IslamIc state In Germany,Germans In IslamIc stateGermany’s homeGrown jihadists
artur Ciechanowicz
IslamIc state In Germany, Germans In IslamIc state Germany’s homeGrown jihadists
artur Ciechanowicz
warsawaPriL 2017
© Copyright by ośrodek studiów wschodnichim. marka Karpia / Centre for eastern studies
Content editormateusz Gniazdowski, anna Kwiatkowska-drożdż
editorKatarzyna Kazimierska
Co-oPerationanna Łabuszewska
transLationmagdalena Klimowicz
Co-oPerationnicholas Furnival GraPhiC desiGn Para-buCh
PhotoGraPh on CoVershutterstock
dtPGroupmedia
Chartswojciech mańkowski
PubLisherOśrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka Karpia Centre for eastern studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, warsaw, PolandPhone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl
isbn 978-83-62936-93-9
Contents
Theses /5
InTroducTIon /6
I. isLamiC state miLitants CominG From Germany /7
1. The profile of a German jihadist /72. The jihadists’ motivation /83. Actions by German jihadists in syria /114. The returns /125. The legal consequences /126. The assessment of the threat /13
II. the reaCtion oF the state /15
1. Toughening the law /152. The end of lenience /173. expanding the police and intelligence services personnel /18
III. the danGer oF radiCaLism /21
1. salafis as a subculture /212. The narrow perspective /243. The dimensions of the risk /25
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Theses
• MuslimsfromGermanyhavetravelledtoregionsmilitaryconflictsandac-tivityarebeingcarriedoutbyIslamicradicals.OneconsequenceofthisinGermanyhas involvedthe introductionofaseriesof legislativechanges,the strengthening of the operating potential of specific services and theimplementationofcertainexisting,albeithithertonotapplied,provisionsaimedatpreventingpossibleattacks.
• SomeofthemeasurestakenbyGermanpoliticiansandservicesaimedatsteppingupcontrolofradicalIslamistgroupsnaturallyleadstocivilfree-domsbeinglimited.InGermany,thisisasensitiveissue.Ittriggersnumer-ousdebatesanddisputes.TheGermanleadershipisresponsibleforprovid-ingsecurity,butcanneverthelessnotpermititselftoexcessivelyinterfereinlawsregardingthesurveillanceofcitizens.
• Salafis have become the embodiment of the terrorist threat in GermanyandIslamicStateisconsideredtheironlyspiritualhomeland.Atthesametime, it has become a characteristic feature of the German narrative re-gardingtheterroristthreattoemphasiseaverystronganddurabledivi-sionbetweenIslamandSalafismanddefiningIslamicradicalsthroughtheprismofthetheoryofayouthcounter-culture,which–accordingtoGer-mansecurityservices–hasaround8,000supporters.Similartoneo-Naziandleftistarmedgroups,Salafishavebecomeoneofthegroupswhichre-belagainsttheGermanconstitutionalorder.
• TheSalafiproblemisinfactapoliticalproblemandtheapproachtoithasbeenaproductofactionstakenbyspecificpartiesindomesticpolitics.MostpoliticianssupporttheideaofnotassociatingIslamicradicalismwiththemajorityofMuslimsandnotstokinganti-IslamicmoodinGermany.Theyclaimthat,especiallyinthecontextofthemigrantcrisis,thiscouldleadtothestigmatisationofallMuslimsand,inturn,tosocialconflicts.
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InTroducTIon
InGermany,Islamicradicalismisnotanewandunknownphenomenonanddeparturesofjihadiststoconflictregionshavebeenrecordedbefore.However,thepresentscaleof thisphenomenon,alongsidethreatsformulatedtowardsGermany,hasmadeGermansawareofthesizeoftherisk.TheFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitution(BfV)considersseveralhundredindividualswhoinrecentyearstravelledtofightinthewaralongsidegroupsfromwhichtheyoriginatetobeoneofthegreatestthreatstoGermany’sinternalsecurity.DespitethefactthattheyhavenotorganisedanyattackonascalecomparabletothatoftheattackscarriedoutinMadrid,London,ParisandBrussels,throughtheirpresenceandactivity,IslamicradicalspermanentlyresidinginGerma-ny exert a certain influence on how the German state and society function.Moreover,theirexistenceisasymptomofadeepproblemwhichisunlikelytobeautomaticallyresolvedifandwhenIslamicStatecollapses,thepossibilitytotraveltotheconflictregionsisblocked,andthejihadistsreturningfromthesetripsaretakentocourt.TheproblemoftheradicalisationofMuslimslivinginGermanywilllikelygrowinthecomingyears.Thebiggestfearexperiencedbysecurityservicesandpoliticians involvesthisradicalisationtranslating intoactsofviolenceandterrorcarriedout inGermany, thepotentialreactiontothese by German radicals, and the social and political consequences of suchconflicts.Despitenotbeinginterconnected,recentattacksinvolvingmigrants(thesummerof2016)havemadethesloganspromotedbyanti-immigrantandanti-Muslimgroupsallthemorecredible.Topicsreferredtointheseslogansinclude:theimpossibilityofintegratingMuslims,crimeamongimmigrants,andthestate’sfailuretofulfilitscommitmentstowardsitscitizens.
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I. IslamIc sTaTe mIlITanTs comIng from germany
SincethebeginningofthecivilwarinSyria,around810individualsfromGer-manyhavetravelledtotheMiddleEasttosupportIslamicterrorgroups1.ThisistheofficialnumberquotedbytheFederalCriminalPoliceOffice(BKA).TheactualnumberofjihadistscomingfromGermanyisnotknown.Accordingtothesecurityservices, itmaybeconsiderablyhigherthanisstatedinofficialstatisticsanditcontinuestorise.Sofar,over130GermanjihadistshavebeenkilledinSyriaandIraqandaround270havereturnedtoGermany.70ofthemareknowntohavegainedcombatexperience2.
1. The profile of a german jihadist
The reasons why individuals travel to Syria and Iraq to fight in the war aredifferentineachcase.Religious,economic,socio-political,culture-relatedandpsychological factors play a role here. However, radicalised Islamists fromGermanydohavecertainsocio-demographicparametersincommon.
80% of militants from Germany are men. However, recent months haveseenarise inthenumberofwomenwhodecidetotravel toaconflictre-gion3.Mostoftheseindividualsareaged15–25,overhalfofthemwereborninGermany,and60%haveGermancitizenship.Convertsaccountfor12%ofthetotalnumber.AllthemilitantscomingfromGermanyhavebeenassoci-atedwithSalafigroups(asarealltheIslamicterroristcellssofaridentifiedinGermany)4.
