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MoralEmotions:AnAnalysisGuidedby
HeidersNaiveActionAnalysisUdoRudolph,KatrinSchulz,NadineTscharaktschiew
InstituteforPsychology,ChemnitzUniversityofTechnology,Chemnitz,Germany
AbstractThe present research proposes a theoretical framework
describingtheemergenceofmoralemotions.Inanalyzingthe
cognitiveantecedentsofmoralemotions,werefertoHeiders
(1958)conceptsofought,goalattainmentandeffort.InStudy
1,participants(N=60)ratedwhethertheyexperiencemoral
observeremotions(i.e.,admiration,anger,contempt,disgust,indignation, pride, respect, schadenfreude, and sympathy)
with respect to situations characterized by different
combinationsofought,goalattainment,andeffort.InStudy2
(N=61),thesameprocedurewasusedtoanalyzemoralactor
emotions (i.e., embarrassment, guilt, pride, regret, and
shame). Studies 3 (N = 75) and 4 (N = 51) replicated these
findings by using techniques characterized by higher
ecological validity. ANOVAS and cluster analyses were
conductedtoanalyzesimilaritiesanddifferenceswithregard
to different subgroups of moral emotions. Taken together,
resultsrevealthatought,goalattainment,andeffortexplain
impressive amounts of variance in the elicitation of moralemotions.Basedontheseresults,anempiricalclassificationof
moralemotionsisproposedwhichisbasedontheevaluative
functionandtargetoftherespectiveemotions.
KeywordsMoralEmotions;Morality;FolkPsychology;AttributionIntroduction
Weknowverywellwhatitisliketofeelsympathyor
anger,admirationorindignation,prideorguilt.Thus,
wenavigate through the landscapeofthesesocalled
moralemotionseasily,andapparentlydonotneedto
engageincomplexconsiderationsto decide howwe
feel.However,thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatwe
do not make decisions that guide our emotional
experiences. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, a
comprehensive conceptual framework describing
these decisions and thus explaining the genesis of
moralemotionshasnotbeendeveloped.Recentworks
havedemonstratedthatmoralemotionshaveastrong
impactonmoraldecisions,ascribingtheseemotionsa
strong causal status in the chain from cognition to
action.Many researchershaveelaboratedon specific
moralemotionsorspecificsamplesofmoralemotions,
contributing to a deeper understanding of these
specific emotions. A comprehensive experimental
analysisand synthesisof these findings,however, is
stilllacking.
Inthepresentpaper,wewillfirstprovideaconceptual
analysisofthesocalledmoralemotions,followedbyan experimental analysis of their cognitive
antecedents.
WhatareMoralEmotions?Thus far, a comprehensive and generally accepted
definitionofmoralemotionsdoesnotexist,although
numerous definitions of moral emotions have been
proposed. As a common denominator, these
definitions include aconsideration concerning good
andbad, right and wrong, and ought and should.
Moreover,Haidtdefinesmoralemotionsasthose thatare linked to the interestsorwelfareeitherofsociety
asawholeoratleastofpersonsotherthanthejudge
or agent (p. 276). In addition, Fiske points out that
moral emotions are the immediate motivational
proxies for expected longtermbenefits of important
relationships(p.170).Thesedefinitionscomplement
one another by highlighting different important
elements of moral emotions that is, cognitive,
adaptive,andmotivationalaspects.
Given these definitions, it nevertheless appearsdifficult tocompileadefinite listofmoralemotions.
As a practical approach for identifying moral
emotions, we conducted a PsycInfo and
PhilosophersIndexOnline searchonallwordsofthe
affective lexicon, in combination with the words
moralemotion*.Additionally,wecheckedthelistsof
moral emotions offered by Haidt and Weiner.
According to this literaturesearch,23emotionshave
been labeled as moral emotions: Admiration, anger,
awe, contempt, disgust, elevation, embarrassment,
empathy,envy,gratitude,guilt, indignation,jealousy,
pity, pride, regret, remorse, respect, schadenfreude
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(joy in the misfortune of others), shame, scorn, and
sympathy.
Ononehand,thislistisprobablyquiteexhaustive,as
wehave includedallpotentialcandidatesmentioned
in thepsychologicalandphilosophical literature.On
the other hand, there is no consensus as to which
emotionscanbereferredtoasmoral,andthereisno
obligatory or selective criterion to distinguish moral
from nonmoral emotions. The abovementioned list
of moral emotions should thus be regarded as
preliminary,andcurrentlycontainsprototypesaswell
asclosesynonyms.AsHaidthasnoted,someofthese
moral emotions are likely more prototypical than
others.We suggest that themoreprototypicalmoral
emotions are exclusively experienced concerning
actions of individuals and occur in a wide range of
differentsituations (e.g.,pride,shame,admirationor
schadenfreude; to mention a few). In contrast,
nonprototypical moralemotions(e.g.,awe,elevation)
arerestrictedtospecificcontexts(e.g.,religion,natural
and moralbeauty, or exceptional human actions or
abilities). In addition, some of these emotions
represent close relatives rather than highly distinct
emotions.
AClassificationofMoralEmotionsWe propose two criteria, target and evaluative
function, for classifyingmoralemotions:First,moral
emotions canbe distinguished with respect to their
target. Some of these emotions are regarded as
selfconscious or selfdirected, as for example guilt,
pride, regret, and shame. In the following, we will
label these emotions as actor emotions, as they are
targeted at ones own actions. In contrast, several
moralemotionsare regardedasbeingotherdirected
(e.g., admiration, anger, gratitude, and sympathy.
Theseemotionshaveincommonthattheyaretargeted
atotherpersonsand theiractions; therefore,wewill
labeltheseemotionsasobserveremotions.
Second, as several authors have pointed out, moral
emotions function to regulate social behaviors. We
therefore propose that moral emotions evaluate a
persons action as either positive or negative. This
criterion applies to both moral actor emotions
(evaluatingonesownactionsaseithergoodorbad),
as well as to moral observer emotions (evaluating
othersactionsaseithergoodorbad).Toputitinother
words,moralemotionsevaluateonesownaswellas
other persons actions as morally praiseworthy or
blameworthy).
We suggest that the evaluative function of a moral
emotion represents the evaluative content of the
respective emotion as a means for communication
(towards others) and information (towards oneself).
