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Yale University epartment of Music
The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity by Roman Ingarden; Adam Czerniawski;Jean G. HarrellReview by: Stephen DaviesJournal of Music Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 169-176Published by: Duke University Presson behalf of the Yale University Department of MusicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/843390.
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NOTES
1. Karl
van
Jan,
Musici
scriptores
graeci
(1895;
reprint,
Hildesheim:
Olms,
1961),
pp.
252.17-253.3
2.
Inexplicably
the
Greek for
syntonic
is
given
in the
masculine,
plural,
accusative,
syntonous.
3. This
anomoly
was
pointed
out
by
Giovanni
BattistaBenedetti
in
a series of letters
to
Cipriano
de Rore written
in the
early
1560s
and
printed
in
Benedetti's
Diversarum
speculationum
mathematicarum
t
physicorum
liber
(Turin,
1585).
Apparently
the
gradual
change
of
pitch
in a
just
tuned
vocal
performance
was not uncommon
during
the
sixteenth
century.
See Claude
V.
Palisca,
"Scientific
Empiricism
in Musical
Thought,"
Seventeenth
Century
Science and the
Arts,
ed.
Hedley
Howell
Rhys
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1961),pp. 113-120.
The Work
f
Music and the Problem
of
Its
Identity
by
Roman
Ingarden
Berkeley:
University
of California
Press,
1986.
Translated rom the
original
Polish
by
Adam
Czerniawski;
Edited
by
Jean G.
Harrell.
Includes
(pp.
159-173)Max Rieser's"Roman
ngarden
nd His Time", e-
printed
rom The
Journal
of
Aesthetics
and Art
Criticism39
(1971)
xvi,
181
pp.
REVIEWER
Stephen
Davies
This book
by
the
Polish
aesthetician
Roman
ngarden
who
died
in
1970)
was first
published
n
Polish
morethan
twenty
years
ago,
but the
present
edition
is
the first
English
translation.
Originally
he work was
intended o
be
part
of
the
book
known
n
English
as
The
Literary
Work
fArt
(first
pub-
lished
in
Polish
in
1931;
n
English
in
1973)
in
which
a
unified
theory
of
the
arts
was
to be
presented,
but
eventually
t
appeared
eparately.
As the
title
suggests,Ingarden's
main
concernhere lies
with the
ontological
tatus
of the musical
work.
In addition
o
his
text,
the
book containsa
Preface
by
the
translator,
Adam
Czerniawski,
nd a reviewof
Ingarden's
ontribution
to aestheticswrittenby Max Rieser.
In
general Ingardendistinguishes
he
musical
work
both
from
"ideal"
and
"real"
objects
(whether
mental
or
material).
In
particular,
e distin-
guishes
the
musical work
from
its
performances,
he
composer's
or the
listeners'
mental
experiences,
and
from
the
score. The
strategy
of the
argument
s the same in each case-he tries to show that statements rue
169
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3/9
of the musical
work
are
true neither
of
"ideal"
bjects
nor of the
"real" b-
jects
in
which the musical work
might
be concretised.
The essentialsof
Ingarden's
iew of
intentional,
"ideal",
nd "real" b-
jects
would
appear
o be
this:
An intentional
bject
is one which
depends
for its existenceon conscious minds and
upon
real
objects
from whichits
presence
can
be abstracted
r
inferred.
This
is not
to
say
that intentional
objects
are
"subjective"
n
the
sense that
heir
properties
re
determined
y
the beliefs or
desires
of
any particular erson;
heir
properties
re
subject
to
inter-personal
erification.Intentional
bjects
would cease to exist
if
conscious
beings
were
expunged
rom
the
world,
or
if
the
real
objects
through
whichtheir
presence
s detectedwere
destroyed.
ntentional
bjects
are
abstract
n
that
they
are not
presented
directly
o
perception,
but
they
are located n time in thattheymaybe createdor destroyed.By contrast,
"ideal"
objects
(such
as
numbers,
universals nd the
like)
depend
or their
existence neither on conscious minds nor on their
instantiation.
