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Jews in General Anders’ Army In the Soviet Union by
Yisrael Gutman
1. The Organizational Phase
Mustering of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union (Polskie Sity
Zborjne w ZSSR), known as “Anders’ Army”, began during the latter half of
1941. Until the end of July 1941, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London
had not maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, condemning
her as an invader who had conspired with Nazi Germany to seize the eastern
portions of Poland during the invasion of 1939. Even the dramatic volte-face in
the wake of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union on July 22, 1941 did not bring
about an immediate thaw in Polish-Soviet relations. The Polish Prime Minister
in Exile, Wladyslaw Sikorski, maintained that Poland should seek avenues of
consultation with the Soviet Union and that she should join the new alignment
of forces arising out of the Soviet Union’s entering the anti-Nazi camp. The
Poles did insist however that any agreement with the Soviet Union be
conditional upon an unequivocal Soviet commitment that the Polish state to
be reconstituted after the war have its former eastern borders reinstated – that
is, the Soviet Union was to rescind its annexation of Western Byelorussia, the
Western Ukraine and the Vilna district. The Soviets refused to undertake any
such commitment while the tense and exhausting deliberations on the issue
resulted in a split amongst the Poles. The radical faction among the Polish
exiles — the Endeks,* the last of the Sanacja** supporters of Pilsudski and
also a minority of the socialists — would not agree to any formulation that did
* Members of the Narodowa Demokracja — ND — The right-wing National-
Democratic Party, of an extreme anti-Semitic character. ** Sanacja (regenerative purge) — the name given to the regime that took
power under the leadership of Pilsudski after the coup d'etat of May 1926. It
remained in power until the outbreak of WWII.
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not set out in detail the eastern Polish boundaries. However, a majority in the
Polish Government-in-Exile was inclined to accept a compromise formula that
deferred drawing the map of the eastern sector to a later date. The official
agreement, signed by representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union in
London on July 30, 1941 contained a clause stating that "The Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that the Soviet-German
treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their
validity."
A prime consideration for Sikorski in seeking an agreement with the Soviet
Union was the anticipation of establishing in the Soviet Union a Polish
contingent which would be subordinate to the Polish Government-in-Exile in
London. The forces that the Poles had managed to muster in the West after
the debacle of September 1939, had been almost completely lost in the
campaign in France. The Poles attached much importance to a substantial
Polish force taking its place alongside the Allied forces in the struggle against
Hitler.
In the wake of the debacle, masses of Polish citizens had
reached the interior of the Soviet Union, some as prisoners-of-war,
some as refugees who had fled before the Germans and some as exiles
deported by the Soviet authorities; their number is estimated to have reached
a million to a million and a half. A large proportion of these, perhaps even the
majority, were interned in Soviet prison camps, where they suffered greatly
from degradation, intense hardship and harsh weather. The agreement
which was signed in July 1941 stated that "The Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses its consent to the formation on
the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under
a commander appointed by the Government of the Republic of Poland, in
agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will
be subordinate in operational matters to the Supreme Command of the USSR
on which there will be a representative of the Polish Army." In a separate
protocol appended to the general agreement, the Soviet Government
undertook, immediately upon the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, to
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"grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their
freedom on the territory of the USSR either as prisoners-of-war or on other
adequate grounds."
It is estimated that the number of Jews among the Polish exiles in the Soviet
Union reached 400,000 about a third of the total number. Their proportion
among the exiles was thus more than triple their proportion among the
population of the independent Polish State in the years between the wars. It
was only natural that the persecuted Jews should seek refuge in the Soviet
State; their numbers would have been even greater had it not been for the
obstacles preventing mass evacuation and flight in the first weeks after the
outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Many of the
Jewish exiles were banished and imprisoned under cruel conditions in Soviet
prisons and labor camps.
Thanks to the accord reached between Poland and the Soviet Union and the
subsequent military agreement, masses of tortured, frail and infirm Polish
citizens, Jews among them, were released from the prisons and the camps;
recruiting of Polish military units and the armed struggle of the Poles became
possible.
The first Polish units — two divisions plus a support force— were
concentrated in army camps/in the Saratov region of the Volga. (Staff
headquarters were set up at Buzuluk, over 100 km. from Kuybishev; one
division was at Tatishtyevo and the other at Tock.) General Wladyslaw Anders
was given command. With the opening of the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev,
diplomatic relations between the two countries were normalized. The first
Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the war years, Professor
Stanislaw Kot, was, until his appointment to this post, a senior minister in the
Government-in-Exile, and was regarded as a close friend and confidant of
Sikorski's. Kot and his staff showed much initiative and ingenuity in organizing
a system of consular offices, locating Polish citizens in the far corners of the
Soviet Union and offering speedy assistance to those in need.
In the network of “delegations” which spread their protective presence over
the exiles in the Districts and Republics throughout the Soviet Union, Jews
were also assigned positions, albeit at subordinate levels. Despite numerous
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inequities it is only fitting to point out that a large number of Jews did benefit
from the substantive aid offered by the Polish welfare program, which
received assistance in the form of shipments from the free countries.
Even in the preliminary organizational stages of the Polish military force,
differences arose between the Polish command and the Soviet authorities.
The Soviets initially restricted conscription to 30,000 men, while the Poles
asked for far more and spoke of an army of 150,000. Thousands of Polish
officers among the prisoners-of-war could not be located, while the Poles
demanded that they be released to serve as the professional and command
cadre essential for the army in formation. There were also differences of
opinion as to military and strategic matters: The Soviets sought to accelerate
and curtail the training period of the recruits, and to send separate divisions to
the front, while the Poles demanded that the recruits be given thorough
training and be committed to battle only as a consolidated unit. These
differences arising out of deep-seated mutual distrust and variance in goals,
marked the beginning of the break which ultimately led to the transferring of
the Armed Forces of General Anders outside of the Soviet Union and, after
the revelations concerning the Katyn Massacre, to the severing of diplomatic
relations and to far-reaching developments affecting the Polish nation and the
Polish state.
From the very beginning of the recruiting, thousands of released Jewish
prisoners and exiles flocked to the collection points, acting either on their own
initiative or on the basis of orders. For the majority, mobilization signified a
guarantee of day-today existence and a relative sense of permanence, given
the war situation. Official directives set out the criteria of preference and
eligibility for service in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union: a)
officers and N.C.O.'s formerly on active service; b) enlisted men who had
been on active service; c) volunteers who underwent pre-military training and
were found eligible by the recruiting committees. The first units set up had a
very large number of Jews; according to Anders the Jews at times constituted
sixty per cent, and according to Kot, forty per cent. The surge of Jews to the
ranks of the Polish Armed Forces aroused suspicion and dismay. In Polish
sources one finds complaints to the effect that the Russians intentionally
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released the Jews from the camps -before all others so as to flood the Polish
Armed Forces with the "Jewish element." In a letter to the Polish Foreign
Minister in London on November 8, 1941, Kot writes that "the Soviets delayed
by various means the release of the Polish element who were in better health
and spirits, sending instead the handicapped and the Jews."
Another complaint was incessantly voiced by the Poles in the matter of the
"national reckoning" which they had with the Jews. Anders himself would
begin every meeting with Jewish representatives and delegations, and the
orders he issued relating to Jews, with the "reminder" that the Poles bore the
Jews a severe grievance for their disloyal behavior during the occupation and
internment in the prisons and camps.13 In his book, An Army in Exile,
describing the Polish Armed Forces organized in the Soviet Union, Anders
begins the chapter on "The Jews in the Armed Forces" with these words: "I
was greatly disturbed when, in the beginning, large numbers from among the
national minorities, and first and foremost Jews, began streaming to enlist. As
I have already mentioned, some of the Jews had warmly welcomed the Soviet
armies that invaded Poland in 1939..." In documents that were not intended
for publication or for public consumption, General Anders' style is much
harsher. Kot, too, writes in his report to the Foreign Minister in London, that
"the Poles feel very bitter towards the Jews for their behavior during the
Soviet occupation — their enthusiastic welcome of the Red Army, the insults
which they directed towards the Polish officers and men who were under
Soviet arrest, offering their services to the Soviets, informing on Poles, and
other acts of the sort." This one-sided accounting, listing only injuries to Poles
and reminding Jews of them — injuries for which the Jews were collectively
blamed — and the total disregard for Poland's anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish
policy between the wars, in particular the violence and organized persecution
of the late thirties was but the first in a whole series of claims invoked to
"justify" discrimination against Jews serving in the Polish Armed Forces in the
Soviet Union.
Another claim that recurs in the Polish sources is that the Jews, by and large,
are physically inferior and are not suited for active military service. This is
what Kot wrote:
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"The liberation of Polish citizens in accordance with the agreement was
greeted by the Jews with great enthusiasm. The decent ones among them
rejoiced at Poland's achievement, while the inferior element sought to
cover up their past behavior by vociferous identification with Poland. It
was from this element that large numbers streamed to enlist in the Armed
Forces. Not knowing what to do with themselves, they decided that it was
obligatory to join the Armed Forces, and once having joined they almost
always became a burden. They were found unfit for military service or they
were deferred for a time, and meanwhile they would noisily demand that the
relief work be continued."
The claim that the Jews were "unfit for military service" undoubtedly had much
deeper roots. Amongst the Poles, and in particular amongst the professional
soldiers, the opinion was commonly held that the Jews were cowards by
nature and were not suited for military service or useful on the battle-field.
The testimonies of Jews who served in the Armed Forces of General Anders
and of those who tried to enlist are replete with accounts of many who were
rejected because of their Jewish ancestry, and tell of crude injustices done to
others who were permitted to serve but denied promotion. These very
testimonies reveal the existence of two stages in the recruitment process.
During the first stage, which extended from the granting of pardons and the
beginning of the organization of the Armed Forces until the end of 1941, a
large number of Jews were accepted and they constituted a sizable proportion
of the units being formed. However, those Jews who were accepted and
remained in the ranks throughout the duration of the war, relate that Jews
were often transferred to the support units and to the kolkhozes in the wake of
deliberate "inspections" and re-examinations, or were simply cashiered from
the service. During the second stage, when the recruiting was carried out at
several centers in Soviet Central Asia, disqualification of Jews, according to
these testimonies, was automatic: Jews would try a second and a third time to
enlist, and each tune they would meet with a flat rejection. Their physical
fitness had no bearing on the decision; they were disqualified just because
they were Jews. These disqualifications, according to the testimonies, were
only rarely based on restrictions or prohibitions imposed by the Soviet
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authorities; the principle of collective disqualification was, however, applied
not only to Jews but to Ukrainians and Byelorussians as well.
Henryk Dankiewicz, a student of the Warsaw Polytechnic, with an assimilated
background, was among the first to present himself for recruiting. He was
accepted and sent to officers' training school. In January 1942, the
commander of the school singled out "twelve Jews, and one Pole for the sake
of appearances" and informed them that they were being expelled from the
course since they were not suitable officer material. Some time later, they
were transported to a different place and again brought before a recruiting
committee. This committee assigned to each of them, without exception, type
E classification which meant absolute disqualification. Dankiewicz tried his
luck one
more time in the city of Tzezar in Uzbekistan, and there too the scene
repeated itself: all the Poles, without exception, were accepted and the Jews,
Ukrainians and Byelorussians were rejected. Dankiewicz finally enlisted in the
army organized by the Polish pro-Communists in the Soviet Union; he was
given offi-cer's rank and fought later in the Kosciuszko division.
Another Jew, Michael Licht, a gymnastics and sports teacher by profession,
who had served as N.C.O. in the battle over Poland at the outset of World
War II, also presented himself at the recruiting center together with several
other Jews who were, in his words, "strong as oaks;" all of them were
disqualified, having been found physically unfit. Licht tried to enlist a
second time, and was accepted, making him feel as if he had "finally made it."