For example, with respect to actor emotions, pride
represents a positive selfevaluation, whereas
embarrassment, guilt, regret, remorse, and shame
represent negative selfevaluations. Analogously,
observer emotions represent evaluations of the
observed actions of other persons. For example,
admiration, awe, gratitude, elevation, empathy, pity,
pride, respect and sympathy evaluate the actions of
the observed person as positive, whereas anger,
contempt, disgust, indignation, jealousy, scorn and
schadenfreude are negative evaluations of others
actions1.
Toconclude,theproposedcriteriafortheclassification
of moral emotions, target and evaluative function,
serveasconceptualtoolstodifferentiatethefunctional
aspectsofmoralemotions:Positiveactoremotions(i.e.,
pride) signal the experiencing person has done
something good or praiseworthy and motivate the
actor to continue with this behavior. In contrast,
negative actor emotions (i.e., embarrassment, guilt,
regret,shame)signalthattheexperiencingpersonhasdonesomethingwrongorbad,thatthepersoncanbe
blamed and should change thebehavior. The same
regulative function is applied to observer emotions,
exceptthattheevaluativesignalinthiscaseisdirected
attheobservedperson.
AntecedentsofMoralEmotionsWhichkindsofcognitiveconceptsmightgiverise to
thismultifold landscapeofmoralemotions?Wewill
next describe a theoretical framework based on
Heidersnaveactionanalysisthatprovidesimportantsufficient conditions for eliciting moral emotions 2 .
1Pleasenotethatsomeoftheemotionsdescribedasmoralemotions,
forexampleangeranddisgust,mayalsooccurinnonmoralsettings:
For example, you may feel nonmoral anger because your train
arrived lately; oryou may feel coredisgust watching somebody
eatingapieceofrottenmeat.Rozinetal.refertocoredisgustasthe
guardianofthemouthagainstpotentialcontaminants(p.575).(For
amoredetaileddiscussionofmoralangerandmoraldisgust).
2 Interestingly, Heiders considerations closely resemble the ideas
raised already in 1740 by David Hume in his early and
groundbreaking work ATreatise of Human Nature: Being anattempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into
moralsubjects.
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Therefore, we take a closer look at his concepts of
ought,goalattainment,andeffort.
1)OughtAs already stated, it is widely agreed upon that
moral emotions require a consideration of goodand bad or right and wrong. In addition, these
judgments involve a general viewpoint beyond
immediatepersonalinterests.Similarly,Heiderhas
stated that ought is an impersonal concept and
referstorelativelystablestandardsofwhatought
to be done or experienced. These standards are
independentoftheindividualswishes: Thisisnot
to say that personal wishes do not influence the
perception of ought forces; it is rather that they
should not; in principle the ought is established
by objective requirements and beyond personal
concerns. The characterization of ought as an
impersonal,normativeconceptalsoimpliesthatit
hasinterpersonalvalidity: Notonlyshouldought
disregard personal desires, not only does ought
appear in principle unchanged in spite of
incidentalsituationalfactors,butitisalsouniversal
andshouldlookaliketoeverybody.
To summarize, the concept of ought refers to
morallygoodversusbadgoalsorsocialstandards,
and isdefinedasacognitiverepresentationofanimpersonal requirement, invariant across many
situations,andtranscendingtheindividualspoint
ofview.
2)GoalAttainmentMoralityisnotonlyamatterofwhatpeopleshould
do, but also a matter of what they actually do.
Furthermore,itisnotonlyimportantwhichgoalsa
person wishes to achieve,but also whether s/he
actuallydoesachievethesegoals.Asfollowsfrom
Heiders nave action analysis, goal attainment isdependent upon a relatively stable relationship
between the person and the environment.
According to this viewpoint, goal attainment
requiresthatapersonsabilitiesandeffortsexceed
bothtaskdifficultyandrandomsituationalfactors.
In the moraldomain, goal attainment informsus
whetherapersonactuallyreachesagivenstandard,
that is, whether a generally positive or negative
goal is either attained or not attained (for a
differentiationbetweenactionsandgoals).
In sum, ought provides the moral standard
concerning what should be done, and goal
attainment defines whether the desirable or
undesirable goal is actually attained or not
attained.
3)EffortGivenamoralstandard(ought)anditsattainmentor nonattainment, motivational forces located
within the acting person may still vary. Within
Heiders nave action analysis, goal attainment is
dependent upon a persons ability and effort,
taskdifficulty, and luck. As Heider states, the
concept of effort is a motivational factor
contributing to theeffectivepersonal force.While
ability, taskdifficulty, and luck are not subject to
volitional change and are thus uncontrollable,
effort has been conceptualized as a controllable
cause.Withinthemoraldomain,freedomofchoiceand personal controllability are necessary
prerequisites for moral evaluations. That is, a
personhasthechoicetoexpendeitherhighorlow
efforttoattainher/hisgoals(e.g.,asacontrollable
causeforsuccessorfailure).Incontrast,apersons
abilityisnotacontrollablecause.
Thus, theconceptofeffort iscloselyconnected to
the volitional forces of the person, expended to
attaina certaingoal.Due to the controllabilityof
effort, judgments concerning this concept (the
investmentofhigheffortversuslackofeffort)exert
adecisiveinfluenceonourmoralemotions.
PredictionsWe argue that different combinations of ought, goal
attainment,andeffortelicitpositiveornegativemoral
evaluations thatconstitute thecognitivebasis for the
experience of moral emotions. As outlined above,
moral emotions communicate positive and negative
evaluationsofapersonsownactions(actoremotions),
ortheactionsofobservedothers(observeremotions).
Ourcentralassumptionisthatthesemoralevaluations
are determined to a large extentby ought (O), goal
attainment (GA), and effort (E), and that different
combinations of ought, goal attainment and effort
provide sufficient conditions for eliciting different
moral emotions. The following predictions can be
derived:
1)PositiveMoralEmotionsAcertainactionshouldberegardedas good if it
conforms to moral standards (O+). A positiveoutcome (GA+) is likely to further increase the
positive evaluation. With respect to effort, it is
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widelyagreeduponthatinvestingefforttoattaina
positivestandard(E+)ispositivelyevaluated.Thus,
concerningonesownactions,i.e.,O+,GA+,andE+
should elicit pride, whereas for other persons
actions, the same combination should elicit
admiration,pride,andrespect.Incontrast,whenagoalisnotattained(despitethefactthateffortwas
invested,i.e.,O+,GA,andE+),sympathyshould
betheprototypical emotion.
