8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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Melancholy, Irony, and KierkegaardAuthor(s): Abrahim KhanReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (1985), pp. 67-85Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40036365.
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International Journal
for
Philosophy
of
Religion
1
7:67-85
(1985).
1985 Martinus
Nif
ho
ff
Publishers,
Dordrecht.
Printed
in the
Netherlands.
MELANCHOLY,
IRONY,
AND
KIERKEGAARD
ABRAHIM KHAN
Trinity
College,
University
of
Toronto,
Toronto,
Ont.
Almost
everyone
who knows
anything
about
Kierkegaard
nows
that
his
writings
tend
to
be
melancholy.
Some
know
rightly
of
the
irony
with which
he
writes. Still
some others
know that both
melancholy
and
irony
are
thematic
features
primarily
of
his
early writings.
But
probably
very
few
know that
he
perceives
melancholy
and
irony
as two
closely
related
concepts.
The
conceptual
nexus between
the
two,
taken
almost for
granted,
remains
argely unexplored
and somewhat
surprisingly
disquieting.A footnote in his doctoral dissertation,providingsome evidence of
Xenophon's
failure
to
understand Socrates
correctly,
arouses
the
disquietude.
Drawn
from
Memorabilia
II,
14, 2ff.,
the evidence is
Xenophon's
depiction
of a
young
dinner
guest
who
is
presumed
to
understandSocrates'
remarkson
greed.
Kierkegaard
contends
that
instead of
representing
the
youth
as
taking
a little
bread
with his
meat
in
order
to
indicatehis moral
mprovement,
Xenophon
should
have
shown
him as
becoming
so
melancholy
(Melancholf)
hat he
gave
up eating
meat
altogether. 1
This
disquietude
stirs
as we
try
to find an
answerfor
why
the
young
man
should be
cast
as
being melancholy
Melancholi).
The
reply
that melan-
choly
is
a
fitting
expression
for
Socratic
irony
is
neither lucid
nor
perceptive.
Al-
though an 1849 passagefrom his journal2in which Kierkegaardtates that the
melancholy
person
tends,
like the
ironist,
to become
the
henpecked partner
n a
marriage
s
a
vague
hint
at
an
answer,
he
passage,
nevertheless,
makes the
question
more
vexing,
and
the
demand for an
adequate
account
of
their
conceptual
nexus
more
pressing.
Hence,
this
paper
aims to
put
the
disquietude
o
rest
by
clarifying
the
relationship
between
melancholy
and
irony.
More
specifically,
he clarification
is
beneficial
on two
counts.
One,
it sheds
more
light
on
the
way
in
which Kierke-
gaard
exploits
scepticism;
he other
is
that
is
permits
he
drawing
of
a
tighter
com-
pass
around
the
meanings
of
Melancholi and
Tungsind ,
each
purportedly
representing
ifferent
degrees
of
melancholy
n
his
writings.3
Kierkegaard's arly pseudonymouswritingshave been used as the basis for
drawing
the
purported
distinction
between
Melancholi and
Tungsind .
How-
ever,
the nature
and
intention
of the
works,
the
first
of
which is
Either/Or
ssued
in
two
volumes,
are such
that the
distinction
between
these
two terms is
not a
priority.
Artfully
constructed to be
dramatically
provocative,
they
make use
of
67
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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68
thought experiments,speeches, diaries, letters, etc., to attracttheir reader'saess-
thetic
interests while
unobtrusivelyaiming
to make the
reader take
note
of his
own
mode of
existence
and
to become the
agent
of
his own selfhood.
They
present
aesthetic
life in
its manifold as
being
constituted
by
accidents,
by idiosyncracies,
by
'raw
material',
by
chance,
and
by
the fortituous
contatenationof
circumstances
that a
family
or an
environment
provides. 4
n this connection
melancholy
s
both
a
constituent of
the aesthetic life
and a
definite thematic features
especially
in
Either/Or.
The
treatment
of
the
theme
shows
melancholy
not as a
problem
to be
resolved,
but
as a
means and
motive
for
becoming
a
genuine
or
complete
person.
The
literature,
having
been rendered more connotative than
denotative
by
the
literary freedom exercised and artistry employed in its composition, does not
support
unambiguously
distinctionbetween
two
types
of
melancholy.
For it
lends
to
an
equally
plausible hypothesis
that
Tungsind
s
a
stylistically
elegant
varia-
tion
of
Melancholi. 5A defense of that
hypothesis
is
not the
intention
of
this
study.
On
the
contrary,
its intention
is to see whether
the
purported
distinction
can
be
further
clarifiedand
strengthened
on
the
basis
of
a
text that
is
more
formal
and
denotative n
comparison
o the
early
pseudonymous
iterature.
Already
alluded
to,
the
text
for our
study
is
Kierkegaard's
issertation,
pub-
lished
underthe
title The
Concept
of
Irony,6
submitted o the
University
of
Copen-
hagen
in
1841,
and
precedes
the
composition
of
Either
Or.
Its use
of
either term
is
admittedlysparsebut no way a handicapin accomplishingour stated objective.
More
specifically,
the
text
shows
one
occurrence
of
Melancholi and contains
none
of
its
six
variant orms
occurring
n the
Kierkegaard
orpus.
As
for
the term
Tungsind
t does
not occur in the
text,
but
its
variants
tungsindig
nd
tung-
sindigt
do,
occurring
wice
and once
respectively.
As
we
shall
see,
the contexts
in
which
they
occur are
substantial
enough
to
establish the
meaning
of
Melan-
choli
and
to
extrapolate
it in the case of
Tungsind.
The context
for the
one
Melancholi
ccurrence,
already
cited,
is
that
engendering
he
unsettling
question
as
to
why
the
young
dinner
guest
should
be
depicted
as
becoming
so
melancholy
as
to
refuse
food
altogether,
a
question
occasioning
he clarification
of
the
conceptual
tie between
melancholy
and
irony.
Kierkegaard's
nderstanding
of
irony
is an
appropriate
tarting
point
for that
clarification.His
development
of
the
concept
is such that the
expression
irony
as
a
mastered
moment is
crucial
in his
interpretation
of
an
authentic
human
exis-
tence.
He
singles
out for his
purpose
a
particular pecies
of
irony
and calls
it
irony
in
its
essential
greatness,
as its
zenith. When
mastered,
his
particular
orm of
irony
has,
in
brief,
a
chastening
effect
on the
personal
ife. In
a
profound
sense,
Kierke-
gaardian
rony
is a
possible way
of
being
in
the
world,
a
condition
for
acquiring
wholeness
of
personality,
or
human
plenitude.
Valuable in
the
shaping
of
his
understanding
f
irony
are
two
figures,
Socrates
and
the
German
Romanticist,
Solger.
It
is the
latter
who
provides
him
with
a cue
for
making
rony
a
condition for
authentic
human
existence.
For
Solger
ectures
on
aesthetics
take
irony
as a
condition
for
very
artistic
production.7
This
means that
irony
is
a form of
consciousness,
a
standpoint,
or
a
moment of
an
infinitely
abso-
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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69
lute negationof everyaspectof finitude. At thatmoment,ironyis at its zenithand
is
truly
the
negation
of
negation. Solger'sunderstanding
f
irony,
however,
has
a
defect.
