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Retrospective taxation : section 58 of the Finance Act 2008 Standard Note: SN6361

Last updated: 28 August 2013

Author: Antony Seely

Business & Transport Section

Over the last two years many Members have been contacted by constituents about a provision in the Finance Act 2008 – specifically, section 58 of the Act – which was designed to frustrate a tax planning scheme. At the time the Labour Government took the view that the legislation clarified existing legislation which had been introduced in 1987, and that it was a reasonable response to the operation of an abusive tax avoidance scheme. Many commentators raised concerns that as this change was to be treated as having always had effect it was unfairly retrospective. These complaints were unsuccessful. In 2011 the Court of Appeal considered a legal challenge to overturn this provision on the grounds that it was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, though the Court ruled that “the legislation achieves a fair balance between the interests of the general body of taxpayers and the right of the Claimant to enjoyment of his possessions, without imposing an unreasonable economic burden on him.”1 More recently many constituents who had invested in these tax planning arrangements have lobbied to have the legislation reversed, although there is no indication that the Government are willing to do this.2

Contents

1 Introduction – the question of retrospection 2

2 Budget 2008 : double taxation treaty abuse 4

3 Subsequent discussion 9

4 Recent developments 11

Appendix : Court of Appeal judgement 15

1 R (on the application of Huitson) v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2011] EWCA Civ 893 para 95 2 See, HC Deb 5 November 2012 cc446-8; HC Deb 11 February 2013 c447W; Public Bill Committee (Finance

Bill), Twentieth sitting, 20 June 2013 cc688-700

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1 Introduction – the question of retrospection In a report on tax policy published in 2011 the Treasury Select Committee noted, “for over two hundred years there have been attempts to define a set of fundamental principles, providing rules by which to assess objectively and apolitically, new tax policy proposals.” Arguably the most famous of these are the principles of equality, certainty, convenience, economy - set out in the late 18th century by the economist Adam Smith. On certainty, Smith proposed that, “the tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other person.”3 Retrospective tax legislation overturns this principle – as it imposes or increases a tax charge on income earned, gains realised or transactions concluded at the time before the legislation was announced. Quite often governments have felt obliged to balance this principle against the risks to the Exchequer from tax avoidance – announcing legislation to counter specific avoidance schemes that has effect from the date of announcement, or, far more rarely, before this time. As one practitioner wrote recently in this context, “retrospection has been a dirty word for centuries [as] … everyone believes in the principle of arranging taxation affairs with full knowledge of their consequences.”4 In 1978 the approach taken by the revenue authorities to retrospective legislation was codified in the ‘Rees rules’, following the controversy over avoidance legislation announced in the Budget that year. In his Budget speech on 11 April 1978 the then Chancellor, Denis Healey, announced two measures related to tax avoidance:

This has emerged recently in a new form which involves marketing a succession of highly artificial schemes – when one is detected, the next is immediately sold – and is accompanied by a level of secrecy which amounts almost to conspiracy to mislead. The time has come not only to stop the particular schemes we know about but also to ensure that no schemes of a similar nature can be marketed in future. So the provisions I shall be introducing this year to deal with artificial avoidance by certain partnerships dealing in commodity futures will go back to 6 April 1976, that is, before the date when the intention to legislate was announced in a parliamentary answer. My proposed measures against avoidance by means of land sales with the right to repurchase will go back to 3rd December 1976, the date foreshadowed in a parliamentary answer.5

When the first of these was debated in Standing Committee, Peter Rees MP argued that when retrospective legislation was used to deal with tax avoidance – to “give a warning in the House of Commons by some recognised method – either by an answer to a Parliamentary Question or by some statement – and to legislate in the subsequent Finance Bill back to the date of that warning” – it should be subject to four conditions:

First, the warning must be precise in form. A mere suggestion that there are vague schemes of tax avoidance that must be counted should not suffice. Secondly, the problem at which the warning has been directed should immediately be referred to a committee which I understand exists … composed of members of the Inland Revenue

3 Principles of tax policy, 15 March 2011 HC 753 2010-12 para 5 4 “Morality, tax avoidance and retrospection”, Tax Journal, 2 March 2012 5 HC Deb 11 April 1978 c 1202. These formed clauses 27 & 28 of the Finance Bill 1978; they were enacted as

ss 31-2 of the Finance Act 1978.

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and of the accountancy and legal professions … [the committee] should to left … to devise the precise legislative measures which should then be introduced. Thirdly, if the committee can hit on appropriate legislative provision, the draft clause … should immediately be published in advance of the Finance Bill so that those who are likely to be in the field of fire will have a second clear intimation of what to expect. Fourthly, such a clause must, without fail, be introduced in the following Finance Bill … I believe there may be situations in which [this approach] … is the only solution if we are to counter avoidance of the sophistication and scale which we understand has been current of late. But if a Government are to adopt that remedy, it must be on [this] basis.6

At the Report stage of the Bill both provisions were debated, when the Conservative Opposition tabled amendments to restrict their scope – unsuccessfully as it turned out. Sir Geoffrey Howe took the opportunity to give a detailed speech on retrospective legislation, when he referred to a number of precedents since the Second World War.7 He concluded, “a long tradition has developed which may be untidy but which can be regarded as an acceptable convention of the constitution along the lines set out by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dover and Deal [Mr. Rees] in the rules that were enunciated upstairs.”8 Since then, this practice seems to have been generally adhered to, and there have been very few examples of tax provisions whose effect is backdated prior to their being announced. In a paper on this issue published in 2010 the Chartered Institute of Taxation noted that “the Exchequer will not unilaterally preclude its ability to protect itself with retrospection when it detects what it considers to be unacceptable avoidance”, though it went on to argue that there were very limited circumstances where it might be considered necessary:

We would like to see the Government adopt a general principle that includes a presumption against retrospection. That said, this principle could set out certain very limited circumstances where the Government could make the argument that retrospection can be used because it is considered necessary (rather than desirable). Such limited circumstances might include the position where:

• the law turned out, for example due to a court case, to be very different from what everyone, including taxpayers expected …

• an announcement is made with immediate effect, provided it is accompanied by clear and workable legislation; and

• the budgetary impact of not acting retrospectively would be crippling to the UK economy, say X% of GDP, or to avoid a financial crisis or damage to the UK‟s credit rating.9

The Institute also noted the practice of governments giving advance warnings of retrospective legislation – something first done by the then Paymaster General, Dawn Primarolo, in December 2004. At this time the Minister announced legislation to deal with a number of individual schemes but went on to state that other schemes came to light that had the same purpose, legislation would be introduced to close them down, if necessary from the

6 SC Deb (A) 6 June 1978 cc 718-9 7 HC Deb 12 July 1978 cc 1629-1642 8 op.cit. cc 1641-2 9 CIOT, Retrospective taxation, November 2010 para 5.4

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date of her statement.10 At this time many commentators expressed the view that this was a major development in the field of tax avoidance.11 In a paper on tax compliance, in a survey of the UK tax system published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the authors noted, “there is anecdotal evidence that this threat, coupled with the fact that it has been acted upon … has been largely successful in stopping the annual bonus scheme round, where each year a series of devices targeted at eliminating tax/NICs on ‘city’ bonuses appeared.”12 2 Budget 2008 : double taxation treaty abuse In its 2008 Budget report the Labour Government announced a number of measures to counter tax avoidance schemes, including a scheme that sought to exploit double taxation treaties – the bilateral agreements between countries to prevent income or gains that are potentially liable to tax in each state from being taxed twice:

4.68 The Government announces, with retrospective effect from 12 March 2008, clarification of indefinitely retrospective legislation introduced in 1987 to counter double taxation treaty avoidance schemes, so that the legislation applies as intended and is effective. This will ensure that, notwithstanding the wording of any double taxation treaty, UK residents pay UK tax on their profits from foreign partnerships. Budget 2008 announces there will also be a further measure to prevent future tax avoidance through the misuse of double taxation treaties by UK residents.13

More details were given in HM Revenue & Customs’ Budget note issued at the time:

UK law taxes a UK resident beneficiary of certain trusts on the income to which they are entitled under the trust arrangement as it arises. This means that, in cases exploiting the above avoidance scheme, the UK resident should be taxable in the UK on his or her share of the profits of the partnership comprised of the foreign trustees. But the users of the scheme claim that a provision, known as the Business Profits Article, common to most tax treaties, exempts the partnership profits from UK tax – not only in the hands of the foreign partners but also in the hands of the UK beneficiaries. The first provision will make clear that (in line with retrospective legislation introduced in Finance (No2) Act 1987) tax treaties do not exempt UK residents from UK tax on any profits of a foreign partnership to which they are entitled. The second measure will ensure that the Business Profits Article in the UK’s tax treaties cannot be read as preventing income of a UK resident being chargeable to UK tax … The first measure will be treated as having always had effect. The second will have effect for income arising on or after 12 March 2008.14

10 The role that the ‘Primarolo statement’ played in the Labour Government’s approach to tackling avoidance is

examined in, Tax avoidance: a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) – background history, Library standard note SN2956, 15 March 2013.

11 The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee examined this issue in some depth in their report on the Finance Bill 2005 (First report, 4 July 2005 HL Paper 13 2005-06 para 32-44).

12 Jonathan Shaw, Joel Slemrod & John Whiting, “Administration & Compliance”, in, Dimensions of tax design: the Mirrlees Review, IFS May 2010 p1155. For a longer discussion of the debate over retrospective taxation at this time see, Retrospective taxation : earlier debates, Library standard note SN04369, 18 July 2012.