2)NegativeMoralEmotionsAnactionisevaluatedas bad ifitdoesnotfollow
moral standards (O). Such a negative evaluation
willbestrengthenedwhenapersontrieshard(E+)
toattainanegativegoal,and/orwhenthenegative
goal is actually attained (GA+). In addition, an
action will be also regarded as bad if it doesfollowmoralstandards in thefirstplace(O+),but
when no effort is invested to attain the morally
positivegoal(E).Moreover,lackofeffortbecomes
mostobviouswhenthegoalisnotattained(GA).
Emotional reactions related to ones own actions
include embarrassment, guilt, regret and shame.
With respect to other persons actions, observers
typicallyexperienceanger,contempt,disgust,and
indignation. When other persons either pursue
positivegoalswithout investingeffortor tryhard
toattainanegativelyevaluatedgoal(O+,E orO,E+),schadenfreude iselicitedwhen therespective
goalisnotattained(GA ).
We will now present four studies analyzing the
influenceofought,goalattainment,andefforton
moral emotions. In Study 1 and 2, participants
receive descriptions of events containing
information about ought, goal attainment and
effort; subsequently, moral emotions are assessed
as dependent variables. As actor and observer
emotionsrequireslightlydifferentmethodologies,
Study 1 investigates moral observer emotions,whilemoralactoremotionsareanalyzedinStudy2.
In Study 3 and 4, we will employ a different
method by analyzing autobiographical
recollections of situations that our participants
actuallyexperienced.
STUDY 1
Method1)ParticipantsSixtypsychology students (47 female,13male)ofthe University of Chemnitz (Germany) received
coursecreditsforparticipatinginthisstudy.Their
agerangedfrom19to46(M=23.32)years.Sessions
were run in groups of 20, using a paperpencil
questionnaire, and lasted approximately 30
minutes.
2)ExperimentalDesignAs independent variables, Heiders concepts of
ought, goal attainment, and effort were
manipulated. First, the normative aspect of the
situation (ought)wasvaried; that is,we informed
ourparticipantsaboutanotherperson(referredto
as Max) who wants to attain a highly positive
versus a highly negative goal. Second, we varied
the conceptofgoal attainmentby indicating that
the person either did or did not reach this goal.
Finally, we varied the concept of effort, as this
personeitherdidordidnot investmucheffort to
attainthedesiredgoal.Asforsomeoftheemotions
(e.g.,guiltorpride)closenessofrelationshipmay
be an additional factor contributing to their
elicitation, half of the participants were told that
thetargetpersonwasacloserelativeorbestfriend,
whiletheotherhalfwereinformedthatMaxwasa
stranger to them.This resulted ina2x2x2x2
mixed design, with three withinsubjects factors
(ought, goal attainment, effort) and one
betweensubjectsfactor(closenessofrelationship).
The resulting eight scenarios were presented intwo random sequences toavoidordereffects.All
materialsareavailableuponrequest.
As dependent variables, we presented a set of
moral observer emotions. These emotions were
admiration,anger,contempt,disgust, indignation,
pride(here:beingproudofsomeoneelse),respect,
schadenfreude and sympathy3 . The participants
taskwastoratehowlikelyitwasthattheywould
feel theseemotions.A7pointratingscale labeled
with0 (notatall)and6 (extremely)wasprovided.Thedependentvariableswerepresentedinoneof
tworandomsequences.
3Wedidnotincludeclosesynonyms(remorseasactoremotion,
andempathy,pity,andscornasobserveremotions)aswellas
emotionswhichtypicallyoccurinhighlyspecificcontexts(awe,
elevation, gratitude, jealousy). Moreover, we did not include
envybecausewedonotconsiderthisemotionasamoralemotion:
AsSmith&Kim [11]noted,envy ischaracterizedbysubjective
feelings of inferiority produced by social comparison. This
impliesstandardsforcomparisonarenotuniversal(moral),but
personal. In contrast to moral emotions, envy does notjudge
actionsasmoralornonmoral,butisratherhighlydispositional
andthereforestronglydependentonpersonality.
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3)ProcedureWithin each session, participants were randomly
assignedtotherespectiveconditionsandreceived
an instruction sheet, explaining the overall
procedureandintroducingthetargetperson(Max).
Participants received an explanation of a highlypositive versus a highly negative goal. A highly
positive goalwasdefined as an excellent or very
praiseworthy prosocial action, such as helping
someone, whereas a highly negative goal was
defined as a blameworthy or antisocial action,
suchasaggression.Finally,participantswereasked
toratethedegreetowhichtheyexperiencecertain
emotions in different individual scenarios
presentedonthefollowingpages.
ResultsAnalyses reveal that there is no influence of age,
gender and presentation order on any of the
dependentvariables.Therefore,wewillnot consider
these factors in the followinganalyses.According to
ourexperimentaldesign,weanalyzed the respective
conditionsby repeated measurement ANOVAs with
ought, goal attainment and effort as withinsubjects
factors and closeness of relationship as a
betweensubjects factor. With only one minor
exception, no effects were obtained for closeness of
relationship. (Among11possiblemaineffectsand33
possible first order interactions of closeness of
relationship,justonewassignificant,explainingonly
littlevarianceinthedata(pride:F(1,57)=3.59,p
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FIG.1MEANVALUESFORMORALOBSERVEREMOTIONSINSTUDY
When taken together, the three independent
variables on average (that is, across all moral
observer emotions) explain 57 % of variance,
rangingfrom48%(anger)to68%(admiration).As
can be seen from Table 1, the respective
independentvariables(ought,goalattainment,and
effort) as well as their interactions do not
contribute equally to variance explanation:
Differentmaineffectsandinteractionsareobtained
for the respective observer emotions, with someemotions (e.g., admiration, pride and respect)
showing quite similar patterns, while other
emotions (e.g., schadenfreude and sympathy) are
characterized by unique patterns across the
respectiveexperimentalconditions:
Admiration,pride,andrespectareexperiencedwhenapositivegoal isattained,particularlywhena lot
ofefforthasbeen invested (seeFigure 1).Hence,
admiration, pride and respect are determinedby
maineffectsofought(admiration:F=312, 2=0.33,
pride:F=175, 2=0.29,respect:F=250, 2=0.35),goal attainment (admiration: F = 204, 2 = 0.12,
pride:F=128, 2=0.06,respect:F=126, 2=0.06)
andeffort(admiration:F=120, 2=0.08,pride:F=
107, 2=0.09,respect:F=125, 2=0.10).Thesemain
effectsarequalifiedbyinteractioneffectsofought
x goal attainment (admiration: F = 150, 2 = 0.08,
pride:F=122, 2=0.05,respect:F=55, 2=0.03):
Theseemotionsarealsoexperiencedtoamoderate
degreewhenanotherpersonhas investeda lotof
effort to pursue a positive goal,but nevertheless
does not attain this goal, as can be seen frominteractionseffectsofoughtxeffort(admiration:F
=85, 2=0.06,pride:F=89, 2=0.08,respect:F=153,
2=0.10).