Kierkegaard
aults him
for not
going
further.
Instead
of
following
through
to
master
irony
and
thereby
to
become
reconciled
with
the
finite,
Solger
himself
is
trapped
in a state
of
vacuous
infinity.
Although
he
grasps
rony
as
engendering
a
mood
in
which
all
contradictions
are
cancelled,
his
irony
remains,
n Kierke-
gaard's stimate,
speculative
or
contemplative
at
best.8
Irony
at its zenith
is never
mastered,
and therefore
cannot teach the
ironic
subject
that his
personal
life
must become an actualized
infinity every
moment.
Consequently, Solger's
view
breaks
no
new
ground
with
respect
to
Socrates'
understanding
f
irony.
The paradigmatic igure in the shapingof Kierkegaard'sonception of irony
is
Socrates. For in
Kierkegaard's yes
he is the
accouncher
for the
principle
of
actualizing
he infinite
through
one's
personal
ife.9
Although
the
principle
has its
inception
in
Socrates,
we are reminded that it is
only
cryptically
and not
fully
present
in
him.
To the
extent
that the
principle
s
present
in him
and that
irony
for him
is
an
orientation
of
personality,
Socrates
is a
world historical
personage
marking
the
beginning
of the
period
of
reflective
individuality
n
world
history.10
The
implication
s
that
through rony
Socrates
negates
the form
of life
encouraged
and
defined
by
the Greek
state
of
his time. Put another
way,
he
becomes
through
irony
negatively
related
to
the
objective
ethical
reality,
to its
demands
and
obliga-
tions constituting the substantiallife of Hellas.11And,
having
assumedsuch a
standpoint,
he
divorces
himself
not
only
from
the
past
but from
any
subsequent
future
development
of
it. A further outcome
is
that his
earthly
life
culminates n
an
infinite
negativity
nstead of
affirming
he
actuality
of
infinity.
As with
Solger,
Socrates
too
is
trapped
by
the
seductive and
enchanting
moment
of
irony,
or as
Kierkegaard
ells
it,
is
swept
out
upon
that
infinite Oceanus where
the
good,
the
true,
the
beautiful,
etc. confine
[delimit]
themselves n
infinite
negativity. 12
Although
he never
masters
irony,
he
represents,
nonetheless,
the
instantiation
of
irony
as an
infinite absolute
negativity,
that
is,
one
whose life is
oriented so as
to
begin
with
the concrete and to
endeavour
onstantly
to
arrive
at the
abstract.
Any
account
of
Socrateswhich fails
to
depict
him as an
essential
ronist
is,
for
Kierkegaard,
mpoverished.
One such
account
is that of
Xenophon.
In
Kierke-
gaard's
estimate of
that
account,
the
misunderstanding
f the
Socratic
utterances
is
occasioned
by
Xenophon
s lack of an
eye
for a
situation and of
an ear for
repar-
tee,
shortcomings
reflected
by
his
failure
to
depict
the
young
dinner
guest
as be-
coming
so
melancholy
(Melancholi)
hat
he refuses
food
altogether.
Kierkegaard's
insight
that
melancholy
is
associated with
sitophobia,
the
obstinate
refusal
of
food,
anticipates
the
psychoanalytic
enquiries
and estimate of
Abraham
nd
Freud
on
severe
forms
of
melancholy.13
That
aside,
Kierkegaard,
believe,
does not
quite
accuratelyexplain
the
deficiency
in
the
Xenophonticaccount. He takes it that
Xenophon
does
not
know how to
depict
melancholy
on
the
basis
that
the
account
fails
to show
any
trace
of
irony.
He
rightly
perceives
the
account
as
missing
the
thrust
of the
Socratic utterances
which he
takes as
being
in
the
direction of
per-
sonality
and
its
inward
transformation.But
by
charging
hat
it
contains
no
trace of
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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70
irony, he is implyingthat Xenophon fails to understand hat the Socraticutter-
ances are
essentially
intended as a
catalyst
in the
development
of
genuine per-
sonality.
The
implication
is buttressed
by
his remark hat
Xenophon
lacks
an ear
for
detecting
in
the
Socratic
rejoinders
the infinite
reverberating
ackward
echo
of the
reply
in
personality. 14
To
lay
out the
charge
further,
and
consequently
to
pinpoint
more
accurately
wherein
lies
Kierkegaard's
mistake,
the
charge
againstXenophon
amounts
to
this:
he
fails to
understand hat the
Socratic
utterances,
n the final
analysis,
require
of
the hearer
an
inward
response through
which
the
hearer
realigns
himself
with the
ideal
infinity.
The
response
s
not,
as
Xenophon
assumes,
an external
one
having
o
do with bringingone's outwardbehaviour nto conformity with the established
norms,
that
is,
with
what
is
considered
useful,
expedient,
and
finite. That
which
Xenophon
takes to be
the
fitting
human
response
s determined
by
his
philosophi-
cal
anthropology,
or,
his
view of human
personality
and
the
way
in
which
it
is con-
solidated.
In
his
estimate,
human
plenitude
is
independent
of
any
reference
to
an
ideal
infinity.
Indeed,
personality
is consolidated
by
means
of
the
good,
but
the
good
taken
as whatever is
immediately
useful,
serviceable, ucrative,
moderate
and
accords
with the
existing
and
objectively
ethical
order.15
Completeness
n
personality
is
taken to be
in
correlation with
becoming
properly
related
to the
finite
order of
reality.
Human ife
is
shaped
by accidentality,
by
empirical
ealities,
in Xenophon'sview.
For
Kierkegaard
uch
a
view,
in which
personality
s
shaped
by
the
parodying
shadows
of
the
good,
is worthless.
The
useful and
serviceablewith
respect
to the
good
is
only
the
external
dialectic
of
the
good
and
even
though
that
dialectic
is
infinite,
it
is,
as he
puts
it,
an
infinitely
bad
one.16 His
objection
to
Xenophon's
view
of
personality
and his
own
view
of it
have as their
scaffolding
at
least
two
presuppositions
o
which
Xenophon
does not
subscribe.
One is that the
good
must
be
conceived
n
such a
way
that
in
itself it
has both an internaland infinite dialec-
tic,
as
well as an
external
one.
The other is that
personality
s such that
it has
an
inner
infinity
and cannot
become
complete
unless its
infinity
becomes
correlated
with the internal and infinite dialectic of the good. Kierkegaard'smistake is in
assuming
that
the two
presuppositions
are
unquestionable,
hat
they
are
shared
by
Xenophon
and
by
others.
And,
as
we
have
shown,
for
Xenophon
that
is
cer-
tainly
not the
case. His
anthropology
s
conceived
differently
from
that of
Kier-
kegaard.
The
scheme
and
thrust
of
Kierkegaard'srgument
n
the
text remains ntact and
undiminished
nspite
of
his
wrongly
mputing
o
Xenophon
certain
presuppositions.
In
pointing
out
Kierkegaard's
pparent
oversight,
we
have uncovered
presupposi-
tions
which are
implicit
for
the
conception
of
personality
which
has
for
its
proper
task
the
actualization
of
ideality
through
the infinite
exercise
of the
will,
and
which has
irony
as a condition for
the
inception
of that task.