13 HC 388 March 2008 p72 14 HM Revenue & Customs Budget Note BN66, Double taxation treaty abuse, 12 March 2008

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Provision to this effect was made in clauses 55 & 54 of the Finance Bill 2008; following the Bill receiving Royal Assent, these provisions are now ss 58 & 57 of the Finance Act 2008. Following the Budget, professional bodies raised concerns about the first of these measures being retrospective. In their commentary on the Bill, the Chartered Institute of Taxation argued that there was “no justification for the introduction of such legislation with such extreme retrospective effect”:

The proposal to backdate this legislation to the 1987 legislation is excessive and, whatever the issues are surrounding such avoidance, unjustified. The mischief being targeted is not new and has been known to HMRC for some time; it is referred to in the International Manual (ITH 1660). Whilst HMRC are entitled to change their minds and legislate against the planning, to take retrospective action against something that has been acknowledged this way is wrong. This sort of move gives rise to significant concerns about not only the proportionality of the measure but also whether the UK tax system has any certainty and whether the UK is a stable place in which to invest.15

The Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants also raised concerns:

Although we understand that the clause is directed primarily at situations involving Isle of Man or Channel Isles partnerships, we believe the EU law principle of legitimate expectation needs to be respected so that taxpayers are entitled to understand the implications of any transaction that they enter into. Treating this provision as always having had effect runs contrary to Parliament’s intent over the past 30 years to lay down rules whereby the tax effect of particular transactions can be ‘changed’ or advance warning is given of a change in tax treatment in identified circumstances. One of the earliest attempts to set out some rules that ought to apply in such situations was made by Peter Rees (now Lord Rees) in the Standing Committee debates on what became the 1978 Finance Act: these have since been known as the ‘Rees rules’. The proposals put forward by Lord Rees were in the context of anti avoidance provisions and the time from which they should have effect. The Rees rules laid down that if some form of anti avoidance provisions were to be legislated then there should be a clear warning in the House of Commons that that was intended, if possible a draft clause should be published as soon as possible which would give effect to the proposal and the clause should be incorporated in the next available Finance Bill/Act. The practical effect of the Rees rules was that they laid the ground rule for retroaction, i.e. the law when it was finally enacted could not have effect earlier than the House of Commons announcement of the upcoming anti-avoidance change. Another approach was adopted in the late 1980s to counter a legal decision that had gone against the Inland Revenue and which the government wished to ‘reverse’. In that case although the new law was stated to have always had effect this did not influence any judicial decisions made before the new law was announced. So, for instance, s 62 of Finance Act 1987 was introduced to reverse the decision in Padmore v IRC and the amendment to section 153 ICTA 1970 was deemed always to have had effect, except in relation to any judicial decision before 17 March 1987, the date when the amending legislation was announced, or to any appeal therefrom. In other words the High Court decision in Padmore was not retrospectively declared to be wrong and the old law was not treated as amended for the purpose of any appeal by the Inland Revenue against the High Court’s decision. The appellant in Padmore kept

15 Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT), Finance Bill 2008: CIOT representations, 14 May 2008 p33

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the fruits of his appeal, but no other taxpayer was expressly protected by the terms of the legislation. A more recent approach was the statement of the Paymaster General on 2 December 2004 to the effect that legislation would be introduced in the future, effective from 2 December 2004, in relation to: “what the Government considers to be unreasonable tax avoidance schemes involving employment income.”16

The Faculty went on to argue the department should re-examine the rationale for legislation with retrospective effect:

We wrote to the Paymaster General in February 2005 and in our letter we noted that the Treasury Select Committee had stated in a written report that: ‘The Inland Revenue should, without jeopardising their position, publish a paper setting out their thinking on the principles which will guide the way they implement [the Paymaster General’s] announcement.’17 Such a paper has never been published but we believe that the philosophy underlying retrospective or retroactive legislation should now be examined in conjunction with the current move to introduce purposive, or principles based, legislation. If the underlying purpose behind any piece or legislation, or any area of tax law, is clearly articulated then any taxpayer who respects that purpose should have certainty as to the (tax) outcome of their particular transaction. If the underlying policy is to be changed then any change should, in our view, only have effect in relation to future transactions. We recommend that an appropriate modus operandi ought to be agreed by HM Treasury, HM Revenue & Customs and Representative Bodies and then published for the benefit of all taxpayers.18

These provisions were debated at the Committee stage of the Finance Bill on 22 May 2008, when both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats argued that clause 55 of the Bill should only apply from the day it was announced – Budget day 2008.19 In response the then Financial Secretary, Jane Kennedy, argued “the avoidance scheme that the clause closes down was designed to frustrate legislation passed by Parliament in 1987 to prevent this type of avoidance, also with retrospective effect … we have not come to a decision lightly [and] I am satisfied that in these unusual circumstances, retrospective clarification of the law is fair, proportionate and in the public interest. That is the human rights test that we must apply.” The Minister went on to give a detailed explanation of the issue, and a long extract from her speech is reproduced over the next two pages:

In 1979, Mr. Padmore, a UK resident, worked in the UK as a patent agent. He was also a member of a Jersey partnership, which had been set up to receive some of the income from Mr. Padmore’s activities as a patent agent. In line with the law as it was generally understood at the time, the Inland Revenue sought to tax him on his share of the foreign partnership’s profits. In December 1986, the courts upheld his claim that the tax treaty between Jersey and the UK meant that none of the Jersey partnership’s profits could be taxed in the UK, even those belonging to UK resident partners. The decision was a surprise, not only to the Inland Revenue but to other tax authorities and most tax advisers. It overturned the generally held view that unless explicitly specified, tax treaties do not remove a country’s right to set taxes …

16 ICAEW, TAXREP 31/08: Detailed commentary on Finance Bill 2008, May 2008 p30 17 Treasury Committee, First report: The 2004 Pre–Budget Report, 27 January 2005 HC 138 2004-05 para 93 18 TAXREP 31/08, May 2008 p31 19 Public Bill Committee (Finance Bill) 22 May 2008 cc 361-384

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Parliament acted at the next available opportunity—in the 1987 Finance Bill—to make it clear that the UK’s treaties did not give, and never had given, tax exemption to a UK member’s share of a foreign partnership’s income. During the debate on the 1987 Bill … the then Financial Secretary [Norman Lamont] observed that although the provisions had caused him “considerable concern”, he had concluded that the clause should apply with retrospective effect. He noted that that did not involve the “type of retrospection on which the House has normally looked with disfavour” as all that it did was to “restore the general understanding of the law to what it was before a decision of the High Court.” —[Official Report, 15 July 1987; Vol. 119, c. 1180-87.] … UK individuals and companies have been artificially routeing their income through offshore trusts and partnerships and claiming that one of the UK’s many double taxation treaties exempts them from tax. That is in wilful contravention of the purpose of the treaty and the 1987 legislation. A fundamental purpose of the clause is to put it beyond doubt that a wholly artificial avoidance scheme designed to frustrate legislation passed by Parliament in 1987 to prevent such avoidance does not work, and never has. Some taxpayers were awaiting the outcome of litigation in the expectation that it would clarify their affairs. The legislative change in the clause will result in the necessary certainty, not litigation, thus enabling tax returns to be finalised. Many descriptive terms have flowed in the discussions that I have had about this avoidance scheme, one of which is “an egregious case”. In such a case, the Government consider that the law already defeats the scheme and that it is clear to all concerned that the scheme is in defiance of Parliament’s intent. Used in such a context, retrospection preserves the expectation that tax will be applied fairly and consistently. That will build confidence and trust in the law. Nobody could seriously think that the clause is unfair to the people who will be affected by it. Users of the scheme have deliberately tried to frustrate the will of Parliament, and they will have been aware that Parliament had closed down similar schemes 20 years ago with retrospective effect. My understanding is that that retrospectivity was unlimited, in effect, until the end of the second world war. The Committee might not be aware of the scale of the risk to the Exchequer as a result of this avoidance scheme. HMRC is aware of more than 2,000 scheme users, and it involves tax of £50 million a year—a not insubstantial sum. Given the increasing numbers using the scheme, the rapidly growing amount of tax at risk and the wilful attempt to circumvent the clear purpose of the legislation and of the UK’s tax treaties, we consider it appropriate to legislate to provide retrospective clarification and to put the matter beyond doubt. HMRC has learned that the large number of taxpayers who have been using the scheme has suddenly started to grow; I shall explain why in a moment ... The scheme is similar to the Padmore scheme except that UK taxpayers set up offshore trusts as well as partnerships. The trusts are for their own benefit, and the trustees become members of the partnership. UK taxpayers agree to work for the partnership, so that once a scheme is set up, their UK income thereafter becomes payable to the partnership and, through the trust, it is paid straight back to them in the UK. They assert that such an arrangement circumvents the 1987 legislation so that the income is tax-free. HMRC does not believe that the scheme works, but we have taken into account its scale and the wilful attempt to flout the law that retrospectively clarified how tax treaties work. The Government have developed our approach on the detail of the legislation on anti-avoidance rules generally to ensure that they are effective and properly targeted. Business welcomes that approach, and it has led to better legislation …

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The Government do not accept that the clause changes the meaning of the law. The law already applies to partnership profits, and we interpret that as including profits enjoyed through a trust. The measure clarifies rather than amplifies the scope of the 1987 legislation and puts beyond doubt what most people understand it to mean. We recognise and acknowledge the difficulties inherent in such legislation. Although the clause is strictly retrospective, as was the case in 1987, it does not change what is generally understood to be the meaning of the law but merely clarifies it.20

Opposition Members pushed the matter to a vote, but the clause was approved unamended, by 13 votes to 7. Professional bodies continued to raise concerns. On 4 June 2008 the CIOT wrote to the Treasury, reiterating their view that, “the degree of retrospection is extreme and unjustified”:

