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Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Irans Nuclear Facilities
Rev: September 10th, 2012
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AnthonyH.Cordesman,Arleigh A.BurkeChairinStrategyand Abdullah Toukan
2
ThisreportisbasedonaseriesofreportsbyDr.AnthonyCordesmanonIran,publishedbytheBurkeChair,CSIS.Theycanbefoundat:
IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance PartOne:ConventionalandAsymmetricForces,availableontheCSISwebsiteathttp://csis.org/publication/reassessinggulfmilitarybalancepartoneconventionalandasymmetricforces.
IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalanceII:TheMissileandNuclearDimensions,availableontheCSISwebsiteathttp://csis.org/publication/iranandgulfmilitarybalanceiimissileandnucleardimensions.
Dr.AbdullahToukancanbecontactedat:abdullah.toukan@sagracenter.orgStrategicAnalysisandGlobalRiskAssessment(SAGRA)CenterAbuDhabiUAE
9/10/2012
Page
ExecutiveSummary 4
USPerceptionoftheIranianThreat 10
TheMilitaryOptiontoDealwithIransNuclearProgram 15
IllustrativeU.S.PreventiveMilitaryStrikes 18
CounteringIransAirDefense 29
GCCvsIranAirforceComparison 33
IransMissileForce 44
U.S.&GCC DefenseagainstIranianBallisticMissiles 56
CounteringIranianattacksontheStraitsofHormuz 64
MilitaryStrike Israel:ScenarioI 81
MilitaryStrike Israel:ScenarioII 89
USSimulationResultsontheConsequencesofanIsraeliStrike 92
Appendix 95
3
ExecutiveSummary
ExecutiveSummary
Overthepastcoupleofmonths,speculationaboutaU.S.orIsraelistrikeonIransnuclearfacilitieshasmadeheadlinesaroundtheglobe.ThisreportaddresseshowtheU.S.couldtaketheleadincarryingoutapreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranIfallpeacefuloptionshavebeenexhaustedandIranhasleftnoothermeanstoconvinceittostoporchangeitscourseinpursuingnuclearweapons.ItalsoexamineshowtheUScouldprovideadefenseumbrellaagainstanyIranianairandmissileretaliationthatwouldbeaimedatU.S.militarytargetsandalliesintheregion,inparticulartheGCCstates.
Akeyquestionarisesiswhatshouldtheobjectivesofamilitarystrikebe?TohalttheIraniannuclearprogram?Tosetitbackfiveyearsorforoneyear?ThiscriteriaisthekeytodefiningtheforceallocationrequiredtoachieveasuccessfulmissionagainstIransnuclearfacilities.
ThestudyshowsthattheinitialstrikeshouldbeagainstkeyIraniannuclearenrichmentandresearchfacilities,ballisticmissilebasislocatedaroundthecountry,numerousmobileballisticmissilelaunchersdispersedaroundIranandmainballisticmissileproductionfacilities.Atthesametime,itshowsthatthepayloadsrequiredtohitundergroundenrichmentfacilitieswithahighlevelofdamage,tocarryoutthescaleofinitialandfollowupattacks,andprovidingresourcessuchasnearrealtimeintelligencerequiredtodetectanddestroyotherpotentiallylethalIranianmilitaryweapons,forinstanceballisticmissilesthatcouldbeusedinaretaliation,canonlybecarriedoutbytheUnitedStates.
AninitialU.S.strikewillrequirealargeforceallocationconsistingofDefensiveCounterairandOffensiveCounterairOperations,suchasthemainBomberForce,theSuppressionofEnemyAirDefenseSystem,EscortaircraftfortheprotectionoftheBombers,ElectronicWarfarefordetectionandjammingpurposes,FighterSweepandCombatAirPatroltocounteranyairretaliationbyIran.
Whilesuchfirststrikewilltrytobeaseffectiveaspossible,theU.S.wouldbetheonlycountrythathastheairpower,supportcapability,andmixofseaairforcesintheGulftocontinueasustainedcampaignoveraperiodoftimeandrestrikeafteraninitialbattledamageassessmentitisfoundthatfurtherstrikesortiesarerequired.
Severalotherkeypointsaremadeintheanalysis:
TheagingIranianairforcewilldefinitelybenomatchagainsttheU.S.andeventheGCCairforces.InadditiontheIranianAirDefensesystemsdonothavetheCommandControlCommunicationsandIntelligencerequiredtodetect,trackandshootdowntheUSadvancedmilitarycombataircraft.HoweverU.S.plannerswilldefinitelytakealloperationalplanningprecautionsnecessarytoensurethatboththeIranianAirforceandAirDefensesystemareineffectiveandallU.S.combataircrafthaveahighprobabilityofsurvivalthroughout.
U.S.officialsareworkingwithalliesintheGulftodevelopthecapabilitytodefeatthethreatIranposestotheGulf,alliedterritory,andtheflowoftradeandenergyexportsGCCcountriesworrythatduringacrisis,IrancouldtrytopreventtheirshipsfromtraversingtheStraitofHormuz,cuttingofftheiroilexportbusiness.
TheonlyeffectivecounterstrikecapabilityIranhasotherthanasymmetricwarfareintheGulf,andtheuseofproxieslikeHezbollah,istheirBallisticMissileForce.AmassiveretaliationstrikewithwhateverlaunchingsitesthathavesurvivedtheU.S.firststrikecouldstillcausequiteaconsiderabledamagetotheGCCstates,inenergy,financeandvariousothercriticalinfrastructurecenters.
TheU.S.iscurrentlyinvolvedinbuildingaDefensiveShieldagainstamassiveIranianBallisticMissileattacktargetedattheGCCstates.ThedefensiveshieldconsistsofaMultiTierBallisticMissileDefenseSystemconsistingofTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)andPatriotAdvancedCapability,PAC3,missilesystemssupportedwiththemostadvancedRadarandCommandandControlfacilities.
Ballisticmissiledefense(BMD)systemshavebeenprovidedtoKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,QatarandOman,aswellasstationingAegisequippedwarshipsinthewatersoftheArabianGulf.TheU.S.hasbeendevelopinganintegratedearlywarningradarsystemacrosstheGCCstatesthatcouldhelpU.S.andGCCforcestoquicklyrespondtoanIranianmissileattack.
.
IsraeldoesnothavethecapabilitytocarryoutpreventivestrikesthatcoulddomorethandelayIranseffortsforayearortwo.
Finally,thefactthatUShasthecapabilitytocarryoutpreventivestrikesdoesnotmeanitshouldnotseektonegotiateanendtothethreateningaspectsofIransnuclearprograms.ThebriefshowsjusthowdangerousanywarintheGulfcouldbetotheworldseconomy althoughIranismorevulnerablethananyofitsSouthernGulfneighbors.
TheU.S.alsoneedsitsGulfalliesaskeypartnersandmustconsiderthelawofunintendedconsequences.Preventivemilitarystrikescouldpushthepresentlyvolatilemiddleeastregionintoawarwithfarreachingglobalpolitical,military,andeconomicconsequences.
USPreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesandBallisticMissileBases
Panchin
Fordow
ArakNatanz
Esfahan
BallisticMissileBases
Tabriz
Bakhtaran
ImamAli
SemnanSpace&MissileCenter
MashhadAirbase
BandarAbbas
KuhestakAbuMusaIsland
5MainNuclearFacilities 8BallisticMissileBases 15BallisticMissileProductionFacilities
CombatAircraftStrikeForcecouldbeF18sofftheU.S.5th fleet,andF15ElaunchedfromForwardAreaBases.
TheCombatAircraftcanalsoperformallOffensiveCounterairOperations:FighterSweep,SEAD(suppressionofEnemyAirDefense),InterdictionandEscort.
B2MissionPayloadistheB57A/BMissionOrdnancePenetrator(MOP).
(LocationofFacilitiessource:NTI)
Iran
SaudiArabia
Iraq
UAE Google
NuclearFacilities
Kuwait
Qatar
B2Bombers
StrikeForce
CombatAircraft
StrikeForce
TwoTierTheaterBallisticMissileDefense(TBMD) THAAD&PAC3EndoandExoAtmosphericEngagementsusing
ShootLookShoot&HittoKill
THAADLauncherPAC3Launcher
UpperTier1st Intercept
UpperTier2ndIntercept
ShootLookShoot
LowerTier1st Intercept
LowerTier2nd Intercept
UAEQatar
IRAN
SaudiArabia
TBMDSystem Defense againstTHAAD :UAE SRBMs(
USPerceptionsoftheIranianThreat
TheMilitaryPowerofIran:TheOfficialUSView
AnnualReportonMilitaryPowerofIran ReportbyU.S.DefenseSecretaryLeonPanetta,June2012
IranianGrandStrategy,SecurityStrategy,andMilitaryStrategy
TherehasbeennochangetoIran'sstrategiesoverthepastyear.Iran's grandstrategyremainschallengingU.S.influencewhiledevelopingits domesticcapabilitiestobecomethedominantpowerintheMiddleEast. Iran'ssecuritystrategyremainsfocusedondeterringanattack,andit continuestosupportgovernmentsandgroupsthatopposeU,S.interests. Diplomacy,economicleverage,andactivesponsorshipofterroristandinsurgentgroups,suchasLebaneseHizballah,IraqiShiagroups,andthe Taliban,aretoolsIranusestoincreaseitsregionalpower.Iran's principlesofmilitarystrategyremaindeterrence,asymmetricalretaliation, andattritionwarfare.
IranseekstoincreaseitsstaturebycounteringU.S.influenceand expandingtieswithregionalactorswhileadvocatingIslamicsolidarity. Iranalsodesirestoexpandeconomicandsecurityagreementswithothernations,particularlymembersoftheNonalignedMovementinLatinAmericaandAfrica.
WiththeadventoftheArabSpringin2011,Iransawopportunitiestoincreaseitsinfluencebysupportinggroupsopposedtoregimesinpower,particularlythoseperceivedtosupportU.S.interests.Iranpublicizeditsbeliefthatthesepopular,democraticuprisingswereinspiredbyitsown1979IslamicRevolution.