However, ten days later he was expelled from the service together with all the
other Jews. According to his testimony, only Jewish physicians were kept on,
or those who paid a hundred-dollar bribe to the Polish officers. He also
claims that the taking of bribes by the Polish officers was done quite openly.
Another witness, Felix Davidson, an engineer by profession, relates that he
did not encounter any particular difficulty on enlisting in the Armed Forces of
General Anders. He credits this fact to his profession. He did however have
problems in the course of his service: "I asked to be allowed to take a
mechanics course, but was rejected because I was a Jew. Anti-Semitism was
a very open feature of the Armed Forces of General Anders." Simon Perl, an
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electrician by profession, was also disqualified. He relates how in the city of
Fregana, in Uzbekistan, thousands of Jews, Poles and Ukrainians sought to
enlist:
"The scenes familiar from Poland before the war were here reenacted. The
Poles were automatically included among the ranks of the army; the
Jews were graded type "D" — unfit for active military service — and even
those who had already been accepted were expelled for trivial reasons.
Finally, my turn arrived to appear before the committee; appearing together
with me was Richterman, a swimming champion. Both of us were graded type
"D"..."
Perl did finally manage to make his way into the ranks of the army with the
assistance of a Polish officer whom he had known for many years. Meir
Lustgarten, the son of farmers from Western Galicia, relates:
"I was accepted into the army without any difficulty. During the first stage of
organization many Jews presented themselves for enlistment; in the
beginning they were accepted without any difficulties and there was in fact a
Jewish majority in the army. This naturally did not please the Poles who
sought ways of getting rid of the Jews, or at the very least of limiting the per-
centage of Jews accepted into the army. The Polish Command thus ordered
all soldiers to appear before a medical board. During the examination most of
the Jews were marked grade "D" for physical fitness and were released from
the service. This occurred at the outset of the winter of 1941-42. Men were
freezing from the cold and nevertheless they were released. The Polish Army
remained free of Jews — judenrein as the Germans put it. From then on,
Jews were not accepted into the Polish Army; only Poles were accepted."
Dozens of testimonies checked by the author of this article all present a
uniform picture. The directives which ostensibly determined the acceptance of
personnel into the Polish Army were not applied to Jews and to the members
of the other minorities. At any rate, during the later stages of the recruiting no
objective criteria whatsover were applied. It is a fact that during these later
stages the Soviets forbade the recruiting of some of the minorities, including
Jews. However, it will be seen that this prohibition was not strictly enforced;
being open to varying interpretations it served the Poles as a pretext for
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closing the door to Jews. In any case, all agree that the restrictions imposed
by the Soviet authorities did not apply to those Jews who had already been
recruited and were serving in the army. Yet, the facts show that not only were
new Jewish soldiers not accepted, but also that Jews already serving were
systematically and deliberately expelled. In his letter to General Z. Bohusz-
Szyszko of April 30, 1942, Kot wrote:
"...complaints are again being voiced by Jews that a purge is being carried out
in the ranks of the army so as to reduce their numbers, and that those who
are healthiest are being released as sick. Is this necessary and does it serve
our interests at this time...? "
Who then were the Jews who were nevertheless accepted into the army in
1942 or who succeeded in remaining in the army despite the obstacles placed
in their way and despite the purges? The impression is that physicians and
those trained in the professions in demand were accepted, as well as
individuals enjoying the backing of influential Poles. The Jews who remained
in the army were those who were protected by their superiors or those who
simply could not be expelled because of their excellent service record.
The dominant influence underlying the relationship of the army command to
Jews was undoubtedly the anti-Semitism so deeply imbedded in the souls of
many Poles. This antagonistic attitude was particularly prevalent among the
officer class, and it thus found expression in army life. In a letter sent from
Moscow to General Sikorski on September 5, 1941, Kot wrote (it was only a
few days after his arrival in the Soviet Union): "...I discussed with General
Anders the matter of the Jews. They are generally accepted into the Army
when they apply; after I explained to him the importance [of recruiting Jews]
vis-a-vis America and others, he promised to stress the necessity of
maintaining a friendly relationship with them..." Kot often reiterated the
political significance of the conscription of Jews. In a letter to Mikolajczyk on
October 11, 1941, he wrote:
"...in the future, when we will be dealing with the eastern borders, this stream
of Jewish recruits will be of considerable political weight, particularly when the
Ukrainians' systematic hatred of anything Polish is taken into account..."
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In that very same letter he notes that "our men in the Armed Forces,
particularly those types like Pstrokonski, are already anxious to institute a
numerus clausus in the military institutions."
A discriminatory attitude towards Jews and a desire to block their entry into
the Armed Forces was by no means characteristic of only a certain "type" of
officer. This line was set and determined by the men at the top of both the
political and the military hierarchies. J. Klimkowski, General Anders'
Personnel Officer, described in his memoirs a high-level meeting of senior
Soviet officers and leaders of the Polish Armed Forces, including General
Anders, in which the matter of the Jews was raised. The meeting took place at
the General Headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces in Buzuluk, during
January 1942. Klimkowski writes:
"The matter of the recruiting was raised and on this point General Anders
made the strange request that members of the minorities, first and foremost
the Jews but also the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, not be taken into the
Army. Jewsiegnie-jew pointed out that they were Polish citizens, and the
Polish-Soviet Agreement stipulated that all citizens of the Polish Republic be
accepted into the Army. General Anders then remarked:'There are so many
Jews that they will judaize the Army and their flocking to the Army will radically
alter its entire character.' "
Of even greater significance was the conversation between Sikorski and
Stalin which took place in the Kremlin on December 3, 1941. For the Polish
side, both Anders and Kot also attended, and representing the Russians was
Foreign Minister Molotov. The discussion was the high point of Sikorski's
much-heralded visit to the Soviet Union and it was devoted almost entirely to
the problems of organization of the Polish Armed Forces and their future.
When Anders dwelt at length upon the difficult conditions under which the
organization was being carried out, and a suggestion was made, to transfer
the operation to Persia where more conducive conditions prevailed, Stalin
angrily retorted: "If the Poles don't want to fight, they should leave." To this
Sikorski replied: "Mr. President, when you say that one of our soldiers does
not want to fight, you insult me." Further on in the discussion, Anders
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submitted details about the size of the force and its distribution at the various
collection points:
"...I am counting on 150,000 people, that is eight divisions together with the
army's maintenance forces. Perhaps there are even more of our people, but
among them there is also a great number of Jews who do not want to serve in
the army. Stalin: Jews are poor warriors. Gen. S.: Many of the Jews who
reported are speculators or have been punished for dealing in contraband;
they never will make good soldiers. These I don't need in the Polish Army.
Gen. A.: Two hundred Jews deserted from Buzu-luk upon hearing the false
report on the bombing of Kuybishev More than sixty deserted from the 5th
Division a day before the distribution of arms to the soldiers was made public.
Stalin: Yes, Jews are bad warriors."
It seems that these three persons found a common denominator in their
assessment of Jews as soldiers. There is also no doubt that Sikorski and
Anders carefully weighed everything they said during the course of their
discussion with Stalin and they realized the full significance of their words.
The very fact that the Poles were given permission to set up an autonomous
army within the Soviet Union conferred preferential status and the power of
authority. (For many, the chance to be recruited while in the Soviet Union was
virtually their salvation.) The Poles realized immediately that they had been
granted a position of power and this recognition enhanced their feeling of
security and mastery. They did not at first dare to make full use of their
freedom fearing that any step contrary to Soviet law and accepted custom
would have repercussions. It may be assumed that this was what prevented
them from blocking from the very beginning the stream of Jews who sought to
enlist in the Army. In discussions with Soviet officers, and in particular in the
discussion with Stalin, the Poles sought to sound out the Soviet reaction to
imposing restriction on the recruiting of Jews and other minorities. The Poles
knew full well that official discrimination against Jews was not acceptable at
that time in the Soviet Union. Many surmised — as did the rightist forces in
Europe — that a secret pact existed between the Jews and the government
and the men in power in the Soviet Union. Stalin's concurring with Anders' and
Si-korski's evaluation of the Jews and their ability as soldiers removed any
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doubt from the hearts of the Poles. The Soviet leader in his turn also knew
how to exploit the Poles' frankness to his own advantage, as we shall later
see.
2. The Significance of the Soviet Restrictions on the
Recruiting of Jews
Just a short while after the talks with Stalin and after operative consultations
at the military level, Soviet liaison officers informed the Polish Armed Forces
authorities in late December that recruiting for General Anders' Army would
encompass all Polish nationals of Polish descent, with the exception of Jews,
Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who on November 29, 1939 were resident in
the territories annexed by the Soviet Union and declared Soviet citizens. On
December 30, Anders sent a telegram to Kot in Kuybishev reporting that two
days earlier he had been told by Colonel Wolkowysky, a senior Soviet liaison
officer, that "of all the Polish citizens living in the Western Ukraine and
Western Byelorussia, only ethnic Poles may be recruited for our Armed
Forces." On February 21, 1942 Anders cabled Sikorski stating that the Soviets
authorized recruiting of all Polish citizens; from the territories held by the
Soviets in 1939, only ethnic Poles were to be recruited. On February 25 Kot
asked Anders to clarify the recruitment rights of non-ethnic Polish citizens —
whether it was intended to exclude those who were born in the territory taken
over in 1939 or was referring to any individual who was a permanent resident
of these territories prior to the outbreak of the war? To this Anders replied:
"The Soviet authorities have officially informed me that recruiting encom-
passes all Polish citizens who until November 29 (1939) were residents of the
territories occupied by the Germans [formerly held by the Soviets]."
As we have already noted, the heads of the Polish Armed Forces and the
central political leadership were both interested in excluding the Jews, or at
the very least in limiting as much as possible the number of Jews in their
army. The Soviet initiative directed towards preventing the Jewish citizens of
Poland from enlisting should have helped the Poles to achieve their goal, for it
gave them a ready-made answer for the free world: the discrimination was a
result of a Soviet coercion and pressure. However, the matter was not so
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simple. At first glance it seems that the Soviet restriction applied only to the
members of the other ethnic groups resident in the annexed territories on the
date that Soviet citizenship was conferred on all the residents of these
territories; as for the Poles in the annexed territories, they too had become
Soviet citizens but the Soviets claimed that they were showing exceptional
lenience and making an extraordinary gesture in allowing them to be recruited
for the Polish Armed Forces. Consent to this restriction was tantamount to
indirect recognition of the Soviet annexation of Polish territory, and to this the
Poles were, of course, vociferously opposed. The Soviet-imposed restriction
thus put the Poles in a quandary, and it is against this background that one
should view the anxious questioning by the various Polish authorities
concerning the precise meaning of the restriction. It was perhaps not by
chance that the Soviets chose the matter of the recruiting for the Polish Armed
Forces as a means to undermine the jurisdiction of the Poles over certain
categories of Polish citizens living in the occupied territories. It is reasonable
to assume that the idea of excluding Jews and other minority groups was
broached only after Sikorski and Anders had voiced their anti-Jewish
comments in the presence of Stalin and after they had revealed their
intentions of disqualifying the Jews as being unfit for "our Army." An episode
that occurred the day after the conversation with Stalin, at -a- dinner given by
Stalin at the Kremlin in honor of Sikorski and his aides, is most revealing.
Sikorski again raised the issue of the release of pri-soners-of-war from Soviet
"labour divisions" and complained that the process was too slow and not
sufficiently comprehensive. Anders then remarked that he had been officially
informed that Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Jews would not be released at
all. "Were they not Polish citizens?" he asked in anger. "They have never
ceased in fact to be Polish citizens, because your agreements with
Germany have been annulled." Stalin then replied, all the while ignoring the
basic question that Anders had raised: "What do you need Byelorussians,
Ukrainians and Jews for? It is Poles you need, they are the best soldiers."
