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South Africa: ExplainingDemocratic Stability
JAN-ERIK LANE & SVANTE ERSSON
Geneva University, Umea University
ABSTRACT Democracy scores for South Africa are now quite high. How is this to beexplained? Testing social, economic, cultural and institutional models of democracy,we suggest that South Africas current democratic stability is best explained by acombination of institutional and political culture factors. The ANC in South Africa is
found to be an interesting example of a dominant party. In contrast to superficiallysimilar cases in Mexico and Taiwan, the position of the ANC is based upon
electoral mobilisation not state monopolisation. However, in the long run anydominant party poses a risk for democracy, especially if contextual conditions donot fully support democratic stability. Civil society is identified as an important
factor that is conducive to democratic vitality in South Africa.
Introduction
The crushing victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in the 2004
parliamentary elections in South Africa (SA) raises the question of the
influence of a dominant party upon the functioning of democracy. One of themajor findings in the literature on democracy is that a predominant position for
one political party, which becomes almost identical with the state, makes democ-
racy unstable (Dahl, 1972). However, the ANC is deeply committed to democracy
in South Africa as a result of its long struggle against the Apartheid regime. But
will such a democratic commitment last, and will a democratic spirit suffice?
Democracy in South Africa is entrenched through a system of institutions
that are conducive to the stability of democracy (Lijphart, 1998; Friedman,
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
Vol. 45, No. 2, 219240, April 2007
Correspondence Address: Jan-Erik Lane, Department of Political Science, Geneva University,
UNI Mail 40 Bd Du Pont dArve CH 1211 Geneve 4 Switzerland Email: Jan Erik Lane@
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1999; Mattes, 2002; Pottie & Hassim, 2003; Lodge, 2003; Southall, 2003).
Thus, there is a Constitutional Court with legal review, an Ombudsman,
proportional representation and political decentralisation. At the same time
there is a presidential system of government based upon a dominant position
for one of the political parties. This sets up a problematic that will be resolved
in one of two ways. Either political competition is reinforced through the
emergence of a more balanced party system. Or the institutions of democracy
will be bent in favour of the dominant position of the ANC. As David Welsh
underlines, there are longer-term challenges to the integrity and effectiveness
of the political system of SA, and the worst reaction would be complacency
(Welsh, 2004: 21).
The purpose of this article is to explore these predictions by relating South
Africa to the general analysis of the conditions of democracy among thecountries of the world (Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003; Doorenspleet,
2004; Epstein et al., 2006). We will employ the regression technique in
order to isolate the conditions that increase or decrease democratic stability
and then apply these insights to the case of South Africa. In the long run,
South Africa can do no better on democracy than the average country in the
world. Interestingly, at present its democracy score is considerably above its
predicted score from a regression model that takes into account the basic
conditions in democracy research. Such a high level of democracy, we
suggest, would need underpinning by civil society and its culture of toleranceamidst multiculturalism.
The first step in the analysis involves an attempt at mapping the variation in
democracy in SA over time. The second step is a discussion of conditions
promoting democracy both in general and in particular with reference to the
South African experience. Following a distinction between social or economic
factors on the one hand and institutional factors on the other hand, we discuss
political institutions (focusing specifically on the ANC as a dominant party
within a predominant party system in South Africa) social structure and
political culture. On the basis of this discussion we employ the regressiontechnique to test the implications of different models for predicting
democracy in SA. The article ends with a discussion about the implications
for democracy in South Africa in relation both to its political institutions
and to macro-forces within society.
Mapping Democracy in South Africa
There are many democracy indices available in the literature, and they tend by
and large to agree upon country rankings (Munk & Verkuilen, 2002). It is true
that under closer scrutiny the variation in scores over time for specific
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Africa it is generally agreed that the country is today a democracy. Figure 1
presents the scores for South Africa before and after the regime change in
1994 using a standard index of democracy (Freedom House, 2004)1 as well
as an index compiled for South Africa (Fedderke et al., 2001),2 and they
both tend to agree.
Similar trends over time for this period (1973 onwards) can also be
identified from other democracy indices. The Polity data scores (Polity,
2004) comes very close to the Freedom House scores, and the Vanhanen
democracy index (Vanhanen, 2000) displays a similar pattern, although the
level of the democracy scores in the latter is lower than in the other democracy
indices, since that index is based on participation and competition.