Furthermore, observers are most likely to feel
sympathywhentheactorhastriedhardtoattaina
highly positive goal, and nevertheless fails.
Sympathyisalsoexperienced(althoughtoalower
degree)whenapositivegoalisnotattainedandthe
observed person has invested only little effort.
Hence,maineffectsareobtainedforought(F=58,=0.06),goalattainment(F=287, =0.18)andeffort (F = 128, = 0.05). Significant interactions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Admiration
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment + Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Anger
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Contempt
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Disgust
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Indignation
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Pride
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Respect
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Schadenfreude
Ought+
Ought
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attainment+ Attainment+ Attainment Attainment
Effort+ Effort Effort+ Effort
Sympathy
Ought+
Ought
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ariseforoughtxgoalattainment(F=250, =0.16),
oughtxeffort(F=92, =0.04),goalattainmentx
effort(F=77, =0.04)aswellasforoughtxgoal
attainmentxeffort(F=100, =0.05).
Anger, contempt, disgust and indignation emerge
predominantly in situations involving a
normativelynegativegoal.Thus, amaineffectof
ought is obtained (anger: F = 185, 2 = 0.39,
contempt:F=209, 2=0.52,disgust:F=150, 2=
0.47, indignation: F = 271, 2 = 0.46). For anger,
additionalvarianceisexplainedbyeffort(F=32, 2
= 0.02). Moreover, anger, contempt, disgust and
indignation are experienced to a higher degree
whenanegativegoalisactuallyattained,ascanbe
seen from the interaction of ought x goal
attainment(anger:F=50, 2
=0.03,contempt:F=32,2=0.01,disgust:F=46, 2=0.01,indignation:F=
72, 2 = 0.04). With regard to positive moral
standards, interactions of ought x effort are
obtained for anger, contempt and indignation:
These emotions are more likely when only little
effort hasbeen invested to attain a positive goal
(anger:F=55, 2=0.04,contempt:F=48, 2=0.01,
indignation:F=64, 2=0.03).Furthermore,slightly
lowerdegreesoftheseemotionsareobtainedwith
regardtonegativemoralstandardswhenefforthas
notbeen invested.Thisoccurs fornegativegoals,regardless of whether they were attained and
nonattained.
Finally,schadenfreudeismostlikelywhenanegative
goal isnotattained. It isalsoexperiencedwhena
positive goal is not attained and the observed
personhas investedonly littleeffort toattain this
goal. Thus, schadenfreude is determinedbyboth
maineffectsofgoalattainment(F=170, =0.29)
andought(F=205, =0.15),aswellasinteractions
ofoughtxgoalattainment(F=127, =0.10)andoughtxeffort(F=18, =0.01).
2)ClusterAnalysesHierarchicalClusterAnalyseswereusedtoanalyze
differences and similarities between moral
emotions. The eight situations presented
(representing the eight cells of our design, with
O+/ * GA +/ * E+/) served as independent
variables. Moral emotions were clustered
according to their intensity in each of the eight
situations.Averagelinkagewaschosenasacluster
algorithm, because (a) it is less influenced by
extreme values than other methods, and (b) it is
resistant to several types of potential errors in
cluster calculation. As we were interested in the
similarities of the profiles of the respective
emotions rather than their absolute differences,
Pearson correlations were used as measure ofsimilarity The elbow criterion was applied to
determinethebestclustersolution.
Figure2showstheoptimalclustersolutionforour
data,consistingofatwoclustersolution(cluster1:
admiration, pride, and respect; cluster 2: anger,
contempt,disgust,and indignation),accompanied
by two distinct emotions (sympathy,
schadenfreude). The vertical line represents the
optimalstoppingpointofthemergingprocessand
wasdeterminedbyusingtheelbowcriterion.
Weassessedthevalidityandglobalfitofthecluster
solution. First, tests of cluster homogeneity were
conductedforeachcluster:AccordingtoBackhaus
Fvalues
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TABLE2.ANALYSESOFVARIANCEFORACTOREMOTIONS(STUDY2):FVALUESAND FORMAINEFFECTSAND
INTERACTIONSFOROUGHT,GOALATTAINMENT,ANDEFFORT.
Source
Ought GoalAttainment Effort
Oughtx
GoalAttainment
OughtxEffort
Goal
AttainmentxEffort
Oughtx
GoalAttainment
xEffort
Emotio
nF F F F F F F Treat Between Error
Embarr
assment6.69* 0.00 139.36*** 0.26 3.12 0.00 39.88*** 0.06 15.58*** 0.01 10.53** 0.01
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w.ijpsychol.
(embarrass
0.13,sham
Thedatap
of embarr
thereare s
notonlyd
30, =0.0
butalsoby
Thus,regre
forallnega
the nonat
moresoif
observatio
oughtxgo
effort(F=
xgoalattai
Pride is e
negativeg
forpositiv
invested.T
(F=544,
effort (F =
further qu
attainment
=0.01),a
0.02).2)ClusterAsinStud
x 2 x 2 r
factors ou
addition,
Analyses t
between t
statistical
Analyses
analysesre
presentatio
variables.
Ascanbes
into the cl
guilt,ands
as also su
regretstill
0.71, p
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the observer perspective; therefore, moral standards
areappliedmorestrictlytootherpeople.
As expected, admiration, pride (as an observer
emotion),andrespect typicallyoccurwhenobserved
others attain morally positive goals (O+, GA+),
especially when effort has been invested (E+).
