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    Trustees of Princeton University

     

    Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence

    Authors(s): Robert Jervis

    Source: World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jan., 1989), pp. 183-207

    Published by: Cambridge University Press

    Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407

    Accessed: 28-03-2016 10:40 UTC

     

    REFEREN ES 

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      RATONALDETERRENCE

     Theoryand Evdence

     By ROBERTJERVS*

    AMONGt h e mot mport an t q u e t on n o c a c e n ce are t he

    c au e an d e f fe c t of t h re a t an d f orc e n n te rnat on ap o t c w e

     arepartcuary nteretednwhenthreatprotectthe tateandwhen by

    c ont ra t t h e y e t of f a p ra of c oun te rth rea t t h at e av e b ot h d e w ore

    offthantheywoud havebeenhadthe tateadoptedanaternatvepo

      cy2Schoar andtatemenwoud fndtheprobemea y ftheeffect

    w ere n v arant e f ap rop ery c on t ru ct e d p o c y of t hre at aw ayp ro

     tectedthe tatea tmghthaveprotectedBrtan andFrance nthe

    930 orf t h re a t aw ay p rov e dn e ff e ct v e orp rovo c at v e a mayh av e

     beentheca ebeforeWordWar 3But nfactboththreat andconc a-

     toncanproducetheveryconequencetheywerede gnedtoavod

    Of e c onc e rn t o t a te me n t han t o c h o ar are met h od oog c ad e

     bateoverthereatve advantageofdeductonand nducton4andthe

    me rt of t h e orzn gb ae d on t h e a umpt on t h at a c to r b e hav orc an b e

     * am gratefu to Davd Badwn Heen M ner Kenneth Oye Robert Shapro and Jack

     Snyderforcomment andugget on

      For an assessment of the relevant evidence from outside international politics considered

     wth n the frameworks deveoped by studes of nternatona deterrence see Pau Stern et a

     eds PerspectvesonDeterrenceNew YorkOxfordUnverstyPressforthcomng

     2 For an extended dscusson see Robert Jervs Percepton and Mspercepton n nternatona

     Politics (Princeton Princeton University Press, I976), chap 3 Also see Aaron Wildavsky,

      Practca Consequences of the Theoretca Study of Defense Po cy Pub c Admnstrat on

     Review 25 (March i965), 90-I03 For a recent summary of the evidence, see Martin Patchen,

     Resovng D sputes Between Natons Coercon or Conc aton? Durham NC Duke Unversty

     Press 988 A comp catng factor s that many abstract and seemngy hstor ca or scentf c

     arguments are drven by po tca preferences because debates about deterrence are centra to

     Amercan foregn po cy Thus many dsagreements about the org ns of Word Wars and

      orKhrushchevsratona tyn puttngmss es nCubaarenotpurey academc

     3 These cases are more comp cated than the stereotypes commony used by po tca sc-

      entsts See Robert Jervs War and Mspercepton Journa of nterdscp nary Hstory 8

     (Spring 1988), 685-88 Patrick Glynn, The Sarajevo Fallacy, National Interest, No 9 (Fall

      987 3-32 Rchard Ned Lebow and Jance Gross Sten Beyond Deterrence Journa of So-

      c a u e 4 3 N o 4 9 88 3 3- 35 -

     4 See for exampe Oran R Young Professor Russett ndustrous Taor to a Naked Em-

      peror Word Pot cs 2 Apr 969 486-5 Bruce Russett The Young Scence of nter-

     natona Po tcs Word Pot cs 22 October 969 87-94 K aus Knorr and James Rosenau

     eds Contendng Approaches to nternatona Po tcs Pr nceton Prnceton Unversty Press

      9 6 9 e s p M a r onLev y Jr Do es tM a t te r f He s N a ked ?Bawed theCh d

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     184WORLDPOLTCS

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      6AchenandSnda RatonaDeterrenceTheoryandComparatveCaeStude Word

     P o t c 4 Janu ary 989 156-59

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS185

     whetherthephenomenawearemot ntereted nmoreco eyre embe

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     186WORLDPOLTCS

     e ary t h e ame Th e a t te rc an b e app e d t op art c u arc a e w t h ou t

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS187

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     RATONAL DETERRENCETHEORES

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     b o th 5 f p re c rp t v e t ayw h at a ct o r h ou dd o t omaxmze t h e r

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     188WORLDPOLTCS

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     c ome ac t on w produ ce t t h en h ard tod e v e op v e rf ab e p ropo

    t on f romt h e t he ore E c on omt h ave n o t b ee n ab e t omode t h e b e

     h av orof o g opo t n eary a d e te rmn t c a y a t h eyh av e t hat of t he

    wheatfarmerfacngamarkethecannot nfuence ThegameofChcken

      6B u t e e Ke n ne th Wat zTh e ory of n t e rnat ona P o t c Re adn gMA Addon We e y

    979Th e ap p c a t on of t he d e aof ev ou t onarydyn amc n ot e nt re y t raght forward

    Trat w t h u rvv av au e d on o t au tomat c ay ap pe art h ey c an u rvv e e v en f t h ey ac k u c h

     vaue Agreatdeadepend ontheharhne oftheenvronmentandthecompetton For

     g oodd c u on of e v ou t on and SEU mode e e Rc h ardNe on an d Sydn e yWn te rAn

