Download - Number 81-5 August 12, 2010 Authority of HOAs in Texas ... · Texas has the largest unincorporated community township in the country, the Woodlands, which is structured as a master

Authority of HOAs in Texas examined

Where should inmates be counted for redistricting?

(See Inmates, page 8)

(See HOAs, page 2)

Interim NewsNumber 81-5 August 12, 2010

TheMaryland,Delaware,andNewYorklegislaturesrecentlyapprovedlawsthat,forredistrictingpurposes,willcountinmatesattheirmostrecentpermanenthomeaddressesbeforetheywereincarcerated,ratherthanattheinstitutionwheretheyarehoused.Maryland’slaw,thefirsttobeenacted, willassigninmatestotheir previousaddressesforbothU.S.congressionalandstatelegislativeredistricting.TheDelawareandNewYorklawswillapplyonlytostatelegislativeredistricting.CountinginmatesattheiraddressespriortoincarcerationdiffersfromtheU.S.CensusBureau’spracticeofcountinginmatesasresidentsofthecommunitieswheretheyareincarcerated.

WhileTexasandmostotherstatesusetheCensusBureau’sapproachforredistricting,countinginmateswheretheyareincarcerated,Connecticut,Florida,Illinois,Minnesota,Oregon,RhodeIsland,andWisconsinrecentlyhaveconsideredorareconsideringmeasuressimilartotheonesadoptedbyMaryland,Delaware,andNewYork.Duringthe2009regularsessionofthe81stTexasLegislature,theHouseCorrectionsCommitteeheardtestimony

TheTexasLegislaturehasconsiderednumerousbillsinrecentyearstoaddressthemanagementandconductofhomeownersassociations(HOAs).InApril,theSenateIntergovernmentalRelationsCommitteeandtheHouseBusinessandIndustryCommitteebothheldhearingstoconsiderifcurrentlawgoverningHOAsisadequatetoprotecttheinterestsofhomeowners.

RecentcasesofHOAsforeclosingonhomeownershavereceivedlocalandnationalattention.NationalandlocalmediahaverunstoriesaboutHOAsforeclosingonhomesintheDallasareaandinSanAntoniofordelinquentassessmentsowedtotheassociation.

CriticsofcurrentHOApracticessayabusesreportedinthemediaandinpublictestimonybeforelawmakersshowtheneedforstateregulationofHOAs.AhomeownerwhohasadisputewithanHOAhasfewmeaningfulprotections,theysay,andthiscanbecorrectedonlybystatelaw.ManyHOAshavepowerscomparabletomunicipalitiesandshouldhavetofollowsimilarrules,criticssay.

SupportersofcurrentHOApracticessayabusesthatreceivemediaattentionareoutlyingcasesthathavebeenexaggeratedanddonotrepresentmostinteractionsbetweenHOAsandhomeowners.ImpairingtheabilityofHOAstooperateinorderto

reininthefewthatmisbehavewouldbeadisservicetothevastmajorityofTexanswhohaveamicablerelationshipswiththeirassociationsandenjoythebenefitssuchcommunitiesprovide,HOAadvocatessay.

Background

HOAs,whicharesetuptogovernresidentialsubdivisionsmadeupofsingle-familyhouses,townhomes,orduplexes,areonetypeofpropertyownersassociation

(POA).APOAtypicallyisanonprofitentitygovernedbyaboardthatiselectedbyhomeownersandsometimesdevelopers.POAsincludenotonlyHOAs,butcondominiumassociations andmixed-use associations,suchasinLasColinasortheWoodlands.

HOAsinparticularhavebecomemorecommoninTexasinrecentyears,asdevelopersincreasinglyrelyonthemtofinanceongoingmaintenanceofcommonproperty

HOAs, from page 1

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HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

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Developers have used HOAs to ensure maintenance of privately built infrastructure, recreational features, and landscaping.

inresidentialsubdivisions.Especiallyinareasofrapidgrowth,suchasinsuburbanandexurbanareasaroundcitiesandinunincorporatedareasofcounties,developershaveusedHOAstoensuremaintenanceofprivatelybuiltinfrastructure,recreationalfeatures,andlandscaping.

Texashasabout25,000to30,000propertyownersassociations,accordingtoanestimatefromnationaldatapreparedbytheCommunityAssociationInstitute(CAI),anationalorganizationthatrepresentsPOAs. Accordingtotheestimate,theseassociationsrepresentabout750,000condominiumunitsand1.9millionlotsinsingle-family,residentialsubdivisions.Texashasthelargestunincorporatedcommunitytownshipinthecountry,theWoodlands,whichisstructuredasamasterplannedcommunitywithamandatoryassociation.TheHoustonandtheDallas-FortWorthareasalsohavesignificantconcentrationsofplannedcommunitieswithestablishedassociations.POAsinTexashouse4.8millionpeoplewhocontributeabout$3.2billioninassessmentseachyear,accordingtoanestimatebytheCAI.

LocalgovernmentsinTexashavevaryingpoliciesontheroletheyshouldassumeinbuildingandmaintaininginfrastructureandpublicrightsofwayinnewresidentialsubdivisions.Localgovernmentscannotmaintainprivateroadsorotherprivateamenities.Asaresult,unlessacityorcountyagreestomaintainroadsandotheramenitiesaspublicinfrastructure,developersmustestablishaprivate meanstomaintainthem,suchasbyestablishinganHOA.Somecitiesandmanycountiessimplyrequirenewsubdivisionstobesetupwithanassociation.

Legal framework

CondominiumsandHOAsaretreateddifferentlyunderthelaw.CondominiumsaregovernedprimarilybytheUniformCondominiumAct(PropertyCode,ch.82). HOAsderivetheirauthorityprimarilyfromcommonlaw,includingdeedrestrictionsandprivatecovenants,

butincreasinglyareregulatedbystateandfederallawandlocalordinances.

TexasdoesnothaveacomprehensivestatuteonHOAsforresidentialsubdivisionsnoranylawthatmandateshowHOAsarecreatedorgoverned.Title11ofthePropertyCodegrantssomepowerstoandimposescertainconstraintsonHOAs, suchasprohibitingthemfromrestrictingreasonablepoliticalsignsinyards(ch.202).Manyof thelawsunderTitle11applyonlytoacertaincountyorregion,andthestatutesdonotregulateprocedures,boards,andbylawsasextensivelyas dolawsthatgoverncondominiums.