The retrospective nature of clause 55 is apparently justified as it is said to clarify the existing law, ie as effected in 1987. If clarification is necessary, that implies the law needs changing as, presumably, HMRC are not confident that their interpretation is correct. The place to test the way the law works is in the Courts: as the Minister is aware, that is how the system of tax law operates in the UK. Taxpayers have had no warning of this apparent need for clarification. Quite the reverse: the HMRC manual has referred to the sort of planning now being attacked since 1997. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the avoidance device, taxpayers and advisers could surely be forgiven for assuming its use was accepted – or, at any rate, not seen as warranting tackling with any urgency. In particular, there was never any indication of a need to change – or clarify – the 1987 law. We do not think the case has been made in any way for a change that acts retrospectively by 21 years. We could in principle, but reluctantly, accept backdating to December 2004, in line with the PMG’s statement. As the Clause stands it is damaging to the standing and integrity of the UK’s tax system and we urge you to reconsider it.21

On 8 July 2008 the then Financial Secretary, Jane Kennedy, wrote back, stating that she had “reviewed the clause, the various representations received and meetings which I have held with representative bodies and I am still of the mind that clause 55 combats a clearly abusive avoidance scheme in a proportionate and justified way”; an extract from the Minister’s letter is given below:

The users of this scheme have embarked on a highly aggressive piece of tax avoidance. It has no commercial purpose and is deliberately designed as an attempt to frustrate the clear intention both of the UK's double tax treaties and Parliament's 1987 legislation . The Government takes the view that retrospective clarification of the 1987 legislation to deal with such schemes is both proportionate and justified in the public interest as these schemes are unfair to the vast majority of taxpayers who pay their fair share of tax . You suggest in your letter that the Government is seeking to change the law because they are not confident that HMRC's interpretation of it is correct, and you stress that the best place to test how the law works is in the Courts. Such schemes have been marketed for a number of years and HMRC initially dealt with them successfully by persuading the scheme's users that they had misunderstood the relevant legislation.

20 Public Bill Committee (Finance Bill) 22 May 2008 cc 372-377 21 Finance Bill 2008: Clause 55 and retrospection: CIOT comments, 4 June 2008

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Last year HMRC's disclosure regime22 revealed that the latest version of the scheme was being used on an unprecedented scale. Given this, and the wilful intent of these schemes to circumvent the clear purpose of the 1987 legislation, the Government considered it appropriate to clarify the legislation now to put it beyond doubt that such schemes do not work and, in line with the action taken in 1987, never have done. Clause 55 therefore is a provision that clarifies this situation and enables taxpayers to avoid lengthy and fruitless litigation.23

3 Subsequent discussion Following the introduction of section 58, its impact and the possibility of it being reversed, was raised a few times in the House, though the Labour Government’s position remained unchanged. In May 2009 the then Financial Secretary, Stephen Timms, restated the Labour Government’s case in a written answer, reproduced below:

Mr. Drew: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) for what reason HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) has decided to close schemes permitted under section 58 of the Finance Act 1987; for what reason the decision was made with retrospective effect; what factors were taken into account in determining that the period of such retrospective effect would be seven years; and what the policy of HMRC is on charging interest on sums owed as a result of retrospective closure; (2) what impact assessment HM Revenue and Customs has made of the effect of the retrospective closure of schemes permitted under section 58 of the Finance Act 1987; and if he will assess the effects of the closure on the financial situation of households operating such schemes. Mr. Timms: Section 62 Finance (No. 2) Act 1987 retrospectively restored the principle that double taxation treaties do not affect a UK resident’s liability to UK tax on their income or gains. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) does not believe that any tax avoidance schemes were permitted under that legislation—although the tax avoidance schemes in question here purported to circumvent it. Evidence emerged that a large number of people were using the scheme and in light of a number of factors (including the widespread use, aggressive nature and artificiality of the scheme, the deliberate attempt to flout the clear intention of Parliament in 1987 and the need to ensure fairness and certainty for all taxpayers), the Government introduced legislation at section 58 Finance Act 2008 to put beyond doubt that none of the schemes worked—and never had done. Although, like the 1987 legislation, it is indefinitely retrospective, HMRC is not aware of any relevant schemes prior to 2001. Any tax paid late will be subject to interest in accordance with the relevant legislation on late payments. Formal impact assessments are not published in respect of measures where the impact is only on those who are avoiding tax and thus one was not published for this particular measure. Such decisions on the production of an impact assessment are taken on a case-by-case basis. As indicated in the 2008 Financial Statement and

22 Under this regime, those marketing tax avoidance products must notify HMRC of any new scheme – allowing

the department to tailor its legislative response to avoidance activity accordingly. For more background on the disclosure scheme see, Library standard note SN02956, 3 May 2012. Details on the current regime are published at:http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/aiu/index.htm

23 Letter from Rt Hon Jane Kennedy MP, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, to Nick Goulding, CIOT President, 8 July 2008

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Budget Report, it is estimated that the tax at stake on the schemes that purported to circumvent the 1987 legislation is around £200 million. Those who used those schemes are, like all other UK taxpayers, required to pay tax on the profits that they earned.24

Quite soon after the Coalition Government took office, the Exchequer Secretary was asked about the new Government’s position on this issue:

Zac Goldsmith: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) what his policy is on continuing the provisions of Section 58 of the Finance Act 2008 in respect of UK residents and foreign partnerships; and if he will make a statement; (2) whether he plans to introduce proposals to repeal legislative provisions that ensure UK residents retrospectively pay UK tax on their profits from foreign partnerships; and if he will make a statement. Mr Gauke: UK residents are taxable on their worldwide income wherever it arises-including situations where it arises by way of foreign partnerships. Section 58 of Finance Act 2008 was enacted to help put that beyond doubt. The Government are, in general, opposed to retrospective legislation. However, the retrospective element of section 58 is currently the subject of judicial review by the courts and the Government's view is that it is best dealt with there.25

As the Minister noted in this answer, in January 2010 the High Court heard a claim for judicial review, on the grounds that the retrospective nature of these provisions were contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights – specifically, the right to the peaceful employment of possessions (A1P1).26 However, the judge dismissed the defendant’s application, finding that, though retrospective, the legislation was ‘in the relevant circumstances proportionate and compatible’ with A1P1.27 In 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld this judgement,28 and in February 2012 an application for the case to be heard by the Supreme Court was refused.29 In turn many taxpayers affected by this provision have contacted Members, to make the case that the legislation should be amended so that it would apply from the date of the Budget in 2008, which was when the intention to change the law was first announced.30 During this time the issue does not appear to have been mentioned in the House – though, as noted in a recent PQ, last year the Government published details of the circumstances in which it would consider introducing tax legislation with retrospective effect:

Asked by Lord Myners : To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will publish guidance on the circumstances in which they will introduce retrospective tax measures. The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon): The Government recognise that there is a balance to be struck between improving stability and

24 HC Deb 20 May 2009 cc1399-400W 25 HC Deb 24 June 2010 cc318-9W 26 So termed as this is Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention 27 R (on the application of Huitson) v Revenue & Customs Comrs [2010] EWHC 97 (Admin) (For a summary,

see, Simon’s Weekly Tax Intelligence, 4 February 2010 pp376-8) 28 [2011] EWCA Civ 893 – this is reproduced in full below 29 A list of the applications heard by the Court in February 2012, which includes this, is at: http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/PTA-1202.pdf 30 Details of this campaign are collated on the No To Retro Tax website.

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predictability in the tax system and acting to reduce risk to the Exchequer. At Budget 2011, the Government published a "Protocol on unscheduled announcements of changes in tax law" in the document Tackling Tax Avoidance. The protocol states that "changes to tax legislation where the change takes effect from a date earlier than the date of announcement will be wholly exceptional".31

4 Recent developments The Chancellor did not make any mention of section 58 in his 2012 Budget speech, though he announced a series of measures to counter tax avoidance – including a statement that the Government would consider retrospective legislation if necessary. He also confirmed that the Government had decided to introduce a new ‘general anti-abuse rule’ – as recommended by a study group set up to look at this approach to frustrating aggressive tax avoidance. An extract from his speech is given below:

I regard tax evasion and, indeed, aggressive tax avoidance as morally repugnant. We have increased both the resources and the number of staff working on evasion and avoidance at HMRC. Taken together, the anti-avoidance measures in this year’s Finance Bill will increase tax revenue over the next five years by around £1 billion, and protect a further £10 billion that could have been lost. This week we have signed a further agreement with the Swiss to stop UK residents evading tax. We have done all these things, but today we do even more. On coming to office, I asked Graham Aaronson QC to establish whether a general anti-avoidance rule could work in the UK tax system. He recommended that such a rule would improve our ability to tackle tax avoidance without damaging the competitiveness of the UK as a place to do business. We agree, so we will introduce one. We will consult on the details of the new rule and legislate for it in next year’s Finance Bill. A major source of abuse, and one that rouses the anger of many of our citizens, is the way in which some people avoid the stamp duty that the rest of the population pays, including by using companies to buy expensive residential property. I have given plenty of public warnings that this abuse should stop, and now we are taking action. I am increasing the stamp duty land tax charge applied to residential properties over £2 million that are bought into a corporate envelope. The charge will be 15%, and it will take effect today. We will also consult on the introduction of a large annual charge on those £2 million residential properties that are already contained in corporate envelopes, and, to ensure that wealthy non-residents are also caught by these changes, we will be introducing capital gains tax on residential property held in overseas envelopes. We are also announcing legislation today to close down the subsales relief rules as a route of avoidance. Let me make this absolutely clear to people. If you buy a property in Britain that is used for residential purposes, we will expect stamp duty to be paid. This is the clear intention of Parliament, and I will not hesitate to move swiftly, without notice and retrospectively if inappropriate ways around these new rules are found. People have been warned. It is fair when money is tight, and so many families could do with help, that those buying the most expensive homes contribute more. From midnight tonight,