Furthermore,sympathy istypicallyelicitedwhen the
observed person has tried hard to attain a morally
positive goal (O+, E+),but nevertheless fails (GA).
Anger,contempt,disgust,and indignationemerge in
situations either characterized by a negative moral
standard(O),orapositivemoralstandard(O+)given
thatonlylittleefforthasbeeninvested(E).Similarly,
schadenfreude is predominantly elicited when a
negative goal is not attained (O, GA), or when a
positive goals is not attained (O+, GA) due to low
effort(E).
Moreover,pride (as an actor emotion) ismost likely
whenamorallypositivegoalwasattained(O+,GA+)
andhighefforthasbeen invested (E+).Thenegative
moralactoremotionsofembarrassment,guilt,shame,
and regret are typically elicited in case of negative
goals (O), but also with regard to nonattained
positive goals (O+; GA), especially when only little
efforthasbeeninvested.
Thus far, we have used abstract scenarios, and
participantsreceivedonlyminimalinformationabouttherespectivesituations.Althoughpreviousresearch
indicates that this method does not necessarily
influencetheobtainedresults[e.g.,10,57,seealso58],
our goal now is to investigate whether the present
findings areobtained formore reallife situations as
well. Therefore, in Study 3 and 4, we will use
situationsderivedfromautobiographicalrecollections
involvingmoralemotions.
STUDY 3
Method
1)ParticipantsSeventyfive psychology students (60 female, 15
male) of the University of Chemnitz received
coursecreditsforparticipatinginthisstudy.Their
agerangedfrom18to46(M=22.00).
2)ExperimentalDesignAs inStudy 1 and 2,Heiders conceptsof ought,
goal attainment, and effort were varied as
independentvariables.IncontrasttoStudies1and
2,weused16scenariosdescribingreallifeevents
which manipulated the three independent
variables.Furthermore,wevariedtheinvolvement
oftheobserver.Thatis,weselectedeightsituations
characterized by a receiver perspective (i.e.,
participantsbeing the target of the action of the
observedperson).
Incontrast,theremainingeightsituationsinvolved
an observer perspective (i.e., participantsbeing a
mere observer). The resulting selection of
situationsisavailableuponrequest.Asdependent
variables,participants rated towhichdegree they
felt admiration, anger, contempt, indignation,
pride, respect, schadenfreude, and sympathy
elicitedby thescenario4.Situationswerepresented
intworandomsequences,witheachscenarioona
separatesheet.
3)ProcedureTo generate a sample of situations manipulating
ought,goalattainment,andeffort,weproceededas
follows: (1) We generated five scenarios for each
combinationofought,goalattainment,andeffort
byaskingrandomlyselectedrespondents(N=24)
torecollectautobiographicalevents inwhich they
had experienced any moral emotion. (2)
Subsequently, we asked 10 independent raters to
assess these situationswith regard toought,goal
attainment,andeffort,ratingthenormativeaspectof the situation (ought), the degree of goal
attainment,andtheinvestedeffort(effort)foreach
scenariobyusing6pointratingscalesanchoredat
bothends(ought:1=verynegative,6=verypositive;goalattainment:1=goalnotattainedatall,6=goalcompletelyattained;effort:1=noeffort,6=higheffort).(3) We chose the 16 scenarios (two for each
combinationofought,effortandgoalattainment,
respectively)providingthebestfittotheintended
manipulations.
Participants received an instruction sheet
explainingtheoverallprocedureandratingscales.
They were asked to imagine the situations as
vividly as possible and to evaluate the degree to
which they would experience the different moral
emotions in the respective situation. A 6point
rating scale anchored atbothends (1 =notatall)and (6 = very strongly) was provided. As a4We excluded disgust from Study 3 because this emotion is
connected to highly specific contexts [17] and thus difficult toassesswithscenarioswhichshouldelicitawiderangeofpossible
emotions.
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manipulationcheck (using thesame rating scale),
participants were asked to rate the normative
aspectofthesituation(ought),thegoalattainment,
andtheinvestedeffortforeachspecificscenario.
ResultsAsforStudies1and2,weconducted2x2x2repeated
measuresANOVASandhierarchicalclusteranalyses.
Furthermore, to allow for comparisons between
Studies1and3,correlationanalyseswereperformed.
Additionally, mixed ANOVAS and ttests were
conducted to investigate potential influences of
perspective (receiver vs. observer), control variables
and to assess the quality of our experimental
manipulation.
1)ControlVariablesandManipulationChecksAnalysesrevealthatthereisnoinfluenceofgender
and presentation order on any of the dependent
variables. Therefore, we will not consider these
factors in the following analyses. In addition, we
conducted manipulation checks to ensure that
ought, goal attainment, and effort were
manipulatedas intended.For thispurpose, ttests
fordependentsampleswereconducted:
(1) The positive ought conditions received
significantlyhigherratings(M=5.78,SD=0.27)as
compared to the negative ought conditions (M =1.29,SD=0.40),t(74)=64.90,p
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TABLE3.ANALYSESOFVARIANCEFOROBSERVEREMOTIONSINREALISTICSCENARIOS:FVALUESAND(MAINEFFECTSAND
INTERACTIONS) FOROUGHT,GOALATTAINMENT,ANDEFFORT.
