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foucault studies Thomas Biebricher, 2005

ISSN: 1832-5203Foucault Studies, No 3, pp. 1-26, Nov 2005

ARTICLE

Habermas, Foucault and Nietzsche: A Double

Misunderstanding

Thomas Biebricher, University of Florida, Gainesville

Doyoumean tosay thatmyfundamentalNietzscheanismmightbeat the

originofdifferentmisunderstandings?1

1. Introduction

It wasJrgen Habermas himself who conceded at the funeral address for

MichelFoucault thathehadmet theFrenchphilosopheronlyonce:and

perhapsIdidnotunderstandhimwell.2Inthesocialsciencesthereishardly

anydisagreementthattheHabermasFoucaultdebateifthereeverwasone

hasinfacttobeconsideredacaseofseveremiscommunication.Thisfailure

toengageindialogueappearstobeevenmorepuzzling,sinceHabermasand

Foucault, as well as many of their respective followers, share at least an

interestinthesamemattersandoftenevenarriveatalmostindistinguishable

political conclusions. Certainly, the two philosophers differ greatly in their

accountsofreason,powerandlanguage,whichgoesalongwayinexplaining

lasting disagreements between the respective positions. However, what

commentators have often found more troubling than these substantial

controversies are the serious misunderstandings between the two thinkers,

startingwithHabermassextensivetreatmentandcritiqueofFoucault inthe

Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.3 While Foucault has been thoroughly

defended against the Habermasian accusations in the aftermath of the

PhilosophicalDiscourse ofModernity,4 these defences have mostly focused on

1 Foucault,Michel.FinalInterview,Raritan5(1985):5.

2 JrgenHabermas,TakingAimattheHeartofthePresent,inCritiqueandPower.

RecastingtheFoucault/Habermas Debate,ed.MichaelKelly(Cambridge:MITPress,

1994),103.

3 SamanthaAshenden&DavidOwen,Introduction:FoucaultandthePoliticsof

Critique,inFoucaultcontraHabermas.RecastingtheDialoguebetweenGenealogyand

CriticalTheory,eds.SamanthaAshenden&DavidOwen(London:Sage,1999),1.

4 BoIsenberg,DiekritischenBemerkungenvonJrgenHabermaszuMichel

Foucault,DeutscheZeitschriftfrPhilosophie39:13861399;JamesTully,ToThink

andtoActDifferently:FoucaultsFourReciprocalObjectionstoHabermasTheory,

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foucault studies, No 3, pp. 1-26

refutingthe immediateobjectionsraisedbyHabermaswithouttryingto link

these points of criticism to his general and possibly faulty portrayal of

Foucault. However, it is this problematic portrayal, as I will argue, which

constitutestheheartofthemiscommunicationbetweenthetwothinkersand

the rectification of which is required for a more productive dialogue.According to the thesis put forward here, Habermas fundamentally

misunderstands Foucaults genealogical approach in projecting the

methodologicalmaximsofthelattersearlierarchaeologicalapproachontohis

genealogicalwritingofhistory.Hence,Habermasmissestheuniquecharacter

ofFoucaultshybridapproach thatblendsscienceand literature.Thereason

for this misreading, as I will suggest, is Habermass misunderstanding of

Foucaults reading of Nietzsche, which is ultimately rooted in Habermass

own interpretationofNietzscheanphilosophyand theconceptofgenealogy

in

particular.

Themeritsthatlieinredeemingthisclaimaretwofold:notonlydoesit

become clear that the fiercenessof Habermass attacks is largely fuelledby

this misunderstanding of the general approach,but a clarification of these

matterswillalsofacilitateamoreproductive,albeitstillcontroversial,debate

betweenthetwoparadigmsofcritique5inwhichtheyactuallyarguewithone

another.Tobemoreprecise,IwillarguethatHabermastakesthegenealogist

Foucault tobeengaged indevelopinga superscience thataspires to reach

trueobjectivity,whereasFoucaulthimselfseesgenealogyasanapproachthat

makes

massive

use

of

rhetorical

strategies,

provides

a

fictional

re

writing

of

historyandthusbynomeansaspirestoreachobjectivitybut,onthecontrary,

onlyraisesverymodesttruthclaimsofapeculiarcharacter.Totheextentthat

Habermass objections rest on the failure of genealogy to reach the aim of

scientific objectivity, these objections lose their persuasiveness if it canbe

shown that this isnot theaimofgenealogy.Thereal issuebetween the two

inFoucaultcontraHabermas,eds.SamanthaAshenden& DavidOwen(London:Sage,

1999),90142.

5 Recently,thetermcritiquehasoftenbeenusedwithexclusivereferenceto

HabermassapproachincontrasttogenealogydenotingFoucaultsapproach.Cf.

DavidOwen,OrientationandEnlightenment,inFoucaultcontraHabermas,eds.

Ashenden&Owen(London:Sage,1999),2144.FollowingJudithButlerIwillusethe

termcritiqueinanonspecificsensethatcanrefertobothHabermassapproachand

whatFoucaultsometimescallscriticalpracticecriticalattitudeorsimplycritique.

Cf.JudithButler,WhatisCritique?AnEssayonFoucaultsVirtue,[online2001].

AvailablefromtheWorldWideWebat

andMichelFoucault,WhatisCritique,inWhatisEnlightenment?Eighteenth

CenturyAnswersandTwentiethCenturyQuestions,ed.JamesSchmidt(Berkeley:

UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996),382398.Iassumethattherearedifferent

grammarsofcritique,butthetermcritiqueitselfshouldremainemployablewith

regardtobothHabermasandFoucaultaswellasothers.

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzscheapproaches then is the question, what role rhetoric can play for a critical

approach. Iwill argue thatHabermassown attempt todiscard approaches

that make heavy use of rhetoric as illegitimate ultimately fails. Thus, the

debate between the two paradigms could shift to discussing the relative

meritsandshortcomingsofaparticular grammarofcritique.Furthermore,this might clear the way for debates about the potential of productive

articulations, e.g., between Foucaults microanalysis of disciplinary

institutions and Habermass macrodiagnosis of a colonisation of the life

world, or Foucaults strategic analysis of the state on the basis of

governmentality and Habermass deliberative democracy. The Habermas

Foucaultdebatehasbeenrestrictedforfartoolongtomisunderstandingsand

polemicsaboutmetacriticalissues.Itistimetomoveontothenextstagein

this debate, a stage more concerned with substantive issues and less with

defending

some

dogma

of

how

to

practice

criticism.

Accepting

a

pluralism

of

different grammars of critique and articulating their relative merits in a

creativeandproductivewaymightbeamorepromisingoption.Thispaper

hopestocontributetosuchashift.

Theargumentisstructuredasfollows.First,Iwillprovideanaccount

ofHabermassreadingofbothNietzscheandFoucault,showinghowhelinks

the two thinkers and thereby arrives at his conclusion regarding the

Foucaultian approach. This section will be followed by a different

interpretation of Foucaults genealogical project that portrays the latter as

roughly a combination of science and literature. Based on this it will be

possible toshow that it isHabermassreadingofNietzschewhichunderlies

hisimpoverishedinterpretationofFoucault,erasingalltheliterary/rhetorical

elements.Finally,IwilltrytoreconstructaHabermasianpositionvisvisthe

genealogicalapproachincludingtheliterary/rhetoricalelements.6Theseclaims

willmakeuseofHabermasswritingsonJacquesDerrida,whoseparadigmis

treatedasstronglyrhetoricalinthePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity.Itwill

becomeclearthateventhoughHabermasatfirstseemstobeopposedtothe

useofrhetoricingeneral,itturnsoutthathisaccountacceptsitasanecessary

device,notonly in literaturebutalso inphilosophy.Thus,Foucaultsgenealogy

maybedefendedasaphilosophicalapproachonHabermassownterms.

Finally,ageneralcaveatregardingtheterminologicaldifficultiesofthis

paperoughttobementionedattheoutset.Asthisintroductorysectionshows,

many of the arguments under scrutiny revolve around the (potential)

distinction among the spheres of science, philosophy and literature, and,

particularly, the use of rhetorical elements in each of them. Hence, the

6 Readerswhoarelessinterestedinanexplanatoryaccountofthemisunderstanding

betweenHabermasandFoucaultandwouldliketofindoutmoreaboutthe

significanceoftheissueofrhetoricfortherelationbetweenthetwoapproachesmay

finditconvenienttoskiptothissectionrightaway.

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respective definitions gain critical importance. Since my aim is to question

HabermassunderstandingofNietzscheandFoucault immanently,Iemploy

his terminology throughout thepapernot least topointout its limitations

and inconsistencies. Unfortunately, in my view, Habermas himself is not

entirely consistent in his usage of the terms with regard to Nietzsche andFoucault.Atthe leastthere isaslightshift inemphasis.Iwilltrytoremedy

this potential source of confusion by inserting some explanatory notes

regarding thesekey termswherenecessary.ForHabermassmostelaborate

andsystematictreatmentofthevariousdefinitionsanddistinctionsIreferthe

reader to theExcursuson theLevellingof theGenreDistinctionsbetween

PhilosophyandLiteratureinthePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,aswell

astosection4ofthispaperwherearespectivesummarycanbefound.