Further,
without
the
two,
neither can the
proper
weighing
be
given
nor the
proper
sense be
made
of
Kierkegaard's
emark
that the
situation and
reply
for
which
Xenophon
lacks
respectively
an
eye
and ear are
essentially
the
complex
forming
the
ganglia
and
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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71
cerebral ystemsof personality. 17Theyalso make ntelligiblehis pithilystated and
familiar thesis that
irony
is a
determination
of
subjectivity.
And,
finally,
they
are
the
background
rom which
emerges
his
assertionthat
whoever does
not
under-
stand
inrony
and
has no
ear
for its
whisperings
acks
eo
ipso
what
might
be
called
the
absolute
beginning
of the
personal
ife. 18
The
species
of
irony
which
the
presuppositions
avour
and which
is
ascribed o
Socrates
does
not
issue from
Kierkegaard'smagination.
Plato
identifies
it
as the
more
significant
of
a
double
species,
and,
more
specifically,
as that
which
simply
has no
purpose
or has
itself
as
its
purpose.
This
irony
is both the
agent
and
ter-
minus
towards which it
strives. 19
Its
corresponding
dialecticalmovement is not
that which keeps a problemhovering n order to arriveat a solution. Instead,the
movement
is one in
which
the
abstract Idea can become
actualizedor
concretely
manifested
in
human life.
As
the
movement
infinitely
expands
itself
and flows
out in
extremities,
rony
brings
t to a
check and
turns
t
back
into the
personali-
ty
to
round off
itself
there.20A
consequence
of
this
movement
being
rounded
off
in
personality
s
that
all
empirical
experiences
are
invalidated or
the
subject.
Or,
as
Kierkegaard
uts
it,
irony
works itself
free from
sheer
empirical
sandbanks
and
from
the
restraintsof
speculation.21
Irony,
a
negating
force
setting
free the
subject
from
the
restraintsof
his
given
historical
actuality,
is in
Hegelian
framework
an
integral
moment in
the
dialectic
of the Idea. Accordingto Hegel,whom Kierkegaard ivescredit to on this score,
irony
is
essentially
a
self-destructionwith an
apriority
within
itself.22
Its
apriority
implies
that
irony
directs itself
against
the
totality
of
existence,
the
given
actuality
of a
certain
time and
place,
and
not
just
against
a
particular
henomenon.
That
is,
the
person
who
is bounded
by
the restraints
of
the
objective
ethical
reality
of
his
day
is
set
free from
them,
from
the
civic
commitments and
obligations
marking
normal
daily
existence. The
validity
of
the
established
orm of
existence,
that de-
fined
by
his
society,
having
been
destroyed
n
a
Hegelianway
with
respect
to
him,
the
person
is
free
only
in
a
negative
way,
since
irony
negates
by
virtue
of
a
higher
which
is not. 23
Its
negating
power
s
depicted
more
forcefully
and
vividly
through
Kierkegaard's
wn words:
Irony
establishes
nothing,
for thatwhich is to be estab-
lished
lies behind
it. It is a
divine
madnesswhich
rages
ike a
Tamerlane
nd
leaves
not
one
stone
standingupon
another in
its
wake. 24
That
raging
or
divine
madness
is
precisely
what
Kierkegaard
as
in
mind
also when
he
refers
to
irony
as
an
in-
finite
absolute
negativity.
When he
speaks
of it
as an
instant
of
critical
satisfac-
tion
in
theoretical
concerns, 25
he
has
in
mind also
the
characteristic
f
the
per-
sonal
freedom it
occasions. The
person
whose
standpoint
is
irony
as a
negating
force,
experiences
a
subjective
freedom which at
every
moment
has
within
its
power
the
possibility
of
a
beginning
and is
not
generated
from
previous
condi-
tions. 26
Consequently,
he
person,havingadopted irony personally,
becomes
not
only
free
but is
also
intoxicated
by
the
infinity
of
possibles
confronting
him.27
And
insofar as
it
occasions the
freedom
described
above,
irony
is
considered
o be
a
determination f
subjectivity.
The
point
about
irony
and
its
corresponding
eflex
movement
in
personality
s,
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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72
in regard o our concern,that it leavesthe persontaking rony asa standpointcon-
fronted with
nothingness.
The
objectless
confrontation
s
implied
by
the
very
fact
that
irony
has within it an
apriority
for
self-destruction,
and
by
the
very
nature
of
the
personal
freedom it
occasions.
According
o
the
former,
t
does
not allow
any-
thing
to
endure,
nor
posits anything
for that
matter.
In accordance
with the
latter,
its
freedom
is
a
negative
one,
again
meaning
that
nothing
is ever affirmed.
The
im-
pact
of
its
infinitely
delicate
play
with
nothingness 28
n the
personality
s that
the
latter
is faced with
having
either
always
to
posit
something
or
simply
to
despair.
Kierkegaard
s
quick
to
point
out, however,
that
if
a
person
does not
feel that
im-
pact,
if
he
is
not
faced
with
either,
then he is not
really takingnothingness
erious-
ly. The nothingnessin that case is only speculative,andhe is not truly an ironic
person.
This
infinitely
delicate
play
with
nothingness
marking
an
ironic consciousness
and
Kierkegaard's
se of the term Melancholi
re,
I
forward,
a mutual
fit. The
term
has
reference
to the
temporary
experiencing
of
nothingness
specifically
oc-
casioned
by irony
taken as one's
personal
standpoint. Kierkegaard's
emark hat
Xenophon
should have
depicted
the
young
dinner
guest
as
becoming
melancholy
(Melancholi)
to the
point
that
he
refuses
food,29
implies
that
the
irony,
which
Xenophon
misses
in
Socrates'
utterances,
taken
as a
personal
standpoint,
is cor-
related with
the
encountering
of
a
serious
nothingness.
When
carefully
considered,
the refusal to take food is construableas an expressionfor the temporaryen-
counter
with
nothingness.
Freud
notes
in his
enquiry
that refusalof nourishment
is
met with in severe
forms of melancholia. 30
But
one
need not
appeal
to
Freud
to
appreciate
hat
the refusal marks
the
person's
break
away
from the
temporal
or
finite
reality.
There is
no
doubt that the abandonment
does
bring
to mind
the li-
bido's
drawing-in,
or
regression
rom
the external world
to the
ego.
A form of
narcissism,
his
regression
s taken
by
Freud as a
necessary
precondition
of melan-
cholia.31
Although
quite
decisive
about
the
fact
that the
disposition
to
fall
ill
from
melancholia
predominates
n
narcissistic
types,
Freud
in the
very
enquiry
cautions
that
his conclusion is based
on
insufficient
empirical
data.
To
cite
Freud
in connection with this
study
is to
acknowledge
he stark resemblanceof his me-
lancholia
to
Kierkegaard's
Melancholi,
and most
important
to caution
against
the
temptation
to
conclude
that both men are
speaking
about
the
same
condition,
namely
an
illness.
Indeed,
Freud's
enquiry
is about
an
illness,
a
condition
not
necessarily
and
deliberately
willed.
