Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Norms, Frames and Prosocial Behavior inGames
Erik O. Kimbrough Joshua Miller Alexander Vostroknutov
Simon Fraser University
Bocconi University
Trento University
May 14, 2015
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Norm-Dependent UtilityQuestion: How do we account for cooperative and altruisticbehavior (in the lab)?
Usual Answer: “Social preferences”
Our Answer: Norm-dependent preferences
Individuals care about own payoffs and (heterogeneously) aboutwhether their actions correspond to social norms.
They bring norms with them to the lab and their behavior reflects atradeoff between norm-following and selfishness.
We can account for prosociality (without relying on explicitdistributional preferences) and well-known context effects (for whichpure distributional preferences cannot account).
We attempt to manipulate norms and test the predictions of themodel in variants of two well-known games.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Norm-Dependent UtilityQuestion: How do we account for cooperative and altruisticbehavior (in the lab)?
Usual Answer: “Social preferences”
Our Answer: Norm-dependent preferences
Individuals care about own payoffs and (heterogeneously) aboutwhether their actions correspond to social norms.
They bring norms with them to the lab and their behavior reflects atradeoff between norm-following and selfishness.
We can account for prosociality (without relying on explicitdistributional preferences) and well-known context effects (for whichpure distributional preferences cannot account).
We attempt to manipulate norms and test the predictions of themodel in variants of two well-known games.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Norm-Dependent UtilityQuestion: How do we account for cooperative and altruisticbehavior (in the lab)?
Usual Answer: “Social preferences”
Our Answer: Norm-dependent preferences
Individuals care about own payoffs and (heterogeneously) aboutwhether their actions correspond to social norms.
They bring norms with them to the lab and their behavior reflects atradeoff between norm-following and selfishness.
We can account for prosociality (without relying on explicitdistributional preferences) and well-known context effects (for whichpure distributional preferences cannot account).
We attempt to manipulate norms and test the predictions of themodel in variants of two well-known games.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Model of Norm-DependentPreferences
� We model social norms in extensive games
� N = {1, ..., n} - set of players
� 〈N,H〉 - extensive form with observable actions
� H - finite set of histories
� h = (a1, a2, ..., a`) - history of length `
� Actions at = (at1, ..., atn) at time t
� Ai (h) - set of actions of player i after h
� A = ∪i∈N ∪h∈H\Z Ai (h)
� π : Z → Rn - payoffs
� S - set of pure strategies
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Model of Norm-DependentPreferences
� g : A→ [−1, 1] is a norm: assigns a “social appropriateness”index to each action
� The norm defines behavior in all contingencies in the game (so,includes things like reciprocity)
� In each node, each player knows what is the “most sociallyappropriate” thing to do
� Players should choose a trade-off between desire to increasepersonal payoff and following the norm
� Redefined payoffs:
Ui (z) = πi (z) + φi
`
∑t=1
g(ati (z))
Implication 1: individuals with higher φ will more nearly adhere tosocial norms.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Model of Norm-DependentPreferences
� g : A→ [−1, 1] is a norm: assigns a “social appropriateness”index to each action
� The norm defines behavior in all contingencies in the game (so,includes things like reciprocity)
� In each node, each player knows what is the “most sociallyappropriate” thing to do
� Players should choose a trade-off between desire to increasepersonal payoff and following the norm
� Redefined payoffs:
Ui (z) = πi (z) + φi
`
∑t=1
g(ati (z))
Implication 1: individuals with higher φ will more nearly adhere tosocial norms.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Model of Norm-DependentPreferences
� g : A→ [−1, 1] is a norm: assigns a “social appropriateness”index to each action
� The norm defines behavior in all contingencies in the game (so,includes things like reciprocity)
� In each node, each player knows what is the “most sociallyappropriate” thing to do
� Players should choose a trade-off between desire to increasepersonal payoff and following the norm
� Redefined payoffs:
Ui (z) = πi (z) + φi
`
∑t=1
g(ati (z))
Implication 1: individuals with higher φ will more nearly adhere tosocial norms.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Frames
The definition of a norm suggests a natural definition of a “frame” ofa game:
A frame is a payoff-irrelevant description of a choice setting thatevokes a particular norm.
