ihe trustworthilless criteria of credibi.l- mechanisms, such as professional codes of con-
Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
duct and human subjects committees. Further, thercalist ontology undergirding Ihese paradígms provides a tilt toward the use of deceplion, which, it
is argued in certain cases, is warranted to determine how "things really are and work" or for thesake of sorne "higher social good" or sorne "cIcarertrutlí" (Bok, 1978, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978).
Critical theory. Ethics i8 morelleliflyjrurim,ic
to this paradigm, a ~ . i _ ! ! I p J j e á O y i h e ¡ntent lo .erode
i'gnorancc::and misapprehensions, and loll!k!'<{ullaccount of values and historical situatedness in
t h e i n . 9 u . k ~ , " p i 2 c ~ . ! ' ~ . Tlius there is á mor31 tÚt thal
the inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous meaning of "fully informed consent") rather tlían deceptive. Of course, these considerations do not
prevent unethical behavior, but they do providesorne process barriers that make it more difficult.
Constructivism. Ethics is intrinsic to Ihis paradigm also because of Ihe inclusion of paitiéipant
v,all1es in the inquiry (slarting with respondents'
existing constructions and working toward increased infonnation and sophistication in theirconstructions as well as in the inquirer' s construction). There is an incentive-a process titl- for
revelation; .hiding the inquirer's intent is destruc:
tíve of lheaim of uncovering andiniproving <;:"0117.·structlblrS. rn"li1I'ffitioñ-;!he herÍneneúticalZdialecfféa:ríñetliodology itself pro vides a strong but not
infallible safeguard against deception. However,
the close personal interactions required by Ihemethodology may produce special and ofien slickyproblems of confidentialily and anonymity, as
well as other interpersonal difficulties (Guba &Lincoln, 1989).
Row 7: Whal "voice" is mirroredin the inquirer's activities,especially Ihose directed at ehange7
Positivism and postpositivism. The inquirer' svoice is tlíat of the "disinterested scientist" infofming decision makers, poliey makees, and change
agenls, who independently use this scientific infurmation, at least in part, 10 form, explain, and
justify actions, policies, and change proposals.
Critical theory. Th,e inquirer's voice iSJhat nI.¡he "transformative illtellectual" (Giroux, 1988)
.;h o has eipaiided c o n s c i o u . ~ n e s s and sO ls in aposítion to confron! ignorance and misapprehensÍon·s. Change is facílitated as lndi viduals develop¡¡reater insight into Ihe existing state of affaies(the nature and extent of their exploilation) andare stimulated lo ael on it.
Constructivism. T ~ e i ' ! 9 . u . ! ! ~ r ' ! > . ~ ~ ~ . ! ! . i ! L 9 ' [ the "passionate parUci»ant" (Lincoln, 1991) ac
tively engaged in facilitatillg the "multi voice"reconstruction of his or her own construci!oñas
: w ~ n as those. of¡dl other participants .. J;::hange isfacilitaled as reeonstruclions are formed and individuals are stímulated to act on them.
Row 8: What are the implications of each paradigm for the training of novice inquirers?
Positivismo Novices are trained primaríly intechnical knowledge about measurement, design,and quantltative methods, with les s but substantial emphasls on formal theories of the phenornena in their substantive speciallies.
Postpositivism. Novices are trained in waysparalleling the positivist mode, but wilh the addition of qualitative methods, often for the purpose
of ameliorating the problems noted in the opening
paragraphs of Ihis chapter.
Critical theory and constructivism. Novices muslfiest be resocialized from their early and usuallyintense exposure 10 the received view of scieoce.That resocialízalion cannot be accomplislíed withoutthorough schooling in the poslures and tecbníquesof positivism and postpositivism. Studcnts must
come lo appreciale paradigm differences (summarizcd in Table 6.1) and, in that context, lO masterboth qualitative and quantitative metlíods. The
former are essential because of their role in car
rying out Ihe dialogic/dialectical or hermeneuticalldialectical methodologies; the ¡atter because theycan playa useful infonnational role in al! paradigms.They must a1so be helped to undeestand the social,political, cultural, econorruc, ethnic. and gender history and stnlcture that serve as the surround for theirinquiries, and to incorporate the values of altruismand empowennent in their work.
Row 9: Are Ihese paradigms necessarily in conflicl? Is il possible lo accommodate Ihese several views within a single conceptual framework?
Positivism alld postpositivism. Proponents of
tlíese two paradigms, given their foundalionalorientation, take the position llíat all paradigrnscan be accommodated-that is, that Ihere exists,or will be found to exist, some common raliona]structure to which aU questions of difference can
be referred for resolulion. The posture is reductionist and assumes the possibility of point-bypoint comparisons (commensurability), an issueabout which there continues 10 be a great deal of
disagreement.
