MINORITIES, MEDIA AND
INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
Federica Prina
Alkistis Zavakou
Fulvia Ghirardi
Sabrina Colombo
ECMI WORKING PAPER #71
November 2013
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The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a
non-partisan institution founded in 1996 by the
Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the German State of
Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in
Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border
region, in order to draw from the encouraging example
of peaceful coexistence between minorities and
majorities achieved here. ECMI’s aim is to promote
interdisciplinary research on issues related to
minorities and majorities in a European perspective
and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic
relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe
where ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail.
ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of
ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the
Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its
own, the views expressed in any of its publications are
the sole responsibility of the author concerned.
ECMI Working Paper
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Director: Dr. Tove H. Malloy
© ECMI 2013
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MINORITIES, MEDIA AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
ACFC Opinions have developed various principles on intercultural
dialogue, which detail, and crystallize, the responsibilities of the state
parties to the FCNM in furthering intercultural dialogue and tolerance
through the media. Principles developed by the ACFC relate, inter alia,
to training and awareness-raising activities for journalists,
collaboration with persons belonging to minorities in the development
of programmes, the adoption of journalistic codes of ethics and
relevant legislation, as well as media monitoring.
Federica Prina Alkistis Zavakou
Fulvia Ghirardi Sabrina Colombo
November 2013
ECMI Working Paper # 71
I. INTRODUCTION
References to ‘intercultural dialogue’ are not
uncommon in international documents. In
particular, Article 6(1) of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities1 (hereinafter FCNM) reads:
The Parties shall encourage a spirit of
tolerance and intercultural dialogue and
take effective measures to promote mutual
respect and understanding and co-operation
among all persons living on their territory,
irrespective of those persons’ ethnic,
cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in
particular in the fields of education, culture
and the media. [emphasis added]
The expression ‘intercultural dialogue’ can also
be found in the 2009 Declaration of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe on the Role of Community Media in
Promoting Social Cohesion and Intercultural
Dialogue;2 and in the 2006 Joint Declaration by
the Four Special Mandates for Protecting
Freedom of Expression.3 The 2005 UNESCO
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of
Diversity of Cultural Expression4 similarly lists
among its objectives the encouragement of
‘dialogue among cultures’ and the fostering of
‘interculturality in order to develop cultural
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interaction in the spirit of building bridges
among peoples.’5
Despite these references, the exact scope
and significance of the expression remain
nebulous. This working paper focuses on Article
6(1) FCNM, and unpacks the notion of
intercultural dialogue and its close relationship
to kindred expressions such as ‘tolerance’,
‘mutual respect’ and ‘understanding’, also
referred to in the same article. The focus of the
paper is on the promotion of intercultural
dialogue through the media.
The paper is divided into three parts.
First, it provides an introduction to the notion of
intercultural dialogue, particularly with
reference to Article 6(1). Second, it highlights
recommendations on the implementation of
Article 6(1) contained in the Opinions of the
Advisory Committee on the FCNM (ACFC). A
series of principles arise from these Opinions, of
which eight principles are identified in the
paper; these principles contribute to clarifying
the scope of application of Article 6(1) in
relation to the media. Third, the paper provides
an analysis of state reports to the ACFC, to
illustrate the states’ interpretation of their
obligations in relation to intercultural dialogue,
and the translation of such obligations into
practical measures. The paper further points to
the complexity of assessing the impact of
measures aiming at facilitating intercultural
dialogue through the media.
In addition to the quantitative data
presented in the paper, several examples from
the state reports are provided. The cases cited
are simply illustrative examples: they are not
meant to be exhaustive, or to convey data or
judgements on the ‘best’ or ‘worst’ cases of
FCNM implementation.
II. THE NOTION OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
The Council of Europe has proposed the
following working definition of ‘intercultural
dialogue’:
Intercultural dialogue is an open and
respectful exchange of views between
individuals and groups belonging to
different cultures that leads to a deeper
understanding of the other’s global
perception.6
It is further clarified that:
In this definition, “open and respectful”
means “based on the equal value of the
partners”; “exchange of views” stands
for every type of interaction that reveals
cultural characteristics; “groups” stands
for every type of collective that can act
through its representatives (family,
community, associations, peoples);
“culture” includes everything relating to
ways of life, customs, beliefs and other
things that have been passed on to us for
generations, as well as the various forms
of artistic creation; “world perception”
stands for values and ways of thinking.
This definition is only one of the possible
interpretations of intercultural dialogue. There is
still no universally accepted definition of the
expression, including by the IGOs that make use
of it in their documents.
One thing is certain: intercultural
dialogue is not a new phenomenon. Ancient
civilisations already had some degree of contact
with other groups – whether in the form of
economic exchanges or political contacts.7
Nowadays the media and new technologies
provide the opportunity to communicate in real
time with people living on the other side of the
world. The continuous exchange of information
contributes to creating an overarching sense of a
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‘global community’. Yet, while this exchange
has increased our knowledge of other regions of
the world, it has arguably also diverted our
attention from persons belonging to
communities residing within our country, with
whom we might share a passport, but not a
language or a religion.8
The expression ‘intercultural dialogue’
seems even more nebulous when one considers
the multiple definitions of ‘culture’ in different
disciplines, from anthropology to political
science, and the fact that the FCNM does not
clarify what ‘dialogue’ exactly entails. Given the
context set by the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities,
‘intercultural’ is to be taken to mean, effectively,
‘interethnic’ – which is reaffirmed by the fact
that the ACFC uses the two expressions
interchangeably. Moreover, while the FCNM
does not provide a definition of ‘national
minority’, in the specific case of Article 6(1) the
absence of a definition does not create
ambiguities, as, unlike other FCNM articles,
Article 6(1) applies to everybody, not only to
‘minorities’: the provision refers to ‘all persons
living on their territory’ (of the state parties),
rather than ‘persons belonging to national
minorities’. Thus, it also applies, for example, to
asylum seekers,9 as well as persons belonging to
the majority. This fact reveals that intercultural
dialogue involves multi-directional
communication - interaction of members of
minority groups with the majority, and between
members of different minority groups
themselves.
Various principles are crystallized
through the ACFC Opinions, and various
approaches exist to state obligations under
Article 6. The reason for the multiplicity of
interpretations is that the obligations under
Article 6 are flexibly worded. The Explanatory
Report of the FCNM notes that the treaty
contains ‘programme-type provisions setting out
objectives which the Parties undertake to pursue’
[italics added].10
This is in light of the varied
circumstances affecting minorities in different
member states, which need to be taken into
account in developing adequate, tailor-made
policies that can address the specific needs of
minorities. Then, as the Explanatory Report
notes, the FCNM allows a degree of discretion
to states as to the exact measures to adopt in
order to implement the treaty. The article is
programmatic rather than normative: by
containing (general) legal principles rather than
strict and precise obligations, it allows states to
determine the modus operandi in the fulfilment
of their obligations. Moreover, Article 6(1)
refers to the encouragement of a ‘spirit of
tolerance and intercultural dialogue’. This
phrasing points to a process, and a continuous
effort to move towards the objectives contained
in the provision. These are, Gilbert argues,
‘objectives for states to work towards, but it is
unlikely that they will ever be fully realized’.11
Given the flexibility of interpretation and
application, Gilbert calls the promotion of
intercultural dialogue an ‘ephemeral
obligation’12
– although this does mean that it
does not generate concrete responsibilities, or
that states should not have a proactive attitude in
pursuing them.13
The concept of intercultural dialogue
cannot be divorced from the promotion of
tolerance. The Explanatory Report on the FCNM
states that Article 6 is ‘an expression of the
concerns stated in […] the Vienna Declaration
(Declaration and Plan of Action on combating
racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and
intolerance)’ [italics added].14
Thus, the
provision does not refer to dialogue per se, but
to dialogue as a means towards enhanced
tolerance. As a result, there is a blurring of the
distinction between the promotion of tolerance
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and intercultural dialogue: the two processes are
inter-connected, and mutually reinforcing.
The ACFC’s approach points to what
should be a multi-faceted strategy to promote
intercultural dialogue. The media is one of the
instruments that can enhance interaction
between different societal groups. In the
encouragement of a ‘spirit of tolerance’ and
‘intercultural dialogue’, as well as the promotion
of mutual respect and cooperation, the FCNM
specifically mentions the fields of media, but
also education and culture because ‘they are
considered particularly relevant to the
achievement of these aims.’15
The ACFC is
clearly aware of the importance and power the
media have in the area of intercultural
communication. The media can challenge or
reinforce stereotypes, as well as shaping public
opinion.16
The media is also ‘both a vehicle of
communication and carrier of culture’.17
The promotion of intercultural dialogue
is closely linked to other FCNM provisions,
which generate responsibilities to adopt other,
related, measures: the fostering of ‘knowledge of
the culture, history, language and religion of
their national minorities and of the majority’
(Article 12);18
the prevention of hate speech
(Article 6(2));19
and access to the media by
persons belonging to minorities and ‘cultural
pluralism’ (Article 9).
Behind Article 6(1) is the need to
maintain a careful balance between societal
integration and the preservation of minority
cultures. The Explanatory Report states with
regard to Article 6(1):
In order to strengthen social cohesion,
the aim of this paragraph is, inter alia, to
promote tolerance and intercultural
dialogue, by eliminating barriers
between persons belonging to ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious groups
through the encouragement of
intercultural organisations and
movements which seek to promote
mutual respect and understanding and to
integrate these persons into society
whilst preserving their identity.20
Thus, the Explanatory Report reiterates that the
ultimate objective of Article 6(1) is ‘social
cohesion’, by ‘eliminating barriers’ between
persons belonging to different groups. One of
the means towards social cohesion is ‘mutual
respect’, which carries the dual objective of
integrating persons belonging to minorities
while also providing them with the opportunity
to retain their cultural identity. As Gilbert puts
it, this process is linked to making the minority
group ‘part of the overall culture of the majority
society’.21
The objective is, then, the prevention
of society’s fragmentation into separate groups,
living side by side rather than interacting with
each other.22
This menace is present in societies
that are linguistically and/or ethnically divided.