DisputesbetweenHOAsandhomeownersmaybepursuedincivilcourtorsettledthrough

alternativemeans.HOAsmaysuehomeownersforfinesandassessmentsortoobtainanowner’scompliancewiththeHOA’srestrictions,andtheymayforecloseuponownerswhodonotpaymonthlyassessments.Statelawrequiresenforcementactionsagainsthomeownersto

beprecededbyacertifiedletterprovidingnoticeofpossibleactionandinformingtheownerthatheorsheisentitledareasonableperiodtoaddressaviolation.HomeownersmaysueanHOA foraperceivedviolationoftheassociation’sestablishedproceduresorforanarbitraryenforcementofaparticularruleorregulation.HomeownersandHOAsalsomayagreetoalternativedisputeresolution,suchasmediation.Acourtmayordermediationbeforeatrialisscheduled.

Powers and responsibilities of HOAs

HOAsusuallyareestablishedbydevelopers,whoarerequiredbystatelawtocreate andfilealegalinstrument,oftencalledtheassociation’scovenants,conditions,andrestrictions(CC&Rs)orthedeclaration.MostHOAsalsohaveorganizationalbylawsandarticlesofincorporation.Manyhaverulesandregulations,andsomeincludearchitecturalguidelines.

ThesegoverningdocumentsestablishthepowersandresponsibilitiesofHOAboardsandhomeowners.Ingeneral,theHOAbylawsaddressassociation

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governance,suchasqualificationsforofficersanddirectors,requirementsforboardandmembershipmeetings,noticerequirementsformeetings,andvotingprocedures.EachgoverningdocumenthasitsownprocedureforhowitmaybeamendedbytheHOAafterthedeveloperleaves.

HOAsgenerallymaintainpropertyandcollectassessments.Theymightexercisearchitecturalcontrolandpursuedelinquentaccountsorviolationsofgoverningdocuments.Insomecases,cityordinancesorstatelawsmayimposedutiesonHOAs,suchassubjectingthemtoauditsorrequiringthemtopublishcontactinformation.Associationsalsoarerestrictedbysomefederallawsand mayvoluntarilycomplywithrequirementsofcertainlenders,suchasFannieMaeandtheFederalHousingAdministration.

MaintenanceresponsibilitiesofHOAsvarybasedontheirgoverningdocuments,applicablestatelaw,andthesize,type,andlocationofthedevelopment.SomeHOAsmaydolittlemorethanmowrightsofwayormaintainentrancefeatures, suchasgates,whileothersmayberesponsibleforagreaterrangeofduties.InTexas,dependingonthecommunity,responsibilitiesofHOAsmayinclude:

• landscapingcommonareasandmowingfrontyards;

• operatingrecreationalfeatures,suchasswimmingpoolsandgolfcourses;

• maintainingprivateroads,alleys,andsidewalks,especiallyingatedcommunities;

• maintainingdrainageandwaterretentionstructures;

• providingutilities,suchastrash,electricity,water,wastewater,andcable;

• maintainingcommonwaterfeatures,suchasfountainsandponds;

• maintainingexteriorpaintandroofs,suchasontownhomes;and

• maintainingcontrolledaccessgatesanddoorsandsecuritycameras.

HOAschargeyearlyormonthly“assessments”forregularmaintenanceanddutiessetforthintheir governingdocuments.Theymayimpose“specialassessments”forimprovementsandmaintenancefor

one-timeevents,suchastorepairrecenthurricanedamage.

Concerns about HOAs

RecurringconcernsaboutthepowersandpracticesofHOAsfallintoseveralareas,including:

• powertoforecloseonahomeowner;• policiesonapplyingpaymentsreceivedfrom

homeownerstofinesandassessments;• excessivefinesleviedagainsthomeowners;• lackofregulationofelectionsandvoting;• applyingstateopenmeetingsandopenrecords

lawstoHOAs;and• prohibitingHOAsfromrestrictingcertain

improvements,suchassolarpanels.

WhiletheLegislaturehasenactedlawsinthepasttoreviseindividualaspectsofHOAgovernance,nosinglebillsignificantlyrevisingHOApracticesinTexashasmadeitswaytothegovernor’sdeskinrecentsessions.HB1976bySolomons,anomnibusbillseekingtomakebroadchangestoHOApracticesandprocedures,wasapprovedbytheHousebutdiedintheSenatein2009.TheLegislatureislikelyonceagaintoconsiderproposalsconcerningHOAsduringtheupcominglegislativesession.

Power of foreclosure

Proposalslawmakersmayconsiderin2011includerevokingHOAs’powerofforeclosureormandatingthattheytakeextrastepsbeforeforeclosingonahome.Frequentlydiscussedproposalsinclude:

• revokingthepowerofanHOAtoforecloseinfavorofalternativemeansofdebtcollection;

• allowingforeclosuresonlywhentheassessmentsahomeownerowesexceedapredetermined amount;

• requiringapaymentplanbeissuedtoahomeownerbeforeforeclosure;

• eliminatingtheoptionfornon-judicialforeclosures,possiblyreplacingthiswithan“expeditedjudicialforeclosure”option;or


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• requiring alternativemeansofsettlingdisputes,suchasprovidingarighttomediationbeforeattorney’sfeescouldbechargedinaforeclosuresuit.

TheauthorityofHOAstoforecloseonhomestocollectasubordinatelienfordelinquentassessmentsthehomeownerowestotheassociationisalong-standingissuefacingtheLegislature(seeHouseResearchOrganizationInterim News,“ForeclosurebyHomeownerAssociations:StrikingaBalance”,July2002).Thepowerderivesprimarilyfroma1987TexasSupremeCourtrulinginInwood North Homeowners Association v. Harris(736S.W.2d632)thataprovisionintheTexasConstitutionrestrictingforeclosuresdoesnotprotecthomeownersfromforeclosurefornotpayingmonthlyHOAassessments.Inthatcase,theSupremeCourtreversedaHoustonCourtofAppealsholdingandruledinfavoroftheInwoodNorthAssociation,whichhadforeclosedonahomeownerwhowasdelinquentinassessments.

InTexas,HOAsmayexecuteeitherjudicialornon-judicialforeclosure,dependingontheassociation’sdeclaration. Inajudicialforeclosure,theassociationfilesalawsuitandtriestogetajudgmentagainstapropertyowner.Inanon-judicialforeclosure,whichmustbespeciallyauthorizedinanassociation’sdeclaration,anHOAmustprovidenoticetoahomeownerthroughcertifiedmail,andifthehomeownerdoesnotpaytheassessmentsowed,theHOAmayofferthehouseforsaleatanauctionfortheamountofoutstandingassessments, withoutanorderfromajudge.Ifthereisasuperiorlienonaproperty,suchasamortgagelienfromabank,thenwhoeverpurchasesthepropertyatforeclosuredoessosubjecttothatlien.