2. Habermas on N ietzsche and Foucault

2.1 Habermass Reading of Nietzsche

Habermassjudgment of the philosophy of Nietzsche has remained quite

consistentovertheyears.Nevertheless,hisviewshavechangedconsiderably

regardingthesignificanceofNietzsche.Hisfirstcriticalengagementwiththe

latters philosophy dates back to 1968. In this essay Habermas still feels

comfortable enough to write that Nietzsche holds nothing infectious

anymore.7 What is still of some, if only narrow, scholarly interest in

Nietzsche, according to Habermas, is the rudimentarypragmatist theoryof

knowledgethatcanbefoundinNietzscheswritingsstartingwiththesecond

ofhisUntimelyMeditations,On theUses andDisadvantages ofHistoryforLife,

and becoming even more prominent in the later writings. In Habermass

view, Nietzsches protopragmatism conceptualises knowledge and the

theoryofknowledgeasinextricablylinkedtohumaninterests.Manconfronts

andimposesuponnatureusefulillusionstogainmasteryoveritoratleastto

lessentheexistentialinsecurityhehastoendure.Categoriesofepistemology

and

ontology,

like

substance

and

causality,

are

not

true

in

the

sense

that

they

correspondtoanythinginreality:theyarerathersurvivalstrategiesemployed

bymankind thataredeeplyengraved inand reinforcedby the structureof

human language as well.8 Nietzsches initial aim is a critique of such

7 JrgenHabermas,Nachwort,inFriedrichNietzsche.Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften,

ed.H.Holz(Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp,1968),237[mytranslation].

8 ThesentencestructureofSubjectPredicateObjectissupposedtogiverisetoand

continuallyreinforcetheillusionofidentityandthemistakendistinctionofaction

andsubject,forexample.Cf.R.J.Hollingdale,TheoriesandInnovationsin

Nietzsche:Logic,TheoryofKnowledgeandMetaphysics,inNietzsche:ACritical

Reader,ed.PeterR.Sedgwick(Oxford:Blackwell,1995),111122.

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzschemetaphysics, a critique that exposes human reason in its contingency and,

moreover, reveals the will to power that always lurksbehind it.Nietzsche,

saysHabermas, concludes that truth in the classical senseof the term isan

obsoletecategorybecausethetruthofanidearestsonitsusefulnessandnot

itscorrespondencetoreality:wecanonlygiveinterpretationsthevalidityofwhich relies on valuejudgments related to a certain perspective and

therefore remains fundamentally relative.9 As a consequence, cognitive

(true/false) and normative (right/wrong) judgments are assimilated to

aestheticpreferencesthatarerelatedtoaperspectivismofvalues.Nietzsches

world thus turns out to be one of perpetual masquerade, deception and

illusionforwhichtheattitudeofanartistappearstobemoreappropriatethan

the traditional theoryofknowledge.Behind theveilofappearances there is

no longer an essence to be discovered (which would be a motif of

conventional

metaphysics),

and,

strictly

speaking,

the

semantics

of

veil,

illusionandsoonthereforeceasetohaveanymeaning,dealingyetanother

blowtometaphysics.

What Habermas finds intriguing in this pragmatist theory of

knowledge ismostly theaffinity tohisown thoughtson theconceptual link

betweenknowledgeandhumaninterestsastheyarefoundinhisbookofthe

same title.10 Here Habermas tries to argue against the positivist self

understanding of the social and natural sciences in favour of quasi

transcendental human interests that inform the formation of scientific

knowledge

and

thereby

negate

the

ideal

of

strict

objectivity.

While

both

philosophersagreeintheircritiqueofthepositivistsciencesthatdenythelink

betweenknowledgeandinterests,Habermastreatstheillusionsofmankind

as elementsof a conception of possible control over nature specific to the

speciesthathasbeenformedinacollectiveformationprocessofthelatter.11

Hestresses thepointthat there isadifferencebetween theuseful illusionof

causality, forexample, thatenables successful interventions intonatureand

otherratherdreamlikeillusions,theimplementationofwhichnecessarilyfails

in the face of the materiality of nature. Nietzsches refusal to distinguish

between these two sensesof illusionandhisassimilationof the firstone to

deceptionconstitutesHabermassmainpointofcriticism.Thelatterinstead

opts for a critical reflection of mankinds useful illusions and the quasi

transcendentalintereststhatguidethem.

WhileHabermasusesNietzscheashardlymorethananegativefoilin

Knowledge and Human Interests, his evaluation of Nietzsches significance

changes dramatically in the following twenty years. In the Philosophical

DiscourseofModernity,Nietzschesphilosophysignifiesnothing lessthan the

9 Habermas,Nachwort,256[mytranslation].

10 JrgenHabermas,KnowledgeandHumanInterests(Boston:BeaconPress,1971).

11 Habermas,Nachwort,525[mytranslation].

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entry point to postmodernity. Habermas famously portrays the different

branchesofpostmodernismasmodifiedcontinuationsofdifferentelementsin

Nietzschesphilosophy.

According to Habermas, the radical character of Nietzsches

philosophynowliesinitsattempttoleavebehindthediscourseofmodernitythathasbeenevolvingaroundvaryingselfcritiquesofreasonandinsteadopt

for myth, which, in its illusory character, is linked to the realm of the

aesthetic.12As inhisanalysisof1968,HabermasseesaNietzschean fixation

on theaestheticaspectofreason. Therespectiveconsequencesappear tobe

more severe to Habermas now as he perceives the aesthetic to havebeen

assimilated to the irrational myth and to hold no connection to reason

anymore. For Habermas the quintessence of Nietzsches philosophy is still

contained in the view of the world as one of illusion and deception. In it

theoretical

and

practical

validity

claims

have

been

reduced

to

power

laden

evaluationsthatareasrelativeasartisticpreferencesandtheonlyrationality

of which lies in an attempted augmentation of power. This most extreme

assaultofreasonyetthatunmasksitsunderlyingwilltopowerandconfronts

reasonwithanewartisticmythologysupposedlyprovides theblueprint for

thepostmodernistcritiquesofreasonthatHabermasattributestoDerridaand

FoucaultwithHeideggerandBatailleasrespectiveintermediaries.

CrucialtoHabermassreadingofthepostmodernistsishisportrayal

ofwhatheperceivestobethedilemmaofNietzschescritiqueofreason:the

selfreferentialityofacritiqueofreasonthatitselfhastomakeuseofreasonas

a resource. Habermas identifies two strategiesbetween which Nietzsche is

saidtooscillate.Ontheonehand,thereistheattemptofascientificallyoriented

critiqueofreasonthatshouldtakeontheformofanartisticcontemplationof

the world.13 This critique of reason would employ psychological and

historicalmethodstounmaskthepowerbehind it.Thisstrategysupposedly

becomes a template for Batailles analysis of the sacred and Foucaults

genealogical writing of history. On the other hand there is thephilosophical

critiqueofmetaphysicsthatclaimstheknowledgeoftheinitiatetogobeyond

philosophyitself.ThisstrategysupposedlyanimatesHeideggersontological

critiqueofmetaphysicsandDerridasdeconstructiveproject.

Aswillbeshown,itisthisclearcutdistinctionbetweentwostrategies

and two respective paths into postmodernity that lies at thebottom of

HabermassmistakenoratleastimpoverishedaccountofFoucault.

12 JrgenHabermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity.TwelveLectures

(Cambridge:MITPress,1998),107.

13 Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourse,96.

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzsche

2.2HabermassReadingofFoucault

HabermasstreatmentofFoucaultinthePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernityis

extensive.Twoentirechaptersaredevoted to theanalysis,more than in the

case of any other author discussed in thebook. As mentionedbefore, the

criticismsofFoucaultthatthechapterscontainhavebeenputunderscrutiny

on numerous occasions and therefore I shall focus on Habermass general

interpretationofFoucaultsapproach. It isnot thecriticismsbut thegeneral

interpretation thatultimatelystands in thewayofa fruitfuldebatebetween

thetwopositions.

HabermassreadingofFoucaultdealswithafairlywideselectionofhis

works, ranging from Madness and Civilization to The Order of Things, the

Archaeology of Knowledge, The Order of Discourse, Discipline and Punish and,

finally,theHistoryofSexualityVol.1.14Whatdeservesmentioningfirstisthata

large part of the chapters devoted to Foucault displays an admirable

explicativeandanalyticalsophisticationonHabermasspart.Theaccounthe

presentsisahighlysynthesizedonethatformsafairlycoherentwholeoutof

whatmanycommentatorshaveoftenperceivedasaKafkaesquelabyrinthof

thought.Yet, for all the empathyHabermas shows inhis analysisof single

works,hisfinalcharacterisationofFoucaultsapproachdoesnotdojusticeto

itscomplexitiesandsubtleties.

Before we can begin an inquiry into the reasons for this

misrepresentation,ashortsynopsisofHabermass interpretationofFoucault

isrequired.Asfarastheearlyworksareconcerned,Habermasprovestobe

aninsightfulreaderwhoisawareoftheintricaciesandspecificidiosyncrasies

of an author. Foucaults archaeology is depicted as a protostructuralist

attempt to write a history of the human sciences that doubts the

progressivism of Enlightenment thought and points out the random

emergence of certain knowledge structures (the episteme, as Foucault calls

them).Theseneitheradhere toaPopperian logicof sciencenoreven to the

much weaker progressivism of a Kuhnian approach. Habermas accurately

depictshowFoucault criticizes the currenthuman sciencesbecauseof their

paradoxical humanistic epistemicbasis15 and the way in which Foucault

14 VolumesIIandIIIoftheHistoryofSexualitywerepublishedrightbeforethe

publicationofthePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernityandthereforecouldnotbe

included.Habermassupposedlyhasreadthosevolumes(ashehasstatedinan

interviewwiththeauthor)buthasneverwrittenonthem.