For example, in relation to Estonia, the ACFC
has encouraged the creation of an environment
in which both groups (Estonian and non-
Estonian speakers) can have access to ‘a diverse
but shared media space’ [italics added].23
It
encouraged the Estonian authorities:
[…] to increase their efforts to promote
Russian- language radio and TV
broadcasts, particularly as regards the
promotion of locally-produced news, to
ensure that Estonian and non-Estonian
speakers share a common media
environment and thereby develop a
better sense of a common society.24
In turn, the promotion of tolerance and
integration are coupled to freedom of
expression.25
The ACFC’s position is that an
effective response to manifestations of
intolerance, such as hate speech and negative
reporting, is not routinely suppressing offensive
media outputs,26
but more speech. Knowledge
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and information, provided by a plurality of
sources, can facilitate the overcoming of
prejudice, which tends to be linked to ignorance
and biased information. Thus, the media can
have a corrective function in reducing the lack
of understanding between groups. This can, in
turn, pre-empt the escalation of tensions through
misunderstanding, or correct misunderstanding
through counter-speech.27
Clearly, in the
ACFC’s position there is an assumption that
cultural pluralism, when it is reflected in the
media, favours stability. The ACFC’s position
further implies that the appreciation of minority
cultures is shown through their exposure through
the media, rather than their being confined to the
private sphere, and invisible to the wider society.
Exposure can facilitate dialogue which, in turn,
enables the identification of common ground
between representatives of groups that do not
share the same language, traditions or religion.
III. OPINIONS OF THE ACFC
This section contains the principles arising from
the ACFC Opinions relating to the
implementation of Article 6(1) with regard to the
media. All Opinions that were available in May
2012 were examined (94 Opinions), for all
member states of the Council of Europe that
signed and ratified the FCNM (39 countries).28
In 2012, for the majority of state parties there
had been three Opinions (three monitoring
cycles); for some state parties, which had
ratified the FCNM at a later stage, there had
been only one or two Opinions. Overall,
Opinions were available for a 15-years period.
Given that Opinions are organized
article-by-article, the research involved the
analysis of the sections under Article 6 for all
Opinions. After completing this process,
searches were conducted on the rest of the text
of the Opinions, using the key words ‘media’,
‘tolerance’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’, both
combined and separately. The aim was to find
references to these notions under sections
referring to other relevant articles of the FCNM
(particularly Articles 9 and 12). In order to
illustrate the principles arising from the
Opinions, some cases are referred to in the
present section. These cases are not exhaustive,
but only examples; they include both cases
considered good practice by the ACFC, and
instances in which the ACFC criticised states for
shortcomings in FCNM implementation. The
research aimed at crystallizing the main ACFC
recommendations, which can serve as guidelines
for the promotion of tolerance and intercultural
dialogue through the media. The principles
identified through the analysis of the Opinions
were:29
1. Raising awareness of minorities through
the media
2. Broadcasting in minority languages
3. Ensuring participation of minorities in
the media
4. Training journalists on minority issues
5. Reporting on crimes without conveying
the ethnic origin of suspects
6. Adopting legislation and codes of
conduct promoting pluralism
7. Criminalising racism and discrimination
on the internet
8. Monitoring media content
These principles are outlined in the remainder of
this section.
Principle 1: raising awareness of
minorities through the media The ACFC has encouraged governments to take
measures to raise societal awareness of
minorities through the media. The media
(particularly state broadcasters) ought to include
in their programmes information on minority
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groups, their cultural events, and issues that
affect them. For example in the Third Opinion
on Cyprus the ACFC stated:
a positive change has been recorded over the
past few years regarding the presence of
information about the history, culture and
identity of the Armenians, Latins and
Maronites in radio and television publicly
broadcasting for the majority population.
Generally speaking, the media – both public
and private – have covered the three groups’
main public events. The media attitude
towards these groups is generally positive,
as is the image of them conveyed to the
public30
.
Norway was also found by the ACFC to be an
example of good practice. In its second Opinion
the ACFC welcomed the fact that ‘the quality of
programmes on minorities and their various
cultures is increasingly high’.31
It noted the
‘commitment of the public-sector television
teams in charge of these programmes and hopes
that these efforts will have an increasingly
visible impact on the way the public perceive the
growing diversity of Norwegian society and
their attitude towards it’. The ACFC has been
less positive on levels of implementation of
other states. For example, with regard to the
United Kingdom, the ACFC pointed to the fact
that, according to information it had received,
‘the capacity of the mainstream media, including
public broadcasting, could be better utilised as a
platform to promote mutual respect and
understanding between the majority and the
country’s ethnic, cultural, linguistic and
religious minorities’. 32
In the case of the Czech
Republic, the ACFC noted that, despite
improvements between the first and second
cycles of monitoring, the time devoted to
national minorities on public television was still
‘too limited’. 33
Awareness-raising of minorities can be
facilitated through the adoption of legislation
providing incentives to journalists and to
national broadcasters to incorporate relevant
broadcasts in their programming. An example is
an amendment to Poland’s Broadcasting Act in
2001, which introduced the category of ‘social
broadcaster’.34
Broadcasting companies
recognised as social broadcasters became
exempt from the payment of licence fees. In its
Opinion on Poland, however, the ACFC pointed
out that no minority organisation had yet applied
for this status; it encouraged the Polish
authorities to inform minority organisations of
this opportunity - and, generally, to develop a
‘more proactive policy as regards access to
media for persons belonging to national
minorities’. 35
Thus, access of minorities to the
media involves not only making such access
possible, but also a proactive attitude by the state
in bringing about increased access.
The importance of raising awareness of
minorities through the media has been linked to
their societal integration. Thus, in relation to the
Slovak Republic, the ACFC noted that ‘the
media, in particular the Roma media, can play
an important role […] in the inclusion of persons
belonging to the Roma minority into society by
inter alia providing information on issues of
interest to society. 36
An inclusive media, like an
inclusive society, is itself linked to the
recognition of minority groups’ contribution to
society.
Principle 2: broadcasting in
minority languages Programmes on minorities can also include
programmes in minority languages, particularly
in the public service broadcaster. As noted
above, the ACFC linked the production of
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programmes in Russian-language in Estonia to
the opportunity for both Estonian- and Russian-
speakers to ‘share a common media environment
and thereby develop a better sense of a common
society.’37
A paucity of media programmes in
Russian language produced in Estonia is likely
to cause the Russian minority to turn to the
Russian-language media broadcast from Russia,
rather than programmes from their country of
residence. A divided media environment is,
clearly, not conducive to intercultural dialogue.
With regard to Macedonia, the ACFC
expressed its concern that public and private
media outlets ‘remain strongly divided along
linguistic lines with very limited opportunities
for intercultural dialogue’.38
Only one Albanian-
language television channel in Macedonia was
found to broadcast bilingual programmes on a
regular basis, which was considered insufficient
to promote interaction between the Albanian and
Macedonian communities.39
In relation to mono-lingual
programming there are two possible scenarios:
cases in which majority and minority languages
are mutually intelligible, by which programmes
can be followed by various linguistic groups;
and cases in which there is a language barrier
(when the language(s) of minorities are not
generally understood by the majority, or when
some persons belonging to minorities do not
know the state language40
). A focus on
exclusively mono-lingual programming runs the
risk of creating two (or more) parallel
broadcasting systems that separate the various
communities within a society. Thus, the
members of individual groups can remain
unaware of issues relating to other groups, or
their interests and concerns. In extreme cases,
intercultural dialogue can be very limited or
non-existing. This scenario is contrary to Article
6(1), which aims at creating a common media
space that facilitates interaction. Measures to
avoid the consolidation of a divided media
environment can involve the provision of
subtitles, or the re-broadcasting of a programme
in another language at a different time. The
advantage of subtitles is that various groups can
follow the same programme simultaneously. In
the Third Opinion on Estonia, the ACFC added
that bilingual news programmes could be
‘particularly important and effective’ in creating
a common media environment; however, the
programmes had to guarantee ‘balanced and
similar news in both languages’.41
Thus, translations can be important in
preventing minority groups from becoming
excessively insular, and in facilitating
interaction with other groups. For example, in its
first Opinion on Montenegro,42
the ACFC noted
that, while it welcomed the presence of Albanian
language on public television, this was ‘not
easily accessible to the general public due to the
language barrier’; this was the case despite the
fact that Montenegrin law states that resources
are to be provided for the translation of minority
language programmes into the official language.
At the same time, translation requirements can
become excessively onerous to media outlets.
Estonian legislation requires broadcasts in
languages other than Estonian to be translated
into the state language, with the imposition of
sanctions when the relevant provisions are not
fully complied with. The introduction of this
legal obligation was justified with the need to
make programmes available to the wider public.
However, the ACFC in this case pointed to the
‘overly prescriptive’ nature of the provision,
disproportionate to the aim pursued of
promoting the state language - given the lack of
subsidies and support from the state to
broadcasters to meet the translation
requirements.43
Thus, a balance ought to be
reached between the opportunities for different
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groups to understand media content and the
obligations imposed upon broadcasters.