In2001,the77thLegislatureaddedPropertyCode,ch.209,whichrestrictedforeclosurepowersofHOAs,includingprohibitingHOAsfromforeclosingonahomeownersolelytocollectfinesorattorney’sfeesassociatedwithfines.Theactalsoaddeda180-dayrightofredemptionperiodduringwhichahomeownercouldbuybackaforeclosedhome.

DebateonrevokingHOAforeclosurepower. SomesaythepowerofforeclosurebyHOAsshouldbe

revokedaltogether,whileotherssayHOAsneedthispowertofunctioneffectively.Stillotherssaythepowerofforeclosureshouldberestrictedandnon-judicialforeclosuresprohibited,withhomeownershavingtherighttopursueotheroptionsbeforeforeclosure.

Supporters of revoking or restricting the power of HOAs to foreclosesayHOAsarenotsubjecttoenoughchecksandbalancesanddonotprovidesufficientdueprocesstoexercisesuchafundamentalpoweroverhomeowners.TheysaythispowershouldbereservedforinstancesclearlylaidoutintheTexasConstitution—fordelinquenttaxes,mortgages,andliensforpropertyrepairandrenovation.Otherserviceproviders,suchasdoctors,lawyers,andmechanics,arenotempoweredbytheConstitutiontoforecloseonhomestocollectpayments,eventhoughtheyprovidenecessaryandimportantservices. Associationsalsohavepowersofnon-judicialforeclosurethatarenotavailableeventogovernmententitiestocollectdelinquentpropertytaxes.

Associationsshouldhavetousethesamedebt-collectionmethodsasothercommonnon-housing creditors,suchascollectionagenciesandsmallclaimscourts,supportersofrestrictingHOApowersay.Asanalternative,HOAscouldbeallowedtoplacepassiveliens,withoutforeclosurepower,onhomesofthosewhoowedelinquentpayments.Theassociationwouldcollectitsdebtifthehomeweresold,butitcouldnotforecloseonthehome.SupportersofrevokingforeclosurepowernotethatmanyHOAsneverfileforeclosurelawsuitsandthatthisshowstheycancollectassessmentswithoutexercisingforeclosureauthority.

SupportersofrestrictingHOAforeclosureauthoritysaythatsomeassociationsforecloseonhomesforminoroverdueamountsof$1,000orless,suchasthoserecentlyfeaturedinnationalnewsstories.TheDallas Morning NewsandNationalPublicRadiorecentlyranstoriesaboutanarmycaptainservinginIraqwhoseDallas-areahousewasforeclosedonandsoldbecauseheandhiswifeowed$1,000inassessmentsandlatefeestotheirHOA.InJuly,CNBCairedastoryonanHOAintheSanAntonioareathatforeclosedonahomeownerforlessthan$800inassessmentsowed.Supporterssaysuchexamplesarenotexceptional,butcommonplace.

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Opponents of revoking or restricting the power of HOAs to foreclose saywithoutthispower,HOAswouldhavenoeffectivewaytocollectoverdueassessments,enforcedeedrestrictions,provideessentialservices,andprotecthomeowners’investments.ServicesprovidedbyHOAs—suchastrashcollection,poolmaintenance,andsafetypatrols—reducethedemandforservicesfromcitiesandcountiesandhelppreserve,protect,andmaintainneighborhoods.ThepowertoforecloseisappropriateforHOAsbecausetheirdutiesaretiedtothesafety,security,andvalueofhomesandneighborhoods.Withoutforeclosurepower,associationscouldbecomelittlemorethan“civicclubs”withasmallnumberofmemberspayingdueswhilealargernumberrefused.If20percentoftheownersinanassociationstoppedpayingdues,opponentssay,remainingownerswouldhavetoincreasetheirassessmentsby25percenttomakeupthelossinrevenue.

Peoplevoluntarilybuyhomesinareasgovernedbyhomeownersassociationsandcontractuallyagreetoabidebytheirrules,includingtherightofforeclosure,opponentsofrevokingthispowersay.Whilethevastmajorityofhomeownerspaythemoneytheyowe,associationsneedflexibilitytoproceedwithforeclosureifitiswarranted.HOAsrarelyfileforeclosuresuits,andthenonlyasalastresort.HOAswanthomeownerstopaytheirfeessotheHOAcanperformitsduties.Fewforeclosuresuitsresultinthesaleofahomebecausehomeownersusuallypaytheirdelinquentobligationsorsettlethesuits.Taxingauthoritiesalsoforecloseonhomesfordebtslargeandsmall,andhomeownersassociationsarecomparabletotheseauthoritiesinsomeoftheservicestheyprovide.

TheTexasSupremeCourtandothercourtshaveupheldHOAs’righttoforeclose,andtheLegislatureshouldnotinfringeonthatcontractualright,opponentssay.Abusesofforeclosureauthoritybyafewassociationsareisolatedincidentsthatshouldnotbeusedasanexcusetodepriveallassociationsofavitaltool.

Open meetings, open records

AnumberofconcernsaboutHOAsrelatetorecordsandboardmeetings.Somehomeownerssaytheyhavenotbeenabletoacquirecertaindocuments,

suchasanassociation’sfinancialrecords,inatimelymanner.Othersclaimtheyhavenotbeenabletoaccessinformationreadilyaboutthetimeandlocationofboardmeetingsandagendasandthatsomeboardsabusethepowertoholdexecutivesessions,preventingownersfromviewingproceedings.SomehavesuggestedthatHOAsshouldbesubjecttothestate’sopengovernmentlaws—thePublicInformationActandtheOpenMeetingsAct—inordertomaketheiractivitiesmoretransparent.

Supporters of bringing HOAs under the Public Information and Open Meetings acts saytheselawswouldprovideaframeworkforholdingassociationsaccountabletohomeownersbecausetheyproviderealpenaltiesnotauthorizedincurrentlawgoverningHOAs.Theselawsestablishrequirementsfortimeframeswithinwhichrecordsmust beprovidedtoarequestor,typesofrecordsthatmustbeprovided,noticethatmustbeprovidedformeetings,andotherrequirements.Supporterssaythatbecauseassociationshavemanyofthepowersofgovernments,theyshouldhavesimilarobligationstoberesponsive,open,andtransparent.Supporterssaythecostsofcomplyingwiththeselawshavebeenexaggerated.

