CHAPTER III
CHANGE IN SOVIET LEAD ERSHIP : A PERSPECTIVE ON CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF RELATIONS
CHAPTER III
CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP : A PERSPECTIVE 9N CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF RELATIONS
Pakistani leadership's intention to improve relations
with the Soviet Union coincided with a change in the Soviet
leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev in October 1964. This
,event sent a stream of happiness in Pakistan as the Pak:istani
leadership by aligning itself with the western powers over
the years, had developed a psychological feeling that
Khrushchev followed·an anti-Pakistani and pro-Indian policy,
notwithstanding his consistent efforts to improve relations
with neighbouring Pakistan compelled by ideological as well
as strategic considerations. Nevertheless, the change in
the Soviet leadership created a favourable condition for
Pakistan to improve its relations with the Soviet Union,
as Ayub Khan could now approach the new Soviet leadership
with greater confidence and boldness. By improving relations
with Moscow, Pakistan wanted to weaken the Soviet sympa.thy
for India and to demonstrate that she had not become a camp-
follower of China. Moreover, this policy waS in tune with
Pakistani tactics of playing one great power against the
other to gain maximum benefit out of both.
Brezhnev's assumption of power in the Soviet Union
and Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow led a score of Indian and
foreign scholars to indulge in shift-watching exercises.
They alleged that the new leadership in the Soviet Union waS
: 138:
139
maintaining "equidistant", "neutral ll and nnon-partisan"
attitude in its relationship with India and Pakistan. In
their enthusiasm for justifying their new hypothesis, they
completely forgot the Soviet Union'S ideological as well
as strategic compulsions in maintaining normal good-
neighbourly relations with Pakistan from 1949 onwards as
has been shown earlier in this work. An Indian scholar
argued that there were IItwo major and interrelated reasons
which prompted it (the Soviet Union) to make various
overtures to Pakistan : the growing detente between the
Soviet Union and the United States and the growing conflict
and friction between the Soviet Union and Communist China". 1
Similarly Roger E. Kanet along with an Indian SCholar M.
Rajan Menon explained that "the deterioration of Sino-Soviet
relations coupled with the growing ties between China and
Pakistan suggested the need to counter Peking by setting
Soviet-Pakistani relations on a new footing. n2 But they
chose to ignore the Soviet ideological and strategic
compulsions which forced her to offer her hand of friendship
to Pakistan3 at a much earlier period when there was no
1 Mohanunad Ayoob, "Pakistan's Soviet Policy, 1950-1968: A Balance Sheet ll
, in M.S. Rajan (ed.), Studies in Politics (Delhi, 1971), p.235.
2 Roger ~.Kenet and M. Rajan Menon, IISoviet Policy Toward the Thl.rd World", in Donald R. Kelley, Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (Praeger, New York, 1980), p.253.
3 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1954), vol.8, p.691.
140
indication of Soviet-American detente, Sino-Pal< ties and
Sino-Soviet rift. However, the Soviet-American detente
helped in Soviet-Pak rapprochement in another way. Now
Pakistan was free of fears of annoying or displeasing the
United States and other Western Powers in improving relations
with MoscOW. 4 It is thus wrong to say that the Soviet
Union under Brezhnev made special efforts to improve Soviet-
Pakistan relations, rather .. at no point did the Soviets
completely close their doors on PakistanI!. In order to win
the friendship of Pakistan it always kept dangling the
carrot of economic aid.S
And if it failed to gain the
confidence of Pakistan, it was primarily due to mental
reservations of Pakistani leadership. Later in early and
mid sixties, the moment Pakistan started responding favourably
to Soviet overtures after her disappointment and disillusion-
ment with the United States and other Western powers, "Soviet-
Pakistani relations too started growing, and they grew very
rapidly indeed". 6 In this regard the comment made by Werner
Levi seems most plausible whO wrote, itA shift in sympathies
and a reappraisal of policies in Pakistan, favouring the
Soviet Union, resulted not so much from positive measures
4 Ayoob, op.cit., no.1, p.227.
S Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia : Relations among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR (Praeger, New York, 1970), p.70.
6 K.D. Kapur, Soviet Strategy in South Asia (Young Asia, New Delhi, 1983), P.29.
141
in Soviet-Pakistan relations as from growing dissatisfaction
with the American policies and actions ... 7
Although the reason for Soviet-Pakistan rapprochement
in early and mid-sixties cannot be entirely attributed to
Soviet-American detente, or Sino-soviet rift or Sino-Pak
detente, the role of fastly changing global and regional
environment cannot be altogether ignored. The ball for
improvement of Soviet-Pak relations was not in the Soviet
but in the Pakistani court. When she started playing the
ball, relations improved. In this period Pakistan'S rela-
tionship with the United States was strained as the latter
had shown promptness in giving arms assistance to India in
the wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. China
became a cause of concern for all the three - India, the
Soviet Union and the United States. Pakistan resorted to
cultivate China in this period to improve its bargaining
power vis-a-vis all these three states. It further aggravated
the Soviet anxiety to wean Pakistan away from the Chinese
fold. Moscow was, at the same time, uneasy with the political
developments in India in the post-Nehru period as certain
sections had started demanding a review of India's friendship
with the USSR. All these factors provided additional sti-
mulus to the Soviet Union to mend her fences with Pakistan
which Moscow had been trying since 1949, though unsuccessfully.
7 Werner Levi,"Pakistan, the Soviet Union and Chinall,
PacifiC Affairs, vol.35, 1962, p.217.
142
Without any Llarge-scale disengagement from India, Soviet
policy sought to broaden the base of its South Asia poiicy
in such a way as to bring about the establishment of a
mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan as well.8
In an exercise in this direction, the Soviet Union
under Brezhnev renewed her invitation to President Ayub
Khan to visit Moscow. He waS initially invited by Khrushchev
in September, 1964. Before Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow, the
Pakistani Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto set out to tha't city
on a probing mission in January 1965, and it cieared the
deck for President Ayub'svisit in April 1965. Bhutto held
high-level talks with the Soviet leaders on global as well
as regional issues.9
Through these talks Bhutto wanted to
enhance his understanding with Moscow and to explain to the
Soviet leaders the rationale of Pakistanis foreign policy.
He was quite satisfied with his talks in MOSCOW. 10 Through
this diplomatic exercise both sides ensured the success of
President Ayub Khan's projected visit to the Soviet Union.
Moscow Radio on Bhutto's visit observed, "We are sure that
as a result of this visit, the first visit of the Pakistani
Foreign Minister to the USSR, the sphere of our cooperation
will expand and this visit would be of great importance in
strengthening the relations between the two countries.1111
8 Zubeida Hasan, II Pakistan 's Relations with USSR" , World Today(London), January 1969, p.27.
9 Pravda, 13 and 14 January 1965.
10 ~, 19 January 1965.
11 Ibid., 26 January 1965.
143
Thus, after eradicating all the obstacles, the process
of normalization of relations between the two countries was
hastened by President Ayub Khan's official visit to Moscow
early in April 1965. He was accorded official welcome on
his arrival and had his first round of talks with the Soviet
leaders the same day, in the office of Premier Kosygin. It
was the first direct personal contact in 18 years between
the top leaders of Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Welcoming
the distinguished guest, Prime Minister Kosygin said, "We
have been eagerly looking forward to the visit of President
Ayub to the USSRII, which waS "a momentous event in the
history of Soviet-Pakistan relations" and "will contribute
to the further strengthening of mutual understanding and
good neighbourliness between our two countries" .12 Premier
Kosygin in a conciliatory statement said, "We have different
views on the laws governing the development of human society
and on some concrete questions of international policy too.
It is our conviction that different views on public system
should not prevent our peoples from becoming good neighbours
and even friends and our governments from cooperation with
13 each other". In addition, mentioning identity of common
views, he further said, "We note with satisfaction the
identity of the Soviet Union's and Pakistanis approach to
such important problems of our time as struggle against
12 Pravda, 4 April 1965.
13 Pakistan Observer, 5 April 1965.
144
imperialism and colonialism, guaranteeing of the people's
lawful right to an independent development, general and
complete disarmament, and banning of nuclear weapons. This
is a good requisite for our cooperation in international
aff airs .,,14
In .a similar vein the Chairman of the Presi'cfum of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, President Anastas Mikoyan lauded
Ayub as It a great statesman". He said, "It is our profound
belief that the development of relations between the USSR
and Pakistan in a spirit of friendship and neighbourliness
would bring appreciable benefits to the peoples of our states
d t · b t t th' " II 15 an con rl ute 0 s reng enlng peace ln Asla •••• Even
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU observed that the
talks with President Ayub Khan were "epoch-making" .16 During
their talks they had a frank exchange of opinion on a broad
range of topics. President Ayub complained that Sovil2t
military assistance to India had led her to follow aggre-\
ssive and expansionist policies and Indo-Pakistani disputes
remained unresolved, because "Whenever we brought the matter
to the world forum, India had the assurance that she would
be bailed out by the Soviet veto ll•
17 Premier Kosygin while
14 Op.cit., no.12.
15 ~., 6 April 1965.
16 Dawn, 7 April 1965.
17 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (OUP, Lahore, 1967), p.171.
145
denying that Soviet military aid to India had aggravated
tension in the sub-continent, argued that Indo-Pakistani
dispute could be resolved through Ildirect negotiations ll
and suggested to uevolve some kind of practical coexistencell
18 between themselves. Included in the talks were not only
various aspects of Soviet-Pakistani relations and how they
might be improved but also basic international issues,
including the question of maintaining world peace, easing
international tension, end settling international conflicts.
The joint communique issued after the end of Ayub
Khan I s vis it dec lared that "In spite of the differences in
their socio-economic systems, there are real possibilities
for the further development of good neighbourly relations
between the two states, and for strengthening trust and
business collaboration on a mutually advantageous basis". 19
Expressing the need for disarmament, the communique stressed
the conviction of both sides that \I it is of good importance
in the present stage to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in any form and to establish nuclear-free zones in
the various areas of the worldll • 20 Inclusion of this clause
in the declaration was of a special significance to Pakistan
as at that stage India was debating as to whether it should
divert part of its resources in the development of nuclear
weapons in the wake of recent Chinese entry into the nuclear
18 Ibid., p.172.
19 For the text of the communique Pravda, 11 April 1965.
146
club. The communique waS, however, couched in sufficiently
ambiguous terms on many a topic on which neither of them
wished to commit itself. Omitting any direct reference to
the Kashmir dispute, it stated that the Soviet Union and
Pakistan "declare resolute support for the peoples who are
waging a struggle for their national liberation and indepen-
dence and for the peoples who are fighting for the right to
determine their future in accordance with their own will". 21
Although this statement was vague enough to be regarded as
applicable to Kashmir, it was widely propagated in Pakistan
as an evidence of Soviet endorsement of Pakistanis stand on
Kashmir. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs waS the
main propagater of this interpretation. Similarly, the jOint
declaration stressed the need for immediate implementation of
all international agreements for the sake of world peace and
cooperation. This Part of the communique was also interpreted
by many Pakistani sources as the Soviet affirmation of
Pakistani stand on implementation of Security Council resolu-
tion on Kashmir, which demanded immediate holding of plebiscite
22 in the state. Thus, the joint communique was well received
in Pakistan. The Soviet leaders described the communique as
II a milestone in the Pakistan-Soviet relations 11.23
21 Ibid.
22 Pakistan Times and~, 13-15 April 1965.
23 Pravda, 11 April 1965.
1~7
President A~b Khan at the press conference at Lahore
airport after his return from the visit, expressed his satis-
f action over the IIfrank and cordial talks". He said that a
II good many misunderstanding of the pastil were reso lved, making
the way "clear for friendship and cooperation between the two
• 11 24 countr~es • He later wrote in his autobiography, lilt waS
not until April 1965 that Pakistan was able to establish
direct contact with the USSR. For eighteen years we knew
little about each other at the human level. Inevitably, both
sides acted under preconceived notions and suffered from a
sense of distance l1• 25 He further added, liMy visit to the
Soviet Union was essentially intended to cover the lost links.
The fact of neighbourhood was a physical and geographical one,
and I wanted to re-establish the validity and compulsion of
this fact". 26 Later, he summed up his impress ion of his talks
with the Soviet leaders in the following words: "I think there
was general recognition on both sides that the meeting might
prove a turning point in our relations and that there were
tremendous possibilities of cooperation. I found the Soviet
leaders extremely knowledgable. They were courteous, polite
and hospitable, but firm on their basic assumptions. I
venture to think they recognised our sincerity and came to
h b tt . t· f ·t· II 27 ave a e er apprec~a ~on 0 our pos~ ~on • So, the
24 Dawn, 12 April 1965.
25 Ayub Khan, °E·cit., no .17, p.169.
26 ~. 27 Ayub Khan, °E·cit., no: 17, p.173.
148
Pakistani President ' s visit to Moscow cleared many misunder-
standings between them and proved out to be a turning point
in the history of Moscow's relations with Rawalpindi.
Ayub Khan's visit resulted in three agreements relating
to trade, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Under
one of the agreements the Soviet Union agreed to provide 50
million dollars for oil exploration and purchase of industrial
machinery and extended the existing oil-exploration agreements
for another five years. In another agreement it was designed
to double the Soviet-Pakistani trade by 1967. The third
28 agreement was related to a cultural exchange programme.
The Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev
mentioned that the Soviet exports to Pakistan "will mainly
consist of machinery and equipment necessary for the develop-
ment of Pakistan'S industry and agriculture. They will
include power equipment, road building machinery, as well as
29 ferrous rolled stock, asbestos, cement and other goOOs ll •
Thus, the Soviet Union's long-cherished desire of
establishing cordial relations with Pakistan without pre-
judicing the decade-old warm relations with India materialised
in the year 1965. The new Soviet orientation towards Pakistan
became more apparent when Pakistan along with Turkey and Iran
figured into Soviet May Day slogans. In May Day slogans only
28 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London, 1973), p. 302.
29 ~, 8 April 1965.