Source:AnnualReportonMilitaryPowerofIranApril2012,FullUpdateJune29.ReportbyU.S.DefenseSecretaryLeonPanettaforfourcongressionaldefensecommitteestocomplywithafiscal2010directivetoprovideanannualclassifiedandunclassifiedassessmentofIransmilitarypower.]http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rNnp87SL4Ew8[ProvidedbyBloombergNews:
OutsidetheMiddleEastIran'seffortstoexpandpolitical,economic,andsecuritytieswitharangeofcountriesdemonstrateTehran'sdesiretooffsetsanctionsanddiplomaticisolation.IrancontinuestouseamultiprongedstrategyinIraq,includingengagementwithleadersacrossthepoliticalspectrum,outreachtotheIraqipopulace,andcontinuedsupporttoIraqiShiamilitantsandterrorists,suchasKataibHizballah,AsaibAhlalHaq,andthePromisedDayBrigade,inthewakeoftheU.S.militarywithdrawal.Iranprovidesmoney,weapons,training,andstrategicandoperationalguidancetoShiamilitiasandterroristgroupstoprotectandpreserveIran'ssecurityinterests,includingthreateningtheresidualU.Spresence.Inadditiontoprovidingarmsandsupport,theIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsQodsForce(IRGCQF).isresponsiblefortrainingIraqimilitantsandterroristsinIran,sometimesusingLebaneseHizballahinstructors.
IrancontinuestoinfluenceeventsinAfghanistanthroughamultifacetedapproach,includingsupportfortheKarzaigovernmentwhilealsosupportingvariousinsurgentgroups.TehranmaintainstieswithAfghanleadersacrossthepoliticalspectrumandcontinuestobeinvolvedinanumberofhumanitarian,economic,andculturaloutreachactivitiesamongtheAfghanpopulace.AlthoughTehran'ssupporttotheTalibanisinconsistentwiththeirhistoricenmity,itcomplementsIran'sstrategyofbackingmanygroupstomaximizeitsinfluencewhilealsounderminingU.S.andNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)objectivesbyfomentingviolence.
IranhasbeeninvolvedinLebanonsincetheearlydaysoftheIslamicRepublic,especiallyseekingtoexpandtieswiththecountryslargeShia]population.TheIRGCQFcontinuestoprovidemoney,weapons,training,andlogisticsupporttoLebaneseHizballahandviewstheorganizationasakeytoolinitseffortstopressureIsrael.
SincethebeginningoftheSyrianunrest,IranhassupportedPresidentBasharalAsadwhiledownplayingthedepthofthissupportinpublic.Iran'ssupporttotheAsadregimehasincludedmilitaryequipmentandcommunicationsassistance.IranprobablyhasprovidedmilitarytrainerstoadviseSyriansecurityforces.
Iran'sConventionalForces
Iran'sconventionalmilitarycapabilitiescontinuetoimprove,NavalforcesareaddingnewshipsandsubmarineswhileexpandingbasesontheGulfofOman,thePersianGulf,andtheCaspianSea.Inaddition,Irancontinuestoexpandthebreadthofitsnavaloperations.IrandeploysnavalshipsintotheGulfofAdenandArabianSeaforcounterpiracyoperationsandin2011andearly2012deployedtwoseparatesurfacegroupstotheMediterranean.
Inearly2012,theIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsGroundResistanceForces(IRGCGRF)conductedaseriesofexercisesinnortheasternandcentralIran.Theexercises,MARTYRSOFUNITYinthenortheastandSUPPORTERSOFVELAYATandVALFAJRincentralIran,werethefirstsignificantexercises conductedbytheIRGCGRFsinceitsreorganizationin2008.Thethreeexercisesconsistedofcombinedarmsmaneuversandweremeanttoshowthe!RGCGRF'soffensiveanddefensivecapabilitieswhileofferinglimitedtrainingvaluefortheparticipatingunits.
Iran'sUnconventionalForcesandRelatedActivities
ThroughtheIRGCQF,IranprovidesmaterialsupporttoterroristormilitantgroupssuchasHAMAS,LebaneseHizballah,thePalestinianIslamicJihad,theTaliban,andIraqiShiagroups.
InclosecooperationwithSyria,IranhasprovidedLebaneseHizballahwithincreasinglysophisticatedweapons,includingawidearrayofmissilesandrocketsthatallowHizballahtolaunchweaponsfromdeeperinLebanonortostrikeIsrael.WejudgethattheIranianmilitarytrainsHizballahandPalestinianextremistgroupsatcampsthroughouttheregion.
IranprovidesfundingandpossiblyweaponstoHAMASandotherPalestinianterroristsintheGazaStrip.
IranianCapabilitiesRelatedtoNuclearandMissileForces
Iranisdevelopingarangeoftechnicalcapabilitiesthatcouldbeappliedtotheproductionofnuclearweaponsifthedecisionismadetodoso.ItcontinuestoprogresswithitsuraniumenrichmentatNatanzandthenewlyoperationalQom'EnrichmentFacilitydespiteUNSecurityCouncilsanctions,TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency's(IAEAs)November2011reportonIranprovidedextensiveevidenceofpastandpossiblyongoingIraniannuclearweapons relatedresearchanddevelopmentwork.IranhasrefusedtoaddressthisevidenceanddeniedrepeatedIAEArequestsforaccesstodocuments,personnel,andfacilities.
AttheNatanzUndergroundFuelEnrichmentPlant,asofFebruary2012,Iranwasproducing3.5percentlowenricheduraniumhexafluoride(LEUF6)withabout8,800ofthe9,150installedIR1lcentrifuges.AttheNatanzAbovegroundPilotFuelEnrichmentPlant,Iranwasproducing20percentLEUF6withoneinterconnectedcascadepair(328centrifuges).About6,200emptyIR1centrifugecasingswereinstalledinthatfacility.AttheQomEnrichmentFacility(akatheFordowFuelEnrichmentPlant),Iranwasproducing2OpercentLEUF6withtwopairsofinterconnectedcascades(about700IR1centrifuges).Iranhadfilledtheremainderofthefacilityscentrifugecapacitywith2,100emptyIR1centrifugecasings.IrandeclaredtheentirefacilitywouldbeusedforproducingLEUF6,abandoningpreviousplanstoconductcentrifugeresearchanddevelopmentthere.
IrancontinuedconstructionattheheavywaterIranNuclearResearchReactor(IR40)atKhondabinviolationofUNresolutions.
RegularIranianballisticmissiletrainingcontinuesthroughoutthecountry.
Irancontinuestodevelopballisticmissilesthatcanrangeregionaladversaries,Israel,andEasternEurope,includinganextendedrangevariantoftheShahab3anda2,0OOkmmediumrangeballisticmissile,theAshura.Beyondsteadygrowthinitsmissileandrocketinventories,Iranhasboostedthelethalityandeffectivenessofexistingsystemswithaccuracyimprovementsandnewsubmunitionpayloads.Iransmissileforceconsistschieflyofmobilemissilelaunchersthatarenottetheredtospecific physicallaunchpositions.Iranmaybetechnicallycapableofflighttestinganintercontinentalballisticmissileby2015.
TheMilitaryOptiontoDealwithIransNuclearProgram
USExtendedDeterrenceagainsttheproliferationofWMDandtheirdeliverysystems.
TheU.S.seesIranwithitsballisticmissilesandpotentialofdevelopinganuclearweaponisadirectthreattotheGCCandalsoposesathreattoallfriendsandalliesintheMiddleeastregion.
IranhasignoredU.S.warnings andhaspressedaheadwithitsuraniumenrichmentprogramandhasrecentlyannouncedthatitisselfsufficientinnucleartechnology.Iranclaimsthatitcandomesticallyproduceitsownrawuraniumforenrichment.
TheU.S.administrationhasstatedthatthefullrangeofU.S.militarycapabilityinbothconventionalandunconventionalweaponswillbeavailableandreadytobecommittedtodefendingitsalliesandfriendsagainstanythreat.TheU.S.hasstartedimplementingastrategytoinfluencethedecisionmakingbodiesinIranastothedevastatingconsequencesiftheGCC,andanyotheralliesareattackedorthreatened.
CitingtheIranianthreat,theObamaadministrationshiftedfromtheBushadministrationsplanstoplacemissiledefensesitesinPolandandradarintheCzechRepublictoanapproachthatwouldinfourphasesplaceclosertoIransomeAegisclassNavymissiledefensevessels,groundradarandeventuallyland basedNavyStandardMissile3interceptors
Shoulddeterrencefail,theU.S.willhavealreadyprovidedtheGCCcountrieswithBallisticMissileDefenseSystems whichhavealltheEarlyWarningandCommandControlfacilities.Thiswilllimitthedamageshouldtheybeattacked,andtoenhancetheconventionaldeterrencecapabilityoftheGCC.Inadditionprovidingmoderntechnologycombataircraftthatcanbelaunchedwithinaveryshortwindowoftimetoblockanyfirstattackwaveandtohavethecapabilitytomovethewarintoenemyterritory,intheshortesttimeperiod,usingbothDefensiveandOffensiveCounterairMissions.
Ballisticmissiledefense(BMD)systemshavebeenprovidedtofourcountriesontheArabianPeninsula.BMDsystemswereprovidedtoKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates,QatarandOman,aswellasstationingBMDcapable,AegisequippedwarshipsinthewatersoftheArabianGulf.
TheU.S.hasbeendevelopinganintegratedearlywarningradarsystemacrosstheGCCstatesthatcouldhelpU.S.andGCCforcestoquicklyrespondtoanIranianmissileattack.ThemovesareintendedtoreassureGulfcountriesthattheywouldbeprotectedagainstpossibleoffensiveactionfromTehran.U.S.officialsstressedthedefensivenatureoftheactionsbeingtakenthroughouttheregion.
U.S.officialsalsoareworkingwithalliesintheGulftoensurefreedomofnavigationintheregion.Arabcountriesworrythatduringacrisis,IrancouldtrytopreventtheirshipsfromtraversingtheStraitofHormuz,cuttingofftheiroilexportbusiness.USofficialshaverepeatedlyinsistedtheyarekeeping"alloptionsonthetable,"whichincludesamilitarystrikeoption,whenitcomestoIran.SecretaryofStateClintonmadethefollowingremarkswithSaudiArabianForeignMinisteronMarch31,2012(USStateDepartment).
Webelievestronglythat,inadditiontoourbilateralmilitarycooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesandeverymembernationoftheGCC,wecandoevenmoretodefendtheGulfthroughcooperationonballisticmissiledefense.Webeganthatconversationinthisforumtoday.AdmiralFox,thecommanderoftheFifthFleet,madeapresentationoutliningsomeofthechallengesthatwefacewhenitcomestoballisticmissiledefense.ButwearecommittedtodefendingtheGulfnationsandwewantittobeaseffectiveaspossible.
Sowewanttobeginexpertdiscussionswithourfriendsaboutwhatwecandotoenhanceballisticmissiledefense.Therearesomeaspectsofaballisticmissiledefensesystemthatarealreadyavailable,someofwhichhavealreadybeendeployedintheGulf.Butitsthecooperation itswhattheycallinteroperabilitythatwenowneedtoreallyrollupoursleevesandgettoworkon.