15 Whatismeantbythis,istheframeworkofthePhilosophyoftheSubjectwhich,

accordingtoFoucault,isthefoundationofallthemodernhumansciences.This

epistemeiscriticizedinthefinalchapterofTheOrderofThingsbecauseofits

conceptualisationofmanasanempiricaltranscendentaldoublethatissupposedto

leadtothreeinsurmountableparadoxesthatkeepresurfacinginthehumansciences

andcanonlybeovercomeinastructuralistparadigmifatall.

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flirtswith the ideaof structuralist antisciences.These shouldpossibly take

theplaceofthetraditionalhumansciences,which,accordingtoFoucault,do

not even deserve tobe called sciences in the strict sense of the term. The

starkest contrast between these and their structuralist version lies in the

professedantihermeneuticalapproachofthelatter;theirdetachedgazeaimsto dissolve meaning into the anonymous play of discourses, thus trying to

circumvent the paradoxes that haunt the traditional human sciences and

accountfortheirshakyfoundation.

Habermasthengoesontodiscusstheproblemsandinconsistenciesof

such an archaeology, most of which havebeen voicedbefore and some of

whichevenFoucaulthimselfhasacknowledgedasvalid.16Thecrucialpoint

in Habermass discussion is his view of Foucaults introduction of a new

historical research design for which the latter uses the Nietzschean term

genealogy.

Habermasassumes that this isa response to the shortcomingsof the

archaeological approach, the aims of which remain unaltered. Foucaults

genealogy is to startamodified attempt tobreak free from theparadoxical

humanist framework of the pseudosciences and, in Habermass reading,

aspires to gain true objectivity of knowledge.17 According to the

PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,Foucaulthopes tohave found thekey to

this new science in the form of a theory of power. The latter is said to

inform the genealogical gaze and explain the (re)formation of discursive

landscapesasmanifestationsoftheeverchangingfaceofpower.

HabermasconcludeslaconicallybypointingoutthatFoucaultssuper

science cannot meet its selfset standards and turns out to be even less

scientific than its traditional counterparts in its subjectivism, presentism,

relativismandcryptonormativism.18IfHabermasiscorrectaboutFoucaults

ambitiousaims,onecanhardlycharacterisegenealogyasmorethanafailure

butwhatifgenealogyweresupposedtobetheoppositeofwhatHabermas

thinks?

16 Cf.JeanPiaget,StructuralismandPhilosophy,inMichelFoucault.Critical

AssessmentsVol.II,ed.BarrySmart(London:Routledge,1994),404407andMichel

Foucault,ArchaeologyofKnowledge(NewYork:Pantheon,1982),320.


18 Forabriefsummaryoftheseobjectionsseethefollowingchapter.

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzsche3. A Different Reading of Foucaults Genealogy

Topindowngenealogyasa researchdesignhas remaineda taskburdened

with difficulties, as the continuous debate especially among readers

sympathetic toFoucaultproves.19Still, itappears thatsome traitshavebeen

widely agreed on:20 genealogy is a historical method that emphasizes the

writingofhistory,whichisstronglyopposedtoasearchforauthenticorigins

(Ursprnge) and undistorted essences. These categories are perceived as

belonging toametaphysical framework that imposesanorderuponhistory

thatdoesnotexist.Onthecontrary,thegenealogicalhistoriantriestodepict

herobjectasacomplexinterplayoffactorsandwillcultivatethedetailsand

accidents that accompany every beginning.21 Genealogical history, as a

consequence,ischaracterisedbyadiscontinuitythatdeniesthepossibilityof

apresent that that canbeunderstood as the simple culminationof a linear

processinthepast.Thisleadstoadefamiliarizationofboththepastandthe

present,sincetheyarenolongerconnectedbyastraightlineofeventsbutby

a contingentandprecariousprocess that shows that thepresent isahighly

improbable outcome of the past,just as this past turns out tobe a highly

improbable antehistory of the present. Finally, it is not just the way

genealogy envisionshistorybutalso itsprofessedgoal to show thatcertain

phenomena exist within history in the first place that accounts for it as a

specific approach. Just as Nietzsche tried to write a natural history of

something that was not even supposed to have a history at all (morals),

Foucault setsout todescribephenomena like the souland thebodyamong

many others as products of history.22 Exposing phenomena in their utter

historicityunderlinesthestronglyantimetaphysicalthrustofgenealogythat

tries to undermine the certainty of the absolutes23 in a manner that is

potentially liberating:24 if things have been different before and their

present form isan improbableoutcomeof thepast then these thingscanbe

19 Cf.Owen,OrientationandEnlightenment.

20 Cf.MichaelDonnelly,FoucaultsGenealogyandtheHumanSciences,inFoucault.

CriticalAssessmentsVol.II,ed.BarrySmart(London:Routledge,1994),329343;David

Hoy,Nietzsche,Hume,andtheGenealogicalMethod,inNietzsche,Genealogy,

Morality,ed.RichardSchacht(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1994),251268;

JohnRajchman,TheStoryofFoucaultsHistory,inFoucault.CriticalAssessments

Vol.II,ed.BarrySmart(London:Routledge,1994),363388.

21 MichelFoucault,Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,inLanguage,CounterMemory,

Practice,ed.DonaldF.Bouchard(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1977),144.

22 Cf.MichelFoucault,DisciplineandPunish(NewYork:Vintage,1979).

23 Foucault,Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,153.

24 Rajchman,TheStoryofFoucaultsHistory,394.

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different, which opens up a space of concrete freedom, that is of possible

transformation.25

However,byascribingapotentiallyliberatingeffecttogenealogy,one

has alreadyventured slightlybeyond its ratheruncontroversial tenets since

therealdebaterevolvesaroundtwointerconnectedquestions:isgenealogya

criticalapproach,and ifso,howdoesthiskindofcritiqueorcriticalpractice

operate? In other words, what is the grammar of this critique? For

Habermassobjectionstogenealogytheallegedstrictlyscientificambitionsof

the latter acquire utmost importance. Admittedly, Foucault speaks of his

approachaspatientlydocumentaryandgoeson toargue that ifhistory is

the endlessly repeated play of dominations and the development of

humanity is a series of interpretations, then the role of genealogy is to

record its history.26 This reminds one of the selfunderstanding of the

archaeological observer who claims neutrality and objectivity for her gazethat aims to historicize everything except for itself.27 A lack of self

referentialitywidelyconsideredtobeoneofthemostseriousshortcomingsof

thearchaeologicalmethod.28

Nevertheless, as I will argue, these scientific sounding remnants of

archaeology are more and more supplemented by a strictly genealogical

element that is still relatively weak in Foucaults early essay on Nietzsche,

Genealogy,History,which isaprolegomenon tohisgenealogicalworkphase,

but virtually rises to dominance at the height of this phase. These two

elements

can

help

illuminate

not

only

the

methodological

standards

of

Foucaultsnewapproachbutalsoitscriticalcharacter.

Corresponding to the archaeological element that stresses the detached

descriptionofadiscontinuousandcontingentcourseofhistorythereisafirst

25 MichelFoucault,CriticalTheory/IntellectualHistory,inCritiqueandPower,ed.

MichaelKelly(Cambridge:MITPress,1994),127.

26 Foucault,Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,139,152.

27 Asaremindertothealmostscientisticandstronglypositivistambitionsoftheproto

structuralistarchaeologicalprogramme,onemayciteFoucaultsselfportrayalasa

happypositivistwhoidentifiestherulesofdiscoursealmostinductivelywith

referencetoobservableclustersofrealstatements.MichelFoucault,Archaeologyof

Knowledge,125.Moreover,theviewofarchaeologyasanethnologyofthecultureto

whichwebelong.Itrytoplacemyselfoutsideoftheculturewebelongto,[]in

ordertofindouthowitcouldactuallyemerge.MichelFoucault,WersindSie,

ProfessorFoucault?,inMichelFoucault.Schriften,Band1,ed.DanielDefert

(Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp,2001),776[mytranslation].NotealsoFoucaultscontention

thatanarchaeologicaldiscourseanalysiswouldbesuperiortotheestablishedhuman

sciencessuchasthatsetofdisciplineswhichwecallhistoryofideas,historyof

sciences,historyofthought,historyofknowledgebecauseoftheshaky

epistemologicalfoundationofthesewouldbesciences.MichelFoucault,Politics

andtheStudyofDiscourse,inTheFoucaultEffect,ed.ColinGordonetal.(Chicago:

UniversityofChicagoPress,1991),63.