149
those countries I names appear with whom Moscow has warm and
cordial relationships. However, Soviet efforts to balance
relations with India and Pakistan caused much concern in
India. Ayub Khan's visit to MOScow in April was followed
by Lal Bahadur Shastri's in May 1965. It appears that Prime
Minister Shastri raised this issue during his visit to Moscow
but the Soviet leaders assured publicly that Soviet-P~(istani
relations would not be developed at the cost of Indian interests.
Kosygin in his speech at the reception of Shastri at Kremlin
Palace dec lared, "When the Soviet Union is striving to improve
its relat~ons with a third country this does not have to be
at the cost of Soviet-Indian friendshipll.30 However, the
Soviet policy of maintaining equal friendship with both India
and Pakistan was put to ac id tests during 1965 when an armed
conflict arose over the Rann of Kutch in April-May 1965 between
the two neighbouring countries. Although the border clashes in
Kutch area had started from January 1965, it was only in the
month of April that serious fighting broke out in the region.
Moscow projected its neutral posture and refused to go into
the merits of the case. It warned that the solution of
problems between India and Pakistan through war would only
help imperialist powers by providing opportunities to fish
in the troubled waters. It cited the recent statements of
30 Pravda, 16 May 1965.
150
Ayub and Shastri regarding peaceful solution of disputes
between the two countries and emphasised the necessity of
d . t d fIt·' 31 h t t t J.rec an peace u nego J.atJ.ons. T e Tass s a emen on
8 May 1965 hoped that It India and Pakistan will solve their
differences through direct negotiations taking into account
the interests of both sides" and asserted that a military
solution would be contrary to the interests of both India
and Pakistan. 32
Both sides accepted British mediation and consequently
ceasefire was effected. Contrary to the Soviet view, the
British Government was against any direct negotiations between
India and Pakistan to settle their dispute. When Dixon Report
came up for discussion before the Security Council in 1957,
the British representative Gladwyn Jebb declared that his
government could not accept Dixon Report. 33 The Report had
recommended direct negotiations between the parties concerned.
The Rann of Kutch conflict was only a prelude to a major
military conflict in September 1965. For Pakistan this clash
was only a probing operation to test India's military capa
bility and her will to fight. 34 Better performance of Pakistani
31 Ibid., 9 May 1965.
32 Ibid.
33 A. APpadorai, The Tashkent Declaration, 1969, p.ll.
34 Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent (Somaiya, Bombay, 1973), pp.156-157.
151
army in this war emboldened their morale to seek a military
solution to the Kashmir problem. 35 However, some Indian
scholars have blamed Soviet neutrality for Ilan increase in
Pakistani aggressiveness against Indiall• 36 It is difficult
to understand how Soviet neutrality helped Pakistan in its
aggressive designs against India. Pakistan could have never
imagined that Moscow would fight India's battle as a price
for Indo-Soviet friendship, when it could not bombard
Peshawar during U-2 incident. Even India could have never
seen Moscow in that role. The other way of helping one's
ally at war with a third country is to maintain regular
supply of arms and ammunition which Moscow did without fai.l,
very much unlike western powers who imposed arms embargo on
India and Pakistan during the war. Moreover I if the Indo-
Pakistani conflict of September 1~65 was the outcome of
Soviet neutrality in Kutch dispute, why it cannot be inter-
linked with Soviet neutrality on Kashmir dispute. Soviet
suggestion in both the cases was peaceful and direct nego
tiations over differences between India and Pakistan. 37
35 See "Ayub Khan talks to his countrymen" in London, Dawn, 20 June 1965.
36 R. Vaidyanath, "Recent Trends in Soviet Politics Towards India and Pakistan", International Studies, vol.VII, No.3, January 1~66, p.437; V.S. Budhraj writes "India's moderation and Moscow's neutrality must have encouraged Pakistan to launch another military adventure again at a place where its army had an edge over India", op.cit., no.34, p.157; K.D. Kapur writes, "The non-partisan stand of the Soviet Union on the dispute over the Rann of Kutch further encouraged Pakistan in its aggressiveness", op.c it., no.6, p.49.
37 Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan (Vikas, Delhi, 1971), p.86.
152
However, it cannot be denied that it was during President
Ayub's visit to Hoscow that the Soviet Union got a breakthrough
in its long-cherished desire of establishing cordial relations
with Pakistan in addition to India, and it was bound to have
some bearings on Indo-Soviet relations as well. But this
did not mean that India's importance in Soviet eyes had
diminished and they became insensitive to India's feelings. 38
The Soviets would have never liked to wipe out the decade-old
gains of Indo-Soviet friendship for the sake of a dubious
improvement in Soviet-Pak relations. The policy of the Soviet
Union towards the subcontinent from the very beginning was to
maintain equally good relations with both India and Pakistan.
The security interests of the Soviet Russia demanded that she
should consider Indo-Pakistani subcontinent as a single unit.
Moreover, the subcontinent itself was historically a single
unit, artificially cut apart by the imperialist machinat.ions.
But even after partition the facts of geography remained the
same. Strained relations with Pakistan could have easily
neutralised the strategic advantages obtained by strengthening
Indo-Soviet relations or vice-versa. Knowing this fully well
and prompted by ideological considerations too, the Soviet
Union strived to develop equally good relations with both the
neighbouring countries since their independence undeterred
38 R. Vaidyanath holds the view that after the breakthrough in Soviet-Pak relations, the Soviet Union became insensitive to India's feelings, op.cit., nO.36.
153
by Pakistan's initially negative response. A piecemeal
state-wise approach was not expected to enhance the proper
understanding of Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan.
It would be rather very misleading. The comment made by the
Times of London on Soviet neutrality during Kutch dispute
that "it goes to confinn that Russia's policy on the sub-
continent is changing I turning from its previous out-'and-out
commitment to India's case over Kashmir and everything else
at issue with Pakistan to a more wary and detached stance
between the two neighbours ll ,39 reflects the same piecemeal
approach. Mikoyan' s suggestion on his visit to New Delhi in
June 1964 "that it was time for India and Pakistan to seek a
settlement of all their differences .. 40 and the August 1965
remark of Soviet Vice-Premier K. Mazurov, in New Delhi "that
the Soviet union should not be expected to allow its relations
with India and Pakistan to be governed by the mutual relations
of these two countries"41
were but aff inn at ions of the Soviet
integral approach and not examples of Soviet hardening of
attitude towards India as an Indian scholar R. Vaidyanath
has maintained in one of his articles. 42
39 The Times, 10 May 1965.
40 QUoted by Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreign Affairs, Vol.43, No.2, January 1965, p.323.
41 Link, 28 August 1965, p.9.
42 R. Vaidyanath, op.cit., nO.36.
154
A. SOVIEI' UNION AND INDO-PAl< WAR, 1965
Encouraged by better performance of the Pakistani army
in the Kutch conflict, Ayub Khan on 5 August 1965 decided to
send well-trained armed guerillas into the Kashmir vall.ey on
the pretext of waging "a war of national liberation". Ayub's
strategy was to instigate a largescale uprising in the valley
to undermine Indian control over the region and thus to impose
on India a negotiated settlement of Kashmir problem favourable
to Pakistan. He assumed that Indian Muslims would support
Pakistan in its war with Pakistan and India would soon dis
integrate under the stre·ss of war. 43 Armed guerillas intru
sion into Kashmir boiled down to fighting among regular army
units. The conflict became more fierce when Pakistani army
crossed international border on 1 September. Their main
concentration was on Chhamb-Jaurian sector where they had
some strategic advantage too. They were just 20 miles away
from Jammu by 5th September and thus, India was forced to
open another front in Lahore and Sialkot sectors by'September
in order to release the pressure mounted in Jammu sector.
This move of Indian army was unexpected for Pakistan.
The Soviet union which had traditional friendship with
India and waS striving to improve relations with Pakistan
vlith a recent limited breakthrough in the form of President
Ayub's visit to Moscow, was caught in a dilemma. But it
43 Budhraj, op.cit., nO.34, p.158.
155
played its cards with admirable skill. Guided by reason
and realism, the Soviets assigned to themselves the role of
a peace-maker in the Indo-Pakistani dispute~ Moscow observed
strict neutrality throughout the conflict and emphasized from
the very beginning the ruinous economic implications of war
in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union pointed out that the
conflict would weaken both India and Pakistan and would lead
to their instability. Even before the Pakistani army's
actual intrusion into Indian territory on 1 September, Soviet
newspaper Pravda in an article elaborately brought out Soviet
perspective of the situation in the subcontinent. Without
blaming India or Pakistan for the initiation of war, it
emphasized that "the main thing is to find a way to stop the
bloodshed immediately and to liquidate the conflict". 44
While praising Indian policy of peaceful coexistence and
non-alignment and India's fight against colonialism, it held
that the Soviet Union had .. a long-standing, traditional
friendship with India" and was .. striving for further deve lop-
ment of its relations with Pakistan". It further ascertained
that the Soviet improvement of relations with Pakistan would
not be directed against her friendship with any third country.
The Pravda artic Ie maintained that 11 strengthening the ties
between the USSR and Pakistan must be regarded as a part of
a general policy aimed at ensuring peace in Asia and throughout
44 ~, vol.XVII, No.34, 15 September 1965, p.15.
156
the world ll • While laying stress on peaceful settlement of
dispute, it pointed out that like her traditional friendship
with India, Soviet-Pak relations would be a stabilising
factor for normalisation of relations between India and
Pakistan.45
On 4 September the Soviet Premier Kosygin sent almost
similar notes to both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan
expressing concern over the military conflict II in an area
directly contiguous to the borders of the Soviet Union"
and pleaded for the II immediate cessation of military opera
tions" .46 He further explained, uIn the present grave
situation, the main emphasis should not be placed on the
question of the cause of the conflict or of ascertaining
who is right and who is wrong. The main efforts should be
concentrated ••• on halting the tanks and silencing the
guns". Kosygin urged the warring parties to stop fighting
and withdraw their forces behind the ceasefire line agreed
by India and Pakistan in 1949. He also offered Soviet
Government's IIgoOd offices if both sides consider this
47 useful". On the same day Indo-Pakistani conflict in
Kashmir came up for discussion in the Security Coune il,
where the Soviet delegate while urging both fighting states
45 Ibid., pp.15-16.
46 Pravda, 12 September 1965.
47 Ibid.
157
II to put an immediate end to the bloodshed in Kashmir and
halt this conflict" almost again repeated the Soviet stand
of 1964 on Kashmir for a bilateral solution by peaceful
means. He said, liThe two neighbouring states must resolve
the outstanding issues between them by peaceful means, with
due regard for their mutual interests ... 48
People's Republic of China just contrary to the Soviet
stand started instigating Pakistan against India from the
very beginning. Peking vehemently attacked India's stand on
Kashmir. On 4 September when Soviet Premier Kosygin in his
special letter to heads of the government of India and
Pakistan urged peaceful solution of dispute, the Chinese
Foreign Minister Chen Yi landed in Pakistan to pledge his
country's "moral and material support to Pakistan ... 49
China's
People's Daily supported IIPakistan's counter-attack in self-
defence against India's armed aggression and openly blamed
Moscow for vy~ng with the US in aiding and abetting the
d . .... 50 In ~an react~onar~es •
The Security Council discussed the Kashmir question
on 4 and 5 September which led to the passage of two unanimous
resolutions demanding ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from
each other's territory. In the course of discussion in the
48 ~, Yr. 20, mtg.1237, 4 September 1965, pp.36-37.
49 See H.P. Klaus, "China's Role in India-Pakistan Conflict", China QUarterly, No.24, October-December 1965.
50 Peking Review, vol.8, No.37, 10 September 1965, pp.7-8.
158
Security Council, Moscow openly acknowledged that Kashmir
was a matter of IIdispute" between India and Pakistan. The
Soviet delegate in the Security Council on 6 September
extended full support to the Council resolution which asked
for immediate cease-fire followed by mutual withdrawal of
troops to positions occupied before 5 August 1965. A ~
statement of 7 September once again expressed Soviet concern
as the conflict was taking place in an area neighbouring
its frontiers. It again offered Soviet IIgood offices" to
settle the issue and to restore peace in the area only if
they deemed them useful. 51 People's Republic of China on
the other hand on the same day in order to raise PakistanIs
morale issued a statement which criticized India IS Itnaked
aggression" arid warned lithe Indian Government that it would
bear the responsibility for any consequences arising out
of its criminal aggression". 52 In continuation the Chinese
Government on 8 September sent a note to the Indian Govern-
ment alleging border violations. The Soviet Union condemned
these Chinese actions.
Unaffected by China I s outbursts against India I.Belyaev in
a commentary on Moscow Television made a passionate appeal
for ending the conflict. He said, liAS it is a war between
two peoples who were one people and lived in one country,
51 Pravda, 8 September 1965.
52 Peking Review, op.cit., no.50, p.6.
159
India, before it was divided in 1947". He further added,
IIPeople of India and Pakistan must not allow outside forces
to use religion to play one against the other to serve their
own vested interests". 53 The reference of "outside forces"
in the above statement was an indication towards China.
Expressing his genuine concern for peace and good-neighbourly
relations between the people of India and Pakistan, whom
Brezhnev called Ilblood brothers ll at the Soviet-Rumanian
friendship meeting in Moscow,54 the Soviet leader on 11
September in an indirect reference to China said that "third
forces" "sometimes added fuel to the fire n • In a speech
before the Rumanian leaders in MOscow, Brezhnev made a friendly
reference to both India and Pakistan and appealed to them to
stop fighting. He said, "Bonds of friendship which have
already become traditional exist between us and India. We
are accustomed to appreciate and respect India'S peace-loving
foreign policy, her fidelity to the principles of non-alignment,
national freedom and friendly international cooperation".
While referring to Pakistan, he declared: IIWe want to develop
good neighbourly relations with Pakistan as well ••. and we
have noted with satisfaction that this striving of ours met
55 wi th understanding on the part of the Pakistani Government".