31 HC Deb 8 Mar 2012 ccWA447-8. The protocol is set out in full at pp19-20 of the report cited here: Tackling

tax avoidance, March 2011 – which is at: http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_taxavoidance.pdf

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we will introduce a new stamp duty land tax rate of 7% on properties worth more than £2 million.32

In turn section 58 did not figure in the Budget debates after the Chancellor’s statement, though its impact on individuals was raised in a few PQs: for example,

Mr Laurence Robertson: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many people had to pay additional tax following the coming into force of section 58(4) of the Finance Act 2008; and if he will make a statement. [112152] Mr Gauke: UK residents are taxable on their worldwide income wherever it arises—including situations where it arises by way of foreign partnerships. Section 58 of Finance Act 2008 was enacted to help put that beyond doubt and in so doing, made clear that a wholly artificial tax avoidance scheme involving a foreign partnership comprised of foreign trustees did not work. As section 58 retrospectively clarified existing legislation, its introduction had no affect on any taxpayers' tax position.33

*

Mike Freer: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) how much revenue HM Revenue and Customs estimates will be raised in 2012-13 due to the provision of section 58 of the Finance Act 2008; (2) what effect he estimates the bankruptcy of individuals required to pay tax retrospectively under section 58 of the Finance Act 2008 will have on HM Revenue and Customs revenues. Mr Gauke: UK residents are taxable on their worldwide income wherever it arises, including situations where it arises by way of foreign partnerships. Section 58 of Finance Act 2008 was enacted to help put that beyond doubt and in so doing, made clear that a wholly artificial tax avoidance scheme involving a foreign partnership comprised of foreign trustees did not work. The total tax at stake in respect of this scheme is estimated to be £230 million.34

While the Budget and the Finance Bill made no provision in relation to this issue, Nigel Mills MP put down a new clause to the Bill, to require the Government to review its implementation.35 This was subject to a short debate at the final sitting of the Public Bill Committee on 26 June 2012, when Mr Mills argued that the Government should review the approach taken in section 58, in the light of its own position on retrospection:

No assessment was made at the time of the impact on individuals’ pay. The new clause imply asks the Government to go back and consider whether what was done was consistent with how the Government now think we should use retrospection, if at all. Was the impact on those individuals fair and reasonable? Would we not be better off changing the law to close the scheme down from the date of the announcement in 2007, then litigating under the old rules to find out whether the scheme was legal? We would normally do things in that way, which would be better and fairer for the taxpayer.36

32 HC Deb 21 March 2012 c804. For more detail on the proposal on a GAAR see, Tax avoidance: a General

Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR), Library standard note SN6265, 20 June 2013. 33 HC Deb 18 June 2012 c723W 34 HC Deb 28 June 2012 c334W. A further PQ has stated that the department has “identified about 1,900

individuals who used the avoidance scheme or one of its variants and whose tax returns are currently under inquiry” (HC Deb 17 July 2012 c675W).

35 Public Bill Committee (Finance Bill), Notice of amendments, 21 June 2012 p213 36 Public Bill Committee (Finance Bill), Eighteenth Sitting, 26 June 2012 c683

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In response the Exchequer Secretary, David Gauke, argued that this had been appropriate, given the impact that the scheme would have had on participants’ liability

The impact of section 58 has been raised previously and it may be helpful for me briefly to say something on this subject. As the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) explained in a written answer in 2009, regulatory impact assessments are not published in respect of anti-avoidance measures where the impact is only upon those avoiding the tax in question. This particular scheme would have resulted in individuals paying income tax at less than 5%. Preventing egregious avoidance is not a regulatory burden, none the less, HMRC reviewed the information it held. Most of the people who would have been affected by the measures were in the top 5% of earners, with a substantial proportion receiving an annual income over £100,000. They have been advised by professional tax consultants. HMRC was quite clear that the legislation would not apply to individuals, other than those seeking to avoid tax through the scheme. Let us be clear, HMRC was challenging the scheme, so its users should have taken reasonable precautions to ensure that they had funds to meet their liabilities. HMRC is not free to distinguish in principle between an individual who spent the money that should have been paid in tax and one who has not. In those circumstances, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw his clause.37

Mr Mills withdrew the clause, noting that its purpose had been to “get some comments from the Minister on the record about an issue of concern to many.”38 Further to this, the Government have maintained the position that they have “no plans to amend” this provision.39 The issue was raised a second time during the Committee stage of the Finance Bill in June 2013, when Steve Baker MP put down a new clause, to amend section 58 so that it had effect from 12 March 2008. Mr Baker argued that without such a change, those affected would be exposed “to financial ruin at the hands of the state for conduct that they genuinely thought was lawful at the time.”40 Speaking for the Opposition Catherine McKinnell suggested that “we need to be clear that the reasons given for the introduction of the retrospective legislation in 2008 were the right ones, particularly in light of the several thousand people affected by the change.”41 In his response the Exchequer Secretary reiterated the Government’s position that “retrospective clarification was warranted in respect of the wholly artificial scheme targeted by section 58”:

The new clause has provided an opportunity to debate the role of retrospective legislation. I understand and appreciate the concerns expressed. I believe that Government should use retrospection only after very careful consideration, even where the change does no more than clarify law or put its meaning beyond doubt. However, we must reserve the right to use retrospection in wholly exceptional circumstances, in line with the protocol we have introduced.

37 op.cit. c684 38 op.cit. c684 39 HC Deb 11 February 2013 c447W 40 Public Bill Committee (Finance Bill), Twentieth sitting, 20 June 2013 c689 41 op.cit. c696

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In this specific case, it is worth pointing out that HMRC never accepted that the scheme worked, and the scheme promoters told users that HMRC was likely to challenge it and that the scheme was not guaranteed to work. The previous Government took action to put it beyond doubt that the rules worked as Parliament intended. Since then the courts have looked at this matter on issues relating to legitimate expectation, and found that the action was reasonable.42

In the event Mr Baker withdrew the clause, without putting it to the vote.

42 op.cit. cc699-700

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Appendix : Court of Appeal judgement Judgments R (on the application of Huitson) v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs Tax avoidance - Retrospective operation of statute - Income tax - United Kingdom resident claimant seeking to take advantage of double taxation agreement in order to reduce his liability to income tax in UK - Parliament enacting amending legislation with retrospective effect to counter operation of schemes such as that used by claimant - Whether retrospective legislation contrary to right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions - Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Pt II, art 1 - Finance Act 2008, s 58(4), (5) [2011] EWCA Civ 893, (Transcript) CA, CIVIL DIVISION MUMMERY, SULLIVAN, TOMLINSON LJJ 2, 3, 4 NOVEMBER 2010, 25 JULY 2011 25 JULY 2011 D Elvin QC and J Ramsden for the Appellant R Singh QC and C Sheldon for the Respondents Devonshires; Solicitor for HMRC MUMMERY LJ:

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is a very unusual income tax case. The Claimant taxpayer initiated it against Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs ("HMRC"). By way of judicial review the Claimant challenges the lawfulness of HMRC's enforcement of retrospective amendments to legislation in violation of his human rights. The Claimant says that, before the legislation was amended with retrospective effect, he was entitled to relief from UK income tax on income received by him from a trust in the Isle of Man. Now HMRC rely on the amendments to deny him, retrospectively, the tax relief previously available.

[2] The arguments range widely over public interest issues: the right to enjoy one's possessions without unjustified State interference; a taxpayer's legitimate expectations in such matters; the State's fiscal policies and financial concerns; principles of legal certainty and proportionality in the context of retrospective legislation; achieving a fair balance between the interests of the community and the rights of the individual; the operation of Double Taxation Arrangements; and changes over recent years in the judicial approach to the construction of tax avoidance schemes and applicable tax legislation.

[3] The prominent features in the litigation landscape are: (a) a marketed tax avoidance scheme locating a trading partnership and an interest in possession trust in the Isle of Man in order to take advantage of a Double Taxation Agreement ("DTA") made between the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man in 1955 (as subsequently amended), the scheme having no other purpose than the avoidance of UK income tax; (b) legislation in s 58(3), (4) and (5) of the Finance Act 2008 ("the 2008 Act") amending retrospectively the long standing double taxation relief provisions, the aim being to render the tax avoidance scheme ineffectual by depriving it of its potential tax advantages for a taxpayer resident in the United Kingdom and in receipt of income here from his Manx trust; and (c) the taxpayer's claim for judicial review of the unlawful application to him of the amended legislation on the ground that its retrospective effect is incompatible with his fundamental right to the peaceful enjoyment of "possessions" as guaranteed, through the Human Rights Act 1998, by art 1 to the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention").

[4] It is common ground that art 1 of the First Protocol lays down the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. It covers the deprivation of property, while recognising that the State is entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. The Convention requires that a measure which interferes with peaceful enjoyment of property should be proportionate to the object for which it is imposed.

[5] The term "possessions" in art 1 of the First Protocol bears an autonomous meaning: it includes rights in property and rights to property. There is protection for familiar property interests in physical things of significant economic value. There is also protection for rights in judgments, awards and recognised property claims under domestic law, such as a claim to payment of state compensation or a claim to repayment of VAT paid under a mistake.