17
IllustrativeU.S.PreventiveMilitaryStrikes
18
TheU.S.istheonlycountrythatcanlaunchasuccessfulMilitaryStrike,ifallpeacefuloptionshavebeenexhaustedandIranhasleftnoothermeanstoconvinceittostoporchangeitscourseinpursuingNuclearWeapons.TheU.S.shouldalonedeterminewhatthetimelinecouldbeifIrandoespursuethepathtodevelopnuclearweapons.
Thequestionarisesiswhatwouldtheobjectivesofamilitarystrikebe?TopulltheIraniannuclearprogramback5yearsordelayitfor1year?ThiscriteriawilldefinetheforceallocationrequiredtoachieveasuccessfulmissionagainstIransnuclearfacilities.WepointoutthatitisnotasimplemissionofbombersflyinginandoutofIran,thisisacomplicatedOffensiveAirStrikethatwillinvolvemanyaircraft,eachwithitsownrole,suchasCombatAircarftwhoseroleistosuppressenemyairdefensesalongtheway,aircraftthatflyfighterescortwiththebombers,aircraftthatcarryspecializedelectronicwarfareequipmenttojamenemyradarsandcommunications.,plusprobablyairtoairrefuelingalongthewayinandoutofIran.
Dependingontheforcesallocatedanddurationofairstrikes,itisunlikelythatanaircampaignalonecouldaloneterminateIransprogram.Thepossibilityofdispersedfacilitiescomplicatesanyassessmentofapotentialmissionsuccess,makingitunclearwhattheultimateeffectofastrikewouldbeonIransnuclearfacilities.
TheU.S.isawarethattheactionofamilitarystrikecouldbedestabilizingfortheentireMiddleEastregionandpotentiallygenerateanuclearweaponsraceinthatpartoftheworld,"AdmiralMichaelMullen,thechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,toldCNN."Ithinkanattackwouldalsobe,byusorbyanybodyelse,beverydestabilizing.
MilitaryRisksinStrikeagainstIransNuclearFacilities
19
IllustrativeUSStrikeMission
B2bombersoutofDiegoGarcia,eachcarrying2GBU57MOPbombs.
Missioncanbeachievedwithahighsuccessratealsomaintainingasustainedstrikeoveracoupleofdays.
B2bombersescortedbyF18sfromthe5th fleetstationedintheGulfarea,orF15EsandF16Csfromforwardareaairbases.
UnitedStatesandWesternalliesconsideredtobetheonlycountriesinvolved,noGCCoranyArabcountryinvolvementandespeciallynoIsraelidirectinvolvement.
Stillthough,IranmostprobablywillaccuseIsraeltobepartoftheStrikeandwilltrytoretaliate,eitherbylaunchingaBallisticMissileonIsraelcarryingconventionalorWMD(chemical,biological,radiological)andactivatingHezbullahtolaunchcrossborderattacksagainstIsrael.
IranwouldalsotrytoattackanyU.S.militaryairbasesthatareactiveintheGulfeveniftheyarestationedinGCCcountries.
IfIranattacksanyoftheGCCcountries,thentheywillhavetherighttoselfdefense.InadditionthewholeArabMiddleEastwillnotacceptanIranianattackonanyoftheGCCcountries.
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TheB2Bomber
PrimaryFunction Multiroleheavybomber
Engines: FourGEF118GE100engines,eachwithathrustof17,300pounds(7,847kg)
Speed,Cruise: Highsubsonic
Ceiling: 50,000ft(15,000meters)
WeightTakeoff,(typical): 335,500 350,000pounds(152,600 159,000kg)
Weight, Empty(typical): 125,000 160,000pounds
Range: 6,000nmi (9,600km),unrefueledrangeforaHiLoHimissionwith16B61nuclearfreefallbombs10,000mileswithoneaerialrefueling.
Payload: 40,000pounds(18,000 kg)
Crew: Twopilots
CurrentArmament: Nuclear:16B61,16B83Conventional:80MK82(500lb),16MK84(2000lb),3436CBU87,3436CBU89,3436CBU97Precision:216GBU39SDB(250lb),80 GBU30JDAM(500lb),16GBU32JDAM(2000lb),GBU27,GBU28,GBU36,GBU37,AGM154HSOW,816AGM137TSSAM,2MOP/DSHTW/BigBLU
(Source:http://www.GlobalSecurity.org/wmd/systems/b2s[ecs.html)21
GBU57A/BMassiveOrdnancePenetrator(MOP) Specifications
Weight,total 13,600kg(slightlylessthan30,000pounds)
Weight,explosive 2,700kg(6,000lb)
Length 6m/20.5feet
Diameter 31.5indiameter
Control Shortspanwingsandtrellistype tail
Penetration 60meters(200ft)through5,000psireinforcedconcrete40meters(125ft)throughmoderatelyhardrock8meters(25feet)through10,000psireinforcedconcrete
Contractors Boeing,Northrop Grumman
Platforms B52,B2
Guidance GPSaidedInertialNavigationSystem
InJuly2009,verificationofequipmentrequiredtointegratetheMOPontheB2wascomplete thehardwarethatholdstheMOPinsidetheweaponsbay.TheMOPisaGPSguidedweaponcontainingmorethan5,300poundsofconventionalexplosivesinsidea20.5ftlongbombbodyofhardenedsteel.Itisdesignedtopenetratedirt,rockandreinforcedconcretetoreachenemybunkerortunnelinstallations.TheB2willbecapableofcarryingtwoMOPs,oneineachweaponsbay.
TheB2currentlycarriesupto40,000poundsofconventionalordnance.Forexample,itcandeliver80independentlytargeted500lbclassbombsfromitssmartbombrackassembly;orupto162,000lbclassweaponsfromitsrotarylauncher.IntegrationoftheMOPontheB2isthelatestinaseriesofmodernizationprogramsthatNorthropGrummananditssubcontractorshaveundertakenwiththeAirForcetoensurethattheaircraftremainsfullycapableagainstevolvingthreats.
22
(Source:http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/iran/deliverysystems/)
PriorityTargetsinadditiontoIransMainNuclearNuclearFacilities
U.S.MilitaryStrikeForceAllocationagainstIransNuclearandBallisticFacilitiesOffensiveCounterair(OCA)Mission
PerformanceCriteriaandMissionParameters: Adamageperformancecriteriaabove75%foreachtarget,nuclearandmissile,resultinginadelayof
atleast5to10yearsinIransNuclearProgram,andsubstantiallyweakeningIransballisticmissileretaliatorycapability.
TwoaircraftareallocatedtoeachtargettomaximizethedamageonFirstStrike. DestroyingthemaximumnumberofMissileBases,MobileLaunchersandProductionFacilitiesduring(boostPhase)orbeforeLaunch, therebyreducingthenumberofincomingmissiles(warheads)andalsoreducingthenumberofshotsdefenseneedstotakeateachIncomingwarhead.
IranTarget NumberofTargets AircraftAllocated
MainNuclear 5Facilities 2A/C pertargetresultingin10B2Bombers
MissilesBases 8 Bases 2A/Cperbaseresultingin16StrikeA/C
MissileProduction 15Facilities 2A/Cpertargetresultingin30StrikeA/C
MobileMissileLaunchers Assuming22Launchersinvariouslocations2A/Cper mobilelauncherresultingin44A/C
TOTAL 5010B2Bombers90StrikeAircraft=100
25
EnRouteSEAD
AttackOperations
OffensiveCounterairMissions(OCA)
CAP
(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)
AttackOperations Attackoperationsareintendedtodestroy,disrupt,ordegradecounterairtargetsontheground.Thesemissionsaredirectedagainstenemy:
BallisticMissileSitesAirfieldsCommandControlandtheirsupportinfrastructure:
SuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses(SEAD)SEADisanOCAmissiondesignedtoneutralize,destroy,ordegradeenemysurfacebasedairdefensesbydestructiveordisruptivemeans.
FighterSweep:Anoffensivemissionbyfighteraircrafttoseekanddestroyenemyaircraftortargetsofopportunityinadesignatedarea.
Escorts:Escortsareaircraftassignedtoprotectotheraircraftduringamission.Escortmissionsareflownoverenemyterritorytotargetandengageenemyaircraftandairdefensesystems.
DecreaseinAircraftRequiredinanAirtoGroundStrikeMission: ImprovedWeaponsAccuracy IncreasedSurvivability LargerPayload
AdditionalrequirementstoincreaseMissionEffectiveness
TheeffectivenessofOCAoperationsdependsontheavailabilityofcertainresources.Systemcapabilitiesareinfluencedbythesituation,threats,weather,andavailableintelligence.ThefollowingaresomeoftheresourcesusedtoconductOCA:
Aircraft:FighterandbomberaircraftprovidethebulkoftheweaponsystemsforOCAoperations.Othertypesofaircraftandweaponsystemsareoftencriticalenablersofcounterairoperations(e.g.,electronicattack,electronicprotection,andairrefuelingaircraft).
Missiles:Theseweaponsincludesurfacetosurface,airtosurface,andairtoairmissiles,aswellasair,land,andsealaunchedcruisemissiles.Manyoftheseweaponshavelongrangesandsomehaveveryquickreactiontimes.Theseweaponsystemscaneliminateorreducetheriskofharmtofriendlyforcesbydestroyingenemysystemsintheairandontheground.
ISRSystems:ISRsystemsandresourcesmaybeusedincounterairoperationstoprovideintelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance,deception,andothereffectsagainstenemyforcesandairdefensesystems.Theseactivitiesincludetheuseofairborne,spaceborne,andground(e.g.,humanintelligence)assets.
(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)
UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS):UASmaybeusedincounterairoperationstoprovideISR,deception,jamming,harassment,ordestructionofenemyforcesandairdefensesystems.Thesesystemsmaybepreprogrammedorremotelypiloted.Theyprovidevaluableintelligencetofriendlyforcesandmaynowbeusedtoattacksometargetseithertoodangerousorriskyformannedaircraftorwheremannedaircraftarenotpresentoravailabletorespond.Theymayalsobeusedtohelpprovidepersistentairpresenceoverenemyforcesinsituationswherethismayhaveimportantpsychologicaleffectsuponanadversary(aspartofOCAorotheroperations)ifsynergisticallytaskedtohelpprovidepersistentpresenceoveradversaryforces.
SpecialOperationsForces(SOF):SOFcanconductdirectactionmissions,specialreconnaissance,andprovideterminalguidanceforattacksagainstvaluableenemytargets.PlannersintheAOCcoordinatewiththespecialoperationsliaisonelementtocoordinatetheuseofspecialoperationsassetsinsupportofthecounterairmission.
C2Systems:ThesesystemsenhanceOCAoperationsbyprovidingearlywarning,intelligence,identification,andtargetingdata,aswellasC2offriendlyforces.