It should be pointed out and emphasised that these democracy scores for
South Africa today are very high, at or above 9 on a scale from 1 to 10.They indicate not only that South Africa is the only country on the African
continent where one may hope for a consolidation of democracy but also
that South African democracy is on par with European states.3
These judgements on democracy scores for South Africa are complemented
in Figure 2 with data capturing citizens attitudes to the new democracy
introduced in 1994 as they are reported in the Afrobarometer dataset. On
one hand we have an indication as to how satisfied people are with democracy
(SWD); and on the other hand we have the extent to which people support
democracy over other regimes (SFD). Over the period from 1995 to 2006 aplurality are satisfied and tend to support the new political system, although
the trend varies slightly over the years.
Figure 1 Democracy scores in South Africa Sources: The scores displayed are based
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Various indicators measuring the state of democracy in South Africa suggest
that democracy is in the process of being consolidated. It is obvious that South
Africa today fulfils accepted criteria on political rights and civil liberties. This
state of affairs is to a large extent supported by the citizens of South Africa.
Conditions Promoting Democracy
Democracy, we know, around the world is promoted by a set of social,
economic and cultural factors as well as by institutional factors. These
general conditions include affluence, degree of ethnic fragmentation, religion
(here defined as exogenous conditions) as well as institutions (here defined as
endogenous conditions). Let us start this discussion with political institutions
that may be of relevance for understanding the development of democracy in apolitical system like the one in South Africa.
Institutional Factors: Dominant Party Position
The list of countries with a former one-party system left or right is long,
including among others: the Philippines, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast,
Hungary, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Paraguay, Seychelles, and Cape Verde.
Most of these one-party states collapsed in the democracy wave during the
1990s. A one-party state differs from a predominant party system in terms of
mainly institutional characteristics The one-party state is authoritarian in its
Figure 2. Satisfaction with (SWD) and support for democracy (SFD) in South Africa19952004. Sources: Satisfaction with democracy (SWD): Mattes et al. (2000: 21),Bratton and Cho (2006: 19); Support for democracy (SFD): Mattes et al. (2000: 5),
Bratton and Cho (2006: 17)
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democratic regime. While the dismantling of many one-party states during the
1990s has been well studied, there is little analysis of how a dominant party
system emerges. We introduce the discussion by looking at the role of a domi-
nant party in a predominant party system. Then we examine the role of the
ANC in South Africa and its place in the republic. The relationship between
party system and political regime is an under-researched area where only the
extreme case of a one-party state in a totalitarian regime is unambiguous
(Sartori, 1976). One significant distinction is between the competitive one-
party state and the non-competitive one-party state, as the imposition of a ban
against competing parties would make democracy highly unlikely. Matters are
entirely different when one party retains a dominant position over and against
the others as a result of free and fair elections. In between these two polar
types there is certainly a grey area where dominant parties employ tricks tomaintain their position.
When a one-party state is legally entrenched, then there is little likelihood
of a democratic regime evolving autonomously. Other parties may be allowed
to operate, but they are accorded the status of supporting parties to the
hegemonic one. The one-party legal status is characteristically used for
the total penetration of state and society, meaning that the party fills all key
positions in the bureaucracy and in the key associations of society. Africa
experienced this type of legal one-party state for some time after
independence when the earlier freedom fighters chose to put in place so-calledmodernising regimes based upon a political monopoly for the national
developing party. Such a dominant position for one party has commonly
been achieved through institutional means. This is definitely not the case in
South Africa. The ANC has been very eager not to associate itself with the
African model of a one-party state. Entry for alternative and new parties is
open in the South Africa polity and the small parties are not merely support
parties to the ANC but true contenders.
However, there are other less extreme types of one-party states where a
connection with democracy is far from excluded. Clearly, South Africa fallsinto a category of one-party regimes where there is no legal restriction upon
entry or competition but the elections return one party to political power on
a consistent basis. Among earlier examples of such regimes the dominant
party has not always refrained from using illegal practices against contenders,
but the essential point is that there is no legal prohibition upon the entry of
other parties. There may be intimidation and vote rigging, but this may also
occur even when there is no dominant party. Classical examples of such
predominant party systems are provided by Taiwan and Mexico. The two
countries share striking similarities, particularly in their respective
experiences under single-party rule and in their recent electoral results The
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Institutcional) in Mexico were the only two dominant ruling parties in the
world that survived the democratic transition relatively intact, but they
finally succumbed in presidential elections held in March 2000 and July
2000 in Taiwan and Mexico, respectively. It was the first time that the
Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan and the National Action Party in
Mexico won the presidency. Both presidential winners failed to gain a
majority of the votes and the parties they belong to do not control a majority
of the seats in the legislative assembly either.