Ideal"
objects
are
abstract
n
that
they
standoutside
space
and
time;
they
can
be
neither
created
nor
destroyed,
although
hey
may
be
"discovered."
Real"
objects,
which
are
given
immediately
o
perception,
lso do
not
depend
or
their
existenceon consciousminds.
They
are
autonomous,
whereas nten-
tional
objects
are
heteronomous.
But,
in
contrast o
"ideal"
bjects,
"real"
objects
exist
concretely
n
space
and time andcan be created
or
destroyed.
Ingarden'serminology
and treatmenthere derivesfrom Brentanovia
Husserl,
but the
distinction
whichhe drawsdoes not
rely uponany particu-
lar
metaphysical
ystem.
A
philosopher
s
far n
spirit
romHusserlas Karl
Popper
has madea similardistinction.His notion
of "World
Three"
bjects
corresponds
losely
to
Ingarden's
ccount
of intentional
bjects.'
Ingarden
haracterizes
he musicalwork as
an
intentional
bject.
If all
conscious
beings
were to be
removed
rom the
world,
musical
works
(as
opposed
to successions
of
sound)
would cease to
exist. Like other inten-
tional objects, the continuedexistenceof a musical workdepends upon
"real"
objects
from which the work
may
be
inferred-notations,
perfor-
mances,
and the like.
Clearly
he musical
work is not
an
"ideal"
bject
in
that t is created
at a
particular
ime andcould
be
destroyed y
the destruc-
tion of the real
objects
upon
which ts existence
depends including,
s well
as
scores,
recordings
nd accurate
memoriesof
them).
Neither s it
a
"real"
object,
since
it is
not
given
directly
o
perception
ndhas
no
spatial
ocation.
Strictly
speaking,
take
t
thatthe score
and
any
performance
would
be
classed
by
Ingarden
s intentional
bjects,
in
that
their existence
depends
uponthe consciousrecognitionof theirsignificanceas a notationor per-
formance.
But
clearly
he believes
hat,
as an intentional
bject,
the musical
work
is
more
abstract
han its score
or
any
performance
f it.
I
take the
point
to
be this: The
score,
as
a
notation,
ranscends
he marks
on
paper
with which it is correlated.
Similarly,
he
performance
its
themes,
etc.)
transcends
he sound-basiswhich
is
given
directly
to
perception.
The
170
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4/9
musical
work,
though,
is
yet
more abstract n that t
transcends hese
tran-
scendences.
Moreover,
whereas coresand
performances
re
determinate
n
their
qualities,
musical
works
are indeterminate
n
permittingmany
pos-
sible,
but
equally
faithful,
performances.
hus,
the
musicalwork s
doubly
removed rom the realworld.
But,
in its ultimate
dependence
on realob-
jects,
the
musical work is not so
abstractas
"ideal"
objects
are.
SUMMARY
The
musical
work
is
distinguished
n
a
numberof
ways
from
(A)
its
performances
Chapter
One),
(B)
an
auditory
xperience
of a
performance
Chapter
Two),
and
(C)
its
score
(Chapter
Three).
(A)
It
per-
sists
in
time
(although
a
temporal
tructure s
immanent
within
it)
without
a spatial ocation,whereas ts performancestartandend, and takeplace
at
particular
ocations.
The
musical work is
unique, by
contrast
with
the
multiplicity
of its
possible
performances.
A
performance
manifests tself
directly
n the
auditory
xperiences
f
the
listenerand s
univocally
andulti-
mately
determined
y
its
"lowest" ound
properties,
whereas
he
perception
of
the
musicalwork s
mediated
by
its
performances
nd
many
of
the
quali-
ties
of
the
musical work
are
indeterminate
for
example,
its exact
pitch,
tempo
and
colouring
are
not
determined
y
the
musical
notation).
B)
The
performance
f a work
contains
hemes and
the
like,
but
auditory
xperi-
ence is fluid.No theme is the contentof auditory xperience,
although
he
auditory
experience
of
sound refers
he
listener
to
the
theme. And
just
as
the
properties
f
the
performance
ranscend
he
auditory
xperience
of the
performance,
o
the
properties
f the
musicalwork
ranscend
he
properties
of its
performances.