28 Cf.HansHerbertKgler,MichelFoucault(Stuttgart:Metzler,1994).

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzschelevel of critique that has been characterized as a critique of aspectival

captivity.29Theaimofthislevelofcritique,whichisstill,ifonlytoacertain

extent,compatiblewiththescientificselfunderstandingofarchaeology,isto

show that things can be different. It is to undermine their selfevident

character that leaves no room for any plausible alternative and is largelybasedonverifiablehistoricalsources.Thispartof thecritiquesimplypoints

outthatlogicallythereisnonecessityatalltothestatusquobeingthewayit

is. It tries toargueagainstan impoverished imagination that is caught ina

certainperspectivebyconfrontingitwithadifferentone.30

The question of the status of this other perspectivebrings us to the

second level of critique that corresponds to its strictlygenealogical element.

Mostimportantly,thiselementtakesthenotionofselfreferentialityseriously.

Foucault leavesbehind the notion of an outside perspective on the power

laden

discursive

formations

from

which

to

speak

the

truth

about

these

objects

in theclassicsenseof theword.ThegenealogistFoucaultacknowledgeshis

beingimmersedinpowerrelationsandselfconsciouslyapplieshisaxiomofa

circular relationbetweenpowerandknowledge tohisowngenealogies.As

onecommentatorhasputit:

Unlike theneutral,disinterested,archaeologicalhistorian, theNietzschean

genealogistadmits thepolemical interestsmotivating the investigation.[]

nolongerclaimingtobeoutsidethesocialpracticesanalysed.31

Thus,

genealogy

consequently

ceases

to

raise

strong

truth

claims

and

considers itselftobeoneamongmanymoreor lessbiased interpretationsof

(historical) reality. It explicitly subscribes to a radical perspectivism in this

sense, which obviously is at odds with conventional truth claims in the

naturalandeveninthesocialsciences.

Still, while Foucault would never claim a privileged position for his

interpretationof thesocialworldon thebasisofbetterarguments,he isnot

contentwiththejuxtapositionofhisperspectivetoothers.32However,instead

29DavidOwen,KritikundGefangenschaft.GenealogieundKritischeTheorie,inMichel

Foucault.ZwischenbilanzeinerRezeption,eds.AxelHonneth&MartinSaar

(Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp,2003),140.

30 Owenthinksthatthiscritiqueofaspectivalcaptivitydescribesthecriticalpotentialin

itsentirety.Aswillbeshown,thislargelyignorestheaspectofFoucaultscritique

fromwhichitderivesitsuniqueandinnovativecharacter.

31 DavidHoy,Introduction,inFoucault:ACriticalReader,ed.DavidHoy(Oxford:

Blackwell,1986),6.Cf.MichelFoucault,QuestionsofMethod,inAfterPhilosophy.

EndorTransformation?,eds.KennethBaynesetal.(Cambridge:MITPress,1987),103;

MichelFoucault,Body/Power,inPower/Knowledge.SelectedInterviewsandOther

WritingsbyMichelFoucault,ed.ColinGordon(NewYork:PrenticeHall,1999),62and

ThomasSchfer,ReflektierteVernunft(Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp,1995).

32 AlthoughithastobementionedthatFoucaultsowncommentsonhisapproach

sometimespointintothisdirectionwhenhemaintainsthathisanalysesarenothing

11


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ofusingadiscursive framework toargue for the superiorityofhisaccount

overothers,whichwouldnot sitwellwithhisprofessedperspectivism,he

uses the nondiscursive framework of rhetoric to make his history of the

present more appealing and suggestive. This rhetoric, which has to be

consideredan indispensableaspectof thegenealogicalapproach,33

hasbeenscrutinizedby several commentators. They have mostly stressed Foucaults

hyperbolism, his suggestive analogies, his drastic generalisations and other

textualmicrostrategiessuchassubstitutionofnounsbyverbsasthecoreof

his rhetorical repertoire.34 What Speech Act Theory would call the

perlocutionary effect of these devices is to give the genealogies an air of

drama,urgencyandanalmostapocalypticundertone.Thus,itbecomesclear

that Foucault does notjust want to present another perspective on social

reality;he also tries topersuade (not convince) the readers to adopt anew

perspective

by

painting

the

status

quo

in

overly

disconcerting

colours.

The strictlygenealogicalelementofFoucaults approach turnsout to

bring genealogy close to fictional discourses:35 the genealogist reduces his

truth claims tomoreor less literary interpretations thatmakeheavyuseof

rhetoric, which is most closely associated with poetic language. In sum,

genealogy presents itself as a unique and hybrid blend of scientific and

fictional elements, incorporating accounts based on verifiable facts and

documentsaswellas the rhetoricallyladen arrangementof thismaterial to

producefictionalhistoriesofourpresent.36

The hybrid character of this critical approach that contains heterogeneous

elementshasperhapsbeenbestcapturedbyFoucaulthimself:

Astotheproblemoffiction,itseemstometobeaveryimportantone;Iam

wellawarethatIhaveneverwrittenanythingbutfictions.Idonotmeanto

say,however,thattruthisabsent.Itseemstomethatthepossibilityexistsfor

fictiontofunctionintruth,forafictionaldiscoursetoinduceeffectsoftruth,

morethananofferofstrategicknowledgetobeusedorrefusedbyreaders.Cf.

MichelFoucault,PowerandStrategies,inPower/Knowledge,ed.ColinGordon(New

York:PrenticeHall,1999),145.

33 MartinSaar,GenealogieundSubjektivitt,inMichelFoucault.Zwischenbilanzeiner

Rezeption,eds.AxelHonneth&MartinSaar(Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp,2003),175.

34 Cf.HaydenWhite,TheHistoriographyofAntiHumanism,inMichelFoucault.

CriticalAssessmentsVol.III,ed.BarrySmart(London:Routledge,1994),4876;William

E.Connolly,Taylor,Foucault,andOtherness,PoliticalTheory13(1985):365376;

Hoy,Introduction,126.

35 Cf.Butler,WhatisCritique,1516.

36 Cf.forthisinterpretationButler,WhatisCritique;Schfer,ReflektierteVernunft;

Hoy,IntroductionandPaulPatton,MichelFoucault:TheEthicsofan

Intellectual,inMichelFoucaultCriticalAssessmentsVol.III;ed.BarrySmart(London:

Routledge,1994),162170.

12


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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzscheand forbringing itabout thata truediscourseengendersor manufactures

somethingthatdoesnotasyetexist,thatis,fictionsit.37

Onthebasisofthistwodimensionalaccountofgenealogy,itisnowpossible

toanalyseHabermassmisreadingandtoinquireintothereasonsthatmight

liebehindit.

Firstofall itshouldbenoted thatan interpretationofgenealogyasa

largely rhetorical framework numbs the sting of Habermass accusations

considerably.Even if onedoesnot question thevalidityof theseobjections

entirely, theiracuity isderived from the inconsistencyofFoucaultsalleged

superscientificambitionsandthecompletefailuretoreachthesestandards.If

itisFoucaultsintentioninsteadtowriteafictionalhistoryofthepresentthat

doesnotaimtobesuper butrathersubscientific,thenHabermassproofof

relativism, subjectivism and to a certain degree presentism and crypto

normativism in Foucault ceases to have an unmasking effect.38 In the end,

Foucault himself would concede a certain subjectivism, relativism and

presentism as being an integral, though not the only, aspect of his

genealogies.

How doesHabermasarrive at a reading ofFoucaults approach that

implicatestheseillaimedcriticisms?TheproblemlieswithHabermassrather

staticandhomogenizingapproach toreadingFoucault.Somecommentators

have argued that this is an intentional strategy that imposes themodernist

viewoftheauthorandthecoherentoeuvreonthepoststructuralistFoucault

inordertoshowhowhefailstoliveuptothestandardsthataccompanythis

view.39Ratherthanfollowingthesespeculationsaboutthestrategicintentions

behind Habermass intelligent, calculated and deliberate40 misreading of

Foucault,Ishalltrytoexplainitsonesidednessbyplacingitinthecontextof

HabermassreadingofNietzsche.ThemisreadingofFoucault,Iwillcontend,

37 MichelFoucault,TheHistoryofSexuality,inPower/Knowledge,ed.ColinGordon

(NewYork:PrenticeHall,1999),193.

38 Inshort,subjectivismandrelativismbothrefertoFoucaultsrefusaltoidentifysome

kindofcognitiveornormativeorderasafoundationofhiswritingofhistory.Ifatall,

thenormativeorderremainsimplicitandunacknowledged,whichisemphasizedby

thechargeofcryptonormativism.Presentism,finally,referstoFocaultsattemptto

describepracticesfromanoutsideperspectivewithoutrecoursetohermeneutic

procedures,which,accordingtoHabermas,leadstoahistoriographythatis

narcissisticallyorientedtothestandpointofthehistorianandinstrumentalisesthe

contemplationofthepastfortheneedsofthepresent.Habermas,Philosophical

Discourse,278.

39 Cf.MitchellDean,CriticalandEffectiveHistories(London:Routledge,1994);Ingeborg

Villinger&BernhardDotzler,ZweiKapitelfrsich.NotizenzuHabermas

FoucaultKritik,kultuRRevolution11(1986):6769.

40 DanielConway,Paxdedeux:HabermasandFoucaultinGenealogical

Communication,inFoucaultcontraHabermas,eds.Ashenden&Owen(London:Sage,

1999),75.

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is rooted in a debatable decision Habermas makes in reconstructing

Nietzschesphilosophy.