Opponents of bringing HOAs under the Public Information and the Open Meetings actssaytherequirementsoftheselawswouldbetooonerousforHOAs, whichdonothavethecapacitythatcitiesdotooperateundersuchrigidandtechnicalguidelines. TheysayHOAsareprivateentitiesoperatingonasmallerscalethangovernmentsandwouldbeundulyburdenedbyregulationscraftedforlargerbureaucracies.Manyassociationshavedifficultyevenachievingaquorumatboardmeetings.BringingHOAsunderstrictstatelaws,opponentssay,couldrequireanattorneytobeinvolvedineveryHOAmeetingbecauseofcriminalpenaltiesprovidedundertheselaws,drasticallyincreasingoperatingcostsformanyassociations.Thisalsowoulddetermanypotentialboardmembersfromservingbecauseoffearofpenaltiesandtheinvestmentoftimenecessarytoconformtothestatutes.Opponentssayitwouldbebettertocreateaseparate,moreflexiblelawforHOAswithsanctionsfornotprovidingrecordsinatimelymannerorholdingmeetingswithoutsufficient notice.

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HOA authority to collect fines

Somehomeownerssaytheyaresaddledwithdisproportionatefinesthatmaybeenhancedbyattorney’sfeesawardedtoanHOAthatprevailsinalawsuit.StatelawexpresslyallowsanHOAtofilesuitagainstahomeownerforviolationofanassociation’sdeclaration,suchasbymakingunapprovedadditionsornotmaintainingpropertytotheassociation’sstandards.Acourtmayassesscivildamagesof$200orlessforeachdayaviolationtakesplace.UnderPropertyCode,sec.5.006,aprevailingpartywhoassertsalegalactionmaycollectreasonableattorney’sfees,butthelawdoesnotauthorizepaymentoflegalfeesforaprevailingdefendant.

Supporters of restricting HOA authority to collect finessaycurrentprocessesforchargingandcollectingfinesareheavilyweightedinfavorofHOAsbecause petitioningtheHOAitselfistheonlyrecourseforahomeownerwhodisputesafine,otherthanpursuingcostlylegalaction.

SomesayHOAsandmanagementcompaniesshouldnothavethepowertolevyfines.Supportersofrestrictingtheauthoritytofinesayassociationsareprivateentitieswithauniquepowertofinehomeownersforviolationsonthehomeowners’ownpropertythatotherprivateentitiesdonotpossess.Otherssayfinesshouldhavestrictcapsinstatelawandthatwhenanassociationlosesasuititinitiatesagainstahomeowner,theassociationshouldhavetopayattorney’sfees.

SupportersofrestrictingtheauthorityofHOAstofinesayassociationscommonlychargeunreasonablefinesforviolationsandthatthesefinescompoundwithattorney’sfees.Forexample,anHOAinHoustonrecentlyfiledsuitagainstahomeownerforfailingtomakeroofrepairswithanapprovedmaterial.Theassociationisseeking$2,000indamages($200adayfor10days),$290forassessmentsandlatecharges,andatleast$2,500forattorney’sfees.

SupportersalsosaythatinmostcasestheHOAsuesthehomeowner,andassuch,theassociationisabletocollectattorney’sfeesforprevailing.Homeowners,wholessfrequentlysuetheirassociations,arelefttopaytheHOAsattorney’sfeesiftheylosebut stillmustpaytheir

ownattorney’sfeesiftheywin.Further,homeownersareessentiallypayingtwiceforattorneysfees—oncefortheirownattorneyandoncefortheassociation’sattorney,paidforinpartthroughassociationassessments.

Opponents of restricting HOA authority to collect finessayfinesareanecessarymeansforHOAstoupholdthevaluesandrulestowhichpropertyownersagreedbypurchasingahomeinthecommunityandtopreservethevalueofmemberhomes.Plannedcommunitiesareestablishedwithcertainvaluesanownerembracesbybuyingpropertyinthecommunity,contractuallyagreeingtocertainminimumstandards,andbecomingamemberoftheassociation.Associationsneedtheabilitytoimposereasonablefeestoensurethatmembersadheretothestandardsofthecommunitythattheyagreedtobypurchasingahomebenefitingfromtheassociation.OtherssaythestatecouldstrikeabalancebyrequiringHOAstopublishascheduleoffines andmakeitavailabletoallmembersandthatassociationmemberscouldreviseitiftheysochose.

Priority of payments

Somehaveexpressedconcernsaboutthewaymanyassociationsprioritizewhereahomeowner’spaymentswillbeapplied—toassessments,attorney’sfees,orfines.Somehomeownerssaytheirassociationshaveappliedtheirpaymentstofinesthatthehomeownerdisputes,insteadoftotheirassessments,allowingtheHOAtoholdtheminarrearsontheirassessmentandthreatenorpursueforeclosure.OnerecentproposaladoptedbytheHousebutnottheSenatewouldhaverequiredassociationstoapplypaymentsfirsttoassessments,thentofinesandotherfees,unlessthehomeownerrequestedotherwise.

Supporters of statewide requirements for priority of paymentssaysomeHOAsgetaroundstatelawsprohibitingforeclosingonhomeownersforfinesbyapplyingassessmentpaymentstofinesfirst,againstthewishesofthehomeowner.Supporterssayhomeownersarecommonlychargedunreasonablefinesforahostofviolations,suchasnotmaintainingtheirpropertytotheassociation’sstandardsorparkingimproperly,andthatpayingthesefinesmaymeanahomeownercannotaffordtopayanassessment.Homeowners

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inassociationsthatapplypaymentstofinesmaybethreatenedwithforeclosureiftheycannotaffordtopaybothfinesandassessments.SupportersofrestrictingthispracticesayitisclearlyatoddswiththeintentofstatelawthatprohibitsHOAsfromforeclosingforfines.StatewiderequirementsarenecessarytoclosethismajorloopholeinstatelawthatsomeassociationsareusingtosubverttheintentoftheLegislature,theysay.

Opponents of statewide requirements for priority of paymentssaysuchanapproachwouldbetooinflexibletosuitthediverserangeofHOAsacrossthestate.OpponentssayHOAshavefewwaystocollectfineswithoutgoingthroughcourtproceedings,whicharenoteffectiveforsmallamounts.AbetterapproachwouldbetorequireHOAstoadoptspecificpoliciesabouthowtheywillapplypaymentsreceived.Thesepolicieswouldhavetobeapprovedbythecommunitiesbymajorityvote,givingresidentsasayinhowtheircommunityprocessespayments.