53 Quoted by Bhagat Vats, Foreign Intrigues Against India, (New Delhi, 1967), p.137.
54 Pravda, 11 September 1965.
55 Ibid.
160
He further advised declaration of ceasefire by both parties
and withdrawal of their troops to the positions they held
before fighting commenced.
An explosive situation was created by China by her troops'
movement in various strategic points in the north of India and
open provocations near Sikkim border whose defence was t:he
treaty obligation of India. Knowing fully well the various
implications of Chinese provocations, the Soviet Union through
another Tass statement of 13 September condemned the acts of
"certain forces seeking to profit by the worsened India
Pakistan relations and trying to push the two countries
towards aggravation of the military conflict ••• by their
incendiary statements". It indirectly warned China by stating
further that "those who facilitate the fanning of the conflict
by their incendiary statements and by their policy ••• aSsume
grave responsibility for such a policy, for such actions.
No government has any right to add fuel to the flames".56
The ~ statement asserted that there was no possibility
for settling the conflict other than by peaceful means. A
Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom also condemned the Chinese action. 57
However, China in order to coerce India and to relieve
Pakistan of mounting Indian military pressure in the Lahore
Sector and in a bid to thwart Soviet move for mediation in
the Indo-Pak conflict, issued an ultimatum to India on
56 Ibid., 14 September 1965.
57 See Bhagat Vats, op.cit., no.53, p.147.
161
16 September demanding the removal of all 'Indian' milita~
establishments on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese
border and the return of four kidnapped Tibetans, 800 sheep
58 and 59 yaks within three days. Cautiously watching the
Chinese move, Premier Kosygin, on 17 September, i.e., the
day on which Chinese ultimatum was received in New Delhi,
in another message to Prime Minister Shastri and President
Ayub Khan proposed direct meeting between the leaders of
India and Pakistan on the Soviet soil, preferably in Tashkent
.. in order to achieve agreement on the reestablishment of
peace" 1:1etween the two countries and offered his good offices
59 on request. The Security Council once again took up the
matter on 18 September in the wake of Chinese ultimatum to
India. Moscow put forward its earlier three proposals for
the establishment of peace.60 The Soviet delegate said, "It
is quite obvious that such a turn of events is not at all
in the interest of the peoples of India and Pakistan or the
peoples of Asia as a whole •••• It is equally clear that
the continuation of this conflict benefits only the forces
which are pursuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples
t h . th" . l' t d ., t . 'I 61 so as 0 ac ~eve e~r J.mperl.a ~s an expanS~onl.S a~ms.
58 Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, vol.46, 1965, col.6334.
59 Pravda, 20 September 1965.
60 §fQB, 20 Yr, 1241 Mtg., 18 September 1965, pp.27-28.
61 Ibid.
He further said that the Soviet Union felt concerned "because
the hostilities are taking place in a region immediately
adj acent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union" .62 He again
asserted: "It goes without saying that it is first and foremost
the Governments of India and Pakistan themselves which can
and must settle the present conflict. The Charter of the UN
and the Bandung principles_cry out for statesman-like wisdom
on the part of the leaders of both countries. ,,6 3
Prime Minister Shastri in a statement in the Lok Sabha
on 17 September outrightly rejected the Chinese allegations
contained in China's first ultimatum to India. However, the
deadline of Chinese ultimatum expired and India remained
unmoved. But China served another ultimatum to India on
19 September. Taking stock of latest developments in the
s-q.bcontinent, in the wake of second Chinese ultimatum to
India, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on
20 September. The Soviet delegate voted for the Security
Coo.ncil resolution which demanded that l1a ceasefire should
take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours
GMTII, and demanded IIboth Governments to issue orders for a
ceasefire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all
armed personnel back to the positions held by them before
5 August 1965 11•64
The resolution without naming China or
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 For the text of the Resolution see Rahmatullah Khan, Kashmir and the United Nations (Vikas, Delhi, 1969), pp.176-177.
163
any other power aPpealed to 11 all states" to refrain from
any action nwhich might aggravate the situation in the area".
It was a most strongly worded resolution ever passed by the
Security Council with regard to the Kashmir conflict.
The ceasefire resolution of the Security Council influenced
the course of conflict and resulted in its termination, although
a little bit late, in the early hours of 23 September. Pakistan,
after the passage of the resolution, was left with only ·two
options. It could have either ignored the ceasefire resolution
in the hope of intervention by the Chinese forces in the
conflict in its favour, or to readily accept the ceasefire
demand contained in a unanimous Security Council resolution.
Pakistan hesitated in the beginning and sent her Foreign
Minister to Washington but she soon realized that President
Johnson would not intervene in the conflict except through
the world body and that the Chinese only issued incendiary
statements with no intention to enter into the conflict as
the sUbsequent events also revealed. President Johnson on
22 September telephonically assured President Ayub Khan of
his country's support to Pakistan if she agreed to the
cease-fire call of the Security council.65 Thus, Pakistan
was left with no choice except to accept the ceasefire
resolution, which neither included the right of self
determination for the Kashmiri people, nor the withdrawal
of troops from other's territory. Pakistan, thus reluctantly
65 Hindustan Times, 23 September 1965.
164
accepted the ceasefire demand. Peking first extended and
later allowed to expire its ultimatum to India. Premier
Kosygin expressed happiness over the development and viewed
th- t J."t ld th" t f t th' 66 a wou serve e J.nteres s 0 s reng enJ.ng peace.
In continuation of its initiative to bring two warring
nations to the negotiating table, Moscow viewed that they
could meet only under Soviet auspices because the Western
powers had failed to maintain peace in the subcontinent and
had always tried to create bad blood between Asian and African
67 peoples. India immediately agreed to the Soviet proposal
of its mediation and venue of the conference to be on the
"Soviet soil". But it took some time before Pakistan agreed
to meet in Tashkent. President Ayub sent a letter to Premier
Kosygin stating that II such a meeting would not at present be
fruitful" and Moscow shOUld try for a "meaningful resolution ll
in the Security Council, IIthat can lead to an honourable
settlement of the Kashmir dispute ll • 68 But Pakistan also
soon realized that due to their neutral posture throughout
the course of Indo-Pakistani war the Soviet Union only,
among all the powers, could successfully mediate and in
their bid to improve relations with Pakistan, they would not
play with their national interests during the course of
66 Pravda, 24 September 1965.
67 Ibid., 22 September 1965.
68 Ibid., 26 September 1965.
165
mediation. So, they also agreed to Soviet mediation at the
conference which finally took place from 4 January to 10
January 1966.
China, however, waS not satisfied with the Security
Council resolution and condemned it outrightly. The Chinese
Government had from the very start of the conflict openly
favoured Pakistan, issued provocative statements against
India, communicated threatening ultimatums and tried to
disrupt the soviet move for mediation and efforts to end the
war through the world body. China supported Pakistan in her
war with India because Pakistan seemed to fight its battles.
If Pakistan could have defeated India, the latter would have
ceased to be a rival of China in Asia. In this regard
Indian Foreign Minister rightly observed that China was
fighting through Pakistan.69
Moreover, China supported
Pakistan as it would have provided her an opportunity to.
fish in the troubled waters of the subcontinent and to
undermine the growing Soviet influence in Pakistan.
Indo-Pakistani conflict gave birth to a dilemma for
the Soviet diplomacy. Any Chinese attack on India would
have compelled Moscow to review its neutral posture in the
conflict. However, the ·Soviets wanted to avoid an open
confrontation with Peking. Moscow, on the other hand,
knew that any Chinese intervention in the war would strengthen
the hands of reactionary forces and undermine the progressive
69 Indian Express, 20 September 1965.
166
forces in India. That was what happened, after all, in 1962
as a result of Sino-Indian war. This apprehens~on of Moscow
proved quite realistic as immediately after the war the Jan
Sangh Party alleged that Moscow deserted India during her war
with Pakistan.70 Similarly, the Swatantra Party pleaded for
review of Indian foreign policy as the Soviet Union did not
give qny preferential treatment to India in her war with
Pakistan.71
Moreover, the Chinese intervention would have
led New Delhi to seek military assistance from Washington,
which would have ultimately affected the Indo-Soviet relations
in general and Soviet interests in South Asia in particular.
Moscow never wanted any growth of Chinese and Western powers'
influence in the subcontinent. Western involvement in the
subcontinent as a result of Chinese intervention would have
turned this area into another Vietnam, and Soviets would not
have liked war so close to its frontier.
Moreover, it had been alleged by many scholars that
during Indo-Pak war, the Soviet and American policies ran
pgrallel to each other and equated India and Pakistan, i.e.
aggressor and the victim by putting them on the Same plane.
It should be noted that it was the United States not the
Soviet Union who equated the aggressor with the victim.
When India protested to Washington against the use of US
70 Organiser, Vol.19, No.8, October 1965, p.l. ¥
71 Swarajya, Vol.9, No.22, October 1965, pp.18-19.
167
arms by Pakistan against India, which Rawalpindi received
under Mutual Security Pact with the United States to contain
communism only, the US administration imposed arms embargo on
both the countries placing them on equal footing. It waS the
White House, which keeping Pakistan on par with India, cancelled
the proposed visit of Shastri and Ayub to Washington. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, never cancelled her arms
agreement with India. When Indo-Pak war was about to end,
a high-level Indian defence delegation was busy in finalising
an arms agreement in Moscow.72
Just a few days before the
outbreak of war, Moscow had readily agreed to supply submarines
to India along with training and maintenance f aci lities. 73
The defence of Indian coast-l~ne was quite vulnerable to
Pakistani attack due to the outdated ships of the Indian navy.
India's earlier endeavours to purchase submarines from both
Britain and the USA had bore no fruit. When India, disappoin-
ted with western powers, approached Moscow for the said purpose,
Britain threatened to severe the existing connections of the
74 'Royal Navy with the Indian Navy. The USA which had already
sold a few submarines to Pakistan in 1964, termed Indian deal
75 wi th MOSCOw for submarines as .. over-preparedness" •
Some Indian and foreign scholars also blamed the Soviet
Union for letting down India during its impending need for
72 Times of India, 18 September 1965.
73 Ibid., 6 August 1965.
74 Hindu, 5 August 1965.
75 Times of India, 11 August 1965.
168
Soviet support. However, it is quite unreasonable to accuse
Krem1in of a changed stance towards India because it could
not condemn Pakistan as an aggressor, consistently demanded
bilateral negotiation for the settlement of mutual dispute
and finally favoured ceasefire resolutions on the Kashmir
issue in the Security Council. There was, however, hardly
anything new in the Soviet stand. Moscow, from the very outset
urged bilateral negotiation for the settlement of any dispute
between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan had, in
f act, accepted this view after the Security Counci I discussion
on the Kashmir issue in May 1964. The Soviet Union did not
change her view on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council.
Kremlin finally supported the Council resolution which had
only asked for cease-fire without any reference to withdrawal
from or even self-determination in Kashmir. Indian stand in
the Security Council during the war was precisely the same.
This resolution later on became acceptable to both the warring
parties. So it would have been quite foolish on Soviets'part
to veto this unanimous resolution which became acceptable to
both the parties.
For the relaxation of tension in the subcontinent, the
Soviet demand for immediate cease-fire and peace waS the
most appropriate stand. In the difficult situation of war,
which was made much more explosive by People's Republic of
China'S provocative stance, the Soviet initiative proved quite
decisive in defusing the crisis. Kremlin's open support to
169
India would have only aggravated the tension and delayed the
cease-fire process. Chinese leadership would have been
irritated over Soviet support to India and would have given
them more excuses to create trouble on India's northern border.
Ultimately it might have led to the Chinese military adventure
leading finally to US intervention. A warning to this effect
had already been conveyed by the US Secretary of State Dean
Rusk to People's Republic of China.76 Later, when China gave
its first ultimatum to India, the US Ambassador Cabott Lodge
warned his Chinese counterpart, Wan Kuo-chuan in Warsaw, of
77 the consequences of such an adventure.
The Soviet diplomacy in the'Indo-Pak conflict was guided
by reason and pragmatism. If they had to develop equally good
relations with both India and Pakistan, they had no other
choice but to maintain a neutral posture in the war. Moscow
assigned to itself the role of a peace-maker. Even though
Moscow was fully aware of the fact that right from the time
of Kutch conflict up to the naked aggression along the Indo
Pak border Pakistan was the real trouble-maker, yet this truth
telling would have cost Moscow its mediatory role. Further,
it would have delayed the military disengagement which was
draining their hard earned rare resources and would have
ultimately led to instability in these countries. So, given
the facts, it is wrong to assume that Soviet policy towards
76 See New York Times, 14 September 1965.
77 Hindustan Times, 18 September 1965.
170
India during its war with Pakistan in any way amounted to
withdrawal of Soviet support to India.
Although Soviet policy during the Indo-Pakistani conflict
was largely sympathetic towards India, MOscow deliberately made
attempts not to criticize or condemn Rawalpindi. The Soviets
were primarily interested in a sensible, satisfactory and
durable peace settlement between two warring neighbours on
the southern flank of their border and to establish equally
balanced bond of friendship with both the neighbours.
B. TASHKENT AGREEMENT
India after the ceasefire was disturbed over a particular
phrase of the Security Council resolution 211(1965) of 20 September
1965 which envisaged that the Security Council would consider,
as soon as the fighting had stopped, "what steps could be taken
to assist towards a settlement of the political problem under
lying the present conflict". The reason for Indian anxiety
was that it implied reopening of Kashmir problem in the Security
Council. But the Soviet representative to the Security Council
Fedorenko on 25 October 1965 assured India in the Council that
since ceasefire resolution called for a complete ceasefire and
the withdrawal of armed personnel had not been fully materialised,
it would be . utter disregard to the letter and spirit of the
resolution 211(1965), if it discussed other aspects of the
problem without solving the previous one. Thus he urged the
Council to discuss only those problems which were directly
connected with the settlement of the armed conflict between
171
India and Pakistan.78
He further asserted that the withdrawal
of troops and armed personnel by both sides to the positions
occupied by them upto 5 August 1965, must proceed more rapidly.