In addition to broadcasting in minority
languages, the authorities must ensure that
minorities have access to these programmes. In
this respect, in its first Opinion on Georgia, the
ACFC considered problematic that:
[…] minority languages […] occupy a
proportionately very small place in the
media, and […] the access of persons
belonging to national minorities to the
media and to the news remains
particularly problematic in those regions
where they live in substantial numbers.44
Public radio and television do not cover the
whole of Georgian territory: those persons
belonging to minorities who live in regions
excluded from coverage do not have access to
the national media. As a result, the population of
these regions tend to turn to foreign media
outlets broadcasting from the Russian
Federation, Armenia or Azerbaijan. The ACFC
took the view that:
[…] while these outlets certainly
constitute additional sources of
information … the national media
remain in the best position to reflect the
views in Georgian society about current
affairs. This is all the more important
during periods of tension or conflict,
when news takes on a particular
importance and can play a role in
maintaining and promoting of social
cohesion.45
It thus reflects the Opinion on Estonia cited
above.46
In the case of Georgia, the ACFC
added:
[…] genuine involvement by the central
authorities is essential in order to enable
these persons, using their own
languages, to keep abreast of the latest
developments in the country's social,
economic and political life, to make
their own needs known and to
familiarise others with their cultural and
historical heritage.47
Finally, media in minority languages can
facilitate the preservation and development of
such languages. For example, with regard to the
Romani-language media in the Slovak Republic,
the ACFC noted that this type of minority media
serves the dual purpose of facilitating the
integration of Roma into the wider society, and
of promoting Romani language.48
Principle 3: ensuring
participation of minorities in the
media Participation of minorities in the media can take
several forms: consultation in decision-making
on the media; involvement of minorities in
producing programmes (ad hoc involvement
through commission, or the actual recruitment of
persons with minority backgrounds in media
outlets); and direct access to the media, in the
sense of minorities themselves being featured in
programmes, for example when they are invited
to television debates.
The ACFC has recommended that the
media consult with minority representatives and
recruit persons from various ethnic and religious
backgrounds to serve as journalists. For
example, in the Third Opinion on Estonia, the
ACFC argued that ‘it is essential that the
minority representatives are members of the
National Broadcasting Council and actively
participate in its work’.49
One issue that the
ACFC believed should to be decided through
consultation with minority groups in Estonia is
legislation on translation requirements: open
discussions would enable the formulation of
strategies to build a pluralistic, but shared, media
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space, taking into account the needs of various
stakeholders.50
The practice of involving minorities in
consultations and in the production of
programmes is often found to be wanting. In
relation to the Czech Republic, the ACFC
referred to the limited possibilities for minority
representatives to be consulted by the editorial
boards of broadcasters on programmes for
minorities, or to be directly involved in
producing such programmes. The ACFC added
that, in some regional television stations in the
Czech Republic, there are no representatives of
minorities at all.51
With regard to Serbia the
ACFC referred to the Council for National
Minorities, which exists at the state level, noting
that it has only rarely met and does not amount
to a forum for discussion that could lead to
initiatives for dialogue and tolerance.52
The ACFC has further noted that:
[…] the recruitment of young persons
from different ethnic backgrounds
would make the media more aware of
cultural diversity and help them
understand this principle better and
carry out their role in the promotion of
tolerance.53
Thus, in its second Opinion on Denmark, it
judged positively the initiative of the Danish
School of Journalism to introduce a two-year
course in journalism for persons from different
ethnic backgrounds, which could lead to the
newly-trained journalists from minority
backgrounds being recruited by the Danish
media.54
With regard to direct access to media
programmes, the ACFC pointed to the views of
representatives of ethnic, linguistic and religious
minorities in the United Kingdom – including
Welsh-, Gaelic- and Irish-speakers.
Representatives of these linguistic groups
complained that they were only invited to
participate in programmes on the national media
to discuss specifically issues related to their own
communities, while they were not actively
involved in all other cases. Thus these groups
remained excluded from programmes treating
mainstream news. 55
Principle 4: training journalists
on minority issues The ACFC has strongly recommended the
training of journalists and media professionals
and their sensitization to minority issues. This is
linked to the production of programmes for
and/or on minorities, but also to general interest
programmes that involve references to
minorities. It is of paramount importance that
journalists display sensitivity in their reporting
of matters concerning minorities: there can be
particular sensitivities in relation to specific past
events, such as instances of sustained
discrimination or violence affecting particular
groups. In extreme cases, they can relate to full-
blown inter-ethnic conflicts, as in the case of the
former Yugoslavia. Such cases often result in
different narratives and interpretation of events.
Journalists need to use special care in handling
these subjects, so as to avoid an escalation of
societal tensions.
In its first Opinion on Albania the
ACFC pointed out that journalistic training
‘could open the way to increasing the level and
quality of coverage of minority issues […] in the
media’.56
The ACFC, then, encouraged the
Albanian authorities to examine ways to carry
out training and awareness-raising activities for
journalists. In its second Opinion on the same
country the ACFC went a step further, by
suggesting that courses on minorities should
become an integral part of basic journalist
training programmes. Coverage of minority
issues should be based on principles of
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journalistic ethics, which require journalists to
provide objective information to the public.57
The ACFC judged positively efforts
made in Moldova, in the shape of a project on
diversity launched in 2004 by the (NGO) Centre
for Independent Journalism.58
A network was
established by journalists from different ethno-
linguistic backgrounds and regions of Moldova
to produce bilingual publications in both the
state language (Moldovan/Romanian) and
Russian. The publications treat issues relating to
intercultural dialogue. This project involved not
only training but also co-operation of journalists
from different ethnic backgrounds.
Principle 5: reporting on crimes
without conveying the ethnic
origin of suspects or offenders A common practice in many state parties to the
FCNM, and criticised by the ACFC, is the
disclosure by the media of the ethnic
background of suspects or offenders in the
coverage of crime. This information is often
added gratuitously when suspects or offenders
belong to minorities, and contributes to
reinforcing stereotypes. For example, with
regard to Portugal, the ACFC expressed its
concern of the fact that immigrants and Roma
are often associated with crime in the media,59
leading to, in the words of the ACFC,
‘stigmatisation and prejudices’.60
Similarly, in
its Second Opinion on the Russian Federation,
the ACFC criticised the disclosure of the ethnic
origin of offenders in the media, which
strengthened negative stereotypes against Roma,
Tajiks and persons originating from the
Caucasus.61
Thus, the state parties to the FCNM
should encourage media outlets to make it a
policy not to disclose the ethnic origin of crime
suspects or offenders. This principle can be
realised through training, and the sensitisation of
journalists as to the need to avoid the
reinforcement of stereotypes through the media.
Principle 6: adopting legislation
and codes of conducts promoting
tolerance Training might not be sufficient to guarantee
tolerance: states should also adopt legislation
that prohibits intolerance and hate speech in the
media, with strict sanctions against offenders. In
its Second Opinion on Bulgaria the ACFC
welcomed the adoption in 2009 of amendments
to the Criminal Code, introducing severe
sanctions in cases of hate speech.62
The ACFC
also judged of importance - although insufficient
- the arrangements present in Slovenia: media
regulators, such as the Broadcasting Council,
have the authority to issue warnings in instances
of hate speech, although they cannot withdraw
broadcasting licences. The ACFC signalled that
it would welcome more far-reaching sanctions in
cases of hate speech.63
Measures taken in Cyprus and Croatia
were considered more effective. In Cyprus the
ACFC welcomed the amendment of the Public
Broadcasting Act between the first and second
monitoring cycles; the amendment introduced a
clear obligation for the public broadcaster to
give appropriate airtime to programmes aimed at
various groups, including national minorities.
The journalists’ code of ethics in Cyprus
protects persons belonging to minorities from
discrimination or hostility by the media on the
grounds of their religious or ethnic identity.64
Codes of conduct are particularly important in
the promotion of tolerance, and in limiting
negative, stereotypical coverage of vulnerable
groups. Principles contained in codes of conduct
can guide journalists towards a more culturally-
sensitive approach to their coverage of minority
issues. The ACFC similarly judged positively
the case of Croatia: the Council for Electronic
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Media, established as an independent regulatory
body, was tasked with the supervision of the
activities of radio and television broadcasters for
compliance with the legislation. It was also
given the authority to revoke a licence or to start
judicial proceedings in cases of breach of
impartiality or hate speech.65
Principle 7: criminalising racism
and discrimination on the
internet The internet is the source of defamatory and
racist comments on minorities that is hardest to
regulate. Thus, the ACFC has often
recommended that states criminalise racist and
xenophobic acts perpetrated through the internet.
As part of this process, it has recommended that
states that have not already done so sign and
ratify the 2003 Additional Protocol to the
European Convention on Cybercrime.66
Principle 8: monitoring media
content Legislation and strict sanctions per se are
insufficient if not accompanied by well-
functioning monitoring mechanisms. The
ACFC, then, has placed an emphasis on the
development and strengthening of mechanisms
to monitor media content, with a view to
identifying unduly negative reporting or hate
speech against persons belonging to minorities.