A dominant party may arrive at its position by diverse routes. It may
exercise hegemony due to past practices when it was the only legally accepted
party. Thus, it would continue to be the state party even after the regime
evolved towards democracy. Often it is then merely a matter of time before
its position cracks due to the entry of competing parties and a contenderundermines its dominant position as in Mexico and Taiwan. It may exercise
dominance by means of the skilful employment of the electoral system,
relying upon first past the post in combination with the preaching of a national
ideology as in Singapore. These one-party states encompass clientelism in
order to buttress their dominant position by co-opting new elites into their
cadres. It is an open question to what extent this penetration of state and
society is fully achieved or merely presents an opportunity to be undone
when the dominant position cracks.
The case of the ANC and South Africa is entirely different, as its dominantposition derives from its social support and has been retained despite the employ-
ment of the PR election method (Giliomee, 1998; Southall, 1998; see also
Prevost, 2006; Butler, 2007). In many ways, the dominant position of the
ANC resembles the electoral fortunes of the social democratic parties in Scandi-
navia over long periods or the dominant position of the Conservative Party in the
UK under Thatcher, although it must be underlined that the dominant position in
a two-party system is, of course, facilitated by the majoritarian election method.
Could one, then, predict that the ANCs dominant position will falter, as did
that of the Norwegian and Swedish social democrats eventually? Not quite.There are certain factors typical of South Africa that makes such a prediction
improbable. The ANC will for a long time be able to draw upon the inherited
racial cleavages in the country, dividing the Black vote between itself and the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which does not monopolise the vote of the
Zulus. Thus, the ANC stands strong with voters from among all the Black
tribes as well as with the Indian and Coloured electors, additionally receiving
some support from English speakers. Consequently, the dominant position of
the ANC is today more of a threat to democracy than Scandinavian social
democracy ever was, because there is the risk of a marriage between
domination and concentration of power as has occurred so frequently in
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has a dominant presence in the legislative assembly and the ruling party, the
ANC, enjoys a two-thirds majority in the chamber, which amounts to an over-
concentration of power in a single institution (Labuschagne, 2004: 100).
On the other hand, South Africa, a big country both population-wise and in
territorial size, remains a multi-party system, which is a positive for
democracy. This multi-party system is based upon proportional elections to
parliament, which elects the president who is the head of state and head of
government at the same time. Since the introduction of a democratic regime
there have been three parliamentary elections, all resulting in an unbalanced
multi-party system (Reynolds, 1994, 1999; Lodge, 1999; Fox & Lemon,
2000; Piombo, 2004; Piombo & Nijzink, 2006). Table 1 shows this imbalance
between a giant ANC and a number of smaller parties.
The ANC has actually increased its dominant position in election afterelection reaching a high of 70 per cent in 2004, which is not a good sign.
The earlier state party, the National Party, has virtually collapsed and
entered into a coalition with the ANC. Opposition comes mainly from the
Democratic Party/Democratic Alliance, receiving 12 per cent of the votesin 2004, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, which did not score above 10 per
cent in 2004. In terms of party system, South Africa currently equates to a
predominant party system where the effective number of parties has declined
from 2.25 (votes) in 1994 to 1.97 (votes) in 2004.
However, when one takes the regional picture into account, then thedominance of the ANC is not so conspicuous. Table 2 shows the regional
composition of vote and seats, based upon the elections to the provincial
assemblies.