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Critical theory an d construclivism..J;'roponents
. . 2 . ~ t w o , ' p ! ! r ¡ ¡ g ! g m s j . ? ~ n lIf[irmill.giheoasic1 ! l . : o m m e n s ~ ! l . t > i 1 ! ! y ' , ~ t t,/Ie" E _ ~ a d ~ t l m ~ ( a l t h o u g h they would agree that positlvism an dpostpositi v-
ism are commensurable, and would probably agreethat critical theory and constructivism are commensurable), The basic beliefs of the paradigmsare believed to be essentially contradictory. Forconstructivists, either there is a "real" reality orthere is nol (although one míght wish to resolvethis problem differently in consideríng the physical versus the human realms), and thus constructivism and positívísmlpostpositivism cannot belogically accommodated anymore than, say, theideas of f1at versus round earth can be logicallyaccommodated. For critical theorists and constructivists, inquiry is either value free or it is not;agaín. logical accommodation seems impossible.Realism and relativism, value freedom and valueboundedness, cannot coexist in any intemally consistent metaphysical system, which condition ofconsistency, it is stipulated, is essentially met byeach of the candidate paradigms. Resolution ofthis dilemma will necessarily await the emergence of a metaparadigm that renders the older,accommodated paradigms not less true, but simply irrelevant.
Row JO: Which of the
paradigms exercises hegemony overthe others? That is,which ís predominantly influential?
Positivism an d postpositivism. Proponents ofposilivism gained hegemony over the past severalcenturies as earlier Aristotelian and theologicalparadigms were abandoned. But the manlle ofhegemony has in recent decades gradually fallenon the shoulders of the postpositivists, the "natural" heirs of positivismo Postpositivists (and indeed many residual positivists) tend to controlpUblication outlets, funding sources, promotionand tenure mechanisms, dissertation committees,and other sources of power and influence. Theywere, at least until about 1980, the "in" group, andcontinue to represent the strongest voice in pro
fessional decision making.Critical theory an d constructivism, Proponents
of critical theory and constru,ctivism are stiU seeking recognition and avenues for input. Over thepast decade, it has become more and more possible for them to achieve acceptance, as attested byincreasing inclusion of relevant papers in journalsand professional meetings, the developrnent ofnew joumal outlets, the growing acceptability of"qualitative" dissertations. the inclusion of "qualifati ve" guidelines by sorne funding agencies andprograms, and the Iike. But in alllikelihood, criti-
MAJOR PARADIOMS AND PERSPECTIVES
cal theory and constructivisrn will continue toplay secondary, although important and progressively more influential, roles in the near future.
Couclusion
The metaphor of the "paradigm wars" describedby Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawn. Describing Ibe discussions and altercations of thepast decade or two as wars paints the malter as
more confrontational than necessary. A resolution of paradigrn differences can occur only whena new paradigm emerges that is more inforrnedand sophisticated than any existing one. That is
most likely 10 occur if and when proponen!s ofthese several points of view come together 10
discuss their differences, not to argue the sanctityof Ibeir views. Continuing dialogue arnong paradigm proponents of all stripes will afford the bestavenue for moving toward a responsive and congenial relationship.
We hope Ibat in this chapter wehave ilIustratedthe need for such a discussion by clearly delineating the differences that currently exist, and byshowing that Ihose differences have significantimplications at the practical level. Paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain. oughtto go about the business of inquíry without beingclear about jusI what paradigm informs and guideshis or her approach.
Notes
l. Many of Ibe objections listed here were fIrsl enunciated by posítivisls Ihemselves; indeed, we míght argue Iba! the postpositivist position represenls an atlemptto transform positivism in ways Ihal take aeconnl of
Ibese same objeclions. The naive posítivisl pos lion ofIbe .ixll:enlh Ihrongh Ibe nineleenlb eenturies is nolonger held by anyone even casually acquainled withIbese problems. AlIhough we would concede Ibal IhepostpositivíSI position, as enuncÍated, for example, byDenÍ.
Phillips (1987, 1990a, 1990b), represenls a considerable improvemenl over cIassic positivism, il failslO make a elean break. It represenls a kind of "damage
eonlrol" ralher Ihan a reformulalion ofbasic principIes.The nolion Ibal Ibese problems required a paradigmshíft was poorly recogni:red until Ihe pnblícalion of
Thomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Sci
entific Revolutions (1962. 1970), and even Ihen proceeded bul slowly. Nevertheless. Ihe contributions ofpre-Kuhnian crilies should be reeognizedand applauded.
2. We are reminded by Robert Slake (personal communicalion, 1993) Ihal !he view of paradigms Ihal wepresenl here should nol "exclude a belief thal there are
Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
worlds wilbin worIds, unending, each wlth ilS own
paradigms. Infinitesimals have Iheirown cosmologies."3. It i8 unlikely Ibal a praclitioner of any paradigm
would agree Ihal our summaries cIosely describe whathe or she Ihinks or does. Workaday scíen!ists rarelyhave either Ihe time or Ibe inclinalion to assess whalIhey do in philosophical lerms. We do contend, however, Ibal Ihese descriptíons are apt as broad brush
strokes. íf nOI always al Ibe individual leve!.
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