Source
Ought GoalAttainment
Effort
Oughtx
GoalAttainment
OughtxEffort
Goal
AttainmentxEffort
Oughtx
Goal
AttainmentxEffort
Emotion F F F F F F F Treat
Bet
ween
Erro
r
Admiratio
n1138.36*** 0.41 479.31*** 0.18 89.12*** 0.02 423.66*** 0.16 72.45** 0.02 39.34*** 0.01 53.44*** 0.01 0.81 0.03 0.15
Anger652.95*** 0.43 140.81*** 0.08 146.93*** 0.04 233.62*** 0.10
114.37*
*0.03 53.02*** 0.02 124.79** 0.03 0.73 0.07 0.20
Contempt 899.98*** 0.61 6.89* 0.00 5.23* 0.00 64.51*** 0.03 66.13** 0.03 34.74*** 0.01 16.91*** 0.00 0.68 0.11 0.21
Indignatio
n1020.89*** 0.56 56.76*** 0.03 82.37*** 0.03 134.08*** 0.06 77.61** 0.02 70.00*** 0.02 56.08*** 0.02 0.74 0.08 0.18
Pride 177.02*** 0.21 76.82*** 0.09 96.41*** 0.04 114.50*** 0.12 119.49**
0.04 0.39*** 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.37
Respect892.11*** 0.43 279.59*** 0.14 150.30*** 0.04 260.16*** 0.13
100.64*
*0.03 22.90*** 0.00 36.24*** 0.01 0.78 0.04 0.18
Schadenfr
eude105.48*** 0.13 158.00*** 0.20 10.00** 0.00 60.80*** 0.09 3.16 0.00 18.68*** 0.01 9.78** 0.00 0.43 0.08 0.47
Sympathy 20.83*** 0.03 183.05*** 0.11 64.24*** 0.04 146.47*** 0.11 50.50** 0.04 15.37*** 0.01 49.l6*** 0.03 0.37 0.21 0.41
M() 0.36 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.64 0.90 0.26a. =explainedvarianceforeachindividualfactorintheexperimentaldesign; Treat=explainedvariancebytreatmentfactor; Between=
percentageintersubjectvariance; Error=percentageerrorvariance;*p
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andoughtxgoalattainment (anger:F=234, 2=
0.10,contempt:F=65, 2=0.03,indignation:F=134,
2=0.06).Angerandindignationarealsoreported
(again, to a much lower degree) when a person
doesnotattainapositivegoalbuthasinvestedalot
of effort. Thus, main effects for goal attainment(anger:F=140, 2=0.08, indignation:F=57, 2=
0.03) and effort (anger: F = 146, 2 = 0.04,
indignation:F=82, 2=0.03)areobtainedforthese
twoemotions.
Schadenfreude is most likely to occur when a
normatively negative goal is not attained,
especially if the other person has tried hard to
attain thisgoal.Thus,schadenfreude isdetermined
bybothmaineffectsofgoalattainment(F=158, 2
= 0.20) and ought (F = 105, 2 = 0.13), as well as
interactionsofoughtxgoalattainment(F=61, 2=
0.09)andgoalattainmentxeffort(F=19, 2=0.01).
3)ClusterAnalysesAsforStudies1and2,weusedhierarchicalCluster
Analyses to explore differences and similarities
between different moral emotions. To allow for
comparisonsbetween Studies 1 and 2, the same
statistical procedures and methods were used.
Apart from the fact that disgust is no longer
investigated,thestructureoftheclustersolutionis
identical to the cluster solution in Study 1:
Admiration,pride,andrespectconstitutecluster1;
cluster2containsanger,contempt,andindignation.
Schadenfreudeandsympathyaredistinctemotions.
(Due to space limitations, we do not present a
Figureforthisclustersolution;thedendrogramis
availableuponrequest.)
Tests of cluster homogeneity, again conducted
separately for the eight cells of our experimental
design,indicatethatbothclustersarehomogenous:
Only two of the 16Fvalues were slightly higherthan1 (bothcasesoccurred forO+,GA,E+;F=
1.01forcluster1,F=1.04forcluster2).Forcluster1
(admiration, pride, respect) a mean value of F =
0.35 is obtained. For cluster 2 (anger, contempt,
indignation) the mean value is F = 0.48. Thecophenetic correlation of rcoph = 0.95 (p
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the items from the observer into an actor
perspective. For example, a situation with a
positive ought, high effort, and attained goal is:
Youwanttobeagoodmother/father. Youhaveto
workveryhard inyourjob,butyou spendevery
spareminutewithyourchildrenandcarealot.Thechildrenaredoingverywellandareveryhappy.
As dependent variables, we presented the moral
actoremotionsembarrassment,guilt,pride,regret,
andshame.
3)ProcedureWeused thesame instructionsandproceduresas
in Study 3, the only difference being that
participants received two situations for each
combination of ought, effort and goal attainment
(as there is only one perspective for actorsituations).
ResultsAs for theprevious studies,we conducted2 x2 x2
repeatedmeasuresANOVASandhierarchicalcluster
analyses. Again, we also conducted correlation
analyses to assess the similaritiesbetween Studies 2
and 4. Again, mixed ANOVAS and ttests were
conducted to assess the quality of our experimental
manipulations and the potential influence of control
variables.
1)ControlVariablesandManipulationChecksAgain,analysesrevealthatthereisnoinfluenceof
gender and presentation order on any of the
dependent variables. Therefore, we will not
considerthesefactorsinthefollowinganalyses.As
isStudy3,we conductedmanipulation checks to
ensurethatought,effort,andgoalattainmentwere
manipulatedas intended.For thispurpose, ttests
fordependentsampleswereconducted,comparing
means of the two variations of each independent
variable. The positive ought conditions received
significantlyhigherratings(M=5.77,SD=0.35)as
compared to the negative ought conditions (M =
1.28,SD=0.34,t(50)=50.82,p
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TABLE4.ANALYSESOFVARIANCEFOROBSERVEREMOTIONSINREALISTICSCENARIOS:FVALUESAND(MAINEFFECTSAND
INTERACTIONS) FOROUGHT,GOALATTAINMENT,ANDEFFORT.
Source
Ought GoalAttainment Effort
Oughtx
GoalAttainment
OughtxEffort
Goal
AttainmentxEffort
Oughtx
GoalAttainment
xEffort
Emotion F F F F F F F Treat Between
Error
Embarras
sment34.67** 0.05 492.55*** 0.47 2.91 0.00 62.61*** 0.06 25.41** 0.01 2.83 0.00 39.37** 0.02 0.61 0.15 0.23
Guilt 85.61*** 0.13 355.52*** 0.27 31.14** 0.01 574.50*** 0.25 2.21 0.00 33.35** 0.01 10.34* 0.00 0.67 0.12 0.20
Pride 493.81*** 0.19 821.83*** 0.48 49.94*** 0.01 475.62*** 0.19 0.03 0.00 49.33*** 0.01 1.35 0.00 0.88 0.03 0.10
Regret 115.54*** 0.21 132.70*** 0.16 44.92*** 0.02 178.31*** 0.13 22.33** 0.01 41.02*** 0.01 33.58** 0.02 0.56 0.17 0.27
Shame 113.28*** 0.17 346.12*** 0.27 3.29 0.00 189.82*** 0.14 48.96*** 0.01 3.89 0.00 28.48** 0.01 0.60 0.17 0.23
M() 0.15 0.33 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.13 0.21a. =explainedvarianceforeachindividualfactorintheexperimentaldesign; Treat=explainedvariancebytreatmentfactor; Between=
percentageintersubjectvariance;Error=percentageerrorvariance;*p
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moral actoremotionsobtained for abstract scenarios
(Study2)anddescriptionsofreallifeevents(Study4).