Table 1. Parliamentary elections to the National Assembly in South Africa: votes,seats and turnout (%)
1994 1999 2004
Party Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
ANC 62.6 63.0 66.4 66.5 69.7 69.8DA/DP 1.7 1.8 9.6 9.5 12.4 12.5IFP 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.5 7.0 7.0NNP/NP 20.4 20.5 6.9 7.0 1.7 1.8ACDP 0.5 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5VF 2.2 2.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0PAC 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8UDM 3.4 3.5 2.3 2.3
Others 0.9 0 2.2 1.9 3.7 3.3Turnout [86.9] 89.3 76.7
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Only in two regions is there balanced competition since the ANC has no
majority in Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The Inkatha Freedom
Party receives about 37 per cent of the vote in Natal whereas the Democratic
Alliance and the New National Party together take about 38 per cent of the
vote in the Western Cape. In these two provinces we may talk about multi-
party systems with an effective number of 3.42 (votes) in Western Cape and
2.75 (votes) in Kwazulu-Natal, whereas there are predominant party
systems in Limpopo (1.25) and Mpumalanga (1.33). Nevertheless, South
Africa has a unitary constitution and this means that the system of nine
decentralised provincial governments provides only limited regionalism as a
counterbalance to ANC dominance in the centre.
Accordingly, the dominant position of the ANC in South Africa raises two
questions:
(1) What mechanisms and factors, other than the ANC itself, can prevent the
coming of a party hegemony?
(2) What mechanisms inside the ANC can be identified that would make that
outcome less likely?
Important institutions, exogenous to the ANC, for preventing party hegemony
include parliamentary opposition and legal control. However, in order for the
ANC to remain a clean party, albeit in a strong electoral position, it is vital thatits internal democratic processes function and that it is in contact with civil
society and its organisations. A South African scholar concludes:
The party system is still characterised by competition, even though it has
become slightly more of a predominant-party system. The predominance
Table 2. Provincial election results in South Africa in 2004: votes and seats (%)
ANC DA IFP UDM ACDP NNP
Province Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat
Eastern Cape 79.3 80.9 7.3 7.9 0.2 0 9.2 9.5 0.8 0 0.6 0Free State 81.8 83.3 8.5 10.0 0.4 0 0.9 0 1.3 3.3 0.8 0Gauteng 68.4 69.9 20.8 20.5 2.5 2.7 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.4 0.8 0Kwazulu-Natal 47.0 47.5 8.4 8.8 36.8 37.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.5 0.5 0Limpopo 89.2 91.8 3.6 4.1 1.7 2.0 1.3 2.0 0.5 0Mpumalanga 86.3 90.0 6.9 6.7 1.0 0 1.0 0 1.1 0 0.5 0Northern Cape 68.8 70.0 11.1 10.0 0.2 0 0.5 0 1.9 3.3 7.5 6.7
North West 80.7 81.8 5.0 6.1 0.3 0 1.0 0 1.2 0 0.4 0Western Cape 45.3 45.2 27.1 28.6 0.1 0 1.8 2.4 3.4 4.8 10.9 11.9
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of the ANC alliance is countered by its willingness to cooperate in
government with other non-ruling political parties, but its overall domi-
nance is unlikely to change in the immediate future. (Botha, 2004: 56)
General Conditions Underpinning Democracy: Social and Economic
Factors
Let us now consider the impact of contextual factors like affluence, ethnicity
and religion (Hadenius, 1992; Lipset, 1994; Przeworski et al., 2000). Although
SA is in a much better economic condition than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa,
it is still true that its income inequalities and the high level of black
unemployment, as well as its enormous diversity ethnically and religiously,would or should, following the general models of democracy, threaten to
reduce the stability of the new regime that was put in place after the fall of
Apartheid.
It is clear that in a global perspective South Africa has one of the most
unequal income distributions with its Gini-index coming close to 60. It is
still unclear as to whether income inequality has increased or decreased
over recent years. Some studies indicate a positive development (Gelb,
2003) whereas other studies suggest more inequality (UNDP, 2003a) or
only small changes (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005). Since South Africa may beconsidered a middle-income nation in a comparative context, the country
occupies an extreme position when comparing the level of human develop-
ment with the degree of unequal income distributions (see Figure 3).
Another problematic aspect of the social structure of the country relates to
ethnicity and religion. Ethnic and religious fragmentation is not conducive to
either political stability or democratic development, and this is particularly
true for countries on the African continent (Easterly & Levine, 1997). As is
displayed in Figure 4 South Africa is characterised by a high degree of both
ethnic and religious fragmentation when examined from a comparativeperspective.
Looking at such crucial social and economic factors it seems to be the case
that in South Africa there are conditions present that are hardly likely to be
conducive to democratic development.