Asmentionedabove,Habermas seesNietzschesattemptata radical

critiqueofreasonasconfrontedwithachoicebetweentwostrictlyseparable

strategies: either it is the scientific strategy that makes use of historicaland/orpsychologicaldevicesandisultimatelyinformedbyatheoryofpower,

or it is the philosophical strategy of a fundamental antimetaphysics that

operatesonthebasisofanesoteric,privilegedinsight.41

BeforeIturntotheimpactthisconceptualdecisionhasonHabermass

portrayal of Foucaults approach, it is important to note that it is a highly

debatable conceptualisation that goes strongly against the grain of more

recent research done on Nietzsches genealogical framework. While

commentators widely differ on a wide array of questions surrounding

Nietzsches

approach,

most

of

them

are

adamant

about

its

strongly

hybrid

character,42aposition that Iwill try todefendhereaswell. Inshort,On the

Genealogy ofMorals combines the virtually positivist claims of the natural

scientistofmoralswiththeantimetaphysicalsubjectivismofthephilosopher

artistwhohaslostallfaithinobjectivity,scienceandtruth.

Ontheonehand,onecanstillfindtracesofthepositivistNietzsche

ofHuman,All TooHuman inOn the Genealogy ofMorals. Nietzsche himself

positions his latest treatise in continuity with his first attempt at writing a

history of morality in the former book,43 an attempt that was just as

41 InthiscontextHabermasemphasisesthedifferencebetweenscienceandphilosophy.

Aswillbecomeclearinthefollowingparagraphs,hisdepictionssuggestthatthe

formertendstobebasedonapositivistmethodologyandaspirestoprovidean

objectiveaccountofhowthingsreallyareincontrasttomystificationsand

superstitions.Philosophysignifiestheattempttocallintoquestionthemetaphysical

frameworksdevelopedbyKantandothersthatlendepistemologicallegitimacytothe

claimsofthesessciences.Incontrasttothisdistinction,theonesintroducedinthe

followingsectionsaremuchmorefocusedonthevariousfunctionsof(metaphorical)

languageinthesegenresnottheleastbecauseliteraturegainsmoreimportanceas

anotherpotentiallydistinctgenre.Thisleadstoaslightincongruenceofthevarious

definitions/distinctions.

42 MacIntyredescribestheprojectasamixtureofencyclopediaandgenealogy.

AlasdairMacIntyre,GenealogiesandSubversions,inNietzsche,Genealogy,Morality,

ed.RichardSchacht(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1994),293.Leiterpoints

outthetensionbetweenNietzschesrelativisttruthscepticismandhisprotoscientific

EmpiricismandNaturalism.BrianLeiter,PerspectivisminNietzschesGenealogyof

Morals,inNietzsche,Genealogy,Morality,ed.RichardSchacht(Berkeley:Universityof

CaliforniaPress,1994),339.Hoydescribesgenealogyinthefollowingway:There

arefacts,butonlyinsofarastheyinhereininterpretations.Theinterpretationwill

determinewhatcountsasafact.Hoy,Nietzsche,262.

43 FriedrichNietzsche,OntheGenealogyofMorality[Translated,withandIntroduction

andNotesbyMaudemarieClarkandAlanJ.Swensen](Cambridge:Hackett,1998),1.

14


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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzschenaturalistic44initsapproachastheoneinOntheGenealogyofMorals,which

is another indication of the scientific aspect of the project that plots the

soberedscientificviewofmoralityasastrictlynaturalphenomenonagainst

metaphysicalandreligiousinterpretations.Notealsothenumerousreferences

Nietzschemakestothenecessityofwritingtherealhistoryofmorality,themoralitywhichhasreallyexisted,reallybeenlived.45Thisemphasisonthe

real may well be considered to betray the ambitions of the scientific

investigator.Moreover,whenhewritesthathewantstosavePaulRe46from

hypothesizing into theblue, since the real colour of genealogy is gray,

which is to say that which can be documented, which can really be

ascertained, which has really existed, in short, the very long, difficultto

decipherhieroglyphicwritingof thehumanmoralpast,47 itsoundsalmost

reminiscent of positivisms call for a scientific reasoning that ought tobe

strictly

based

on

observable

evidence.

Nietzsches

On

the

Genealogy

of

Morals

incertainpartsbreathesthespiritoftheenthusiasticallypositivistsciences

ofhistime.48However,wefindhimgoingbeyondthisscientificreasoning

when he mocks the natural sciences about their seemingly most objective

realmandassertsthattheystillstandundertheseductionoflanguage in

theirenterprises.Hence,Nietzsche considers ithis task to take the analysis

beyond the confinements of metaphysics as they are exemplified in

language.49 How the scientific and the philosophical strategies that

HabermasascribestoNietzscheblendinavirtuallyindistinguishablemanner

in the approach taken in Genealogy is probablybest demonstratedby the

ambivalentstatusof languageand thestudyof it in the treatise.On theone

hand, Nietzsche uses etymology as a device that provides him with major

clues regarding his hypothesis about the origin of good and bad. He

obviouslyfindsnothingwronginmakinguseofetymologyasaconventional

scienceof language toapproach theproblem.On theotherhand,asalready

stated,heblamesthenaturalsciencesandWesternpostSocraticthoughtin

generalforfallingpreytothemetaphysicalspellsoflanguage,whichmakes

aprofessedly antipositivistphilosophical inquiry into thematterofmorals

44 MaudemarieClark,introductiontoOntheGenealogyofMorality,byFriedrich

Nietzsche,xxii.

45 Nietzsche,OntheGenealogyofMorality,56.

46 RepublishedabookcalledDerUrsprungdermoralischenEmpfindungenin1877.The

GenealogyofMoralsispartlyacriticalresponsetoit.

47 Nietzsche,OntheGenealogyofMorality,6.

48 OnemightalsoaddthatthejargonofTheGenealogyofMoralsseemstobehighly

influencedby(pseudo)scienceslikeDarwinism(althoughNietzschethoughtthat

thelatterssurvivalofthefittestsignalledonlythearrivalofTheLastMan),

EvolutionaryBiologyingeneral,butalsooftheoriesofraceandeugenics.Thisisnot

tosaythatNietzschewasaspiritualancestorofNazism,butthathewasinfluenced

bythediscourseofhistimes.

49 Nietzsche,OntheGenealogyofMorality,12,25.

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necessary. Thus, while working within the limits of language/metaphysics,

Nietzschesimultaneouslyistryingtogobeyondthem.Still,thesearenottwo

separablestrategiesbetweenwhich there isachoice,asHabermassuggests.

The historical, psychological and etymological aspects of Nietzsches

enterprise would remain helplessly within the gravitational field ofmetaphysicswereitnotfortheaccompanyingantimetaphysicalthrustofthe

analysisthattriestotheorizemoralitywithoutresortingtotheconceptofthe

freewilled subject, leavingbehind the prejudices that we inherit from our

collectiveuseof language.Thisantimetaphysics,however, stillneeds tobe

informedbyconventionalscientificanalysesliketheetymologicalonethat

is so integral to the theses of On the Genealogy ofMorals. Science without

philosophy remains nave;philosophy without science remainsblind. Since

these two elements of the genealogical framework presuppose each other

(while

at

the

same

time

undermining

each

other

to

a

certain

extent),

they

should ratherbeviewedas twoaspectsofonehybridapproach.Otherwise

the originality of Nietzsches On the Genealogy ofMorals, which is largely

constitutedbythisveryhybridity,getsdissolvedintothemoreconventional

Habermasianchoicebetweentwopartiallyconflictingapproachesthatcannot

formawhole.

Nietzschesownversionofgenealogyhasaremarkableresemblanceto

itsFoucaultiancounterpartinthatittriestointegrateheterogeneouselements.

However, the point to stress here is not that Nietzsches and Foucaults

genealogiesareidentical,50butthattheyatleastshareahybridcharacterthat

50 Theydiffermostimportantlyinthenormative/criticalclaimstheyraiseandtheway

thesearesupported:Foucaultsclaimsareweakerandstronglyrhetorically

supported,whileinNietzschescasetheyarecertainlystronger,meaning,theyclaim

superiorityoverotherviews,andaresupposedtobesupportedbyeitherthe

aforementionedtheoryofpower(Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourse)orthestructure

ofthegenealogicalinterrogationfromwhichitsrelativevalidityisderived.Daniel

Conway,GenealogyandCriticalMethod,inNietzsche,Genealogy,Morality,ed.

RichardSchacht(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1994),325.Alternatively

thesupportissupposedtocomefromamethodologicallyturnedtheoryof

health/sickness(Hoy,Nietzsche,266).RecentlyithasbeensuggestedthatFoucault

wasutterlywrongtoeverassumethatgenealogywasaNietzschenprojectatall,

sincethelattersuseofthetermjustmockedgenealogistsandtheirenterprise.

JacquelineStevens,OntheMoralsofGenealogy,PoliticalTheory31(2003):559.