Implication 2: changes in behavior due to ‘framing effects’ operateby changing the norm individuals bring to bear.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Frames
The definition of a norm suggests a natural definition of a “frame” ofa game:
A frame is a payoff-irrelevant description of a choice setting thatevokes a particular norm.
Implication 2: changes in behavior due to ‘framing effects’ operateby changing the norm individuals bring to bear.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Evidence for (1)In settings where we think we know the norm, individuals who caremore about norms should be more cooperative.
“The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”
We measure how long individuals spend waiting at the light.
This allows us to measure the underlying heterogeneity, else whywould people vary in willingness to incur the cost?
In a previous paper, we found evidence consistent with thishypothesis in Dictator, Ultimatum, Trust and Public Goods games(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2014)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Evidence for (1)In settings where we think we know the norm, individuals who caremore about norms should be more cooperative.
“The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”
We measure how long individuals spend waiting at the light.
This allows us to measure the underlying heterogeneity, else whywould people vary in willingness to incur the cost?
In a previous paper, we found evidence consistent with thishypothesis in Dictator, Ultimatum, Trust and Public Goods games(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2014)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Evidence for (1)In settings where we think we know the norm, individuals who caremore about norms should be more cooperative.
“The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”
We measure how long individuals spend waiting at the light.
This allows us to measure the underlying heterogeneity, else whywould people vary in willingness to incur the cost?
In a previous paper, we found evidence consistent with thishypothesis in Dictator, Ultimatum, Trust and Public Goods games(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2014)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Evidence for (1)In settings where we think we know the norm, individuals who caremore about norms should be more cooperative.
“The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”
We measure how long individuals spend waiting at the light.
This allows us to measure the underlying heterogeneity, else whywould people vary in willingness to incur the cost?
In a previous paper, we found evidence consistent with thishypothesis in Dictator, Ultimatum, Trust and Public Goods games(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2014)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Evidence for (1)In settings where we think we know the norm, individuals who caremore about norms should be more cooperative.
“The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”
We measure how long individuals spend waiting at the light.
This allows us to measure the underlying heterogeneity, else whywould people vary in willingness to incur the cost?
In a previous paper, we found evidence consistent with thishypothesis in Dictator, Ultimatum, Trust and Public Goods games(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2014)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Evidence for (1)In settings where we think we know the norm, individuals who caremore about norms should be more cooperative.
“The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”
We measure how long individuals spend waiting at the light.
This allows us to measure the underlying heterogeneity, else whywould people vary in willingness to incur the cost?
In a previous paper, we found evidence consistent with thishypothesis in Dictator, Ultimatum, Trust and Public Goods games(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2014)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Rule-Following
Rule
Waiting Time
Density
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0 10 20 30 40 50+
No Rule
Waiting Time
Density
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0 10 20 30 40 50+
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The Data
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) PG - Percent Contributed
Period
Percent
Rule-Breaking GroupsRule-Following Groups
0 20 40 60 80
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(b) TG - Amount Sent
Tokens (out of 80)
Cum
ulat
ive
Pro
babi
lity
1-20 21-60 61-80
(c) TG - Proportion Returned
Bins of Amount Sent by First Movers (out of 80 Tokens)
Returned/Received
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
29 42 40 39 48 43
(d) DG - Amount Sent
Percentiles of the RF Task Distribution (Wilcoxon tests, * < 0.1, ** < 0.05)
Eur
os (o
ut o
f 16)
02
46
8
* * ** * ** *
35th 30th 25th 20th 15th 10th
(e) UG - Amount Sent
Percentiles of the RF Task Distribution (Wilcoxon tests, * < 0.1, ** < 0.05)
Eur
os (o
ut o
f 16)
02
46
8 *
35th 30th 25th 20th 15th 10th
(f) UG - Acceptance Threshold
Percentiles of the RF Task Distribution (Wilcoxon tests, * < 0.1, ** < 0.05)
Eur
os (o
ut o
f 16)
02
46
8 ** **
35th 30th 25th 20th 15th 10th
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The Elicitation TaskOne concern with the stop light task is that it is too noisy becauseindividuals might follow the rule out of concern that their “littleman” will be hit by a car, e.g.