     EvoutonaryTheoryofEconomcChangeCambrdgeHarvardUnvertyPre 982 and

     TmothyMcKeown TheLmtaton ofStructura Theore ofCommerca Pocy nter

    n at ona Organ za t on 40W n te r986 52-55

    17Wh et h erp re c rp t v e d e c rp t v e orb o t h t of te n unc e arw he t he rt h e c am t h at

    t h e po c y an ap propra t e w ay t ore a ch t h e p eron g o a ort h e be t w ay t od o oTh e a t te r

     an d t ron g erc am obv ouy e x t re me ydf f c u t t ov erf y n c e d ong ore q u re c omparn g

     t he re u t of t he p o c yw t h t ho e mput ed t o a t e rnat v e n on e v er on t ho e p o c e t h e

     peronthoughtofand nanotherver ona thoethatcoudhavebeenadopted A trct nter

     p ret a t on of S EU w oud mpy t h at t h e p o c y t h e be t on e mot t e t n o c a c e n ce more

     modety eektodemontratethatthepocy adequateforthegoa

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS189

    d o e n o t h av e ad e te rmn an t ou t on n man y t u at on g ame t h eory

     precrbe am xedorrandomzedtrategyOfcoure gametheoryye d

     greatn ght ntohowactortrytoout thnkandoutbuffeachother

     butthecompettveandvarab e umnatureofthe tuatonmeanthat

      choar cannotproducedeductonon themode n tuatonXtheac

     t o raw ay h ou d orw doY We c an t ry t oh ow t h at t h e a ct o rc a

    c u a t on are c on t e nt w t h d e te rre n ce b u t th re qu re o ok ng n to t h e

     b a c k b ox of de c on mak ng8

     A t t h p on t h ow ev e rt h e g re a te t d f f c u t y n a e n gRD T d e te r

     mn n g e x ac t yw h at t A A c he n and Sn d an o t e t h e g en e ra a ump

    t on of S EU c an y e d an e n ormoun umbe rof u b t an t v e t he ore Th ere

      thennooneRDT onecanarguethatthereareat eata manytheore

     a thereareauthor orthattherearenotheore becauenooneha de

    v e ope d on e w t h u f f c e nt rg orA c h e n and Sn d a b re f u b t an t v e

     d c u on of d et e rre nc e u t ra te t h e prob e m9Wh e t t rue t h at

      omeratona deterrencetheort havepontedto thenegatveapectof

     d e fe n v e y t e m u c h ac v d e fe n e t he AB M an d SD o t he rre e c t

     t h p o t on argun g t h at u n e t h e Un t e d S ta t e re t an ome ab t y t o

     p rot ec t t e f t t hre at w ac k c re d b t y 20The d ag re eme nt p art y

     rooted ndfference aboutthepoturethat betfora country kethe

    U n t ed S t a te t h at n e ed t op rot e ct n o t on y t h ome an dbut a o t a

      e t a o c a u ed b y d c r ep an t v ew o f t h e go a a nd b e e f o f t he

     SovetUnonqueton that eout deageneratheoryofdeterrence

    B ut w h at mport an t n t h c ont e xt t h at b o t h pon t of v e w c an be

     mod e e d a RD TS

     Th ambgutymake thetheoryextremeyhardtod confrmAre

     wetocounttheReaganadmn traton advocacyofSD a evdence

     g an t t he v ad t y of ra t on ad e t erren c e? t he f a c t f t af a c t th at

     theSovetUnondoe notapprecatethevrtue ofmutuavunerab ty

     evdencethatthearm anddoctrneofat eatoneof theuperpower

     cannotbeexpanedby th theory? RDTconfrmedbythefactthatthe

     Ru an w t h drew t h e rm e f romC ub aord c onf rmedb e c au e

     theydepoyedthem nthefr tpaceand wereabetoexact ome

    c onc e on f romt h e Un t e d S ta t e a t h e prc e f orw t h drawa?

     18A good ummary of re ev ant t e ra t ure Robe rt W on D et e rre nc e n O gopo t c

     C omp e t t on n S t ern e t a e d f n

      9A ch e n and Sn d a f n 6 153

     20S e e f ore xamp e Ab e rt Woh t e tt e r Sw ordW t hou t Sh e d Nat ona n t ere t No

    8 S umme r987 3 57C o n GrayNu c e arS t rat egy an dNat on aS t y e L an hamMD

    H amt on P re 986P art of t h e ex p an at on f ort h d pu te ad ag re e me nt on w h et he r

    d ec o n m ak er f oc u o n r e at v e or a b o u te g a n a n d o e S ee J er v f n O 9 84 5 9- 63

     ArthurSten Demma ofnterdependenceLogc ofnternatonaConfct andCooperaton

     forthcomng

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     190WORLDPOLTCS

    EMPRCALCRT CSMSANDSECONDWAVEDETERRENCETHEORY

     Weneedtod tngu hbetweentheknd ofRDTthatcoudbedeve

     opedandthoethathavebeenmotthoroughy d cu edSomeofthe

     c rt c m rae d by e mprc a t u d e 2are ame d at t h e f ormerman y

     howeverarea medattheatter Thebetknownandbet deveoped

     RDTknowna ca ca or econdwave deterrencetheory22

    make an umbe rof re t rc t v e aump t on un re a te d t ora t on at y Th e e

    n c u de t h e t a te ad ve rary h gh ymot v at e d to e x p an d t h e ad ve rary

    un de rt and t h at t h e t a t e d e fe n v e an d t he e ade ron b o t h d e are

    c onc e rn e dman yw t h t he e x t ern a t u at on Th p art y e x p an w h y

      th e f oc u on t hre at an d o t t e ro e f ore e e n f or n duc e me n t M an y

    f n dn g c on trad c t th e e au x ary a umpt on bu t cou db e a c commo

     datedbya broaderRDT Thu RchardNedLebowandJanceStenhave

     demontratedthat tatemenmayadoptdeterrencepoc e thatarenot

    n t h e n at on a n t ere t b e c au e t h e y are a c t n g on t he b a of t he rd o