(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)
USPreventiveMilitaryStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesandBallisticMissileBases
Panchin
Fordow
ArakNatanz
Esfahan
BallisticMissileBases
Tabriz
Bakhtaran
ImamAli
SemnanSpace&MissileCenter
MashhadAirbase
BandarAbbas
KuhestakAbuMusaIsland
5MainNuclearFacilities 8BallisticMissileBases 15BallisticMissileProductionFacilities
CombatAircraftStrikeForcecouldbeF18sofftheU.S.5th fleet,andF15ElaunchedfromForwardAreaBases.
TheCombatAircraftcanalsoperformallOffensiveCounterairOperations:FighterSweep,SEAD(suppressionofEnemyAirDefense),InterdictionandEscort.
B2MissionPayloadistheB57A/BMissionOrdnancePenetrator(MOP).
(LocationofFacilitiessource:NTI)
Iran
SaudiArabia
Iraq
UAE Google
NuclearFacilities
Kuwait
Qatar
B2Bombers
StrikeForce
CombatAircraft
StrikeForce
CounteringIransAirDefense
IransCurrentLandBasedAirDefenseSystems
Iranhasextensivesurfacetoairmissileassets,butmostareobsoleteorobsolescent.Iranssystemsarepoorlynetted,havesignificantgapsandproblemsintheirradarandsensorcoverageandmodernization,andanumberofitssystemsarevulnerabletoelectronicwarfare
U.S.neverdeliveredintegratedsystembeforefallofShah soIranneverhadafullyfunctioningairdefensesystem.
IranhasmademanystatementsthatithasupgradedandmodernizedmanyofthecomponentsofsuchitsAirDefensesystemsusingRussian,Chinese,US,European,andIraniandesignedandmadeequipment.ButIrandoesnothavethedesignandmanufacturingcapabilitytocreatetrulymodernsystem,onethatisimmunetoelectronicwarfare,andonethatcanfunctionwithoutbecometacticallyvulnerabletoantiradiationweaponsandotherformsofactivesuppressionofenemyairdefense(SEAD)systems.
OnlymodernshortrangepointdefensesystemisTORM.OthershortrangesystemsmixofolderRussiansystem,SHORADs(ShortRangeAirDefense),andaging possibleinactiveBritishandFrenchsystems.
Mediumtolongrangesystemsarelowcapabilityorobsolescent.Iranhassome150HAWKSandIHAWKsdonothavecapableECM.Datebackto1960sand1970s.ItclaimstobeabletoproduceitsownIHAWKmissiles.HasvariousversionsofSA2obsolete.
Radarsensorandbattlemanagement/C4Isystemshavemajorlimitations.
RegardlessofhowmuchIranstatesthatithasmadeprogress,itwillstillbevulnerabletotheadvancedtechnologyU.S.combataircraftaswellastheelectronicwarfareanddefensesuppressionweaponsystems.ThiswillgivetheU.S.StrikeForcethefreedom,ifrequiredafterthefirststrike,toconductasustainedcampaignofstrikesoverafewdays.
(Source:AnthonyCordesmanCSIS) 30
GulfLandBasedAirDefenseSystemsin2008
Country MajorSAM LightSAM AAGun
Bahrain (8)IHAWK (60)RBS70(18)FIM92AStinger(7)Crotale
(26)Guns(15)Orlikon35mm(12)L/7040mm
Iran (16/150)IHAWK(3/10)SA5(45)SA2Guideline
SA7/14/16HQ7(29)SA15;SomeQW1Misaq(29)TORM1;SomeHN5(30)Rapier;SomeFM80(ChCrotale)15Tigercat;SomeFIM92AStinger
(1,700)GunsZSU23423mmZPU2/423mmZU2323mmM193937mmS6057mm
Kuwait (4/24)IHAWKPhaseIII(5)PatriotPAC2
(6/12)Aspide(48)Starbust
12Oerlikon35mm
Oman None Blowpipe;(2)MistralSP(34)SA7;(6)Blindfire(20)Javelin;(40)RapierS713Martello
(26)Guns(4)ZU23223mm(10)GDF(x)5Skyguard35mm(12)L6040mm
Qatar None (10)Blowpipe(12)FIM92AStinger(9)RolandII(24)Mistral(20)SA7
SaudiArabia (16/128)IHAWK(46/1624)Patriot(17/141)ShahineMobile(24/160)PAC2Launchers(17)ANA/FPS117Radar(73/68)CrotaleShahine
(40)Crotale(500)Stinger(ARMY)(500)Mistral(ADF)(500)FIM43Redeye(ARMY)(500)Redeye(ADF)(73141)ShahineStatic(500)FIM92AStinger(ARMY)(400)FIM92AAvenger(ADF)
(1,220)Guns(92)M163Vulcan20mm(30)N167Vulcan20mm(NG)(850)AMX30SA30mm(128)GDFOrlikon35mm(150)L7040mm(store)(130)M290mm(NG)
UAE (2/31)IHAWK 20+Blowpipe(20)MistralSomeRapier/Crotale/RB70/Javelin/SA18
(62)Guns(42)M3VDA20mmSP(20)GCFBM230mm
(Source:IranianWeaponsofMassDestruction.AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)
31
AirDefenseSystem
AssociatedEarlyWarning/AcquisitionRadars
AssociatedTracking&GuidanceRadars
MissileRanges(km)Altitude(ft)
In ServiceDate
SA2 SpoonRestD(P18)FlatFaceA(P15)
FansongA/B Max (km):40Min(km):8Altitude(ft):3,000to90,000
1971Upgraded
SA3 FlatFaceB(P19)SquatEye
LowBlow Max(km):30Min(km):6Altitude(ft): 150to160,000
1971
SA6 LongTrack(P40)HeightFinder:ThinSkinB(PRV9)
StraightFlush Max(km):24Min (km):4Altitude(ft):50to45,000
1973
SA8 FlatFaceB(P19)LongTrack(P40)HeightFinder:ThinSkinB(PRV9)
LandRoll Max(km):15Min(km):0.2Altitude(ft):40to40,000
1982
SA5 BackTrap(P80)TallKingC(P14)Spoon RestD(P18)HeightFinder:Oddpair(PRV13)OddGroup(PRV16)
SquarePair Max(km):250Min(km):20Altitude(ft):1,500to130,000
1983
IHAWK AN/MPQ50AN/MPQ55(PIPII)/62 (PIPIII)RangeonlyRadar
AN/MPQ57(PIPII)/61(PIPIII) Max(km):35Min(km):3Altitude(ft):0to55,000ft
1971
PatriotPAC2 AN/MPQ53PhasedArrayRadarCarriesoutSearch,targetdetection,trackandidentification,missiletrackingandECCMfunctions
AN/MSQ104EngagementControlStation(ECS)
Max(km):70Min(km):3Altitude (ft):80,000
1990
MediumtoLongRangeSurfaceToAirMissileSystems
32(Source:IranianWeaponsofMassDestruction.AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)
GCCvs IranianAirforceComparison
IransmostadvancedfightersconsistofasmallnumberofexportversionsoftheSu24andMiG29,whoseavionicslagfarbehindtheirRussiancounterparts.ItisreportedthatIranhaslessthan30exportversionsofMiG29,somenotoperational.TheselimitstoIransairforceareparticularlyimportantasIranhasairbasesthatareonlyafewminutesflighttimefromcriticaltargetsintheGulfandinthecoastalareasofthesouthernGulfstates.TheyarealsoimportantbecauseIransweaknessesinairtoaircombat,anditsweaknessesinsurfacetoairmissiledefensewhicharedescribedshortly,leaveithighlyvulnerabletoanyUSattack.
Iranclaimstohavemodernizedtheavionicsonsomeoftheseaircraft,andtohaveadapteditsF14stocarrytheHawkairtosurfacemissileasalongrangeairtoairmissiletocompensateforthefactitsF14sweresabotagedduringthefalloftheShahandcannotmakeeffectiveuseofPhoenixmissiles whichinanycasearelongbeyondtheirusefullife.Italsoclaimstohavecreatedelectronicwarfareaircraftandtohavemodernizedtheavionicsonits3PF3OrionmaritimepatrolaircraftwhichareasclosetoanAWACs/airbornewarningandcontrolaircraftasIranhas.Italsohasclaimedtohaveamixofunmannedcombataerialvehicles(UCAVsandUAVs)itcanusetomakeupforsomeofthelimitationinitsaircraft.
TheGCChavebeenplanningtheirdefensessoastoprovideamilitarydeterrentsufficienttomakeanydirectconfrontationascostlyaspossibletoIranoranyotheradversary.ItisinthisdeterrentrolethatliestheultimaterationaleforanyGCCJointDefensePactandCooperation.
TwomainconsiderationsunderlyingthechoiceofaMilitaryDoctrinebytheGCCstateshavebeen:BalanceofForcesandStrategicDepth.InparticularfortheArabianGulffrontlinestatesKuwait,Bahrain,Qatar,UAEandOman,themainconcernwouldbestrategicdepthtoanIranianattack.
(Source:AnthonyCordesmanCSIS)
DefensePerformanceCriteriashouldbea85%Probabilitythatthedefenseshootsdownalltheincomingthreataircraft;thisalsomeansan85%ofzeroleakage.Furthermorea90%ProbabilitythatincomingareincomingthreataircraftaresuccessfullydetectedearlyandtrackedbytheGCCAirDefense.
LackofStrategicDepthresultsinlimitationsontheareaofoperationalmaneuverabilityduringconflict,timetorespond,andanincreaseinthevulnerabilityofvitalstrategiccriticalinfrastructureeconomiccentersduetotheproximitytotheborders.SaudiArabiaisbetheonlystatethathasstrategicdepth,andislookedupontoplayapivotalroleintheSecurityArrangementsoftheGulfandtheArabIsraeliconflict.SaudiArabiasoilresources,populationandstrategicdepthmakeitamajorandessentialparticipantinanyregionalsecurityarrangementsorconflictintheGulfregion.
Whentransformedintoanoperationaldoctrine,theGCCstateswouldbasetheirForceStructurePlanningon:DefensibleBorders.Borderswhichcanbedefendedwithoutapreemptiveinitiative,andtheparallelcapabilitytotakethewartotheenemyandtofightonenemyterritory.
TherequirementwouldbetoenhancetheconventionalmilitaryabilityfortheGCCstatesconsistingoffourmajorcomponents:ForceStructure;Modernization;Readiness;Sustainability.Inadditionitwouldincludedevelopinganasymmetricwarfarecapability.ThetotalGCCAirPoweris428combataircraft,inassumingonly75%areoperationallyready(fullmissioncapable),thetotalavailableforcewillthenbe320andwithasortierateof3peraircraftperdaythetotalnumberofsortiesgeneratedwouldbe960.WhereasforIran,atotalof158aircraftwithanoperationalreadinessrateof60%,theavailablecombatforcewillbe95,andwith2sortiesperaircraftperdaythetotalsortiesgeneratedwillcometo190.The6:1ratioofsortiesgeneratedprojectstheweaknessoftheIranianAirforcevsthethoseoftheGCCcountries.