Fedorenko took special care in making statements, otherwise
it would have been misunderstood in Pakistan. While making
assertion that withdrawal of troops must precede taking up
of other issues, he did not rule out the possibility of Security
Council considering the Kashmir question at some future date.
. .. He emphas1zed that these are the questions that must be settled
first, these are the questions to which attention must be given
in the situation that has now arisen If. The Soviet Union had
"constantly called for, c;md calls for strict compliance with
the Council's resolution". 7
9 These calculated and balanced
statements indicated that Kremlin was eager to preserve its
neutral posture and was not willing to let slip its opportu-
nities for playing the useful role of a mediator between
India and Pakistan.
Although India and Pakistan both accepted the Soviet
offer of mediation, Ayub Khan before its acceptance paid a
visit to the United States to extricate President Johnson's
support on the Kashmir issue. However nothing specially
significant came out of this ·visit. The Soviet Union once
again repeated her offer for mediation in th~ middle of
78 UN Document S/PV. 1247.
79 Ibid.
172
November. Left with no other alternative, President Ayub
Khan on 11 November 1965 agreed to meet Prime Minister Shastri
at Tashkent for summit talks. Moscow formally announced that
the summit meeting would take place at Tashkent on 4 January
1966. Peking was very critical of the meeting and alleged
that Tashkent conference was a US-Soviet design to support
Indian 'reactionaries'.
The press release of 12 November 1965 (a day after
Pakistan's acceptance of Soviet mediation) by the Press
Information Department-of the USSR Embassy in Karachi clearly
reflected the neutral posture of the Soviet Union in the Indo-
Pakistani conflict. The release stated that "attempts are at
times made to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not
objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense
of the other side. Such opinions are far from reality. The
only thing desired by the Soviet Government is the establish-
ment of a stable peace between Pakistan and India and, as far
as this basic desire is concerned, the Soviet Government
equally appeals to the leaders of Pakistan as well as to those
of India with the call to display wisdom, restraint and
patience. Soviet people are convinced that only under these
conditions, not on the battlefield but at the round table of
peaceful negotiations, can and should a final and stable
agreement be reached between Pakistan and India on the
Kashmir problem ll • 80 This non-Partisan attitude was essential
for building confidence in the parties concerned to accept the
Soviet mediation effort.
80 ~, 13 arid 14 November lY65.
173
Mediation is a very difficult job, and particularly if
mediation has to be done between India and Pakistan, it
becomes a herculean task. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur
Shastri before leaving for Tashkent declared that India, in
any case, would not compromise on Pakistani strategic posts in
Pakistani-occupied Kashmir seized by India, namely - Kargil,
Tithwal, Hazi Pir - through which Pakistani infiltrators had
sneaked into Kashmir valley. In addition, he declared that
Indian sovereignty over Kashmir was not negotiable. Ayub Khan
on the other hand insisted upon a self-executing machinery
for the settlement of the Kashmir problem before the final
withdrawal of forces. The Tashkent conference began on 4
January 1966 against this background. It was the first
diplomatic move on the part of Khrushchev's successor Brezhnev
and for that reason also Moscow made special efforts to make
it successful.
Premier, A.N. Kosygin inaugurated the conference and in
his welcome address he pointed out that the purpose of calling
this summit meeting was to assist both India and Pakistan in
their search for peace. He asserted that Moscow was not only
interested in strengthening ties with ,both these countries
but also in cordiality of good neighbourly relations between
India and Pakistan itself. He highlighted the economic
implications of war and the seriousness of the economic tasks
before them. Kosygin hopefully emphasized that "Tashkent
might start a turning point in Indo-Pak relations, if they
would create a climate of mutual trust and understanding" .81
81 Pravda, 5 January 1966.
174
Ayub Khan and Shastri on their turn outlined the central
points of their respective positions. Before the inauguration
of the conference Kosygin met both these dignitaries and it
appears that he persuaded both of them to tone down the final
drafts of their inaugural speeches. Kosygin successfully
arranged a brief meeting between them before the beginning of
the plenary session. As a result Ayub Khan did not mention
Kashmir in his inaugural speech and Shastri stressed the
importance of multidimensional improvement in Indo-Pakistani
relations. Shastri in his inaugural address underlined the
importance of a II no warll pact between the two countries and
the gradual elimination of points of differences. Ayub Khan
on the other hand doubted the feasibility of "no warll pact
until all those disputes which divided the two countries were
82 resolved.
The first major obstacle in Indo-Pakistani negotiations
came in the shape of question of agenda. However, a formula
agreeable to both was worked out. Both sides decided to
exchange views on various issues even without an accepted
a~nda. Further deliberations of the conference centered
on troops withdrawal, Kashmir question, restoration of
economic and trade relations, repatriation of prisoners of
war, problem of refugees, illegal immigrations and the vital
issues of war and peace on the subcontinent. The task before
175
Kosygin was to reconcile the irreconcilable divergent points
of view of the two countries. Pravda correspondent while
covering the inaugural session of the Tashkent Conference
commented, liThe opening of the meeting between Indian and
Pakistani leaders is a good omen. An important step has
been taken towards a real settlement of the Indo-Pakistan
conflict. This step has been interpreted by the people of
the world as a manifestation of goodwill and statesmanship
on the part of Indian and Pakistani leaders .1183
Premier Kosygin had a difficult time shuttling from one
dignatory to another in order to settle the main hurdles. In
this process he met President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister
Shastri almost dai ly. The discussion on lithe entire range
of problems involved in making the Tashkent meeting a success ll
between the guest dignitaries continued on 5 and 6 January
1966. On 7 January the meeting between Shastri and Ayilb Khan
got deadlocked in the presence of Kosygin. The following day
Tass observed that the two delegations were lIapproaching the
stage of diff icult negotiations". 84 There was no meeting on
8 January and stalemate continued. JI.yub'Khan's inability to
get concessions from India forced him in desperation to
threaten to walk out of the conference and return to Rawalpindi
85 on 11 January. The Indian delegation also decided to return
on the same day. 9 January proved to be most crucial day.
83 News and Views from Soviet Union (New Delhi), Vol. 25, no. 3, 5 January 1966, P.13.
84 Pravda, 9 January 1966.
85 ~, 9 January 1966.
176
~ reported on the same day that the participants were
evolving a new path to narrow down their differences on a
score of important issues.86
After the deadlock it was left
to the diplomatic skill of Premier Kosygin to convert the
dead meeting into a live and successful one. He made frantic
efforts in that direction, meeting Shastri three times that
day. Once in the morning for two and a half hours, second
time in the evening for three hours and at last at the end
of the day. Simil~ly, he had two meetings with President
Ayub, one of two and a quarter hours duration and the other
of 45 minutes duration. His labour was well-rewarded that
day, as due to his efforts only a nine-clause declaration
was concluded which was eventually signed by them on 10
January. This last minute breakthrough took even the Soviet
press people by surprise as Pravda's report on the conference
on 10 January was far from encouraging.
Indian scholar M.S. Rajan acknowledged Kosygin's great
personal contribution to the success of the meeting. He
wrote, II ••• the Soviet Prime Minister firmly stuck to the
letter and spirit of the offer of good offices. He did not at
makeLany stage any propoposals, or pressurise either of the
leaders to accept the proposals of the other. Contrary to
inspired and malacious press reports, there was no Soviet
armtwisting of India or Pakistan. All that the Soviet Prime
Minister tried to do was to bring to bear on the two leaders
86 Pravda, 10 January 1966.
177
his tremendous powers of persuasion to make them see each
other's point of view in the interest of peace in the Indian
b . t 87 su contl.nen • The Soviet leader was not only interested
in the withdrawal of troops from each other's territories
and obserVance of cease-fire line, but also in laying "a
solid foundation for peace and security in Hindustan". 88
The declaration had a two-pronged object - First, the
immediate resumption of cordial relations between India and
Pakistan and, secondly, to chalk out a procedure for the
settlement of all disputes ·between the two countries through
peaceful means.
The highlight of the nine-clause declaration was the
resolve by the two major powers of the subcontinent to
renounce the use of force and settle their mutual differences
through peaceful means. I t announced that II all armed personnel
of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25
February 1966 to the pOSitions they had prior to 5 August 1965,
and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-
fire line". They further agreed on the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs and to discourage hostile
propaganda against each other. It envisaged resumption of
normal diplomatic ties, to "consider measures towards the
87 M.S. Raj an, "The Tashkent Declaration : Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies, vol.8, July 1966-Apri 1 1967, p.8.
88 Y. Lugovkai, "International Commentary - Hindustan Second Anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration", International Affairs, No.2, February 1968, p.83.
178
restoration of economic and trade relations, communications,
as well as cultural exchanges", to "continue the discussion
of questions relating to the problems of refugees, evictions,
illegal immigrations ", to repatriate prisoners of war. The
joint declaration did not mention Kashmir question directly.
It simply said that II it was against this background that
Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set
forth its respective position". It further envisaged joint
meetings at ministerial and other levels and the setting up
of joint Indo-Pakistani bodies to consider problems of common
89 concern. But the jOint ministerial meeting held at Rawalpindi
in March 1966 did not achieve any substantial progress though
the joint declaration at the end of the meeting observed:
"Considerable progress was made in clarifying the issues
involved. The talks which were of an exploratory nature,
1 d f 1 h f · II 90 e to a use u exc ange 0 v~ews • Similarly, restoration
of trade and cultural relations made very slow progress chiefly
because Pakistan considered meaningful talks on Kashmir
question as an essential condition for such normalization
of re lations.
The Soviet Union was very happy over the outcome of
the Tashkent meeting. Replying to the queries of the Soviet
journalists, Premier Kosygin stated that the Tashkent Declaration
89 Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.12, No.1, January 1966, p.9.
'90 Dev Sharma, Tashkent : A study in Foreign Relations with Documents, Allahabad, 1966, p.121.
179
had ushered in a new era of good relations between India
and Pakistan and had laid a solid base for the creation of
conditions of peace in the subcontinent.91
The Soviet'
leader reiterated that the declaration might become lithe
symbol of eternal friendship between India and Pakistan" and
at the same time also II s trengthen friendship between India
and the Soviet Union and between Pakistan and the Soviet
Union ll .92 Kosygin was thankful to both the visiting state
guests for the II anergy , patience, and ••• perseverance they
had shown in search of a mutually acceptable solution, the
implementation of which will promote the strengthening of
93 peace and friendship between people".
Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri immediately
after the signing of the document in a private conversation
with Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan stated that "we have fought
in this (rndo-Pakistan conf lict) with all our strength. Now
94 we have to fight for peace with all our strengthll
• According
to Shastri the declaration had achieved "very tangible results".
He expressed that establishment of peaceful relations between
India and Pakistan would promote the IIcause of peace in Asia
95 and throughout the world u • According to him Tashkent
91 Pravda, 11 January 1966.
92 Soviet Review (Information Department of the USSR Embassy, New Delhi), 14 January 1966.
93 Pravda, 11 January 1966.
94 Quoted by Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., nO.37, p.97.
95 See Summary of World Broadcasts, Series 2, SU/2059, 12 January 1966, p.SU/2059/A3/2.
180
Conference was a lIunique experiment in international diplomacy". 96
President Ayub Khan also praised the conference as livery good
and fruitful meeting" and assigned its accomplishment to lithe
untiring and commendable endeavours of the Soviet Prime Minister,
• II 97 ... h Mr. Kosyg1n. In an 1nterv1ew w1th Tass newsmen e expressed
his dissatisfaction over the inability of the Conference to
discuss the Kashmir question but he whole-heartedly praised
Premier Kosygin I s role. He Observed, liThe Tashkent declaration
has not gone as far as it should have gone to resolve the
Kashmir dispute. It should have been attempted because that
is the basic problem that creates stresses and strains between
India and Pakistan •••• Prime Minister Kosygin has shown a
unique example of statesmanship and far-sightedness in convening
the Tashkent meeting, and the initiative shows the Soviet
98 Union I s genuine interest in peacell
• He said that although
the Soviet union itself was not directly involved in the
conflict, it had set a unique example in international diplomacy
by using its good offices in resolving the dispute between
neighbouring countries.99
The Tashkent declaration proved to be an embodiment of
the policy of peaceful co-existence as it was Signed by the
Prime Minister of non-aligned India and the President of aligned
96 Times of India (New Delhi), 11 January 1966.
97 ~, 11 January 1966.
98 Ibid.
99 ~.
181
Pakistan in the presence of a Soviet socialist Premier. It
convinced ASia in general and Pa.kistan in particular that
Moscow was genuinely interested in maintaining peace in the
region. The US intervention in the South Asian region in
1954 multiplied the tension in the area and brought cold war
at the doorstep of the subcontinent. Similarly, Chinese entry
into South Asia in the early 1960s further aggravated the
tension and virtually created a second front for India.
However, the Soviet involvement in this area in the form
of Tashkent mediation generated a harmonious atmosphere -
something which the United Kingdom and the United Sta~es
, 100 attempted in 1962-63 but without any tang1ble result.
Chinese reaction to the Tashkent declaration was one of
hostility and animosity. China, which wished Indo-Pakistani
conflict to be prolonged, called this meeting "a neo-
colonialist gathering" and denied the significance of the
declaration. Peking branded the declaration as II a product
of US-Soviet plotting ll that would weaken the struggle against
, '1' 'A' d f' 101 1mper1a 1sm 1n Sla an 'A r1ca. It accused the Sovie"t
Premier of "aiding the aggressor and disguising himself as
, t' 1 't II 102 an 1mpar 1a negot1a or • While the Tashkent meeting was
in progress, the Chinese Government sent a strong note to
India on 6 January, alleging that Indian troops were creating
100 Budhraj, op.cit., no.34, p.166.
101 Peking Review, vol.9, no.5, 4 February 1966, p.l1.
102 Asian Survey, vol.8, no.3, March 1967, pp.185-86.
182
trouble at the Chinese border and China would repulse them
unless Indian intrusion into Chinese territory ceased. 103
It was an indirect Chinese move to make it difficult for
the parties to come to an understanding at Tashkent.