In its Second Opinion on Albania the ACFC
argued that the Albanian authorities should
encourage the monitoring of the media,
including through media self-monitoring, in
order to identify instances of stereotypes and
hate speech against minorities; legal redress
should also be guaranteed in these cases.67
More
specifically, in its Second Opinion on Croatia,
the ACFC noted that the Croatian media had not
set up a self-regulatory body to which
complaints on media content could be submitted
– despite the fact that the Croatian media had
reflected prejudices against minorities.68
The ACFC judged positively Ukraine’s
establishment of a special unit within the
Ministry of Interior to monitor hate speech, in
the print and broadcast media, including the
internet.69
Similarly, the ACFC welcomed the
establishment, within Spain’s Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs, of a mechanism to
monitor the media coverage of immigrants and
Roma, by which media outlets that convey
pejorative messages are admonished.70
The
ACFC also welcomed the granting of additional
competences to Catalonia’s Audiovisual Council
to monitor and sanction broadcasters that engage
in hate speech.71
Some monitoring is also carried
out by civil society: for example, in Moldova,
the ACFC judged positively the (already
mentioned) establishment of a network of
journalists to, inter alia, monitor the coverage of
issues of intercultural dialogue and diversity in
the mainstream media.72
In addition to the monitoring of media
content, mechanisms exist to assess compliance
of media outlets with the relevant legislation and
codes of conduct, and for the public to file
complaints against media outlets. The Second
Opinion on Lithuania referred to the Ethics
Commission, which monitors compliance with
legislation prohibiting incitement to hatred on
the basis of ethnicity, religion or gender. Also
with regard to Lithuania, the ACFC welcomed
the fact that the Inspector of Journalists’ Ethics
and the Ethics Commission of Journalists and
Publishers can receive and examine complaints
on defamation and privacy. The ACFC,
however, regretted that the Inspector’s mandate
did not extend to complaints on hate speech.73
It
is essential that the agencies that monitor the
media and the complaint systems are fully
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operational, known to the public, and easily
accessible. The ACFC has pointed out that some
procedures in place to monitor compliance with
standards of journalistic ethics are not
sufficiently effective.74
IV. FREQUENCY OF INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLES IN ACFC OPINIONS Principle Opinions containing the principle Number of
Opinions
containing the
principle
1 – Raising awareness of minorities
through the media
1. Albania-Opinion 2
2. Bulgaria- Opinion 1
3. Cyprus-Opinions 1,2,3
4. Czech Republic-Opinion 2
5. Estonia-Opinions 1,3
6. Georgia-Opinion 1
7. Hungary-Opinions 1,3
8. Ireland-Opinion 1,2
9. Lithuania-Opinion 2
10. Moldova-Opinion 1,2
11. Montenegro-Opinion 1
12. Norway-Opinions 1,2
13. Portugal-Opinions 1,2
14. Romania-Opinion 2
15. Slovenia-Opinion 2,3
16. Sweden-Opinion 1
17. Switzerland-Opinion 2
18. Ukraine-Opinion 2
27
2 – Broadcasting in minority
languages
1. Estonia-Opinion 3
2. Georgia-Opinion 1
3. Moldova-Opinion 3
4. Portugal-Opinion 1
5. Sweden-Opinion 1
5
3 – Ensuring participation of
minorities in the media
1. Denmark-Opinions 2,3
2. Estonia-Opinion 3
3. Moldova-Opinion 2
4. Serbia-Opinion 2
5. Slovak Republic-Opinion 3
6. Spain-Opinion 2
7. United Kingdom-Opinion 2
8
4 – Training journalists on minority
issues
1. Albania-Opinions 1,2
2. Macedonia-Opinions 1,2
3. Moldova-Opinion 2
4. Romania-Opinion 2
5. Russian Fed.-Opinion 1
6. Serbia-Opinion 2
7. Slovak Republic-Opinion 2
8. Slovenia-Opinion 2
9. Spain-Opinion 1
10. Sweden-Opinion 1
14
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11. Ukraine-Opinion 1,2
5 - Reporting on crimes without
conveying the ethnic origin of
suspects or offenders
1. Georgia-Opinion 1,
2. Germany-Opinion 1,2,3
3. Italy-Opinion 1
4. Lithuania-Opinion 1,2
5. Macedonia-Opinion 1
6. Portugal-Opinion 1,2
7. Romania-Opinion 1
8. Russian Fed.-Opinion 1,2
9. Serbia-Opinion 2
10. Spain-Opinion 2
15
6 – Adopting legislation and codes
of conduct promoting tolerance
1. Albania-Opinions 1,2
2. Austria-Opinion 3
3. Bulgaria-Opinion 2
4. Cyprus-Opinion 2
5. Croatia-Opinion 1
6. Georgia-Opinion 1
7. Ireland-Opinion 2
8. Russian Fed.-Opinions 1,2
9. Serbia-Opinion 1
10. Ukraine-Opinion 2
11. United Kingdom-Opinion 1
13
7 – Criminalising racism and
discrimination on the internet
1. Croatia-Opinion 3
2. Finland-Opinions 2,3
3. Lithuania-Opinion 2
4. Slovak Republic-Opinion 3
5. Slovenia-Opinion 3
6. Ukraine-Opinion 2
7
8 – Monitoring media content 1. Albania-Opinion 2
2. Armenia-Opinion 2
3. Cyprus-Opinion 3
4. Croatia-Opinion 2
5. Czech Republic-Opinion 2
6. Georgia-Opinion 1
7. Lithuania-Opinions 1,2
8. Macedonia-Opinion 2
9. Romania-Opinion 2
10. Serbia-Opinions 1,2
11. Slovenia-Opinion 2
12. Spain-Opinion 2
13. Ukraine-Opinion 2
15
V. STATE REPORTS After presenting the principles emanating from
the ACFC Opinions, this section focuses on the
states’ interpretation of their obligations under
the FCNM in relation to media and intercultural
dialogue. The data included in this section is
from the reports which the state parties to the
FCNM are required to submit to the ACFC for
each five-year monitoring cycle, outlining
measures towards the implementation of each
article of the treaty.75
The research for this
section involved the analysis of the most recent
reports submitted by each of the state parties, as
of September 2012 – a total of 39 reports. The
approach used was exclusively qualitative. This
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is for two reasons. First, states have different
styles of reporting, and reports can be more or
less comprehensive. Second, as is to be
expected, the state reports outline specific
measures - the practical actions that states have
taken to implement the FCNM. The choice of
measures depends on many factors; thus, the
circumstances of different minorities in different
countries, and the actions taken by states, are not
easily quantifiable or comparable. The cases
presented in this section are therefore meant to
be only illustrative. They give a flavour of the
ways states interpret their responsibilities under
the FCNM, and how these are translated into
reality.
The analysis took into account the
section of the reports devoted to the
implementation of Article 6. In order to also
cover data that might have been included in the
other sections, searches were conducted for the
key words ‘broadcast’, ‘television’, ‘radio’,
‘media’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’. These
searches revealed that a number of initiatives
related to intercultural dialogue are listed under
Article 9 rather than Article 6. Article 9,
although not referring specifically to
‘intercultural dialogue’, focuses on the media -
freedom of expression, access to the media by
minorities and cultural pluralism.76
The focus of the reports’ analysis was
on programmes aiming at facilitating
understanding and interaction among different
groups. Thus, this part of the paper does not
include examples of programmes for and about
minorities transmitted exclusively in the
languages of the minorities and without subtitles
- as these programmes tend not to reach the rest
of the population. It also does not include
measures relating to the minority print media - a
form of media that is primarily consumed by
minorities themselves.77
Various observations can be made on
the basis of the analysis of the state reports.
First, the expression ‘intercultural dialogue’
itself appears only very rarely in the reports.
This may signal a limited awareness by states as
to the significance of intercultural dialogue,
and/or the fact that it is not considered a priority
by them. Second, the state reports indicate that
some of the measures listed are implemented by
NGOs, with the state having only a limited (or
unclear) role – for example, in various instances
of training programmes for journalists. At times
relevant projects were carried out with the
financial help of other states. This is the case, for
example, of the project of the Romanian Centre
for Independent Journalism, ‘Increasing the
capacity of the Romanian media to facilitate
social integration’, implemented in 2008 with
financial help from the United Kingdom.78
Third, reports reveal that state parties to the
FCNM present variegated situations, which
result in different sets of initiatives - although
some commonalities were also discerned.
Numerous differences were recorded from state
to state with regard to the level of detail, and
comprehensiveness of the data included in the
reports. These differences are not explained by
the number of (recognised) minority groups
residing on the territory of a state, nor, for
example, by the size of minority group(s), or the
size of the country in question. Rather, reports
reflect different styles in data collection and in
the presentation of implementation measures.
For example, in its Second Report, Serbia,
following a brief general introduction on its
legislative framework, provides detailed
statistical data divided on the basis of FCNM
articles and by national minorities present in the
country.79
It also lists radio programmes and
television programmes by broadcasting
language, but without providing explanations on
policies. Generally, it was found not to be
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infrequent for states to provide lists of measures
taken in relation to Article 6(1), but with a
paucity of details, including on the aims, content
and audience of the relevant programmes. Only
in few cases there were attempts to provide
information on audiences – for example, the
reports by Lithuania80
and Estonia81
provide
information on the preferences of the majority
and minority groups in terms of choice of
channels.82
Moreover, it remained sometimes
unclear what type of broadcasts the various
reports referred to (e.g. documentary or debate),
for example when there were references to
programmes ‘devoted to minorities’, or similar
expressions. There was often limited clarity as to
whether programmes were primarily intended
for minorities, or for the general public (about
minorities) – or whether they were meant to
serve both types of audiences more or less
equally.