There was another fundamental question of great concern which became a
subject of dispute between the Soviet and Polish authorities. In the eyes of
Soviet law, the residents of the annexed territories were regarded as Soviet
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citizens, but according to the agreement signed between the Soviets and the
Poles these residents were Polish citizens. This ambiguity led of necessity to
friction. On November 10, 1941, Kot lodged a complaint with the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that attempts had been made in Kazakhstan to
conscript Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews into the Red Army, despite the
fact that they were Polish citizens and not subject to conscription; he also
complained that Polish citizens who were not ethnic Poles were being
prevented from reaching the recruiting centers of the Polish Armed Forces. In
the Ministry's response of December 1, the Soviets attempted to present their
interpretation of the Soviet-Polish Agreements in a manner which would not
seem to run counter to the legislation turning residents of the annexed
territories into Soviet citizens. The recognition of the Polish citizenship of
ethnic Poles residing in the eastern territories "shows the good will and
readiness to compromise of the Soviet Government, but can in no case serve
as a basis for the analogous recognition as Polish citizens of persons of other
nationalities, in particular, Ukrainian, White Russian and Jewish." The
response did not however refer in any way to the right of the ethnic groups in
the eastern territories to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces.
Naturally, the status assigned to Jewish nationality or religion in this context
raises pointed questions concerning the attitudes of the Soviet regime and
Communist ideology; however, as in so many other cases, here too pragmatic
political interests took precedence over ideological principles. The Polish
Embassy rejected both the claim and the interpretation of the agreement as
made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Kot explained that from the Polish
standpoint all citizens, regardless of ethnic origin or race, enjoyed equal
rights, and this equality applied both to the amnesty being granted and to the
privilege of enlisting in the Polish Armed Forces. Polish law did not dis-
criminate among its citizens, and the military agreement granted every Polish
citizen the right to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces. On January 5, 1942, the
Soviet Foreign Ministry replied that after studying the arguments put forward
by the Polish Embassy with regard to the different categories of citizens, it
saw no reason to modify its position. It continued in a lengthy paragraph
"explaining" the distinction between "occupation" and the "entry" of Soviet
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soldiers into the eastern territories of Poland; the gist of the claim was that the
annexation of the territories was carried out "as the result of the freely
expressed will of the population of those districts." This correspondence
between the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Embassy was
preceded by an announcement by military circles to the effect that certain
categories of citizens were not to be recruited; no protest is known to have
been lodged either by military or civilian elements in the Polish camp against
the Soviet restrictions imposed in the military sector. Kot empha-zises that in
the discussion with Stalin of March 18, 1942, Anders did not even hint at the
issue of the restrictions on the recruiting of the national minorities.
The documentary evidence and eye-witness accounts indicate that the Soviet
authorities did not as a general rule actively interfere in the recruiting process,
and they did not enforce rigid adherence to the regulations stipulating
rejection of certain of the national minorities. Soviet representatives did sit on
the recruiting committees, but only on very rare occasions would they
investigate the ethnic background of the potential recruit;
for the most part they refrained from taking an active role in the work of the
committees.
One phenomenon which did concern the Russians to the extent of an angry
response, forced the Poles to act cautiously. The only relevant document
registering a Soviet complaint about the infringement of their directives, is a
letter addressed to Anders from General Panfilov, the Associate Chief of Staff
of the Red Army. The letter opens with these words:
"According to Paragraph 4 of the decision of the Governmental Committee for
the Defence of the Soviet Union, of December 22, 1941, citizens of Polish
extraction who until 1939 were residents of the Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia may be recruited for the Polish Armed Forces. Citizens of any
other ethnic origin who lived in these territories are not to be recruited."
Further on in the letter, General Panfilov claims that the above paragraph of
the Soviet decision had been contravened by the recruitment of "escaped
Soviet citizens." Following a severely worded protest he then proceeds to list
by name ten such "escapees" and demands that they be handed over. Seven
of the names are unquestionably Jewish and the three others are
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Byelorussian or Ukrainian. Panfilov closes with the request that he be
informed as soon as possible of the hand-over so that these men may be
brought to trial. The letter apparently refers to individuals who had fled from
the "work units." Residents of the "western territories" (zapadniki), particularly
Ukrainians, were considered to be too unreliable an element to be posted to
the front, and they were therefore chanelled to conscripted work units. We
indeed know of Jews escaping from these units, which were subject to the
harshest of conditions, and fleeing to recruiting centers of the Polish Armed
Forces. The individuals in question had had Soviet citizenship imposed on
them, but in accordance with the terms of the Polish-Soviet agreement, were
still regarded as Polish citizens, and could in theory enlist in General Anders
Armed Forces. The Soviets, however, regarded them as deserters from
conscripted Soviet units, to be treated as such.
However, as already noted, the Soviets did not generally insist that the
recruiting for the Polish Armed Forces be strictly in line with their directives.
Numerous testimonies from Jewish candidates for enlistment and from
individuals who actually served in General Anders' Armed Forces do not
intimate that anyone was rejected on the Soviet representative's intervention
or because he was a resident of the annexed territories. Moreover, no
difference whatsoever can be discerned in the treatment of the "legitimate"
recruits from the western provinces as opposed to treatment of those who,
according to Soviet directives, should have been rejected. We have in our
possession a list of recruits, both Poles and Jews, drawn up by the military
some time between 12-20 of August ,1942, that is a short while before
the second stage of the evacuation from Russia. This list, unique among the
papers found in Anders' files, reveals that of a total of 88 Jews presenting
themselves for enlistment, 65 were disqualified and 23 were found fit for
service; in contrast, out of a total of 75 Poles, 56 were listed as fit for service.
The list also states the grounds for disqualification, but in no case does it note
that the Soviet directives were the reason.
A memorandum sent on November 10, 1942, by the Bundists Y. Glicksman
and Feinsilber, evacuated with Anders' Army, to comrades in the United
States and England, mentions the Soviet prohibition and the attitude of the
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Polish Armed Forces. A fierce anti-Soviet stance coupled with loyalty to the
Polish Government in London were characteristic of the Polish Bundists at
that time. In their memorandum Glicksman and Feinsilber state that:
"The position taken by the Soviet authorities with regard to citizenship has
paved the way for discrimination against Jews on the part of Polish anti-
Semitic elements. This was most blatant in the matter of recruiting for the
Polish Armed Forces. The fact is that the position adopted by the Soviet
authorities was instrumental in the exclusion of thousands of Jewish youth
who were fit to serve, from the ranks of the Armed Forces. However, a large
share of the responsibility for this state of affairs devolves upon Polish military
elements."
Ambassador Kot who, as we have seen, attached political significance to
demonstrations of concern for Jews, did show a degree of goodwill towards
Jews despite his numerous contradictory statements on the subject, and
frequently dealt with questions relating to Polish Jews living in the Soviet
Union. In a cable to Sikorski of April 10, 1942, he wrote:
"...4. It should be brought to General Anders' attention that the systematic
anti-Semitic policy pursued by the General Staff — a policy at which certain
officers on the recruiting committees excelled — unwittingly serves the
interests of the Soviets, who are seeking to distinguish between Jews and
Poles so as to create a precedent which would enable them to take over the
territories in the east..."
Here Kot makes no mention of the Soviet prohibition nor does he claim that it
is tying the hands of the Poles; quite the contrary — he emphasizes that
Polish officers are cooperating with the Soviets and are carrying out their
wishes by getting rid of the Jews.
It is clear, therefore, that the Soviet directives did not have a decisive
influence upon the policies and practices of the Poles with regard to the
recruiting. The Soviet directives actually gave the Poles a free hand and
served as a ready pretext which was later used to justify to the outside world
the low percentage of Jews in the Polish Armed Forces. From a political point
of view, the aims of the Poles and the Soviets were diametrically opposed.
The Russians sought to emphasize the basic political principle of
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distinguishing between segments of the popula-tion in the east and the other
parts of Poland, thus creating a precedent for the future. Whether the Poles
were carrying out the order in practice, and preventing Jews from enlisting did
not particularly concern the Soviet authorities, although they did fear the
possibility of desertion from conscripted units of their own and escape from
camps. The Russians attached no importance to the recruiting of Jews from
the eastern provinces — the fact is that at a later stage the Soviet authorities
placed no restrictions upon Jews from the various pre-1939 Polish provinces
who wished to join the ranks of the Berling Polish Army, which was set up by
the Communist-influenced League of Polish Patriots (Zwiqzek Patriotow
Polskich)..
The Poles, in contrast, sought to base their relations with the Soviets on
mutual agreements; in the recruiting process they abstained from any decision
that would be of political significance vis-a-vis the future of teritories. They
were however definitely interested in rejecting the majority of the Jews who
sought to enlist in their ranks and in reducing the number of Jews already
accepted. In this clash between the two approaches and the two sides, the
Jews were always the losers. The rights of Polish citizenship were denied to
some, as were the possibilities of receiving Polish papers, material aid, exit
visas from the Soviet Union and the legitimate right to enlist in the Armed
Forces. Although in Polish military circles there was some difference of
opinion concerning the political significance of the Soviet directives, they
most willingly adopted the selectivity which was their key feature, adding to
it their own brand of discrimination and rejection.
3. The "Jewish Legion" and the "Jewish Unit in Koltubanka" For a while the
concept of a separate "Jewish Legion" within General Anders' Armed Forces
in the Soviet Union drew the consideration and the attention of Polish and
Jewish sources alike. The idea was independently raised at one and the same
time by two individuals active in the Zionist-Revisionist Movement in Poland
between the wars — Mark Kahan, a lawyer, and Miron Sheskin, an engineer.
Both had been imprisoned in Soviet camps, had been released following the
Polish-Soviet Agreement, and had managed to reach the first recruiting
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centers of the Polish Armed Forces. Only after they met did they band
together to try to put their idea into action.
Mark Kahan was sent to the Tock concentration center. He found there that
relations between the Poles and the Jews were unstable and at times violent
fights would erupt. It was this situation which, he says, brought home the need
for separating the Jewish from the Polish soldiers; this in turn led to the idea of
establishing a "Jewish Legion" within General Anders' Armed Forces. He
brought his proposal before General Michal Tokarzewski-Karasiewicz, the
commander of the force in Tock and an acquaintance of his from the pre-war
days of independent Poland. According to Kahan, Tokarzewski showed
interest in the idea of establishing a Jewish unit and promised to take up the
matter with Anders. Kahan was subsequently summoned to army
headquarters in Buzuluk, where he met Sheskin who told him of his meeting
with Anders that had been arranged on his own initiative to discuss the
possibility of setting up a Jewish unit in the Armed Forces now organizing. We
do not have material in our possession that could shed light on Shes-kin's
motives for making the proposal. After the war, both Kahan and Sheskin
claimed that in the forefront of their minds was the potential role that a Jewish
military force might play in the envisaged battle for Eretz Israel. Kot notes that
the two advocates of the idea regarded the planned unit as a force that would
eventually reach the battle theater there. It is indeed quite conceivable that
Kahan and Sheskin, both of whom had been active in Zionist-nationalist
affairs, did in fact hope that the unit would eventually have a role to play in a
Jewish national struggle, even though the immediate stimulus for establishing
a Jewish unit arose from the troubled relationships prevailing among the Jews
and the Poles within the ranks of the army in formation.
We do not have the written material that Kahan and Sheskin presented nor do
we know the precise date of their joint initiative. From Kahan's testimony
and the comments of Rabbi Rozen-Szczekacz, a chaplain in the Armed
Forces of General Anders who was a close friend of both Kahan and Sheskin,
one culls the impression that their plan called for concentrating all the Jews
already recruited and those seeking to enlist into one separate unit; all the
enlisted personnel and officers of the unit would be Jews, while only the
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senior military and command positions would be manned by Poles. Since the
discussions on the establishment of this separate unit took place some time
before Sikorski's trip to Moscow, and on the basis of other indications as well,
one may assume that the idea was first broached during the months of
September-October 1941.