ThemostrecentdataregardingtheethnicdescentofGermanjihadistscomefrom2014.Accordingtothem,38%ofindividualswhotravelledabroadtojoinIslamicStateandfightareofAraborigin,22%areofTurkishorigin,9%have
1 BKA-PräsidentwarntvorIS-Rückkehrern,16May2016,http://www.focus.de/politik/ex-perten/tophoven/holger-muench-im-interview-militaerausbildung-kampferfahrung-net-zwerk-bka-praesident-warnt-vor-is-rueckkehrern_id_5531663.html
2 BKAliegenhochbrisanteIS-Papierevor,7March2016,http://www.n-tv.de/politik/BKA-liegen-hochbrisante-IS-Papiere-vor-article17163921.html
3 Ibid.4 SalafistischeBestrebungen,21July2015,http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeits-
felder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/was-ist-islamismus/salafistische-bestrebungen
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theirrootsintheBalkans(mainlyinBosnia),and4%havetheirrootsinAf-ghanistan5.
TheGermanFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitutionreferstotheprofileofatypicalGermanjihadistusingtheabbreviation“4M”–fromfourGerman M-words which stand for four characteristic features: muslimisch(Muslim), maennlich (male), Migrationshintergrund (having an immigrantbackground), Misserfolg (not particularly successful in life)6. The FederalCriminalPoliceOffice(BKA),foritspart,publishedaspecialreportinwhichitanalysedthebiographiesof670militantsandfoundoutthatalmosthalfofthemhadpreviouslycomeintoconflictwiththelawandhadbeenknowntothepolice;82hadsecondaryorvocationalschooleducation;80hadenrolledasstudentsbutnevergraduated;around160wereunemployed7.
2. The jihadists’ motivation
DeparturesbymilitantsfromGermanytoconflictregionswiththeintentiontohelptheir‘brothersinfaith’arenotanewphenomenonandformoneofthesymptomsoftheexistence(forsometimealready)ofradicalgroupsofGermanMuslimsor,morebroadlyspeaking,ofthesocio-politicalproblemofthelackofintegrationofasectionofindividualsstemmingfromimmigrantfamilies.Theso-calledHamburgGroupcentredaroundMohammedAttaplayedakeyroleintheattackscarriedouton11September2001.Inthewakeoftheseat-tacksthemediarepeatedlyreportedonGermancitizensundergoingtrainingin camps run by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic JihadUnioninPakistanandthosefightingISAFtroops.ForGermans,thebrothersYassinandMounirChoukahavebecometheembodimentofthe‘jihadistsnextdoor’.TheyareGermancitizensofMoroccandescentwhotravelledtotheKun-duzprovinceinAfghanistantojoinagroupofmilitantsassociatedwiththeIs-lamicMovementofUzbekistanandtofight,forexample,Bundeswehrcontin-gentsoldiers.However,“AbuIbrahim”and“AbuAdam”becameknownmainlyforshortpropagandavideosinwhichtheycalledonMuslimsinGermanyto
5 ImmermehrdeutscheDschihadisteninSyrien,26February2014,http://www.faz.net/ak-tuell/politik/nrw-kuendigt-konsequenzen-an-immer-mehr-deutsche-dschihadisten-in-syrien-12822278.html
6 DeutschlandsNeo-Salafisten,29October2014,http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/hans-georg-maassen-die-vier-m-der-deutschen-salafisten-13235053.html
7 Klug,kriminell,großerFreundeskreis:SoistderdeutscheIS-Kämpfer,23September2015,http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/dschihad-so-ist-der-deutsche-is-kaempfer-1.2661697
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carry out attacks and invited them to join the fight against “the infidels” inAfghanistanandPakistan8.DespiteconsiderablemediaattentionfocusedonthebrothersfromBonn,thescaleofthephenomenonwasstillmarginal.ItisestimatedthatsincethebeginningoftheinterventioninAfghanistanaround100 German residents (with some sources claiming this number to be 200)havetravelledtheretofightinthewar.Thisnumberincludesthewivesandchildrenofthesemen9.AccordingtoGermansecurityservices,thesignificantincreaseinthescaleofindividualsdepartingfromGermanytotakepartinthewarinSyriaandIraqismainlyconnectedwithtwofactorsdiscussedbelow.
• Geographicalaccessibility
Syria is much better accessible by various means of transport than Soma-lia, Chechnya or Afghanistan, where only the most determined individualsmanagedtotravel,additionallyonconditionthattheyhadlocalcontacts.ItischeaperandsimplertomakedreamsofjihadcometrueinSyriaandIraq.Themostpopular ‘route’toIslamicStaterunsfromGermanytoTurkeybyplane(GermanSalafisrefertotheseflightsasthe“Dschihad-Express”or“jihad-ex-press”),andfromthereontoSyria.
• IslamicStatepropaganda
IslamicStatehasbeenabletoorganiseasuccessfulpropagandacampaigntowinsupportersinEurope.Videomessages,nasheeds(inthiscase–warsongsperformedsolo)andblogsbuildtheimageofIslamicStateterritoryasaplacewheresharialawisbeingfullyobservedandasacentreofthefightforjusticeand moral purification, thus making migration there (hijrah) an obligation.TheseareplaceswherepeopleareassessednotbasedontheirskincolourbutonwhethertheyaregoodMuslims10.IslamicStatevaluesarecontrastedwiththe“rotten”West.Takingpartinthewar–themessageseemstosuggest–is
8 IchwillunbedingtDeutschetöten!,4December2013,http://www.if-zeitschrift.de/portal/a/ifz/!ut/p/c4/JYvBCsIwEAX_KNvUHsSbJRdBPOhB66WkzRoXmqSsWwvix5vgG5jL8OAOm-Wjf5K1QinaCG3Qj7YZVDavDnh4fJU8MGNWwIHvk_iXWClzL0aEaU0QpFoxC2Z6tJFZzYplKWZhzUeSgq7Rp9UbX1X_6uz2Z46XWTWMO7RnmEPY_5Z7Eww!!/
9 Fürdeutsche"Gotteskrieger"istSyrienReisezielNr.1,4October2014,http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article132910243/Fuer-deutsche-Gotteskrieger-ist-Syrien-Reiseziel-Nr-1.html
10 WATCH:ISISReleasesNew‘NoRespite’PropagandaVideoinEnglish,24November2015,http://heavy.com/news/2015/11/new-isis-islamic-state-news-pictures-videos-no-respite-english-language-propaganda-full-uncensored-youtube-daesh/
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aromanticadventure,anoccasiontofeelamemberofacommunityofmili-tants,andanopportunitytofightagainstBasharal-Assadandother“infidels”(meaningthosewhoopposeIslamicState,nomatterwhethertheyareMus-limsornot).Itisalsorepresentedasahistoricmissioninvolvingthecreationof a “caliphate and predominantly a religious imperative”11. It is not just thecontentofthispropagandamessagewhichisimportant,butalsoitsformandchannelsofcommunication.ThefootagedistributedviasocialmediaandvideosharingsitesareusuallyofgoodqualitywithcertaineditingeffortsevidenttocopycatthedynamicstyleofHollywoodmoviesandvideogameswhichWest-ernviewersareaccustomedto12.Anothercharacteristicfeatureinvolvesfoot-agetargetedatGermanviewersincreasinglyoftenfeaturingGermanspeakingfighters13. Salafi groups operating in Germany are fertile ground for IslamicState propaganda as they form part of Muslim youth subculture referred toasturbo-Islamorpop-Islam(seebelow).Intheirview,IslamicStateistheem-bodimentoftheutopiaofatruecaliphate.