Political Culture
Political culture in South Africa, however, contains a number of factors that
compensate for a democracy deficit (Diamond, 1997; Paxton, 2002). Political
culture sustains democracy although affluence is not high wealth is unevenly
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Figure 3. Human development and income distribution (Gini index): South Africa in aglobal context. Source: See Appendix
Figure 4 Ethnic and religious fragmentation: South Africa in a global context Source:
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restrains the ANC from attempting to rule more or less autocratically. The
chief danger is, of course, that the ANC would be tempted to employ its
dominant position to create a regime of favouritism, focused upon a strong
president without effective opposition in parliament or from the regions,
engaging in outright clientelism (Sandholz & Koetzle, 2000; Sung,
2004; Xin & Rudel, 2004; see also Lodge, 1998; Hyslop, 2005). Kotze
concludes his up-to-date examination of South African democracy at
various levels:
The nature of democracy in South Africa is the one area in the process of
democratic consolidation and the transition process in general that
remains contested, and in which there is no clear indication of what
the final result will be. (Kotze, 2004: 36)
And Gibson and Gouws (2003: 221) argue that attitudes towards political tol-
erance are crucial for democratic vitality in SA. They state: the lack of pol-
itical tolerance among the mass public will surely have to be addressed.
Below we adduce data suggesting that mass political culture in SA can
support democratic stability.
The international corruption index may be consulted in order to throw light
upon the danger of sultanismus (Chehabi & Linz, 1998). This index covers
some 100 countries on the globe, including several African ones and SA.Figure 5 gives some estimates of the level of corruption in SA today; in the
figure we have reversed the scales, which means that the higher the score,
the more corruption is perceived. South Africa scores lower than the mean
Figure 5 Perceived corruption scores for South Africa and world mean and median
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and median, but over time perceived corruption is increasing somewhat, with
the recorded scores going up.
Another aspect of the political culture is captured by the presence of social
capital and gender equality. These are both factors that may be important for
the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Figure 6 displays social
capital as measured by interpersonal trust in relation to gender equality as
measured by female parliamentary representation. Although South Africa
scores rather low on the measure of social capital, it comes out higher on
the gender equality indicator.
The strength of civil society in South Africa is clearly a positive for
democracy, especially for its prospective consolidation (Heinrich, 2001;
Kotze, 2003). A democratic regime may be introduced through constitution
making in the short run, but the consolidation of such a regime requires favour-able conditions, such as for instance a vibrant civil society, as Tocqueville under-
lined in his classic nineteenth century study (Tocqueville, 1990). Civil society
theory should be tested in relation to SA, given the emergence of many and vig-
ilant associations during the Apartheid period, such as COSATU (Congress of
South African Trade Unions). COSATU was initiated in December 1985 after
talks between unions opposed to apartheid and committed to a democratic
South Africa. At that time it represented less than half a million workers
Figure 6. Social capital and female parliamentary representation: South Africa in aglobal context Note: Social Capital here refers to interpersonal trust as measured by
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organised in 33 unions. COSATU now has a membership of more than two
million workers, of whom at least 1.8 million are paid up. By international stan-
dards it has been among the fastest growing trade union movements in the world.
Besides COSATU there are many more free associations in South Africa. This is
well portrayed in Figure 7 where civil society is measured by the workforce in
relation to trade union density. Currently, South Africa, viewed in a global
context, comes out rather low on these indicators. Nevertheless, there is apotential for growth within these sectors of society.
Model Estimations: Predicting Democracy Scores for SA
This section analyses the empirical evidence concerning the sources of
democratic vitality in South Africa. We first look at economic and social
factors, and then institutional ones, and finally examine the role of civil
society and a culture of tolerance. The aim of the model estimations presented
in Table 3 to Table 5 is to test how well different models predict the democ-
racy score for South Africa 4 Predicting the democracy score for SA does not
Figure 7. Trade union density and civil society: South Africa in a global context. Note:Civil society here stands for civil society workforce as estimated by Salamon et al.
(2003). Sources: See Appendix
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prediction. What we look for is what impact different factors may have upon
consolidating democracy in South Africa. What, specifically, is the impact of
social and economic factors, institutional factors and political culture factors?
We start by looking at how well different models capturing social and
economic factors may predict the democracy score for SA in the period
between 1995 and 2003. From Table 3 we can see that the predicted scoresgo from 5.74 to 8.25.