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[6] The particular "possession" for which protection is sought here is a claim for tax relief: not having to pay UK income tax on the profits of an Isle of Man partnership trade paid to the UK taxpayer through and under a Manx trust. HMRC dispute the similarity of such a claim to a claim for compensation. They say that in this case the Claimant is not being deprived of an asset or proprietary kind of claim. Rather the Claimant is asserting that he should not have to pay the same level of income tax as other taxpayers who, like him, live in the UK and carry on the trade or profession of providing services to clients in the UK. The position of Mr Robert Huitson, the taxpayer Claimant, is that the value of the tax relief to him is in the region of £195,000. That, he says, is a right to property of significant value. He says that he has been deprived retrospectively of a proprietary interest in a claim to tax relief in each relevant year of past assessment.

[7] Mr Huitson is the Appellant in this court. I will refer to him throughout this judgment as the Claimant.

[8] Kenneth Parker J made an order dated 28 January 2010 in accordance with his judgment [2010] EWHC 97 (Admin); [2011] 1 QB 174. He dismissed the claim in judicial review proceedings commenced by the Claimant on 21 October 2008. The relief sought was a declaration that the retrospective element of s 58 of the 2008 Act and the Claimant's liability to pay additional tax infringed and was incompatible with art 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. The judge held that "96 . . . the challenged legislation, although having retrospective effect, is in the relevant circumstances proportionate and compatible with art 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention."

[9] The judge refused permission to appeal.

[10] By an order dated 26 May 2009 in the case of R (Shiner and another) v HMRC C1/2009/08) an application for judicial review seeking declarations that the retrospective effect of s 58 was incompatible with art 56 of the EC Treaty, as well as with art 1 of the First Protocol, was directed to be listed with this appeal before the same constitution. The hearing of the judicial review application in Shiner immediately preceded the hearing of this appeal. The separate judgments handed down on this appeal and on the judicial review application should be read together for the full picture of the proceedings between taxpayers and HMRC about the lawfulness of HMRC enforcing the retrospective provisions in the 2008 Act.

BACKGROUND FACTS

[11] The Claimant is an electrical engineer who is resident in the United Kingdom where he works as a self-employed IT consultant. The end users of his services are based in the UK. The Claimant would ordinarily pay UK income tax on the taxable profits of his trade. Following the "IR35" legislation in 2000 he could not have obtained any tax advantage by supplying his services to end users through an intermediary, such as a company.

[12] From June 2001, when he became a client of Montpelier Tax Planning (Isle of Man) Ltd of Douglas, Isle of Man, the Claimant participated in a tax avoidance scheme operated through a partnership and a trust located in the Isle of Man. It was designed to take advantage of the DTA provisions for claiming relief from UK income tax on specified income paid to a UK resident. Under the scheme the Claimant provided his services to end users in the UK through an intermediary partnership. It is called the Allenby Partnership. It consists of five companies incorporated and resident in the Isle of Man. Each partner is the trustee of an interest in possession trust established in the Isle of Man. The Claimant was the settlor and is the life tenant under one such trust called the Robert Huitson Family Settlement. He paid £1,000 into that trust. The trustee was Crackington Limited. Along with the other ordinary partners Crackington entered into partnership with a managing partner.

[13] The Claimant entered into a consultancy agreement with the Allenby Partnership, which arranged for him to provide his IT consultancy services to end users in the UK. The Allenby Partnership received full payment for his services. Under the consultancy agreement the Claimant received a fixed annual fee of £15,000, or such lesser sum as might be generated by his work for the partnership. The annual fee was subject to UK tax.

[14] The tax avoidance aspect of the scheme arrangements focused on fee income that was channelled to the Claimant through his Manx interest in possession trust. That income, which could well exceed £15,000 a year, was generated by the Claimant's activities through the medium of the Allenby Partnership. The partnership paid profits to the trustee, which then made payments to the Claimant in the UK in his capacity as the beneficial owner of an interest in possession under the trust.

[15] The Claimant's case was that, as a result of the DTA provisions and the legislation then in force, the income channelled to him through his Manx trust was not subject to UK income tax nor, it seems, not even subject to Manx tax as a result of concessions made by the fiscal authorities in the Isle of Man. He claimed that the income he received from:

"the offshore trust, in my capacity as the sole income beneficiary, represents the share of the profit of an Isle of Man Partnership whose profits are excluded from UK tax by virtue of art 3 of the UK-Isle of Man Double Taxation Agreement. My claim for Double Tax Relief, as the life tenant, is based on Baker v Archer Shee principles." (That case is authority for the proposition that a beneficiary under an interest in possession trust has an absolute right to the income and that the income does not belong to the trustee.)

[16] As for his tax treatment by HMRC, the Claimant's position was that from 2002 onwards he submitted tax returns claiming double taxation relief in respect of the trust income. He relied on the scheme, which was devised on the footing that, on its true construction, para 3(2) of the DTA was effective to exempt from UK income tax the share of the partnership profits received by the Claimant in that manner. As the judge commented, the tax outcome was paradoxical: by the use of DTA measures aimed at

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avoiding the imposition of double taxation on UK resident taxpayers, the Claimant, as a UK resident, was able to reduce his effective UK income tax rate to an average of 3.5%.

[17] Two different types of double taxation relief should be noted, as the judge is criticised for not observing the distinction between them. One kind is a "tax credit" provision. That means that credit is given by HMRC for tax that has been paid by the taxpayer in the jurisdiction of another fiscal authority, such as the Isle of Man. A different kind of double tax provision, which is relevant here, is "tax relief." That means that there is a charge to tax in one country only and that the specified income received by the taxpayer in this country is relieved by the DTA provision from liability to pay UK income tax. In this case the Claimant's claim was for tax relief on quantified sums for past years in respect of income which, it is argued, did not fall within the charge to UK income tax, as it was exempt from UK income tax by virtue of the DTA.

[18] HMRC did not intimate any challenge to the validity of the DTA claims by the Claimant in his tax returns until June 2004. It gave no reasons for the challenge until February 2006. The Claimant was advised by HMRC to make payment of tax on account in respect of the disputed sum, so as to avoid liability for accruing interest and liability for possible penalties. In February 2006 HMRC set out reasons for the challenge to the claims for relief. In May 2007 HMRC informed the Claimant that they were preparing a number of representative cases to take to the special commissioners regarding the validity of the claims to double taxation relief. Before the cases were listed for hearing the Government announced in the March 2008 budget that legislation would be enacted to render the tax avoidance scheme ineffective beyond doubt.

[19] On 21 July 2008 s 58 of the 2008 Act came into force. It amended, with retrospective effect, the existing legislation in s 858 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005. That section provided that where a UK resident is a member of a foreign partnership firm (ie one which resides outside the UK or carries on a trade the control and management of which is outside the UK) and by virtue of DTAs any of the income of the firm is relieved from tax in the UK, the partner is liable to income tax on the partner's share of the income of the firm despite the DTA.

[20] The section was amended by s 58 of the 2008 Act so as to render the tax avoidance scheme ineffectual and to impose on the Claimant and others in a similar position liability to pay UK income tax on the trust income received in past years. That position was achieved first by providing in sub-s (3) of s 58 that the members of the firm include "any person entitled to a share of income of the firm". Subsections (4) and (5) of s 58 then gave retrospective effect to the amendment in sub-s (3) by treating it as always having had effect and by treating the members of the partnership firm as having included "at all times" a person entitled to a share of the income of the partnership.

[21] HMRC revised the Claimant's tax assessments accordingly. The revisions and the validity of the legal basis on which they were made are challenged in these proceedings. The ground of challenge is that the retrospective changes made by the amendments are disproportionate and are incompatible with art 1. The claimed interference is retrospective deprivation of "possessions": that is, interference with proprietary interests in claims to relief from payment of income tax in the UK in respect of income received by the Claimant in his capacity as owner of an interest in possession under his Manx trust. The case rests on legal objections to retrospective legislation, which violate the principle of legal certainty. The retrospective amendments are said to impose an unreasonable burden on the Claimant. Issues of fiscal policy and proportionality are also raised. Reliance is placed on the claimed legitimate expectation of the taxpayer that the tax benefits of the scheme would not be removed with retrospective effect.

[22] More generalised objections were made at the hearing below about the distressing personal consequences of the retrospective provisions for individual users of the scheme: some would not be able to meet the tax demands, even if they sold all their assets, including the family home, while others could only settle HMRC's claims by selling or re-mortgaging the family home. Some taxpayers would face bankruptcy, financial worry, health problems and marital breakdown.

THE JUDGMENT

[23] The judge made a considered assessment of the practical and public interest implications of the Claimant's contentions:

"16 It is also immediately plain that the tax avoidance scheme, if it worked, would be singularly attractive to any person in the position of the Claimant, that is, any resident of the United Kingdom, who, as a self-employed person, carried on a trade or profession here. So long as end users were content to contract with an intermediary, rather than with the actual provider of the services, and so long as professional rules did not preclude such intermediation (barristers, for example, need not apply) any UK self-employed trader could reduce his or her taxable income to a tiny fraction of what it would otherwise have been. I accept that very many would not do so, taking the view that the tax avoidance scheme was wholly artificial and perhaps thinking that as UK residents they should be paying UK income tax on the profits of their trade or profession. But, and the figures produced by HMRC confirm this, a substantial number would be attracted. By the time the challenged legislation was enacted there were about 2,500 taxpayers exploiting similar arrangements, and the amount of income tax at stake had risen to £100m."

[24] The public interest in the potential distortion for competition was noted by the judge. An IT consultant participating in the Isle of Man scheme had the competitive advantage of an effective income tax rate of 3.5% over a consultant who did not participate in the scheme. He also noted the scheme's popularity. As appears from the facts in Shiner the Manx partnership/trust scheme has attractions for UK property developers, as well as for self-employed traders and professionals.