After Kahan's arrival in Buzuluk, Anders summoned Sheskin for an additional
discussion during which he made it clear that he regarded the "Jewish Legion"
plan as essentially political in nature and therefore falling within the purview of
Ambassador Kot. Kahan and Sheskin thereupon proceeded to Kuybishev to
meet with Kot. The Ambassador put off deciding on the matter pending
Sikorski's arrival, apparently because he wished to discuss the matter with
him. Some time later Kot returned a categorically negative answer. The Poles
utterly rejected the proposal to establish a separate Jewish unit within their
Armed Forces in the Soviet Union.
Kahan surmises that the matter of the "Legion" was raised during Sikorski's
discussions with Stalin, and that it was at this level that it was rejected. He
also assumes that the opposition came from Stalin and that Kot did not dare
to defend the proposal in the face of Stalin's nyet. However, these as-
sumptions have no basis in actual fact. One can hardly imagine that the Poles
attached such importance to the proposal that they saw fit to raise the issue
during the summit meeting with Stalin. From the information at hand we can
conclude that the Poles were not in the habit of discussing with the Soviets
matters relating to the composition and internal structure of their armed forces
— this matter was exclusively for Polish determination. The full minutes in our
possession of the discussions between the Poles and Stalin and his aides,
reveal not a single trace of the proposal to establish a Jewish unit within the
Polish Armed Forces. One does find references indicating that certain Poles
— among whom were Anders and Kot — took note of the proposal to set up a
separate Jewish unit, but nowhere is there any indication that the Soviets had
formed an opinion on the matter or that Soviet considerations had any bearing
whatsoever upon the decision of the Poles.
It is clear, therefore, that the negative decision was taken by the Polish
authorities. Kahan claims that some of the senior military staff, including
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Anders, were in favor of the idea, and that the rejection came from Kot; this
version is only partially confirmed. It is apparently true that certain officers in
General Anders' Armed Forces did support the idea — for a combination of
conflicting reasons. However, Anders and Kot saw eye to eye on the matter,
and both were instrumental in its rejection. Kot relates that on October 24,
1941 a discussion was held on the subject at the Embassy in Kuybishev, with
the participation of Jewish representatives (of the Bund, undoubtedly including
Ludwig Seidman, the Embassy's adviser on Jewish affairs). Anders also took
part in this discussion and it was he who blocked the establishment of the
separate Jewish unit.
On the other hand, Kahan's assertion that there existed a broad front of
Jewish opposition to the plan is substantially correct. According to Kahan the
Jews of Buzuluk belonged to what had been the affluent class in independent
Poland and they feared that the establishment of the "Legion" would endanger
their rights to Polish citizenship and perhaps also prevent them from
recovering their property after the war. It appears that there was a large
proportion of formerly wealthy and assimilated Jews in Buzuluk who for
personal reasons were not in favor of the idea of separation. The
Bundists, who wielded considerable influence in Embassy circles, adopted
a position of emphatic opposition to the plan. On October 16, 1941 one of the
senior Bundists who chanced to be in the Soviet Union, Lucjan Blit, sent a
memorandum to General Anders "concerning the plan to raise military units
manned by Jewish citizens of Poland residing in the Soviet Union."56 Blit notes
that he was informed by the army staff that the number of Jewish recruits was
above nine percent, that is, it exceeded the percentage of Jews in the
population of pre-war Poland. "This fact, which should have given satisfaction
to every true patriot, seems to have led to a number of problems of a
psychological nature among the organizers and commanders of the various
units of our Armed Forces in the territory of the Soviet Union,"complained Blit.
"The cause would seem to be the anti-Semitic feelings which prevail in
various degrees among Polish personnel." Blit claimed that staff officers
sought to channel overflow Jewish volunteers into the work units or to
establish separate Jewish units in an effort to provide a safety valve for these
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anti-Semitic feelings. He was informed that these tendencies had gained the
support of several Jewish communal leaders who belonged to the extreme
nationalist faction. Blit, however, claimed that because the Nazi regime which
was enslaving Poland was eager to see a division of the population along
ethnic and national lines, the establishment of separate Jewish units would
necessarily be interpreted as a political and moral victory for Nazism. The
Polish command would be undertaking a heavy responsibility for which it
would be answerable to the whole world should it decide in favor of such
units. The Jewish nationalists sought to create a "Jewish ghetto within the
Polish Armed Forces," but to do so would run contrary to the interests of the
Polish Government and to the sincere aspirations to live together in harmony
"which beat in the hearts of the masses of Jewish workers of Poland."
Kot, as was his custom, was here as well guided by diplomatic considerations.
He believed that the establishment of a separate unit would serve the Soviet
goal of fragmentation and at the same time create an unfavorable stir in the
free countries, particularly in the United States. Kot noted that among the
initiators and supporters of the idea were "representatives of the Revisionists-
Jabotinskyites, the lawyer K. from Warsaw and the engineer S. from Vilna
and... officers who are known to be anti-Semites are said to be actively
supporting the idea of establishing separate Jewish units."
According to Rabbi Rozen, three types of supporters of the idea of a "Jewish
Legion" can be distinguished within the Armed Forces of General Anders: 1)
Real friends, who sought to assist and aid Jewish national aspirations; 2) A
group of officers who supported the old regime and resented Sikorski and
Anders; they hoped to win the support of Jewish circles abroad by favoring the
creation of the "Legion"; 3) Plain anti-Semites who wanted to rid the Armed
Forces of Jews through the medium of the "Jewish Legion."
Anders refers on two occasions to the proposal to establish separate Jewish
units. In his book he wrote:
"...a series of Jewish communal activists wanted to point up Jewish
particularity. The two foremost representatives of Polish Jewry, Alter and
Ehrlich, approached me on the matter. After numerous discussions they
admitted that their proposal was unrealistic, for it meant that I would also have
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to set up Ukrainian or Byelorussian units. I took the position that if we were to
continue with the forming of the Polish Army, all citizens without religious or
ethnic distinctions could be included."
Anders goes on to quote at length from a letter he received from Alter and
Ehrlich, who were the leaders of the Bund. The letter is dated October 31,
1941, and in it, according to Anders' version, the authors advocate one sole
unified military organization in which Jews and Poles alike would be assigned
positions on the basis of equal rights. "The primary function of this army must
be the waging of the armed struggle on behalf of a free and democratic
Poland, the common homeland of all her citizens..." Anders interprets this
letter as a retreat from the position the authors had formerly held and an
acceptance of his viewpoint.
The second time Anders dealt with this issue was at a 1967 press conference
with Polish journalists. He said:
"While we were still in the Soviet Union, several Jewish leaders approached
me with the request that separate Jewish units be established. I refused,
because in order to be consistent I would have had to establish separate
Ukrainian and Byelorussian units too, and this was most undesirable in the
Soviet Union. Doing so would have demonstrated the presence of Jews,
Ukrainians and Byelorussians in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union,
and the Soviets had tried to prevent that from happening."
There is no basis, of course, for Anders' claim that Alter and Ehrlich had
originated the idea of separate Jewish units and that under his influence had
been induced to abandon the proposal. Kot in his book deliberately points out
every false step made by his rival Anders; in this respect he notes that the
General's comments on Alter and Ehrlich "do not, of course, conform to the
truth." There are however no grounds for assuming that Anders was wilfully
misleading; he was probably just mistaken. Totally lacking as he was in under-
standing of the postures and ideological variations among the main blocs in
Jewish public life in Poland, he could easily have attributed to the Bund
leaders a stance that was actually quite unthinkable for them. We can
however safely assume that Anders' claim that he had contact with Alter and
Ehrlich was not pure fabrication. In his book Anders praises the leaders of the
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Bund as loyal patriots of the Polish homeland, while in a note not meant for
publication, he prides himself on having thrown these two leaders out of his
office. It seems that Alter and Ehrlich were trying to have tension between the
Jews and the Poles in the Armed Forces reduced, and in this connection of-
fered several proposals for Anders' consideration. Anders must have
confused this intercession with the proposal to set up a a separate unit, and it
was thus that he came to pen the incorrect version of the facts quoted above.
At a later stage, Kahan was forced to disavow his own proposal. On March
29, 1942 he sent a note to Anders stating that political developments had
made it necessary to revise the proposal with regard to the separate Jewish
units submitted by Sheskin and himself. "It is not fitting to give priority to spe-
cific Jewish interests" he wrote, "since the policies of the Soviets which seek
to deprive the Jews of their Polish citizenship and prevent their enlisting in the
Polish Armed Forces, also seek to undermine the territorial integrity of the
Polish State; this is a situation which calls for greater, not lesser unity." In
concluding his declaration Kahan noted that he had sent a similar letter to
Professor Kot in Kuybishev. And in fact, Kot did mention in a cable he sent to
the Polish Foreign Office in London on March 25, 1942, that Kahan had
informed him in writing that he was revoking his proposal concerning the
establishment of separate Jewish units "because the Soviets are now
forbidding the Jews to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces and they are likely to
take advantage/of the Revisionists' position and use it to buttress their claim.''
In his detailed testimony, Kahan does not mention the letter he sent to Anders
and the declaration he transmitted to Kot. On the other hand, in the postcript
he wrote for Rabbi Rozen's book, Cry in the Wilderness, which was published
in 1966, he stated about the "Jewish Legion": "...would this attempt suc-
cessfully be accomplished, it would change the whole of Jewish history." This
statement is a gross exaggeration which bears no resemblance to a realistic
evaluation. Kot, on the other hand, in a letter he sent to Rabbi Rozen in 1951,
claimed: "The problem of the unrealized Jewish Legion I knew closer, and
today I am of the opinion, that it would have been completely drowned in the
Soviet camps and that none of it would have reached Poland or Palestine."
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Apart from the attempt to create a general "Jewish Legion," there were
several local, temporary arrangements in existence whereby Jews were
concentrated in special units. D. Katz, a highly experienced electrical
technician, relates in his testimony that he chanced upon a reserve unit of this
sort which was made up of members of liberal professions (doctors,
engineers, lawyers, etc.). He volunteered for enlistment in Yangi-Yul, and in
May 1942 he appeared before a medical committee; he was disqualified
because he was a Jew, while "maimed, crooked, hunchbacked and one-eyed
Poles" were assigned fitness grades that qualified them for military service.
However, since he was a qualified engineer he was not rejected outright, and
was assigned to a company of civilian experts which operated under military
cover. Katz's description of the conditions prevailing in the unit is exceedingly
bleak. The unit numbered some sixty men, "all of whom were top-notch and
dependable both as to age and profession" while most of the officers were
coarse Poles who unceasingly demonstrated their deliberate and insulting
anti-Semitism. The unit was not issued an adequate supply of food and the
men suffered constantly from hunger pangs. They received no blankets,
clothing or serviceable tents, and they literally had to sleep on the ground. No
one was at all concerned that they be equipped at least to the extent that
regular soldiers were. And no one knew what was planned for the unit: when
one of the men asked a senior officer of the division, he was told, according to
Katz, that "tests will have to be run, the diplomas checked out, some will be
released, and for the rest we'll put up two tents and let them slowly waste
away from hunger." Katz noted, with bitterness, that the unit was set up on the
assumption that the "army must protect the intelligentsia" particularly in light of
the fact that the Nazis were systematically liquidating the intelligentsia of the
occupied territory; this "protection," however, was tantamount to torture. At the
end of June 1942 the unit was disbanded. Ten or twelve were accepted into
the ranks of the army and the rest — "indigent, exhausted men who had been
imprisoned in camps and jails on account of their loyalty to Poland and who
caught at the army as drowning men at a straw, were scattered to the wind."