Other proposals

Otherissuesthatlawmakersmayaddress inthe2011regularsessionincludeHOAvotingpractices,howassociationsmayamendtheirdeclarations,andrequiringassociationstofollowsomealternativedisputeresolutionprocessesbeforetakingformallegalaction.Proposalsforstatewiderevisionsthatlegislatorsmayconsiderinclude:

• changingHOAvotingprocedures,suchasrequiringanindependentthirdpartylikeaCPAtoverifyboardelectionresults,limitingthenumberofproxyvotes,andrequiringHOAstoallowabsenteeorelectronicvoting;

• requiringalternativedisputeresolution,suchasmediationbeforelegalaction,forHOAsandhomeowners,orestablishinganombudsman’sofficetoprovideaneutralforumtoresolvedisputes;

• prohibitingenforcementofcertainrestrictions,suchasthoseprohibitingparkinginthestreet,hangingsymbolslikecrossesormazuzahsondoorways,placingsolarpanelsonrooftops,orxeriscaping;and

• revisingHOAadministration,suchaseliminatingorcappingfeesthatassociations

ormanagementcompaniesmaychargeforcompilingresalecertificates,establishingtermlimitsforboardmembers,orrepealingorrevisinglawsthatprovidespecialauthoritytoassociationsintheHoustonarea.

Supporters of statewide restrictions on HOA practicessayabusesarefairlycommonacrossthestate,homeownershavelittlerecourseordueprocessundercurrentlaw,managementcompanieshiredbyHOAsoftenexploitexistinglegalimbalancestomaximizeprofitsattheexpenseofthehomeowner,andinmanycaseshomeownersareunabletoparticipateinandeffectchangeintheirHOAs.WiththeincreasingnumbersofHOAsinthestate,homeownersdonothaveagenuinechoicetomoveintonon-HOAneighborhoods.Supportersofstatewiderestrictionssaysubstantialchangetoexistinglawisnecessarytocorrectimbalances.SupportersalsosaymanyHOAsdonottrulyreflectthemajoritywillofpropertyownersduetooveruseofproxyvoting—thatis,oneownervotingforotherswiththeirapproval.Insomeassociations,dozensofpropertyownersmayberepresentedatameetingbyahandfulofmembers,eachwithmanyproxyvotes.

Opponents of statewide restrictions on HOA practicessayexamplesofabusiveHOAsarerareandhavebeenexaggeratedinthemedia.HOAsareacriticalmeansofpreservinghomevaluesandprovidingindispensibleservicesinthestate,opponentssay,andtheyneedtoretainpowerstoachievetheseends.PeoplewhomoveintocommunitiesorganizedunderHOAshaveampleopportunitytoreviewgoverningdocuments,andtheychoosetoabidebycertainruleswhenbuyingahomeintheneighborhood.Homeownersareempoweredtoparticipateintheirneighborhood’saffairsandremoveanassociation’sboardifitcontradictsowners’wishes.Opponentssaystatewiderestrictions,iftheyarenotcarefullycraftedandlimited,couldhinderallHOAsjusttoaddressafewproblemcases.

— by Andrei Lubomudrov

Interim Newspage 8


on,butdidnotreport,HB2855byDuttonandHB672byHodge,bothofwhichwouldhaverequiredTexastocountinmatesattheiraddressesbeforeincarceration.Duringthe2001regularsession,theHouseElectionsCommitteefavorablyreportedasimilarbill,HB2639byDutton,whichtheHouserejectedby48-91-3.Inaddition,U.S.Rep. GeneGreen,D-Houston,hasfiledabillinCongress(H.R.2075)thatwouldrequiretheCensusBureautocountinmatesattheirpreviousaddressesforthe2020Census.

Supportersofthenewlawarguethatcountinginmateswheretheyareincarceratedartificiallyinflatesthepopulationsofruralareaswheremostprisonsarelocatedattheexpense ofurbanareaswheremostinmatescomefromandeventuallyreturn.Opponentssaythatcountinginmatesattheiraddressbeforeincarcerationignorestheimpactthatprisonpopulationshaveonthedistrictswheretheyareincarceratedandthatitwouldbeadministrativelyburdensome.

Three ways to count inmates

Threecommonapproachesforcountinginmatesforredistrictingpurposesincludecountinginmateswheretheyareincarcerated,notcountingthematallwhenestablishingdistrictbasepopulationsforredistrictingpurposes,orcountinginmatesattheirresidencebeforetheywereincarcerated.

Counting inmates where incarcerated

Countinginmateswheretheyareincarceratedisthemethodusedbyalmostallstatesandlocalgovernments.Itisthemethodusedforthefederaldecennialcensus,andinTexas,fortheredistrictingofcongressional,legislative,andstateboardofeducationdistrictsandformostlocalredistricting,suchasdividingTexascountiesintocommissionerandjusticeofthepeaceprecincts.

TheU.S.CensusBureauhascountedinmateswheretheyareincarceratedsince1850.Thisisconsistentwiththebureau’sgeneralpracticeofcountingindividualswheretheyreside,whichtheCensusBureaudefinesas“wheretheyliveandsleepmostofthetime.”TheBureau’sgoalistocountallthepeopleinthecountryandtiethemtoaspecificgeographiclocation.OthergroupstheCensusBureaucountswheretheyreside,ratherthanattheirpreviousaddresses,includecollegestudentsindormitories,seniorcitizensinretirementhomes,andstatesidemilitarypersonnelinbarracks.

Excluding inmates

Anotherapproachtocountinginmatesistoexcludethemfrompopulationcountsforthelimitedpurposeofredistrictingandrepresentation.Sometimescertainpopulationsegmentsareexcludedinthebeliefthattheyaretootransitoryorsimplydonotparticipatefullyinthelifeofthecommunity.

Afewstatesexcludemilitarypersonnelhousedonbasesorcollegestudentsindormitoriesforredistricting.Hawaiiexcludesmilitarypersonnel,andKansasexcludesbothmilitarypersonnelandcollegestudents.AccordingtoPrisonersoftheCensus,aredistrictingreformadvocacygroup,morethan100localgovernmentsacrossthecountryexcludeinmatepopulationswhendrawingrepresentativedistricts,suchascountycommissionersprecinctsorcitycouncildistricts.

SomeTexascountiesexcludeinmateswhenestablishingcountycommissionerprecincts.Anderson,Bee,Brazos,Coryell,Childress,Concho,Dawson,Grimes,Karnes,Madison,Mitchell,Pecos,Walker,andWoodcountiesallhaveexcludedinmatepopulationswhenestablishingcountycommissioner,justiceofthepeace,andconstableprecincts,accordingtostudiesinMarchandJunebyPrisonersoftheCensus.InAndersonandConchocounties,excludinginmatepopulationspreventedthecreationofprecinctsthatwouldhaveconsistedentirelyofinmates.

Inmates, from page 1

Counting inmates where they are incarcerated is the method used by almost all states and local governments.