    me t c orp e ron a n t ere t F ore xamp e on e re aon w hyNe hruman

     tanedthe forwardpo cy n962agan tcredbe threat byChnato

    t ake d pu te d t errt oryw a t h at h e h ad t ak edh d ome t c p o t c af or

     t u ne on t an dn gf rm23Wh e t h k n d of b e hav ord o e n o t f t t h e

      ec ondw av e mod e an d k e y t on c rea e c on f c t t he re n o th n g

     n ec e ar y rra t on a ab out t a t hou gh a w e w n ote b e ow dome t c

    p re u re of t e n e ad t o e v e re yb a e dn f ormat on pro ce n g

    Sm ary ara t on at h eory c an e a y n c orp ora te a e c on d f n dn gby

    t h e emprc a c rt c t a te may c re a te a c on front a t on org o t ow arn o t

      n t h e h op e of mak ngp o t v e g an bu t n ord ert o av od t h e o e t h at

    are f ore e e n un e t h eyd oSO24E x pe c te d u t t y t he ore of w ar are

      omet me ummarze d a a e rt ng t h at t a t e w f gh t on yf t h e e x

    p e ct e d g an are g rea t ert h an th e e xp e ct ed c o t e t h at t h e t a t e w n ot

     f gh t f t t h n k t h e re u t w b e w ore t han t h e t a tu q u oB u t t h

    an e rrort h e re n ore aon w hy t h e t a t e h ou db e e v e t h at af u t ure

    21Forc onv e n en c e w t rea t t he e e mprc a t u d e a t hou gh t h e met h od an d re u t

    w e re e n t re y c omp at b e w t h e ac h o th e rw h c h n ot th e c a e

     2 2 F or a d c u o n o f th e e co nd w av e e e Je rv f n 0 9 79 2 9 3 0 t h o u d a o b e

    n o te d t h at w h e t h e e w rt n g are g e n eray c a e d a t h e ory t h e yd on ot me et t rc t c rt era

     f ort h d e gn at on

     23SeeRchardNedLebowBetweenPeaceandWarBa tmore MDTheJohn Hopkn

     U n v er t yP re 98 Robe rt Jerv Rc h ardNe dL eb ow an dJan c e Gro S t e n Py c h o

    ogy andD e te rre n ce B at more MD Th e Joh n H opk n U n v e rt yP re 985L e b ow and

    S t e n f n 3 amu n g t he Ne hru c a e d raw n f romRc h ardNedL e bow an dNev e M ax

    w e n d a C h na W a r N ew Y or k P a nt he on 9 7 0 a a t y z ed u t r at o n a nd a m g n or

    n g t he c omp ex t e an d ambgu t e

    24F ora marargumen t e e Ph p Te t o c Te t n gD e te rre nc e Th eory S ome Con ce p

     t u a a n d Me th od o og c a u e J ou rn a o f S oc a u e 4 3 N o 4 9 87 8 5- 92

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS191

     w t hou t aw arw b e k e t he t a tu q u of t e x pe c t t h e f ut u re t ob e

     b e tt er t c an ra t on ay e e k to av od aw art h at t t h n k w oudy e d g

    n f c an t b en e f t f t e x pe c t t h e t a t u q u o t od e te rorat e b ady t c an

    ra t ona yun de rtak e aw arwh oe e x p ec t ed u t t y mu ch e t h an ze ro

     TheJapanee dec ontoattackPearHarborandtheGermandec on

     t og o t ow arn 94may e x e mpf y t h t ype a t h ough w e h ou dn o t e

     ag an t hat t h a ume t h e a ct o rp rob ab t y an du t t y e t mat e w h c h

      nretropectmayappeartobe bzarre

     Butathoughratonatyneednotbe nquet onherethe tandardfor

    mu at on of d e t erren ce are Wh e n th e o e t h at t h e t a t e f ear t em

    f romt h e ad ve rary t h re a t an dh o t t y n d c at n g t h e p re e n ce of a p

    rap ro c e f u rt h ert h rea t f romt he a t te rw rare y re d uc e t he c onf c t

    Th u w h e an SEU mode c ou db e app rop ra t e t h e u e of e c on dw ave

     deterrenceprecrpton woudnot nfactmaxmze ut ty25

    Ne ve rth e e on e p art c u arapp c a t on of t h e d e a t hat t a t e c ou d ra -

     tona yfghtbecaue theyfearedadeteroratonofthe tatuquo fthey

     ddn o t t and a a c e nt ra n gh t of e c on dw ave t h eort Th ey t re e d

     t h e p rob e mof c r n t ab t y e t h e dan ge rt h at on e d e w ou d

      au nc h af r t t rk e n o t b ec au e t w a aggre v e orb e e v e d th at w ar

    w ap re f erab e t op ea c e b u t b ec au e t w a u re t hat t he o t h er d e w a

     abouttoattackandbe evedthat trkngf rt wa betterthantr kng

      econd26Secondwavetheor t coudhavebroadenedth n ghtntoa

     genera argumenta tatedefendngthetatu quomut rea urethe

     c h ae n ge rt h at t w n g t ore p ec t t he a t t e rv t a n t ere t e n u re

     t h at t h e adv e raryd o e n o t e e t a ag gre v e an dmn mze t h e e cu rt y

     d e mma e mn mze t h e e x te n t tow h c h t he a c t on t h e t a t e t ak e t o

    n cre a e t e c urt yd e cre a e t h e adv e rary e cu rt y 27That e c ondw av e

     t he ort d dn o t d oo a t trb u tab e e t o t he rg e n era t h e ore of n

     ternatona pot c thantotherbe efthattheSovetUnonundertood

     thatAmercanm taryadvantagewoudonybeu edtoenhancedeter

     rencenotto undermneSovet ecurty

     25For this reason, Lebow and Stein argue that the resulting theory would not be one of

     deterrence Rational Deterrence Theory I Think, Therefore I Deter, World Politics 4I