Major Western powers' reaction to the Tashkent Declaration
was a mixture of applause and hosti Ii ty. The Press and the
leaders of these countries were astonished at the fact that
104 India and Pakistan - two major countries of the Commonwealth,
one of them, in fact, aligned with them, who fought the war
largely with Western weapons, had decided to settle their
dispute under the aegis of their camp opponent-USSR.
Washington followed a dubiOUs policy towards the holding of
the Tashkent Conference. Whereas President Johnson openly
and wholeheartedly supported the Soviet mediation efforts,
his defence secretary Robert ¥lCNamara made a statement which
waS quite contrary to the President's spirit. President
Johnson supported the move for holding the conference during
Ayub's visit to Washington. He, at the same time, on the eve
of the conference emphasized the need for peaceful solution
f h d ' 'h be ' t 105 b h' d o t e lspute ln t e su on tinen • The purpose e ln
this support to the soviet Union was to isolate Peking in
playing an effective role in South Asia. Defence Secretary
McNamara, on the other hand, on the eve of the conference told
India's Minister of Food, S.K. Patil, that Washington would
103 Dawn, 10 January 1966.
104 See The Daily Telegraph, 13 September 1966.
105 ~, 3 January 1966.
183
recognise Tashkent agreement only when it suits its interests,
otherwise the US Government would resume its arms supply to
Pak. 106 ~stan.
Similarly, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United
Kingdom who welcomed the outcome of the Tashkent Declaration,107
had earlier on 6 January showed his ill-will by releasing his
letter to Noel Baker in which he had branded India as an
aggressor in the September war.108
These double-edged policies
of the USA and UK and open threatening note to India by China
were aimed at supporting PakistanIs tough attitude towards the
conference to enable her to extract few more concessions from
India. It should be remembered that it was around 6 J-anuary
that the talks at Tashkent were deadlocked. Perhaps Ayub
Khan had got some external support for his tough stance at
the conference.
The Western press especially the British newspapers were
skeptical of the achievement of the Tashkent Declaration.
The Times of London after the signing of the agreement wrote
next day, "This is far from the no-war dec laration that wou ld
have assured the Indians that Kashmir was closed to future
. I II 109 v~o ence • It emphasized that the declaration was only a
no-force declaration. Alastair Lamb viewed Tashkent spirit
106 Quoted by P. Krukov, World Economy and International Relations (Moscow, 1966), (Russian).
107 ~, 11 January 1966.
108
109'
Times (London), 6 January 1966. ~b-i..el. ~k5j,g~ (London), 11 January 1966.
184
as II a phrase of little meaningll and advised partition of
Kashmir on communal lines for the solution of the problem.110
Michael Edwardes opined that the declaration was II a negative
achi evement" and branded it as a "funerary monument to the
dead Prime Ministerll• He observed that lithe dialogue he
had begun, instead of continuing fruitfully, petrified into
an obituary" .111 However, all these misinterpretations were
less directed towards analysing the event in proper persPec-
tive than devaluing the Soviet efforts.
However, Pakistan IS willingnes's to accept Soviet mediation
indicated that Chinese influence on Pakistan had diminished
as Peking was never in favour of stopping the conflict, much
112 less to accept and implement Tashkent agreement. Soviet
mediation pointed out that not only Chinese influence on
Pakistan was on wane but also the Western influence. Thi.s
could be easily observed in the 11th meeting of the SEATO
Council of Ministe~s, held in Canberra, Australia, some six
months after the Tashkent meeting. Pakistan did not send her
minister to the meeting, instead she was represented by her
high commissioner in Australia. Pakistan in this meeting
refused to support the resolution which stroke of communist
aggression in south Vietnam and Laos.
110 Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966 (London, 1966), p. 137 & 149.
111 International Affairs (London), Vol.42, No.3, July 1966.
112 S.W. Simon, liThe Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective", Asian Survey, Vol.VII, No.3, March 1967, PP.185-86.
185
The Tashkent conference became a turning point through
which Moscow acquired political influence in both India and
Pakistan. Normalization of relations between India and
Pakistan was beneficial not only to these two countries but
also to the Soviet Union because it involved its own security
interests owing to the geographical proximity and strategic
-location of the South ASian region. Apart from Soviet anxiety
for peace and stability in the subcontinent, there was also a
desire in Kremlin to insulate the growing Chinese and Western
influence in Pakistan. This conference left a significant
imprint on Soviet-Pakistani relations. Just in contrast to
the previous history of Soviet-Pak relations, the Kremlin
had the satisfaction that like India, now Pakistan too had
confidence and feeling of friendship towards Moscow. The
significant part of the success of the Soviet diplomacy was
its ability to cultivate Pakistan without alienating India.
C. TASHKENT' S AFT E..RMATH
So far as the implementation of the provisions of the
Tashkent Declaration was concerned, most of them were executed
in the letter and spirit of the Declaration. For some time,
it appeared that this agreement would start a new phase in
Indo-Pakistani relations. But soon it was realized that
the atmosphere of mistrust and hostility persists and all
hopes to start good neighbourly relations between the two
remained unfulfilled.
186
Some immediate positive results of the declaration may
be recalled. Both the countries withdrew their armed personnel
before 25 February 1966 to the positions they held before 5
August 1965. They at the same time exchanged Prisoners of War.
Diplomatic missions were restored with the return of the High
Commissioners to their respective posts in New Delhi and
Rawalpindi. Communication f~cilities - air, postal and tele
graphic - between the two neighbouring countries, which were
disrupted by the war were restored, inter-state travelling was
resumed through two points on the common land border and the
cargo and ships seized during the war were returned.
The provisions which were not implemented in the spirit
of the declaration were the establishment of the joint meetings
at ministerial and other levels and the resumption of trade and
cultural relations. The joint Indo-Pakistani bodies were to
be instituted to consider the problems of common concern. But
to Moscow's disappointment the head of the Governments of the
two countries did not meet again, though the officials of the
two countries did have some unsuccessful meetings. The Foreign
Ministers of India and Pakistan met at Rawalpindi on 1 and 2
March 1966, but their meeting did not result in substantial
progress though the joint communique issued at its conclusion
Observed: "Considerable progress was made in clarifying the
issues involved. The talks, which were of an exploratory
nature, led to a useful exchange of views" .113 Similarly I the
113 Dev Sharma, op.cit., no.90.
187
resumption of trade and cultural relations envisaged in the
agreement had been very slow, primarily because Pakistan
considered that meaningful talks on Kashmir were essential
for such normalization of relations. Thus, Pakistan made
it obvious that there could be no rapprochement with India
as long as the Kashmir dispute existed.
Despite several demonstrations and mass meetings orga-
nised by some political parties against this agreement and
several motions against this document tabled in the Indian
Parliament, the Government of India did not withdraw its
t th O d 1 t' 114 support 0 1S ec ara 10n. The newly elected Prime
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi Observed about this declaration
that Lal Bahadur Shastri had put the seal on the document
with his own life and thus she was prepared to implement
this agreement in toto. In contrast to India's positive
response, Pakistan's attitude towards Tashkent declaration
was from the very beginning far from encouraging and was full to
of misgivings. The news of Tashkent agreement le~an explosive
situation in Pakistan. Students, women, doctors, lawyers - all
staged a big demonstration in Pakistan. Police had to open
fire to control the mob. High-placed authorities in Pakistan
started indulging in mud-slinging over the declaration. The
anti-declaration feelings in Pakistan were fanned by Foreign
Minister Z.A. Bhutto~ Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad, Information
Secretary Altaf Gauhar and few other havJks. Bhutto who was in
114 See Lok Sabha Debates (New Delhi), Vol.50, No.3, 1966, cols~ 652-653; No.5, cols. 1284-1286.
188
the entourage of President Ayub Khan to Tashkent, a£ter
returning home, publicly attacked the agreement. He formed
his own party after his expulsion from Ayub's cabinet. He
alleged that the Tashkent Declaration was a "betrayal" of
Pakistani interests. Ayub Khan, in fact, was under tremendous
pressure not only from political but also from military and
corrmunal quarters of Pakistan which was being encashed by
Bhutto. During National ASsembly debates on the declaration,
Bhutto alleged that the Tashkent agreement did not provide
any specific solution to the actual problems which lie
between India and Pakistan. He further stated that the
Tashkent Declaration was "not a contractual obligation" and
it could not deter Pakistan from" espousing the cause of
Jammu and Kashmir", and its people whose defence was the
I 't' t 'ht of PakJ.'stan. 115 eg1 J.ma e rJ.g
The Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Aziz Ahmad suggested
that the II armed personnel" who were to be withdrawn under
Tashkent agreement, did not inc lude II freedom fighters in
Kashmir" .116 The Information Secr~tary of Pakistan Altaf
Gauhar in a speech to the Pakistan Institute of International
Affairs on 2 March 1966 asserted that the Tashkent document
permitted Pakistan to resort to war if Kashmir dispute was
not settled through peaceful means. He further observed that
the ceasefire line in Kashmir was II a temporary arrangement ll
115 ~, 16 March 1966.
116 Pakistan Times, 12 January 1966.
189
and lithe freedom fighters had the right to be there where
117 they were."
The opposition parties in Pakistan during the course of
National Assembly debates considered Tashkent agreement as a
IIdownright betrayal of the political aspirations of the people
of Jammu and Kashmirll, a diplomatic defeat, a surrender, an
t f II d It' wl.'th Indl.' all .118 agreemen or a no-war ec ara l.on Some of
the National Assembly members viewed the declaration as a
design of American imperialists and still others saw in the
agreement a IIdiplomatic victory for Russia over China in South
ASiall ,119 and still few others felt that the accord under the
leadership of Soviet Russia amounted to a betrayal of Peking.120
President Ayub Khan when he Saw that the general opinion waS
against the declaration, also thought it fit to return to a
policy of confrontation with India in the name of Kashmir.
In an unscheduled broadcast to the nation on 14 January 1966,
he announced that the agreement did not-affect PakistanIs
position on Kashmir as IIhe had not signed a no-war pact with
I d ' 11121 n l.a.
117 QUoted in Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), vol.19, No.1, 1966, pp • 2 3- 2 5 •
118 National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, vol.1, 15 March 1966, pp.435-437.
119 !bid., pp.425-429.
120 ~., 14 March 1966, p.360.
121 ~, 15 January 1966.
190
The anti-Tashkent campaign of Bhutto and others led to
the rise and growth of pro-Peking element~ in Pakistan. China
was too happy over this development. In order to encourage
the anti-Tashkent feelings in Pakistan and to boost their
morale, the Chinese Head of the State Liu Shao-chi visited
Pakistan first in March and once again in Apri 1 1966. During
his first visit, in the course of his various speeches in
Pakistan, he declared that "when Pakistan resolutely fights
against foreign aggression in defence of its national inde-
pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 650
million Chinese people wi 11 stand unswervingly" for them
d 1 ... 1 d'" 122 h' an wou d provlde reso ute support an asslstance. C lnese
were knowing that the successful execution of Tashkent Decla-
ration would enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union in Asia
and at the same time it would result into reduction of Pakistan'S
dependence on China. Pakistan also knew the importance of the
Chinese trump card through which it wanted to extract maximum
economic and political concessions from the Soviet Union and
mili tary assistance from both the superpowers simultaneously.
The post-Tashkent period was marked by the Soviet Union's
endless efforts as earlier to strengthen its relati.ons with
both India and Pakistan and to bridge the gap between the two
countries. L.I. Brezhnev in his report to the Twenty-Third
Congress of the CPSU (29 March-8 April 1966) significantly
122 The Times (London), 28 March 1966.
191
mentioned that Moscow's traditional friendship with New Delhi
had further developed and, above all, it had proceeded along
with a certain improvement in its relations with Rawalpindi.
He further added that the Soviet Union was interested in
closer cooperation with Pakistan and that the Soviet people
appreciated the efforts made by the Pakistani people to
123 strengthen their country's independence, economy and culture.
Thus, the Soviet Union sincerely wished to improve its relations
with Rawalpindi. The year 1966 Saw a marked improvement in
Soviet contacts with Pakistan. After the Tashkent conference
Moscow and Rawalpindi signed, in the same month, a barter
agreement which provided for the exchange of Pakistani rice
for Russian vehicles and road-building and engineering
machinery.124 Similarly, when a nine-member Soviet parlia-
mentary delegation under the leadership of K.T. Mazurov
visited Pakistan in April-May, a contract was Signed in Dacca
for the construction of a thermal power station in Gorzala,
East Pakistan with an optimum capacity of 110,000 kilowatts. 125
AS a result of the agreement, there was increase in Soviet
economic assistance to Pakistan. 80 million dollars of economic
aid was offered towards the end of 1966. It also signed an
agreement under which it granted a credit of Rs 600 million
to Pakistan for the execution of twenty-one projects which
included two plants for the production of electrical machinery,
123 Pravda, 30 March 1966.
124 ~, 19 January 1966.
125 Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy - An APpraisal (Bombay, 1970), p.151.
192
fifteen broadcasting stations, the Guddu thermal power station,
a high voltage transmission line, and a rai lway-cum-highway
bridge across the river Rupsa.
The post-Tashkent period in Soviet policy towards Pakistan
reflected the development of multi-dimensional Soviet relations
with Rawalpindi, which remained operative more or less till
the serious upheaval in the sub-continent in 1971. A number-
of pelegations were exchanged ranging from political to military,
cultural, sports, and also of journalists. Pakistanis position
in the list of May Day slogans, issued on 17 April 1966, waS
also elevated. Pakistan which was earlier grouped with Iran
and Turkey, had now been placed next only to India. Pakistan
in Soview view was no longer detestable despite her negative
attitude towards the Tashkent agreement and the ever-growing
friendship with China. The new Soviet policy towards Pakistan
was aimed at weaning her away frOm both China and the USA,
whereas Pakistanis new stance towards the Kremlin was directed
towards neutralising the Soviet Unionls traditional friendship
with India. The Soviet desire to improve relations with
Pakistan found frequent expression in the Soviet media. Soviet
print media established that there were no unmanageable gaps
between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. The internal development
of Pakistan was'also painted positively by the Soviet press.