ByfollowingtheguidelinesoftheUSAFDoctrinemanualsinthemissionsneededforOffensiveCounterair,DefensiveCounterairaswellasCounterlandOperations,the6:1ratioclearlyimpliesthatthereisasubstantialadvantageinfavoroftheGCCAirforcesachievingthespecifiedwartimeobjectiveofwinninganairwarordestroyingatargetset.
IranAirforceTacticalFighterCapabilities 2012
Type No OperationalReadiness(%)Force
AvailableTotalSortiePerDay
PostulatedEmployment
MiG29A 25 60 15 30AirDefense/Escort/FS/BAS
Su25 13 60 8 16 CAS/BI/DeepStrike
SU24 30 60 18 36 CAS/BI/DeepStrike
F14 25 60 15 30 AirDefense/FS
F4E/D 65 69 39 78
CAS/BI/Deep
Strike/SEAD
Total 158 95 190
BAS:BattlefieldAirSuperiority
CAS:CloseAirSupport
BI:BattlefieldInterdiction
DS:DefenseSuppression
FS:FighterSweep
SustainedConditions:12hrOperationalDay18hrMaintenanceDay2SortiesperAircraftperday
37
Type OrderofBattle OperationalReady% ForceAvailableForceTotal
SortiesperDayPostulatedEmployment
TornadoIDS SaudiArabia:25 75 19 57 DeepStrike
Typhoon SaudiArabia:22 75 16 48 FS,BAS,AD,Escort
Mirage2000UAE:62Qatar:12(Total:74)
75UAE:46Qatar:9(Total:55)
UAE:138Qatar:27(Total:165)
FS,BAS,AD,Escort
F18 Kuwait:39 75 29 87
FS,BAS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI,
SEAD
F16C/D
Bahrain:21Oman:12UAE:80
(Total:113)
75
Bahrain:16Oman:9UAE:60(Total:85)
Bahrain:48Oman:27UAE:180(Total:255)
FS,BAS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI
F15C/D SaudiArabia:84 75 63 189 FS,BAS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI
F15S SaudiArabia:71 75 53 160 DeepStrike,FS,AD,Escort,CAS,BI
Total 428 320 960
GCCAirforceTacticalFighterCapabilities 2012
SustainedConditions:12hrOperationalDay18hrMaintenanceDay3Sortiesperaircraftperday
FS:FighterSweep,BAS:BattlefieldAirSuperiority,AD:AirDefense,CAS:CloseAirSupport(AirtoGroundRole),BI:BattleFieldInterdiction(AirtoGroundRole)SEAD:SuppressionofEnemyAirDefense
39
40
DefensiveCounterairOperations
CombatAirPatrol
StripLaunchedIntercept
Mission :DefenseofBorderfromEnemyIntrusion.Objective :Provide AirspaceSurveillanceover
selectedcorridorandIntercept.Assumptions&Conditions:
CorridorWidth&DistancefromBase ThreatOperations DurationofCoverage
AWACS
GroundControlInterceptRadar
(Source:CounterairOperationsUSAFAFDD21.1October1,2008)
CentralFactorsinThreatEngagementAnalysis:
C4I(CommandControlCommunicationsComputingandIntelligence)andthemaximumAirDefenseengagementforce
TheOperationalReadinessoftheforcesresultinginthecombatforcesavailableasFullMissionCapable.
ThemaximumusableGround/StripLaunchedInterceptorforceandCombatAirPatroloperations.TheMaximumStripLaunchedInterceptorsishighlysensitivetotheC4Itimedelayandtheresponsetime.
IntheAlertPhaseofairoperations,thecombatreadyassetsareassignedtotheGroundLaunchedInterceptandCombatAirOperations(CAP).
RadarCoverage
ThreatAircraft
CorridorWidth
TypicalGCCCombatAirPatrolMission
AircraftRequiredonCAPStationsNumberofAircrafttoSupport
EachCAPStation TotalAircraftRequiredx =
(NumberofCAPStations)x2 OperationalDay12hrs(SortieRate)x(LoiterTime)(AircraftRequiredonCAP)x
(AircraftRequiredtoSupportCAP)x =
3x2=6 12/(3x2)=2 6x2=14x =
IRAN
Qatar
UAEOMAN
SaudiArabia
CAP CAPCAP
DecreasingtheNumberofAircraftRequiredEntails: IncreasingAircraftSortieRate&TimeonStation(LoiterTime) IncreasingAircraftRadarRange&TimeonStation(LoiterTime)
42
WhatIranlacksinAirPower:
ThefollowingaresomegeneralcriteriathatwouldberequiredforIrantotryandmaintainatechnologicalandqualitativeedgeovertheGCCAirforces:
Aircraft:Multimissioncapability.HighOperationalReadiness/FullMissionCapablestateandhighsortierates.Allweatherday/nightoperationalcapabilityQuickresponse/groundlaunchedinterceptorsagainstincomingintruders.HighEndurance.AirborneElectronicWarfare(ESM/ECM/ECCM)survivabilityDetecttrackandengagemultiplemobilegroundtargetsaswellasHardandDeeplyBuriedTargets(HDBTs).Rapidlydestroyadvancedairdefensesystems.Capableofcarryingoutdeepstrikemissions.ShortC4IEarlyWarningdelaytimeduetohavingantiquatedSystem,semiautomatedmanintheloop,givingrisetolongResponse/ScrambleTimebyCombatAircraft
AirtoAirMissiles:Aircrafttobecapableofmultipletargetengagement.FireandForget/Launchandleavewithhighsingleshotkillcapability.Goodtargetdiscriminationandenhancedresistancetocountermeasures.Increaseinrangeoffiringmissileatthesametimeshorteningtheflighttimetothetarget.lowLossExchangeRatioinaClosing/BVREnvironmentandVisualEngagementEnvironment.
AirtoGround:Weaponsthatserveasaneffectiveforcemultiplier.Standoffcapability,operatingfromrangesoutsideenemypointdefenses.Lowandhighaltitudelaunches.PreservecrewandaircraftsurvivabilityEffectiveagainstawidearrayoflandandseatargetswithhighsingleshotkillprobability.Weaponsthatemploylaunchandleavewithhighaccuracy(smallCEP).Capableofday/nightandadverseweatherconditions
IransMissileForces
ThereislittledisagreementthatIransactionsposeapotentialthreat,butthereisfarlessagreementoverthenature,scaleandtimingofthisthreat.US,European,Gulf,andIsraelipolicymakersandexpertsagreethatIranpossessesalargeandgrowingmissileforce,withsomemissilescapableofhittingIsrael,andEurope.TheyagreethatIranhasbegundevelopinglongerrangeandsolidfuelmissiles.Atthesametime,theIranianprogramisinfluxandmanyofIransmissilesystemsarestillinadevelopmentphasewheretheirrange,accuracy,warhead,andreliabilityareimpossibletopredict.
IranhasbeendevelopingballisticmissilecapabilitiesbasedonRussian,NorthKorean,andChinesetechnologyorweaponssystemssincetheearly1980s.IrancurrentlypossessesthelargestballisticmissileinventoryintheMiddleEast,andthecountrysmilitaryandscientificestablishmentsareworkingtoincreasethesophistication,scale,andreachofitsmissiles.
Iranseesitsmissilecapabilitiesasawaytocompensateforitsshortcomingsinconventionalforces,aswellasameanstostrikeathighvaluetargetswithlittlewarning,suchaspopulationcenters,andWesternandWesternbackedforcesintheregion,includingUSbasesintheGulf.Assuch,ballisticmissilesplayanintegralroleinIransasymmetricwarfaredoctrine.GiventheemphasisIranplacesonitsmissileprogram,itisclearthatIranconsidersitsballisticmissilearsenalamongitsmostimportantassetsasbothadeterrenttoattackandleverageoverotherregionalplayers.
ThereisnoagreementastowhenIranmayacquiremissileswithhomingwarheadsandthekindofterminalguidancethatcanhitpointtargetseffectivelywithconventionalwarheads.ThereisnoagreementonthereliabilityandaccuracyofIransmissilesunderoperationalconditions,thereisnoagreementonIransabilitytodeploysystemswithcountermeasurestomissiledefenses.ThereisnoagreementonwhenIranmightdeployafullyfunctionnuclearwarhead.And,thereisnoagreementonthefuturesize,character,andbasingmodeofIransmissileforcesonceitslongrangesystemsaredeployedinstrength.
DeterrenceandActiveDefenseRisksIransMissileProgram
(Reference:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner.CSISIranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance IandII.) 45
IranMilitaryDoctrine: SinceIranpresentlydoesnothaveaccesstohightechnologymilitaryweaponsystems,itwillneedto
developallrangesofBallisticMissilestocompensateforitsdeficienciesinconventionalforces.
IranhasnoprobleminStrategicDepth,canbeanadvantagefightinginandoverfamiliarterritory.ForceStructurePlanningbasedon:
o Highattritionrateinflictedonadversarycivilians
o Indepthdefenses,asIranhasthestrategicdepth
TacticalBallisticMissilesThreat:
Iransballisticmissilescoverthecompletespectrumrangefrom150kmupto5,500km,theShort,Medium,andIntermediateRangesofBallisticMissiles.IranbelievesthatthesewillcompensateforanydeficienciesinitsAirPower.
BallisticMissilescanbeusedwithsuccessagainstSoftTargets,inopenareasandcitiestoinflictmaximumhumancasualtiesandcreateterror.InessencewhatisconsideredasamajorcomponentinAsymmetricWarfareintheformofhighciviliancasualties.
ThisarsenalofBallisticMissilespossessedbyIranhasbeendeclaredtobefordefensivepurposesagainstanyforeigninvasion,inparticularagainsttheU.S.
However,ithasbecomeveryclearthatitisanarsenalthatisintendedtoinflictmaximumcasualtiesanddamage,inessenceamajorcomponentforAsymmetricWarfareintheformofhighattritionanddefensesindepthandtocompensateforanydeficienciesinitsAirPower.
SRBM:ShortRangeBallisticMissileMRBM:MediumRangeBallisticMissileIRBM:IntermediateRangeBallisticMissileICBM:IntercontinentalBallisticMissile
(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.TechnicalAddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)
(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.TechnicalAddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)
(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.TechnicalAddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)
(Reference:TheodrePostol,ATechnicalAssessmentofIransBallisticMissileProgramMay6,2009.TechnicalAddendumtotheJointThreatAssessmentonIransNuclearAndMissilePotential.)