Whendrawingnewboundaries,thesecountiesexcludethepopulationsoffelony-levelprisons,aswellasinstitutionsthathouseillegalimmigrantsawaitingdeportationhearings.Countiesthatengageinthispracticesayithelpsprotecttheone-person,one-voteprinciplebecauseincarceratedfelonsandillegalimmigrantscannotvote.Thesecountiesincludepopulationfromjuveniledetentionfacilities,whichhousepeopleuptoage21,becausesomestillmaybeeligibletovote.Thispracticeaffectsthedrawingofboundariesfortheelectionofothercountyleveloffices,suchasjusticesofthepeaceandconstables,aswellasdesignatingelectionprecincts.WhileJPsandconstablesdonotholdrepresentativeoffices,theirboundariesoften

aredrawntoconformtoplansforcountycommissionerscourtssothatelectionprecinctsacrossthecountymaybeusedforallcountyoffices.

Texascountieshavewidediscretionwhencraftingcountycommissioner,justiceofthepeace,andconstableprecinctsunderArt.5,sec.18oftheTexasConstitution.TheseprecinctsaresubjecttorequirementsofthefederalVotingRightsActintendedtopreventdiscriminationagainstminorityvotersordilutionoftheirvotes.WhenthesecountiessubmittheirplanstotheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeforpre-clearanceundersec.5oftheVotingRightsAct,theydetailwhichfacilitieswereexcluded,arguingthatthosepopulations

Statesmustadjusttheboundariesoftheirlegislativedistrictseverydecadeinordertocomplywiththeconstitutional,one-person,one-voterequirement.In1973,theU.S.SupremeCourtruledinMahan v. Howell, 410U.S.315,330-332,thatstatesdonotnecessarilyhavetousecensusdataforlegislativeredistrictingortoshowcompliancewiththeone-person,one-voterequirement.

UndertheU.S.SupremeCourt’sholdinginBurns v. Richardson,384U.S.73,92(1966),excludingcertainpopulationsinredistrictingispermissibleifitresultsinadistributionoflegislators“notsubstantiallydifferent”fromwhatwouldresultifstatecitizenpopulationwereused.InBurns,theCourtsaidithadnotrequiredstatestoincludealiens,transients,short-termortemporaryresidents,orthoseconvictedofacrimeandthereforeunabletovote,eitherinapportioningstatelegislativedistrictsortoshowcompliancewiththeEqualProtectionClause.

Untilitwasamendedin2001,theTexasConstitutionrequiredthatstateSenatedistrictsbedrawnbasedon“qualifiedelectors”—thoseeligibletovote—ratherthanonthetotalpopulation.Whiletherequirementhadlittlepracticaleffectafterthe“one-person,one-vote”SupremeCourtdecisionsofthe1960s,whichrequiredthatlegislativedistrictsbedrawn basedonequalpopulation, thenGov.BillClementsvetoedalegislativeredistrictingplanin1981becauseitdidnotapportionstateSenatedistrictsonthebasisof“qualifiedelectors.”

In1981,AttorneyGeneralMarkWhitesaidinanopinionthattheconstitutionalprovisionrequiring“qualifiedelectors”ratherthanpopulationasthebasisofsenatorialdistrictswasunconstitutionalonitsfaceandinconsistentwiththefederalconstitutionalstandard.TheopinioncitedKilgarlin v. Martin,252F.Supp.404,411(S.D.Tex.1966),whichfoundthestateconstitutionalprovisionviolatedtheEqualProtectionClausebecauseitdidnotrequire thatsenatorialdistrictsbeapportionedonapopulationbasistoproducedistricts ofasnearlyequalpopulationaspracticable.In2001,theprovisionoftheTexasConstitutionrequiringtheuseofqualifiedelectorsforSenatedistrictswasrepealedbyTexasvotersaspartofa“clean-up”amendmentintendedtoremoveobsoleteprovisions.

Excluding certain populations in redistricting


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arenoteligibletovoteandincludingthemwouldundulyskewthecounty’sone-person,one-votegoals.Somecountiespointoutthatanyadditionalminoritypopulationnumbersaprisonordetentionfacilitymightcontributetowardcreatingaminorityopportunitydistrict—whichisadistrictwithaminoritypopulationlargeenoughtoselectarepresentativeofitschoice—wouldnottranslatetovotingpowerbecauseinmatescannotvote.

Counting inmates at previous residence

Anotherapproachtocountinginmatesistocountthemattheaddresswheretheylivedbeforetheywereincarcerated.Marylandwillusethismethodforredistrictingin2011,aswillNewYorkandDelawareundertheirrecentlypassedlaws.

InMaryland,thefirststatetoimplementthelaw,stateofficialsareseekingtocompileanaccuratelistofpreviousresidencesforinmatescurrentlyhousedthere.TheirinitialstepwastogatherpreviousaddressesfromarrestrecordsandrecordsfromMaryland’sDepartmentofCorrections.Afterexaminingtheseaddresses,Marylandofficialscrosscheckedinmateidentificationnumberswithcourtrecords.Sometimesonerecordfilledingapsinanotherrecord.Forexample,anunusable,fictionaladdressonanarrestrecordcouldbesupplantedbyacorrectaddressfromacourtdocument.Theresultingdatacontainusablepreviousaddressesforallbutafewthousandinmates,accordingtotheMarylandDepartmentofLegislativeServices.Thethirdstepwillbetocontactinmatesdirectlywhenausableaddresscannotbedeterminedfromofficialrecords.

Onceanaccuratelistiscompiled,Marylandwillusethedatatoidentifyinmatesattheaddressesatwhichtheylivedbeforebeingincarcerated.Thestatewillusethisadjustedcensusdataduringits2011redistrictingprocess.

District size

Countinginmatesattheirpreviousresidencesorexcludingthemfromthepopulationforredistrictingpurposeswouldaffectequalpopulationrequirementswhendistrictsareredrawnusingthenewcensusdata.

Districtsofequalsizeareintendedtoensurethateachresidenthasequalinfluencewithgovernmentandelectedofficials. CourtshavestrictlyinterpretedArt.1,Sec.2,oftheU.S.Constitution,whichstatesthatrepresentatives“shallbeapportionedamongtheseveralstates…accordingtotheirrespectivenumbers,”asrequiringU.S.congressionalHouseseatsinthesamestatetohavepopulationsthatareasequalaspossible.