The Jewish unit which did achieve a certain renown was the Jewish battalion
stationed at Koltubanka (a village located not far from Tock, which was
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the recruiting centre for professional units, such as the men of the armored
corps). Kahan claims that the Koltubanka unit was established to serve as a
model — or as a small-scale local precursor — for the broader plan for a
"Jewish Legion." Kahan says that he was approached by Colonel Leopold
Okulicki with the suggestion that a battalion composed of Jewish soldiers
already inducted into the army be set up; he was told that if this experiment
proved successful it would be possible to set up additional units. A special
meeting was held to explain the reason for creation of the unit, and Colonel
Jan Galadyk, a Polish officer and devoted friend of the Jews, volunteered to
assume command of the Jewish unit. Kahan adds that this offer constituted an
unusual gesture on Galadyk's part, since the command of a battalion was
generally given to an officer with the lower rank of major. Kahan also claims
that relations between the Jews and the Poles within the unit were proper.
However, even according to him this idyllic picture was muddied somewhat by
the fact that prior to the transfer from Tock to Koltubanka, the Jewish soldiers
were stripped of their uniforms and were sent to Koltubanka in rags and with-
out equipment. Kahan tends to view this as an isolated episode, the result of
ill-will on the part of one particular Polish officer, an apostate Jew who sought
in this fashion to demonstrate his antagonism towards Jews; he does not view
this as proof of the existence of a definite policy set up by the Polish military
command. Kahan argues that the opposite was true, that the Koltubanka
experiment was successful and that Kot bore responsibility for the fact that
there was no follow-up to Koltubanka as had been planned.
Kahan's description is, however, contradicted on all scores by Rabbi Rozen's
description of the general circumstances surrounding the establishment of the
Battalion and the conditions in Koltubanka. It will be recalled that Rabbi Rozen
had close ties with the original advocates of the "Legion" proposal and he had
given his blessing and support to the plan. It also should be noted that Dr.
Kahan publicly expressed his agreement with Rabbi Rozen in the postcript he
wrote for his book. And yet, according to Rabbi Rozen, the Jewish Battalion
was established and sent to Koltubanka at the end of October 1941, i.e. consi-
derably prior to the date when it was decided not to adopt the proposal of
establishing a Jewish Legion. According to Rabbi Rozen, before the Battalion
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was set up the Jewish soldiers in Tock were summarily dismissed from the
army in a manner that clearly demonstrated the anti-Semitism of the Poles. All
the soldiers were assembled and then officers who in the author's words had
themselves just been released from Soviet camps, gave orders to "all those of
the Mosaic faith" to step forward. This method of expelling the Jews from Tock
came to Kot's attention and he complains about it in one of his reports.
According to Rabbi Rozen, the way in which the Battalion was set up
resembled nothing more than ghettoization. When Rabbi Rozen protested to
Colonel Galadyk of this degrading attitude — an act which placed the Rabbi in
personal danger — Galadyk justified the actions by claiming that the Jews
"might live happier in ghetto barracks rather than dwell together with anti-
Semites and Hitlerites." In the wake of the protest the officers attempted to
justify the system.
According to Rabbi Rozen the Jewish soldiers were made miserable
preceding the transfer to Koltubanka. They were, for example, issued with
boots that were too small and many of the soldiers had to go barefoot as a
result. And Koltubanka itself, after Tock, in Rabbi Rozen's words, was merely
the exchange of a small ghetto (Tock) for a "larger ghetto" numbering some
1,000 men. In the light of the alarming news from Koltubanka, Okulicki sent
Rabbi Rozen "to straighten out matters...there." According to Rabbi
Rozen, Okulicki regarded whatever was happening there as matters among
the Jews, and not as a matter of anti-Semitism in the army.75 Rabbi Rozen
found the Jewish unit in a very low state of morale and fitness. The Jewish
soldiers had been forced to dig their own underground dugouts in the rock-
hard earth, with the temperature at 40 degrees C. below zero. His first task
was to bury the large number of Jewish personnel who had died there. The
military kitchen, which was supervised by Poles, often "forgot" or simply
refused to issue regular rations to the Jewish soldiers. The officers in the unit
were all Jews, but an anti-Semitic Polish captain had command of the
Battalion. Colonel Galadyk was in fact stationed at Koltubanka, but as overall
commander of the military base and not of the Jewish unit. Rabbi Rozen
confirms the fact that Galadyk evinced good will towards the Jews. He had
however not come to Koltubanka of his own free will; as a follower of Pilsudski
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he had been "exiled" to Koltubanka by Sikorski's men. The Jews suffered
constantly at the hands of their Polish "comrades-in-arms": "Jewish soldiers
were prohibited from passing through the streets where the Polish soldiers
camped... If a Jewish soldier from Koltubanka did appear there... he met with
both physical and moral degradation in the worst anti-Semitic manner
possible." According to Rabbi Rozen, the name "Koltubanka" became
synonymous with a "Jewish ghetto" — at army headquarters the mere
mention of Koltubanka would elicit cynical smiles, while among Jews it was
viewed as a confirmation of their abasement.
News about Koltubanka did reach foreign countries. Rabbi Rozen states that
the information was published in the free countries, but he does not indicate
how the news was transmitted or when it appeared. But we do know of
repercussionsarising from the publication of information on Koltubanka, from a
cable sent from London by Sikorski to the staff headquarters of the Polish
Armed Forces in the Soviet Union, on March 19, 1942. General Anders was
asked if a "Jewish Legion had ever been established or was in existence at
that time" within the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union; reply was
requested by return cable. The answer, sent on March 22 under the signature
of General Bohusz-Szyszko, read: "Report that in the Polish Armed Forces in
the Soviet Union there never was nor is there now a Jewish Legion."
Kot's version of the Koltubanka story was included in the report he sent
Sikorski for the period September 1941-July 13, 1942. In this report he
complains of the army's refusal to accept any suggestions made by the
Embassy ostensibly because the Embassy was guided by political
considerations and that it was the army's duty to stay clear of politics. In fact,
claims Kot, the army provided ample opportunity for very dubious political
initiatives, all the while under the guise of being apolitical:
"In exceedingly severe fashion, the politics of anti-Semitism [has been
adopted] and applied first and foremost in Tock, the home base of the Sixth
Division and the center of reserves. After discussions with several
Revisionists who had dreamed of a Jewish Legion and who were popular
and influential in army circles back in the homeland, it was decided to
separate the Jews and group them in special units. This was carried out
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arbitrarily on October 7 — upon the order given by a young officer: 'Jews,
step out of line." Jewish personnel were then sent to Koltubanka and put
under the command of an officer who was known to be an anti-Semite. Jews
were subsequently removed from other formations as well, segregated, or
discharged en masse, no distinction being made between unreliable elements
and those whose discharge would provoke a storm of protest that could only
be harmful to Polish diplomacy. One of the senior officers at general
headquarters vigorously advocated this system which merged the interests of
the anti-Semites with the ambitions of the Revisionists."
There is no doubt that Kot's underscoring the collaboration of the Revisionists
with the anti-Semites was not just fortuitous. Kot believed that the Revisionists
had won the support and the assistance of the Sanacja regime and this
regime indeed was anathema to him. As a result, he exploited every
opportunity to connect the Revisionists with the anti-Semites who were to be
found, in his opinion, largely among the supporters of the Sanacja. However
even if we choose to ignore Kot's tendencious commentary we must still reject
Kahan's apologetic claims. The description of Koltubanka as a partial, or first-
stage, realization of the larger plan for a Jewish Legion is not valid; it bears no
resemblance whatsoever to the true picture of the harsh reality as revealed in
Rabbi Rozen's book and in the testimonies of others.
One question remains to be answered: what eventually happened to the
Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka? Rabbi Rozen claims that when the Polish
Armed Forces in the Soviet Union were transferred to Central Asia, in May
and June 1942, "the Koltubanka Ghetto was automatically liquidated" and the
majority of the Jews as well as Jewish personnel in other units, were
discharged from the Army. However, a small number did manage to remain
with the Force in Soviet Asia until August 1942 when they were evacuated
with the rest of the Army [to Iran]. Rabbi Rozen does not mention how many
of the Jews from Koltubanka managed to remain with the Army nor does he
indicate with what unit they served in Central Asia.
However, we have in our possession an additional testimony concerning the
final stages of the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka. Meir Lustgarten (whose
testimony was cited earlier) relates:
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"Towards the end of the winter of 1942, we all left the camp and were
transferred by train to the city of Gusar on the Afghanistan border of
Uzbekistan. Several weeks after our arrival, the battalion of Jewish soldiers
from the village of Koltubanka also arrived. When the Jewish soldiers were
removed from the ranks of the Polish Army in Tock, the Polish commanders
thought that they had rid the army of Jews, that they would disappear. They
could not possibly have expected that these wretched Jews, who had been
expelled from the army, would attain a level higher than that of the Poles in
the service. The Poles were astounded on seeing Jews in the uniform of the
Polish Armed Forces parading smartly and in unison, all looking fit and well
dressed and marching to the songs on their lips."
It seems that the situation of the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka improved
considerably with the passing of the time. The change for the better probably
came about together with a general improvement in the state of the Polish
Armed Forces in 1942; it also resulted from the dismissal of its anti-Semitic
commander and the intervention of civilian factors. With the improvement in
material conditions, the desire of the Jewish soldiers to demonstrate their
ability also grew, and a sort of "Jewish unit patriotism" came into being. (It is
here that the positive potential of Jewish units with the capacity for inde-
pendent development within the Polish Armed Forces, came to the fore.)
Lustgarten's testimony shows that Rabbi Rozen's contention that the Battalion
was liquidated prior to the evacuation to Central Asia has no basis in fact. One
cannot however de-termine from Lustgarten's testimony whether or not a
purge of the Battalion was carried out in Koltubanka, as was the case in other
units of the Polish Armed Forces.
Lustgarten relates that even in Gusar attempts were made to injure the
Battalion, but by this time the Jewish unit had hard-ened into a cohesive body
and knew how to fend for itself. Lustgarten further relates:
"Shortly after the Jewish Battalion arrived in Gusar, I was also sent there as
an instructor — and I felt strange. Around me I saw long-nosed faces, Semitic
types; the soldiers openly conversed in Yiddish and in the evenings they
gathered together and sang Yiddish folk songs — and all this in the context of
a Polish Army. These were not the Jews I had known from the Jewish streets
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of the Diaspora countries. When I inspected them closely I understood that
the Jewish Diaspora characteristics of fear and apprehension were not
necessarily characteristic of Jews in general. It was then that I began to
believe that Jews would be good soldiers when they felt themselves to be a
free nation."
According to Lustgarten, the Jewish Battalion was evacuated by train to
Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea. From there the soldiers sailed to the port of
Pahlevi, Persia, arriving a short time before Passover of 1942. In Iran, the
Jewish Battalion was disbanded, for the British refused to transfer a separate
Jewish unit to Eretz Israel. Kot for his part relates that he does not know the
ultimate fate of the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka.
4. Anders' Orders of the Day Concerning Jews Further on in his description
of the intentions of the military command to create a "Jewish Legion" and
separate Jewish units, Kot wrote:
"General Anders put a stop to this harmful trend after the discussion at the
Embassy on October 24 (1941) with the participation of representatives of
various blocs in the Jewish community. On November 14 he issued a very
astute order on the treatment of Jews in the Armed Forces. However, in Tock
he met with very strong opposition; he then issued a follow-up order which
contained several paragraphs that are politically touchy. His declaration about
'reckoning' with the Jews in the homeland immediately became widely known
in the free countries and the commander of the Polish Armed Forces came to
be regarded as an enemy of the Jews."