Shahab1 Shahab2 Shahab3 Shahab4
Class: SRBM SRBM MRBM MRBM
Range(km): 300 500 1,300 2,000
Payload(kg): 1,100 600 650 1,000
IranShahabBallisticMissiles
RangevsPayload
IRAN
(Reference:BallisticMissileDefenseReviewReport.BMDRDoDFebruary2010)
U.S.& GCCDefenseagainstIranianBallisticMissiles
SeaBasedAirDefensesTheU.S.NavysRoleinMissileDefenseNetwork
RoleoftheU.S.NavyAegisSystem:
WillprovideanefficientandhighlymobileseabaseddefenseagainstShortandMedium RangeBallisticMissilesintheirmidcoursephase.
ThesystemwillallowtheBMDCommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysites. ThesystemwillhavetheEngagement&LongRangeTrackingCapability InterceptingShorttoMediumRangeBallisticMissilesinthemidcoursephaseoftheflightwithStandardMissile 3. Servesasaforwarddeployedsensor,providingearlywarningandlongrangesearch&trackcapabilitiesforICBMsandIRBMs.
Contributions:
WillextendthebattlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.TheNavalAegissystemextendstherangeoftheGroundMissiledefense(GMD)elementbyprovidingreliabletrackdatausedtocalculatefiringsolutions.
AegisBMDwillcoordinateengagementsofshortandmediumrangeballisticmissileswithterminalmissiledefensesystems.
Astrackinginformationissharedamongthesesystems,theBMDSwillhavetheopportunitytofollowtheengagementofatargetduringthemidcoursesegmentwithcoordinatedterminalengagements.
SeaBasedRadar SeaBasedRadar AegisBallisticMissile 3
(Source:MissileDefenseAgency.(MDA)DepartmentofDefense.TestingBuildingConfidence,2009) 58
Country TBMDSystem
UAE TheUAE issofarthefirstGCCcountrytobuytheTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)missilesystem.
OnDec31,2011PentagonannouncedthattheUAEwillbebuying2fullTHAADbatteries,96missiles,2RaytheonAN/TPY2radars,and30yearsofspareparts.TotalValue$3.34billion.
In2008theUAEorderedPatriotPAC3:10fireunits,172missiles,Firstdelivery2009.
Kuwait July2012,Pentagon informedCongressofaplantosellKuwait$4.2billioninweaponsystems,including60PAC3missiles,20launchingplatformsand4radars.Thiswillbeinadditiontothe350Patriotmissilesboughtbetween2007and2010.In1992,Kuwaitbought210oftheearliergenerationPatriotsand25launchers.Kuwaitboughtafurther140morein2007.
SaudiArabia In2011Saudi Arabiasigneda$1.7billionUScontracttoupgradeitsPatriotantimissilesystem.
Qatar TheU.S.isbuildingaMissileWarningFacilityinQatarthatwouldutilizeanAN/TPY2XBandRadar.
(Source:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner,IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance1July11,2012)
TwoTierTheaterBallisticMissileDefense(TBMD) THAAD&PAC3EndoandExoAtmosphericEngagementsusing
ShootLookShootHittoKill
THAADLauncherPAC3Launcher
UpperTier1st Intercept
UpperTier2ndIntercept
ShootLookShoot
LowerTier1st Intercept
LowerTier2nd Intercept
UAEQatar
IRAN
SaudiArabia
TBMDSystem Defense againstTHAAD :UAE SRBMs(
DefensePerformanceCriteria:85%Probabilitythatthedefenseshootsdownalltheincomingmissiles(warheads);85%ofzeroleakage.
99%Probabilitythatincomingmissiles(warheads)aresuccessfullytrackedbythedefense.
Probabilitythatanincomingmissile(warhead)isdestroyed
Num
bero
fsho
tsth
atm
ustb
etakenat
eachincomingmissile
(warhe
ad)toachievethedefensepe
rformance
criteria.
DefenseRequiredtomeetPerformanceCriteria
DestroyingasmanyBallisticMissileLaunchersduring(boostPhase)orbeforeLaunch: Decreasesthenumberofincomingmissiles(warheads)andalso Decreasesnumberofshotsdefenseneedstotakeateach
Incomingwarhead.
THEATERBALLISTICMISSILEDEFENSESYSTEM,C4ISR&BATTLEFIELDMANAGEMENT.
TheChallengefortheGCCStatesistodesignaneffectivemultilayeredTheaterBallisticMissileDefenseSystem(TBMDS)tocountertheShort,MediumandIntermediateBallisticMissiles.
DuetotheveryshorttimewindowinthedefenseagainstBallisticMissiles,theywillhavetobeengagedautomatically,whichrequiresinterceptauthorizationandrulesofengagementtobeagreeduponinadvance.AllpartofaneffectiveC4ISR/BMsysteminbothpeacetimeandwar.ThiswillalsoactasaForceMultiplier.
EvidentthatthekeytoaneffectiveTBMDliesinregionalcooperation,whichcantakearangeofformsfromcoordinationandcooperationbetweencommandcentersanddefensesystemsforTBMDpurposes whileenablingeachstatetocontrolitsowndefenses.
Cooperationtobecomprehensiveinnature,leadingtoanearrealtimesituationawarenessofthemilitarydevelopmentsinthearea,hostileandfriendlymilitarycapabilitiesandtheiroperationallevels.ThiswouldalsobeintheformofcooperationintoTBMDsandNBCthreatassessment.ThisrequiresanC4ISRcapabilityinallitsComponents,suchas,UnmannedAirSystems(UASs)/UnmannedAirVehicles(UAVs).
AstheFrontLinesofaMissileWarwillbeovertheArabianGulfregion,theaMultiTierTBMDsystemswillplaytheleadingroleinAirDefensesandinaTheaterBallisticMissileDefenseNetwork.SeabasedsystemswillprovideanefficientandhighlymobiledefenseagainstTheaterBallisticMissiles.
TheNavalSystem,suchastheU.S.NavyAegissystem,willallowtheTBMDcommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysitesandserve asaforwarddeployedsensorandwillhavetheLongRangeEngagementand TrackingCapability.Thiswillextendthe battlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.
62
PAC3THAAD
EarlyWarningRadar
AWACS
AirDefense
SeaBasedEW&TerminalDefense
Midcourse&TerminalMissileDefense
EarlyWarning&LongRangeSearch&TrackCapabilitiesagainstIranianMRBMs
BallisticMissileWarBetweenIrantheU.S.andtheGulfStates
IranianShahab3LaunchedagainstIsrael
UAEOMAN
GulfofOman
IRANIRAQ
SAUDIARABIA
KUWAIT
QATAR
BAHRAIN
DefenseSupportPrograminBoostPhase
SpaceSensor
63
CounteringIranianattacksontheStraitsofHormuz
TheIMFinareportWorldEconomicOutlook(update)January24,2012,summarizedtheglobalfinancialsituationasfollows:
Concernsaboutgeopoliticaloilsupplyrisksareincreasingagain.TheoilmarketimpactofintensifiedconcernsaboutanIranrelatedoilsupplyshock(oranactualdisruption)wouldbelarge,givenlimitedinventoryandsparecapacitybuffers,aswellasthestilltightphysicalmarketconditionsexpectedthroughout2012.
OnJanuary25,2012,InaregularnotetotheGroupof20leadingindustrializedcountries,theIMFsaidthatifIrangoesaheadwithathreattoblockadeoilexportsviatheStraitsofHormuzintheGulf,theshockcouldbeevengreater.AblockadeoftheStraitofHormuzwouldconstitute,andbeperceivedbymarketstopresage,sharplyheightenedglobalgeopoliticaltensioninvolvingamuchlargerandunprecedenteddisruption."
EffectsofOilPriceSpikes:
Sharpand/orsustainedoilpriceincreasesplacefurtherpressuresonhighlyoildependentindustriesandconsumers,aswellasraisinggeopoliticaltensions.AccordingtotheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),asustainedUS$10/barrelincreaseinthepriceofoilcouldlowergrowthofglobalGDPby0.5percentagepoints(pctpts)inthesubsequentyear.
Inadditiontoadverseimpactsforgrowtheffects,substantiallyhigheroilpricesgeneratecurrentaccountsurplusesinproducingcountries,whichmayexacerbateglobalmacroeconomicimbalancesandfuelfinancialmarketturbulence.
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MediterraneanSea
TheSuezCanal/SumedPipeline: OilFlow:4.5millionbbl/d
TheStraitofHormuz: OilFlow:16.5millionbbl/d
BabelMandab: OilFlow:3.3millionbbl/d
OilTransitChokepoints
ThevolumeofGulfoilexportsamountstosome20%ofalltheworldsoilproductionof87millionbarrelsaday.AnymajordisruptionaffectstheentireeconomyofAsiaandallworldoilprices regardlessofwhereoilisproduced.ItcanleadtopanicandhoardingonaglobalbasisandtheUSeconomywillbenomoreexempttotheresultingriseinenergypricesandtheglobalimpactonlimitedexportstotheUSandothermajorindustrialandtradingstatesonthananyothermajoreconomicpower.USandotherenergyimporterenergyindependencemayhappensomeday,buttodayitisfoolish,dangerousmyth.
VirtuallyalloftheGulfsoilmustpassthroughtheGulf,theStraitofHormuz,theGulfofOman,andtheArabianSea andthenthroughtheIndianOcean.Gulfoilproductionandloadingfacilities,andtankertrafficcanbeattackedanywhereintheGulf.Irancanuseamixofmines,submarines,submersibles,drones,antishipmissiles,smallcraft,andassaultforcesanywhereintheGulfregiontothreatentheflowofoilexports.
IrancancherrypickitstargetsinanefforttopressureandintimidatetheUSandSouthernGulfstates.Itcanuselongrangeconventionallyarmedmissilesordronesagainstlargemilitaryorurbantargetsasterrorweapons.ItcanattacksporadicallyandunpredictablyinawarofattritionorattempttoswarmUSandGulfnavalforces.).
GlobalImportanceofGulfEnergyExports
(Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.
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Atitsnarrowestpoint,theStraitis21mileswide,butthewidthoftheshippinglaneineitherdirectionisonlytwomiles,separatedbyatwomilebufferzone.TheStraitisdeepandwideenoughtohandletheworld'slargestcrudeoiltankers,withabouttwothirdsofoilshipmentscarriedbytankersinexcessof150,000deadweighttons.
FlowsthroughtheStraitin2011wereroughly35percentofallseabornetradedoil,oralmost20percentofoiltradedworldwide.Morethan85percentofthesecrudeoilexportswenttoAsianmarkets,withJapan,India,SouthKorea,andChinarepresentingthelargestdestinations.
Inaddition,Qatarexportsabout2trillioncubicfeetperyearofliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)throughtheStraitofHormuz,accountingforalmost20percentofglobalLNGtrade.Furthermore,KuwaitimportsLNGvolumesthattravelnorthwardthroughthe StraitofHormuz.Theseflowstotaledabout100billioncubicfeetperyearin2010.