      J a nua ry 9 8 9 2 1 2- 1 4A s o s e eG eo rg e a nd Smokefn 1 4 8 - 8 2

     26 The classic statements are Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, Foreign

     Affairs 37 (January I959), 2II-34, and Thomas Schelling, The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise

     Attack, in Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge Harvard University Press, I 960), chap

     9 Many previous wars developed because decision makers believed that the c hoice was be-

     tween war now and war later Warner Schilling et al, American Arms and a Changing Eu-

     rope (New York: Columbia University Press, I973), I72-74. For an argument that the main

     danger of such dynamics today is largely psychological, see Robert Jervis, Implications of the

     Nucear Revouton thaca, NY Corne Unversty Press, forthcomng , chap 5

     27 Indeed these points follow from a full SEU model see John Mueller, Retreatfrom Dooms-

     day The Obsoescence of Maor War New York Basc Books forthcomng

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     192WORLDPOLTCS

    An ot he rf n dn g t rou b e ome n ot on yf ort h e e c on dw ave b u t ao

     formanyotherdeterrencetheore eventhoughratonaty agannot

     a t u e Th e n ee d f oran dp o b t e of d e te rre nc e n p e rph era are a

     dependn partoncommtment beng eena nterdependentThat

     theUntedState cancredbythreatentore thot emove anywhere

      becauetorefranfromdong owoud undermnecommtment

      throughoutthegobeBut tappearthatother donotpercevecommt

     menta otghty nkedandthattheoutcome ofconfrontatonare de

     t e rmn e d t o ag rea t ere x t en t by e ac h d e n t rn c n t ere t n t h e u e a t

    t ake Th e re u t c an b e mod e e dn t e rmof SEU bu t many of t h e e xt en

    on of d e t erren ce t h eory t oow -e ve c onf c t w h ave t ob e modf e d

    Toreturntotheframeworkeaborated ntheopenngparagraph

      econdwavetheort wereamot excu veyworredthatdeterrence

     w ou d f a b e cau e a t a tu q u op ow er ac ke d t he t ren g th k orre ov e

      to re t o r e v en more k e y t h at an e x pan on t w ou dn c orre c t y b e

    e v e th at th e t a t u q u op owe rw aw e ak n an y of t h e e w ay p art c u

     ary t he a t n ame dTh eort w e re n o t c on ce rne d t hat p ra of h o t t y

    andthreatperceptoncouddeveopoutoftheunntendedconequence

    of e a ch d e b e hav orAg an t he re aon q u t e t ragh tf orw ard S ov e t

     expanon mwa takenforgranted

      t ofcoure perfecty egtmatefora theoryofdeterrencetotake

     h o t t y a agv e n An y t h eoryh at o t art omew h ere an dp o c yb ae d

    on e c on dw av e t he orymayb e w e d e gn e d t od ea w t h c e rt an k n d

     of e xp an on t t a te B u t RDT h ave n od agn o t c t he y ayn o t h n g

     abouthowtatemenaretodetermneother ntenton28 andcae tud

    e re ve a t h at f t h e o t he r d e e e k man y e c urt y d e te rre nc e c an fa

     throughthedeveopmentofconfct pra 29Secondwavetheorymay

    t he n p rovd e ag oodd e c rp t on of Ame rcan p o c y n t h e C odWarbu t

    am e adngp c t u re of t h e c on e q u en ce of t h p o c y Th e Un t e d S ta t e

     mayhaveuedthreata theecondwaverecommend butthereut

     mayhavebeentoncreaeconfct andmakethenatone ecure

     Theprobemof boththeorzng andpocy makngwoudbemuch

     ea er ftherewereonyone ourceofdeterrencefa ureBut ncethe

    t a te c an no t e a y d e t ermn e t he ad v erary n t en t on an dh ow t w

     28F oraf u rth e rd c u on e e G eorge an d Smok e f n 77-78G e orge an d Smok e f n

     14 8 82Je rv f n 10 1979 Th e u e of t h e t erm d agn o t c n G e org e an d Smok e f n

    14 8ore fe rt o t h e u t t y of d et erren c e th eoryn p on t n g ou t t he t u at on n w h c h d et e r

     rence keytobe chaengedbutthetheorycannotte tatemenwhethertheyarefacng

      u c h a t u at on

     29Th a ow a t h e man p on t of e are rc rt c of t h e e c on dw av e e e f ore x amp e

    C h are Og oodAn At e rnat v e t oWarorS u rren d er U rban aU n v er t y of n o P re

     962

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS193

     reacttowhatthe tatedoe tmut guardagantbothappeaementand

     provocatonDec onmaker thenconfrontmoreptfa andhavea

     wderrangeofchoce than truenthe tuatoncontempatedbythe

    e c on dw ave An RD Tc ou dman t an a t re on t hre at an d f orc e b u t

     c amt o ap py on yw h e n a t a tu q u o t a t e f a ce dw t h ara t ona e x

    p an on t t a te Th w oudp re erv e muc h of t he t h eoryp ow e rand

      parmon y at t he c o t of mt n g t d oman A t e rn at ve y RD Tc ou db e

     broadenedtotakeaccountofa wderrangeofprobem andmoretoo

     of tatecraftt coudthencovermorecae butwoudhavetobemuch

     morecompexTh compextydoe notmeanthatratonaand/orde

    d u ct v e t h eore are mpo b e b u t th e a tt e mp t t o e nc omp a b o th p ra

     anddeterrencedynamc doemeanthatthereu tngtheorycannether

     be extremeypar monou norconcernedpredomnantywththreat

     forceandcoercon30

    Th e f n dng p re e nt e d of arc a n t o q ue t on mport an t p art of

    econdwavedeterrencetheoryand howthattherearemutp epattern

    bu t th e y e ave un tou ch ed t h e b ac c am of SEU Aft e rab re f d c u on

     of ame th odoog c ap rob e mw e w d c u t h e ca e t u dy argume nt

     thatare ncon tentwthbothtandarddeterrenceandratona mode

      BASN CASESELECTON

     AchenandSnda havetre edthatdeterrencefa urecannotbecom

    p e t e y und e rt ood by t u dyn gon yn t an c e n w h c h th e y o cc u rap on t