The two orders of the day to which Kot refers are in our archives. The first
was issued in Buzuluk on November 14 and the second, also from Buzuluk,
dates from November 30, 1941. Anders' first order gave a decisive definition
of the position of the Jews in the Armed Forces and how they were to be
treated. The general directives contained in the order were to be obeyed and
followed strictly; a "clear, consistent, unambiguous line" was to be pursued
in dealing with Jews, on the part of both commanding officers and soldiers in
the ranks. He similarly asked that there be an "end to the rumors and the false
charges that spring up behind our backs concerning alleged anti-Semitism in
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the army," rumors that, Anders claimed, originated from foreign sources. In
the body of the order, Anders explicitly stated that Jews had the same rights
and obligations vis-a-vis military service as all other Polish citizens. Within the
Armed Forces, they were to be dealt with "as sincerely and with the same
degree of warmth" as all other soldiers and they were to be granted "the same
measure of confidence" as everyone else. In order to prevent any
misunderstanding, he spelled out the principal directives governing
recruitment of soldiers for active service in the Armed Forces. According to
these directives, the following were to be recruited forthwith: officers, sub-
officers with professional skills, men in the ranks who had seen active service
and volunteers who underwent pre-military training and were found fit by the
recruiting committee. All others were to be sent to the southern republics of
the Soviet Union where the registration of reserve forces would take place. He
spelled all this out in refutation of the libel that Jews were encountering
difficulty in being accepted into the army. "I order all my subordinate
commanding officers to fight relentlessly against any manifestation of racial
anti-Semitism." It must also be explained to the soldiers that Poland has
always adhered to the principles of democracy and tolerance and any
divergence from these principles cannot be countenanced. The Jew will
benefit from the same laws that apply to all Poles; drastic action is to be taken
against him only "when he does not know how to wear with pride the uniform
of a soldier of the Polish Republic and he forgets that he is a Polish citizen."
This order, embodying as it did a clear and forceful enunciation of Anders'
position on a whole series of key questions, would undoubtedly have had a
decisive impact on recruiting procedure and on relationships within the Armed
Forces.
It is clear, from Kot's comments on the subject and from the wording of the
original order, that it was Anders who issued the order and not Sikorski, as
has been claimed by the Palestine Haganah Weekly that published Anders'
second order. Unfortunately, this authoritative and clear-cut order did not long
remain the sole pronouncement that the Commanding Officer of the Polish
Armed Forces in the Soviet Union would make on the matter. Some two
weeks later, a second order was issued; the wording of this order and its
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general tenor virtually cancelled out all that was positive in the first order of
the day.
The second order of the day opens with a reference to the previous order. The
first had officially presented the supreme commander's political credo on the
Jewish question, which he did not care to have misinterpreted by his
subordinates. "I well understand the reasons underlying anti-Semitic
manifestations in the ranks of the Armed Forces;" these were reactions to the
disloyal, and at times hostile, behavior of Polish Jews between 1939-1940. "I
am consequently not surprised that our soldiers, those ardent patriots, regard
the matter so seriously, particularly since they suspect that our Government
and Armed Forces intend to overlook the experiences of the past. When
viewed from this vantage point, our defence of the Jews might seem incom-
prehensible or historically unjustified and even anomalous." However,
explained Anders, the current policy of the Polish Government, tied as it
was to the policy of Great Britain, made it imperative to treat the Jews
favorably, since the Jews wielded considerable influence in the Anglo-Saxon
world. The soldiers must understand that in the interests of the Polish
Government, the Jews must not be provoked, for any anti-Semitism was
likely to bring about harsh repercussions. "I therefore recommend that our
position be explained to the units in a suitably discreet manner and that the
hot-heads and the quick-tempered should be particularly warned" that from
then on any expression of the struggle against the Jews was totally forbidden
and whoever was found guilty of such would be severely punished.
"However, after the battle is over and we are again our own masters, we will
settle the Jewish matter in a fashion that the exalted status and sovereignty of
the homeland and simple human justice require."
The differences, indeed the polar distinctions, between the two orders are so
pronounced that it is extremely difficult to understand how one man was
capable of issuing both documents within the short space of two weeks. The
contradictions and vacillations in Anders' orders do however become more
comprehensible on comparing Anders' public statements with those he made
in closed sessions with Stalin or wrote for inclusion in his own personal files.
Kot claimed, as we have already noted, that Anders' retrenchment from the
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first order and its general orientation was due to pressure applied by the
command staff of the Sixth Division located in Tock. We cannot be certain of
the validity of this version, for we know that Kot tended to be suspicious of the
Tock command which he regarded as a collection of political rivals composed
of Pilsudski-ites. There can however be no doubt that the sharp about-face in
the wording and content of Anders' orders was prompted by the criticisms
voiced by friends and subordinates in his army. There is also no doubt as to
which version reveals Anders' real feelings and opinions.
In the first order Anders claimed that anti-Semitism was nonexistent in the
Armed Forces and that hostile forces had maliciously charged the Poles with
hatred of the Jews; for this reason the Poles should be wary and be
responsible in their behavior. From the second order, it evolves that there
actually was anti-Semitism and the Supreme Commander understood its
causes. He did not demand this time that every manifestation of anti-Semitism
be unequivocally opposed, but only asked that the hot-heads be held in check
and prevented from doing acts of violence. In the first order, the rejection of
anti-Semitism was a function of a basic attitude stemming from the constitu-
tional and ideological foundations of the Polish State, while in the second,
opposition to anti-Semitism was but a political strategem necessitated by
momentary circumstances and the true reckoning by the Poles would have its
day when they would be free to act as they pleased in their liberated
homeland. Kot noted that Anders' second order found its way abroad and
gave the Supreme Commander a bad name. However, the fact that Anders'
first order was so radically altered under the influence of friends and military
subordinates indicates that hostility towards Jews was not the exclusive
attribute of the Supreme Commander. The opposite is true: many
military personnel would not have taken a position in defence of the Jews
even for reasons of expediency. The truth of the matter is that anti-Semitism
was general and widespread throughout the Armed Forces and all the Jewish
witnesses, no matter what their outlook, education or position testify to the
fact; that proves that even the hypocritical approach of the second order
remained a dead letter and was not adopted by the Armed Forces. Thus,
some of the testimonies tell of attempts to check anti-Semitism "from above,"
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but these attempts were futile. M. Kahan notes in his testimony that the anti-
Semitic manifestations increased as the self-confidence and the sense of
mastery of the Poles grew, with the consolidation of forces, the acquisition of
equipment and the improvement in conditions. This means that not only did
anti-Semitism in the Armed Forces not decrease, but it actually became
progressively worse. One of the witnesses, a doctor, states that "anti-
Semitism was expressed in acts of degradation and physical injury." Another
witness states that the anti-Semitic treatment of Jews took the form, among
other ways, "of frequent and unjustified demands to do physical labor, of
insults, and of the fact that Jewish complaints were not investigated and
rectified and no steps were initiated against the parties." However, it is only
just to note that there were commanders and officers in various units who did
try to protect the Jews under their command, and who, despite the difficulties
involved, did adopt an attitude of decency and comradeship towards Jews.
The Haganah Weekly Eshnab, edited in Palestine by Lieben-stein, (Eliezer
Livne), published Anders' second order of the day in its issue of June 28,
1943.At that time, elements of General Anders' Armed Forces were stationed
in Eretz Israel, and the publication of the order provoked a sharp response
from the Jewish community. The "Representation of Polish Jewry"
(Reprezentacja iydostwa polskiego), with its office in Palestine, was
composed of representatives of all the Zionist parties (excluding the
Revisionists) and of Agudat Israel. They regarded Anders' order of the day as
a declaration that "would necessarily give rise to an intensification of anti-
Semitic trends and not to their weakening" and approached the Prime Minister
and Minister of National Defense, Sikorski, on the matter. The
"Representation" pointed out that the order stood in direct contradiction to
formal and binding declarations made by the Polish Government in London
and asked whether the Government intended taking any steps and what
conclusions it proposed to draw in the face of the order. The letter to Sikorski
was sent on July 5, 1943, the very day on which Sikorski was killed in a plane
crash near Gibraltar.
Towards the end of June 1943, Jan Stanczyk, a leader of the Polish Socialist
Party and a minister in the Government-in-Exile in London, visited Eretz
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Israel, and on July 1st he met in Tel Aviv, with a delegation of the
"Representation." At the meeting, the secretary of the "Representation," Dr.
Abraham Stupp, raised the matter of Anders' order: ".. .I must speak about
something very painful. I have before me a paper issued by General Anders in
which he explains his position on the anti-Semitic feelings in the Armed
Forces." At this point, Stanczyk interrupted Stupp and said: "I am familiar with
the contents." Dr. Stupp continued, giving his interpretation of the order's
significance. Stanczyk then replied:
"Anders' motives in issuing the order were possibly not as bad as they appear.
Given the prevailing mood, he sought to explain a position that had
encountered opposition. He did it in an unsatisfactory manner. Anders is
merely a soldier, not a politician. A politician would have done it differently and
better. There is no cause to turn this into an international issue. I know that
when this will become known abroad there will be an outcry about anti-
Semitism in the Polish Armed Forces, and this in turn might bring about an
even more severe reaction on the part of the Poles..."
Later on, in response to a question, Stanczyk said: "I do not want to deny, and
I admit, that an anti-Semitic mood prevails among the population that returned
from Russia and in the Armed Forces. I note this in pain, but the fact cannot
be changed by decree..."
On July 12, 1943, that is less than two weeks after the meeting between
Stanczyk and the delegation from the "Representation," the "Representation"
received a letter from the Polish Consulate in Tel Aviv. The letter stated that in
the course of a conversation between Minister Stanczyk and General Anders,
the General had denied outright the existence of any such order and "claimed
that the text was forged." Stanczyk added for his own part: "I am convinced
that this is a product of hostile propaganda which aims at disrupting relations
between Poles and Jews."
Among the documents Kot included in his book published in London in 1955,
was, as we have seen, Anders' second order. Although it is true that Kot was
at that time waging a battle against the General, it is inconceivable that he
would have included a spurious document in his book. It is worth pointing out
that Anders, in his book, chose to make no mention of the order, although in
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meetings with Jews he continued to claim that it was a forgery. A meeting was
held on September 19, 1943 between Anders and a delegation from the
"Representation" at the home of the Polish Consul General in Tel Aviv, Dr. H.
Rozmaryn. During the discussion, the engineer Anschel Reiss hinted that "the
Armed Forces had been warned not to engage in anti-Semitic tricks, while it
had been emphasized that the accounting with the Jews would take place
after returning to the homeland." Anders interrupted him at this point and said:
"I know that some sort of rag published an order, allegedly coming from me,
expressing what you just said. I do not even want to discuss the matter. It is a
forgery, no order of this sort ever existed."
Polish sources continued to be concerned over the criticism stirred up by the
publication of the order. The Polish Consul General in a report dispatched to
the Foreign Minister in London (no date indicated) noted that owing to the
commotion that the publication in Eshnab had provoked, he had seen fit to ar-
range a meeting between his deputy, Weber, and Yitzhak Grun-baum. At the
meeting Weber reiterated the claim that the order had never been issued and
Grunbaum was asked to help quiet the excitement. After consulting with the
other officials of the Jewish Agency, Grunbaum agreed to take steps in
keeping with the Consul General's request. At the same time, he asked Dr.
Rosmaryn to write him a letter confirming that "the document which was
published by Eshnab and about which he (Grun-baum) had heard a half-year
earlier, was never issued."
An additional reverberation sounded at a meeting held in London on January
13, 1944 between Sikorski’s successor as Prime Minister, Stanistaw
Mikolajczyk, and two Jewish representatives, Dr. Schwarzbart, a member of
the National Council in London, and Dr. Tartakower of the World Jewish
Congress. At the meeting, Schwarzbart spoke of what was taking place in the
Armed Forces and he cited Anders' order of the day. Miko-lajczyk pointed out
to him that Anders had explicitly stated that the order was a forgery. To this
Schwarzbart replied:
"Yes, I know. However, there are witnesses, among them ministers, who
fought against the order when it was issued. We know that one of the cables
referred to the order as a forgery. I have no objection against making such a
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claim for external consumption, but on the inside, no one should expect me to
believe that it was a forgery."
The Prime Minister remained silent and after a while said: "I will deal with this
matter also."