The model (1) with the lowest predicted democracy score includes income
distribution, religious and ethnic fragmentation. These structural factors are
disadvantageous in the South African case. Yet, a model (3) covering
human development and Protestantism only increases the prediction by one
unit. Significantly, it is model (6) that includes all the structural variables
which arrives at the predicted score closest to the observed democracy
score. Still it is the case that from a model including social and economic
factors we may expect a quite high democracy score for SA.
There is thus a prediction deficit and our next step is to test the predictive
Table 3. Predicting democracy scores for South Africa: economic and social forces
Predictors Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incomedistribution
coeff 20.012 0.037 0.038 0.036
t-stat 20.51 1.79 1.97 1.82HDI 2001 coeff 7.892 9.437 9.006 9.327
t-stat 7.73 8.28 8.27 7.42ELF coeff 22.416 23.316 0.560
t-stat 22.87 23.92 0.62Protestants coeff 0.060 0.047 0.041 0.039
t-stat 4.46 4.36 3.91 3.68Rel fragment coeff 1.772 1.235 0.463
t-stat 1.72 1.26 0.57
Constant coeff 7.526 6.300 0.1042
1.6182
1.7812
2.364t-stat 7.53 11.80 0.14 21.16 21.35 21.59
Adj rsq .068 .201 .386 .374 .451 .443N 117 147 142 119 118 117Dem score Observed 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25
Predicted 5.74 6.28 6.93 7.03 7.89 8.25
Sources: See Appendix.
Note: Coeff unstandardised regression coefficients; t-stat corresponding t-statistics; Adj
rsq adjusted r square or explained variance of the model; N number of countries included
in the analysis; observed score the democracy score based on the Freedom House normalised
index; predicted score predicted democracy score arrived at from the corresponding regression
model.
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democracy from a set of favourable political institutions (Linz & Stepan,
1996; Diamond, 1999; Lijphart, 1999; Reynolds, 2001). However, favourable
institutions in SA have to work themselves out while also taking into account
the dominant position of one party, the ANC. As stated above, a dominant
position for one party is all the time and everywhere a negative for
democracy.
The predicted scores vary from a low 6.41 to a high 9.43. The models (1 and
2) with the lowest predicted scores include the presence of a dominant party( size of the largest party). As soon as we eliminate this variable from the
models tested the predicted democracy scores increase. In fact we may
arrive at a model (5) where the predicted score is higher than the observed
score this model includes the presence of proportional representation and
parliamentarism. There is thus no doubt that institutional factors are important
for predicting democracy for a country like South Africa.
The main political institutions of SA have certainly been framed as
bulwarks against an authoritarian regime. Thus, they include PR, a strong par-
liament, a constitutional court, an Ombudsman and political decentralisation
to nine regions. When compared with other constitutions, the South African
Table 4. Predicting democracy in South Africa: Institutional factors
Predictors Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lgst party coeff 20.064 20.064 t-stat
29.29
29.39
Elect syst coeff 1.153 1.138 2.134 2.122 2.340t-stat 4.14 4.13 6.56 6.56 6.25
Ombudsman coeff 1.032 1.027 1.627 1.607 t-stat 5.34 5.36 7.07 7.12
Parliam SA 0 coeff 0.677 t-stat 2.06
Parliam SA 1 coeff 0.791 1.615 1.594 2.680t-stat 2.46 4.07 4.05 6.35
Federalism SA 1 coeff 20.412
t-stat2
1.12Federalism SA 0 coeff 0.236 0.225
t-stat 20.65 20.49Constant coeff 8.476 8.464 3.547 3.540 4.415
t-stat 14.97 15.14 14.18 14.21 17.50Adj rsq .722 .727 .554 .557 .399N 143 143 143 143 143Dem score Observed 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25
Predicted 6.41 7.41 8.69 8.86 9.43
Sources: See Appendix.