Up
to this
point Kierkegaard's
Melancholi
cannot
be
considered
an
illness.
We
have
no
indication
that it is
a
protracted
en-
counter with
nothingness.
It is
decisively
different
from Freud's
concern
in
that
the
experience
of
nothingness
ssues
from
having
adopted rony
as a
personal
tand-
point
or
orientation
in
life.
To
underscore
Melancholi,
t
is
a
condition
always
in
alignment
with
irony,
one
in
which
the
personby
virtue of his
irony
is
indifferent,
hovering,
or detached from the finite world
as
defined
by
the observance
f
ethical
obligations
or commitments n accordance
with
daily
life in a
society.
The
notion of
detachment or indifference
is the
conceptual
nexus between
Melancholiand
irony.
Kierkegaard
enders
t
by
his use
of the Greek erm
epoche ,
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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73
ordinarily aken as meaning openness asin beingreservedwith respectto passing
judgment.
He sees
in the
term,
however,
its
deeper meaning,
one in
which the no-
tion
of
personality
is resonant. More
specifically,
its
meaning
is the reflex of
personality
nto
itself
which
at
that
point
is abstract
or void of
content.32
The
reflex
of
personality
nto
itself is akin
to
a reserved tate
of
mind.
Notwithstanding
their
close
affinity,
the
two are
not
identical.
Their
difference is
predicated
on
Kierkegaard's
hoice of
the
Danish
term
Paaholdenhed,
o
translate he Greek
epoche .
The
significance
of
that choice
must
be made
to
prevail
f
the texture
of
the
conceptual
nexus is to
become
manifest. The Greek term is
ordinarily
rans-
lated into Danish
by
Tilbagenholdenhed
whose
etymology suggests
the
idea of
holdingback or closedness.33But in optingto translate t by Paaholdenhed
whose
etymology suggests
the
idea
of
holding
on
to,
Kierkegaard
as in mind
the
perseverance
f
abstract
personality,
that
is,
the frameof
mind correlated
with
such
a
personality.34Consequently,
epoche
with
respect
to
abstract
personality
implies
not a refusal to
give
assent,
but
the
clinging
on to the
imperturabibility
f
mind
attained
by
suspendingjudgment
about what men consider
good,
useful,
etc.
in
daily
life.
The comments on
epoche
and Greek
scepticism
by
Kierkegaard's seudonym
Climacus s beneficial.
For
according
to
him
epoche
is
associated with doubt
begot by
an act
of
the will.35
Its intractablerelation to the
act
of
willing
warrants
further the caution againstthe equatingof Melancholiwith Freud'smelancholia.
To continue
with
Climacus'
omments,
Greek
scepticism
s
essentially
the
retiring
kind,
one in
which
the
sceptic
remains
aloof
by
drawing
no
conclusion from im-
mediate
cognition.36
The
implication
of that form of
scepticism
s not that
cogni-
tion
is
unreliable,
but that
error
might
arise in the
drawing
of a
conclusion. The
Greek
sceptic,
therefore,
kept
his
mind
in
suspense
and
held on to that
repose
of
mind
by
willing
it.
He
did not
even
express
the
negative
and
cognitive
results
of
his
indifference o
existing
states of affairs
est
it
disturb
his mental
equipose.37
What is
central to
Pyrrhonic
scepticism
s
evidently
also
central
to the connec-
tion
between
melancholy
and
irony
as
conceived
by
Kierkegaard.
As
represented
by
Pyrrho,
scepticism
took
repose
of
mind,
achieved
by
being
indifferent to all
that
appears
good
to
man,
as the
happiness
which
Stoics and
Epicureans
ought.
The
central
notion,
repose
of
mind,
does
not
imply empty-headedness.
For
the
Pyr-
rhonic
phrase
on
mallon
(no
more
this
than
that) suggests
instead the
idea
of
giving
equal weight
to
arguments
or
and
against
the
claim
that some
appear-
ances
can be
apprehended
as
being
true. That claim
is the
backbone of the
Stoics'
theory
of
apprehension
katalepsis).
The
avoidance
of
distinction,
the
refusal
to
favour the
inclining
of
one
way
over
another,
is
the
essence of the
catch
phrase
on
mallon which
characterizes
he
sceptic's
mental
equipose
reported
by
Dio-
genes
Laertius38and
reiterated
by
Climacus.39To the
word
epoche
Laertius
couples
the
word
akatalepsis
(non-apprehension)
when
describing
Pyrrho's
scepticism.40
Kierkegaard's
ognizance
of a
Pyrrhonic
repose
of
mind,
which
he
does
not
confuse with
the
harmonious
repose
in
nature,
is
registeredby
his refer-
ence
to
the
rise of
ironic
ataraxy
which
elevates itself
higher
and
higher.41
The
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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74
referenceis clear evidence that he has in mind the self-consciousnessof Greek
scepticism
for
which ataraxia
calmness
of
mind)
is
another
catchword
for a
certain self-
consciousness,
taken
by
Kierkegaard
as
marking
the
incipience
of
reflective
ndividuality.
The
conceptual
link identified
as
the
notion
of
holding
on to
a
frame of mind
marked
by
mental
equipose
needs no
further
exposition
to
appreciate
why
the
melancholy
person
and the
ironist
in
Kierkegaard's
iew tend to become the
hen-
pecked
partner
n a
marriage
relationship.
Each tend
to be indifferent
to the de-
mands of
daily
living,
to its
responsibilities
nd
obligations.
Each is
unruffled
by
the
variety
of
human
passions
and desires
experienced
ordinarily
n
the course
of
daily living. Each consequently tend to appearaloof, complacent,and morally
malleable. But
more
important,
by
tracing
the
conceptual
link,
the
meaning
of
the term
Melancholi
s
more
clearly
and
readily
perceived.
The
term,
included
in
Kierkegaard's
roader
concept
of
melancholy,
is
apparently
neither
easy
to
grasp
nor on
quick
glanceevidently
and
sufficiently
rich
in
content,
except
through
a
tracing
of
its
conceptual
ie
to
irony.42
A
tighter
grasp
of its
meaning
s
acquired
by
examining
also
Kierkegaard's
sti-
mate
of
Socrates. In his
view,
Socrates,
his
paradigmatic
igure representing
he
historical
turning
point
at which
subjectivity
or reflective
individuality
appears,
instantiates
Melancholi.
For he
describes
the
master
of
irony,
the
Socrates
who
throughhaving adopted irony as a standpoint negates the substantialreality of
his time
as it
is
embodied
by
Hellas,
as
being
mastered
by irony
in the
end.42
Al-
though
Socrates
was
concerned
to
begin
with the concrete
in
order to arrive
at
the
abstract
Idea,
the
good,
and
constantly
to arriveat
it,
he falls
short of
exempli-
fying
in
his own life that
which
he
himself
espouses.
In the final
analysis,
he re-
mains
always
more
negatively
free,
holding
on to a frame of
mind
described
as
ironic
ataraxy
and
suggested
by
his
professed
ignorance,
his claim that he
knew
nothing,
and
his
constantly
seeking
of
enlightenment
rom
others.43
By
main-
taining
an
ironic
standpoint
to
the
last,
he
becomes consumed
by
his own
en-
thusiasm
for
irony.