     thatwh efrequentynotedn theabtractha oftenbeengnored3 So

    c a c e n t t g e ne ray b e gn an d oft e n en d t he rre e arc h by oc at n g

     exampe nwhchtheoutcomeofnteretha occurredandthenookng

    b ack n t me f orf act o rt h at e e mt ob e n k ed t o t h e out c ome Th pro

    c ed u re t e nd t o c h ara ct erze t u d e of a an ce armrac e t h e pro cu re

     me nt of w e ap on c v un re t an d rev ou t on a w e a of w ar an dd e

     30Thu Georgeha tre edtheneedtodeveopdfferentatedtheorebecaue cae areof

    d f f ere nt t ype G e org e and Smoke f n A e x and e rLG e org e Ph pF are y an dA e x

    an de rD a n e d U S S ov et S e cu rt yC oop era t on Ne w Y ork Oxf ordU n v er t yP re

      988 c h ap an d 29G e org e and Smoke f n 4 170-73A p ara e argume n t froman

     o th e rf e d t hat n o n g e t h eory c apab e of e x p an n gn t e rn at ona t rad e n a c om

     mod t e an d at a t me A E Agra aTh e Th eory of n t ern at on aTrad e L ond on C room

     H e m 983 85a o e e Robe rt Gpn Th e P o t c aE c on omyof n t e rn at on aRe a t on

      P rn ce t on P rn c e ton U n v er t yP re 987 74-80 F orf urt he rd c u on of w hy t h e t he

     orywoudno ongerbeoneof deterrence eeLebowandStenfn 25

     3A c h en an d Sn d a f n 6 60-63a o e e L eb ow and S t e n f n 3 7-8G e org e an d

     S mo ke f n 5 6 - 7 J e rv L eb ow a n d S te n f n 2 3 3 J e r v f n 2 3 68 -7 0 A r d L ev t e

      nt e g e nc e and S t rat e g c S urp re Ne w York C oumb aU n v er t yP re 987 23-24 n

    Th e WarTrapNe w H av e n Y ae U n v er t yP re 98 B ruc e B ue n od e Me qu t a argue

      th at o c a c e n ce h ou d e e k on yn e ce ary c on d t on n w h c h c a e t h e p rob e mdoe n o t

     ar e Th e mt at on of t h ap pro ac h are obv ou h owe v er

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     194WORLDPOLTCS

     terrencefaure tcannetherye d nformatononthereat ve

     frequencyofthee event norprovethatthevarabe thatarea ocated

    w t h t h e ou t come are more th an n ec e ary c on d t on Th at t he e v ar

    ab e mayb e p re e n t n man y c ae n w h c h t he ou tc ome df f ere nt

    n d ee d n p rn c p e t h e y c ou db e un v e ra

      Ca e e e c t on n t u d e of d e t erren c e fau re p re e nt ome p e c a

     p rob e m Ev en c omparn g c a e n w h c h c re e d t ow art o t h o e n

     w h c h t he yddn o t w n ot cov era t he re e v an t u e w h e t h e a t t er

    are e xamp e of u c ce n w h at P a t rck M organ c a mmed at e d et e r

     ren c e n w h c h t he c h ae n g e re t edw t h out v o e n c e t h ey a o are

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      de t erred f romatt a ck n gB f oro y e ar h ou d t h b e one u c ce O u c

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS195

    r ea o n t wo fo d F r t a t ro ng f or m o f RD T f a f e d f t he re a r e an y

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     196WORLDPOLTCS

    c rat e ad d t ona p rop o t on an d th e argumen t ap py t o aw d e rang e of

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     38Smon Mod e of M an Ne w York W e y 957

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    pu re y c ogn t v e m t at on bu t f rompy c hoog c ap re u re an dn e ed

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    39Th e b e t t re a tme nt Jack Sn yd e rMyth of Empre D ome t c P o t c an d S tra te g c d e o

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     198WORLDPOLTCS

    t ren g th e n de t erren c e n o t h e rc a e t w d e fe a t t G e ne ray t h e e

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    p e nd on t he ad v erary g o a an dp erc ep t on w h c h are h ard fort h e

      tatetod cern44

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     4S e e f ore xamp e GrahamA on E e n ce of D e c on B o t on L t t e B row n 971

     R c h ardNe dL eb ow Nu c e arC r M anag eme nt t h ac aNY C orn e U n v er t yP re 987

     ScottSagan NucearAert andCr Management nternatona Securty9 Sprng 985

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     42Forconfct ngargument aboutthereatve frequencyoftheerror ofmrror magng

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    43F oran c e e x amp e e e Waac e Th e Wh en Gove rnme nt C o d e B e rke e yU n v e rt y

     o f C a f o rn a P r e 9 80

    4 4S ee G eo rg e H a a nd S m o n f n 3 7 S ny de r a nd D e n g f n 3 7 J er v f n 0 9 79

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    re nc e n t h e f u tu re byn c re an g t h e o e r g re v an c e c on vn c n g t t h at

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    WHATCANNOTBEEXPLANEDBYARATONALTHEORY

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    45F orap ara e argumen t e e G eorge an d Smok e f n 14 182

     4 6 Fo r d c u o n o f t h u e e e Jo n E t e r n t r od uc t on n E t er e d R at o na C h o c e

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     47Thefam aranaogytoathete putforwardbyM tonFredmanandLeonardSavage

