Nicholas Sullivan Systems Engineer
CloudFlare@grittygrease
Running Secure Server Software on Insecure Hardware without a Parachute
What this talk is aboutu The web is changing — consolidation at the edge u Fundamental assumptions about server security are wrong u How do we design server software with the worst case in mind?
u Distinguish between long and short term secrets u Devise approaches for protecting each
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Let’s Talk About Web Infrastructure
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Global Website Traffic
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Global Website Traffic with CDN
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Current Map
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Future Map
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Future Map
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Edge Computing Threat Model
Traditional server threat modelu Assume server is secure u Add layers of protection to keep attackers out
u Network layer protection u Operating System Level: principle of least privilege u Protection against maliciously installed code u More advanced barriers
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Globally distributed serversu Less jurisdictional control = less physical security u Physical access trumps static defense layers !
u Traditional defenses helpful, but not ideal u Cannot rely on security of keys u Single break-in results in immediate compromise
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A More Effective Approach
Approach system security the ‘DRM way’u Assume attacker has bypassed all static defenses u Goal is to refresh secrets before they are compromised u Split system into long-term secrets and short-term secrets u Focus on renewability of secrets
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Secrets must be split into two tiersu Long-term Secrets
u Useful for attacker for long period of time u Do not store at the edge !
u Short-term Secrets u Expire after a short period of time u Cannot be re-used
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Example: Traditional TLS terminationu TLS handshake with nginx and Apache
u SSL keys on disk u Read from disk, use in memory !
u Cryptographic elements at risk if server is compromised u Private key u Session key
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TLS revisited for untrusted hardwareu Long term secrets
u Private key
!u Short term secrets
u Session key u Session IDs and Session ticket keys u Credentials to access private keys
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How to Protect Short-term Secrets
Short-term secrets — threat modelu Must live on machines in unsafe locations
u Memory u Control Flow
u By the time a secret is broken, it should be expired u Don’t keep secrets in a useable state u Impose computational cost to retrieve the original secret u Expire secrets quickly
!
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Techniques from DRM are applicableu White-box cryptography u Code obfuscation
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Standard Cryptography Threat Model
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Alice Bob
Eve
White-box Cryptography Threat Model
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Alice Bob
Eve
White-box Cryptography Threat Model
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Aleve Bob
White-box cryptographyu Hide the cryptographic key from everyone u Protect against key extraction in the strongest threat model !
u Takes time to extract key — lots of math u Choose difficulty based on secret lifetime
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White-box cryptography implementations
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u Commercial products u Irdeto, Arxan, SafeNet, etc.
u Open source u OpenWhiteBox
Code obfuscation
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Code obfuscationu Making reverse engineering difficult
u Compile-time control-flow modification u Data transformation in memory u Anti-debugging
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Before
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After
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Code obfuscation implementationsu Commercial products
u Arxan, Irdeto, etc. u Open source
u Obfuscator-LLVM
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Long-term Secrets
Keyless SSLu SSL without keys? Surely you’re joking. u SSL without keys at the edge. That’s better.
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How Keyless SSL Worksu Split the TLS state machine geographically
u Perform private key operation at site owner’s facility (in HSM, etc) u Perform rest of handshake at edge u Communicate with signing server over mutually authenticated TLS
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Keyless SSL Diagram
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Conclusion
Conclusionu Untrusted hardware requires a new approach
u Split secrets into long-term and short-term u Design for rapid renewal — replace secrets faster than they can be
broken u Leverage short-term secrets to access long-term secrets
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