We want a “culture-free” norm task, so we designed a new one:
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The Elicitation TaskOne concern with the stop light task is that it is too noisy becauseindividuals might follow the rule out of concern that their “littleman” will be hit by a car, e.g.
We want a “culture-free” norm task, so we designed a new one:
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The Elicitation TaskOne concern with the stop light task is that it is too noisy becauseindividuals might follow the rule out of concern that their “littleman” will be hit by a car, e.g.
We want a “culture-free” norm task, so we designed a new one:
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Dictator Game
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary DataRF - Percent Rule-Following
Balls Allocated to Blue (out of 100)
Frequency
0 20 40 60 80 1000
24
68
1012
DG - Amount Given
Balls Allocated to Other (out of 100)
Frequency
0 20 40 60 80 100
05
1015
Spearman’s test of rank correlation, ρ = 0.41, p-value < 0.01, N=44.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary DataRF - Percent Rule-Following
Balls Allocated to Blue (out of 100)
Frequency
0 20 40 60 80 1000
24
68
1012
DG - Amount Given
Balls Allocated to Other (out of 100)
Frequency
0 20 40 60 80 100
05
1015
Spearman’s test of rank correlation, ρ = 0.41, p-value < 0.01, N=44.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Measuring Norms
We can directly elicit beliefs about the norm with the Krupka &Weber (2013) task
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Testing Implication (2)
We construct framed variants of the dictator and ultimatum gamesmeant to manipulate norms.
We measure norms and behavior in a between-subject design.
We test whether induced changes in norms can explain observedchanges in behavior across frames.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Give and Take Dictator Games
Give TakeWe also have a “give-take” treatment in which half the balls areinitially allocated to each bucket.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Can We Alter Norms?
Dictator's Payoff/Dictatee's Payoff
Soc
ial A
ppro
pria
tene
ss
$15/$0 $12/$3 $9/$6 $6/$9 $3/$12 $0/$15
Ver
y In
appr
opria
teInappropriate
Appropriate
Ver
y A
ppro
pria
te
GiveDG
TakeDG
Give_TakeDG
Unfortunately, these manipulations did not substantially alter thenormative profile, although there are minor differences at the veryselfish actions.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
A Replication
Our treatment fails the manipulation check, but:
(a) RF Task
% Rule-Following
Frequency
0 20 40 60 80 100
020
4060
80
0 5 10 150.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(b) Dictator Game
$ Sent
Cum
ulat
ive
Pro
babi
lity
Rule-FollowersRule-Breakers
We replicate the relationship between RF and DG giving(Spearman’s ρ = 0.36, p-value < 0.01., N=186)
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Omission vs. Commission
We introduce two frames of the UG, using a graphical manipulation:1 2
Omission: Do I fill the tank?
Commission: Do I drain the tank?
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Elicited NormsHere our norms data pass the manipulation check:
(a) Proposers
Proposer's Share/Responder's Share
Soc
ial A
ppro
pria
tene
ss
100/0 80/20 60/40 40/60 20/80 0/100
Ver
y In
appr
opria
teInappropriate
Appropriate
Ver
y A
ppro
pria
teOmissionCommission
(b) Responders
Proposer's Share/Responder's Share
100/0 80/20 60/40 40/60 20/80 0/100
Omission (Don't Fill)Commission (Drain)
The model implies that players 1 in the Omission treatment(divide-the-not-yet-created-pie) should make offers in the 50/50 rangemore frequently to avoid the relatively greater likelihood of rejection.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
Preliminary Results
There is more clustering at the normative 50/50 split in thedivide-the-pie version (permutation test, p-value = 0.02, N=71).
(a) 0-Frame
Amount Kept
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
25 50 75 100
(b) x-Frame
Amount Kept
Density
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
25 50 75 100
Regression analysis indicates that players’ response to a questionabout the rejection threshold of player 2 is a significant predictor ofamount sent, only for the empty tank case (p-value = 0.049,two-sided test).