Large effects were obtained for all emotions
(embarrassment:r=0.96,p
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antecedentcognitions.Inwhatfollows,wewillbriefly
summarizetheseresults.
1)PositiveObserverEmotionsAdmiration, pride, and respect are strongly
connected to the attainment of highly positivegoals, especially when high effort has been
invested.Toamoderatedegree,theseemotionsare
alsoexperiencedwhenpositivegoalsareattained
intheabsenceofeffort.Likely,effortandabilityare
regardedasbeingcompensatory.Hence,effortless
goal attainmentwillbeattributed tohigh ability:
We do not only admire, respect or feel proud of
otherpeopleforinvestingeffort(acauseregarded
as being controllable, but also for their ability
(regarded as being uncontrollable). In addition,
these emotions also emerge (although to a lesserdegree) when a normatively positive goal is not
attained while high effort was present, thus
underlining the positive evaluation of the action
(investingeffort).
Sympathyisconnectedtoahighlyspecificpattern
of ought, goal attainment, and effort: We
predominantlyfeelsympathywhensomeonetries
hardtoattainapositivegoalandneverthelessfails,
representing a positive evaluation of the actors
behavior. As effort and ability are regarded as
compensatory,thisresultalsoconfirmsthatpeople
are sympathetic toward others who are unable
andwhoseplight isuncontrollable, suchas the
physically or mentally handicapped. However,
sympathy is also experienced (although to a
substantially lower degree) when effort had not
beeninvested.Fromanevolutionarypointofview,
sympathy (or compassion) has evolved as a
response to the suffering of others (both kin and
nonkin individuals). Applied to our data, the
failing person could be regarded as sufferingbecause of the nonattainment of her/his goal.
Consequently,sympathyiselicitedwhen(positive)
goals were not attained. However, sympathy is
furtherincreased ifthepersontriedhardtoattain
the goal, which also implies an evolutionary
adaptive signal indicating that the persons
behavior was good, encouraging the person to
continuewiththisbehaviorandtryagain.
Interestingly, moderate degrees of positive moral
emotions even occur for nonattained positive
goals (given the presence of high effort), andnegativemoralemotionsevenoccurwhenpositive
goalsareattained(giventheabsenceofeffort).Itis
inthesecasesthattheevaluativefunctionofmoral
emotionsbecomesmost obvious: Despite the fact
that a person was not successful, the morally
positivebehavior (investing effort) is appreciated
bypositivemoralemotions.2)NegativeObserverEmotionsAnger, contempt, disgust, and indignation are
moststronglyexperiencedvisvisnegativegoals
that are actually attained. Moderate degrees of
these emotions are also obtained when a person
pursues a negative goal without attaining it
(especially for indignation and anger). Finally, a
person elicits a certain degree of negative moral
emotionsifthepersondidnotinvestefforttoattain
a positive goal, communicating that thebehavior(notinvestingeffort)wasmorallynegative.Again,
these findings underline that anger is a value
judgmentfollowingfromthebeliefthatonecould
and should have done otherwise. In contrast,
schadenfreudeismoststronglyexperiencedwhen
another person does not attain a negative goal,
regardlessofwhethertheactortriedhardornot.In
addition, some degree of schadenfreude is also
experienced when a positive goal is not attained
because the actor invested only little effort.
Apparently, people do not deserve to attain anynegativegoal(regardlessofhowmuchtheytried),
and (to a lesser degree) they do not deserve to
attainapositivegoalwheneffortisabsent.
3)PositiveActorEmotionsSimilar to its observer counterpart, pride is most
strongly experienced when highly positive goals
are attained given high effort, underlining the
positive evaluative function of pride. Moderate
pride is also experienced for the attainment of
positivegoals in theabsenceofeffortand for theattainment of negative goals. Tangney as well as
Tracyetal.distinguishbetweenalphapride(pride
relatedtoonespersonalself;andbetapride(being
proudofonesownbehavior).Whereasbetapride
results from attributions to internal, unstable,
controllable causes (i.e., effort, according to our
analysis), alphapride results from attributions to
internal,stable,uncontrollablecauses(e.g.,ability,
asderivedfromeffortlessgoalattainment).Almost
noprideisexperiencedforsituationscharacterized
by nonattainment of a goal (regardless of oughtandeffort).
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4)NegativeActorEmotionsEmbarrassment,guilt,regret,andshamearemost
strongly experienced for the nonattainment of
positive goals, when only little effort has been
invested5. As for negative observer emotions, the
negative evaluation of lack of effort becomesobvious. In addition, moderate degrees of these
emotions are obtained for negative goals,
regardless of goal attainment and effort. In
previous research, it is agreed upon that shame,
guilt, and embarrassment as selfconscious
emotions are experienced in social contexts and
functionasameansofbehavioral regulationandto
avoidnegativesanctions fromothers.Thepresent
datasuggestthatagreatamountofthesimilarities
in these negative moral actor emotions can be
tracedback to thecognitiveantecedentsofought,goalattainment,andeffort.
Inshort,ourresultscanbesummarizedasfollows:
Positive moral observer emotions (admiration,
pride, respect, sympathy) constitute positive
evaluation of other persons actions and
predominantlyoccurforpursuingmorallypositive
goals(ought)aswellasforinvestingefforttoattain
thesegoals.
In contrast, negative moral observer emotions
(anger, contempt, disgust, indignation,schadenfreude)communicatenegativeevaluations
ofotherpersonsactionsandare typicallyelicited
by pursuing morally negative goals or not
investingefforttoattainmorallypositivegoals).
Positivemoralactoremotions(pride)functionasa
positive evaluation of a persons own action and
are most likely to occur for the attainment of
positive goals, especially in the presence of high
effort.
Finally, negative moral actor emotions (shame,guilt, regret, embarrassment) are negative
evaluations of a persons own action and are
typically causedbymorallynegativegoalsor the
nonattainmentofpositivegoals,especiallywhen
onlylittleeffortwasinvested.