Clearly, issues relating to the accuracy
and quality of the reports can hinder the
understanding of the real status of FCNM
implementation in each state. Some reports
might be incomplete, with only a partial
representation of the implementation of Article
6(1). For example, some programmes are listed
in the Second Report on Georgia, which are
reportedly also broadcast in Armenia and
Azerbaijan, although they are not included in the
reports by the Armenian and Azerbaijani
governments;83
this might signify that, given the
difficulties in compiling fully comprehensive
reports, some relevant information might be
omitted. There might also be instances in which
states intentionally yield only overly general
information in the reports, rather than specific
and accurate data that can unambiguously lead
to negative assessments by the ACFC. Some
states might present an excessively rosy picture
of the situation, while others openly admit to
issues linked to intolerance. In the report by
Lithuania, for example, the authorities
acknowledged the problem of intolerance in the
media – indicating as one of the remedial
measures the application of a code of ethics of
journalists.84
Similarly, Norway admitted that
the programming for national minorities by the
Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘has not
reached an adequate level in terms of either
scope or subject matter.’85
Croatia included in
its report the opinion of minority representatives
that the Croatian media excessively focuses on
sensationalistic news; this, the minority
representatives argued, results in insufficient
attention to issues concerning national
minorities, and/or the sensationalization of the
coverage of minority issues itself, often leading
to the reinforcement of negative stereotypes.86
Once again, these differences indicate varying
reporting practices by states, as well as differing
priorities and levels of commitment to FCNM
implementation.
Overall, the measures listed in the
reports, and which were identified through the
research, can be grouped into two broad
categories, and various subcategories, which are
summarised and then explained below:
Media Outputs:
1. Films and documentaries
2. Debates
3. News and current affairs
4. Campaigns and social advertising
5. Entertainment programmes
6. New media
Initiatives relating to:
1. Media awards
2. Participation of minorities
3. Training of journalists
4. Legislation and codes of conduct of
journalists
5. Complaint mechanisms
6. Funding schemes
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VI. MEDIA OUTPUTS:
MINORITIES IN THE MEDIA
Media outputs refer here to the broadcast media
(television and radio) and new media. The
categorisation into ‘media outputs’ (divided into
films and documentaries, debates, etc) is only
indicative, as several of the categories overlap:
often media outputs encompass more than one
medium. For example, television or radio
broadcasts can also be made available over the
internet, or social campaigns broadcast on
television and radio can also have a webpage.
Media outputs are divided here into categories to
more easily outline the different types of
measures adopted by the states.
State obligations relate particularly to
public service media (public television, radio
and new media). However, Article 6(1) also
encompasses measures to encourage private
broadcasting companies to promote intercultural
dialogue. There is no sharp differentiation
between public and private media in the state
reports, as in the ACFC Opinions. Initiatives
relating to the public and private media are
treated as part of a continuum.
The importance of bilingual
programmes has already been noted87
– and
several such programmes are mentioned in the
state reports. For example, according to
Austria’s Third Report, the Austrian public
broadcaster (ORF) provides a variety of
programmes for national minorities through
terrestrial and satellite broadcasts, as well as the
internet. The programmes are in both the
languages of the minorities and in German. The
report notes that these programmes are bilingual
precisely ‘in order to bring subjects relating to
the national minorities closer to the German
speaking majority.’88
When programmes are
translated into the state language, they can reach
a much larger number of viewers, and facilitate
inter-group contacts.89
In some cases, media
legislation contains provisions on the use of
subtitles. For example, in Lithuania, the Law on
the Provision of Information to the Public
stipulates that radio and television programmes
broadcast in a language other than Lithuanian
must be translated into Lithuanian or have
Lithuanian subtitles.90
In Latvia, the law
provides that ‘a part of public television’s
broadcasting time in non-state languages must
have subtitles in Latvian’.91
Films and documentaries Various examples of films and documentaries on
minorities are included in the state reports.
Armenia’s Third Report refers to a series of
films produced in Armenia in 2007, ‘dedicated
to’ minorities in Armenia and broadcast on
public television.92
Also in 2007, Lithuanian
national television broadcast a series of
documentaries (entitled ‘Personal Number’) to
inform the public about equal opportunities
policies implemented in the country. According
to the report, the programmes aimed at raising
awareness on equality and non-discrimination,
as well as on the problem of social exclusion of
specific groups.93
In Cyprus the year 2009 was dedicated
to ‘cohabitation’, in the sense of ‘living
together’. The state’s Third Report refers to
television and radio programmes on the history,
culture and language of the different
communities and religious groups, including
immigrants from other countries.94
The Third
Report by the Czech Republic mentions
broadcasts depicting the life of minorities in
major European cities, with each episode
broadcast in a different language, and
accompanied by Czech subtitles.95
In 2008, within the project ‘Imagine
Your Future’, a series of short films were made
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by representatives of ethnic groups residing in
Armenia, on issues relating to their
communities, and were screened at a public
event in Yerevan.96
Armenia’s Third Report
states that the films were also due to be posted
on websites, broadcast on television, and
discussed at various events.97
A similar initiative
by the Georgian Public Broadcaster consisted of
documentaries produced in 2008, on the story of
Georgia’s national minorities – including
smaller minorities such as Kurds, Kists and
Udians.98
The stated aim, as per Georgia’s
Second Report, was to inform the wider
Georgian society about minorities’ cultures and
lifestyle.
As noted, the target audience is not
always specified in the reports. Clearly, films
and documentaries can serve both groups – with
the dual function of satisfying minorities’
communicative needs and better informing the
general public. Films and documentaries can
also be prepared by representatives of both the
minority group(s) and the majority – or a
combination of the two. Special programmes
that enable minorities to express themselves give
a voice to persons belonging to groups that are
often not heard. However, the analysis of the
reports revealed that a there are a number of
initiatives on intercultural dialogue that are not
covered by the media – such as films or
documentaries made by minorities or about
minorities, which are only screened in cinemas
or fringe events, or distributed through DVD
copies. In these cases, the impact of the initiative
is likely to be limited, even when programmes
are of high quality. In other cases, the reports
have limited information as to the channel for
dissemination – whether the public or private
media, and at attractive time slots. The impact of
a programme is likely to be much greater if
transmitted through a popular broadcaster and
during prime time.99
Debates Debates with the participation of representatives
of different groups are a rare example of direct
intercultural dialogue, in the sense of direct
exchange, on the media. Potentially these
programmes can stimulate debate between
members of different ethnic, linguistic or
religious communities. The voices of minority
representatives directly reach the audience
without intermediaries. As noted, access to the
media is also provided for by Article 9; the
Explanatory Report FCNM further links Article
9(4), on cultural pluralism, to dialogue between
groups:
[…] emphasises the need for special
measures with the dual aim of
facilitating access to the media for
persons belonging to national minorities
and promoting tolerance and cultural
pluralism. .[...] The measures envisaged
by this paragraph could, for example,
consist of … offering a dialogue
between groups, or of encouraging,
subject to editorial independence,
editors and broadcasters to allow
national minorities access to their
media.100
[emphasis added]
Examples of debates on minority issues are
incorporated in some of the state reports. For
example, Georgia’s Second Report includes
information on the weekly talk show ‘Chveni
ezo’ (Our yard), which started broadcasting in
2007 on Georgian public television. The target
audiences are both minority groups and the
broader Georgian society and one of its
purposes, as the Georgian authorities put it in the
report, is ‘to inform about the contributions
made by minorities for the development of the
state’.101
The programme envisages discussions
on issues related to ethnic groups, including
tolerance and peaceful coexistence.102
The
Georgia report also refers to the weekly radio
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programme ‘Our Georgia’, which provides a
forum to discuss live social and educational
issues. Guests of the programme include
representatives of minority groups, civil society,
policy makers and public officials.103
This type
of programmes can assist in providing a forum
for discussion for minority representatives and
policy-makers, where concerns can be raised, in
a way that could ultimately impact on decision-
making. However, issues of importance in
debates are: whether programmes directly
involve persons belonging to minorities (rather
than commentators from the majority talking
about minorities); and to what extent the persons
belonging to minorities on the programme are
representative of the group, or of its different
segments – thereby reflecting different
viewpoints within the group.
In many cases, media outputs can be
combined – with, for example, debates
following documentaries. In Romania, in 2008,
the broadcasting of documentaries under the
motto ‘Know the Roma before you judge
them!’104
was followed by discussions on public
television, with both Roma and non-Roma
guests. The documentaries focused on problems
afflicting the Roma.105
Similarly, in the case of
Albania, a television debate in 2008 was
combined to the ‘Festival of Minorities’ – which
presented the cultures of minorities, including
the Roma community, through a photographic
exhibition and a fair.106
Campaigns and social advertising
promoting tolerance
In some cases the media is used to promote
campaigns and carry social advertising
promoting tolerance. For example, this was the
case in several state parties in 2007, the
‘European Year of Equal Opportunities for All’.
The Third Report by Lithuania referred to social
advertising on television and radio, particularly
targeting youth. The campaign was accompanied
by the catchphrase ‘Are we really that
different?’ This form of social advertising was
combined with national radio broadcasts with
discussions among civil servants and
representatives of vulnerable groups.107
In its Third Report Austria listed a
number of initiatives for 2008, linked to the
European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, aiming
at raising the general awareness of ‘the added
value obtained from cultural diversity’, with
discussions on diversity, migration and
integration. The public broadcaster, ORF,
approached over 180 NGOs, as well as cultural
and educational facilities from all regions of
Austria, which outlined their initiatives to
promote intercultural dialogue.108
Another campaign was the European
campaign ‘All different – All Equal’ in 2006-
2007. The Lithuanian authorities outlined in
their Third Report initiatives aiming at
encouraging young people to contribute to
peaceful coexistence between different groups.