StraitofHormuz
70
(Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.
Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c .
VolumeofCrudeOilandPetroleumProductsTransportedThroughWorldChokepoints,20072011inMillionsofBarrelsPerDay
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MostpotentialoptionstobypassHormuzarecurrentlynotoperational.OnlyIraq,SaudiArabia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)presentlyhavepipelinesabletoshipcrudeoiloutsideoftheGulf,andonlythelattertwocountriescurrentlyhaveadditionalpipelinecapacitytocircumventHormuz.Atthestartof2012,thetotalavailablepipelinecapacityfromthetwocountriescombined,whichisnotutilized,wasapproximately1millionbbl/d.Theamountcouldpotentiallyincreaseto4.3millionbbl/dbytheendofthisyear,asbothcountrieshaverecentlycompletedstepstoincreasestandbypipelinecapacitytobypasstheStrait.
Iraqhasonemajorcrudeoilpipeline,theKirkukCeyhan(IraqTurkey)PipelinethattransportsoilfromthenorthofIraqtotheTurkishMediterraneanportofCeyhan.Thispipelinepumpedabout0.4millionbbl/din2011,farbelowitsnameplatecapacityof1.6millionbbl/dandithasbeenthetargetofsabotageattacks.Moreover,thispipelinecannotsendadditionalvolumestobypasstheStraitofHormuzunlessitreceivesoilfromsouthernIraqviatheStrategicPipeline,whichlinksnorthernandsouthernIraq.Currently,portionsoftheStrategicPipelineareclosed,andrenovationstotheStrategicPipelinecouldtakeseveralyearstocomplete.
SaudiArabiahasthe745milelongPetroline,alsoknownastheEastWestPipeline,whichrunsfromacrossSaudiArabiafromitsAbqaiq complextotheRedSea.ThePetrolinesystemconsistsoftwopipelineswithatotalnameplatecapacityofabout4.8millionbbl/d.The56inchpipelinehasanameplatecapacityof3millionbbl/danditscurrentthroughputisabout2millionbbl/d.
The48inchpipelinehadbeenoperatinginrecentyearsasanaturalgaspipeline,butSaudiArabia.recentlyconverteditbacktoanoilpipeline.TheswitchcouldincreaseSaudiArabia'sspareoilpipelinecapacitytobypasstheStraitofHormuzfrom1millionbbl/dto2.8millionbbl/d,whichisonlyattainableifthesystemisabletooperateatitsfullnameplatecapacity.
AlternativeRoutestotheStraitofHormuz
72
Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c .
TheUAEconstructeda1.5millionbbl/dAbuDhabiCrudeOilPipelinethatrunsfromHabshan,acollectionpointforAbuDhabi'sonshoreoilfields,totheportofFujairahontheGulfofOman,allowingcrudeoilshipmentstocircumventHormuz.Thepipelinewasrecentlyopenedandthefirstshipmentof500,000barrelsofoilwassentthroughthepipelinetotheFujairahoilterminalwhereitwasloadedonatankerandsenttothePakArabRefineryinPakistan.
Thepipelinewillbeabletoexportupto1.5millionbb/d,ormorethanhalfofUAE'stotalnetoilexports,onceitreachesfulloperationalcapacityinthenearfuture.However,theUAEdoesnotcurrentlyhavetheabilitytoutilizethispipelinecompletely,untilitrampstofullcapacity.InlateMay,FujairahrulerSheikhHamad binMohammedAlSharqi notedthatthispipelinecapacitycouldrisefurthertoamaximum1.8millionbbl/d.
SaudiArabiaalsohastwoadditionalpipelinesthatrunparalleltothePetrolinesystemandbypasstheStraitofHormuz,butneitherofthemhavetheabilitytotransportadditionalvolumesofoilshouldtheStraitofHormuzbeclosed.TheAbqaiqYanbunaturalgasliquidspipelinehasacapacityof290,000bbl/dandisrunningatcapacity.TheIPSA(IraqiPipelinethroughSaudiArabia)isusedtotransportnaturalgastoSaudiArabia'swesterncoast.Itwasoriginallybuilttocarry1.65millionbbl/dofcrudeoilfromIraqtotheRedSea,butSaudiArabialaterconvertedittocarrynaturalgas,andhasnotannouncedplanstoconvertitbacktotransportcrudeoil.
Otherpipelines,suchastheTransArabianPipeline(TAPLINE)runningfromQaisumah inSaudiArabiatoSidoninLebanon,havebeenoutofserviceforyearsduetowardamage,disuse,orpoliticaldisagreements,andwouldrequireacompleterenovationbeforebeingusable.Relativelysmallquantities,severalhundredthousandbarrelsperdayatmost,couldbetruckedtomitigateclosureoftheStraitofHormuz.
AlternativeRoutestotheStraitofHormuz 2
73
CurrentlyOperable CrudeOil Pipelines that Bypassthe StraitofHormuz:
IfwarshouldcomewhilesurpluspipelinecapacityisstilllimitedtothehighEIAestimateof4.3millionbarrelsaday andallpipelineloadingandotherfacilitiesremainedsecurefromattack thiswouldonlyprovide25%percentofthe17millionbarrelsadayflowingthroughtheGulf.
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Notes:AllestimatesareEIAestimatesasofAugust17,2012andexpressedinmillionbarrelsperday(bbl/d).1AlthoughtheKirkukCeyhanPipelinehasanominalnameplatecapacityof1.6millionbbl/d,itseffectivecapacityis0.4millionbbl/dbecauseitcannottransportadditionalvolumesofoiluntiltheStrategicPipelinetowhichitlinkscanberepairedtobringinadditionalvolumesofoilfromthesouthofIraq.2"UnusedCapacity"isdefinedaspipelinecapacitythatisnotcurrentlyutilizedandcanbereadilyavailable.3Allestimatesfor2012areratesaroundthemidyearpoint;nottheforecastaveragefor2012.4The2012throughputratesarebasedoffof2011estimates.
Source:EIA/DOE,WorldOilTransitChokepoints,August2012,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c.
(Source:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Persian_Gulf/images/pg_map.pdf)
OverlandOilSupplyPipelines
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IranianCounterVulnerabilities: Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference.
Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that, Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by
Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.
Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl/d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl/d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region).
Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl/d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl/d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.
Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable. Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.
Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Todays precision strike assets allow to know out key, repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become weapons of mass effectiveness.
EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.
Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mixof radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.
Needs imports of food and product.
Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports.
Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, inspect all incoming shipping.
No fly zone would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.
KeyTargetsthatIllustrateIransVulnerability
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Criticaldependenceonrefinerieswithhighcost,longleadfacilitiesandonimportsofproduct.
Minimalpowergridthatcanbecrippledordestroyedselectivelyonaregionalornationalbasis.
GasproductionanddistributionfacilitiesneededbyIransdomesticeconomy.
Keybridges,tunnels,overpassesandmountainroutesforroadandrailtraffic.
Gulftankerloadingfacilities,oilstorageandandtankerterminals forminingordirectattack.
Keymilitaryproductionfacilities
Commandandcontrolcenters.
Communicationsgrids.
Airfieldandairbases.
IRGCland,air,andnavalfacilities.
Coastalnavalbasesandportfacilities.
IsraeliPreventiveStrikeOptions
ScenarioI:IsraeliAirforceCombatAircraft
81
IsraeliStrike: ItispossiblethatIsraelwillcarryoutastrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilities,iftheU.S.doesnot,withthe
objectiveofeitherdestroyingtheprogramordelayingitforsomeyears.ThesuccessoftheStrikeMissionwillbemeasuredbyhowmuchoftheEnrichmentprogramhasitdestroyed,orthenumberofyearsithasdelayedIranianacquisitionofenoughUraniumorPlutoniumfromtheArakreactortobuildanuclearbomb.
WeconcludethatamilitarystrikebyIsraelagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesispossibleandtheoptimumroutewouldbealongtheSyrianTurkishborderthenoverasmallportionofIraqthenintoIran,andbackthesameroute.However,thenumberofaircraftrequired,refuelingalongthewayandgettingtothetargetswithoutbeingdetectedorinterceptedwouldbecomplexandhighriskandwouldlackanyassurancesthattheoverallmissionwillhaveahighsuccessrate.
TheU.S.wouldcertainlybeperceivedasbeingapartoftheconspiracyandhavingassistedandgivenIsraelthegreenlight,whetheritdidorhadnopartinitwhatsoever.ThiswouldunderminetheU.S.objectivesinincreasingstabilityintheregionandbringingaboutapeacefulsolutiontotheArabIsraeliconflict.ItwillalsoharmforaverylongperiodoftimerelationsbetweentheU.S.anditscloseregionalallies.
AnotherscenarioisinusingLowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeaponsasasubstituteforconventionalweaponstoattackdeeplyburiednuclearfacilitiesinIran.Somebelievethatthesearetheonlyweaponsthatcandestroytargetsdeepundergroundorintunnels.
TheU.S.wouldnotallowanyothercountry,evenastrongallysuchasIsrael,tousethem,unlessanothercountryhadusednuclearweaponsagainsttheU.S.anditsallies.
AstrikebyIsraelonIranwillgiverisetoregionalinstabilityandconflictaswellas terrorism.Theregionalsecurityconsequenceswillbecatastrophic.
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CentralRouteCentralRoute
SouthernRouteSouthernRoute
NorthernRouteNorthernRoute
ARAK:HeavyWaterPlantandFuturePlutoniumProductionReactor
(5,500sqm)
Natanz:UraniumEnrichmentFacility
(65,000sqm)
Esfahan:NuclearResearchCenter.UraniumConversion
Facility(UCF).(10,000sqm)
Qum:EnrichmentFacilitywithTunnel
Entrances
Syria
IraqIran
SaudiArabia
Jordan
Turkey
CaspianSea
IsraeliStrikeagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesMainTargetSet
Tehran
Bushehr:1000MWNuclearPowerPlant
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85
(250 nmi) fromNorth ofIsrael
(440 nmi)
(420 nmi)To Esfahan
MissionAnalysis:
ApproximaterangetothefurthesttargetEsfahanissome1,110nmi.Whenapproachingthe550nmirange,theF15EsandF16IsneedtorefuelonthewaytoIranandonthewayback.
Refuelingcanbedoneinthreeways:o RefuelingfromKC135AandKC10tankers.o BuddyRefuelingbetweenF15EsandF16Iso Atemporarylandingstrip,alongtheSyrian,TurkishandNorthernIraqregion,whereaircraftrefuelingisavailable.