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     200WORLDPOLTCS

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    h an o t b e en d e mon t rat ed 49n d e e d t h ab e e n t u d e of c ruc a c h o ce

     thathavereveaedtheroeof theeba e NetherJapann1941norNeh

    ru n d an 962g at h ere d ag rea t d ea of n f ormat on on h ow t he rad

     v erare w ou db e k e y t ore ac t Sm ary at h ough mu ch of B rt an

     pocy durngthe1930 retedonbe ef abouttheeffcacyof trategc

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     pe th expanatonprobabycannotaccountforthemethod bywhch

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      948an dA ch en an d Sn d a f n 6 64d o e n o t rea yh e p S t a t e men ac t n a re amof mu ch

     greatercompexty deaw thmanyfewer ntance andonyrarey receveunambguou

    f ee d bac k F orad c u on of t he more n t ere t n g u e of w he t he rn f ormat on p roc e n g

     b a e an d f a a c e re ay c an b e c on d e red d e v a t on f romrat on at y e e LJon ath an

     Cohen CanHumanrratonaty beExpermentay Demontrated? Behavora andBran

     S c e nc e 4 S e pt e mb e r98 37-3 an d t he c omme n t bd 3370 F oran SEU mod e t h at

     take nformatonproce ngcot ntoaccount eePauAnderonandT mothyMcKeown

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    48W amRk e randP e t erOrd e h ook An n t roduc t on t oP o t v e P o t c aTh e oryEn g e

    w oodC f f NJPre nt c e H a 973An t hon yD ow n An E c on omc The ory of D e moc rac y

      N ew Y or k H ar pe r & R ow 9 57 A o e e Je rv f n 2 c ha p 4

     49For omereevantfndng eeDavdSear andJonathanFreedman SeectveExpo

      u re t on f ormat on AC rt c aRe v e w P u b c Opn on Qu art e ry 3 Summe r967 94-213

      W amMc Gure S e e ct v e E x pou re A Summn gU p n Rob ert Ab e on e t a e d Th e

     ore of C ogn t v e C on t e nc yC h c ag oRandM c Na y 968 797-800 Ph pTe t o ck A c

      countab tyTheNegectedSoca ContextofJudgmentandChoce nBarryM Stawand

     L L C ummn g e d Re e arc h n Org an zat on aB e hav orV o 7 Gree n w ch C TJA Pre

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS201

    w e ght t h at p e op e gv e t od f fe ren t k n d of n f ormat on Norc an t a c

     countforthefactthatpeopedenythevad tyofmanyofthe aw of

      probab ty51

     Of c oure on e re py t h at n one of t h re e van t w e w an t amod e

    t h at w matc h mot of t h e t a t e b e h av or n o t rec on t ru c t t he d e c on

     mak n gpro ce B u t t h ard t o e e h ow SEU w n f ac t u c ce e dn d on g

      on gh t of th e n f u e nc e w e h av e t e dNot on yd ow e ob e rv e t a t e

     menfa ngtopayattentontofactor necearyforratona cacuaton

     butn manyn tance thereaonngproce e theyreportwhchtrack

    n c e yw t h ab ora to ry re u t n w h c h p eop e a c tu aymak e c h o ce

      nvoveerrorof nferenceandcacuaton Ony fthee wereomehow

    t o c anc e ou t c ou d t he re u t f t w t h SEU n d ee d on e mu t w on de r

     whether ntrcateandcounterntutveSEUargument canexpan tate

     me n b e h av or D e c on mak e rw on y ad opt c ou re of a c t on t h at

     theyexpecttobeeffectvef the keyadvantage canonybe d covered

     ordemontratedwth thead ofcompexmathematc twoud eemun

      keythat tatemenwoud eetheadvantageof thebehavor Further

     more n man y cae t h e ot h er d e p e rc e pt on are c ru c a Th u f w e

     c ou d h ow th at c ont rary t ow hat amot un v e ra y b e e v e d a c ert an

    t u at on ort a ct c h ou dgv e t he t a te ab arg an n g adv ant age t h w

     ac tu ay b e t rue on y f t h e o th e r d e re a z e t an d o n f act more w

      ngtomakeconce on whenfacedwththat tuatonortactc

     Theargumentthatpeope behavorcanbe expanedbya umng

     thattheyacta thoughtheywereratonamaycope omewhatbetterw th

     motvatedba e Whentheeoperate theexternaenvronment d

     tortedto ervepychoogca orpo tca functon 52Butthefactthatthe

    p o c y ow e t t e t o ad n t ere t e d app rec a t on of t he e x te rna e nv ron

     mentdoenotmeanthatt cannotbeexpanedby SEUTo returntoan

     exampementonedear erthefactthatNehruavodedthepychcpa n

     thatwoudhavereutedfromtherecogntonthathewa puttngh po

    t c af ort un e ah e ad of th e g ood of t h e c oun try n t ere t n gf orapy

    c h oog t b u t t rre e van t t o t he argume nt t h at w e c an e xp an n d a

     p o c y a t h ou gh n d aw e re ac t n g t omaxmze Ne h ru p e rona u t t y

     Furthermore fa peronha nochocebuttoundertakeacoure ofac

    t on t h e mot v at e d d t ort on mayn ot n f u en c e he rb e hav ora t a 53

    5S e e f ore x amp e t h e work ummarze dn D an e Kahn e man P au S ov c an dAmo

    Tv erk y e d Judgmen t und e rU nc e rt an tyH e u rt c an dB ae C ambrdg e C ambrdg e Un

    v e rt yP re 982 an dTve rk y an dKah n eman Rat ona C ho c e an d t he F ramngof D e

     c o n n J ou rn a o f Bu n e f n 5 S 25 7 8

    52Th e c a c a c c ou n t MB re w t erSmt h Je rome B rune ran dRob ert Wh t e Opn on

      andP e ron at yNe w Y ork W e y 956

     53F orf urt he rd c u on e e Je rv f n 2 374-78an dArt h urS t e n Wh e n Mpe rc ep t on