Kierkegaard, ommending
o
his readers his view of
Socrates
and
irony,
sums t
up
vividly
n these words:
His zeal in
its service consumed
him,
and at last
he,
too,
was seized with
irony:
everything spins
around
him,
he becomes
giddy,
and all
things
lose
their
reality.
This view of
Socrates
and the
significance
of his
standpoint
n
world
history
seems
to
me
to
culminate so
naturally
n
itself that
it
will,
I
hope,
find
acceptance
with one
or
another
of
my
readers.44
According
o these
lines,
Socrates
does
not
have a
saturnine,
ethargic,
or maudlin
personality.
They
suggest
then a
consciousness,
to which is correlated a state of
Melancholi, seeming to be marked clearly by a lighthearted,soft, buoyant, or
ethereal
temperament,
to
the extent
that
consciousness
becomes
fluttering,
vacu-
ous,
and
evanescent.
That
being
the
case,
Melancholi does not
imply
dullness,
dejection
or
sluggishness,
hat
is,
moods which do not
show the
slightest
trace
of
the
shared
meaning
which
Kierkegaard
bservesbetween
irony
and
jest.
He
points
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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75
out that in his native language irony is occasionallytranslatedby the word
Skalkagtigheid, eaning irresponsible
layfullness
r
archness.45
That
Socrates
has a
sprightly
and
waggish
side
to his
personality
needs
no
belabouring
here.
In-
stead,
what needs
underscoring
s
that
Socrates'
melancholy
condition
(Melancholi)
is
essentially
that
of
an
abstractly
determined
personality.
That
s,
his
melancholy,
to
which
our term Melancholi
efers,
is
indicative
of
what
Kierkegaard
onsiders
to
be
a
self which
is in abstracto
and not
as
yet
in concrete.
Socrates
s
not the
only
example
of
an
abstractly
determined
personality
or self.
Nor,
for
that
matter,
s the
sprightly,
buoyant
mood ascribed
o
him,
the
sole
dispo-
sition
characterizing
n
abstractly
determined
personality.
A self which
fails
to
be-
come concretelydetermined s markedalso by despondency,gloom,wearinessand
feelings
of heaviness.These
are the kinds of
dispositions
primarily
n the
chiaroscu-
ro
of
Tungsind.
They
are
certainly
the
kinds of
dispositions
or affects
suggested
from the context
in
which
Kierkegaard
ses
the terms
tungdindig
and
tung-
sindigt .
The two terms ean
on
the
main from
Tungsind
whose
etymology
shows
that it is
derived
from the two Danish stems
tung
and
Sind,
meaning
heavy
and
mind/spirit respectively.
Its
etymological meaning
certainly
accords
with
the
description
of
personalities
hat are
to
be found
associated
with the
context
in
which
its two
variants
occur.
Of the two
variants,
the first
one which
Kierkegaard
ses is
tungsindigt
n
his denouncementof the attemptto idealizeSocratesas an Indianmystic and to
construe the Phaedo
as
being
Oriental
n its
spirit. Insisting
that
the
dialogue
of
the
Phaedo
is
authentically
Greek n
spirit
and
that
Socrates
s
essentially
an
ironist,
he
acknowledges
hat there is
a
point
of
coincidence
between
irony
and
a
subjective
mysticism.
They
both terminate
with utter
abstraction or
nothingness,
which
is
essentially
the
instant
of
isolation
occurring
as a result
of
the
reflex
of
personality
into
itself. Their
point
of
coincidence
notwithstanding,
he mood
of
each in
Kierke-
gaard's
view is
distinctly
different. One is the exact
opposite
of the
other,
the
mood
associatedwith
mysticism
being
heavierand
conveyed by
his use of a
Tungsind
form. In
his
depiction
of
the
latter
he
states that
it
consists
of a
dissolution
and
a
melancholy (tungsindigt)
absorbing
anguour,
in a
soaking whereby
one becomes
not
softer but
heavier..so as to move
unsteadily
in
a
fog. 46
Of
course,
tung-
sindigt
s
stylistically
better
suited than
melancholske o
convey
the
feeling
of
heaviness
presumed
o
characterize
mysticism.
But there
is
more to the
use of
a
Tungsind
orm than
just
stylistic
preference.
Kierkegaard
ees
the
subjective
condition
associatedwith
mysticism
as
being
phe-
nomenologically
different
from
the
subjective
condition
expressed
by
the
use
of
Melancholi .
The
mystic,
in
choosing
to
remain
outside
his
finite
self
and
de-
tached from the
external
world
with
it civic
obligations,
has
chosen an
isolated
self,
one with no
history
of
continuity.
Through
hat
choice he has
cancelled
the
instant of
isolation
engenderedby
the
reflex of
personality
nto
itself.
The
crucial
point
for
the
distinction
between
the
two
subjective
conditions
is
that
in the
mys-
tic's
case,
the
cancellation s effected
by
prolonging,
to the extent
possible,
the
instant
of
isolation,
and
yearning
to dwell in it
indefinitely.
Hence
that
which
as a
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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76
transientfactor is wholesomeby being a condition for becominga genuineper-
sonality
becomes a
sickness when
it
is
protracted
ndefinitely
or when one
longs
to
embrace
it
eternally.
As
a
sickness,
it
inculcates
a
disposition
characterized
by
weightiness,
urbidity,
weariness, ndolence,
and
depression.
Together
hese moods
are
part
of the
syndrome
or a
personality
whose
development
s
deformed.
Neither
episodic
nor
superficial,
this
subjective
condition,
exemplified
by
the
mystic,
is a
possible
way
of
being
in
the
world,
but
not a
meaningful
way
of
acquiring
human
plenitude.
Although
the
personality
remains
n abstracto and
will never
become
in
concreto unless the
mystic
chooses himself
absolutely
in
his
eternal
validity,47
his
subjective
condition is
markedly
different from
that
of Socrates.
Again, the two occurrencesof the remaining Tungsind variantsuggestan
arrest
n
the
development
of
an
authentic
personality
ncurred
by
putting
the whole
of
life in
the
service of
maintaining
ternally
the reflex
of
personality
nto itself.
The
wider
context
for
Kierkegaard's
se
of
the variant
tungsindig
s with
respect
to
his estimate of
Schlegel's
novel Lucinde and the
depiction
of one
of its charac-
ters.
Insofar as the
novel is
representative
of
irony,
Kierkegaard
aults it
for not
representing
rony
in
its essential
greatness,
as a
mastered
moment.
Its
primary
concern s
to
abrogate
all
ethics
and
to
sponsor
a view
of life in which the individual
is
left with all
actuality
cancelled,
and
is
consequently
aced
with sheer
nothingness.
In
brief,
the
personality
t
promotes
s
essentially
one that is in abstracto.