In sum, we suggest that ought, goal attainment,
and effort are powerful sufficient conditions
determining the emergence of moral emotions.
5
Thereisonlyoneexception;inStudy2,incaseofnonattainedpositivegoals,shamewas felttoa fairlysimilarextentforboth
conditions(higheffortaswellaslackofeffort).
However, this is not to say that these factors are
their only determinants. For example, much
research has been devoted to the differences
betweenguiltandshame orangerandcontempt,
offeringimportantadditionalinsightswithregard
to specific emotions, for example envy andschadenfreude,admirationorpride.
Furthermore,variousemotionalappraisaltheories
haveanalyzeddifferentcognitiveappraisals (e.g.,
pleasantness, fairness, certainty of the outcome,
suddenness, personal importance, controllability,
effort,modifiability, familiarityetc.)asantecedent
conditions for the elicitation of a large variety of
different emotions (such as sadness, fear,
disappointment,shame,anger,joy,surprise,relief,
disgust or hope. However, note that within the
moraldomain,theemergenceofemotionsstrongly
depends on appraisals that are referring to
volitionalcontrol.Withregardtotheevaluationof
goal attainment, only ought (the positive or
negativemoralstandard)andeffort(theamountof
invested effort to attain the respective goal) are
controllable to the person and thus elicit moral
emotions which function as evaluations of our
intensions(ought)andactions(effort).
Moreover,animportantcontributionofthepresent
research is to offer a comprehensive frameworkthat applies to all moralemotions, andonwhich
more specific analyses, including additional
determinantsofspecificemotions,canbebased.As
a starting point, we suggest that moral emotions
constitute positive (positive moral emotions) or
negative (negativemoralemotions)evaluationsof
our own (actor emotions) or others (observer
emotions)actionsintheprocessofgoalattainment.
Theseevaluations ofactionsarebasedonuniversal
moral standards (ought), the attainment of a
persons goal (goal attainment), and the investedefforttoattainthegoal(effort).
FutureResearchIn the present studies, we have analyzed two new
conceptsinthedomainofmoralemotions,thatis,goal
attainment and effort. Previous studies mainly
focused (1) on the moral standards underlying the
actions under consideration, and (2) the reasoning
processesgiving rise tomoraljudgments [see1,84].
Accordingtoourresults,moralstandardsindeedlieat
the
very
heart
of
moral
judgments.
However,
theonesided focus on moral standards disregards
essentialinformationthatisaccessibletonaveactors
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and observers. In light of our findings, it becomes
apparentthatgoalattainmentandeffortarepowerful
(additional)predictorsofmoralemotionsaswell.
Severalresearchquestionsariseinthiscontext:Firstof
all, future research should analyze the influence of
ought,goalattainment,andeffortonmoralbehavior.It seems plausible to assume that approach and
avoidanceaswellasrewardandpunishmentvaryasa
function of the moral standard of a goal, goal
attainment, and effort. Closely connected to this
question, research is needed to elucidate the
motivational(i.e.,functional)statusofmoralemotions
with respect to moral actions. From an evolutionary
pointofview,weassumethatmoralemotionsevolved
tomotivatemoralbehavior [see32]. In linewith this
view, studies on helping behavior and aggression
from an attributional viewpoint revealed that thesebehavioral reactions arepredominantly mediatedby
the experience of sympathy and anger (prototypical
moralemotions;Furthermore,itwasfoundthatguilt,
shame, regret and schadenfreude also influence
helping behavior or similar prosocial actions.
Equivalent empirical research on the motivational
function of other moral emotions is still missing,
however.
Second, it becomes apparent that the Heiderian
conceptsofought,goalattainment,andeffortdividethe landscape of moral emotions into meaningful
clusters.Furtherresearchisneededtounderstandthe
(probablymoresubtle)differencesof thoseemotions
thatmapintooneandthesamecluster.Forexample,
weneed to fullyunderstand thedifferencesbetween
admiration,respect,andpride,buildingajointcluster
butpresumablydiffering in someotherwaysand/or
withrespecttotheirbehavioral consequences.
Third, it becomes evident that one and the same
emotion can be elicited by a variety of different
antecedent conditions.For example,anger is elicitedvisvispersonspursuingnegativegoals,butalsofor
nonattainment of a positive goal in the absence of
effort.Thus,apromisingdirectionforfutureresearch
is to analyze prototypical situations eliciting the
respective emotion especially clearly.
Autobiographicalrecollectionsofmoralemotionsand
situations are a promising methodology to answer
thesequestions.
Fourth, the selectionofmoralemotionsdiscussed in
our study wasbased on a literature search. On the
basisoftheproposedtheoreticalframeworkitisnow
possible to design studies analyzing the differences
betweenmoralandnonmoralemotions.Forexample,
it seems reasonable that for the elicitation of
nonmoral emotions (e.g., joy or sadness) goal
attainment should be more important than for the
elicitationofmoralemotions.
Insum,webelievethatthecomprehensivetheoretical
frameworkpresentedhereprovidesauseful tool for
futureresearch.Fromthisbasis,wewillbeable(1)to
betterunderstandthecommonunderlyingconceptsof
moral emotions, and (2) to further explore the
idiosyncraticdeterminantsofspecificmoralemotions
beyond their common characteristics outlined in the
presentresearch.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We are extremely grateful to Frank Schssow andBernard Weiner for their comments and insights
related to former versions of the present paper.
Moreover, special thanks to Dieter Reichelt for his
invaluable help with data collection, and Andr
KrnerandStephanieLauxforeditorialassistance.
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UdoRudolph is Professor in General and
Biopsychology at the Department of
Psychology at the Chemnitz University of
Technology (Faculty of Human and Social
Sciences). Research interests include both
basic and applied research on causality,
attribution,andmoralemotions.
Katrin Schulz is lecturer in General and
Biopsychology at the Department ofPsychology at the Chemnitz University of
Technology (Faculty ofHuman and Social
Sciences). Research interests include
applied research on the development of
emotional and social skills during
childhood.
Nadine Tscharaktschiew is lecturer in
General and Biopsychology at the
Department of Psychology at the Chemnitz
UniversityofTechnology(FacultyofHuman
and Social Sciences). Research interestsincludebasicresearchonmoralemotions.