     M att er WordP o t c 34Juy 982 505-26

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     202WORLDPOLTCS

    Th e f ac t t hat h e b adyun d ere t mat ed t h e r k orc o t of h erp o c y

      doe notmeanthat hewoudhavebehaveddfferentyhadheranay

     beenaccurateForexampe n1941 motvatedb a mayhaveedJapa-

     needec onmakerto overetmatethechancethattheUntedState

     w a w n g to w a ge a nd o e a m t ed w ar b ut f t h e r u t t e e ft

     themnochoceotherthantof ghtth errormayhaveonyratona zed

     notnfuencedtherbehavor

     Evenwhenmotvatedba e producemorecompexand eemngy r

     ra t ona b e hav oran EU t he orymgh t t h od n an od e r e n e t h an

     S c he n g t he re mayb e ra t ona t yn rrat on at y 54We uu a y ay t h at

      ap eron w h oc on t en t y ac t n e f d e f ea t n gw ay prob abyd rv en

     byu b c on c ou e g odynamc B u t th n o t od f f e ren t f romayn g

     thatthecot of acrfcng certangoa aremorethancompenatedfor

      bytheavodanceofthepan thatwoudcomefromdrectyfacngthe

     u n con c ou mpu e c oup e dw t h t h e g an on o t h erv au e dme n on

     e g t h e me ry c au e d by t he p e ron ac t on c an g rat f yd ee py f e t

      need tobedebaed

     Th coudevenbethecae whentheperon woudhavebeenbetter

     offhadhefo owedanaternatvepocy thathecoudhaved covered

      t h t he av a ab e d a t aTh a t ron g erc h ae n g e t o S EU b e cau e t h e

    p o c y c h o e n d o e n o t maxmze e v e n th e h dd en u t t e To c ont n u e

     wththeNehruexampea umethatfhe hadundertoodthe tuaton

    h e c ou dh av e d ev e op ed ap o c y t hat h e w ou dh av e e e n a k e y t op ro

    du ce ab e t te rou tc ome n t h c a e t h e mot vat ed b a w ou dh av e e d t o

    u b op t mab e h av orh adh v on n o t be e n c oud e dbyfe aran dn e ed

     hecoudhavemanagedthetradeoffbetweennatonaandperona n

     t e re t b et t er An dye t an S EU ac c oun t t p o b e on c e we c on d e rt h e

     pa nNehruwoudhave ufferedhadheconfrontedthevaueconfctand

     h ow n ambt on We mgh t mary d e aw t h b e hav ort hat f o ow

     f romp e ron a c a o rn at ona d e o og e t h at p rovd e au t f c a t on f or

    au e f u p o c ybyd ev e opn g ad t ort e d v e w of th e e xt e rn ae n v ron

     me n t Th e re u t t op u rc h ae mme d ate n dvdu a an d o c a h armony

     a t t he c o t of a a t erd a t e rn o t on yf ort h e c oun try a aw h oe b u t a o

     f ort he c ont ron g n dvdu a an dgrou pTh e b e e f an dp o c e of

     W hemneGermanyprovdeanexampethecountryandrung e te

     werehedtogetherattheexpeneofa rea tcappra a ofthethreatand

     op portun t e t h at o t he rof f e re d n c a e k e t h t h e bargan n o t

    t ruc k c on c ouy an dn re trop e ct may appe art ob e ab ad one b u t t

     canbeca medtobecompatbew thSEU

     54S c he n gf n 26 36-43

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    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS203

     Toputth anotherway themmedategratfcatonprovdedbya

     motvatedba coudoutweghtheantcpatedongrunco tthatwoud

    b e n c u rre dw he n t he p o c y e v e nt u ay f a P e op e mayh ave h gh d

     c oun t ra te e w h at w h app e n n t h e f ut u re c ount f are t h an m

     medateconequence andpartoftherut tycanbepeaceofmnd and

    ad e re d e f mage F ore x amp e t h e fa c t t hat d e te rre nc e f a b e cau e

    t h e t a te man av od e e n g t hat h p o c y p rov ok ngrat he rt han re

      tranng theadverary canbencorporatedntoSEUoncewecon derthe

    u t t y t o t he e ade ran d t he c ount ry a a w h oe of t he b e e f t h at t n o t

    ame nac e and c ou dn o t b e e e n a u c h

      u p e c t th at man yre ad e rw f n d t h argumen t a t o rt u ou an dun

      a t f a c to ry a d o t t h e eq u v ae nt of ayn g t hat t he p e ron w hopu t

    of f e e n g ad o c torf orf eart h at h e rumpw b e d agno e d a c anc e r

    ra t ona on ce w e c on d e rt he mmed at e c o t of g e t t n gb adn e w An y

    t h eory t hat h at o t ak e a cc oun t of u t t e k e t he e w b e f arremove d

     fromanyRDTthatha beenadvanced Furthermoreth kndoftheory

    c ou dy e dd e d uc t on on y f p e op e are c on t e nt n t h e rd c oun t rat e

     andn theubectve cot ofextendedearche andknowedgeofther

    ow n ut t e B u t ev e n f t h e e re q u re men t are me t t h e b eh av or t

     mgh t n ot b e ra t ona by ome d e f n t on f t h e h ort run g an pu r

     chaedattheprce ofgreaty mtng orharmngtheactor futurepro

     pect 55

     A t e a t a d f f c u t f ormot n o t on of S EU are t h e c a e n w h c h p o c y

      ra t ona ze d n aw ay t h at c h an g e a t erp e rce p t on an du t t e F or

     e xamp e a ume th at d ome t c p o t c e ad a t a te man t o ad op t a h ard

      ne po cyandthathethenreduce thetradeoffbetweendomet cand

    f ore gn p o c yv au e by c omng t ob e e v e t h at t t h e a t te rt h at re q u re

    t h p o c yB u t f t h e d ome t c e n v ronme nt c h ang e t h e po c ymay c on

     tnuebecaue t upportedbythenewycreatedperceptonofthefor

     egnenvronment56Whatut te arethenbengmaxmzed?