Itisdifficulttodrawaprecisepersonalityprofileofajihadist.Similarly,itisnotpossible topoint toasinglecause toexplainwhyyoungpeople living inEurope(andwhofrequentlywerebornthere)decidetoabandontheirformerlivesandtravelabroadtofightinawar.Radicalisationseemstobeaprereq-uisite for making this decision. According to criminologists, the underlyingcauseofradicalisationofaportionofMuslimslivinginGermanyisthesenseofnotbelongingtolay,liberalsociety(typicalofsecondandthirdgenerationimmigrants), accompanied by the lack of connections with their parents’ orgrandparents’countryoforigin14.Thefeelingofalienationisstrongerwhenac-companiedbydisorientationintherealmofaxiology,sotypicalofadolescents,andbyrebellionagainsttheirparents’lifestyle.Thecombinationofpersonal-itytraits,socialfactors(discussedabove)andexposuretoacertainideology(forexampleSalafiorIslamicStatepropaganda)cancauseapersontobecomeradicalisedanddecidetotraveltoIslamicState-controlledterritory.ThecitedBKA report suggests that radicalisation is taking place in a circle of friends
11 ISISkönnteeineModernisierungdesIslameinleiten,10August2015,http://www.20min.ch/reportage-IS/interview_mansour.html
12 Dschihad2.0,28January2015,http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/selbstradikalisierung-im-netz-dschihad-2-0.724.de.html?dram:article_id=310037
13 ISveröffentlichterstesPropaganda-VideoaufDeutsch,6August2015,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHp9s-MnlbQ
14 DeutscheIS-Dschihadisten.KriminalätiologischeundkriminalpräventiveAnalysedesRadi-kalisierungsprozesses.RolandChristianHoffmann-Plesch,Kriminalistik 2015/2,p.74.
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(37%),inmosques(33%)andviaexposuretopropagandamessagesontheIn-ternet(30%ofthecases).
3. actions by german jihadists in syria
SpecificinformationregardingtheroleGermanjihadistsplayinIslamicStateis scarce and difficult to verify. The arrival of a foreign volunteer from Ger-manyinIslamicStateismainlyviewedasapropagandasuccessandproofofthe effectiveness of actions aimed at building a community of supporters inEurope15. On the spot, following verification, having undergone ideologicalandmilitarytraining,jihadistsfromGermanyaredelegatedtoperformoneofthreetypesoftasks16.Notallofthemaresenttothefront.
• VolunteerswhohaveaspecificprofessionforwhichthereisdemandinIs-lamicStategeta‘job’consistentwiththeircompetences;
• Asectionofthevolunteersissenttoworkonpropagandamaterialstarget-edatGermanviewers.TheentireproductionofpropagandamaterialstobedistributedintheWestiscarriedoutbyforeignjihadists.Someofthem–inparticularthosewhowereactivemembersofSalafigroupsinGermany–becomethe‘faces’ofIslamicStatecampaigns(formerrapperDenisCuspertakaDesoDoggakaAbuTalha,SalafiactivistChristianDavidEmdeakaAbuQatada,orRedaSeyamakaDhulalQarnayn).
• Thosewhodonotfit intoeitherof thosetwo ‘professional’categoriesaresent to work for maintenance ‘service’ or to fight at the front. AccordingtostatementsbysomeofthefighterswhoreturnedtoGermany,‘Europe-ans’arebeingusedtotorture,executeorwatchovertheprisoners,totrackdown deserters and to carry out suicide attacks (so far, around 20 indi-viduals from Germany have perpetrated such attacks). Incidentally, theGermannarrativepromotestheviewthatthesearethetaskslocalmujahi-deenrefusetocarryout.Thecrueltyofforeignfightersisseenasaresultofmoreprofoundradicalisation,thelackofknowledgeoflocalcustomsand
15 Wenndudahingehst,bistdutot,16July2015,https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/islamis-cher-staat-rueckkehrer-101.html
16 UnsereAngstvordenPop-Dschihadisten,10August2015,http://www.20min.ch/reportage-IS/index.html
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onlysuperficialreligiousknowledge.Allthismakestheseindividualsmorepronetomanipulation17.
4. The returns
AccordingtoBKAfigures,aroundathirdofthe810IslamicradicalswhohadleftGermanytofightinSyria,havereturnedtoGermany.Theservicesandex-pertsdealingwithSalaficommunitiesdistinguishthreegroupsoftheseindi-viduals18:
• ThosewhodidnotmakeittoSyriaanddiscontinuedtheirtravelinTurkey,withoutcrossingtheSyrianborder.Mostofthetimewhatmotivatesthemisfearoftheincreasinglyrealisticperspectiveofbecominginvolvedinmil-itaryactivities,possiblygettingkilledandfindingthemselvesinasituationwhereitisimpossibletoreturntotheirformerlives.
• ThosewhostayedinIslamicStateforashorttimeonly.UponarrivinginSyria,potentialmilitantsarefirstverifiedfortheirintentionsanduseful-ness.TheverificationprocesstakesseveralweeksduringwhichtimesomeofthevolunteersbegintobecomeawareofthedivergencebetweenwhattheyhadheardaboutlivinginIslamicStateandaboutthewaraspresentedinpropagandamaterials,andwhattheyreallysee.Themountingdoubtsandconsciencepangsmakethemdecidetoreturn.
• Those who formed a bad opinion of Islamic State after several weeks ormonthsof‘service’intheranksoffightersanddecidedtoreturntotheirformer lives. However, this is possible only when German governmentagencieshavenoevidenceofthemtakingpartinmilitaryactivities,other-wisetheseindividualswillbearrested.
