Lessons Learned fromAccident Investigation ofLonger, Heavier Trains
International Heavy Haul Association
Jonathan Seymour, Board MemberTransportation Safety Board of Canada
Calgary, AlbertaJune 20, 2011
Outline
• TSB mandate• Watchlist: Critical Safety Issues• 2 Case Studies • Other investigation findings• Lessons learned• Progress• Looking ahead
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About the TSB
Mandate: To advance transportation safety in the air, marine, rail, and pipeline modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction by:
• conducting independent investigations• identifying safety deficiencies• identifying causes and contributing factors• making recommendations• publishing reports
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Fishing vessel safety
Emergency preparedness on ferries
Passenger trains colliding with vehicles
Operation of longer,heavier trains
Risk of collisions on runways
Controlled flight into terrain
Landing accidents and runway overruns
Safety Management Systems
Data recorders
WATCHLIST
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Watchlist (cont’d)
• Nine Watchlist issues underpinned by: 41 recommendations Many investigation findings
• “Inappropriate handling and marshalling can compromise the operation of longer, heavier trains.”
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Case Study #1: Brighton
• Eastbound Train 137 cars (11 845 tons, 8850 feet) 3 head-end locomotives Over 50% cars – loads Majority of loads marshalled on rear
• Territory Undulating terrain Multi-track – passenger and freight trains
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Brighton: Findings
• Broken knuckle at 107th car = emergency • Rear collided with head-end portion• Resultant in-train forces led to derailment• Bail-off of independent brake did not reduce
forces to a safe level• Simulation: Different marshalling would have
led to significantly reduced forces
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Case Study #2: Drummondville
• Eastbound Train 105 cars (10 815 tons, 7006 feet) 5 head-end locomotives 50-car block of loaded grain cars on rear end Broken knuckle at 75th car
• Territory Single track Freight and passenger train operations daily
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Drummondville Findings
• Marshalling was a factor• Front portion was on ascending grade• Rear portion was on relatively flat segment• high buff forces from heavy rear marshalling
plus late bail off of independent brake• Simulation: Reverse marshalling would have
meant minor buff forces.
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Other Investigation Findings
• Inappropriate throttle, dynamic and automatic brake use
• Emergency braking initiated from head end only• Non-alignment control couplers• Long & Short car combinations• Use of distributed power• Technology can mitigate risks
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Lessons Learned
• Size and tonnage not sole factors• Key Lesson
Need to effectively manage in-train forces and how train interacts with track
• Systemic approach needed by operators
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Progress by Industry
• Both major players taking action• Computerized marshalling management
systems• Enhancement to train braking system• Greater use of distributed power• Enhanced training and job aids for locomotive
engineers• Growth in use of technology
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Progress – Regulator
• Transport Canada: Expressed support for TSB views Sponsored research (Train separation on Kingston
Subdivision) Sponsored research (How to improve handling longer
trains)
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Progress: a TSB Perspective
• Many safety communications, including:2004 Recommendation to TC 2007 Board Concern communicated2010 TSB Watchlist
• 2011: Significant advances
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What’s Next?
• Operators responsible for managing safety• Regulators responsible for overseeing safety
• TSB will continue to: monitor progress investigate occurrences publish our findings make appropriate recommendations advocate for necessary changes
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Summary
• TSB Watchlist, concerns about LHT• Key Lesson from Brighton, Drummondville
Need to effectively manage in-train forces and how train interacts with track
• Additional investigation findings• Progress:
major players are taking actionTC supports our views
• TSB will monitor, report publically, advocate for change to address safety deficiencies
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