TotalFuelinanF15EfortheHiLoLoHistrikemissionis26,300lbs,whereasthatforanF16Iisabout14,755lbs.Thetotalmaximumstrikepackagewasaround80aircraft,allthe30F15IintheIsraeliAirforceInventory plus55F16I/C.TheF15Ewouldthenneed5to6KC130storefuelfrom,andtheF16Iswouldrequire6to7KC130.
Israelpresentlyhas5KC130Hand4B700(SourceIISS).SoalltheIsraeliTankerswillhavetobeairbornetoservicetheF15EandF16IStrikeForceduringtheoutboundlegandinboundlegsofthemission.Couldbedifficulttofindalocationalongtheroutesuchthatthetankerscouldavoiddetectionandpossibleinterception.
Theseestimatesweredoneassuminga100%aircraftandweaponsoperationalreliabilityandthestrikeforcenotencounteringanyIranianAirandGroundDefense.Soifwegivetheoverallreliabilitytobe90%thenweshouldaddaround9to10moreaircraft,bringingthetotalstrikeforceto95.
Soinessenceover25%ofthehighendcombataircraftofIsraeliAirforceand100%oftheTankerswillhavetobeallocatedforthismission.
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Onestrikewouldnotnecessarilybeenoughtoachievethemissionobjectives.Strikeaircraftneedtoreturnforanotherstrike.ThiswouldputaheavyburdenontheIsraeliAirforce.
WecanconcludethatamilitarystrikebytheIsraeliAirforceagainstIranianNuclearFacilitiesispossible,however,itwouldbecomplexandhighriskintheoperationallevelandwouldlackanyassurancesofahighmissionsuccessrate.
Iranianretaliationwillhaveadevastatingregionalconsequences.U.S.expectsIsraeltoberesponsibleandnottocarryoutsuchastrike.
Airtogroundstrikemissioncanbedifficulttoimplementandwouldinvolvesomerisks.Flyingonaverytightroute,practicallyhuggingtheTurkishSyrianborders.AerialrefuelingalongthewayandavoidbeingdetectedbyTurkey,SyriaandtheU.S.FlyingdowntoS/LwheninIranianterritory,avoidbeingdetectedbyflyinglowandapplyingECMalltheway.IfdetectedbyIranianairdefensethestrikeformationshouldbepreparedtoencounterinterceptors,andtoencounteringfiringofgroundbasedSAMs.
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IsraeliPreventiveStrikeOptions
ScenarioII:LowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeapons
88
AnotherscenarioisusingthesewarheadsasasubstituteforconventionalweaponstoattackdeeplyburiednuclearfacilitiesinIran.Somebelievethatnuclearweaponsaretheonlyweaponsthatcandestroytargetsdeepundergroundorintunnels.
TheguntypeUraniumbasednuclearbombdroppedonHiroshimabytheU.S.inAugustof1945wasabout8,000poundsinweight,andcontainedabout60kgofweaponsgradeHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU),ofwhichabout0.7kgunderwentfissionproducingaYieldof12.5kilotons.ThePlutoniumimplosionbombdroppedonNegasakiweighedabout10,800poundsandcontainedabout6.4kgofweaponsgradePlutoniumPU239.Producingayieldof22kilotons.inthesubsequentyearstheU.S.wasabletoproducePlutoniumimplosionnuclearbombsinthesameyieldrangewithweightsdownto2,000lbsandless.
IfBallisticMissilesareusedtocarryoutthemission,IsraelhashaveaBallisticMissileDefenseSystemwhereasIrandoesnothaveone,suchastheRussianS300PMU2Favorit,thatwasdesignedto interceptballisticmissilesaswellascombataircraft.
LowYieldEarthPenetratingNuclearWeapons
89
USSimulationsoftheConsequencesofanIsraeliStrike
91
AclassifiedwarsimulationheldthismonthtoassesstherepercussionsofanIsraeliattackonIranforecaststhatthestrikewouldleadtoawiderregionalwar,whichcoulddrawintheUnitedStatesandleavehundredsofAmericansdead,accordingtoAmericanofficials.
TheofficialssaidthesocalledwargamewasnotdesignedasarehearsalforAmericanmilitaryaction andtheyemphasizedthattheexercisesresultswerenottheonlypossibleoutcomeofarealworldconflict.
ButthegamehasraisedfearsamongtopAmericanplannersthatitmaybeimpossibletoprecludeAmericaninvolvementinanyescalatingconfrontationwithIran,theofficialssaid.InthedebateamongpolicymakersovertheconsequencesofanyIsraeliattack,thatreactionmaygivestrongervoicetothoseintheWhiteHouse,PentagonandintelligencecommunitywhohavewarnedthatastrikecouldproveperilousfortheUnitedStates.
TheresultsofthewargamewereparticularlytroublingtoGen.JamesN.Mattis,whocommandsallAmericanforcesintheMiddleEast,PersianGulfandSouthwestAsia,accordingtoofficialswhoeitherparticipatedintheCentralCommandexerciseorwhowerebriefedontheresultsandspokeonconditionofanonymitybecauseofitsclassifiednature.Whentheexercisehadconcludedearlierthismonth,accordingtotheofficials,GeneralMattistoldaidesthatanIsraelifirststrikewouldbelikelytohavedireconsequencesacrosstheregionandforUnitedStatesforcesthere.
Thetwoweekwargame,calledInternalLook,playedoutanarrativeinwhichtheUnitedStatesfounditwaspulledintotheconflictafterIranianmissilesstruckaNavywarshipinthePersianGulf,killingabout200Americans,accordingtoofficialswithknowledgeoftheexercise.TheUnitedStatesthenretaliatedbycarryingoutitsownstrikesonIraniannuclearfacilities.
TheNewYorkTimes,March19,2012U.S.WarGamesSeesPerilsofIsraeliStrikeAgainstIran
92
TheinitialIsraeliattackwasassessedtohavesetbacktheIraniannuclearprogrambyroughlyayear,andthesubsequentAmericanstrikesdidnotslowtheIraniannuclearprogrambymorethananadditionaltwoyears.However,otherPentagonplannershavesaidthatAmericasarsenaloflongrangebombers,refuelingaircraftandprecisionmissilescoulddofarmoredamagetotheIraniannuclearprogram ifPresidentObamaweretodecideonafullscaleretaliation.
TheexercisewasdesignedspecificallytotestinternalmilitarycommunicationsandcoordinationamongbattlestaffsinthePentagon;inTampa,Fla.,wheretheheadquartersoftheCentralCommandislocated;andinthePersianGulfintheaftermathofanIsraelistrike.Buttheexercisewaswrittentoassessapressing,potential,realworldsituation.Intheend,thewargamereinforcedtomilitaryofficialstheunpredictableanduncontrollablenatureofastrikebyIsrael,andacounterstrikebyIran,theofficialssaid.
AmericanandIsraeliintelligenceservicesbroadlyagreeontheprogressIranhasmadetoenrichuranium.ButtheydisagreeonhowmuchtimetherewouldbetopreventIranfrombuildingaweaponifleadersinTehrandecidedtogoaheadwithone.
WiththeIsraelissayingpubliclythatthewindowtopreventIranfrombuildinganuclearbombisclosing,AmericanofficialsseeanIsraeliattackonIranwithinthenextyearasapossibility.TheyhavesaidprivatelythattheybelievethatIsraelwouldprobablygivetheUnitedStateslittleornowarningshouldIsraeliofficialsmakethedecisiontostrikeIraniannuclearsites.
Officialssaidthat,underthechainofeventsinthewargame,IranbelievedthatIsraelandtheUnitedStateswerepartnersinanystrikeagainstIraniannuclearsitesandthereforeconsideredAmericanmilitaryforcesinthePersianGulfascomplicitintheattack.IranianjetschasedIsraeliwarplanesaftertheattack,andIranianslaunchedmissilesatanAmericanwarshipinthePersianGulf,viewedasanactofwarthatallowedanAmericanretaliation.
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Appendix
GBU27 BLU1092000lbclasspenetratingwarhead.Penetrates1.8to2.4metersofconcrete/hardtargetsdependingonangleofattach.Itcarries550lbsofhighexplosives,andcanpenetratemorethan6feetofreinforcedconcrete.
This2000lbweaponwouldbemostlikelyusedagainsttheEsfahanUraniumConversionFacility.InadditiontheGBU10canalsobeused.
GBU28 BLU1135000lbclasspenetratingwarhead.Penetratesatleast6meters(20feet)ofconcrete,presumablyreinforcedconcreteand30meters(100ft)ofearth.
Itisa5,000lblaserguidedconventionalmunitionsthatusesa4,000lbpenetratingwarheadblast/fragmentation,whichcontains630poundsofexplosive.
TheGBU28/BLU1135000lbpenetratorwouldbethemostlikelyweaponofchoiceagainsttheNatanzCentrifugeFacilityaswellastheEsfahanUraniumConversionFacility.
UsedasaBunkerBuster.2properlysequencedGBUswouldmostcertainlypenetratethe30metersofearthandupto6mofconcrete.
TheProbabilityofHit(PH)of2GBUsaimedatthesamepointessentiallyonefollowingtheotheris50%.
Mission Planning Payloads
95
Weapon Warhead(kg) 10psi(ft)
5psi(ft)
3psi(ft)
GBU28 306 62 92 125
GBU27 240 59 89 118
GB10 428 69 105 144
Peak Overpressure Distance
TargetDamageProbabilityEstimates
Wepresentthedestructivecapabilitiesofvariousnuclearweapons:SurfaceBurstsorContactBurstsatthegroundsurfaceThosethatburstafterpenetratingthesurface
TheaboveshowsthattheEarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)needstobeofsufficientyieldtobeeffectiveagainsttargetsofinterest.Fordeeplyburiedtargets,anEPWismoreeffectivethanacontactburst(surfaceburst)ofthesameyield.Theprobabilityofdamagefora300ktEPWat3metersDepthofBlast(DOB)isequivalenttothatfora5to6MegatonSurfaceBurstofthesameaccuracy.
Ingeneral,fordeeplyburiedtargets,anEPWyieldsintherangeofseveralhundredsofkilotonstoaMegatonareneededtoeffectivelyholdthesetargetsofinterestatriskwithahighprobabilityofdestruction.
(Source:EffectsofNuclearEarthPenetratorandOtherWeapons.NationalResearchCouncil.http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html) 96
EarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)at3metersdepthofburstwith100metersCEPaccuracy,againstadeeplyburiedtarget.
ForafixedCEP,effectivenessisnotstronglydependentontargethardness.
EarthPenetratorWeapon(EPW)at3metersdepthofburstwith10metersCEPaccuracy,againstadeeplyburiedtarget.
ForafixedCEP,effectivenessisnotstronglydependentontargethardness.
(Source:EffectsofNuclearEarthPenetratorandOtherWeapons.NationalResearchCouncil.http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html)
97