5. The legal consequences
Returngeneratestheriskoflegalconsequences.Themainpenaltyiscriminalresponsibilityforbeingamemberofaterroristgroup(articles129aand129bof the Criminal Code). Since 2002, membership of a terrorist group outsideGermanyisalsoprosecuted.Since2009,theso-calledTerrorcampgesetz(orthe
17 Ibid.18 LamyaKaddor,ZumToetenbereit,PiperVerlag2015,pp.140–143.
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lawonterroristcamps)hasbeeninplace,whichprovidesforprosecutingin-dividualswhohaveundergonetraininginterroristcamps.InApril2015,theBundestagadoptedapackageoflawspreparedbytheministryoftheinteriorandtheministryofjustice,tougheningtheseprovisions(formoreonthisseesection3).
6. The assessment of the threat
AccordingtotheFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitution,thede-parturesofMuslimsfromGermanytofightinthewarinSyriaalsoposeapo-tentialthreatforGermany.ThesecurityservicesareawarethatinasituationwheresuchalargenumberofvolunteersaretravellingtoIS,itisincreasinglylikelythataportionofindividualswhohaveundergonetraininginterroristcamps,knowhowtousearmsandbuildbombs,havecombatexperienceandare accustomed to violence, will return to Germany. This approach is rela-tivelynew.Untilrecently,theGermansecurityservicesemphasisednumer-ousadvantagesofthefactthatradicalIslamistshadleftthecountry.Theythusturnedablindeyetotravellingjihadistsorevenfacilitatedtheirtravel.ThiswasrevealedinOctober2014byLudwigSchierghoferfromtheStateCriminalPoliceOffice(LKA)inBavaria.HereferredtoaclassifiedinstructionpreparedbythefederalministryoftheinteriorinMay2009.Thelogicbehindthisap-proachwasasfollows:ifwearedealingwitharadicalIslamist,whoisreadytocarryoutanattackinGermany,itisbettertohavehimleavethecountry.Thisstrategywasbeingfolloweduntiltheautumnof201319.Thiswaswhenitbe-cameevidentthatSyria,notAfghanistan,isthemaindestinationforGermanjihadists.Moreover,thenumberofindividualswhotravelledtoIslamicStatehasledtotheconclusionthattheriskposedbyreturningmilitantswhohavegained combat experience, outweighs the advantages associated with theirtemporaryabsencefromGermany.
IndividualsreturningfromSyriaareunderconstantsurveillancebyspecif-icservices.Mostof themhavebeenthesubjectof investigationsortakentocourt.ThisisoneofthereasonswhythethreatofpotentialattackscomesfromlocalSalafis,whohavenottravelledtoregionsofmilitaryactivityandcannotbekeptunderstrictsurveillancebythepoliceandtheFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitution.Backin2012,HeinzFromm,theformerheadof
19 BehördenließenIslamistenjahrelangausreisen,2October2014,http://www.faz.net/ak-tuell/politik/inland/deutsche-dschihadisten-behoerden-billigten-angeblich-ausreise-von-islamisten-13185935.html
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theFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitution,arguedthatnoteverySalafiisaterroristbutallknownIslamicterroristsfromGermanystemfromSalaficommunities.Thisdiagnosiscontinuestobevalid.
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II. The reacTIon of The sTaTe
Accordingtothefederalministryoftheinterior,thelevelofthreatofattackscarriedoutinGermanyishigh.TheinternalreportonstatesecuritycompiledbytheministryinJanuary2016suggeststhatIslamicStatemilitantshaveadd-ed Germany to their list of potential targets. The ministry assumes that thescenarioofpotentialattacksmayresemblethatusedinthetwoterroristat-tackscarriedoutinParisin2015andinBrusselsin2016.MilitantswhohavereturnedfromSyriaandoperateinsmallcellsorontheirownhavebeencon-sideredthebiggestthreat20.Thisassessmentcontinuestobevalid.Moreover,theattackscarriedout in July2016 inAnsbachandnearWürzburg indicatethatalsomigrantswhohadcometoGermanyasrefugeesmayposeacertainthreat. In these circumstances, the government chooses to act according toastrategywhichplacesasecurity-promotingsolutionbeforeafreedom-pro-motingonewheredoubtexists.Asaconsequence,sincethebeginningof2015,aseriesoflegislativesolutionshasbeenadoptedtolimitthescopeofcivilfree-domswhichwouldnothavebeenaccepted(eitherbypoliticiansorthepublic)inasituationofnothreat21.Anotherimplementedmeasureinvolvesboostingthehumanpotentialofspecificservicesandmodernisingtheequipmenttheyuse.Theprovisionswhichhadbeeninplacebutwhichwerenotimplementedarebecomingthebasisforformulatingindictments.
1. Toughening the law
Inconnectionwiththe2015terroristattackontheeditorialofficeoftheCharlie Hebdomagazine,theBundestagadoptedaseriesoflawspreparedbythemin-istryoftheinteriorandtheministryofjusticetougheningtheprovisionsre-gardingthefightagainstterrorismandtravelbypotentialmilitantstoconflictregions.Theamendmentscover22:
• article89asection2aoftheCriminalCode:beforethelawwasamended,a stay in terrorist training camps was punishable similarly to making
20 AnschlägewieinParismöglich:SogroßistdieTerror-GefahrinDeutschland,14Janu-ary2016,http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/bericht-des-innenministeriums-an-schlaege-wie-in-paris-moeglich-so-gross-ist-die-terror-gefahr-in-deutschland_id_5209723.html
21 SoschafftsichunsereDemokratieab,20November2015,http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-11/terror-sicherheit-deutschland-gesetze-freiheit
22 KampfgegendenTerrorwirdverstärkt,4February2015,http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Themen/FokusThemen/KampfTerror/KampfTerror_node.html
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preparationsforanactofviolenceposingathreattothestate(article89a)orparticipationintrainingpreparingoneselftocarryoutsuchanact(ar-ticle91).Atpresent,justtravellingtostateswhichhostterroristtrainingcamps with the intention to take part in such training is punishable. Inthisway,theamendmentimplementsintoGermanlawtheguidelinescon-tainedintheUNSecurityCouncilresolutionno.2178onforeignterroristfightersofSeptember2014.Pursuanttotheseguidelines,allcasesoftravel,attempted travel with the intention of engaging in terrorist activity andfinancingterroristorganisationsshouldbepunishable23;
• article89coftheCriminalCode:beforetheamendment,gathering,trans-ferringassetswhichare“notinsignificant”ormakingthemavailableforterrorist purposes was punishable. This phrasing was imprecise and ledto doubts among lawyers. In the amended version of the law, the phrase“notinsignificant”wasomitted.Theprovisionreferstorecommendationsby the Financial Action Task Force, an organisation involved in fightingmoneylaunderingandthefundingofterror;