109 The campaign had a webpage, and a series of
film shows on human rights themes.110
In
Scotland a campaign called ‘Rock Against
Racism’ aimed at celebrating Scotland’s multi-
cultural society while also tackling racist
attitudes – by attempting to reach its audience
through music. It involved a series of events,
particularly concerts, with coverage on Scottish
public radio. The target audience was, again,
youth, with the participation of well-known
artists to attract interest in the project.111
Moreover, in its Third Report, Hungary referred
to media programmes on Roma celebrations and
special occasions, such as International Roma
Day and the Roma Holocaust Commemoration
Day.112
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News and current affairs News programmes can be exclusively in
minority languages, or be accompanied by
subtitles. For example, in Montenegro, 2009 saw
the introduction of news in Albanian and other
minority languages, broadcast on Sundays on the
public broadcaster, with subtitles in
Montenegrin.113
The Third Report by Finland
notes that Sámi language television news
programmes are broadcast in Northern Finland,
with re-runs are available nation-wide with
subtitles in Finnish and in Swedish.114
The Third
Report by Estonia states that, between 2008 and
2009, there was a 50% increase in funds made
available for the production of news in Russian
language.115
In some cases, state reports do not refer
to specific news programmes on and/or for
minorities. In these cases, information relating to
minorities is only included in mainstream
programmes, normally on the occasion of
religious and traditional holidays of minorities.
There is, thus, a risk of the mainstream media
presenting only a superficial, mono-dimensional
- and possibly biased - picture of minority
groups.
Entertainment and children’s
programmes
Promotion of tolerance and debate on minority
issues can also be furthered through programmes
which have an entertainment format however
educational. For example, the Third Report on
Finland refers to an entertainment programme
entitled ‘Manne-TV/Romano-TV’ broadcast in
2007, and followed by television debates with
representatives of the Roma minority.116
Furthermore, in 2011, the Georgian and
Armenian public broadcasters started the music
television programme ‘10+10’, with joint
performances of popular singers from Georgia
and Armenia. The Second Report by Georgia
claims that the programme contributed to
promoting cultural exchange as well as
entertaining.117
There are also examples of children’s
programmes aiming at furthering tolerance.
Georgia’s Second Report notes that, in 2004-
2006, 42 children television episodes with
puppet shows were produced and broadcast in
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The episodes,
produced under the Children’s Tolerance
Education Program, encompassed issues of
tolerance, good citizenship, intercultural
understanding and conflict resolution. In 2006-
2009, according to the same report, the puppet
shows were complemented by books with the
characters from the show; they were further
combined with talk-shows with the participation
of children, during which issues raised in the
shows were discussed.118
Meanwhile, Finland
reported on a new television programme for
children in Sámi on public television, which was
started in September 2007 (Unna Junná).
According to the report, the 15 minutes
programme is broadcast weekly on the public
broadcaster and on a satellite channel; it is
produced by Sami Radio and carries subtitles in
both Finnish and Swedish.119
New media Several radio and television programmes for
minorities can also be accessed through the
internet. For example, in Austria radio
programmes in minority languages can be
downloaded over the internet, while
documentaries and articles from minority
magazines are available as podcasts. On the
website http://volksgruppen.orf.at,120
information on society, politics and culture with
reference to minorities, can be accessed in
German and in different minority languages.121
The Third Report by Finland states that the city
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of Tampere produces a weekly current affairs
programme for internet television, broadcast in
Russian, Fars and Chinese languages. According
to the report, the programme aims at reflecting
the multiculturality of Finnish society.122
Moreover, when broadcasting licences are
unavailable to minorities, internet radio
represents a cheap and more viable alternative.
Technology-savvy Estonia makes use of
digital and satellite options to increase its
audience reach. Its Second Report notes that
programmes in Estonian have Russian
translations made available digitally. For
persons with Russian as their first language,
programmes to learn Estonian are also provided
through digital television.123
VII. PARTICIPATION,
PRINCIPLES AND
INCENTIVES
Numerous other initiatives mentioned in the
reports do not involve actual media outputs,
but can encourage media professionals to
prioritize programmes where minority issues
are presented or debated. Among relevant
measures are media awards and the
regulation of media outlets’ activities.
Media awards State reports list numerous awards and prizes for
those media outputs that most contribute to unity
and diversity, and act to stimulate intercultural
dialogue through the media. For example, in
Latvia, a media award was included in the
programme for the ‘Year of Intercultural
Dialogue’ in 2008.124
Similarly, in 2007,
Lithuania introduced the annual award ‘For
National Tolerance’, for persons who promote
national tolerance in the media.125
The Second Report by Georgia refers to
the award ‘Supporters of Tolerance’ for
significant contributions to a culture of tolerance
in Georgia. It is part of the celebration for the
International Day for Tolerance (16
November).126
Similarly, Russia‘s Third Report
states that, since 2008, a competition has been
held on the best coverage of inter-ethnic
cooperation and ethno-cultural development,
called SMIrotvorets. In 2009 the competition
saw the participation of 301 media outlets,
including 98 minority media outlets.127
Participation of minorities
Access of minorities to the media profession
can contribute to creating a positive image of
minority groups, provide positive role models
for persons belonging to minorities, and ensure a
more nuanced approach in the preparation of
media outputs. A number of examples are
provided in the state reports. For instance,
Estonia’s Third Report states that the television
channel ETV2 has ‘increased the proportions of
programmes intended for Russian- and other
language viewers and made with their
participation.’128
Denmark notes in its Third
Report that the Danish School of Media and
Journalism wished to attract applicants of
various backgrounds, with applicants of non-
Danish ethnicity having increased by over 3% in
recent years.129
On radio, Lithuania refers to an
example of cooperation between different
groups, in the programme ‘Santara’, prepared by
journalists of six different nationalities - and
broadcast in Lithuanian, Polish, Russian,
Belarusian and Ukrainian. The report further
refers to a daily programme, ‘Klasika’, which
targets on alternative days Lithuanian Jews and
Lithuanian Belarusians.130
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Training of journalists Journalistic training is of two types: for
mainstream journalists - to better prepare them
for a culturally sensitive coverage of minority
issues - and for journalists from minority
backgrounds - to increase their participation in
the production of media outputs. Among the
examples of the former is a project by the Centre
for Independent Journalism in Romania
‘Increasing the capacity of the Romanian media
to facilitate social integration’. Through
seminars and e-learning, the aim was to ‘boost
the quality of coverage on disadvantaged groups
in the local press to a fair and comprehensive
reflection of their national problems’.131
In
another example from Austria, during 2008 - the
European Year of Intercultural Dialogue - six
independent radio stations trained 50 editors in
producing multilingual radio programmes.132
An example of the second type of
training (training of journalists from minority
backgrounds) is provided in the Third Report by
Finland. Since 2005, the Finnish Broadcasting
Company has organised media education and
traineeships for immigrants and national
minorities.133
However, it is important that these
projects impact upon media content in the long
term. Finland acknowledged in its report that
media professionals with a Roma background
who had participated in the training schemes
were not employed by the Company afterwards.
At the time of the submission of the report
(2010), Finland had no television programme in
Romani language.134
Legislation and codes of conduct
of journalists
In addition to training, journalists require
guidelines in the coverage of minority issues.
The tone used and the type of information
disseminated can influence levels of tolerance
and intercultural dialogue. In its Second Report,
Georgia refers to the ‘Code of Conduct of
Broadcasters’ and the ‘Code of Conduct of
Public Broadcaster’, which require media
outlets, and particularly the public broadcaster,
to reflect the country’s diversity.135
In the case
of Lithuania, the ‘Code of Ethics of Lithuanian
Journalists and Publishers’ contain principles
against the (direct or indirect) incitement by
journalists of discord or hatred against any group
of individuals on various grounds, including on
the basis of ethnicity. The Code of Conduct
further specifies that, when reporting on a crime,
journalists ought not to specific the ethnic origin
of the suspect or accused.136
Legislation is further used by the state
parties to protect minorities from the possible
pernicious effects of the media. Article 170(1) of
the 2009 Criminal Code of Lithuania provides
for criminal liability against a ‘person who, for
the purposes of distribution, produces, acquires,
sends, transports or stores items ridiculing,
expressing contempt for, urging hatred of, or
inciting discrimination’, on grounds including
race and nationality. These actions are classified
as criminal acts to be sanctioned with a fine or
imprisonment for up to one year.137
The
legislation of the Czech Republic prohibits the
broadcasting of programmes that might reinforce
stereotypes against ethnic and religious
minorities.138
In addition, in order to facilitate
access of minorities to the media, the Radio and
Television Broadcasting Council is required, in
allocating broadcasting licences, to ‘assess the
applicant’s contribution to the development of
the culture of national, ethnic and other
minorities in the Czech Republic’.139
Complaint mechanisms
Complaint mechanisms give members of the
public the opportunity to report cases of
inappropriate coverage of events involving
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persons belonging to minorities. For example, in
Ireland complaints can be raised before the
Broadcasting Authority, or directly before the
relevant broadcaster, when one believes that
there has been a failure to comply with the
Broadcasting Authority codes. Moreover, since
2011 the Broadcasting Authority’s Right of
Reply Scheme provides for the broadcasting of
right-of-reply statements to rectify the
dissemination of incorrect information that has
affected a person’s honour or reputation.140
Funding programmes
The Explanatory Report FCNM states that
measures envisaged under Article 9(4), on the
promotion of cultural pluralism, may include
‘funding for minority broadcasting or for
programme productions dealing with minority
issues’.141
In the case of Austria, the federal
budget funds the M-Media Association:
established in 2005, it support journalists from
the mainstream media in their coverage of
migration, and in promoting cultural diversity in
the media. The state budget funds various
initiatives, such as training, a documentation
centre, and the promotion of culturally-sensitive
journalistic standards.142
Special funding schemes are also
mentioned in other state reports – for example,
Croatia’s Third Report (Fund for the Promotion
of Diversity and Pluralism in the Electronic
Media)143
and Ireland’s Third Report (the
funding scheme ‘Sound & Vision’).144
In
Germany films and radio programmes produced
by persons belonging to minorities are funded by
the Filmförderung Hamburg Schleswig-
Holstein.145
VIII. CONCLUSION ACFC Opinions have developed various
principles on intercultural dialogue, which
detail, and crystallize, the responsibilities of the
state parties to the FCNM in furthering
intercultural dialogue and tolerance through the
media. Principles developed by the ACFC relate,
inter alia, to training and awareness-raising
activities for journalists, collaboration with
persons belonging to minorities in the
development of programmes, the adoption of
journalistic codes of ethics and relevant
legislation, as well as media monitoring.