It is clear that anti-Semitism was a general feature of the Polish Armed
Forces; it had its roots in traditions of the past and in the ideology and political
conceptions of Poland in the period between the wars. The various strata in
Polish society were not sufficiently perspicacious to study their own history
with a critical eye, nor were they able to perceive just how destructive a role
anti-Semitism played in the internal life of the Polish republic and how it had
served as a vehicle for the penetration of destructive Nazi influences under
the guise of anti-Semitism. In the Soviet Union during the Second World War,
Jews and Poles came into contact to a much greater extent than in Poland
proper where the Jews had been separated from the local population by the
walls of the ghetto; in the immigration centers such as London, there was only
a handful of Jews and relations there were generally based upon formal
attempts at communication, lacking in the elements of spontaneity and
frankness.
The political leadership, however, was sensitive to the harmful ramifications of
anti-Semitism and it did show an understandable degree of awareness to the
negative reactions to the Polish hatred of Jews, by public opinion in the free
countries and by influential Jewish circles in the West. However, since their
attitude to the issue was ambivalent and was dictated by a whole array of
tactical considerations, it is not surprising that periodic "cracks" in their
behavior and pronouncements showed up their true feelings. It should also
not .be forgotten that the Endeks, who enjoyed a position of respect within the
broad-based coalition in London, held Jew-hatred as one of the fundamental
elements in their ideological and political outlook. And as we have also seen,
anti-Semitism was particularly rampant among the officers of the Armed
Forces, and this attitude undoubtedly had its reverberations within the ranks
as well.
5. The Evacuation of the Armed Forces of General Anders
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from the Soviet Union
The total evacuation of General Anders' Armed Forces from the Soviet Union
was the outcome of the tensions and suspicions that accompanied all
dealings between the Poles and the Soviet authorities. The evacuation was
also in no small part a product of the differences of opinion and the rivalries
that existed among the Poles themselves. According to the operative
agreement signed by both the Polish and the Soviet generals, the Poles were
to train the recruits in stages, send them into action in units no smaller than a
division, and be subordinate to the Supreme Soviet Command. The Polish
generals were possibly not fully aware of the significance of the commitments
inherent in the agreement. At any rate, the various political and military
echelons of the Polish leadership sought to raise a large army to be sent into
battle as one cohesive unit in a state of full battle preparedness for they
believed that the decision to commit their forces should be made only after all
factors had been weighed from the point of view of Polish political interests.
Towards the end of 1941, the Soviets demanded that part of the Polish force
be sent to the front. The Poles countered with the claim that they had not yet
completed battle training. As was their wont, the Soviets then applied a very
material form of pressure: they issued orders limiting the rations and
equipment to be supplied to General Anders' Armed Forces, and they also
made it abundantly clear to the Poles that they would not tolerate for any
length of time the continued existence on Soviet territory of a non-combatant
army. An untenable situation was thus created, and both sides were
constrained to find a solution.
Within the Armed Forces the exiles and those who had been released from
the camps did, in fact, require a certain period of time to recuperate and
undergo military training before going on active service. During the initial
stages, the soldiers suffered much from the harsh climatic conditions in the
temporary camps in the Volga region. During Sikorski's visit to Moscow the
Poles asked Stalin for permission to transfer the troops to a more temperate
area. Uzbekistan was then chosen as the major new location. However, the
sudden change-over to a warm climate and to an area ridden with disease
touched off massive epidemics among the recruits. Uzbekistan was also far
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removed from general headquarters and from the centers of political decision-
making.
The suggestion to evacuate part of the Force from the Soviet Union was first
raised by Sikorski during his discussion with Stalin. Stalin's reaction was most
severe, but ultimately he gave his assent for the evacuation of 25,000 men as
reinforcements for the Polish troops in the West. Nevertheless, Sikorski op-
posed evacuating all the troops from the Soviet Union; his basic conception
was that Polish soldiers should take part in the battle for the liberation of
Poland on all fronts and from all directions. He considered the Soviet front to
be of prime im-
portance particularly since the fact that Poles had fought alongside the
Soviets would be a trump card in the inevitable bargaining over the eastern
borders. The British, for their part, pressed for a full-scale evacuation so that
the Polish Armed Forces could reinforce their own points of weakness.
There is no doubt that the Soviets were not unaware of these considerations;
with deliberate cunning they bypassed the Polish political levels and
established direct contact with Anders and his officers, exploiting thereby the
commander's extreme ambitiousness. In the course of time, Anders achieved
a position of independence in both his military and political activity. Anders
flaunted this independence before Kot in Russia; he also apparently had the
support of the Polish opposition in London, who saw him as a potential rival of
Sikorski's.
The Soviets finally decided to rid themselves of the Polish Armed Forces
which they now regarded as a political nuisance. They planned to establish
another Polish army in its place, this time under the auspices of the Polish
Communists in the U.S.S.R.; this army would become a firm support for the
Soviets not only in solving the problems of the borders but also in assuring the
form of rule for Poland in the future. It is not entirely clear which side actually
raised the idea of a total evacuation, Anders or the Soviets. At any rate,
Anders accepted the proposal without waiting for government confirmation
from London. Anders had his own reasons. One may assume that he feared
for the physical existence of his army in the conditions under which they were
operating in the Soviet Union and he viewed evacuation as a means of
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salvation and as an opportunity to obtain an extensive military installation. It
may also be assumed that he did not want to see the force broken up into
small units for a large and unified force served as a guarantee of his own
personal standing. A far from negligible factor in his considerations apparently
was his mistaken estimation that the Soviet Union would not be able to
repulse the might of the Nazis, and removing his men from the Soviet Union
meant taking them out of an area that he believed was destined to be overrun.
Attempts were made to procure Soviet permission for continued recruiting
even after the evacuation on the basis of signed agreements with the Polish
Government in London, but the Soviets flatly refused. The evacuation
allowed the Soviets to shut down the welfare activities that had been carried
on by the Embassy, and to proceed to build up a Polish political and military
force on Soviet soil based upon a handful of Polish Communists and their
sympathizers. The Poles in London and Anders' men apparently believed that
the Soviets would never succeed in attracting Poles to their cause, and that a
Polish force that served the interests of the Soviets could not be created,
just as no quisling or traitor had raised his head in Poland under the German
conquest. In time it became clear that they had erred badly and their error had
fateful conse- ' quences for the future of Poland.
During the two stages of the evacuation, some 114,000 Poles, soldiers and
civilians, left the Soviet Union; the Soviet authorities agreed to allow the
families of the soldiers and certain groups among the civilian population, such
as children, to be evacuated together with the soldiers. In the first transfer, in
March-April 1942, some 44,000 (31,500 soldiers and 12,500 civilians) were
evacuated; in the second stage of the evacuation, during the months of
August-September 1942, more than 70,000 military personnel and civilians
left the Soviet Union (close to 45,000 military personnel and over 25,000
civilians). As has already been noted, the transports made their way by train
to the port of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea, and from there they sailed to
Pahlevi, Iran. Thus there came to an end the Polish Armed Forces in the
Soviet Union which had been established by and under orders from the Polish
Government-in-Exile in London.
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The Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union never reached the dimensions
envisaged by the Poles. Hindering growth were obstacles placed in the way
by the Soviets, such as reduction in equipment and supplies, and adverse
climatic and sanitary conditions. Evidently the Poles themselves prevented
members of ethnic minorities from joining the army. The force which
numbered 34,000 men in December 1941, grew to 66,000 men in March
1942. During the very last stages, just prior to the evacuation, there was an
additional, hasty recruitment. In sum total, 72,000 men of General Anders'
Armed Forces were evacuated from the Soviet Union.
The amnesty and the conscription enabled many to rise from the status of
prisoners to free soldiers, from conditions of neglect and extreme hardship to
a framework which provided their basic necessities; the evacuation meant a
chance for salvation and escape to the free world. When it became known
that civilians and relatives of army personnel would be permitted to join the
evacuation, a great stream of people moved from the farthest corners of the
Soviet Union to the exit points in the south.
We will now review the numbers of Jews among the evacuees and the
attitude of the Poles and their treatment of Jews during the various stages of
the evacuation. According to Jewish sources, some 6,000 Jews were among
them, one source giving some 3,500 soldiers and 2,500 civilians. Close to a
thousand Jewish children known as Yaldei Teheran (Children of Teheran)
were transferred together with a large camp of evacuated children. In total
Jews accounted for about five per cent of the soldiers evacuated (five per cent
of the enlisted men and one per cent of the officers) and about seven per cent
of the civilians.
During the first stage of the evacuation some 700 Jewish civilians reached
Iran. The Polish authorities claimed that the Soviets made certain that no one
to whom the Soviet law of citizenship applied could leave, and emigration of a
much larger number of Jews was thus blocked. Yet it seems that in at least
one case the N.K.V.D. which supervised the transports, forced the Poles to
take with them a group of Jews whom they had refused to allow to enlist.
During the journey, and even after arriving in Iran, these Jews were subjected
to physical and mental maltreatment by the Polish officers in charge, who
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stood firm in their resolve not to allow them to enlist. The episode became
known in the free countries and Yitzhak Schwarzbart queried it in London.
Shapiro, a U.P. reporter, reported the incident to the press of the United
States, and in the wake of' the publications an investigation was held. The
senior officer in charge of the transport, Lt. Col. Pstrokonski, described
the way in which the Jewish group was added to the transport:
"...2/ on the way, if my memory serves me right, it was March 25, 1942, we
discovered that the Soviet authorities had added to our transport five cars of
civilians, almost all Jews. According to my lists, there were 330 people,
including several children. We were not informed about the coupling on of
these wagons. What happened was that at one of the stations we realized that
the cars had been attached and that they were travelling with us..."
By contrast, Captain Dowiaglo, who was directly responsible for these Jews
and against whom most of the charges were levelled, states that there were
300 people in the additional cars, ninety per cent of whom were Jews. Among
them, he claimed, were young children (of pre-enlistment age) and also those
advanced in age, but the majority were young men.117 A Jewish source
describes the episode thus:
"Before the first units of the Polish Army left Russia, that is on the 22nd of
March 1942, 300 Jews of A classification who had been examined by a
Russian health board since the Polish committee was no longer functioning,
were sent by the voyen-komat [the Soviet War Office] to the place where the
division was stationed. However, [the Poles] ordered them to return to their
points of departure. Some of the Jews requested N.K.V.D. intervention and
this in turn asked the Polish authorities why these men were not being issued
with uniforms and why they were being sent back. The Polish authorities
replied that they did not have enough railroad cars to transport them. The
N.K.V.D. immediately supplied cars, and faced with this fact [the Poles] took
them to Persia but did not provide them with uniforms. At the port of Pahlevi,
all the Jews not in uniform were told that they were free to go. Several Jews
then approached the British authorities and asked them to intervene, and it
was only by command of the British authorities that they all were issued
uniforms and inducted into the army."
__________________________________________________________________________ Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies 50/44
Anders himself and General Bohusz-Szyszko, his deputy, took an interest in
the evacuation of the Jews. On July 31, Anders and Bohusz-Szyszko and a
Soviet representative, General Zhu-kov, signed a protocol setting forth which
Jews were eligible for inclusion among the evacuees. Paragraph 1 of that
document states that relatives of soldiers who were residents of the Ukraine
and Byelorussia holding other than Polish citizenship would be allowed to
leave only if they could prove a close family relationship with soldiers in the
Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union. Paragraph 2 stated that separate
lists had to be submitted of family members who were residents of the Ukraine
and Byelorussia and who were not Poles, and a certification of the authenticity
of the lists had to be supplied by the military command. Paragraph 3 spoke of
the prohibition against evacuating Soviet citizens even if they had married
Polish soldiers while in the Soviet Union.
Naturally, the very fact that Anders agreed to sign such a document raises
questions. In practice, however, Anders went even further than the wording of
the document required. At a meeting with several rabbis and Jewish
communal workers, and in a note he sent to London, Anders claimed that the
Soviet Government "agreed to the evacuation of the close relatives only of
those Jews who were serving in the units now stationed in the Soviet Union."