Thecourtshaveallowedsomedeviationfromexactpopulationequalityforlegislativeandotherdistrictswhenjustified.TheU.S.SupremeCourtheldinReynolds v. Sims,377U.S.533(1964),thattheEqualProtectionClauseofthe14thAmendmentrequiresonlythatstatelegislativedistrictsbesubstantiallyequalinpopulation.LaterSupremeCourtcaseshaveestablishedthatforstatelegislativedistricts,thecombinedtotaldeviationofthelargestandsmallestdistrictsfromtheidealdistrictpopulationcannotbegreaterthan10percent.Theidealdistrictpopulationisdeterminedbydividingthetotalstatepopulationbythenumberofdistricts.

Debate about where to count inmates

InTexas,inmatesarecountedforredistrictingpurposesmostlyinthedistrictswheretheycurrentlyarehoused.Advocatesforchangingthecurrentapproachhavearguedforeithercountinginmatesattheiraddressesbeforeincarcerationorexcludingthemaltogetherfrompopulationcountsforredistrictingpurposes.

Counting inmates at their previous address

Supporters of counting inmates at their addresses before they were incarceratedsayitwouldcreatemoreequitableresultsunderthe“oneperson,onevote”equalpopulationprincipleandwouldallowthedistrictsfromwhichinmatescametoretaintheresourcestheyneedtoservetheinmatepopulationwhentheyreturntotheirdistricts.Theysayanyadministrativechallengesassociatedwithidentifyingaddressescanbeovercome.

One person, one vote.Supporterssaycountinginmatesattheirpreviousaddresseswouldcreatemoreequitableresultsunderthe“one-person,one-vote”equal



districtpopulationrequirementestablishedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtinaseriesofdecisionsbeginninginthe1960s.Whendistrictshaveequalnumbersofpeople,eachperson’svotecountsthesameasthatofapersoninaneighboringdistrict.Forexample,adistrictwith100people,10ofwhomarenon-votinginmates,hasonly90peoplewhocanvote,andthusinfluencetheirrepresentative.These90peoplehavethesamevotingpoweras100peopleinadistrictwithnoinmates.Everyurbaninmatecountedasaruralresidentdecreasesthenumberofvotingruralresidentsrequiredforaruraldistrict.Asthenumberofvotingresidentsdeclines,theweightofavotebyaruralresidentincreases.These“phantom”ruralresidentshavesignificanteffectsondistrictcompositioninTexas.IntwocurrentTexasHousedistricts,inmatesmakeup12percentofthepopulation.Iftheinmatepopulationwereremovedfromthesedistricts’populationcounts,theywouldhavetoexpandgeographicallytobewithintheallowableequalpopulationrequirements.

Effects on district. Inmates’homecommunitiescannotaffordthelossinpopulationandsubsequentpoliticalcloutthatfollowinmatestowheretheyareincarcerated.Becauseinmatesdonotparticipateinthecommunitiesinwhichtheyareincarcerated,theirpopulationnumbersandpoliticalpowershouldstayinthecommunityfromwhichtheinmatescameandarelikelytoreturn.Supporterssayurbanareaslosesignificantpopulationwhencommunitymemberswhocommitcrimesaresenttoruralprisonsforincarceration.LargeurbanareaslikeHarrisandDallascountiescanlosethousandsofinmatestoruralcounties.AccordingtoNewYorkUniversity’sBrennanCenterforJustice,ofthemorethan650,000peoplewholeaveprisoneachyear,almostallofthemwillreturntotheirhomeneighborhoods.Whentheseinmatesreturn,theywillneedservicesandresourcestheirhomedistrictsmightnothavebeenabletosecureduetothetemporarylossofpopulationandpoliticalpower.

Inmate representation. Whilemanylegislatorsmaydoexemplaryworkrepresentinginmatestemporarilylocatedintheirdistricts,thefactthatinmatescannotvotemeanstoomanyareignored.Constituentserviceshouldbeconsideredadutyoflawmakers,andinflatedpopulationcountsshouldnotbearewardforhavingalargeinmatepopulation.

Administrative challenges.Thechallengesofidentifyingpreviousaddressesforinmatescanbeovercomeoncestatesdevelopandimplementreliablesystemsforgatheringaddresses.Forinstance,localpolicedepartmentsandthecourtscanbeinstructedtonotacceptP.O.boxesasresidences,buttorequireaphysicallocation,astheCensusBureaudoes.Moderndata-basesoftwareenablesstatestoadjustcensusdatabycountinginmatesattheirpreviousresidences.

Comparison to other groups. Inmatescanbedistinguishedfromothertemporaryresidentgroupswhoarecountedwheretheyreside.Thosecountedingrouphomesawayfromtheirhomeresidences,suchasmilitarypersonnelandcollegestudents,aremorelikelytoparticipateintheircommunitiesthanareinmates.Theseothertemporaryresidentgroupsalsoarelesslikelytoresettleintheirpreviouscommunitiesthanarereleasedinmates.InmatesaremoreappropriatelycomparedtomilitaryandU.S.StateDepartmentemployeesservingoverseas.ForapportionmentofU.S.Houseseats,overseasfederalemployeesarecountedinthestateswheretheyhave“enduringtiesandallegiance,”astandardapprovedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtinFranklin v. Massachusetts,505U.S.788(1992).Becausebothgroupsusuallyreturntothecommunitiesfromwhichcame,bothshouldbecountedintheirhomecommunities.

Opponents of counting inmates at their addresses before they were incarceratedsaythatinmatesshouldbecountedinthedistrictsinwhichtheycurrentlyareusingresourcesandthatidentifyingreliablepreviousaddressesforallthosewhoareincarceratedwouldbeadministrativelyburdensome.Inaddition,opponentssay,itwouldnotachievetheoneperson,onevoteidealbecauseasignificantnumberofconstituentsotherthaninmateswhoeithercannotvoteorarepresentinadistrictonlytemporarilyalsoarecountedinthedistrictinwhichtheyreside.

One person, one vote. Countinginmatesattheirpreviousaddresseswouldnotachievethe“oneperson,onevote”ideal.Electedofficialsrepresentasignificantnumberofconstituentsbesidesinmateswhocannotvote,suchaschildrenandnon-citizens,andpeoplewhoarepresentinadistrictonlytemporarily,suchascollegestudents.Whiletheseresidentsalsohave

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significanteffectsondistrictcompositioninTexas,theynonethelessarecountedaspartofthedistrictpopulationwheretheycurrentlyreside.Thesameprincipleshouldapplytothoseresidinginadistrictduringthetimetheyareincarcerated.

Effects on district.Thosewhoareincarceratedshouldbecountedwheretheyarehousedbecausethatiswheretheycurrentlyareconsumingresourcesandwheretheirpresenceiscurrentlyfelt.Whileurbancountiesmaylosepopulationwhenthosewhocommitcrimesaresenttoruralprisons,ruralcountiesalsolosepopulationtourbancountieswhenstudentsgoawaytocollege.Inaddition,therearenoguaranteesthataninmatewillreturntoapreviousaddress,whichisonereasonthatcensusofficialsofferforwhyinmatesarenotcountedattheaddresstheymaintainedbeforebeingincarcerated.Inmanycases,itmaybeyears,sometimesdecades,beforeinmatesreturntotheirpreviouscommunities,ifatall.