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[25] The judge explained the legislative background referring specifically to the provisions that preceded the decision in Padmore v Inland Revenue Comrs [1987] STC 36, 62 TC 352; affirmed [1989] STC 493 and the rapid legislative response to the decision in that case. That decision turned on the interpretation of the Jersey Double Taxation Arrangement. The court ruled that a UK resident in a Jersey partnership could invoke that DTA in order to avoid paying UK income tax on the profits of his or her trade or profession. The judge said that the swift legislative response to block the loophole exposed by that decision was of considerable importance to the present claim, because the result of that decision was plainly unacceptable in terms of UK public policy in fiscal affairs. He said:

"30 . . . Whatever the true meaning of the Jersey Double Taxation Arrangement, there was a wider rationale in terms of public policy: UK residents should pay UK income tax on the profits of any trade or profession; and a double taxation arrangement, intended to relieve from double taxation, should not be used as an instrument either to avoid all taxation or to reduce it to well below the level that would be applicable to the relevant income in the country of residence."

[26] The judge picked out two other significant features of the parliamentary response to Padmore in 1987: first, Parliament did not wait for the outcome of the case in the Court of Appeal before legislating about it, and, secondly, the re-active legislation was given retrospective effect. The judge said:

"33 It seems to me that these two features emphasised the importance that Parliament attached to the public policy to which I have referred. In my view, these events sent out a clear signal to taxpayers and their advisers that the legislature would be very likely to take effective and decisive steps to counter, even with retrospective measures, any attempt, through artificial arrangements, to take advantage of a double taxation agreement, in particular paragraph 3(2) of the double taxation arrangements with Jersey and the Isle of Man, in such a way that a UK resident would avoid, or very substantially reduce, the UK income tax on the profits of his or her trade or profession that would, in the absence of the artificial arrangements, otherwise have been payable."

[27] Turning to the efficacy of the scheme arrangements, the judge concluded, after a detailed and careful analysis of the rival arguments, that it was far from clear cut whether the scheme worked. There were respectable arguments on both sides of that question. He said "72 . . . I do not believe that the outcome of any legal proceedings in respect of the arrangements would have been a foregone conclusion. They would, I believe, have been complex, protracted and costly."

[28] The judge then considered the Convention and art 1 of the First Protocol as the central plank of the Claimant's challenge. After setting out the provisions of art 1, he summarised some legal propositions about the Convention that did not appear to be in dispute. He then explained how art 1 was to be applied to this claim on the basis of some further general propositions that seemed to him to be "incontrovertible".

[29] The judge identified the "fair balance" principle: in securing the payment of taxes a national authority must strike a fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the individual's fundamental rights, including the right to possessions in art 1. In that balancing exercise the national authority has a margin of appreciation under the Convention and a discretionary area of judgment under domestic law. The area of appreciation and judgment is wide in matters of social and economic policy.

[30] The Judge said that the assessment of the fair balance requires examination of all the relevant circumstances. In this case the principle of non-retrospectivity is specially important. While there is a recognised need for legal certainty, retrospectivity of fiscal legislation is not prohibited as such. The critical point is that the balancing of community interests and individual rights should not result in an unreasonable burden being placed on the individual taxpayer.

[31] Account could be taken, too, of the circumstance that the purpose of retrospective operation in the particular case was to restore the original intention of the relevant legislation.

[32] From the judge's list of incontrovertible propositions on the application of art 1 to the facts of this case, I will pick out those with greatest impact in evaluating the proportionality and compatibility of the amendments made by s 58.

[33] Of prime significance is the fact of the residence of individuals and partnerships exercising a trade or profession: residence is the connecting factor which entitles a State to impose income tax. The correlative proposition is that the resident of a State, who enjoys the benefits provided by it to its residents, has a reasonable expectation of being taxed by the State in question on the income of a trade or profession.

[34] Secondly, DTAs respect the principle of taxation by the State of residence. They aim to avoid the taxation of residents twice over on the same income. What DTAs do not aim to do is to facilitate the avoidance of tax, or its reduction below the level of tax ordinarily paid by residents. In those circumstances it is a legitimate aim of the public policy of the State in fiscal matters to ensure that DTAs relieve double taxation of residents rather than serve as an instrument used by taxpayers who choose to participate in artificial arrangements to avoid or reduce their level of taxation. In principle retrospective legislation may be justified for the purpose of implementing that policy.

[35] Thirdly, in their conduct towards the Claimant and other scheme users in a similar position, HMRC never accepted the interpretation of the legislation relied on by those who asserted the efficacy of the scheme. HMRC challenged those assertions.

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Further, HMRC had never undertaken not to bring proceedings. They had never suggested that no legislation would be enacted, or that any such legislation would only have prospective effect.

[36] In order to provide an overview I will summarise the judge's principal conclusions, leaving his detailed reasoning for discussion when considering the Claimant's submissions on the appeal.

[37] The crunch question was whether, on Convention principles, the retrospective effect of s 58 imposed an unreasonable burden on the Claimant "and thereby failed to strike a fair balance between the various interests involved": MA and 34 others v Finland (2003) 37 EHRR CD 210. The judge concluded that the challenged legislation, even though retrospective, did strike a fair balance: it was proportionate and compatible with art 1 of the First Protocol.

[38] Looking first to the particular situation of the Claimant and others similarly affected, the judge accepted the submissions of HMRC that s 58 did not impose an unreasonable burden on individual taxpayers. The Claimant had entered into a tax avoidance scheme that was wholly artificial and of doubtful efficacy. It would have been reasonable for the Claimant to set monies aside to pay the appropriate tax due. HMRC made it clear that they did not accept that the Claimant had paid the amount of tax due and they told him to make payment on account.

[39] Looking next to the wider interests of the community, the judge said that the retrospective amendments prevented a windfall of more than £200m being conferred on those who used the tax avoidance scheme at the expense of the general body of taxpayers. The amendments avoided the costs, delays and uncertainties of litigation about the efficacy of the scheme and re-asserted Parliament's long standing intention that DTAs would not affect a UK resident's liability to tax on his share of income from a foreign partnership.

[40] The judge agreed that it was a legitimate aim to ensure that a DTA should do no more than relieve from double taxation and should not be permitted to become an instrument whereby UK residents could reduce the tax they would normally pay on income earned from the exercise of a trade or profession in the UK.

[41] The judge thus concluded that it was within the area of discretionary judgment for Parliament to legislate with retrospective effect to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the great body of resident taxpayers and of the individuals who sought to benefit from the scheme.

[42] In disposing of some particular objections raised by the Claimant, the judge held that the State was not obliged, before enacting retrospective legislation about the tax scheme, to test its efficacy in the courts and to allow the Claimant, if successful, to keep the fruits of his victory. HMRC had made clear that they challenged the scheme and gave no assurance that there would be no litigation or legislation aimed at recovering the tax that the scheme had been devised to avoid. Those who had failed to make appropriate provision had done so at their own risk.

[43] Finally, the proportionality of the retrospective provision was not affected by the absence of any impact assessment by HMRC of how individuals might be financially affected by the retrospective operation of s 58.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

[44] The detailed submissions made by Mr Elvin QC on behalf of the Claimant can for convenience be gathered together under four broad heads of appeal. It is difficult to keep the points within any one heading. A degree of overlap and some repetition is unavoidable when assembling arguments relating to concepts such as unreasonable burden, interests of the community, fiscal policy, proportionality and so on.

[45] All of the submissions go to an over-arching general thesis that the retrospective provisions of the 2008 Act failed to achieve a fair balance between the interests of the general body of taxpayers and the rights of the Claimant as an individual and that they are disproportionate and incompatible with art 1.

[46] I will deal with each heading in turn.

A. Proportionality And Policy Factors

[47] In holding that there was no basis for the claim that the retrospective effects of s 58 were disproportionate, the judge said:

"77 . . . Parliament, in my view, was entitled to conclude that a rigorous application of the policy referred to . . . above was called for; that legislation was needed to put the effect of the DTA beyond doubt, and to prevent taxpayers resident in the United Kingdom from exploiting the DTA in a way that would enable them substantially to reduce income tax that would otherwise be properly payable on income from the exercise of a trade or profession. Parliament was also entitled, having regard to the background I have set out, to legislate with retrospective effect, particularly in order to ensure a 'fair balance' between the interests of the great body of resident taxpayers who paid income tax on their income from a trade or profession in the normal way, and the taxpayers, like the Claimant, who had sought to exploit, by artificial arrangements, the DTA, in plain contravention of the important public policy set out above, and in full knowledge of how Parliament had maintained that public policy after Padmore's case."

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[48] The judge identified the policies underlying the enactment of s 58 and justifying retrospective legislation: the entitlement of the UK to impose UK income tax on the profits of any trade or profession, whether carried on in the UK or elsewhere, residence being recognised internationally as "the core connecting factor for the imposition of income tax"; the intended purpose of the Isle of Man DTA and the artificial use of it to achieve a different and contradictory purpose; and the proper conduct of HMRC in their dealings with and treatment of the Claimant and other taxpayers on this matter.

[49] The judge is criticised by Mr Elvin for failing to treat the policies with "the special care" necessary when considering a retrospective change in the law: see Draon v France (2005) 20 BHRC 456. He erred, it is argued, by implicitly treating the Government's "financial concerns" as a justification for retrospective legislation: see Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium [1995] ECHR 17849/91. Overall the judge afforded too much weight to the public policy considerations relied on by him, in particular the policy of an anti-tax avoidance construction of the scheme. In consequence of his errors in approach the judge failed to strike "a fair balance" having regard, in particular, to the retrospective nature of s 58, the effects of HMRC's vacillation and delay in challenging the scheme in legal proceedings and the absence of any assessment of the impact of the retrospective extinction of existing claims to DTA tax relief.