AccordingtoStevens,Nietzschewasnotpostulatingagenealogy(OntheGenealogyof

MoralsissaidtobeacritiqueofsuchagenealogybyPaulRe)butahistoryoforigins

(Entstehungsgeschichte)ofmorals.AlthoughIdisagreewiththisclaim,therestriction

ofspacedoesnotpermitmetoengageinadetailedcritiqueofit,and,moreover,it

doesnothaveanyimmediateimpactontheargumentpresentedhere.AsStevens

herselfconcedes,itwouldbefairtosaythatmuchofwhatNietzschecallshistory,

Foucaultandhisfollowerscallgenealogy.Stevens,OntheMoralsofGenealogy,

578.Thus,FoucaultcanstillproperlybeconsideredafollowerofNietzscheinterms

ofthesubstanceoftheirrespectivewritingofhistory,eveniftheonewastocall

history(Geschichte/Historie)whattheothercallsgenealogy.

16


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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and NietzscheHabermass respective accounts miss in both cases, with the first miss

partially causing the second one. Thisbrings us to the impacts of such a

readingofNietzsche.

Ifonedistinguishes categoricallybetween two separableNietzschean

strategiesanddoesnottreatthemasaspectsofonehybridproject,thenoneisalmostbound to compartmentalize the Discourse of (Post) Modernity the

way Habermas does it, with one strictly scientific and one purely

philosophical passage. It is not difficult to imagine, then, how Habermas

arrivesathisreadingofFoucault.Guidedbythatconceptualdecision,itisall

tooeasy to find textualevidence that supports thenotionofFoucaultasan

epigone of the scientific Nietzsche. Foucaults archaeology actually is the

manifestation of a scientific Nietzscheanism and since the archaeological

element is still present even inNietzsche,Genealogy,History, Habermas can

easily

assume

that

the

archaeological

goal

of

a

scientific

critique

of

reason

remainsunalteredandthatgenealogyisjustasupplementationofthisproject,

a supplementationbased on a scientific analytics of power that has its

analogy regarding content and function in what Habermas perceives tobe

Nietzschesscientific theoryofpowerbasedondescent thatwas toenable

thegenealogisttoevaluateanddistinguishcritically.

Insummary,muchofHabermassmisunderstandingofFoucaulthasto

be attributed to the way the former conceptualises the work of Nietzsche.

Habermas seeks to pin down various distinguishable strategies, though it

wouldhavebeen farmore appropriate to approach Nietzschesphilosophy

with his own pragmatist theory of knowledge in mind. This theory of

knowledgepictures theworldasoneofconstantflux, inwhich thereareno

strictlyseparableentitieswhichonlyourgrammaticalconventionsandour

willtosurvivesuggestbutonlyhybridamalgamations.Thefailuretodoso

mightbeevenmoresurprisingconsidering that,asstatedabove,Habermas

himselfcametoseethispointofviewasoneofthecentralNietzscheantenets

in his comments in 1968. Habermass more recent reading of Nietzsches

genealogy ignores this hybridity, structuring his perception of Foucaults

genealogysuch that theapproachof the latterundergoesanaggravatedde

amalgamation,i.e.,thereisnotonlythedoublingofoneintotwostrategies,as

in Nietzsches case,but the second element of Foucaults hybrid approach

virtuallyvanishesfromHabermassaccount.

4. Towards a New Dialogue

What Ihope tohave shown so far is thatHabermassmisunderstandingof

Foucaultdoesnothave tobeseenasan intentionalmisreading.Neitherare

we dealing with a strategic deformation of the Foucaultian oeuvre, the

creationofastrawman. Instead,one canargue that this isnothingmore

thanabonafidemisunderstandingthatcanbeexplainedbycertainconceptual

17


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decisions in Habermass Nietzschereception. This explanation and the

corresponding clarification of the more complex character of Foucaults

approachthatIhavetriedtogiveultimatelyaimtoclearthewayforafruitful

debatebetweenHabermasianandFoucaultianpositions.

Still, it appears at first as if this newbasis could hardly lead to aproductivedialogue,butmightrather intensify theconflict. Ifanything,one

wouldassume, therhetorical/fictionalcharacterofFoucaultsapproacheven

widens the gulfbetween his model of critique and the Habermasian one.

After all, the normativity of Habermass version of critical theory since the

TheoryofCommunicativeAction isbuiltupon theprimacyof the illocutionary

overtheperlocutionaryuseoflanguageandthecorrespondingprimacyofthe

normal or original mode of language over parasitic forms like irony and

rhetoric in general.51 Hence, it couldbe assumed that Habermass position

regarding

such

a

rhetorical

fictional

approach

that

is

alien

to

his

way

of

thinking is characterised by a complete lack of understanding and/or a

condemnation inthenameofcommunicativerationality.Inthisfinalsection

ofthearticleIwilltrytomakethepointthatneitherofthesetwoassumptions

iscorrectatleastnotwithoutqualificationandtherebymakeanattemptto

initiateaproductivedialoguebetweenthetwotypesofcritique,oneinwhich

thefundamentallegitimacyofaparticulargrammarofcritiqueisnolongerin

question, whereas their relative merits, strengths and their respective

suitability to address various questions is scrutinized to arrive at creative

articulations of thesegrammarsor at least a cooperative divisionof critical

labour.

The reconstruction of Habermass view of a rhetorically understood

FoucaultcanagainmakeuseofHabermassconceptualisationofNietzscheas

a starting point. Here, the scientific and the philosophical are strictly

separated, a result of which is that the nonscientific rhetorical Foucault is

missinginHabermassaccount.However,onecanfindthelattersperspective

onrhetoricbytakingalookattheothersideofthe(post)moderndivide:all

the fictional aspects lacking in the chapters on Foucault are found in

HabermassanalysisofDerrida,especially intheExcursusontheLevelling

of the Genre Distinction between Philosophy and Literature in the

Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. This enables us to apply Habermass

criticismofDerrida,mutatismutandis,toFoucaultsapproachinsofarasthisis

arhetoricalfictionalapproach.

Habermas assumes that Derridas strategy to escape from the self

referentialityofacritiqueofmetaphysics isnot toplacehimself ina lordly

fashion above the objection of pragmatic inconsistency [as Heidegger

51 IthardlydeservesmentioningthatHabermasstheoryinthisrespectisinaccordwith

mostoftheWesternPhilosophicaltraditionstartingwithPlatoscritiqueofthe

sophists.Cf.Schfer,ReflektierteVernunft,79.

18


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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzschesupposedlydoes]butrenderitobjectless.52Thisisachievedbyareductionof

truthclaimsthat,Habermascontends,isonlyplausibleifDerridasucceedsin

erasing thegenredistinctionbetween science/philosophyand literature that

corresponds to the abovementioned primacy of logic over rhetoric. This

blurring of the lines would enable Derrida to read philosophy like literaryworksofart thatgive rise tonumerous contradicting interpretations.Allof

these would be equally valid and thereby frustrate attempts at a

pragmaticallyconsistentauthoritativereading,leavingrhetoric,notlogic,asa

usableguidetointerpretation.53Habermassetsouttodisprovethepossibility

ofsuchalevellingofgenredistinctionsbycommentingonthedebatebetween

DerridaandAustin/Searleaboutapotentialdemarcationlinebetweennormal

and derivative forms of speech. Obviously, he wishes to defend this

distinction,but the argument is transposed onto the fields of different and

separable

languages.

According

to

Habermas,

different

languages

have

different communicative functions and therefore correspond to different

genres.Hesuggests,ontheonehand,aspectrumwithexpertlanguagesthat

arenearlycleansedofallmetaphoricaland rhetoricalelements,and,on the

other hand, poetic languages in which rhetoric is the most prominent

characteristic. While those cleansed expert languages have as a function to

make problems in the world solvable, and therefore are used by the

practitioners/experts of sciences, law etc., poetic language has rather the

functiontoplayfullycreatenewworlds,oratleastcastaradicallynewlight

ontheexistingone.Thisworlddisclosivecharactermakes ittheappropriate

medium forpoetryand literature ingeneral,aswellasphilosophy tosome

extent. Locatedbetween those two ends of the spectrum there is everyday

communicative practice. While this everyday normal language is

ineradicably rhetorical, the worlddisclosive linguistic framework is

almostatastandstillwithin it,bringing itcloser to theexpert languages in

thesciencesandlaw,etc.54

Before we can inquire into the implications of this Habermasian

spectrum, we have to address a potential reservation that concerns the

possibilityofananalogousapplicationofHabermasscriticismofDerridato

theFoucaultian framework.Onehas tobewarynot tooverlyassimilate the

approaches of the two French thinkers who far too often find themselves

being labelledtogetherasthepoststructuralists.Foucaulthimselfhasbeen

adamantinpointingoutthedifferencesbetweenhismethodsandthepractice


53 Cf.JacquesDerrida,Spurs.NietzschesStyles(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,

1979).

54 Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourse,209.Notethatthesedistinctions/definitionsare

muchmorebasedonthelanguageusedinthesegenrescomparedtoHabermass

distinctionofaphilosophicalandascientificstrategyinNietzsche.