A four-man delegation of SOviet journalists led by vishnevsky
reached Pakistan in March 1965. Vishnevsky expressed satisfaction
over the improvement of relations betvleen the Soviet Union and
193
Pakistan especially after President Ayub Khan's visit to
Moscow. He hoped that these relations would further improve
with the successful implementation of the Tashkent declaration.126
A nine-member Soviet parliamentary delegation composed of different
Soviet nationalities and headed by K.T. Mazurov reached Pakistan
in April 1966. He laid emphasis on normalisation of relations
between India and Pakistan, expressing Soviet willingness to
offer its mediatory role in this matter.127
Pakistan on its
part conve~ed her concern over Soviet arms supplies to India,
through Pakistan's Home and Kashmir Affairs Minister, to the
S · l' d 1 . 128 OVlet par lamentary e egatlon.
, In the post-Tashkent period, Soviet arms supply to India
and PakistanIs demand to supply similar quantity of arms to
it also on par with India, became the focal point of foreign
policy issue in Pakistan. It became more important for
Pakistan as Britain and the United States had imposed arms
embargo on the shipment of arms to both India and Pakistan
in the wake of September 1965 war. In this situation India
was getting her arms supply from the Soviet Union. It was
reasonable for Rawalpindi to be concerned about this deve1op-
mente Pakistani leaders were fully aware of the fact that the
Kremlin had a stake in the political, economic and military
developments in India and it would be difficult for the Soviets
126 ~, 10 March 1966.
127 Pakistan Times (Lahore), 29 May 1966.
128 ~,30 May 1966.
194
to disengage themselves from that country. Pakistan's conten-
tion was that even if Moscow could not stop its arms supply
to India, they could easily supply arms to Rawalpindi on terms
similar to India.
In June 1966, in a bid to get military supply from the
Soviet Union, a Pakistani military delegation led by the
Cornmander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Nur Khan
visited the USSR, apparently on a "goodwill-cum-educational
129 tour. The military mission included a group of senior army,
navy and air force officers. These officers were expected to
establish personal contact~ with the Soviet military authori-
. . . f' ld 130'. h 11 Kh t f t1es 1n var10US 1e s. A1r Mars a Nur an me De ence
Minister Marshall Malinovsky and held extensive discussions
131 with his Soviet counterpart. The Pakistani military mission
inspected a number of Soviet military establishments and watched
carefully the performance of several supersonic aircraft. Nur
Khan also held talkS with G.S. Sidorovich, a high SOViet official,
who dealt in military transactions with foreign countries.132
However, there were unconfirmed reports and the activities of
the Pakistani military delegation in the Soviet Union also
suggested that the Kremlin had agreed to sell arms to Pakistan
on similar terms and conditions as it had been dOing in the
129 Pravda, 26 June 1966.
130 ~, 26 June 1966.
131 Ibid.
132 Christian Science Monitor, 4 August 1966.
195
case of India. It was also reported that MOscow, had conveyed
its decision in this regard to Pakistan through K.T. Mazurov,
First SOViet Deputy Prime Minister during his visit to Rawalpindi
as the leader of Soviet Parliamentary delegation. However,
133 the Indian Embassy in Moscow denied this report. The newly
elected Indian Prime ~dnister, Indira Gandhi, after her return
from the Soviet Union, in July 1966, categorically announced
that MOscow had not concluded any agreement with Pakistan on
the supply of arms. Pakistani rnili tary mission, despite no
agreement on arms supply, expressed satisfaction that "we
succeeded in developing ••• a sense of mutual confidence and
134 understanding betvleen our two states".
The Soviet desire to improve relations with Pakistan also
found expression in a speech by Premier Kosygin before the
135 Supreme Soviet in August 1966. This announcement of the
Soviet Premier followed the Soviet Government's offer of
Rs 600 million credit to Pakistan to execute 21 projects in
that country. In September 1966, N.P. Firyubin, the Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister paid an urgent visit to Pakistan with
a two-fold purpose. Firstly, he had to assuage Pakistani
feeling on failure to get Soviet arms supply and secondly,
to restrain Pakistan from its decision to raise the Kashmir
question in the Security Council. Firyubin had a message from
133 K.D. Kapur, op.cit., no.6, pp.84-85.
134 Pakistan Times, 8 July 1966.
135 Pravda, 14 August 1966.
196
Premier Kosygin asking Pakistan to work in the Tashkent spirit
to settle differences with India.136
However, Pakistan once
again raised the issue of arms supply with the visiting
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.
In continuation of the Soviet efforts to establish multi-
pIe contacts with Pakistan, Soviet Minister for Geology, A.V.
Sidorenko also visited Pakistan in the very first month of
the year 1967. He held talks with various Pakistani leaders
and officials. Pakistan received felicitations from Soviet
President, Premier and Foreign Minister on the occasion of
.. Pakistan Day". The messages mentioned that the recent deve-
lopment of good-neighbourly relations "meet the interests of
the Soviet Union and Pakistani people and promote the streng-
137 thening of peace in Asia and throughout the world".
A peculiar incident led Pakistan to depute its Foreign
Minister, Pirzada, to Pay an urgent visit to the Soviet capital
in May 1967. The Soviet Premier was supposed to visit Pakistan
in May 1967138
but for unforseen reasons the visit was postponed
for the next year. Pakistani invitation to Premier Kosygin waS
pending since April 1965. The reported postponement of visit
caused considerable anxiety in Islamabad and led Pirzada to
hurriedly arrange his visit to Moscow. The main Pakistani
concern was related to obtaining military weapons from the
Soviet Union. The cauSe of Pakistani anxiety over weapons
136 Pakistan Times, 27 September 1966.
137 Ibid., 25 March 1967.
138 Ibid., 8 April and 21 April 1967.
197
supply was the US decision to half the quantity of weapons
shipments to both India and Pakistan in the wake of 1965 war.
The Foreign ~dnister waS accorded war~welcome at Moscow.
Hosting a dinner party in honour Pirzada, his Sovieb counter-
part A. Gromyko mentioned that the two neighbouring countries
.. have every possibi lity of continuing to develop and consolidate"
their ever-growing relations in economic and cultural fields. 139
The joint communique issued after the end of Pakistani Foreign
Hinister I s offici al visit, recognised that in recent years the
relations between the two neighbouring countries in the economic,
political and other fields had developed to the full satisfaction
of the two countries. 140 The Soviet Union in a bid to accornmo-
date the differences with Pakistan, went to the extent of ignor-
ing any specific reference to the Tashkent agreement in the
joint communique.141
Speaking about his discussions with the
Soviet leaders at MOscow, Pirzada on his return observed that
it had been "cordial, candid and constructive" and he expressed
full satisfaction over the conversation he had with the Soviet
142 leaders. Howev~r, despite expression of satisfaction over
the con~ersation held at Moscow, the visit waS a failure in
its mission of acquiring arms from the Soviet Union.
To add some more salt to the Pakistani wound, there came
a report that the Soviet Union had agreed to sell hundred SU7B
139 Pravda, 9 May 1967.
140 ~., '13 May 1967.
141 For the text of the Soviet-Pak Joint Communique, see ~, 14 May 1967.
142 Pakistan Times, 14 May 1967.
198
fighter bombers to India in the early 1968. This report
created uneasiness and anxiety in Rawalpindi which was
communicated by Foreign Minister Pirzada to Soviet Premier
Kosygin in New York on 21 June 1967. However, Kosygin did
143 not make any commitment in this regard. The Soviet decision
to supply arms to India was not intended to promote an arms
race between India and Pakistan but to offset an impending
IIthreat to Indian security from the rnili tary hardware, valued
at 2,000 million dollars, supplied by the USA to Pakistan.1l144
TOP-LEVEL EXCHANGE OF VISITS
It was in the wake of this development that the Govern-
ment of Pakistan announced President Ayub Khan's official
visit to Moscow (his third visit) from 25 September to 4
October 1967. However, before the proposed visit of Ayub
Khan, three Parliamentary delegations were despatched to the
Soviet capital for the purpose of creating congenial atmosphere
before the actual visit of the President. Among the three
parliamentary delegations, one was comprised of nine members
of the National Assembly led by the Speaker Abdul Jabbar Khan,
the other two were - one from the East Pakistan Assembly and
145 the other from the West Pakistan Assembly.
The Soviet media portrayed a positive image of Pakis.tan
and the development of SOViet-Pakistani relations before Ayub
Khan's visit to MOscow. It extensively covered President Ayub's
143 Ibid., 23 June 1967.
144 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., no.37, p.106.
145 Pakistan Times, 14 August 1967.
199
visit and his discussions with the top leaderships of the
Soviet Union. Speaking at a Kremlin bauquet hosted by
Premier Kosygin on 25 September, President Ayub Khan complained
that "indiscriminate increase in armaments and the growing
mili tary imbalances in the sub-continent were also a danger."
While doubting India's nuclear intentions, he observed, "The
interests of all nations demanded that the emergence of a sixth
nuc lear power should be prevented under all circumstances and
that a Non-Proliferation Treaty be concluded without further
delay.1I He further urged for speeding up a solution of the
Kashmir problem, which was, according to him lithe main stumbling
block in the way of good-neighbourly relations between Pakistan
d I di II 146 an n a.
The Soviet Union on its part emphaSized the need for a
peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. In his welcome
speech Premier ~osygin outlined the importance of the Tashkent
Agreement in the following words., liThe 'rashkent meeting conf irmed
that the road to the solution of existing differences can and
must be patiently sought, and the profound community of interests
of the peoples which had struggled together against colonialism
can be stronger than the differences and contradictions from
14, the Past. 1I Referring to the bonds of friendship between
the Soviet Union and Pakistan, Kosygin observed that the
II current visit (of Pakistan's President) is further proof that
146 Pravda, 26 September 1967.
147 Ibid.
200
there has emerged in the relations between our two countries
tabl t d t d f · dl d . . II 148 a seen ency owar s r1en y an construct1ve cooperat1on.
The joint communique issued after the conclusion of Ayub
Khan's Moscow visit reflected that Pakistan had changed its
stance on many international issues and both the countries had
now better understanding of each other's view than during
Pakistani President's first visit to Moscow in April 1965.
Earlier, they had identity of views on generalised problems
of world at large, e.g., problems of disarmament and arms
race, colonialism and imperialism, nuclear proliferation, etc.
But during this visit the area of agreement had further deve-
loped, extending upto the specifiC issues of international
relations like Middle East and Vietnam crises. However,
these shifts in Pakistani attitude towards specific issues
of international politics were aimed at impressing upon the
Kremlin leadership that Pakistan had loosened its ties with
the Western military alliances. The jOint communique testified
that both countries had similar views on Israeli aggression
against the Arab states in June 1967. They demanded "wi thdrawal
wi thout delay of Israeli forces from the Arab terri tories" and
condemned the Israeli aggression. Moreover, they pressed for
II immediate cessation of war in Vietnam in acknowledgement of
the right of the Vietnamese people to decide their fate for
themselves without outside interference as envisaged in the
Geneva agreement bf 1954". Both sides favoured II an interna-
149 tional treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ll
•
149 For text of the joint communique see~, 5 October 1967.
201
The joint communique further expressed the desire of
both the countries to Il s trengthen the existing ties and to
enlarge the areas of cooperation in political, economic, and
cultural and other spheres". They agreed to multiply the
activities of economic cooperation and trade and "expressed
their intention to widen Pakistan-Soviet ties in the sphere
of sc ienc e and tec hno logy" • 150
President Ayubls visit to Moscow proved more or less
successful. Ayub Khan himself was satisfied with the outcome
of the visit and called it a success. Pakistan succeeded in
getting Soviet assurance for economic assistance till 1975.
Politically, Ayub Khan succeeded in persuading Premier Kosygin
to visit Rawalpindi which was due since April 1~65. Moreover,
on Pakistanis insistence the jOint communique did not include
any reference to the Tashkent Declaration. In the milital~
sphere, Ayub Khan forcefully presented Pakistanis case for
arms assistance. However, Pakistan did not succeed in her
prime motive, either of limiting the Soviet arms supply to
India or with regard to acquisition of arms for Pakistan.
Thus, like other efforts of Pakistan to acquire Soviet arms,
the Pakistani President l s visit to Hoscow also proved futile
at least so far as the acquisition of Soviet arms was concerned.
On the contrary, in early 1968 there came a report
that the Soviet Union had decided to supply 139 SU-7B fighter
bombers to India, which came in for sharp attack in Rawalpindi.
150 Ibid .•
202
The Pakistan Times wrote, "Thinking people cannot help asking
why the Soviet leaders should pursue a policy which not only
runs contrary to their professions of friendship with Pakistan
and concern for the security of Asian Powers ••• it also
tends to raise doubts about the Soviet doctrines of peaceful
. d 1" , f' . 1 fl' .. 151 co-eXlstence an e lmlnatlon 0 lnternatlona con lct.
The official circles in Pakistan also expressed their resent-
mente Foreign Minister, Pirzada warned that the indiscriminate
supply of arms to India by the Soviet Union would jeopardise
HOSCOvl l s efforts of establishing good neighbourly relations
between India and Pakistan.152
The Soviet decision of
supplying arms to India definitely proved an irritant in
Soviet-Pakistani relations.