C)
Not all
musicalworks
have
been
notated.The
nota-
tion
has
properties
whichthe
musicalwork
acks
(for
example,
a
page
size).
The
score is a
set of
signs
with
imperatival
mport,
and
ust
as a
sign
differs
from
its
referent,
so the
score differsfrom
the
musical work.
Whatfeaturesaredisplayedby musicalworks(ChapterFour)?Musical
works
arenot
to be
distinguished
rom
other
sound-constructs
for
example,
bird
songs)
in
having
a
specific
ordering
f
soundsor in
giving
rise
to
mel-
odic
gestalts,
since
sound-constructs
may possess
these
properties
also.
Whereas
music
may
be
expressive
or
representational
n
intent,
hese
prop-
erties
are
extra-musical
henomena
n
their
natureand
origin
and, so,
do
not
distinguish
music
from
mere
sound-constructs.
either s
music
distinct
in
possessing
"meaning".
Music
(unlike
literature
or
example)
acks
the
stratificationn
which
signification
epends.2
ather,
music s
distinguished
frommeresound-constructsnbeinganintentional ndnot a "real" bject.
Unlike
"real"
bjects,
a
musicalwork
has no
spatial
ocation.
The
musical
work
is
not a
particular
s
are material
objects
of
perception;
he
musical
work
s
a
supra-individual
n
that ts
particularity
rises roma
selection
rom
real
modesof
existence.
Moreover,
musical
work s
supra-temporal
n
that,
whilst
it has
an
"immanent"
emporal
tructure,
t
exists
as
a
totality
n
real
171
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time from the
momentof its
creation;
he
temporality
f
its structure
s
revealed
n
real
time
only
through
he work's oncretization
n
performance.
The
opening
and the close
of a
musical
work
are
not
datablemoments
n
real time
and
there s no
"before"
r "after" musical
workas
there
always
is with datablemomentsnreal ime.Thus,a musicalworkand ts structure
stand
outside
the
spatio-temporal
rameof the real
world.
Only
wherethe
musical
work
is
expressive
or
representational
oes
the
question
of a con-
nection
with the real
worldarise.
A musical
work
is
comprised
of
both
sounding
and
non-sounding
le-
ments
Chapter
ive).
Amongst
he
sounding
lements
displayed
in
at least
some)
musical
worksare
melody,
harmony, hythm
nd instrumental
olor.
Amongst
he
non-sounding
lements
displayed
n
(at
least
some)
musical
worksarea quasi-temporaltructure,movement lusa quasi-spacewithin
which
this
movement
occurs,
form,
emotional
qualities
inherent
n the
music
itself,
emotions
(or
persons)
and
representational
lements.
Where
the "owners"
f
emotions
expressed
or
the
subjectsrepresented
must
be
supplied maginatively
y
the
listener,
he
expressed
motion
or
the
repre-
sented
subject
belongs
to,
without
being
part
of,
the
music.
Both
sounding
and
non-sounding
lements
may
contribute
o the
aesthetic
value of
the
work,
but
no
such elements
possess
inherent esthetic
value.
As we have
already
seen,
the
musical
work,
according
o
Ingarden,
s
an intentional bjectwith its originalsource n a specific"real" bject(the
markswhich
comprise
he
score)
and
its
ground
of continued
xistence
n
a
series
of other
"real"
bjects
the
sound-bases
f
performances)
Chapter
Six).
A
recording
f the work
as
given
or directed
by
its
composer
s a rec-
ord
of a
performance,
nd not of
the work tself.
As
an intentional
bject,
the musical
work
depends
for
its
existence
on certain
"real"
objects-the
intentional
cts
of
composers,
means of
preserving
a schema
of the
work
and
making
that
schema
concrete,
and the
experiences
of listeners.
The
musicalworkis, therefore,heteronomousather han autonomous.But it
is distinct
rom
and
referred o
by
the
"real"
bjects
on which
its existence
depends.
The
musical
work is a
supra-individual
ith
a
supra-temporal
structure
with
purely
qualitative
ndividuality.
t
generates
ndexists
within
its own
spatio-temporal
rame
withinwhich
"real"
bjects
are
located.