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The norm (rule) followingframework
What does it buy us to think about individuals in terms of a model ofdisutility from norm violation?
� This can explain many “context effects” in games that aren’taccounted for by simple models of (social) preferences (e.g.Dictator, Ultimatum games)
� Different contexts activate different normative benchmarks(fairness/equity, reciprocity, winner-take-all)
� Thus it is not an “error” or “irrationality” if people exhibitprosocial behavior in some contexts and not in others.
� Ex: Forsythe et al. (1994); Hoffman et al. (1994); Hoffman etal. (1996); Cherry et al. (2002); List (2007)
� But not everyone cares about norms to the same degree, sothere’s still heterogeneity.
� It could also explain cross-cultural differences. The normassociated with a particular context may vary across cultures.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The norm (rule) followingframework
What does it buy us to think about individuals in terms of a model ofdisutility from norm violation?
� This can explain many “context effects” in games that aren’taccounted for by simple models of (social) preferences (e.g.Dictator, Ultimatum games)
� Different contexts activate different normative benchmarks(fairness/equity, reciprocity, winner-take-all)
� Thus it is not an “error” or “irrationality” if people exhibitprosocial behavior in some contexts and not in others.
� Ex: Forsythe et al. (1994); Hoffman et al. (1994); Hoffman etal. (1996); Cherry et al. (2002); List (2007)
� But not everyone cares about norms to the same degree, sothere’s still heterogeneity.
� It could also explain cross-cultural differences. The normassociated with a particular context may vary across cultures.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The norm (rule) followingframework
What does it buy us to think about individuals in terms of a model ofdisutility from norm violation?
� This can explain many “context effects” in games that aren’taccounted for by simple models of (social) preferences (e.g.Dictator, Ultimatum games)
� Different contexts activate different normative benchmarks(fairness/equity, reciprocity, winner-take-all)
� Thus it is not an “error” or “irrationality” if people exhibitprosocial behavior in some contexts and not in others.
� Ex: Forsythe et al. (1994); Hoffman et al. (1994); Hoffman etal. (1996); Cherry et al. (2002); List (2007)
� But not everyone cares about norms to the same degree, sothere’s still heterogeneity.
� It could also explain cross-cultural differences. The normassociated with a particular context may vary across cultures.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The norm (rule) followingframework
What does it buy us to think about individuals in terms of a model ofdisutility from norm violation?
� This can explain many “context effects” in games that aren’taccounted for by simple models of (social) preferences (e.g.Dictator, Ultimatum games)
� Different contexts activate different normative benchmarks(fairness/equity, reciprocity, winner-take-all)
� Thus it is not an “error” or “irrationality” if people exhibitprosocial behavior in some contexts and not in others.
� Ex: Forsythe et al. (1994); Hoffman et al. (1994); Hoffman etal. (1996); Cherry et al. (2002); List (2007)
� But not everyone cares about norms to the same degree, sothere’s still heterogeneity.
� It could also explain cross-cultural differences. The normassociated with a particular context may vary across cultures.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The norm (rule) followingframework
What does it buy us to think about individuals in terms of a model ofdisutility from norm violation?
� Social preference models can be thought of as a special case ofnorm-following, where the norm is pro-social.
� Note that social preference models also rely on norms. They aresimply implicit in the form of preferences specified. Our modelmakes this connection explicit.
Norms, Framesand ProsocialBehavior in
Games
Erik O.Kimbrough,
Joshua Miller,Alexander
Vostroknutov
Introduction
PreviousEvidence
A New Design
RF Task
Norm Elicitation
Dictator Games
UltimatumGames
Discussion
The norm (rule) followingframework
What does it buy us to think about individuals in terms of a model ofdisutility from norm violation?
� Social preference models can be thought of as a special case ofnorm-following, where the norm is pro-social.
� Note that social preference models also rely on norms. They aresimply implicit in the form of preferences specified. Our modelmakes this connection explicit.