11,C w r p
22,C w r p
r
w
2 2,L Ka a
2 2,L Ka a
1 11K La r a w p
Factor-price determination in the 2x2 case (i)
11,C w r p
22,C w r p
r
w
2 2,L Ka a
2 2,L Ka a
2
2L
K
a
a
2
2L
K
a
a
111 1
L
K K
p ar w
a a
Factor-price determination in the 2x2 case (ii)
11,C w r p
22,C w r p
r
w
2 2,L Ka a
2 2,L Ka a
2
2L
K
a
a
2
2L
K
a
a
Factor-price determination in the 2x2 case (iii)
11,C w r p
22,C w r p
r
w
2 2,L Ka a
2 2,L Ka a
2
2L
K
a
a
2
2L
K
a
a
w(p)
r(p)
111 1
L
K K
p ar w
a a
Factor-price determination in the 2x2 case (iv)
11 1, 'C w r p p r
w
2 2,L Ka a 2 2,L Ka a
2
2L
K
a
a
2
2L
K
a
a
w(p’)
r(p’)
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
1
1 11 , 1f L Kp
2
2 22 , 1f L Kp
K
L
The Lerner diagram (i)
unit-revenue isoquant
Step 1: set technologies and good prices
1
1 11 , 1f L Kp
2
2 22 , 1f L Kp
K
L
wL/y1 + rK/y1 = 1 (unit isocost, common to both
sectors)
1/w
1/r
-w/r
unit-revenue isoquant
Profit-max. point for sector 1
Profit-max. point for sector 2
Step 2: determine profit-maximization points and factor prices
The Lerner diagram (ii)
1
1 11 , 1f L Kp
2
2 22 , 1f L Kp
2
2 2/
KK y a
K
L
(w,r)
(w,r)
1
1K
L
a
a
wL/y1 + rK/y1 = 1 (unit isocost)
1/w
1/r
1
1 1/
KK y a
1
1 1/
Ly aL 2
2 2/
Ly aL
-w/r
unit-revenue isoquant
2
2K
L
a
a
Step 3: determine equilibrium factor intensities given factor prices
The Lerner diagram (iii)
1
1 1
1
1,f L K
p
2
2 2
2
1,f L K
p
2
2 2/
KK y a
K
L
(w,r)
(w,r)
wL/y1 + rK/y1 = 1
1/w
1/r
1
1 1/
KK y a
1
1 1/
Ly aL 2
2 2/
Ly aL
-w/r
This one can’t: out of the DC
Step 4: identify diversification cone
This endowment can be fully employed by a linear combination of industries 1 and 2’s factor intensities: in the DC
The Lerner diagram (iv)
1
1K
L
a
a
2
2K
L
a
a
1
1 11 , 1f L Kp
2
2 22 , 1f L Kp
2
2 2/
KK y a
K
L
(w,r)
(w,r)
1
1K
L
a
a
wL/y1 + rK/y1 = 1 (unit isocost)
1/w
1/r
1
1 1/
KK y a
1
1 1/
Ly aL 2
2 2/
Ly aL
-w/r
The Lerner diagram with everything in it
unit-revenue isoquant
Profit-max. point for sector 1
Profit-max. point for sector 2
2
2K
L
a
a
K
LO
V1’
V2
11La y2
2La y
11Ka y
22 'Ka y
1 1 1, , ,L KA a w r a w r
2 2 2, , ,L KA a w r a w r
Home diversification cone
Home labor endowment
Home capital endowment
= V2’
22Ka y
V2’
11 'La y
The Rybczynski Theorem
K
L
K*
O
O’L*
V1
V2
11La y2
2La y
11Ka y
22Ka y
1 1 1, , ,L KA a w r a w r
2 2 2, , ,L KA a w r a w r
Home diversification cone
Home labor endowment
Home capital endowment
= V2
The factor-price equalization set
22,C w r p
r
w
2 2,L Ka a
1 1,L Ka a
Factor-price determination in the 2x2 case: Factor-intensity reversal
2 2,L Ka a
1 1,L Ka a
More flexible technologyIn this cone, both industries are more labor intensive than in the other one
K
L
K*
O
O’L*
Fi (factor content of trade)
ADi = Vi - Fi (consumption)
Home labor endowment
Home capital endowment
(home is cap-abundant) Vi (production)
The factor content of production and consumption
1KF
1LF
K
L
K*
O
O’L*
ADi = Vi - Fi (consumption)
Home labor endowment
Home capital endowment
Vi (production)
The factor content of production and consumption: Trade surplus
1LF
1KF
Chemicals
Machinery
Textiles
Apparel
K
L
y
time
y
time
Chemicals
Machinery
Apparel
y
time
y
time
Textile
Time path of capital accumulation
Leontieff isoquants
A
B
wS/wU
H/L
Skill premium under autarchy
FPE set
Skill premium after liberalization
H/L
wS/wU
Stolper-Samuelson effects
No FPE set
Autarky
wS/wU
H/L
Skill premium under autarchy
FPE set before the big 5’s entry
Skill premium after liberalization
H/L
wS/wU
FPE set after the big 5’s entry
Asia in the 70s
LA in the 90s
LA’s liberalization vs. Asia’s: Wood’s argument
Defensive skill-biased technical change (Thoenig-Verdier)
α (proportion of low-tech firms)
(unit hazard rate of innovations)
/RH c
α0
E0
“No-bias condition”
R&D sector’s resource constraint
1 0S
dV V
dt
0d
dt
1 0S
dV V
dt
Defensive technical change
0 V1 down
VS up
meaning “per sector” (look at R&D resource constraint)
Defensive skill-biased technical change (Thoenig-Verdier)
α (proportion of low-tech firms)
(unit hazard rate of innovations)
/RH c
/RnH c
0d
dt
α0
α1
E0
E2 “No-bias condition”: unaffected by trade opening
R&D sector’s resource constraint: shifts up with trade opening
before trade
after trade
0 21
E1
i
unit costs
C(.)
C*(.)
C’(.)
Production migrating to the South
i
E0
E1
'i
Production staying in the North
C*’(.)
Offshoring with a continuum of goods
1/
n
zero-profit condition
Consumers’ budget constraint
c (consumption per head)
markup
Monopolistic competition: fixed markup
1/
n
zero-profit condition
Consumers’ budget constraint
c (consumption per head)
markup
Monopolistic competition: variable markup
ij ij ijS f
ijd
ijM
0ij 0ij
0ij
firm 1
firm 2
firm 1firm 2
no exports
OLS estimate
Elasticity to estimate (constant and common to all firms)
Figure 5.1