How does
a musical
work
consisting
of
many products
and
parts
form
a unified
whole
(Chapter
Seven)?
Ingarden
eadily
allows
that not all
mu-
sical
works
are unified
and
is
here
concerned
only
to
explain
the
unity
of
those
which
are.)
A
condition
of
hearing
a
phrase
of the work
as
part
of
a whole is thatit be heardreachingboth intothe work'spastandfuture.
In a
unified
workthe
parts
not
only
succeedeach
other,
they
may
dovetail
intoeach
other,
heymaycomplete
eachother
hrough
armony
r
contrast,
and
they may
sharethe same emotional
quality.
Similarly,
he
movements
postulate,
ompleting
and
fulfilling,
each
other.
The break
between
move-
ments
is
a
part
of the
work,
revealing
he
unity
of that
which it
divides.
172
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The breakshould
be
long enough
o allow
the "after-sound"
f the
previous
movement o
dissipate,
but
not so
long
as to erase
the
memory
of the
pre-
vious movement. n
order to fulfill its function he break
should
be
filled
with
silence
and neither
with
applause
nor the
eating
of
sweets
How is
the
identity
of
a
musical
work
maintained
hrough
ime
in
the
light
of
changing
styles
of
performance Chapter
Eight)?
The
score
of
a
work
is
indeterminate
ith
respect
o
many
aspects
and concretedetails
of
performance,
so
many
equally
faithful
performances,
each
differently
revealing
he
piece
as
possessing
aesthetic
value,
are
possible. Every per-
formance
which
matches
he
score and
does
not extend
beyond
he
possi-
bilities
of the work
as contained
n
the score
is
"proper".
o,
historical
changes
in
styles
of
performance
o not
challenge
he
work's
dentity,
or
there is no single objectwhich is the work. If we mistakenlybelieve that
the
identity
of
the work
is
altered
when it is
given
a
"proper"
ut
unortho-
dox
interpretation,
his is
only
because we tend to
identify
the
work
with
some
possibleperformance
which
strikesus as
high
in
aestheticvalue.
Yet
some new
interpretation
f the
work,
whilst
losing
that which was aesthet-
ically
valuable
n
the
orthodox
reading,may
reveal
in
the
work hitherto
unperceived
lementsof
equal
aestheticvalue.
Modem
recordings
y
com-
posers
allow us
to return o the work
not as the
"original"
ut
rather,
o
one
of
its
possible profiles.
And
the
work,
as
under-determined
y
its
score,
contains he
possibility
of
quite
different,
but
equally
"proper"
nd aesthet-
ically
valuable,
performances
which,
by
virtue of
being "proper",
ill
be
performances
f the
same,
enduring
work.
GENERAL
EMARKS ND
CRITICISMS.
here
is
no
doubt that this
is a fine
book,
rich
n
detailand
nsight,
which
will
be
of
considerablenter-
est to
those
with
a
concernwith
the
philosophy
of
music.
The
arguments
are clear and easy to read (for which, no doubt, thanks s owed to the
translator
s
well as
the
author).
In
particular,
he
discussion in
the
first
three
chapters
s
uncommonly
horough
nd
perceptive,
and
the final
chap-
ter
cannot
fail to
be
of
interest
n
view
of
the
current
oncernwith
authen-
ticity
in
performance-practice.
Nevertheless,
he
treatment
f
some
issues is
(unavoidably)
ated. For
example,
Ziffs
provocative
discussion of the
identity
of
musical works
could not
easily
be
accommodated
y
Ingarden.3
nd
the
interested
eader
should
compare
ngarden's
iews with recent
accounts f
the
ontology
of
the
musicalwork.'In general,Ingarden'sssertion hata musicalworkstands
apart
from
the
real world
and
is
to be
understood
xclusively
on
its own
terms
sits ill
with the
(now
predominant)
iew
thatthe
aesthetic
properties
of
works
of
art
are
determinedn
part
by
their
historical
context.5
He
discus-
ses
the
issue
on
pp.