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ofdeconstruction.55Afterall,FoucaultsandDerridasanalysesdealwithvery

different objects and it makes a considerable difference whether Derrida

claims an undecidabilitybetween various interpretations of a Nietzschean

text or Foucault maintains that there is an undecidabilitybetween various

perspectivesofhistoryor,more specifically, thehistoryofmodernWesternsocieties.Thus,Ishallrefrainfrom levelling thegenredistinctionbetween

genealogyanddeconstruction, forwhich theirdifferingobjectrealm isonly

themostobviousindicator.Nevertheless,foralltheimportantdifferences,on

the one question that is crucial for the present context there is strong

agreementbetweenFoucaultandDerrida:whatever their respectiveobjects,

bothembracethenotionofselfreferentiality,andasaresult theclaimsthey

raisewith theiranalysesareno longersuper butsubscientificones located

somewhere in between the genres of science and literature. Although

Habermass

initial

attacks

focus

on

Derridas

treatment

of

the

textual

objects

of deconstruction and hence cannot be applied to Foucaults framework,

ultimatelysomethingelseisatstakebetweenthetwo,andthereforeFoucault

as well: it is the status of Derridas and Foucaults own analyses. In other

words, it is the question of whether their use of rhetorical and fictional

elementsislegitimateordisqualifiestheirapproaches.

TakingalookatHabermassspectrumasIhavereconstructeditsofar,

onecaneasilyarriveattheconclusionthatheforcesachoiceuponwriterslike

Foucault and Derrida: on one side there is the path of serious approaches

modelledafter the socialand thenatural sciences inwhich languagehas to

performaproblemsolving functionandconsequentlyhas tobecleansedof

almost all rhetorical sediments that would only introduce a

counterproductive ambiguity. Whoever refuses tobe pinned down to the

discursiveobligationsofphilosophyandscience56canonlychoosetheother

side and produce literary works of art in which the worlddisclosing or

constitutingfunctionoflanguageisunleashedandbecontentwiththestatus

of a novelist.57 One way of countering the implications of this clearcut

dichotomybetweenscienceandliterature,whichaimsatadisqualificationof

Derrida and Foucault as nothing more than rather talented novelists is to

applythequestionofrhetorictoHabermassowntextualbody.

Suchan immanentcriticismofHabermassapproachhasbeencarried

outbyRomandColes.Heassumesthattheformercannotplausiblycondemn

rivalframeworksfortheirrhetoricalelementsifitcanbeshownthathisown

is equally contaminated by such elements. Coles states that Habermass

theoryitselfderivesitsplausibility[]andissustainedbyunproblematized

55 MichelFoucault,Polemics,Politics,andProblematizations,inTheFoucaultReader,

ed.PaulRabinow(NewYork:Pantheon,1984),389.


57 HabermasmentionstheworksofTrumanCapoteasanexample.Supposedlythey

areliteraryworksbutmakeuseofhistoricalsources.

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzschemetaphors.58Asanexamplehechoosesthetermconsensusandanalysesits

metaphoricalcontent.AccordingtoColes,inusingexpressionslikereaching

a consensus, Habermas suggests that a consensus is always already

somewhere out there and that there is a somewhat natural character to

agreement.Similarly,theuseofnouns like obligationandverbs like mustsuggeststhat there isacertain inevitability tocommunicativeactionand the

resultingconsensus. Inshort, thepositiveconnotations thatmost readersof

Habermasian texts usually ascribe to the concept of consensus are derived

from the metaphors surrounding it rather than from the discursively

redeemablenormativecontent.Finally,Colesattemptstoprovideconclusive

proof for his point by denaturalising the term consensus.59 Were a

consensus not reachedbut rather forged, its normative meaning would

alreadybe altered considerably, and even more so if the word discipline

were

to

appear

in

the

context

of

the

term.

Spontaneously,

one

is

prompted

to

respond that this is hardly a valid argument since the combination of

disciplineandconsensusisaneasytoseethroughrhetoricalstrategy.Ittries

to discredit the notion of consensus through its affiliation with the term

disciplinethatcarriesstronglynegativeconnotationswith it.However,this

is exactly Coless point: just as his construction makes use of a negative

metaphorical image,Habermasmakesuseofpositiveandmuchmoresubtle

metaphors that shed a more agreeable light on the notion of a consensus.

Thus, although Habermas never implies that scientific language could be

entirelyvoidofrhetoricalelements,butratherthatthelatteraretamed,asit

were, and enlisted for special purposes of problemsolving,60 Coless

argument shows persuasively that even in Habermass own theories the

status of rhetorical elements cannotbe reduced to a mere problemsolving

device,sincetheystabilizethewholenormativearchitectureofthesetheories.

Still, although Coless demonstration is sound, the purpose of this

sectionisnottopushthisimmanentcriticismofHabermassapproachfurther

buttodemonstratethatheavyuseofrhetoriccannotbeusedasaknockdown

argumentagainstaparticulargrammarofcritiqueevenonHabermassown

terms. Inorder to redeem this claim, it isnecessary to takeanother lookat

Habermass spectrum of languages and valuespheres that is not complete

yet. The title of the Excursus in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity

suggeststhatHabermasaimsataclearseparationofliteratureandphilosophy.

However, in the course of the chapter a shift occurs to the effect that the

argumentismainlyoneaboutthedemarcationlinebetweenliteratureandthe

sciences. What is the status of philosophy then? Habermas has frequently

58 RomandColes,CommunicativeActionandDialogicalEthics:Habermasand

Foucault,Polity25(1992):81.

59 Coles,CommunicativeAction,82.


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commentedon the selfunderstandingofphilosophyasadisciplineand the

main thrust of these remarks has alwaysbeen to ask for a more modest

philosophystandinginclosecooperationwiththevarioussciences.61Itcould

beinferredthattheargumentaboutsciencevs.literaturethereforeappliesto

philosophy as well. Yet, Habermas deals with the role of philosophyexplicitly,ifonlyattheveryendoftheExcursus.Ibelievethathereliesthe

key to resolving or at least defusing some of the pending metacritical

controversiesbetweenHabermasianandFoucaultianpositions.

InthesefinalsectionsoftheExcursus,philosophy isdesignatedthe

task of interpreting between isolated expert cultures and their respective

expert languageson theonehandandeveryday communicativepractice in

thelifeworldontheother.Inordertounderstandthisfunctionofphilosophy

as an interpreter more clearly, it is necessary to take a look at Habermass

more

recent

comments

on

philosophy

and

to

place

them

in

the

larger

frameworkofHabermasstheoryofsociety.

In theTheoryofCommunicativeAction therewere twocritical theses to

befound.InthefirstthesisHabermasidentifiedaproblematiccolonisationof

the lifeworld. The far less popular second thesis, complementing the

colonisation thesis, was the segmentation thesis.62 In the tradition of the

KantianWeberiandiagnosisofadifferentiationofreasonand therespective

institutionalised valuespheres of science, morals/law and art, Habermas

voiced concerns about these expert cultures being splitoff from the life

world. The rationalisation waves that occur within these cultures as they

developarelessandlessretranslatableintotheeverydaylanguageofthelife

worldwhich,intheabsenceofsuchtrickledowneffects,threatenstobecome

culturally impoverished. Experts cannot understand each other across

differentvaluespheres,andbetweentheseexpertculturesasawholeandthe

lifeworldcommunication isno longerpossible.Thiswas thecontentof the

segmentationthesisformulatedin1981.

Inaspeechgiventhesameyear,Habermasofferedapotentialsolution

to this problem, or at least identified a promising way of overcoming it.63

Philosophyistotakeupthechallengeofsegmentation,whichaddsanewrole

to the selfunderstanding thatHabermas recommends for thediscipline.As

stated above, philosophys main job was to be a pioneering science that

venturesintounexploredfieldsofknowledgeandtransformsthisamorphous

terrain into material to which the methods of the various sciences canbe

61 JrgenHabermas,WozunochPhilosophie,HessischerRundfunk,January4th1971.

62 JrgenHabermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeActionVol.II.LifeworldandSystem:A

CritiqueofFunctionalistReason(Boston:BeaconPress,1987),330.

63 Cf.JrgenHabermas,PhilosophyasStandInandInterpreter,inAfterPhilosophy,

eds.Baynesetal.(Cambridge:MITPress,1987),296318.

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Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzscheapplied;inotherwords,philosophyprovidesaframeworkofintelligibility.64

Nowthistaskofastandin65issupplementedbytheviewofphilosophyas

an interpreter.Thediscipline should act as amediator in thebrokendown

communicationbetween the lifeworldandexpertcultures tocounteract the

ongoing fragmentation of the lifeworld. In the Excursus Habermasexplicates the reasons for hisbelief that philosophy isbest suited for this

mediation.Philosophy,hemaintains,has the invaluableadvantageofbeing,

so to speak, multilingual. On the one hand it can relate to more or less

esotericandhighlyspecializedexpertdiscoursesthattakeplaceinthevarious

valuespheresanddifferentiateddisciplines.Ontheotherhandphilosophyis

able toconnect to theeverydaycommunicativepracticeof the lifeworld in

which aspects of validity are intermeshed and that, moreover, is

characterised as ineradicably rhetorical.66 It is philosophys position

between

the

two

ends

of

the

aforementioned

spectrum

and

its

capability

of

relatingto the languages thatarespokenatbothends thatqualifies itfor its

interpretingtask.Importantly,though,Habermasholdsthatphilosophycan

only resolve this paradox [the mediation between these spheres] by

rhetoricallyexpandingandenrichingthespeciallanguageofthediscipline.67

Leaving aside all the difficult questions that arise from this role

attribution,68thecrucialpointforthepresentpurposeisthatrhetoricplaysa

legitimaterole inphilosophy.Asamatterof fact, ifoneacceptsHabermass

account,ithastoberhetorical,sincethisisanecessarypreconditionforittobe

asuccessfulinterpreterbetweenthespheres.Wewillseelaterthatthisholds

forphilosophysroleasastandinaswell.