Under the cloud of this disquiet, the Soviet Premier
Alexei Kosygin decided to pay long standing visit to Rawalpindi
from 17 to 20 April 1968.153
The prime motive behind the visit
was to allay the Pakistani fears aroused by Soviet decision to
supply arms to India. Besides that the Soviet Prime Minister
wanted to discuss with Ayub Khan the question of renewal of
the US military and communication facilities at Peshawar and
Rawalpindi I s- ties with Peking. Americ an communic ation base
agreement was to expire on 1 July 1969. The terms of the
agreement provided for its termination after serving one year's
151 Pakistan Times, 8 February 1968.
152 Ibid., 11 February 1968.
153 Ibid., 4 April 1968.
203
notice by either of the two signatories. The date of notice
was due within less than three months after the conclusion
of Kosygin's visit to Pakistan. The Soviet Union wanted
Pakistan not to further extend the lease to the offensive
American intelligence unit beyond 1 July 1969. Pakistani
President Ayub Khan wanted to study the Soviet mood and
their inclination to supply arms to Pakistan. In a shrewd
move Pakistan served notice to Washington for the termination
of the lease on 6 April 1968, just eleven days before Kosygin's
visi t to Rawalpindi. Through this act Pakistan wanted to
demonstrate her disenchantment with Washington. This waS
an indication that Pakistan could even jump out of military
pacts if the Soviet Union agreed to supply weapons and support
them on the Kashmir issue.
The Soviet Premier on arrival at Rawalpindi's airport
was greeted with slogans like, "Give us tanks, not tractors",
"Down with India", etc. These slogans were perhaps instigated
by·the state machinery. However, Kosygin underlining the
basic premises of Soviet policy towards Pakistan stated that
lithe Soviet Union has good normal relations with all these
(West Asian and South Asian countries) including the close
neighbours of Pakistan.... We are strangers to designs for
using the relations with others ••• to sow the seeds of discord
between the states and peoples which have freed themselves,
to seek to confront each other is the favourite policy of
colonisers. They seek to pursue it now after they have been
154 thrown away." He also emphasized the need for peaceful
154 Dawn, 18 April 1968.
204
settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan in the
spirit of the Tashkent Declaration.
In the jOint communique issued after the conclusion of
Kosygin's visit both countries expressed "deep concern at the
continuing war in Vietnam" and desired normalization of the
situation in accordance with the Geneva Accords. Similarly,
on the situation in the Middle East both countries "condemned
the continuing acts of aggression of Israel against the Arab
states." They I?rophesied that "peace in this area would be
restored only when Israel would withdraw its troops frOm
the occupied territories and would respect the territorial
integri ty and independence of the Arab States. tI Both sides
expressed tlurgent necessity of an early conclusion of a treaty
on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". The joint communi-
que also declared that the Soviet Union would provide technical
and economic assistance in the construction of a steel mill
in Kalabagh costing 100 million dollars, an atomic power
station at Rooppur in East Pakistan, supply of a number of
high-powered medium and short-vlave redio transmitters to
provide a radio link between Karachi and Moscow, to finance
a fisheries development project and cooperation in the
exploration of oil and gas in Pakistan. They also agreed
to accelerate their mutual trade to three times within
the next two years. Both sides expressed happiness over
the steady growth of cooperation in political, commercial,
economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields.1SS
15S For the Soviet-Pakistan jOint communique see Pakistan Horizon, Vol.21, no.2, 1968, pp.199-202.
205
The K~sygin visit to Rawalpindi made it obvious that
the Soviet Union desired to establish closer relationship
with Pakistan but not at the cost of its traditional friendship
with India. That is why Kosygin on his return journey decided
to touch the Indian capital out-of-schedule. He was fearful
that his visit to Rawalpindi might be misunderstood in India.
Thus, through his stopover at New Delhi, he conveyed to the
Indian Prime Minister that the Soviet Unionls closer relations
wi th Pakistan would not influence Moscow I s customary cordiality
wi th New Delhi.
However, Pakistanis disenchantment with the west in
general and the United States in particular, their resultant
decision to impose arms embargo on Pakistan, Pakistanis action
of serving notice to Washington on PeShawar communication base
facilities and Pakistanis persistent demand for the supply of
Soviet weaponry to the extent of using state controlled slogan-
shouting on Kosyginls arrival at Rawalpindi airport compelled
Moscow to review its earlier decision of not supplying arms to
Pakistan. Premier Kosygin during his Pakistan visit "reached
an agreement in principle with President Ayub Khan on the
delivery of Soviet arms to Pakistan" .156
D. SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN
Soon after Kosyginls visit to Pakistan a high-powered
military'mission of Pakistan led by the Commander-in-Chief
156 Zubeida Hasan, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India", Pakistan Horizon, vol.21, nO.4, 1968, p.352.
206
of the Army, General A.M. Yahya Khan visited Moscow from 27
June to 8 July 1968, on an invitation from the Soviet Government.
This Pakistani military delegation visited Moscow with a shopping
list. General Yahya Khan met the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal
Andrei Grechko and held discussions and negotiations for the
purchase of Soviet arms. The Soviet decision to supply arms
to Pakistan was conveyed to India on 7th July 1968 through a
letter of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi. The letter was handed over by the Soviet Charge d'Affaires
, lh' 157 1n New De 1.
India took serious view of the Soviet decision to supply
arms to Pakistan. The matter was discussed in the Foreign Affairs
Committee meeting of the Union Cabinet, the day this news was
broken to Government of India. The meeting was:"organised to
discuss the possible Indian course of action in view of the
latest developments. Suggestions came from some quarters in the
meeting that the impending visit of President Zakir Hussain to
Moscow due to commence next day should be cancelled as a protest
against change in Soviet policy. But keeping in view New Delhi's
economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, this drastic
step was rejected.
India made big hue and cry against the Soviet decision to
.. give a very limited quantity of arms to PakistanI! .158 An Indian
scholar refutes Devendra Kaushik's contention that the Soviet Union
157 Times of India, 9 July 1968.
158 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., no.37, p.l07.
207
agreed to supply only limited quantity of arms to Pakistan, as
futile and mischievous without substantiating his own conten-
t ' 159 1 f 'I ~on. Western scho ars Wyn red Joshua and Stephen P .G~ bert
have shown in their work that Soviet supply of weapons to Pakistan
was worth 5 to 10 million dollars only. According to them, India,
on the other hand, had received Soviet military assistance to the
tune of 600-700 million dollars. They further contend that even
Iran and Afghanistan received much larger Soviet military aid
than Pakistan i.e. 100 million and 260 million dollars respec-
160 tively. Even this limited Soviet supply to Pakistan was
consisted of weapons of defensive nature e.g. helicqpters, spare
parts for aircraft, medium tanks and field guns. No sophisticated
weapons like supersonic fighters and bombers were part of the
consignment. President Ayub Khan commented that Soviet arms
161 supply to Pakistan would only 11 fill some gaps here and there"
in Pakistani defence needs. Even Government of India conceded
that the amount of supply was not very spectacular. Giving
answers to 'Half-an-Hour Discussion' on Soviet arms to Pakistan,
Indian Defence Minister Swaran Singh told the Parliament on
9 April 1969, "I would also like to say in fairness to the
Soviet Union that they (Soviet Union) have been assuring us
that they want to normalise the relations with Pakistan. They
159 Budhraj, op.cit., nO.34, p.191.
160 wynfred JoshUa and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World : Soviet Military Aid Diploma£y (London, 1969), p.102. ----
161 ~, 22 July 1968.
208
Want to have friendly relations with Pakistan, but this will
never be done at the cost of friendship with Indi a • .. 162 He
further said that they continued to assert that "they will
supply comparatively a small quantity of II 163 arms •
Despite the knowledge of the SOviet intentions in supplying
arms to Pakistan, the Indian Government, members of ruling Party
and the entire OPPOSition parties raised hulla-balloo over this
issue. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, whi le conceding that II every
country is free to give aid to any other, it is none of our
business to interfere ll• She further remarked, "we are not happy
with the reported Soviet offer of arms to Pakistan •••• We doubt
whether the Soviet Union will be able to control Pakistan, if
P k · t th . db' t . t II 164 . a 1S an uses e arms rece1ve y 1 agalns us. Expresslng
concern over the Soviet supply, Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to
her Soviet counterpart Premier Kosygin in which she argued that
Pakistan had no "reasonable justi fication to seek augmentation
of its armed strength ll, as she was already in possession of
large quantities of arms from its Western allies and China.
She further argued that far from having any external threat to
Pakistan, it had itself attacked India thrice in the past and
had consistently rejected India'S offers of no-war pact. In
such a situation, r~s. Gandhi pointed out,the Soviet arms would
instigate Pakistan's II intransigent and aggressive attitude towards
Indiall, and IIcut right across the objective of serving step-by-step
162 Lok Sabha Debates, vol.27, 9 April 1969, cols.345-346.
163 Ibid., cols. 343-344.
164 Statesman, 10 July 1968.
209
relaxations of tensions within the subcontinent. II Mrs. Gandhi
further wrote that the Soviet decision had put Indian non-
alignment and Indo-Soviet relations under the "severest possible
strains", and instead of promoting peace and stability, it would
II accentuate tension in the subcontinent" .165
The issue was raised at the Congress Parliamentary Party
meeting on 19 July 1968 in New Delhi. The members were unanimous
that the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan would further increase
tension in the region and would create an atmosphere of cold war
between Indi a and Pakistan. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was also of the
similar view. She, however, tried to explain the circumstances
under which the Soviet Union might have decided to sell arms to
Pakistan. She observed that in the fast changing international
relations, MOSCOW must have decided to improve relations with
countries on its southern periphery, e.g., Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan who were also members of western military alliance
system. Thus, to retain her influence in P~(istan, the Soviet
Union might have decided to respond to Pakistan's call for arms.
She told her Party members that the Soviet Union had assured
India that her relationship with Pakistan would not affect her
, 'h d' 166 tles wlt In la.
The right-wing opposition parties and anti-Soviet forces
in India got an upper hand in this development. Their reactions
were quite sharp. They raised their voice for a change in India's
foreign policy. They even demanded exploration of possibilities
165 Ibi£., 11 July 1968.
166 National Heral£, 20 July 1968.
210
of a dialogue with China. Despite feelers that India was prepared
lk 'f h' , II' th f P k' 167 to ta 1 C lna was Wl lng, ere was no response rom e lng.
That means India could have started dialogue with China, if Peking
would have responded favourably to Indian gestures. An anti-
ComlTRlnist weekly observed: "Once again, a ComlTRlnist country has
betrayed our friendship. It was China in 1962. It is Russia in
1968."168
Among the opposition, the Jana Sangh was most vocal. It
even organised a demonstration before the Soviet embassy1s
Information Centre in New Delhi. The crowd became unruly which
waS finally controlled by Police after a light cane charge.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the President of Jana Sangh described the
Soviet action as stabbing at the back of India.169
The Jana
Sangha saw in Soviet supply II a link between arms supply to
Pakistan and Soviet quest for an outlet to the Persian Gulf •••• 1I170
The Deputy Leader of the Praj a Socialist Party in the lower house
of the Parliament, Nath Pai, moved a resolution condemning Soviet
arms supply to Pakistan. 171 Piloo Mody of Swatantra Party on 22
July piloted an adjournment motion with the help of opposition
parties in the house, which waS designed to censure the govern-
ment for its failure to safeguard India1s national interestS.
167 Budh£aj, op.cit., nO.34, p.194.
168 Quoted by J.p. Jain, /Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (Radiant, New Delhi, 1974), P. 97.
169 National Herald, 12 July 1968.
170 Ibi£., 22 July 1968.
171 Hindustan Times, 20 July 1968.
211
But, the motion was defeated by 206 votes to 61. Another
Swatantra Party leader Minu Masani sharply criticized II Soviet
policy of equi-distance between India and Pakistan. 172
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 22 July informed the Lok
Sabha that she had written a letter to the Soviet Government
expressing India's concern over Soviet supply of arms to Pindi. 173
She further observed that like any other country, even the Soviet
Union waS "enti tIed to form her own judgement as to where her
interests lie and how to promote themll, but " we are" also IIbound
to express our misgivings and apprehensions to the Soviet leaders
in all frankness ll•174
However, if at all the Government of India did not take any
drastic step during the whole crisis, it was only because of its
economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union. They knew
that annoying the Soviet Union would harm their own national
interests. They, however, sent feelers to China for improvement
of mutual relationships. China did not respond favourably otherwise
there would have been an altogether different permutation and
combination of powers in this region. However, India should not
have made such a big hue and cry over Soviet decision to supply
a small quantity arms to ~ Pakistan. The SOviet Union had always
assured India that improvement of relations with Pakistan would not
affe~t/in any way, the traditional friendship between the Soviet
Union and India. At a luncheon given by President Zakir Hussain
172 Ibi£., 9 July 1968.
173 Lok Sabha Debates, vol.18, 22 July 1968, col.289.
174 Ibid., col.290.
212
to Premier Kosygin at MOscow, Kosygin warned of certain "outside
forces which were trying to invent all sorts of things to affect
our relations". He further observed that the forces which were
trying II to put a wedge in the relationship betvJeen the Soviet
Union and India would suffer defeat ll• He announced, IIWe are
convinced of the depth of our relations and sincerity of these
relations. These are tested by time and tested in the hard days
h ' hId' 'd" 175 w ~c n ~a exper~ence •
In the changed international scenario, the Soviet Union was
simply interested in improvement of her relations with Pakistan
as Pakistan was both ideologically and strategically important
for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union knew that no amount of
economic aid would be as effective as a symbolic supply of arms
to Pakistan. MOscow provided these weapons to Pakistan just to
wean Pakistan away from China and tl\Testern camp and to consolidate
peace on the subcontinent. The Soviet supply of weapons to
Rawalpindi was not aimed at exploiting the Indo-Pakistani differ-
ences but to enhance its influence in Pakistan. It wanted to
improve relations with both the countries of the subcontinent as
it consisted of a single geographical unit. Neglect of any of
the two countries would have been detrimental to the national
interests of the Soviet Union. That is why since the days of
Indo-Pakistani vJar of 1965 and Tashkent declaration, the Soviet
Union tried its level best to bridge the gulf between the two
countries. It always favoured mutual and bilateral settlement
175 Times of India, 11 July 1968.
213
of disputes between India and Pakistan. This sincere Soviet
desire could be witnessed in the Soviet media reports which
always highlighted the gains of the Tashkent agreement. They
always stressed that Indo-Pak conflict would provide ground for
the Western powers to fish in the troubled waters. Thus, simply
to have some l~erage with Pakistan, the Soviet Union decided
to supply limited amount of weapons to her. Hence, it should
not have been misunderstood in India.