55-61,
butI
find
his remarks
nconvincing.)
n
the
same
vein,
his
tendency
o
dismiss musical
expressiveness
nd
representation
s
173
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extra-musical
henomena
s
cursory,
and it is a shamethat he did not
ad-
dress the
problems
of
accounting
or the
way
in which music
may
present
expressive
and
representational
ualities.6
The remarks bove
bear
upon
a
worry
I
haveabout
he
views
presented
in ChapterEight.Ingarden uitecorrectlyrecognises hat different-sound-
ing
performances
may
be
equally
authentic
or
"proper")
nd
equally,
but
differently, evealing
of
aesthetic
value.
But he
implies,
I
think,
that
"pro-
priety"
allows
more
latitude
o the
performer
han
normally
we would
be
prepared
o
concede.
The scoreof
a musicalwork s
a
convention-governed
notational
ystem
and that
which
is
determined
y
the score
depends
upon
the conventions
n
terms
of
which
it is to be read.
These
conventions
have
changed
hrough
ime
and,
so,
the
identity
of
the
work
s
called
into
ques-
tion if the score is performedn accordancewith conventionsotherthan
those
in
terms
of whichthe score
was
written.'
n
suggesting
hat
stylistical-
ly
very
different
performancesmight
be
equally
"proper",
ngarden
ails
to
take
account
of the
fact that a
score
must be understood
n
its social
and
historical ontext
f
a
reading
of
the score
is to lead to
a
performance
which
is
undeniably
a
performance
f the
composer's
work. If
Ingarden
overs
himself
against
his
objection,
he
does so
in
insisting
hat,
as
well
as
ac-
cording
with the
score,
all
the
remaining
qualities
revealed
n the
perfor-
mancemust
not extend
beyond
he
possibilities
of
the
workas
a
schema
p.
150).Unfortunately,hisqualificationf his main ine on "propriety"s not
expandedupon.
One obvious
objection
o
Ingarden's
iews is
mentioned
both
by
Czerni-
awskiand
Harold
Osborne.8
he
objection
s
invited
by
Ingarden's
oncen-
trationon
pre-1950's
music
in
the
European
radition.
t
is this:
Whereas
the
identity
of
the worksdiscussed
by
Ingardenmight
be determined
n
part
by
their
scores,
not all music derives
its
identity
n this
way.
Czerniawski
notes
that,
for
jazz
and
pop
music,
the
work is constituted
by
the
perfor-
mance; n suchcases the musicis, as it were,but anexcuse for theperfor-
mance.
Osborne
makes a similar
point
with
respect
to Indian
classical
music and
folk music.
Further,
he observesthat
some
electronicmusic
is
composed
on
recordwithout
urther
performances
eing envisaged
and,
as
such,
is
fully
determinate
nd
unique.
And
he
notes,
to
turn
the coin
over,
thataleatoric
music allows
for an
indeterminacy
for
example
n
the order
of the
movements)
which
goes
beyond
hat which
Ingarden
llows.
It
seems
to me that
Ingarden,
who
acknowledges
hat
not all music
depends
for its existence
on a
score,
might
go
some
way
to
meeting
this
criticism.Whatmatters,on his account,is the fact that a musicalwork
depends
upon,
whilst
transcending,
real"
bjects,
and this
will
be
equally
true
of the cases
of score-less
music mentioned
bove.
However,
he
objec-
tion retains ome
force.
Ingarden
writes
as
if
a musical
work
always
ran-
scends a
performance
f
it,
and the
examples
cited
above
suggest
that
this
is not
universally
rue
not all musical
worksare
doubly
removed
rom
the
174
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real world. Where
he
objection
amounts
o the
charge
hatmusical
works
show
more ontic
variety
han is
acknowledged
y
Ingarden's
reatment,
t
continues
o hold.
Osborne
also
disagrees
with
Ingarden's
laim that
musical works
lack
reality.Thisobjection s perhapsmisplacedonce it is noted hatIngarden's
use
of the notionof
"real"
bject
s technicaland
somewhat
estrictive-he
means
by
it
something
ike "thatwhich
may
be
givendirectly
o
perception".