Inmate representation. Inmatesshouldbecountedwheretheyaredemandingservicesfromtheirlegislativerepresentatives,whichisinthecommunitywheretheyareincarcerated. Legislatorsfromdistrictsthathouselargeinmatepopulationssaytheytreattheirnon-votingincarceratedinmatesastheywouldanyotherconstituent.Inmatesknowtheirlocallegislatorsareresponsibleforconstituentserviceandtheydemandandreceivesuchservice.Inaddition,whiletheformercommunitiesofinmatesmightgainincreasedpoliticalcloutbyhavinginmatescountedthere,thiswouldnotimprovetherepresentationoftheinmatesthemselves,whodonotlivethere.

Administrative challenges.Countinginmatesattheirpreviousaddresseswouldposeadministrativechallenges,especiallycompilinganaccuratelistofpreviousresidences.CompilinganaccuratelistofaddressesisespeciallyimportantforcraftingU.S.Housedistricts,whichmusthaveabsolutelyequalpopulations,requiringthatareliableaddressbefoundforeachandeveryinmate.Inimplementingitsnewlaw,MarylandhasfoundaddressesthatnolongerexistandP.O.boxeslistedasaddresses,accordingtoMaryland’sDepartmentofLegislativeServices.

TheCensusBureauhasresistedcallstocountinmateswheretheylivedbeforetheywereincarcerated,sayingitisimpossibletoknowiftheinmatewilllivethereagain.Thebureaualsosaysitwouldhavetoobtaininformationfrominmates,thentiethatinformationbacktoaspecificaddressintheinmates’previouscommunities.Thebureauhasneithertheresourcesnorexpertisetocarrythisoutacrossthecountrybecausetherecordskeptbystateandlocalofficialsvaryandmaynotbereliable.

Comparison to other groups. Opponentsofcountinginmatesattheirpreviousaddressessaythatwhilefederalemployeesstationedabroadarecountedattheaddresswheretheylivedbeforebeingstationedoverseas,CensusofficialssaythisisbecauseofthereliabilityofStateandDefenseDepartmentrecordsandbecausethesegroupsreturntocertainspecificlocationsrequiredbytheiremployer.Itissufficientlycertainthesefederalemployees,unlikeinmates,willreturntothecommunitiesinwhichtheypreviouslyresided.Opponentssaythatforredistrictingpurposes,inmatesaremoreappropriatelycomparedtocollegestudentsandmilitarypersonnelinbarracksintheUnitedStates.Thecensuscountstheseindividuals,housedinlargegroupsettings,asresidentsofwheretheyarehoused.Moststatesdothesameforredistrictingpurposesbecausethesegroupsheavilyimpactthecommunitiesinwhichtheylive.

Excluding inmates

Supporters of excluding inmates from population countssayitwouldavoidshiftsoflegislativecloutfromonedistricttoanotherandwouldbesimpletoadminister.

One-person, one-vote.Excludinginmatesfrompopulationcountsforredistrictingwouldsubstantiallyfurthergoalsofone-person,one-votebypreventinginmatesfrombeingusedas“phantom”residentsthatartificiallyinflatethesizeofanydistrict.

Effects on district.Excludinginmatesalsowouldpreventanunnecessarytransferofpoliticalinfluencetoanyparticularlegislativedistrict.Inmateswouldnotbecountedinthedistrictswheretheyarehousedbutdid



notwillinglylocateandcannotparticipate,norwouldtheybecountedinthedistrictsfromwhichtheycamebutnolongerliveandmightnotreturn.

Inmate representation.Whilelawmakersstillwouldhavetorepresentandperformconstituentservicesforinmateseveniftheirnumberswereexcludedforredistricting,constituentrepresentationandserviceshouldbetreatedasaresponsibilityevenwithouttherewardofinflatedpopulationnumbers.

Administrative challenges.Excludinginmateswouldbeaneasypolicytoimplementbecauseitwouldnotrequiretheonerouscompilationofsometimesquestionablepreviousaddresses.StateofficialscanreadilyidentifyandstripoutinmatepopulationsfromdatatheCensusBureaualreadycollects,andmanyTexascountieshavedonesointhepastforredistrictingpurposes.

Opponents of excluding inmates from population countssaydoingsowouldcausethepopulationbasisofdistrictstobeunfairlyskewed.

One-person, one vote.Excludinginmatesfrompopulationcountsstillwouldnotachievethe“oneperson,onevote”idealbecauseotherconstituentswhocannotvoteorwhoarepresentinadistrictonlytemporarilywouldcontinuetoinflatethevotingpowerofpermanentresidentswhocanvote.Electedofficialsrepresenteveryoneintheirdistricts,notjustthosewhovote.

Effects on districts.Excludinginmatesstillwouldrequiretheboundariesoflegislativedistrictswithlargeinmatepopulationstoberedrawninordertomakecongressionalseatsequalandtoensurethatthepopulationsofstatelegislativeseatswerewithintheallowable10percentdeviation.Somedistrictswouldhavetogrow,causingarippleeffectwithpopulationtakenfromotherdistrictstocompensatefortheremovalofinmatesfromthepopulationbase.

Inmate representation.Likeeveryoneelse,inmatesneedtoberepresentedintheLegislature.Themosteffectivevoicetoheartheirconcernsisthelegislatorinwhosedistricttheyreside.Legislatorsrepresentinmatesjustastheywouldanyotherconstituentandshouldbeallowedtocounttheseinmatesaspartofthepopulationoftheirdistricts.

— by Tom Howe

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Staff:Tom Whatley, Director; Laura Hendrickson, Editor; Rita Barr, Office Manager/Analyst; Catherine Dilger, Kellie Dworaczyk, Tom Howe, Andrei Lubomudrov,Carisa Magee, Blaire Parker, Research Analysts

John H. Reagan BuildingRoom 420P.O. Box 2910Austin, Texas 78768-2910

(512) 463-0752

www.hro.house.state.tx.us

Steering Committee:

David Farabee, Chairman Bill Callegari, Vice Chairman Drew Darby Harold Dutton Dan Gattis Yvonne Gonzalez Toureilles Carl Isett Susan King Jim McReynolds Jose Menendez Geanie Morrison Elliott Naishtat Rob Orr Joe Pickett Todd Smith