There is certainly some overlap in the
interpretation of responsibilities under Article
6(1) - and generally in relation to intercultural
dialogue through the media - by the ACFC and
by states. There are, however, few initiatives
that focus specifically (and exclusively) on
intercultural dialogue. The analysis of the
Opinions and the Reports shows that
intercultural dialogue is very much linked to
integration and tolerance, and various strategies
are used by different states in pursuing these
goals. The range of activities listed in the state
reports reveals that states tend to interpret
differently their responsibilities under the
FCNM; this is even more the case given the
multi-faceted nature of the expression, and its
not having been codified in a commonly
accepted definition. Moreover, some countries
appear more transparent than others, openly
acknowledging the need for greater efforts
towards the promotion of tolerance and
intercultural dialogue. The levels of commitment
in promoting dialogue and tolerance similarly
vary.
Overall, the monitoring cycles are
complicated by the limited data and finite
resources of states. There are four principal
problems. First, some countries still face
problems related to a lack of accurate data on
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demographic, social, economic and educational
structures of national minorities. This impairs
the formulation of effective policies to further
intercultural dialogue, and their implementation.
Second, states tend to report primarily on lists of
activities, which often leave the reader with little
sense of a comprehensive strategy. Only in few
cases studies are mentioned, upon which policies
are built. Arguably, it is difficult to implement
an ‘ephemeral obligation’, as Gilbert calls it146
–
states can only progressively become closer to
the goal of actively encouraging intercultural
dialogue, rather than fully achieving it.
Third, the reports frequently do not
include measures that require a sustained, long-
term effort, such as the monitoring of media
content. Comprehensive media monitoring is
admittedly a labour-intensive activity. It is
sometimes implemented by NGOs as part of
their media-related projects; or there might be
references in the state reports to a broadcasting
regulator – a body generally supervising
compliance with domestic broadcasting
legislation by broadcasters, which however does
not imply substantial media monitoring.147
It
points to a tendency, for some states, to opt for
short-term, straight-forward and relatively
inexpensive measures.
Forth, despite the number of existing
initiatives promoting intercultural dialogue, as
outlined in the reports, the impact of these
initiatives on the population often remains
unclear. Again, relevant information that would
enable impact assessment, such as data on the
audience of specific programmes, is frequently
not provided in the reports - either because
omitted by states or not available at all. The
periodic nature of the reports further complicates
the continuity in impact assessment in the long-
term. And, like states, the ACFC has to work
with finite resources in monitoring
implementation. In order to thoroughly assess
impact, one would require data from surveys, or
comprehensive interviews with stakeholders, as
well as indicators to measure the FCNM’s
impact.
While it is unlikely that any state can
fully implement Article 6(1), given its
programmatic, and aspirational, nature,148
an
argument can be made that states ought to be
able to show whether the measures towards its
implementation are indeed effective. A set of
indicators might guide this process, by requiring
the provision of data that is quantifiable and
comparable: indicators could relate, among other
things, to: audience of programmes about
minorities, number of hours devoted to such
programmes, number of journalists in media
outlets with a minority background, number of
programmes on minorities on which persons
belonging to minorities were consulted and/or in
which actively participated. A problematic
aspect of reporting is precisely the fact that,
while several activities are presented as
contributing to intercultural dialogue, in fact
very little evidence is provided. What is
presented as a positive development might in
fact not alter the status quo. For example, a
government may state that the number of
applications to journalism training by persons
belonging to minorities has increased of a
particular percentage from one monitoring cycle
to the next; this might, however, not be
conducive to enhanced intercultural dialogue – if
the applicants are not actually accepted in the
programme, if the training is of poor quality, or
if the newly-trained journalists from minority
backgrounds do not have access to the
profession due to discriminatory attitudes. While
it is certainly difficult to assess societal change
in favour of intercultural dialogue, a set of
indicators might provide a starting point. They
may also facilitate the identification of minimum
common denominators in the implementation of
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Article 6(1), and lead to more standardized
reports - which can in turn facilitate their
assessment.
Finally, intercultural dialogue, and the
implementation of Article 6(1) generally, are
themselves a long-term, dynamic process that
takes on different shapes and forms. Such a
process ought to be accompanied by debates, at
public events as well as through the media,
gathering insights on the most viable strategies
to implement Article 6(1) in specific contexts.
Given that these open discussions imply
interaction with representatives of minorities,
intercultural dialogue becomes both the ultimate
goal of these efforts, and the process itself.
There is a risk, however, for discussions to
remain superficial, leaving issues unresolved, or
even contributing to tensions and
misunderstandings. What transpires from the
Opinions and state Reports is that a particularly
important vehicle for the furtherance of
intercultural dialogue is the involvement of
minorities in shaping media content, as well as
in relevant decision-making processes. It reflects
a dove-tailing of participatory rights and
freedom of expression for minorities.
Bibliography:
Council of Europe, “The Concept of Intercultural Dialogue”,
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/concept_EN.asp#P30_3374 (accessed 7 August
2013).
Gilbert, G. “Article 6”. In M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities in Europe. A
Commentary on the European Framework Convention on the Protection of National
Minorities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 177-191.
McGonagle, T. Minority Rights, Freedom of Expression and the Media: Dynamics and
Dilemmas. Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011.
Packer, J. and Holt, S. “Article 9”. In M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities in
Europe. A Commentary on the European Framework Convention on the Protection of
National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 263-300.
Robertson, R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage
Publications, 1992.
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Footnotes
1 ETS No. 157, adopted 1 February 1995, entered in force 1 February 1998.
2 Adopted 11 February 2009 at the 1048th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
3 Adopted 19 December 1996. The four special mandates are: the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS (Organization of American States)
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR (African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. 4 Adopted 20 October 2005 at the General Conference of UNESCO (Paris, 33rd session, 3-21 October 2005).
5 Article 1. Moreover, Article 4(8) states that ‘ “interculturality” refers to the existence and equitable interaction of
diverse cultures and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect.’ 6 Council of Europe, “The Concept of Intercultural Dialogue”,
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/concept_EN.asp#P30_3374 (accessed 7 August 2013). 7 Ibid.
8 Robertson, R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage Publications, 1992.
9 Gilbert, G. “Article 6”. In M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities in Europe. A Commentary on the European
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 177-191. 10
Explanatory Report on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (hereinafter FCNM
Explanatory Report), §11. 11
Gilbert, op. cit., note 9, p.178. 12
Ibid, p.184. 13
Ibid. Gilbert contends: ‘Article 6(1) cannot be ignored by states because of its programmatic nature. It is phrased
in compelling terms such that states shall ‘encourage’ and ‘take effective measures’.’ Ibid, p.178. 14
FCNM Explanatory Report, §47. 15
Ibid, §48. 16
While it is rare that the media is able to determine public opinion. McGonagle, T. Minority Rights, Freedom of
Expression and the Media: Dynamics and Dilemmas. Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011, p.389. 17
Packer, J. and Holt, S. “Article 9”. In M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities in Europe. A Commentary on the
European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005,
263-300, p.264. 18
The Explanatory Report states that Article 12 ‘seeks to promote knowledge of the culture, history, language and
religion of both national minorities and the majority population in an intercultural perspective’ [italics added].
FCNM Explanatory Report, §71. 19
Paragraph 2 of Article 6 is more normative than paragraph 1, inasmuch as it prescribes the protection of minorities
from ‘threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence’. 20
FCNM Explanatory Report,§49. 21
Gilbert, op. cit., note 9, p.179. 22
Ibid, p.184. 23
ACFC, Third Opinion on Estonia (2011), §100. 24
Ibid, §95. 25
See McGonagle, op. cit. note 16, p.394. For example, in the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers twin
recommendations on ‘Hate Speech’ (R(97)20), and on ‘Media and the Promotion of a Culture of Tolerance’
(R(97)21) - both adopted on 30 October 1997 on the occasion of the 607th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 26
This does not mean that legislation should not be in place to combat hate speech, including through strict
sanctions, as will be seen below. At the same time, more speech provides opportunities that can aid the prevention of
hate speech, as well as public debates on it. 27
McGonagle, op. cit. note 16, pp.387-390. 28
Although Kosovo is not a state party to the FCNM, in 2013 it had undergone three monitoring cycles, in line with
a 2004 agreement between the Council of Europe and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK). The state parties to the FCNM exclude: Andorra, France, Monaco and Turkey (which have not signed the
FCNM); and Iceland, Luxembourg, Greece and Belgium (which by 2013 had signed but not yet ratified the treaty). 29
It is not our intention here to put the recommendations in order of importance or frequency. The frequency of each
recommendation is reported below.