Kierkegaardmakes use of tungsindig n his descriptionof the seriousness
underlying
the
novel. In
stating
that
it
has
a
certain
melancholy
{tungsindig)
seriousness, 48
e no
doubt has in
mind
at least
one
of
its characterswhose
per-
sonality
is in
abstracto,
namely
its hero
Julian. The fact that
much
of
Julian's
ife
has
gone
unutilized before
meeting
his
true
love
Lucinde,
the fact that he
yearns
for
death
which he
sees as the
eternal
night
that
would
render
perfect
the
lovers'
embrace
and
protect
it
from
the
ravages
of time and from the
demands
of the
finite
world,
the
fact that he
fails
to fill the
gap
between the
luminous
moments
through
the
longing
for an eternal
embrace,
and the fact
that
he
realizes
how dis-
consolate
his life
would be
without his lover attest to the
novel's dominant
motif:
the
yearning
for love. Fashionable
among
Romantics,
the motif
suggests
also the
lapsing
into an
aesthetic
stupor
which
Kierkegaard
ees as
lulling
the
deeper
ego
into a
somnabulant
tate. 49
The whole of life
according
o
that motif is
given
over
to
imagination.
Life's
highest
perfection,
its ideal
infinity,
is the
longing
for a
pure
and
unadulterated
passivity
as in a
vegetative
existence.
That
is,
the
longing
for that
existence
is
itself
a
part
of
the
existence
which
Kierkegaard
inds
expressed
by
the
following
sentence
in
the
novel:
The
supreme
nsight
of
the
understanding
s to
choose
the role of
silence,
to restore
the
soul
to
imagination
and not
to
disturb
he
sweet
cooings
of
the
young
mother
with
her child. 50
The
source
of
the novel's
melancholy{tungsindig)
eriousness
s the ideal which
it
proposes
for the
consolidation
of
personality.
Its
ideal,
in
Kierkegaard's
stima-
tion,
produces
at
best
a
slugglish,
dull, forlorn,
morbid
personality
whose
develop-
ment
in
concreto
is
arrested.
According
to the novel's
ideal for
human
life,
the
imagination
s
given
complete sovereignly
over the whole
of life.
This
is not the
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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77
same as delighting n the free play of the imagination.The latter is indeed a mark
of
our
common
humanity.
But
the
former,
Kierkegaard
ontends,
makes life into
a dream and
robs
the soul of its moral
tension.
Expresseddifferently,
the
novel's
ideality
is
essentially
a
product
of
nature,
namely
the harmonious
unity
of a
beauti-
ful
individuality.
Unlike a
reflective
ndividuality
which
is
necessarily
aligned
with
irony
in
the
case of
Melancholi,
t
is formless and
void of
content.51
To
make the
point
more
forcefully,
and
tersely
from
another
angle,
the
longing
for a
divine
peace
in
which the mind is never
disturbed
s
only
the
negative
and not the sub-
stantial
aspect
of
love.
Longing
can never be
a
determinationof
subjectivity;
or
in
Kierkegaard's
iew it
is a relationto
something
not
given, 52
and
consequently
to nothing.It does not require he exercisingof the samecomplexof humancapa-
cities
as is
required
or the
eternal
self-positing
of self
consciousness 53
whereby
personality
s
in
the
process
of
becoming
more
fully
or
concretely
developed.
The
range
of
moods
or
feeling
tones
associated
with
the
longing
or the desire
for
a
plant-like
existence is
againsuggested
by
the
use of
tungsindig
n
describing
Lisette,
another character n
the
novel.
Lisette,
we are
told,
is a
slave to inward
caprice,
to aesthetic
pleasure, succumbing
to
ennui,
to an
''excessive indolence
which
bothers
about
nothing. 54
In
the
end she
succeeds
in
doing
what
many
times
has
crossed Julian's
mind,
namely
committing
suicide.
That she
is
the kind
of
personality
which
lapses
into an
aesthetic
stupor
is
indicative from
Schlegel,
accordingto Kierkegaard, ot stoppingshort of anythingto portray her with a
poetic
glow.
That
stupor
not
only
lulls her
deeper ego
into
a
somnabulant
tate,
but
permits
her
arbitrary
go
free latitude
in
ironic
self-satisfaction. 55
he
not
only
longs
for an
existence
vegetative
in
its
passivity,
but
at
times
her existence
approximates
hat
longing
quite
closely.
She
represents
one of
the
different sen-
sual
ways
of
being
in
the world.
And
Kierkegaard
otes this
by
citing
from
the
novel
a
line
which
states
that as
a
child
she was more
melancholy
{tungsindig)
than
lightminded
(letsindig)
and that
even
then she had
been
daemonically
ex-
cited
by
sensuality. 56
n
citing
from
the
novel,
Kierkegaard
ranslates he German
schwermutig by
the
Danish
tungsindig
which
Kierkegaard
ranslators ender
by
the
English
melancholy .
The choice of Danish
equivalent
for
the
German
term
schwermutig
with
respect
to
its
meaning
s
faultless.
Furthermore,
tung-
sindig
s
rythmically
and
etymologically
balanced
by
letsinding .
Hence
Kierke-
gaard's
choice of
tungsindig
s
commendable.But that
aside,
there is
no
question
of
tungsindig
having
as its
reference a
person
whose life is
constantly
outside
herself,
is
determined
by
transitory
and
finite realities
and is
marked
by
insensitivi-
ty
to
the
moral
obligations
and
responsibilities
oncomitant
with
everyday iving.
Her
deeper
ego
being
in
a
somnabulant
tate
is
an
indication
of a
prolonged
dura-
tion
of
the reflex
movement
of
personality
nto
itself,
of
her
isolation
from
every
actuality, including
the
actuality
of the
personalitybecoming
reconciled
with
the
surrounding
world in
which
it
finds
itself.
A
plant-like
existence,
her
ideal
infinity
is
formlessand
void
of
content.
To
extrapolate
from
the contexts in which
its variants
occur,
Tungsind
as a
distinctly
different
meaning
from
Melancholi .
That
difference
is
not
obvious
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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78
from the Englishtranslationof TheConceptof Irony since both wordsare trans-
lated
by
the same
English
word
'melancholy'
.
Such a translation
s not without
justification
f
at the
outset
one assumes
hat
Tungsind
nd Melancholi
elong
to
the
concept
of
melancholy,
that
either marks
a self
or
personality
n
abstracto,
and
that
each
is
indeed correlatedwith
an
experience
of
nothingness
and
with
a
personality
detached from
the
obligations
and
responsibilities
that
accord
with
the
objective
ethical world in which one lives. In
brief,
as forms of
melancholy
Tungsind
and
Melancholi
separately
have reference
to a self
that
has no
history
of
continuity,
or that
has not taken as
yet
the
step
that
would
allow the birth
of a
personality
n
its
full
measure.
Howeverstrikinglysimilar n resemblance,he two termsaredecisivelydifferent
when
the
phenomenon
each
represents
s
carefully
considered.
There
s
no
question
that
Melancholi
s
aligned
with
irony
taken as a
personal
standpoint,
and
is there-
fore
indicative of
a reflective
ndividuality.
ts
correlation
with
irony implies
that
it
is
to be
taken as
a
necessary
condition
for,
the first
phase
n,
the
development
of
a
complete
personality.
That
is,
subjectivity
is determined
only negatively
and
lightly.
In
the
case of
Tungsind,
however,
it
is
a
condition
not
in
alignment
with
irony.