In other words: Anders blocked the evacuation of the relatives of those
soldiers who had left during the first stage, claiming this was in accordance
with Soviet desire. Anders similarly ignored the fact that Jews who were
residents of the western provinces and who had not had Soviet citizenship
thrust upon them were eligible, from the Soviet point of view, to leave just like
any other Polish citizen. In his meetings with Jews and in the reports he sent
to London, Anders continued to claim that any attempt to circumvent the
Soviet directives would jeopardize the whole evacuation project. On the other
hand, he did declare that he had no reason to oppose attempts on the part of
Jews to obtain exit permits from the Soviets and that these permits would be
honored by the Poles.
A group of Bund activists who had obtained Kot's recommendation for
evacuation, met with Anders and asked to be declared Poles for purposes of
the evacuation. Anders "categorically rejected" their request. The Bund
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members related that all those who had stated that they were of Jewish faith
were dropped from the transport roster of August 9, 1942. On the other hand,
those Jews who declared themselves to be Roman Catholics did leave.122 By
way of an aside, it is of interest to point out that the Jewish Agency intervened
with the Polish authorities to allow these "Marranos" to resume their Jewish
identity even while they were in Iran.
In a good many cases, Soviet officers forcibly intervened and claimed that
they would have no part in the Polish discrimination policy. One N.K.V.D.
officer stated that he was prepared to authorize the evacuation of any Jew
who could produce two witnesses to testify that he did not fall into the
category of those upon whom Soviet citizenship had been imposed. Thanks to
the intensive efforts of several Jews, a meeting was arranged between
General Zhukov and Bohusz-Szyszko to clarify Soviet restrictions on the
evacuation of Jews. According to a Jewish source, Zhukov complained to
Bohusz-Szyszko:
"General, why do you tell the Jews that we are making it difficult for them to
leave? Do you not know that we in fact do not check the lists, that we close
one eye to what is going on, and that from our point of view it makes no
difference who goes, Ivan, Peter or Rabinovitch?"
At the meeting Zhukov also produced the protocol mentioned above and
demonstrated that the Polish interpretation of Jewish family relationships did
not coincide with the stipulations of the signed document.
In a letter to Kot, Bohusz-Szyszko described the clash with Zhukov and
claimed that Zhukov agreed to the arrangement whereby two witnesses would
certify that a given individual was a Polish citizen, but he made the Polish
commanders responsible for the authenticity of the declaration. The Bundists
relate in their memorandum that Bohusz-Szyszko after giving some other
arguments admitted to them that the Poles knew that a maximum of 70,000
individuals could be evacuated and thus feared that Jews might occupy
places required for Poles and consequently tried to reject Jews by every
possible means.127 Preserved in Professor Kot's files are reports and surveys
of observers and liaison officers sent by the Embassy to the evacuation
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centers in the various divisions. Jacob Hoffman, the liaison officer attached to
the Sixth Division, wrote in his summary:
"The atmosphere at the time the evacuation lists were drawn up was such that
even after it was explained to the Jews who bore responsibility for the harsh
directives and why they were issued, they still did not believe the explanation.
The mood prevailing not only among the men but also among the officers of
certain, types was near rejoicing over the prohibition to include members of
the national minorities."
Hoffman also reports that he was told about one commanding officer who took
pride in the fact that he did not include even one Jew in the list of evacuees he
had prepared.
The liaison officer who was in charge of the evacuation of the Fifth Division,
Witold Misztowt-Czyz, submitted a detailed and angry report of his battle to
manage the evacuation of a group of Jews. According to the report, he put
together a list of relatives of soldiers who were eligible for evacuation, ac-
cording to the directives, but Lt. Col. Dudziriski, who was in charge of the
evacuation of the unit, removed from the list of Polish citizens, members of the
following minority groups: 1) who were by nationality Tatars and Moslems by
religion; 2) Jewish apostates who represented themselves as Catholics and
as Poles; 3) assimilated Jews who were listed in the census as Poles; 4) a
small group of Jews who declared themselves to be Jewish by nationality. The
author of the report claimed that the majority belonged to the working
intelligentsia and included army veterans, orphans of military personnel,
handicapped soldiers and Polish industrialists; "many of them could claim
rights earned by their efforts for the Polish cause." Misztowt-Czyz requested
the intervention of the army staff.
The problem of the Tatars was immediately settled: they were reinstated on
the list. What remained to be solved was the problem of the apostates and the
Jews, who numbered 52 families (122 souls in all). General Bohusz-Szyszko
favored including them all in the list of evacuees. Bishop Josef Gawlina, the
highest ranking religious authority in the armed forces, issued a declaration on
behalf of the apostates in which he noted that racial conceptions were foreign
to the Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless, Lt. Col. Dudzinski stood his
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ground and refused to put the names back on the list. Misztowt-Czyz also
charges that this same Dudzinski removed fifty Jews from the evacuation train
even though they had every right to be in the convoy. Misztowt-Czyz
concludes that an injustice had been done to Polish citizens who were fully
entitled to leave for Iran."
The liaison officer at staff headquarters, the engineer Andrzej Jenicz, drew up
a comprehensive summary of the situation in which he included several
suggestions of a political nature. He noted the fact that a large number of
Jews could be found at those places where the lists of evacuees were being
drawn up and where the potential evacuees had gathered. These Jews were
incensed at the fact that their rights to be evacuated were being ignored while
others were being brought from afar and included in the evacuation; Polish
soldiers, on the other hand, were angry over the fact that the Jews seemed to
be nearby while their own families were far away. Jenicz pointed out in his
report that "the behavior of certain army personnel, who acted in an anti-
Semitic fashion during the evacuation, contributed to the creation of an ugly
atmosphere;" he also pointed out that many of the Jews demonstrated "an
aggressive and hostile" attitude. Jenicz described his efforts to have Jews
included in the lists, and reported that in several cases he received support
from non-military elements. However, his activities brought but meager
results. Jenicz states clearly that "the evacuation of Jews from the Soviet
Union was unpopular with the Polish public and army and was restricted to the
barest minimum, in line with the position taken by the Soviet authorities."
Jenicz concluded his summary with the following comments:
"Circles in international Jewry will, of course, act upon the advice of our
Jews who are embittered because so few were allowed to leave, and will
put all the blame upon the Poles. As far as Polish state interests are
concerned it is immaterial whether the blame is laid upon the civilian or the
military — the Embassy, general headquarters or division staff. It is quite
likely that the Soviet authorities will endeavour to portray the matter in a
fashion unfavorable to Polish interests, and that they will do so in the context
of the clash over the eastern territories. Soviet propaganda will claim that the
Polish authorities did not want to take the Jews, and they will supply the Jews
__________________________________________________________________________ Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies 50/48
with the appropriate propaganda materials. It won't be difficult for them to
obtain such. I shall cite as an example the cable which the [Soviet]
Commissar for Evacuation Matters attached to the Fifth Division, sent to
Bishop Gawlina in Yangi-Yul, stating that the Armed Forces 'were
employing racial tactics.' For this reason I advise that the only [correct]
approach would be the adoption of a unified front by all elements directly in-
volved in the evacuation and the briefing of all those who must know about the
evacuation with one version only, namely that restrictions were applied to the
departure of Jews only because of the absolute prohibition imposed by the
Soviet Government.
If need be, we will be able to produce appropriate material to confirm this
claim. All reports giving unfavorable details of the evacuation campaign
should be treated as top secret, lest they fall into the wrong hands. The anti-
Semitic behavior of certain officers — which has been blown up to maximal
proportions — should be explained as acts of isolated individuals for whom
those in charge of the evacuation cannot be held responsible."
It is abundantly clear that the composition of the evacuation lists, the
treatment of Jews during the evacuation and the small numbers of Jewish
soldiers and civilians among the evacuees all helped to reveal to the free
world the anti-Jewish discrimination and the extreme anti-Semitism practiced
by many Poles.
According to a Jewish estimate, 3,500 Jewish soldiers were evacuated;
according to Anders, 4,000. Even if we accept the Polish figure as the correct
one, we are led to an instructive conclusion. Until the end of 1941, the Soviets
placed no obstacles before the recruiting of Jews; in fact, according to Polish
sources just the opposite occurred — the Soviets deliberately channelled
large numbers of Jews to the recruiting centers, and as a result they made up
forty per cent of the initial recruits, and some say even more than that. If we
may assume that the Polish Armed Forces numbered some 40,000 men till
the end of 1941, then the number of Jews was at least 10,000. When the
Russians began to place restrictions on recruiting from among the minorities,
they also tried, according to Anders, to have the restrictions applied to parts of
the force already in existence. Anders claims that he bitterly opposed the
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Russians on this point, arguing that a law cannot take effect retroactively, and
the Russians were forced to accept his position. If all this is true, the question
then arises: where did all the Jews, who by all accounts were allowed to
remain in the army, disappear? There can be no doubt of the answer: in
addition to the restrictions of the Soviets and the disqualifications by the Poles
of new recruits, a drastic purge of existing units must have taken place.
There is no reason to attribute to isolated officers the policy of discrimination
in the drawing up of the evacuation lists. The Embassy sought to mitigate the
extremism of the Armed Forces and to include a larger number of Jews in the
lists, in particular the more recognized Jewish leaders. As we have seen, the
Embassy's efforts had disappointing results with the open rivalry between the
Armed Forces and the political elements serving as at least a partial cause.
Some officers chose to behave in a brutally anti-Semitic manner, making
the situation in fact harsher even than the stated policy, and only a few
spoke out openly against the discrimination and sought to intervene to
whatever extent they could.
It is very possible that the N.K.V.D., wanting to embroil the Poles, sought to
utilize for their own propaganda purposes the unrestrained anti-Semitism
which was rampant among them. However, we may also assume that even
had those circumstances had no connection with the Soviet restrictive regula-
tions, the Russians would hardly have allowed the Poles to carry out their
machinations while attributing them to the Soviet authorities. Naturally, as in
the earlier stages, those who suffered and were injured in all cases were the
Jews.
Brief mention should be made at this point of the "desertion" of Jews from
General Anders' Armed Forces, even though this is not the concern of this
article and the topic merits a separate and independent study. While the force
was stationed in Eretz Israel desertion from the ranks reached massive
proper-tions. According to Anders, 3,000 out of 4,000 men deserted. We may
assume that a prime motivation was the strong desire to become a part of the
new Jewish community in Eretz Israel after the bitter experiences in the Soviet
Union and in full awareness of events in occupied Poland. Furthermore, the
anti-Semitism and discrimination in Anders' army during recruitment and later
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during service also had their bearing on the decision to desert. We cannot
determine the individual weight of each factor in the final decision nor can we
know what ultimately tipped the balance, but it is reasonable to assume that
both factors played a role and prompted many to decide on desertion.
In his memoirs, and in declarations made elsewhere, Anders claimed to
understand the motivations of those Jews who wanted to remain in Eretz
Israel. For that reason he did not want to employ force in recovering deserters
and did not even mount searches for them. This contention put forward by
Anders years after the fact, while basically true, is not the whole truth. Anders
claimed at meetings with Jewish representatives in Eretz Israel that the
desertion of Jews was not significantly damaging to the Force since he was
bound to lose at least an equal number in battle. However, he did feel that this
type of flight would most likely influence future relations between Poles and
Jews. Anders sought to stem the wave of desertions by using various means
of persuasion; certain Jewish elements also opposed the mass desertion of
Jewish soldiers, out of a concern for the future welfare of the Jews of Poland
after the war. It is worth pointing out that Anders emphasized that the
thousand Jewish soldiers who remained in the Force fought bravely and no
less gallantly than all the other soldiers who travelled the lengthy route from
the Soviet Union through the Middle East to the bitter struggle over Monte
thus continued their struggle.
Source: Yisrael Gutman, Jews in General Anders’ Army In the Soviet Union, Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. XII, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 1977 pp. 231-296.