• thelawonidentitydocumentswhichinitspresentversionmakesitpos-sibletodepriveanindividualofthisdocument.Untilrecently,Germanlawmadeitpossibletodepriveindividualsoftheirpassports,butnotoftheiridentitydocuments.Theamendedlawenablestheauthoritiestoretainthisdocumentaswellandissueatemporarydocumentinitsplace,validforuptothreeyears.ItisimportantthatitwouldnotbepossibletotraveloutsideGermanyusingthistemporarydocument.ThisamendmentisintendedtopreventindividualsfromtakingpartinmilitaryactivitiesinIslamicStateterritory.Untilrecently,despitehavingbeendeprivedoftheirpassports,volunteersfromGermanycouldtraveltoSyriaandIraqiftheyusedtheiridentity document as their travel document. It was enough for them totraveltoanycountryneighbouringtheEU,fromtheretoTurkey,andontoIraqorSyria24;
• thelawondataretentionpassedbytheGermanparliamentinOctober2015enablestelecomoperatorstoretaintelephoneandInternetdataforuptotenweeks.Dataregardingusers’locationaretoberetainedforuptofour
23 Resolution2178(2014),24September2014,http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf
24 ReisenvonDschihadistenverhindern,24April2015,https://www.bundesregierung.de/Con-tent/DE/Artikel/2015/01/2015-04-24-gesetz-personalausweis.html
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weeks. Investigators will have access to certain information when theysuspectanindividualhascommittedaseriouscrimeandwhentheyobtainpermissionfromcourt.Inthiscase“seriouscrimes”includesuspectedin-volvementinplanningaterroristattackandviolatingcertainprovisionsofthelawonnarcoticsubstances25;
• back in 2014, pursuant to article 3 in connection with article 15 section1andarticle18section2ofthelawonassociations,ontheinitiativeofGer-many’sinteriorministerThomasdeMaizièretheactivityoftheorganisa-tionknownas“IslamicState”wasbannedinGermany.ThebanalsocoverspopularisationofISsymbols,illustrationsandimageduringmeetings,inwrittenform,onsoundrecordingdevices,andintheformofimages.TheintroducedamendmentscomplementthesolutionsalreadyinplacewhichwereadoptedintheaftermathoftheattackscarriedoutinNewYorkon11September2001.Theirvalidityhasbeenextendeduntil202126.
2. The end of lenience
The new regulations have been adopted largely under pressure from publicopinionratherthanduetoalackoflegalinfrastructuretofightpotentialat-tackers.PriortotheParisattacks,Germanyhadlegislationinplacewhichena-bledtheprosecutionofmembersofterroristorganisationseveniftheywereactive outside Germany. Before 2015, these provisions had been practicallydefunct.Lawyersavoidedformulatingindictmentsbasedontheseprovisions,doubtingwhethertheyareinlinewithinternationallawandfearingthattheymighteasilybechallenged27.TheincreasedfeelingofthreatintheaftermathoftheParisattackshasledtoasurgeinthenumberofinvestigationscarriedoutbythegeneralprosecutor’sofficeinKarlsruheinconnectionwithsuspectedIslamicterrorism.Inlate2015,theprosecutor’sofficewasworkingon136in-vestigationstargeting199suspects. In2014, therewere42investigationsfo-cusedon80individuals;in2013therewere5investigationsfocusedon8sus-pects.Sofar,accusationshavebeenbroughtagainst17individuals.Sentences
25 BundestagbeschließtneueVorratsdatenspeicherung,16October2015,https://www.bunde-stag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw42_de_vorratsdatenspeicherung/391654
26 Anti-Terror-Gesetzegeltenbis2021,27November2015,https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundesrat-terror-gesetze-jubilaeum-101.html
27 DasTerrorcamp-GesetznutztkaumgegendenIS,1October2014,http://www.zeit.de/poli-tik/deutschland/2014-09/islamischer-staat-syrien-rueckkehrer-terrorcamp-gesetz-89a/seite-2
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havebeenpassedinsevencasesandhaveinvolvedimprisonmentforaperiodrangingfrom21months(suspended)toelevenyears(thiswasthecaseofanindividualwhohadreturnedfromSyria)28.Atpresent,alltheprosecutor’sof-ficesareprocessinginvestigationsfocusedon800individualswhoreturnedfromSyriaorwerepreventedfromtravellingthere.
Therehavealsobeenchangesinhowthepoliceacts.Thisphenomenonhasnotbeenvisibleinstatistics,however,policeofficersadmittothemediathattheyhavebeguntousepreventivedetentionofindividualsconsidereddangerous29.Asimilarshifthasbeenobservedinrelationtoso-called‘racialprofiling’,orselectingindividualsinthestreettobecheckedbasedontheirskincolour30.
3. expanding the police and intelligence services personnel
TheterroristattackscarriedoutinFranceinJanuary2015havetriggeredade-bateonthelevelofpreparednessoftheGermanpoliceforthistypeofthreat.Thisincludedadiscussiononitsequipmentandweaponry.InthecaseofGer-many, the debate revolves around investing in specific technologies, in par-ticularthoseusedforsurveillance,ratherthansupplyingthepolicewithmorearms.
Atthefederallevel,thebiggestproblemfacedbythesecurityservicesisinsuf-ficientpersonnel;thiswasadmittedbyHolgerMünch,theheadoftheFederalCriminalPoliceOffice(BKA).AccordingtoMünch,policeofficersareburdenedwithanexcessiveamountofduties,especiallywhenitcomestothesurveil-lance of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activity. It is truethattheBKAisemployingnewofficerstocombatterrorists,butbeforetheyaredelegatedtoservice,theyneedtoundergoappropriatetraining.Theproblemsareaggravatedbytheongoingmigrationcrisiswhichabsorbstheattentionofalargeportionofthesecurityservices’personnel.
28 ZahlderTerrorverfahreninDeutschlandhatsichverdreifacht,20January2016,http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-01/bundesanwaltschaft-terror-verfahren-islam-ismus
29 KampfgegendieIch-AGsdesTerrors,22January2015,http://www.sueddeutsche.de/poli-tik/neue-strategie-deutscher-behoerden-kampf-gegen-die-ich-ags-des-terrors-1.2316817
30 WennnurdieHautfarbezählt,8April2015,http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/racial-pro-filing-wenn-nur-die-hautfarbe-zaehlt/11604882.html
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Inthissituation,theGermanrulingcoalitiondecidedthatin2016–2018atotalof3,568newjobswillbecreatedintheFederalPolice(Bundespolizei).TheBKAwillbeallowedtoemploy297newofficers,200ofwhomwillbedealingwithIslamicterrorism.TheFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitutionwillemploy 470 new officers, 200 ofwhom willbe involved in monitoring Salafigroups. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) will create 225 new jobs, 125ofwhichwillsupplementteamsinvolvedinexposingterroristorganisations.