None of
Schlegel's
characters
n
the
novel has
irony
as a
standpoint.
In
fact
Kierkegaard
ensures
Schlegel
for
confusing
an
ironic
self-satisfaction,
which
is
a
Romantic
theme,
with
irony
in
its
essential
greatness.57
The fact that
the con-
dition of Tungsindoccurs as a
part
of the
experience
which Romanticismdepicts
and
mysticism
relishes
ndicates that
Tungsind
has to be
understood
as
being
cor-
related with an
attempt
to
eternalize
a
sensual
moment
in
temporality
and
the
failure
to
accomplish
t. The
moods
in
the
range
of
ennui and
depression
engen-
dered
by
that
failure
is
the
syndrome
of
Tungsind,
and of a
personality
hat
has
not
yet
become in
concreto. To underscore heir
decisive
difference,
Tungsind
s
aligned
with
the
constant
onging
to
eternalize,
or
freeze,
a
peak
sensual
experience,
whereas
Melancholi is in
conformity
with
irony
as
a
personal
standpoint.
They
are
essentially
wo
different
conditions
of
melancholy.
The
difference
between
the two
is more
evident and
pronounced
by juxta-
posing
the conditions of
Tungsind
and melancholia.The formerdoes not
approxi-
mate
the
latter in
its
syndrome.
According
o
Freud,
the
syndrome
or
melancholia
includes
the
effect of
dejection,
preference
for
being
alone,
loss of
interest,
re-
morse,
and
suicidal
tendencies.
Although
he
lists
ambivalence
as a factor
in
melan-
cholia,
he
does not
consider
t
a
decisive
one
since
it
is
present
also
in
mourning.58
As
mentioned
earlier,
narcissism
s
the crucial actor
in Freud's
melancholia,
and its
tendency
prevails
n
each
of
the three
personalities:
he
mystic,
Julianand Lisette.
As
personalities
ndicative of
Tungsind,
each
of them
is
marked
by
a
drawing-in
of
the
libido
from
the
external
world
to the
ego
by
a
regression
oncomitantwith
loss
of
interest and
with
being
alone. Julianand Lisette are
ambivalent
with
respect
to
their
love
objects.
Both are
suicidal,
and the
mystic,
insofar as
Kierkegaard
n-
derstands
him
as
going
back behind
consciousness or as
bursting
free
from
his
mortal
frame,
is
equally
suicidal.
Finally,
all
three
personalities
how
signs
of the
effects of
dejection
and
low-spiritedness.
Since none
of
these
symptoms
is
found
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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79
in the case of Melancholi,it may very well be that Kierkegaard'sTungsindand
Freud'smelancholia
efer
to a
personality
with the same defect.
Our
juxtaposing
of
Tungsind
and melancholia
is
intended
not
to establish
synonymity,
but to
accentuate
that
Tungsind
s
construed more
in
terms
of a
liability
to
the
development
of
a
genuine personality,
whereas
Melancholi
s
not.
Although
both
beget
a
personality
void
of
content,
Melancholi
s
definitely
a con-
dition
resulting
from
a
dialectical
movement
flowing
outwards
and
brought
to a
halt
by irony
which leads
the movement back
into
personality
to round off itself
there. This means
that
the
movement cannot
be considered
as
happening
acciden-
tally,
that
irony
must
be accorded
a
specific
role
for the
reflex
in
personality
o
be effected. More importantthan the reflex movement,however, is the ensuing
freedom which
the
person
acquires
and
without which he
cannot
choose
himself
absolutely
n his
eternal
validity.
In
Kierkegaard's
iew
of
personality,
not
sensual
feelings
but
the
personal
self that
is to be
inflnitized
absolutely.
As his
pseudonym
Judge
Williams
n
Either
Or
puts
it:
I
myself
am the
absolute,
for
only myself
can I
choose
absolutely
and
this absolute choice
of
myself
is
my
freedom. 59
Concomitant with Melancholi
is
the
freedom to choose oneself
absolutely.
It
fol-
lows,
then,
that Melancholi
must therefore be
a
transientcondition
abrogatedby
being
subsumed
in
the
positing
of an absolute choice
whereby
personality
con-
tinues
to become
fully developed.
Of
course,
if
that
choice is
not
exercised, then,
as in the case of Tungsind, he developmentof authenticpersonality s arrested.
Whatever
reflex movement
in
personality
accompanies
Tungsind,
he movement
is
certainly
not
led
by
irony,
but
by
the
longing
to infinitize
absolutely
that
which
is
by
definition
episodic
and
labile,
namely, sensuality.
There
is no
shred
of
evidence
available o
suggest
that whatever
onging might
be
concomitant
with
the condition
of
Melancholi
that the
longing
is
essentially
that
associated with
Romantics,
young
men,
poets,
and artists.60To be
clear,
the
longing
which
Romantic
literature
treats,
is
essentially
one in
which the
impulse
of
the libidio
fluctuates without restraints. The
person
is
capriously
pulled
hither and thither
under the
sway
of
feeling
tones
and cerebral
activity.
Whatever
remoteness
exists between the
person
and the
objectively
ethical world is
intended
to
facilitate
and
heighten
the
spiritualizing
of the
sensual and the
sensualizing
of
the
spiritual.
Such is the
nature of the
longing
not
only
depicted
by
Romanticism,
but
marking
the romantic
love
idealized
by
Schlegel
in
his novel
Lucinde and
sought
in
his
personal
relation with
Dorothea.61The same also
might
be said of
the
longing
characterizing
mysticism
to
whatever
extent
Kierkegaard
nderstands
the
phenomenon.
The
unavailability
of evidence
raises
serious
questions
as
to
whether the
claim that Melancholi
is
essentially
melancholy
of
the
Romantics
and
poets
is
coherent and
valid. On
the
basis
of
Kierkegaard's
issertation,
t is a
weak if
not
specious
claim.
Equally
indefensible is
the
claim that
Tungsind
s
Melancholi at
a
deeper
or
higher
evel.
The
temptation
to make
and
accept
the
claim arises from
giving
more
weight
to
seeing
the two conditions as
yielding
an
abstract self
instead
of
seeing
each as a
modally
determinate unction.
To
put
the
alleged
claim
different-
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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80
ly, I cite it verbatim: The essential difference...ies in the meaningof Tungsind
and
the
intensification it
represents
of Melancholi *2 Words
such as intensi-
fication and
higher
evel
obscure
the
real difference between
the two forms
of
melancholy.
The two
are not
anymore
the same
as
are the emotions love
and
hate
the same.
The
implication
s not that the
two
forms of
melancholy
are
oppo-
sites.
Perhaps
hey
are.
Instead,
it
is
that there is
an
unmistakably
lear
difference
which is
predicated
on
the
definite
role
accorded
to
Pyrrhonic
scepticism
with
respect
to
irony,
and,
consequently,
to Melancholi.
Whatever
cepticism
accompa-
nies
Tungsind
s
by
accident and
plays
no essential
role
in
the
latter,
even
though
there
is a
reflex
movement
in
personality.
And,
as
explained
earlier,
the
crucial
difference betweenMelancholi and Tungsind s with the motive force by which
the
reflex
movement
in
personality
is
determined
n each
case.