The Chinese connection with Pakistan had led to increased
tension in the subcontinent. Thus, in order to consolidate peace
in this region, it waS imperative to arrest Chinese influence in
Pakistan. And the only way to minimize Chinese influence in
Pakistan was to agree to sell arms to Rawalpindi. Hence, the
Soviet Union decided to supply arms to Pakistan, which was Pakistan's
long standing demand. "I f Moscow were to persuade Pakistan not to
undertake any military adventure, at least in collusion with
Peking, or not to invite foreign intervention, it was necessary
for the Kremlin to further im~rove its pOSition in Pakistan, so
that it could influence the decisions of the policy-makers in
Rawalpindi". "But ll, the irony was that lIany step t2.ken to increase
MOSCOW's influence in Rawalpindi was misunderstood and resented in
New Delhi. 11176
Although a powerful India would have been a real
check against China, a friendly Pakistan with its strategic
advantages, along with India, would have been most effective in
arresting the growing influence of China and the West in the
South Asia.
176 Budhraj, op.cit., no.34, p.155.
214
Consideration from another angle also suggested that India
should not have made Soviet decision to supply limited quantity
of arms to Pakistan a big issue, keeping in view Pakistan's
limited prnver to purchase Soviet arms. Pakistan, so far, had
received arms from the United States either as a gift or at a
very low price. But the commercial aspect of the Soviet-Pakistani
arms transaction put a limitation on large-scale inflow of Soviet
arms into Pakistan. For every item of arms, Rawalpindi had to
pay either in hard currency or through large quantity of exports
and reduced quantity of imports in its trade with the Soviet
Union. But, Pakistan's limited capacity to export and limited
foreign reserves suggested that there would be only limited
S 't 1 f t Pak' 177 h k ' . . OVle supp y 0 arms 0 lstan. T us, eeplng In Vlew
Pakistan's commercial constraints and sale of sophisticated
weapons to India e.g. setting up of a MIG factory, SPares and
training facilities, submarines, etc. there was hardly any reason
for the Indian fear that the Soviet arms deal with Pakistan would
upset the military balance in the subcontinent. 178
Even if we go by logic, India had no prima facie ground
for protest against the Soviet supply to Pakistan. If India
herself had imported arms from both the superpowerS for her
defence requirements, why should she object to one of the two
177 JI.1ohammed Ayoob, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly, 19 October 1968, p.1614.
178 Aswini K. Ray I "India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union" I
Mainstream, 27 July 1968, pp.8-10.
215
superpowers' decision to sell arms to both India and Pakistan.
Moreover, earlier Pakistan was importing arms not only from
the USA but also from China, Britain and France, but India had
never bothered to register its protest by Passing a resolution
in the Parliament. The passage of such a resolution as waS
proposed by the opposition parties in the parliament would
have caused great harm to IndO-Soviet relations.
So, the Soviet decision to sell some non-lethal weapons
to Pakistan \,las not designed to alienate India but to enhance
its influence in Rawalpindi. No amount of economic aSSistance
would have helped the Soviets in this regard. Keeping in view
their serious differences with the Chinese leadership, the
Soviets were interested in containing the influence of a belli
gerent China in strategically well-placed Pakistan. Arms supply
was the most appropriate move to achieve a break-through in
relations with Pakistan. AnY break-through in Soviet-Pakistani
relations would have brought peace in the subcontinent. But
unfortunately, this Soviet move waS misunderstood in India and
strongly resented.
E. SOVIET UNION AND YAH¥A KHAN REGIME
The Soviet hope for better relations with Pakistan waS
dashed to the ground when their expectations about Ayub Khan
proved illusory. The Soviet Union had come to be lieve that
Pakistan under Ayub Khan had achieved stability. But in late
1968 there were nationwide anti-Ayub demonstrations in favour
of parliamentary democracy. Opposition parties were adamant
on consti tutional reforms. Students were in favour of educational
216
reforms. East Pakistan was agitating for effective autonowI.
An American daily wrote, "instead of stability, ten years of
military rule have brought the young South Asian nation to the
b " k f t lOt" 1 "" ,,179 rln 0 mos acute po 1 lca crlsls. In order to divert
popular discontentment President Ayub declared that he would
not seek re-election as President. When even this assurance
did not satisfy the people, he resigned his post and power
slipped into the hands of the Army Chief, General Yahya Khan
on 25 March 1969. While Peking maintained complete silence
over Ayub's resignation, Pravda reported the incident without
180 any comment.
The Soviet Union was quite surprised over this development
though not disheartened. General Yahya Khan was also considered
to be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. He was instrumental in
successful arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. It was just
a cOincidence that when Yahya Khan assumed power, Soviet weapons
deliveries started arriving in Pakistan. General Yahya Khan
assumed Presidentship of Pakistan on 31 March 1969 and in search
of international support to his regime, he wrote a letter to
Premier Kosygin. Kosygin in reply to Yahya Khan's letter assured
him that Pakistan could II always count on the friendly understandi.ng
and support of the Soviet Union" .181 He hoped that friendly rela-
tions between the two countries would further develop under
President Yahya Khan. The Soviet support to Yahya Khan's rule
179 The New York Times, 19 February 1969.
180 Pravda, 26 March 1969.
181 Ibid., 9 April 1969.
217
was extended onc.e again to reduce Pakistan's dependence on China
and the USA.
Although, Premier Kosygin arrived in New Delhi on 5 May 1969,
he could not utilize this opportunity to visit Pakistan, as he had
come to Delhi to attend President Zakir Hussain's funeral. In
his anxiousness to stabilize Soviet-Pakistani relations, Kosygin
arranged an unscheduled visit to Rawalpindi on 30 May 1969.
During his visit, he tried to evolve a scheme of regional economic
cooperation in South Asia comprising India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
He tried his level best to persuade Pakistan to settle her differences
with Afghanistan and India on the basis of bilateral negotiations.
Kosygin at the same time promised all possible help to proDote
this idea.182
The Soviet Union was interested in this regional
economic Pact because it thought that if these countrieS settle
their differences among themselves peacefully, their energies
could be utilized for a stable peace in South Asia. President
Yahya Khan's initial response to the economic cooperation scheme
. f>O~iJ.e.. 183 was qul te ~_!5lOJEka. The Soviet Union hopeful of success of
this scheme proposed another scheme - a system of lIe!ollective
Securi ty in ASia". Both these plans were proposed by Moscow in
the wake of serious armed clashes between the USSR and the People's
Republic of China at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River. It was
directed to contain the hegemonistic plans of China and the designs
of the USA in Asia.
182 Times of India, 1 June 1969.
183 IbiQ., 7 April 1971.
218
The jOint communique issued at the end of Kosygin's visit
expressed desire lito expand areas of cooperation between the
two countries in the economic I cultural and other fieldS". It
also stressed that the cooperation between the peoples of the
two countries would serve the interest of peace in Asia and
the world and was "not directed against any third statell. 184
President Yahya Khan expressed his feelings that Soviet-Pakistan
friendly relations would "continue to grow in strength fl in
fu ture. Kosygin on his part promised that the Soviet Union
would "continue to work for the consolidation of friendly ties
wi th Pakistan fl•
However I it seems that General Yahya Khan's support to the
Soviet proposals was directed to obtain international support
for his own regime and to consolidate his position at home.
Once this objective waS fulfilled l he gave second thought to
his ccmmitment made to Premier Kosygin. At home Z.A. Bhutto had
generated a hostile public opinion making it difficult for Yahya
Khan to support the Soviet proposal which had anti-Chinese
aims. Under the domestic preSsure Pakistan rejected the Afghan
invitation to jointly consider the Soviet proposal for regional
trade and transit facilities. Pakistan gave more importance to
its relations with China than to its ties with the Soviet Union.
It made its intention clear by sending a goodwill and friendship
delegation to China on 12 July 1969. The mission was led by Air
Marshal Nur Khan who was also the second most important man in the
184 Dawn I 1 June 1969.
219
administration of Pakistan. In Peking, Nur Khan expressed
his country's desire for stable friendship between Pakistan
and China and thanked China for her support in the Kashmir
d ' 185 lspute.
Despite Pakistan's unfavourable response to the Soviet
proposal, Soviet Union signed an agreement with Pakistan on 29
July 1969, to provide machinery and technical assistance for
setting up a general electrical manufacturing plant at Chittagong
in East Pakistan186
and at Taxila in West Pakistan. Similarly,
the Soviet Union agreed to discuss the question of collaboration
between the two countries for setting up a steel plant in Karachi.
An agreement to this effect was signed on 22 January 1970 to study
the feasibility of the project.187
The two countries also Signed
a ten-year agreement on 20 May 1970 for technical cooperation in
the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. SPare parts, machi-
nery, equipment and materials required for the development of
atomic energy were to be supplied by the Soviet Union under this
188 agreement.
President Yahya Khan visi ted MOSCOw on 22 June 1970 and
remained there till 26 June 1970. Hosting a state banquet in
honour of visiting President Yahya Khan, President Podgorny
said that there was no difference between the two countries and,
therefore, there was hardly any reason for not strengthening and
f h . h' f' d h' 189 h ,. t . urt er cementlng t elr rlen s lP. T e JOln cammunlque
185 Peking Review, vol. XII, no. 2 9, 18 July 1969.
186 2~' 30 July 1969.
187 Ibig. , 23 January 1970.
188 Ibig. , 21 May 1970.
189 Pravda, 23 June 1969.
220
issued at the end of Yahya Khan's visit reaffirmed the faith
that both sides were "convinced that the developing fruitful
cooperation in the political, commercial, economic, scientific
and technical, cultural and other spheres conforms to the national
interests of the peoples of the USSR and Pakistan ll• They further
reaffirmed their desire lito strengthen existing contacts and to
expand good-neighbourly cooperation". They also recognised the
usefulness of "periodic consultations through the Foreign
Ministries ll• In the international arena both sides demanded
"wi thdrawal of Israeli troops frcm all Arab terri tories, occu-
pied in June 1967, as the main condition for a settlement of
the Middle East conflict". They further reaffirmed their faith
in the "u ncondi tional wi thdrawal of foreign troops from Indo-
China" and "the inalienable right of the peoples of this area
to decide their own destiny". with regard to Indo-Pakistani
relations, Moscow was convinced that II a settlement of disput.ed
questions between Pakistan and India by means of bilateral nego-
tiations in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration would accord
with the vital interests of the peoples of Pakistan and India as
11 . th h' t f . h t' hI" 1 90 we as Wl t e lnteres s 0 peace ln t a reglon as a woe •
However, the major achievement of Yahya Khan's visit to
the Soviet Union waS in the sphere of economic and technical
assistance for the construction of a steel mill in Karachi with
an annual capacity of a million tons of steel. The Soviet Union
also agreed to provide a sum of £200 mi Ilion on credit to cover
190 See R.K. Jain, Soviet-South ASian Relations, 1947-78; vol.2 (Ratiant: Delhi, 1978), pp.81-84.
221
the cost of the machinery and equipment needed for the construc-
tion of the steel plant. The jOint communique at the Same time
mentioned that the II Soviet organisations would closely study
the list of other projects for which the government of Pakistan
would like to obtain economic and technical assistance from the
Soviet Union during the period of the 4th Five-Year!:Plan of
Pakistan" .191 Both sides also resolved to conclude a long-term
trade agreement for 1971-75 for the gr~lth in the volume of
trade. However, the Pakistani press vias critical of the successes
of General Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow. Nevertheless, the
General himself described the visit as extremely successful.
According to him it was a great steP forward because the nation
which was hunting for the steel plant for the last fifteen years
had ultimately got it.192
had no reason to be dissatisfied with the amount
commercial and economic help provided by the Soviet
Unlon. All this assistance waS provided by Moscow without any
pre-conditions. Kremlin supplied arms to Pakistan while risking
its traditional friendship with India. Moreover, they agreed to
construct and finance a steel mill in Karachi, for which Pakistan
was lOOking for collaboration for the last fifteen years and this
was done by the Soviet Union at a juncture when Pakistan had
rejected their regional economic cooperation scheme. The reason
behind such unilateral Soviet assistance was to reduce Pakistan'S
dependence on the west in the key sector, so that she could play
191 Ibid.
192 Daw£, 27 June 1970.
222
more independent and meaningful role in the international field.
The Soviet union was aware of Pakistanis obsession of achieving
military parity with India which left room for China and the
west to manoeuvre Pakistan away from the folds of the Soviet
Union. Another reason for cooperative attitude towards Pakistan
'"las the hope that the December 1970 general election might
provide a government which would be pro-Soviet in its foreign
policy. This hope waS based on the positive results of the
popular movement at the last quarter of 1968 and the beginning
of 1969. It had forced the President of P~~istan to lift martial
law and release political prisoners, establishment of Parliamentary
democracy and universal suffrage. Thus, the Soviet Union thought
that the democratization of the political processes in Pakistan
might provide a progressive government in that country. It thus
persisted with assisting its next door neighbour,Pakistan.
However, Pakistanis alignment with China remained unaltered as
ever, even under the new regime of General Yahya Khan.
If we scrutinize the Soviet policy in the South Asian
region in the post-Tashkent period, we find that it wa$ pri
marily intended to further consolidate the gains achieved through
the TaShkent declaration. Throughout this period, the Soviet
Union tried to establish close relations with both India and
Pakistan and worked for mutual settlement of disputes between
the two countries without outside interference. This policy
was in sharp contrast to the policies pursued by China and
other Western countries in this region. These powers tried to
223
play one country against the other with the sole purpose of
gaining ground in this region. The Soviet Union on the other
hand tried to sustain the Tashkent spirit which served the
interests of peace and stability in the region.