      BEHAVORCONS STENT?

     ThemnmumrequrementofSEU thatbehavorandthu then

     ferredpreferencebe con tentButweknowthatanaton keany

     c o e c t ve may ac t n c on t e nt y at h ou gh e a ch p e ron n t f uy c on

      tentthu maknganSEUexpanatonoftheformerbutnottheatter

    5 5E t e r fn 4 6 O 1 2

     56 For related arguments, see Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality

     (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i983), chaps. 3 and 4, and Deborah Larson, Origins

     of Contanment Pr nceton Prnceton Unversty Press 985

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     204WORLDPOLTCS

      mpo b e F e w fore gn p o c y c a e t u d e h av e e xamn ed t h qu e t on

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    thecompeng natureoftheexterna envronmentandthemportanceof

     thenatona nteret ubmergedvergentdometc nteret andcoat on

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      nformedThere utwa aparodyofdeterrenceprecrpton France

     fetembodenedbytheexpectatonofBrt h upport Germanywa em

     bodenedbyoveretmat ngthechancethatBrtanwoud remanneu

    t ra A ft er t he w ar m a r p t e d Br t a n t o g ve t he W h te R u a n

      ut enough upporttoen urethattheBohevk woudbeenragedbut

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    d ome t c un t ybymak n gp are d d ec on at h ou gh t he re u t n g ac t on

     w contradctorundercuteachother57

     S e con dd ag re eme nt c an b e od e e p t hat n od e c on p o b e e

     p e c ayw h e n c o e t o c on e n u re qu re dTh u t h e Jap ane e g ov ern

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      derabecot oftheyearongprocrat natonandthefactthatJapan

     wa unabetorepondto thechange ntheexterna envronmentdurng

     thatperod58

    Th rd n c on t e nc e ov ert me app eara f rt on e f ac t on and t h en

     anothercome topowerEvenf broadnatonagoa remanbecaue

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     themaredeepandfrequentThu whe muchofAmercanforegnpo

      cydurngthecod warcanbecharacterzeda contanmentthe up

     portngbehavorvared a dfferentadmn tratoncameto powerwth

     d f fe ren t d e a an dd f f e re n t prort e f ort he u e of re ou rc e 59 t t h en

     57Warn e rS ch n g The P o t c of Nat on aD e f en e F c a 950 n Warne rS c h n g

     PauHammondandG ennSnyderStrategyPo tc andDefene Budget NewYorkCo

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    58Oh at aTokuh ro Th e An t C omn t ern P act 1935-1939 n Jame M ore y e d D e te r

     rentDpomacyJapan Germany andtheUSSR1935-1940NewYorkCoumba Unverty

     P re 9 76 4 7-

    59Se e John G add S t ra t eg e of C on t anme nt Ne w Y ork OxfordU n ve rt yP re 982

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     w t h u t f c a t on t hat a e an d adv e rare a k e c omp an t h at th e y are

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      t 6o Sm ary opn on ov ert h e w ar n Korea an dV e t namw an ot ar

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  • 8/19/2019 Rational Deterrence

    26/26

    RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS207

      po t on Th e p o c e w t h en b e n c on t e nt w t h o t he rb e hav oran d

     defymanynorma deterrenceprecrpt on Sm ary whenpeope re

     ducecogntved onancebycomng to eethechoenaternatvea even

     betterthantheyaw twhentheyreachedtherdec on ther aterbe

     h av orw b e n f u e nc ed n aw ay t h at mak e t n c on t en t w t h t he r

     earer preference Ba ed nformatonproce ngdengratngre ected

     coure ofacton andbo terngthee ectedonenotony maketheper

    on more c omfortab e w t h h d e c on t h ey a o c h ang e t h e wayh e e e

    t h e word an d t he v au e h e p ac e on v arou ou t c ome f SEU t he ore are

     tobedeveopedfurthertheyw havetodoa betterob ofcomngto

    g rp w t h t h e th e ore t ca an d e mprc a q u e t on of t h e c on t e nc y of

     natonabehavor takngntoaccountboththecoa tonnatureofpo tc

     andtheoperatonof ndvdua pychoogy

     SUMMARY

    E ve n f w e p ut o m e o f th e e d f f cu t e a d e n a ny S E U th at w f t

     t he e mprc af n dn g t h e u b e c t ve e e me nt w oomarg e Th

      tru e n ot on yf orv au e an du t t e b u t ao f ort he c ru c ame an e n d

    b e e f p e rc e pt on of t h e o t he r d e an d e t mat e of t h e p rob ab e c on

    e q ue n ce of a t e rn at v e po c e Th e e f a ct o rare a e x og e nou an d

    t u dyn g t h em n n dvdu ac a e t ryng t o e e h ow an dw hy t h ey f orm

    an d o c at n gw h at e ve rp a tt ern e x t are c ruc a t ak P rop o t on on

     thee ubectcon ttutemuchoftheworkbengdonebySEUexpana-

    t on 65Of c ou re d e du c t ve t h eore c an p ay aro e h e re b u t a e rt on

    t h at p e op e a ct a t hou gh t h eyw e re maxmzn gu t t yw n ot he p an

      wermanyofthehardqueton

     65 See Herbert Smon Human Nature n Pot cs The Da ogue of Psychoogy and Po t-

     ca Sc ence Amercan Pot ca Scence Revew 79 June 985 292-303 Jervs fn 63 324-29


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