(It
is
because
I
regard
ngarden's
se of
'real'
as
technical
hat,
unlike
him,
I
have
placed
the term in
scare
quotes.) Certainly
ngardenmight
reason-
ably reject
Osborne's
suggestion-that
the
work
is
a
continuing
set
of
performances
uided
by
a
score-on the
grounds
that this
set
has
many
properties
which
cannot
truly
be
predicated
f the work
and vice versa.
A
related
objectionmight
have more
force:
In
Chapters
Five and Six
Ingarden
writes of the
musical
work as a
supra-individual
ith
melodies,
instrumental
olor,
and so forth.
By
ChapterEight
the
musical
work
has
become a
set of
possibilities
which
may
be
realized
n
different
ways
in
different
performances.
Of
these
ways
of
characterizing
he musical
work,
I
prefer
he second.
The first
characterizationf the
work
misleadingly ug-
gests
that he work
s
a
kind
of
object/event,
lbeita
non-real
and
somewhat
indeterminate
ne,
whereas
he second
sees the work
more
as a
functional
relation
between he
composer,
he
score,
the
performer,
nd the
audience.
Thesewaysof characterizinghe workstrikeme as significantly ifferent,
although
Ingarden
eems
not to
share this
intuition.
Finally,
I find
Ingarden's
reatment
f
musical
unity
rather oo
phenom-
enological;
he
describes
the natureof
the
experience
of
a
musical work's
unity
rather
han
explaining
he basis
for
that
experience.
Possibly
the ex-
planation
would
have led to a
discussion
of
technicalities
which
Ingarden
did not
wish to
pursue.
But it
is
surprising, erhaps,
hat
he
did not
mention
the
theories
of
Reti
and
Schenker.
And the
issues
raised
by
the
analyses
of
the
musical
bases
for
musical
unity
are
worthy
of
philosophical crutiny.A further
oint
on
Ingarden's
iewson musical
unity:
Czerniawskis
scepti-
cal that
the
works
of
the
masters
are
so
unifiedas
Ingarden
would
appear
to believe.
Giventhe
alacrity
with
which
Mozart
and
Haydn
were
prepared
to
substitute
movements rom
work
to
work,
he
may
well
be
right
n
this.
NOTES
1.
See
Unended
Quest,
London,
Fontana,
1976
(Revised
Edition).
2. For an account of
Ingarden's
notion of stratification ee
pp.
50-54
and
the
essay by
Max
Rieser
included
in
the book.
3. See "The
Cow on the
Roof',
The
Journal
of
Philosophy,
70
(1973):
713-723.
4.
See,
for
example,
N.
Wolterstorff,
Works
nd
Worlds
f
Art
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,
1980);
Kingsley
Price,
"What s
a
Piece of
Music?",
The
British
Journal
ofAesthetics,
22
(1982):
322-336;
James
C.
Anderson,
"Musical
Kinds", The
British
Journal
of
175
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Aesthetics,
25
(1985):
43-49;
Ren6e
Cox,
'A
Defence
of Musical
Idealism",
The Brit-
ish Journal
of
Aesthetics,
26
(1986):
133-142.
5.
See,
for
example,
KendallL.
Walton,
"Categories
of
Art",
The
Philosophical
Review,
74
(1970):
334-367.
6. Recentand detailed treatmentsof these topics have been offeredby PeterKivy-see
The
CordedShell
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1980),
and Sound
and Sem-
blance
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1984).
7.
I
have discussed
such
matters
n
'Authenticity
and
Musical
Performance",
The
British
Journal
of
Aesthetics,
27
(1987):
39-50.
8.
Adam
Czerniawski,
"Translator's
reface",pp.
vii-xvi;
Harold
Osborne,
Review of
The Work
f
Music and the Problem
of
Its
Identity,
The
British
Journal
of
Aesthetics,
27
(1987):
181-183.
9.
I
have
discussed
such matters
n
'Attributing
Significance
o
Unobvious Musical
Rela-
tionships",
The
Journal
of
Music
Theory,
27
(1983):
203-213.
176
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