In the aftermath of the January 2015 attacks in France, Germany identifiedtheneedtocreateanewspecialunittointerveneduringaprolongedterroristthreat.GermanydoeshaveaGSG9unitwhichspecialises inoperationscar-riedoutduringaterroristattack.However,itscapabilitymaybeinsufficientshouldanattackbecarriedoutonalargescale.ThisiswhytheMinistryoftheInteriordecidedtocreateaspecialunitwithintheFederalPolicestructuretointervenealsoduringralliesandsportsevents(BFE+).Thisunitwillconsistof250officersdelegatedtofivelocationsinGermany:Blumberg(Brandenburg),SanktAugustin(NorthRhine-Westphalia),Hünfeld(Hesse),Bayreuth(Bava-ria),andUelzen(LowerSaxony)31.
Thestate’sreaction involvingtheuseofrepressiveandpreventivemeasuresalongsideincreasedsocially-motivatedostracismlendsacertainlevelofcre-dencetotheSalafinarrativeaboutthepersecutionofMuslims.So,paradoxi-cally,Salafiswelcometheactionstargetingthem.ThisargumentisbeingusedbyleftistandliberalgroupsinGermanytoprovethatthesemethodsbringtheoppositeresults towhatwasassumed. Incontrast to thisnarrative, though,thereisnoothereffectiveresponse,eithertemporaryorlong-term,tothechal-lengeposedbyradicalIslam.Onedirecteffectofpermanentsurveillanceandincreasedvigilanceamongcitizenshasbeentheabsenceoflarge-scaleattackstodate.Inthelongterm,thesetwofactorsmaydiscouragepotentialsupport-ersofSalafigroupsfromincreasedinvolvement(interroristactivities).
muslims in germany
Before the migration crisis, 3.8–4.3 million german residents identi-fied themselves as muslims. The largest group among them, 2.6 million individuals, are of Turkish origin. around 550,000 german muslims come from albania, Bosnia and herzegovina, and Bulgaria. around
31 DeutscheSicherheitsbehördenrüstenauf,17November2015,http://pdf.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-11/paris-attentate-deutsche-sicherheitsbehoerden-ruesten-auf.pdf
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330,000 are from lebanon, Iraq, syria and egypt. around 280,000 are from the maghreb (mainly morocco). muslims account for around 5% of the german population and 25% (out of over 15 million) of residents who come from immigrant families. 45% of muslims in germany have german citizenship. most german muslims (74%) are believers in sunni Islam; 13% are alevis; 7% are shia muslims; and 6% belong to other branches of Islam.
salafism
salafism is the most prominent and dynamically developing branch of independent Islam in the world. It is an extremist religious movement within sunni Islam characterised by strict puritanism and legalism (all actions must have their justification in the Quran and in hadiths) and the rejection of tradition understood as a foreign element in pure, original Islam to which salafis refer. salafism – both in germany and globally – is an amorphous, decentralised and multi-branch religious movement. It is being shaped by its members and it has no unified leadership, although there are leaders surrounded by groups of their supporters. salafism does not automatically assume military combat – the approach towards militant jihad is one of the lines of division among salafi groups; they are highly diversified when it comes to this issue.
due to the fact that salafism (seen as pure, the most orthodox Islam) is attractive to converts and individuals returning to faith, this branch of Islam is gaining popularity across the world (including in europe).
source: https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/homojihadicus.pdf
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III. The danger of radIcalIsm
BoththeFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitution(BfV)andmostmediaandpoliticiansviewSalafismasthemostdynamicallydevelopingex-tremistmovementinGermany.Inlate2015,thesecurityservicesannouncedthattherewere7,900self-declaredSalafisresidinginGermany.However,theBfValsoassumesthatthecircleofindividualswhosupportthemismuchwid-er.Outofaroundthreethousandmosques,12arecontrolledbySalafis.Ahun-dredothermosquessupportthesegroups.
1. salafis as a subculture
TheGermannarrativeregardingSalafisismainlybeingshapedbyrepresenta-tivesofthesecurityservices,teachers,socialworkers,andMuslimcommuni-tiescompetingwithSalafis.Asaconsequence,thedebatefocusesonsecurityissuesasbroadlyunderstood(terrorism,radicalisationetc.),demonisespropa-gandainitiatives,anddiscreditsSalafisascharlatansjugglingwithpassagesfromtheQuranandpresentingtheirsupporterswithablackandwhitevisionoftheworldalongsideclearrulesonhowtobehave,butlackingfundamentalknowledgeofthereligiontheypromote.Thisisthereasonbehindtheconstantcomparisons of Salafism with leftist and neo-Nazi radicalism and attemptsatexplainingitspopularitysolelyonthebasisofthetheoryofyouthsubcul-ture.Thisapproachpartlyresultsfrompoliticalcorrectnessandpartlyfromthespecific,professionalperspectiveoftheparticipantsofthedebate,whoarefocusedonrepressiveandpreventivemeasurestargetingindividualsunder-goingradicalisation.Thetendencytoinertlyassignnewphenomenatoprevi-ouslyknowncategoriesisequallyimportant32.Thisperspectiveisnotdevoidofpracticalsense,especiallyinthecaseofthepoliceandsocialworkers,whoareexpectedtohaveautilitarianapproachtotheproblem.
Initsanalyses,theBfVpresentsSalafismasaseriousifisolatedproblemaf-fecting “difficult” youth, and as another counter-culture. To justify this ap-proachitfocusesoncategoriesoffeatureswhicharecommonforsubculturesinGermany:theexternalattributesbywhichmembersofspecificsubculturesrecognise each other (short trousers, beard, no moustache), the tendency toformassociations,organiseralliesanduseviolencetowardstheirideological
32 ExtremistischeGewalt:DasIS-Verbotistsymbolisch,10November2014,http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/hooligans-gegen-salafisten-polizei-warnt-vor-hogesa-ge-walt-a-1002027.html
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opponents33. The Salafi ideological offering is characterised as referring toa“pureform”ofIslam,strictobservationofrecommendationscontainedintheQuranandSunnahinreligiouspracticesanddailylife,andfollowingtheex-ampleofMuhammadhimselfandthefirstthreecaliphs(al-Salafal-Salih).Asfaraspoliticalissuesareconcerned,Salafismostfrequentlyholdthefollow-ingviews:theydonotrecognisedemocracy(becauseitisheresy),theytreatpoliticalpartiesasorganisationswhichareagainstIslam(becausetheyleadtoafragmentationoftheunifiedcommunityofMuslims)andbanindividualsfromexercisingtheirelectoralrights(bothpassiveandactive).Muslimswhodonotfollowtheserulesaretreatedas“infidels”.AccordingtoSalafis,thiscat-egoryalsocomprisesChristiansandJews.Engagingincontactswith“infidels”isprohibited34.AlsointhecaseofSalafis,anti-Semitism,whichistypicalofIslamicradicals, is a blend of the most widespread stereotypes (for exampleaccusationsofritualkillingsofchildren),theviewrefusingthestateofIsraeltherighttoexist,andjustifyingviolenceagainstJewsbywayofreligiousmo-tives.TheultimategoalofSalafisinGermanyisthecreationofatheocracyinwhichsharialawwouldbeobserved(intheirinterpretation)andthepresentconstitutionalorderwouldbeannulled35.