Irony
as a
force
not
only
begets
scepticism
a la
Pyrrho,
but when masteredhas
a
chastening
effect
on
the
personal
life.
Hence,
Melancholi
is
a
modally
determinate function
of
irony
taken
as a
personal
standpoint
without which the choice of the self
in
its
eternal
validity
cannot
be made.
The absence of a radical
scepticism
n
Tungsind
results
from
the
very
fact that
yearning
is
the
motive
force and has
also
in
this
case
an
epistemological
apriority.
Taken
as
cognitively
real and
absolute,
yearning
for
the
sensual
blocks
the
final
step
to
total
scepticism.
Whatever
cepticism
might
accompany
Tungsind
eads
to
suicide,
as
is the case with
Lisette.
And so
long
as
imaginations givencomplete sovereigntyover the wholeof life, radical cepticism
is
averted.
The role
accorded to Greek
scepticism
makes a
difference;
marks
off
Melancholias
tending
to be
more
cerebral,
and
Tungsind,
isceral;
and casts
serious
doubt
on
the
claim
that
they
are
essentially
the
same condition
with
a
difference
in
degree.
Indeed,
there is a
definite
difference,
but it seems to be more of
a
differ-
ence in
kind
rather
han in
degree.
Two
observations
ollow
from
our
explanation
of
the connection between me-
lancholy
and
irony
and
from
drawing
a
tighter
compass
around the
meanings
of
Melancholi
nd
Tungsind .
The first is
with
respect
to
Kierkegaard's
iew of
Socrates. He
would
have us
see
Socrates
as a
person
subject
to
Melancholia.
His
activitieshave
suggested
representations
of him as a
gadfly,
as a
midwife,
and as
an
ironist. But
all
these
activities,
Kierkegaard
would
have
us
think,
inculcate
melancholy
in
Socrates.
Consequently,
one
implication
s that
Socrates'
personali-
ty
is
such
that
it is
in
abstracto.
His
subjectivity
or
authentic
personality
s mini-
mally
determined. A
further
implication
is
that he fails
to
exemplify
his
own
precept
enshrined
in
the
expression
know
thyself.
For
he
never became
his
true
self
as
a
result
of
his
failure
o choose himself
absolutely
n his
eternal
validity.
Unlike
the
personalities
exemplifying
a
condition
of
Tungsind,
he
is
depicted
as
being
trapped
between
the
finite
and
infinite,
never
becoming
reconciled
with
temporality.
Such
is
the
view of
Socrates
hat
Kierkegaard's
issertation
ommends.
The
second
observation
and
concluding
remarkcenters
on
Kierkegaard's
nter-
pretation
of
oriental
mysticism
in
the
Brahmanicor
Indian
tradition. The
Vedic
texts
do
not
indicate
evidence to
suggest
a
mysticism
that is characterized
by
a
condition
of
Tungsind,
hat
is,
by
a
longing
that is
hazy,
low
pitched, oppressive,
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
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81
and evaporatingn a feeble lethargy.In fact, the TaittiriyaUpanishad63hows that
the
case
is
the
contrary.
In
setting
out the
mystic
doctrineof the Veda in
the form
of
a
discourse between teacher
and
pupils,
that
Upanishad
puts
the
emphasis
on
the
practicing
of
virtue,
the
heeding
of
duties,
and on
being
truthful. Its
ethical
emphasis mplies
a
recognition
of the seriousnessof
responsibility
and the
feeling
of
respect
for natural
consequences
n
striving
o
attain
the
ultimate bliss of
Brah-
man,
man's
highest
end
according
o
that tradition.
Notwithstanding
he
fact that
he
mistakenly
mputes
to
oriental
mysticism
the
longing
for
an existence
depicted
as
being
essentially
that of the
vegetative
still
life
of
a
plant, 64
his view
of the
relation
between
melancholy
and
irony
remainsunaffected. The intent in
making
the observations to point out that ourunderstandingf Tungsinds not deepened
by
taking
into consideration
mysticism
in
the Brahmanic
radition.For it
is
clearly
not a
mysticism65
endorsing
the
pursuit
of evanescent
wordly
or sensual
desires,
nor
subjecting
the whole of
one's
life
entirely
to
the rule of
fanciful
imagination.
Its
emphasis
s
very
much akin
to
Kierkegaard's
wn
emphasis
on
choosing
abso-
lutely
to inflnitize oneself in its
eternal
validity
and
thereby
to become
reconciled
with
temporality
and
its
obligations.
Whetheror
not
the Brahmanic
raditioncon-
ceives
melancholy
as
a means
of
becoming
one's true self and
the extent
to
which
its view of
the self is in
opposition
to
Kierkegaard's
iew
are
without
doubt
impor-
tant
matters.But
they
do
not
shed
light
for
our
purpose
n
this
study.
In short, that purposeis to understand he nature of the connectionbetween
melancholy
and
irony,
and to
apprehend
and state
accurately
the
meaning
of
Me-
lancholi
and of
Tungsind.
I have
explained
that
the
inter-locking
notion between
the
two
concepts
is one found
at the heart
of
Greek
scepticism,
corresponding
o
the
state of mind in
which no
conclusion about the
empirical
world and
its de-
mands
is
drawn,
and that
both
Melancholi
and
Tungsind
are
modally
determinate
functions.
With
respect
to
the role
each
asigns
to
scepticism,
Melancholi
must
certainly
be accorded a
preponderantweight
over
Tungsind.
For the former is
constituted
necessarilyby
means of
Pyrrhonic
scepticism,
whereas
for
the
latter,
whatever
scepticism
it
might
be
associated
with
is
accidental
to
its
constitution
and
hardly
worthy
to be reckonedas
being Pyrrhonic.
Furthermore,
he
two are
best
understoodwhen
seen
in
terms
of
modally
determinate
unctions.
Melancholi
is
most
certainly
a
function of
a
species
of
irony;
while
Tungsind
s
clearly
a func-
tion
of
imagination
and
desire.
NOTES
1.
S^ren
Kierkegaard,
The
Concept
of Irony,
trans.
(Bloomington:
Indiana
University
Press,
1965),
p.
51. The
original
Danish
text
Om
Begrebt
Ironi
is
included in
Kierkegaard's
Samlede Vaerker, 3rd edition (Gyldendal, 1962), Vol. 1, and the corresponding page
reference is
p.
73.
Hereafter,
English
translation
is cited
as
CI and
Danish
text
as
BI.
2.
Papirer,
X
A
400
translated
by
Howard
Hong
and Edna
Hong
in
Sfaen
Kierkegaard's
Journal
and
Papers,
Vol.
3
(Bloomington:
Indiana
University
Press, 1975),
No.
2691.
The
entry
is made
nine
years
later
from the
writing
of
his
dissertation,
and
its
frag-
ment
appropriate
for
this
study
reads,
how
close
irony
and
melancholy
are
to
one an-
8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard
17/20
82
other. Insteadof Melancholi he originalDanish, rom which the Hongstranslate he
English melancholy ,
as
Tungsind .
A
concern
of this
paper
s
whether he
supposed
differencebetween