[50] In connection with the claim to DTA tax relief as a possession within the meaning of art 1, Mr Elvin QC points out that a change in taxation or the removal of a relief could itself amount to interference with possessions: R (Federation of Tour Operators) v HM Treasury [2007] EWHC 2062 (Admin) at para 105, [2008] STC 547, saying that the Convention looks at the effective financial burden imposed by the tax.

[51] Mr Elvin also submits that a claim to tax relief may generate a legitimate expectation, if a currently enforceable claim is sufficiently established under national law: Kopecky v Slovakia (2004) 41 EHRR 944 at paras 45 to 52, [2004] ECHR 44912/98. It must be something more concrete than a mere hope. It must be based on a legal provision or legal act, such as a judicial decision, and not be just an arguable claim or a genuine dispute. Mr Elvin submits that the Claimant here had a legitimate expectation, when he arranged his affairs to reduce tax liability, that the law would not be changed retrospectively to take away the existing claim for tax relief under the DTA. By vacillating on the matter for a period of seven years or more HMRC had frustrated the Claimant's legitimate and reasonable expectations and had increased the detriment he would suffer as a result of the legislative reversals.

[52] Mr Elvin contends that the retrospective removal of the relief by s 58 failed to strike a fair balance between the public interest in the prevention of tax avoidance and the private interest in the relief in that there was not proportionality between the means employed and the aim of the legislation. The proportionality had to be determined by a consideration of the facts, the reasons advanced for retrospectivity and the conduct of the parties, including HMRC, to see that the action was taken in an appropriate manner, with utmost consistency and in good time: Beyeler v Italy (2002) 36 EHRR 46 at paras 98 to 100 and 114 to 120, [2002] ECHR 33202/96.

[53] In this case the retrospective measure involved deprivation of a claim that had crystallised for past years and was the subject of a legitimate expectation. Interference with that possession of a claim to tax relief could only be justified in exceptional circumstances, which did not exist in this case.

[54] It is submitted that the judge also erred by attributing to the DTA a tax avoidance purpose and not the purpose simply of double taxation avoidance according to its plain terms. It is not the purpose of the DTA to alter the basis of taxation adopted in each Member State or to allocate the burden of taxation in the DTA States. Thus, it was for the Isle of Man to decide whether to tax Manx enterprises: see Smallwood v HMRC [2010] EWCA Civ 778 at para 29, [2010] STC 2045, 12 ITLR 1002.

[55] The judge is said to be wrong in holding that Padmore had sent out a general signal to tax avoiders about retrospective legislation. That was not a case of a tax avoidance scheme or of annulling a long standing claim for tax relief: the legislation consequent on Padmore was passed to restore the law to what had been the general understanding of what the law was before the court ruling. That is not the case here.

[56] The attractive presentation of Mr Elvin's submissions has not persuaded me that the judge was wrong to reject the case that the retrospective effect of the 2008 Act was disproportionate.

[57] In my judgment, the judge correctly directed himself on the issue of fair balance and proportionality and fully understood the purpose and structure of DTAs and the way in which the Isle of Man DTA was being used in the scheme for quite a different purpose than its intended double taxation purpose: to provide tax relief of UK residents. Nothing in his judgment was contrary to the true scope of the cited authorities of Draon and MA v Finland. As for Pressos the State in this case was not relying on purely "financial concerns" to justify retrospective legislation and the judge did not base his decision on such concerns. He focused correctly on whether the retrospective measures achieved a fair balance between community interests and individual rights and whether they placed an unreasonable burden on the Claimant. He did not give too much weight to the policy justification relied on by HMRC.

B. Tax Efficacy Of The Scheme And Legitimate Expectation

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[58] The judge rejected the Claimant's case that the efficacy of the arrangements to avoid tax was practically assured under the DTA and the legislation then applicable and that it was for that reason that HMRC did not bring legal proceedings challenging the scheme before s 58 was enacted.

[59] The judge found that neither side's interpretation of the 2008 Act was manifestly unreasonable, that it was uncertain who was correct and unpredictable which one the court would prefer. There were differences in approach. In claiming DTA relief, the Claimant relied on the principle in Baker v Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844, 11 TC 749, 96 LJKB 803 that the profits received by the trustee as a partner were not treated as belonging to the trustee but to the beneficiary with an interest in possession under the trust, with the consequence that the income arising from his beneficial interest in possession under the trust cannot be assessed to UK tax. The Claimant's interest in possession under the trust retained the character of profits of a Manx enterprise received by the trust and those profits were not subject to UK income tax.

[60] Against that, HMRC relied on a more purposive approach to construction in the case of tax avoidance schemes with which Mr Elvin disagreed (see below).

[61] In the end the judge found that, even if HMRC would have lost any putative proceedings in respect of these tax arrangements, the outcome of the claim in these proceedings would be no different:

"83 . . . It remained, for all the reasons already stated, within the permissible area of discretionary judgment of Parliament to legislate, with retrospective effect, to prevent taxpayers from using, by wholly artificial arrangements, the DTA for a purpose for which it was not intended, so as to defeat the public policy to which I have referred earlier. The importance of the public policy had already been brought home to taxpayers and their advisers by the legislative response following Padmore's case. HMRC had given no assurance that any legislative response in this case would be prospective only. In my view, even if the arrangements indisputably worked under the DTA and the legislation then applicable, taxpayers could reasonably have expected that Parliament would respond in a way that ensured fairness generally between all taxpayers resident in the United Kingdom, and that maintained the relevant policy. Given the background, and the need to ensure fairness between all taxpayers, taxpayers could also have reasonably expected that the legislative response would have retrospective effect, as turned out to be the case."

[62] Mr Elvin's main criticism is that the judge erred in failing to find that the Claimant had a proprietary interest in a sufficiently established claim to tax relief to give rise to a legitimate expectation that would attract the protection of the Convention. The judge had not taken sufficient account of the claim for relief based on the DTA and the application of the Archer-Shee principle and had erred by accepting the approach of HMRC based on its policy position regarding the DTA and its purpose.

[63] Mr Elvin submits that the evidence indicated that HMRC apparently lacked confidence in the points that they now say are good points and thought that they would lose a challenge before the special commissioners.

[64] Further, the judge's approach to the ineffectiveness of artificial tax avoidance schemes generally relied on a purposive anti-avoidance approach to the interpretation of tax legislation and tax avoidance arrangements which was harsher than that laid down by the House of Lords in MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 AC 311 at paras 8, 28 to 29, 49 and 58, [2001] 1 All ER 865 and Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51, [2005] 1 AC 684 at paras 26 to 39, [2005] 1 All ER 97.

[65] Mr Elvin says that the judge had, without justification, departed from a line of authority on art 1 which held that depriving a person retrospectively of a proprietary interest in the nature of a claim is inconsistent with preserving a fair balance between the interests at stake. Only in exceptional circumstances can retrospective legislation depriving a person of a claim to relief from taxation be justified.

[66] It is submitted that the judge gave too much weight to the view of HMRC that the scheme did not work and not enough weight to the evidence of the conduct of HMRC indicating that it shared the view of the Claimant's advisers that it did work. There was a lack of clarity and confidence in HMRC's view that they could defeat the scheme.

[67] I am not persuaded that the judge made any error in his rejection of the case advanced on tax efficacy of the scheme and legitimate expectation.

[68] Before the judge the case was that the Claimant had a legitimate expectation that HMRC would carry out their promise to challenge the scheme before the special commissioners in the usual way and that the retrospectivity had deprived him of the right to be heard. On the appeal the emphasis shifted. The Claimant's case now addresses the deprivation by retrospective legislation of his possession in the form of the alleged proprietary interest in the nature of his claim to tax relief.

[69] On that fresh approach to the point on legitimate expectation, the nature of the "claim" asserted has to be examined. The "claim" to tax relief under the DTA is one which has neither been accepted by HMRC nor has it been made out in any tribunal or court. All that has been established is the existence of a genuine dispute about whether the scheme based on the claim for tax relief under the DTA worked.

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[70] There were grounds on which HMRC based their view that the income received from the Manx partnership via the Manx trust was taxable in the UK and on which the judge concluded that the "tax efficacy of the arrangements were far from clear cut". As he observed, there were respectable arguments on both sides of the question.

[71] As for the approach to construction approved by the House of Lords in MacNiven, the current position is that the trenchant dictum of Ribeiro PJ in Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd (2003) 6 ITLR 454 at 35 has been approved and applied by the highest court in the UK "The ultimate question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically."

[72] On that approach to the interpretation of the legislation, the DTA and the scheme, the judge was, in my view, entitled to conclude that there was a respectable argument that in s 858 of the 2005 Act the phrase "member of the firm" included a person in the position of the Claimant, who was entitled to a share of the profits of the partnership via the interest in possession trust and that no relief would be available under the DTA in respect of profits earned by activities taking place in the UK, as there was no double taxation to relieve, the profits of the Manx partnership not being liable to Manx tax.

[73] Finally, in taking legitimate expectation into account in striking a fair balance which justified the retrospective legislation, the judge was fully and plainly entitled to take into account the reasonable expectation that, even if the scheme worked, UK residents should have to pay UK income tax on the profits of their trade or business.

C. HMRC Delays And Conduct Affecting Fair Balance: Retrospective Legislation Without Prior Test Litigation

[74] The judge held that the failure of HMRC to bring legal proceedings in respect of the scheme before the retrospective legislation was enacted did not render the amending legislation disproportionate. He rejected the Claimant's criticisms of delay on the part of HMRC and of their failure to test the matter in litigation before recommending legislation with retrospective effect.