Based on their preferred methods of attaining this goal, in the German dis-courseSalafisaredividedintoproponentsofthepoliticallineofSalafismandthosewhosupportthe jihadi lineofSalafism.Theformertendtoemphasisemissionaryandpropagandaactivities.Theirapproachtousingviolenceisam-biguousandfarfromanunconditionalrejection.TheotherlineofSalafismas-sumesthatimmediatearmedcombatisthemethodforcreatingaconfessionalstate.Bothlinesconsiderjihad(understoodasarmedcombat)oneofimpera-tivesofIslam.
TheBfVestimatesthatthejihadilineofSalafismissupportedbyaround15%ofGermanSalafis.Accordingto2015data,Salafismisaphenomenon90%shapedbyindividualscomingfromMuslimfamilies,inparticularbyrepresentatives
33 Salafismus–eindeutscherExtremismus,July2013,http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi_siak/4/2/1/2013/ausgabe_1/files/said_1_2013.pdf
34 WiemanMuslimwird,23May2016,http://salaf.de/nichtmuslime/pdf/fue0001_Wie%20man%20Muslim%20wird.pdf
35 SalafistischeBestrebungen,21July2015,https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeits-felder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/was-ist-islamismus/salafistische-bestrebungen
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ofthesecond,thirdorevenfourthgenerationofimmigrants.ThreequartersofsupportersofthisideologyhaveGermancitizenship36.
TheGermanpublicdebateonthisdevotesconsiderableattentiontotheonlinepropagandaactivitiescarriedoutbySalafis.Socialmediaandvideo-sharingsitesenablethemtopresenttheirmaterialsinanattractiveandeasilyacces-sible form.Publiccharitycollections, forexampleforSyria,areanotherop-portunityforSalafistospreadtheirmessage.Seminarsandlectures(Islam-seminare)organisedinthespiritofentertainmentandhostedby“stars”(i.e.foreignorlocalpreachers)areanotherpopularformofmissionarywork.TheseeventsarefrequentlyorganisedduringChristianholidays.Ontheonehand,thesearedaysofffromworkorschool,whichmay justify thechoiceofday.Ontheother,thissparksprotests37.CriticalvoicesnotonlyhelppromotetheeventsbutmayalsobeusedbySalafisasproofoftheallegedIslamophobiaoftheentireGermansociety.MostinitiativesorganisedbySalafisdocontainele-mentsofprovocationsince,asidefromtheirdeclaredgoals,theyareintendedtosparkcontroversyandpromoteSalafigroups.InSeptember2014,SvenLau,aprominentSalafipreacher,accompaniedbyseveralofhissupporterswearingfluorescentvestswiththe inscription“ShariahPolice” ‘patrolled’ thestreetsof Wuppertal in North Rhine-Westphalia. The guard members reprimandedwomenforwearing(whattheysawas)overlyprovocativeclothingandothermembersofthepublicfordrinkingalcoholandlisteningtomusic.PoliticiansandthemediaconsideredthisinitiativeanattemptbyIslamicradicalsatseiz-ingstateprerogatives,makingitahottopicacrossGermany38.Similarly,theSalafitrademarkcampaign“Lies!”(orRead!),duringwhichinSalafisdistrib-utecopiesoftheQuranandinformationbrochuresaboutIslamcitycentres,isseenaschallengingGermany’sconstitutionalorder.GermanSalafisreceivethematerialstheydistributefromSaudiandEgyptianassociationsinvolvedinpropagatingreligion(WorldWideAssociationforIntroducingIslam,WorldOrganizationforPresentingIslam,CooperativeOfficeforCallandGuidance,
36 ExtremistischerSalafismus:Ursachen,GefahrenundGegenstrategien,15August2015,http://www.mik.nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Redakteure/Verfassungsschutz/Doku-mente/Broschueren/Extremistischer_Salafismus_Aug15.pdf
37 SalafistenplanenHasspredigtenanHeiligabend,2December2010,http://www.rp-online.de/nrw/staedte/moenchengladbach/salafisten-planen-hasspredigten-an-heiligabend-aid-1.723430
38 KalkulierteProvokation,7September2014,http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/sch-aria-polizei-kalkulierte-provokation-13140309.html
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ConveyingIslamicMessageSociety)39.Inresponsetothe“Lies!”campaign,inMay2015CDUpoliticiansfromNorthRhine-WestphaliadistributedcopiesoftheGermanconstitutionstopassers-by.
2. The narrow perspective
ThedebateonSalafismlacksaperspectivewhichwouldpayattentiontotheprocesses taking place in Germany’s Muslim community and the trends inGermanIslam.Mostprobably,thedevelopmentofSalafisminGermanywouldnot have been possible without so-called pop-Islam40– an amalgamation ofyouthtrendswhichemergedinGermanyatthebeginningofthe21stcenturyandwhichwereshapedbydescendantsofimmigrants.Thesetwomovements,fortheirpart,wouldnothaveemergedifIslamitselfhadnotgainedpopularityinGermany.Althoughtheyfightpop-Islam,SalafisbuildtheirpositionbasedonarenewedimageofIslamamongsecondandthirdgenerationimmigrants.Indoingsotheyusemethodswhichhavebeentestedbefore,buttheystrivetoattaintheirowngoal.
Pop-Islam
In opinion journalism it is referred to as a blend “of hip-hop and Islam, h&m fashion and gender segregation”. supporters of pop-Islam intend to take an active part in germany’s socio-political life and at the same time maintain and cultivate their muslim identity. The term ‘allah-Kids’ refers to the activists of muslim associations such as muslimis-che Jugend in deutschland (muslim youth in germany), lifemakers germany, Islamische denkfabrik (muslim think-tank) or m.a.h.d.I. (muslime aller herkunft deutscher Identitaet – muslims of all ori-gins with german Identity). Their actions are de facto a protest against becoming isolated in immigrant ghettos and an attempt to negotiate the status of Islam in the german state. on the one hand, pop-Islam is the consequence of the increased popularity of Islam in germany and of individuals searching for an attractive way to express their faith. on the other hand, it has indeed led to a situation in which Islam is no longer associated by muslims themselves with the ritual approach
39 NinaWiedl,GeschichtedesSalafismusinDeutschland,in:BehnamT.Said/HazimFouad(eds.),Salafismus.AufderSuchenachdemwahrenIslam,2014,pp.411-441.