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30
ACFC, Third Opinion on Cyprus (2010), §126. 31
ACFC, Second Opinion on Norway (2006), §79. 32
ACFC, Second Opinion on the United Kingdom (2007), §113. 33
ACFC, Second Opinion on the Czech Republic (2005), §107. This was the view of representatives of minorities
such as Germans and Croats but also numerically smaller minorities. Ibid, §108. 34
ACFC, First Opinion on Poland (2003), §63. 35
Ibid. 36
ACFC, Third Opinion on the Slovak Republic (2010), §105. Given its importance, the ACFC recommended that
the Roma media receive greater public support. 37
ACFC, Third Opinion on Estonia (2011), §95. 38
ACFC, Third Opinion on ‘The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (2011), §28. 39
Ibid. 40
An example of the latter is the monolingual part of the Russian minority in the Baltic states. 41
ACFC, Third Opinion on Estonia (2011), §95. 42
ACFC, First Opinion on Montenegro (2008), §55. 43
ACFC, Third Opinion on Estonia (2011), §99. 44
ACFC, First Opinion on Georgia (2009), §108. 45
Ibid. 46
See note 23. 47
ACFC, First Opinion on Georgia (2009), §108. 48
ACFC, Third Opinion on the Slovak Republic (2010), §105. However, it added that, unfortunately, there is a lack
of qualified Roma journalists who are fluent in Romani. 49
ACFC, Third Opinion on Estonia (2011), §97, 100. 50
Ibid, §100. 51
ACFC, Third Opinion on the Czech Republic (2011), §86. 52
Envisaged in the 2002 Law on National Minorities. ACFC, Second Opinion on Serbia (2009), §103. 53
ACFC, Second Opinion on Denmark (2004), §95 54
Ibid. 55
ACFC, Second Opinion on the United Kingdom (2007), §113. 56
ACFC, First Opinion on Albania (2002), §51. 57
ACFC, Second Opinion on Albania (2008), §109. 58
ACFC, Second Opinion on Moldova (2004), §65. 59
ACFC, Second Opinion on Portugal (2009), §76. 60
Ibid. 61
ACFC, Second Opinion on the Russian Federation (2006), §148. 62
ACFC, Second Opinion on Bulgaria (2010), §117. 63
ACFC, Third Opinion on Slovenia (2011), §75. 64
ACFC, Second Opinion on Cyprus (2007), §79. 65
ACFC, Third Opinion on Croatia (2010), §102. 66
ACFC, Third Opinion on the Slovak Republic, §100. 67
ACFC, Second Opinion on Albania (2008), §110. 68
ACFC, Second Opinion on Croatia (2004), §85. 69
ACFC, Second Opinion on Ukraine (2008), §117. The ACFC noted, however, that there could be some issues
related to possible excessive interference by the Unit with the guarantee of freedom of expression. 70
ACFC, Second Opinion on Spain (2007), §80. 71
Ibid. 72
ACFC, Second Opinion on Moldova (2004), §65. 73
ACFC, Second Opinion on Lithuania (2008), §66. 74
For example, see ACFC, First Opinion on Georgia (2009), §82. 75
Article 25(2) FCNM. 76
Article 9 reads:
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1. The Parties undertake to recognise that the right to freedom of expression of every person belonging to a
national minority includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas in the
minority language, without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. The Parties shall
ensure, within the framework of their legal systems, that persons belonging to a national minority are not
discriminated against in their access to the media.
[…]
4. In the framework of their legal systems, the Parties shall adopt adequate measures in order to facilitate
access to the media for persons belonging to national minorities and in order to promote tolerance and permit
cultural pluralism. 77
Newspapers of national minorities primarily aim at satisfying the communicative and expressive needs of
minority groups, and at preserving cultural and linguistic identities. They tend to be in minority languages.
However, bilingual publications also exist, for example when the members of a minority group, although preserving
their cultural distinctiveness from the majority, have linguistically assimilated. See also the (rare) example of a
bilingual publication promoting intercultural dialogue in a project of the Centre for Independent Journalism in
Moldova, above (‘Principle 4: training journalists on minority issues’). 78
Third Report by Romania to the ACFC (2011), p.43. 79
Second Report by Serbia (2008). 80
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), p.59. 81
Third Report by Estonia (2010). 82
Additional data and statistics are available in the state reports to the ACFC by Estonia (Third Report -- 2010) and
Lithuania (Third Report - 2011). 83
See below. “Entertainment and Children’s programmes”. 84
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), p. 46. On Codes of Conduct, see above (‘
Principle 6: adopting legislation and codes of conducts promoting tolerance’). 85
According to the assessment of the Norwegian Media Authority for the period 2005-2008. Third Report by
Norway (2010), p.34. 86
Third Report by Croatia (2009), pp.65; 83. Difficulties were further acknowledged in the Croatian report with
regard to the exercise of the right of access to the media by persons belonging to minorities (p.82). 87
See ‘Principle 2: broadcasting in minority languages’. 88
Third Report by Austria (2010), p.54. 89
Even without subtitling, these programmes can still generate at least some exposure of the minority by their sheer
presence on the public broadcaster, and they can be used by the majority and minority alike as a means towards
language acquisition. 90
With the exception of ‘educational, occasional, special, music and re-broadcast foreign radio and television
programmes or broadcasts as well as broadcasts produced by the broadcaster intended for the ethnic minorities of
Lithuania.’ Third Report by Lithuania (2011), pp.56-57. 91
There are further provisions on voice-over and dubbing. ACFC, Second Report by Latvia (2012), §154-155. On
subtitling, also see ‘Principle 2: broadcasting in minority languages’. 92
Third Report by Armenia (2009), p.34. The films were made by a member of the Coordinating Council who
represents the Polish community. 93
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), p.20. 94
Third Report by Cyprus (2009), p.38. 95
Third Report by the Czech Republic (2010), p.43. 96
It was part the of the British Council’s project ‘Living Together’. 97
Third Report by Armenia (2009), p.120. 98
Second Report by Georgia (2012), §119.2. 99
For example, in its Opinion on Romania, the ACFC welcomed the increase of broadcasting in minority languages
from the previous cycle of monitoring, although it also noted what were, in the opinion of minority representatives,
unsuitable broadcasting times. ACFC, Third Opinion on Romania (2012), §128. 100
FCNM Explanatory Report, §62. 101
Second Report by Georgia (2012), §119.1.
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102
Ibid, §119.1. 103
Ibid, §119.4. 104
Five documentaries were produced through the involvement of the Department for Interethnic Relations and the
National Agency for Roma. 105
Third Report by Romania (2011), p.31. 106
Third Report by Albania (2011), pp. 42-43. 107
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), p.20. 108
Third Report by Austria (2010), p.49. 109
With the support of the Council of Europe, European Commission and the European Youth Forum. 110
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), p.20. 111
Third Report by the United Kingdom (2010), pp.8; 47-8. 112
Third Report by Hungary (2009), pp.69-70. 113
Second Report by Montenegro (2012), p.79. 114
Third Report by Finland (2010), pp.48-49. The Sámi Parliament has noted that information about the Sámi
languages and culture should be disseminated more intensively through the media (p.49). 115
According to the report, news programmes in Russian are broadcast on prime time on the Estonian public
broadcaster. Third Report by Estonia (2010) (reporting under Art. 9). 116
The debate exposed disagreements within the Roma community and differing attitudes to tradition. Third Report
by Finland (2010), p.43. 117
Second Report by Georgia (2012), §110. 118
Ibid, §116.2. 119
15 episodes were produced in 2007, and 30 more episodes were in 2008 and 2009. Third Report by Finland
(2010), p.48. 120
In Austrian legislation ‘volksgruppen’ are autochthonous national minorities. 121
Third Report by Austria (2010), p.60. 122
Third Report by Finland (2010), p.51. 123
Third Report by Estonia (2010) (reporting under Art.9). 124
The state report states that the competition, called ‘Journalists’ Prize 2008’, had the objective of ‘identifying and
awarding those media workers who have voiced ideas of unity in diversity’. Second Report by Latvia (2012), §130. 125
Organized by the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad. Third Report by Lithuania
(2011), p.46. 126
Second Report by Georgia (2012), §117.6. 127
Awards are issued for different categories of media. Third Report by the Russian Federation (2010), pp.60-61. 128
Third Report by Estonia (2010) (reporting under Art.9). 129
Third Report by Denmark (2010), p.25. 130
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), pp.59-60. 131
Third Report by Romania (2011), p.43. 132
Third Report by Austria (2010), p.49. 133
Under the name of Mundo training. Third Report by Finland (2010), p.43. 134
Ibid. 135
Second Report by Georgia (2012), §118. 136
Third Report by Lithuania (2011), p.46. 137
Ibid, pp.47-48. 138
Act No. 235/2006 amending Act No. 231/2001, Section 32 (1). Third Report by the Czech Republic (2010), p.9. 139
Section 17 (2). 140
Third Report by Ireland (2011), §198. 141
Explanatory Report FCNM, §62. 142
Third Report by Austria (2010), pp.49-50. 143
The Fund finances broadcasts for minorities, including in minority languages. Applications for grants can be
submitted by private broadcasters. Third Report by Croatia (2009), p.5.
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144
The scheme promotes programmes on Irish culture that are broadcast in English and Irish. The Broadcasting
Authority in Ireland also funds research that promotes diversity in broadcasting. Third Report by Ireland (2011),
§199. 145
Third Report by Germany (2009), p.148. 146
See note 12. 147
For example, see Third Report by Ukraine (2009), pp.26-27. 148
See note 11 above.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Federica Prina
ECMI Consultant/Editor of JEMIE
Former Researcher in ECMI’s Culture and Identity Cluster
*Contact: [email protected]
Co-authors:
Alkistis Zavakou
Fulvia Ghirardi
Sabrina Colombo
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION SEE
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI)
Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor) D-24939 Flensburg
+49-(0)461-14 14 9-0 * fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19
* E-Mail: [email protected] * Internet: http://www.ecmi.de