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Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO Case Digest
Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO
402 SCRA 612
G.R. No. 155001
May 5, 2003
Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders,
explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA
airport terminal, so they formed Asians EmergingDragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the
government for the development of NAIA Intl.
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA
approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited,
and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo)
was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference
was given to Paircargo, but still the project was
awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated
into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The
DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession
agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said
terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in
the matters of pertaining to the definition of the
obligations given to the concessionaire, development
of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the
termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the
maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II,
it has a contract with several service providers. The
workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that
they would lose their job, and the service providers
joined them, filed and entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
Filed for motion for intervention. Likewise several
employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the
legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen
filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her
speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which
the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and
void.
Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement
is void, together with its amendments for beingcontrary to the constitution.
Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for
being contrary to public policy. The amendments have
the effect of changing it into and entirely different
agreement from the contract bidded upon. The
amendments present new terms and conditions which
provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have
the altered the technical and financial parameters of
other bidders had they know that such terms were
available. The 1997 concession agreement, theamendments and supplements thereto are set aside
for being null and void.
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced
by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to
be taken away from them.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EMPLOYEES’ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.
FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act
No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution
No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in
the Commission. To support the implementation of
such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution,
authorized the augmentation of a commensurate
amount generated from savings under Personnel
Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR
“collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing
modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one
Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three
Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting
Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modificationand upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for
its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin
Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBM’s
disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-
Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the
plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of
petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-CentralOffice to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that
the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority
mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of
reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of
positions. The CSC-Central Of fice denied CHREA’s
request in a Resolution and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights
validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
HELD:
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the
CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the
CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify,
and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the
DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable.
Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of
Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned,
particularly with regard to the upgrading and
reclassification of positions therein. The CHR,
although admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.as the law’s designated body toimplement and administer a unified compensation
system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
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administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In
Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we
echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
Automotive industry workers v Romulo
Facts: Petitioners, composed of ten (10) labor unions,
call upon this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review to declare as unconstitutional an executive
order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers.
On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code
was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715
declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the
DOLE for program and policy coordination only while
the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its
regional branches and personnel, was turned over to
the NLRC Chairman. The subject E.O. No. 185, in
authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise
administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional
branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-
Rep. Act No. 6715 set-up, amending the latter law
which only Congress can do.
Issue: Rights and interests are allegedly violated and
prejudiced by Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March
2003 whereby administrative supervision over the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its
regional branches and all its personnel including the
executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was
transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Held: All things considered, whether or not E.O. No.
185 is indeed unconstitutional will have to await the
proper party in a proper case to assail its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition dated 27 March 2003 is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Ratio: Petitioners have not shown that they have
sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185.
As labor unions representing their members, it cannot
be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and
interests considering that the scope of the authorityconferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend
to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. 13 Thus, only NLRC personnel who
may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of
Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section
1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to
have a direct and specific interest in raising the
substantive issue herein.
The subject matter of E.O. No. 185 is the grant of
authority by the President to the Secretary of Labor to
exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its
regional branches and all its personnel, including the
Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its
impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is
thereby limited to the departments to which it is
addressed. Takingour cue from the early case of Olsen
v. Herstein and Rafferty, 18 the subject executive
order can be considered as nothing more or less than
a command from a superior to an inferior.