The first conclusion tobe drawn from this is that Habermas could

arguethatColessobjectionisofftarget,at leasttotheextentthatHabermas

considershisownconceptstobephilosophicalones.Thisiswhypushingthe

immanent criticism does not necessarily deal a fatal blow to Habermass

framework.DoesthisalsomeanthatFoucaultandDerridahavetobeleftoff

theHabermasianhookiftheirworkscanbeconsideredphilosophicalones?I

think that this is the case, because there is only one last Habermasian

argument that could potentially delegitimize Foucaults critique as mere

literature. According to Habermas, the rhetorical element of language

64 Habermasdemandsuniversalisthypothesesthatsuccessivelybecomesubjectto

empiricaltestingfromthiskindofphilosophythatisexemplifiedbytheagendasof

NoamChomsky,JeanPiagetbutalsoHabermassowndiscourseethicalproject.

65 Habermas,PhilosophyasStandIn,310.



68 Forexample,howisthefollowingparadoxtoberesolved.Shouldphilosophystrive

foradifferentiationoftheintermeshedaspectsofvaliditythatcharacterisethelife

worldorshoulditorientitselfatthisintegratedideaofcommonsensereasoninits

workasaninterpreter.Toremainstrictlyneutralregardingthisquestionhardly

seemstobeapossiblestrategy.

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occursinitspureformonlyintheselfreferentialityofthepoeticexpression,

whereasintherealmofphilosophythetoolsofrhetoricaresubordinatedto

thedisciplineofadistinctformofargumentation.69Inotherwords,hetriesto

drawalinebetweenrhetoricasanendinitselfasitoccursinpoetry/literature

and rhetoric as a means employed in arguments that are of an essentiallydifferentnature,namelyphilosophicalones.70Butevenifoneconcededthata

hardandfastdistinctioncouldbedrawninthiswaywhichwouldbehard

tooperationalize, I imagine thecase fora philosophicaluseof rhetorical

elements, first and foremostmetaphorical language, can easilybemade for

Foucault.Amongother thingsFoucaultsrhetoricand fictionareemployed

toshedaradicallynewlightonourpresent,toofferanunlikelyredescription

oftheworld.Thisrhetoricquestionstheacceptedmetaphorsandoffersanew

way of making social reality intelligible. Making the world intelligible and

offering

new

frameworks

of

perception

not

the

least

through

new

metaphors,onemightaddisexactlytheroleofphilosophyasapioneering

standin thatHabermashasemphasized inaddition to the interpreting task.

Thus,IcannotseehowFoucaultsgenealogycouldbedeniedlegitimacyasa

philosophicalframework,evenonHabermassownterms.71

5. Conclusion

Thefirsttaskofthisarticlewasananalyticalone.Itriedtofindanexplanation

for Habermass impoverished interpretation of Foucault in thePhilosophical

Discourse of Modernity, a misinterpretation that initiated a longlasting

miscommunication between the respective paradigms of critique. While

Foucaults genealogical approach is properly characterised as a hybrid

combination of scientific and literary elements that is factbasedbut makes

heavy use of rhetoric, an approach that is often scientifically rigid in

constructing its argumentsbut at the same time dramatically reduces in a

perspectivistmannerthe truthclaimsraisedby it, themore literaryoriented

side of the project vanishes entirely from Habermass view. He ascribes to

Foucault the onesided project of a superscience, thereby incorrectly

projecting the aims of Foucaults archaeological work phase onto the

genealogical phase, which is fundamentally different in character. The


70 Cf.JrgenHabermas,PhilosophyandScienceasLiterature?,inJrgenHabermas,

PostmetaphysicalThinking(Cambridge:MITPress,1992),205227forananalogous

attempttodistinguishthetwogenresinanessayonthenovelistItaloCalvinowho

leanstowardsDerridasposition.

71 Tellingly,Foucault,whowasalwaysreluctanttoacceptlabelsattachedtohim,

cautiouslyembracedthephilosophicalone,referringtohisworkasphilosophical

fragmentsputtoworkinahistoricalfieldofproblems.Foucault,Questionsof

Method,101.

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25/26

Biebricher: Habermas, Foucault and Nietzschegenealogist does not claim to be a detached and objective observer who

describestheworldas it really is,asthearchaeologistattimestriedtoasa

happypositivist.Asshownabove,notonlyhas thismisreading led toan

intensification of the Habermasian criticisms directed at Foucault,but to a

large extent it is also responsible for the deeplyrooted mutual lack ofunderstanding for which controversy and debate sound almost

euphemistic because Habermass criticisms are based on and aimed at a

seriously distorted version of Foucaults genealogy an unfortunate

constellationthatmightbesaidtoapplyintheoppositedirectionaswell.

HavingidentifiedthisHabermasianmisreadingIhaveemphasisedhis

interpretationofNietzscheasinvolvingaconceptualdecisionthatgoesalong

wayinexplainingtheonesidedaccountofFoucault.Habermasssplittingof

the Nietzschean project into scientific and philosophical strategies that

can

be

separated

from

one

another

an

interpretation

that

is

highly

debatable

in itself isalso thekey tohisconceptualisationof thediscourseof (post)

modernityinwhichBatailleandFoucaultfollowthescientificpathlaidout

by Nietzsche, whereas Heidegger and Derrida choose the philosophical

one. This decision leads Habermas to disregard all those heterogeneous

elements inFoucaults approach incongruentwith the scientificpath that

would threaten to undermine the clearcut twolane conceptualisation of

(post) modernity. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that Foucaults

earlierarchaeologicalprojectneatlyfallsintoplacewiththisconceptualisation

and supports Habermass view ofFoucault as an unambiguous followerof

thescientificNietzsche.

Toshow thatHabermasmisunderstandsFoucaultand toexplain this

misunderstanding in the manner described above have been the main

analytical tasksof thisarticle.Thisanalysishasservedasaprecondition for

the following reconstruction of the relation between the two frameworks

basedonthesenewpremises.Oneofthemostimportantquestionsraisedby

therectificationofHabermassmisreading isobviouslywhataHabermasian

positionvisvisFoucaultsgenealogy including the rhetorical elementwould

look like. Ihave tried toanswer thisquestionwith reference toHabermass

comments on Derrida, which portray this latter approach as a highly

rhetorical one. The conclusion from the analysis presented here is that

Habermassattempt todisqualify the rhetoricalapproachesbyproving that

there isa cleardemarcation linebetween science,philosophyand literature

failsby and large. Thus, according to Habermass own account, Foucaults

genealogicalcritique,although largelyrhetorical incharacter,wouldhaveto

be considered a valid philosophical approach. Only, one might add, if

Foucault had aimed to make conventionally scientific claims in his

genealogiescouldHabermassargumentdodamagetohisapproach.

FortheHabermasFoucaultdebatethiscouldhavebeneficialeffects.If

theclaimsofthispaperarevalidonthewholethenHabermasiansshouldno

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longer hope to achieve a wholesale disqualification of the Foucaultian

approach,basedoneithertheclassicalobjectionsraisedbyHabermasand/or

the rhetorical character of Foucaults framework. I believe that such a

wholesale disqualification of Habermass approach has not even been

attemptedbyFoucaultians.72

Thismeans thatweare leftwith twodifferentgrammarsofcritique,eachwith itsown relativemeritsandshortcomings. If

thisconstellationcouldbeagreedonasacommondefinitionofthesituation,

thenext stage in thisdebatecouldconcern itselfnotonlywith spellingout

theserelativemeritsataskthatcouldbecarriedoutbysiftingthroughthe

less polemical contributions to the first stage of the debate throughout the

1980s and 1990s and building on these accounts but with creative

articulations between these grammars of critique. As noted in the

introduction,thiscould taketheformofmediatingbetweentheframeworks

of

deliberative

democracy

and

governmentality,

between

disciplinary

micro

analysesandmacrodiagnosesofcolonisationorevenbetween thenormsof

discourseethicsand theethicsofanaestheticsofexistence.73While Idonot

mean to claim that these attempts of articulation would always yield

productive frameworksof critical inquiry, so far the impossibilityof suchan

articulationhaslargelybeentakenforgranted.Intheend,evenifitwereonly

afewcasesinwhichthiscombinationwouldprovetobefruitfulandprovide

newcriticalinsights,eachoneofthemthatwehavefailedtoworkoutsofar

shouldbe seen as one too many not for the sake of a Habermasian or

Foucaultiangrammarofcritique,butforthesakeofcritiqueasawhole.

72 Cf.Owen,OrientationandEnlightnmentforanaccountofthispeculiarasymmetry

andpotentialexplanations.

73 Cf.ThomasBiebricher,SelbstkritikderModerne.FoucaultundHabermasimVergleich

(Frankfurt/M.:Campus,2004)foramoreelaboratetreatmentofpotential

articulations.Cf.alsoSimonThompson,TheAgonyandtheEcstasy:Foucault,

HabermasandtheProblemofRecognition,inFoucaultcontraHabermas,eds.

Ashenden&Owen,195211andHarryKunneman,DerWahrheitstrichter.Habermas

unddiePostmoderne(Frankfurt/M.:Campus,1991)forspecificexamples.