[75] The judge held that there was no legal obligation on the State to test the matter of the efficacy of the tax avoidance scheme in the courts before enacting legislation, even with retrospective effect. He said:

"85 . . . The public policy was of such paramount importance that legislation was necessary in any event to put the position beyond all doubt and to maintain the relevant public policy. Furthermore, for reasons already given, such litigation would probably have been protracted, costly and uncertain. At no time did HMRC indicate to affected taxpayers, including the Claimant, that they could safely rely upon the arrangements. On the contrary HMRC consistently maintained that the arrangements did not work, and advised taxpayers to pay on account the income tax which HMRC said was properly due. Any prudent taxpayer who followed that advice would not now be prejudiced by the retrospective effect of the legislation. The circumstances are wholly different from those in Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 1224, where the public authorities by their conduct over many years had led the Applicant to believe that the state would not exercise a right that it enjoyed, and the later exercise of the right conferred a specific unjust enrichment on the state at the expense of the citizen.

86 Nor did HMRC represent, expressly or even impliedly that legal proceedings would first be pursued before enactment of any legislation, or that any legislation would not have retrospective effect. In so far as taxpayers may have relied upon the route previously travelled by the Inland Revenue and the legislature in Padmore's case, they did so at their own election and risk."

[76] The judge added that the taxpayers were not themselves powerless to bring the issue to a head, if they so chose, under provisions in s 28A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 without waiting for HMRC to bring proceedings in respect of the arrangements. They did not pursue such a course.

[77] Mr Elvin submits that the judge was wrong in failing to take proper account of the unjustified and largely unexplained failure on the part of HMRC to take appropriate action against the tax avoidance scheme based on a disputed interpretation of the DTA. It had knowledge of the scheme from about 1997 and certainly from July 2002. It had not acted in good time, even when all the evidence was assembled. It abandoned within months the test claims proposed in 2007. The delays by HMRC saw a yearly increase in the number of schemes. If HMRC had taken proceedings and lost, as he contended they would have done, Parliament would have allowed the Claimant and similarly placed persons to retain the benefits of their litigation success. Mr Elvin cites cases in which swift action had been taken, such as A, B, C, D v UK (Application No 8531/79) (1981) DR 203 at p 203; National & Provincial Building Society v UK (Application No 21319/93) (1997) 25 EHRR 127 at paras 29 to 30 and 33 to 35, [1997] STC 1466, 69 TC 540; Padmore v CIR [1987] STC 36; and MA v Finland (supra) at pp 212 to 213.

[78] The judge also failed, on the Claimant's case, to take proper account of the delay in addressing whether retrospectivity struck a fair balance, bearing in mind the legitimate expectation on the part of the Claimant to claim tax relief and the exacerbation of the frustration of the Claimant's legitimate expectation as a result of the delay in introducing the legislation. The delay and continuing uncertainty added to the detriment suffered by the Claimant: see Beyeler v Italy (2000) 33 EHRR 1224 at para 119, [2000] ECHR 33202/96, which the judge cited, but distinguished as a case in which the Italian authorities, by their conduct, had led the taxpayer to believe that the State would not exercise the right that it enjoyed. It is submitted that the judge misapplied that authority, since the detriment, both in that case and in the case of the Claimant, is suffered as a result of living through many years of legal uncertainty created by the attitude of the authorities.

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[79] Even in the absence of a representation by HMRC about no litigation or no retrospective legislation the Claimant had a legitimate proprietary interest in a claim for relief. He was entitled to expect the DTA to be applied to him without himself taking steps.

[80] In my judgment, the judge correctly held that this ground of challenge to the retrospective provisions had not been established.

[81] First, Mr Elvin could not point to any legal requirement on HMRC to test the disputed efficacy of the scheme in litigation before recommending recourse to retrospective legislation. There had been no representation by HMRC that legal proceedings would be pursued before legislation was enacted, or that any legislation enacted would not have retrospective effect.

[82] Secondly, the judge looked in detail at the circumstances of the alleged delay by, and the conduct of, HMRC. The litigation would probably have been protracted, costly and uncertain. There was no evidence about the impact that the delay had on the Claimant. HMRC had not given any express or implied indication to the Claimant that he could safely rely on the scheme, or to believe or have any expectation that tax would not be payable. There was no other conduct on the part of HMRC that outweighed the other factors affecting the striking of a fair balance.

[83] Thirdly, HMRC had advised the Claimant and other taxpayers using the scheme to pay on account the income tax that they said was properly due. The Claimant and his fellow taxpayers, who chose not to take that course, took the risk that tax would be payable, despite the scheme.

[84] Fourthly, if the Claimant had wished to bring matters to a head, he could have chosen to take his own proceedings without waiting for HMRC to bring theirs. He could have applied to the special commissioners for a direction for a closure notice. He had not done so.

D. No Pre-Legislation Assessment Of Impact Of Retrospectivity On Taxpayers

[85] The judge concluded that the absence of any assessment by HMRC of how individual taxpayers, such as the Claimant, might be affected financially by the liability that would be imposed by s 58(4) could not, in the circumstances of this case, affect the proportionality of the retrospective legislation. He said that it was not entirely clear to him what such an assessment would have entailed, or what purpose it would have served. He concluded:

"93 Given the background, I see no justifiable basis for saying that HMRC was required to investigate what taxpayers had in fact done: whether they had, for example, prudently reserved for any future liability, or had spent the net income on present consumption or had invested in illiquid assets that, particularly in the light of the fall in asset prices following the credit crisis in 2008, could not now be realised to meet, in whole or in part, the liabilities that would be unequivocally imposed by section 58(4) of the 2008 Act."

[86] Mr Elvin submits that the failure to carry out an impact assessment made the retrospective response by Parliament disproportionate. That failure should have been weighed in the balance to see whether fairness had been achieved. He says that, in order to safeguard the rights protected by the Convention, it is incumbent on public bodies, such as HMRC, to take into consideration the impact of a measure on the rights of those affected. It was also a factor to be weighed in assessing the fair balance. He contends that the judge erred in law by failing to take account of the lack of a proper assessment of the effect on the Claimant and other similarly placed taxpayers of full retrospectivity, given the circumstances of HMRC's delay, the increase in claims resulting from that delay, the apparent lack of confidence by HMRC in its reserved position and its failure to take steps to resolve the issue in good time. In accepting that he did not even know what the assessment would have entailed, the judge had indulged in impermissible conjecture on the possible results of an assessment.

[87] Further, the repeated suggestions of HMRC to put the money on one side did nothing to avoid the fact that the Claimant was ultimately deprived of £195,456 of relief and his tax burden was increased by the same amount. The fact that HMRC may be willing to deal with hardship cases did not answer the point that the Claimant was exposed to hardship as a result of the retrospectivity in s 58.

[88] I would reject this ground of appeal. The judge did not err in law in disregarding the absence of an impact assessment of the effects of retrospective legislation on its proportionality.

[89] First, Mr Elvin could not point to any legal requirement that a State should carry out either a formal or an informal impact assessment before enacting retrospective legislation. I agree that an impact assessment may be desirable, that it may lend support to a submission that the State acted proportionately and that a State may be open to criticism for not having done one: but it is not legally obligatory.

[90] Secondly, there is no authority for the proposition that the failure to have, or to consider having, an impact assessment is a factor to be weighed in assessing the fair balance.

[91] Thirdly, on the facts of this case, HMRC knew with reasonable precision the numbers of taxpayers seeking to take advantage of the scheme and the amount of income tax at stake. They had advised them to set aside or to pay the disputed tax

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in advance. Many of the taxpayers had chosen not to take that precaution. It was neither necessary nor reasonable to impose on HMRC an obligation to investigate what the taxpayers had in fact done with the money that they had decided not to set aside. I agree with the judge that it was for the taxpayers themselves to assess the risk to them inherent in not paying the tax in advance. Although HMRC may decide to take financial hardship into account before seeking to enforce demands for tax and interest, that, in my view, is not relevant to the issue of whether the retrospectivity of s 58 was devoid of the reasonable foundation needed to make it compatible with art 1.

[92] Fourthly, it has not been established what relevant information would have been yielded by an impact assessment, other than the fact that some taxpayers could afford to pay the tax and that other taxpayers could not. That fact, which was already known to HMRC, would not have tipped the balance in favour of finding that s 58 was disproportionate and incompatible with art 1 of the First Protocol.

RESULT

[93] I would dismiss this appeal. The judge was not wrong to conclude in his comprehensive, clear and excellent judgment that the retrospective provisions of the 2008 Act are proportionate and are compatible with art 1. There are no grounds which would entitle this court to disturb it.

[94] In the circumstances of this case, the liability of the Claimant under the retrospective legislation of s 58 to pay the UK income tax that he would have had to pay, if he had not participated in the tax avoidance scheme, is no more an unjustified interference with his enjoyment of his possessions than the ordinary liability that his fellow residents in the UK are under to contribute, by way of UK tax on their income, towards the costs of providing community and other benefits for the purposes of life in a civil society.

[95] In summary, the crucial points on examination of all the relevant circumstances of this case are that the retrospective amendments were enacted pursuant to a justified fiscal policy that was within the State's area of appreciation and discretionary judgment in economic and social matters. The legislation achieves a fair balance between the interests of the general body of taxpayers and the right of the Claimant to enjoyment of his possessions, without imposing an unreasonable economic burden on him. This outcome accords with the reasonable expectations of the taxation of residents in the State on the profits of their trade or profession. The legislation prevents the DTA tax relief provisions from being misused for a purpose different from their originally intended use. There has been no conduct on the part of the State fiscal authorities that has made the retrospective application of the amended legislation to his tax affairs an infringement of his Convention rights. SULLIVAN LJ:

[96] I agree. TOMLINSON LJ:

[97] I also agree. Appeal dismissed.