40 Pop-Islam,19March2012,http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/jugendkultur-islam-und-demokratie/125194/pop-islam
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of their parents and instead it has become an attractive, modern day identity manifested mainly by music (hip-hop in particular), clothing (brands such as styleislam) and new media (cube-mag, muslime.tv). It is worth noting that pop-Islam is not a liberal and secular strand of Islam. It regularly makes reference to preachers such as amr Khaled (an egyptian TV preacher who rejects extremism and used to con-demn osama bin laden), Tariq ramadan (a swiss-born muslim theo-logian and philosopher, promoter of so-called euro-Islam, grandson of the founder of the muslim Brotherhood hasan al-Banna) and even yusuf al-Qaradawi (the main ideologist of muslim Brotherhood)41. however, in contrast to salafis, pop-Islam does recognise germany’s constitutional order and supports increased participation of muslim communities in germany’s political life as part of this order.
3. The dimensions of the risk
Salafi communities pose a certain threat because they supply volunteers tofightinSyriaandotherlocationsacrosstheworld.TheGermansecurityser-viceshavecometoassumethatindividualstrainedinjihadistcampsandhav-ingcombatexperiencemayusetheirknowledgewhentheyreturntoGermany.However, not only Salafis returning from Syria are dangerous. HomegrownradicalswhoremaininGermanyformabasewhichenablespotentialattack-erstocarryoutreconnaissance,findsafeaccommodation,transport,organi-sationalsupport,gainaccesstoequipmentandmaterials.Unlikeradicalneo-Naziandleftistorganisations,Salafigroupsaretightandhighlyresistanttoinfiltration42. For this and other reasons, for example due to the decentrali-sation of their structures, it is difficult to forecast possible moves by Salafigroups.Anincreaseoradropintheiractivityfrequentlydependsonlocalde-velopments.TheemergenceandrapiddevelopmentofaSalaficommunityinSolingeninNorthRhine-WestphaliawasrelatedtothefactthatAbuUsamaal-Gharib,aradicalpreacherwhomovedtoGermanyfromAustriaanddecidedtosettleandworkthere43.
41 Ilovemyprophet–ZwischenLifestyle,GlaubenundMission.IslamischeJugendkultureninDeutschland,September2009,http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Centre/C_Mellemoest/Videncenter/Nyheder/2009/090921GN.pdf
42 WarumsichTerroristensoschwerüberwachenlassen,19January2015,http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article136493969/Warum-sich-Terroristen-so-schwer-ueberwachen-lassen.html
43 Ibid.
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The threat posed by Salafi groups is not limited to potential attacks. The se-curityservicesindicatethatsince2012theinternaldiscoursebetweenSalafigroupshasrapidlybecomeradicalised.ThistranslatesnotonlyintoanincreaseinthenumberofvolunteerswantingtotraveltoSyria,butalsointoagrowingnumberofindividualspronetofasterradicalisationandintotheincreasedin-cidenceoforganisedviolentactsalsoinGermany44.AcrossGermany,thereareregular clashes between Salafis and specific ethnic or religious groups withwhichtheyare inconflict.Thelarge-scalefightsbetweenKurdsandYazidisononesideandSalafisontheotherside,whichtookplaceinOctober2014,areasymbolofthewarinSyriagettingspilledoverontothestreetsofGermantowns.Thestreetfightswiththeuseofmachetesandbarbecuespits,whichtookplace inHamburgandinCelle inLowerSaxony,wereattendedby400and300peoplerespectively.Asaresultofthesefights,23peoplewereinjured.
SalafisarealsotryingtorecruitsupportersamongmigrantswhoarrivinginGermany.TheBKAandtheBfVhaverecordedcasesinwhichmigrantswerebeingoffereddonationsbyradicalIslamists,alongsidehelpintranslationandbureaucraticissuesingovernmentagencies,andinvitationstovisitmosques.However, this is not a large-scale phenomenon. In November 2015, the Fed-eral Criminal Police Office reported 60 attempts to “recruit” supporters andtheBfVidentifiedonehundredsuchattempts.Bothofficesassumethattheydonotknowaboutallcases45.
Moreover, the actions by Salafi groups are causing an increased feeling ofthreat within society and are triggering radicalisation of a section of it. Themainstreamnarrativediscussedaboveisunabletopreventthissinceitfocus-esonthecounter-culturalelementsofthisphenomenonandomitsthebroadersocio-politicalproblemwhichthisphenomenonisasymptomof.Asaconse-quence,anti-Islamicandanti-immigrantmovementsandmilitantgroupsareemerging which offer their supporters simple ideological solutions and con-solidatetheirsupportbasedonthefearsapartofsocietyhas.Since2014,theHoGeSamovement(HooligansgegenSalafistenor‘HooligansagainstSalafis’)has regularly been organising rallies in Cologne. The Dresden-based Pegida
44 Ibid.45 Salafistenwerben–unterdemDeckmantelderHilfe,25November2015,http://www.ta-
gesspiegel.de/politik/f luechtlinge-salafisten-werben-unter-dem-deckmantel-der-hil-fe/12639482.html
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movement46begantoholditsdemonstrationsinthewakeoftheeventsinCelleandinHamburginprotestagainstproxywarswagedinGermany47.AlthoughSalafigroupsinGermanyarecomposedofsecondandthirdgenerationimmi-grants,theiractionsbearanimpactonthecourseofthedebateonthepresentmigrationcrisis.Theyarecitedasconfirmationofthethesisregardingtheim-possibilityofintegratingsomeMuslimimmigrants,theirradicalismandtheirtendencytouseviolence.Inthewiderperspective,byattractingincreasedme-diaattention,SalafiscontributetothepropagationofanegativeimageofIslamamongthepublic.
The increase in the number of Salafis in Germany in recent years
2015
2011
2012
2013
2014
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
3800
7800
6700
5500
4500
source: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
Artur CieChAnowiCz
46 Pegida–anassociationwhichsince20October2014hasbeenorganisinganti-immigrantandanti-MuslimralliesinDresden.Thenameisanacronymbasedonthephrase:Patriot-ischeEuropäergegendieIslamisierungdesAbendlandes(PatrioticEuropeansagainsttheIslamisationoftheWest).
47 Germany:Fearofterroristattacks,OSW Analyses,14January2015,https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/germany-fear-terrorist-attacks