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executive and the nature of the state. The president is elected by parliament but
serves as both head of state and leader of the government. He/she can beremoved from office by a vote of no confidence in parliament. Is this
presidentialism or parliamentarianism? It is difficult to say, which is why
we classify SA as either presidential or parliamentary in Table 4. There is
extensive political decentralisation in South Africa, as the regions have their
own assemblies, premiers and budgets. But is this federalism? We doubt it,
but have classified SA in both ways in Table 4.In their thorough examination of presidentialism in Presidents and
Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (1992) Shugart
and Carey entirely bypass the presidency in SA, which was actually created
before the making of the new constitution after the fall of Apartheid. Here
we have an interesting example of strong presidentialism without direct
election of the president. Shugart and Carey identify three criteria for strong
presidentialism: (a) popular election of the chief executive; (b) the terms of
the chief executive and assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on
mutual confidence; (c) the elected executive names and directs the
composition of the government (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 19). The SA
Table 5. Predicting democracy in South Africa: political culture
Predictors Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perceivedcorruption 2003
coeff 20.071 20.734 t-stat
20.46
26.35
Female parliamentaryrepresentation 1998
coeff 20.020 20.000 20.006 0.045t-stat 20.97 0.00 20.28 1.52
Number of NGOsaround 2000
coeff 0.002 0.001 0.001t-stat 4.17 1.91 4.29
Trade union densityin the 1990s
coeff 0.032 0.013 t-stat 2.21 1.10
Civil society workforce
coeff 0.058 0.018 0.062 t-stat 0.64 0.25 1.13
Social capital:
interpersonaltrust 19901995
coeff 0.033 20.032 0.051 20.043
t-stat 1.842
1.64 3.372
0.021
Constant coeff 3.917 6.817 12.499 7.142 5.376t-stat 6.67 4.49 11.37 19.61 10.26
Adj rsq .626 .605 .536 .531 .394N 35 28 57 28 57Dem score Observed 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25
Predicted 7.22 7.68 7.80 8.13 8.47
Source: See Appendix.
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powers of the South African president are truly impressive an institutional
heritage from the earlier constitution of SA.
Finally we move from political institutions to political culture. In Table 5
we use a number of indicators of political culture, such as the strength of
civil society in a set of countries, in order to establish how, generally speaking,
a variation in civil society strength impacts upon the level of democracy
civil society strength is measured via various indicators. In addition, variables
capturing perceived corruption, social capital and gender equality are included
in the models tested.
The models tested in Table 5 differ in one respect from the previous
models. The number of countries included is lower due to the availability
of data although for all models data for South Africa is included. As dis-
played in Table 5 the predicted democracy scores for SA go from 7.22 to8.47. The model (1) with the lowest predicted score only include civil
society-related variables whereas the model (5) with the highest predicted
scores includes civil society, social capital and gender equality. Yet it is
the case that this model also predicts a lower score than the observed
one. Political culture in its various manifestations is clearly conducive to
consolidating democracy in SA, but cannot itself predict the high observed
score for the country.
Political culture, especially civil society in SA, is of considerable import-
ance to democracy and to its consolidation. Two variables the number ofNGOs and levels of interpersonal trust are strongly and positively related
to democratic stability in general. They also help stabilise democracy in
SA, reducing the democratic deficit considerably. The organisation of civil
society is conducive to softening the dangers of the dominant position of
the ANC in the polls. This should not be unexpected, nor is it surprising.
After all, the roots of ANC include the free associations in the private sector.
ConclusionThe consolidation of democracy in South Africa is vitally important for the
future of the entire African continent. Today South African scores are very
high on the standard democracy indicators. At the same time there is one
political party that has strengthened its grip on power in election after election
to such an extent that it now has a dominant position. There are two major
bulwarks against a possible deterioration in democracy, currently buttressing
the rule of law in the country, we suggest. First, there is the institutional frame-
work, which reduces the democratic deficit even when affluence and perceived
corruption are taken into account. Second, there is the civil society carpet of
free associations from which the ANC largely stems This relatively strong
South Africa: Explaining Democratic Stability 235
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political culture in South Africa that reinforces democratic vitality.
Nevertheless, more effective competition in the party system would certainly
help in further stabilising the new democratic regime. Increased inter-party
competition, in particular, would deter any sultanistic (Bermeo, 2003)
deviations of the type which have already hurt many other African countries
badly after independence was won from European colonialism.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for CCP and the
editor for their helpful comments and suggestions; the usual caveat applies!
Notes
1. It is well known that the scores on civil liberties and political rights go together and therefore
well could form the basis of a one-dimensional democracy index; seeBanks (1989: 675). For
any given year the democracy score is arrived at through the following computation:
democracy score ((14 (political rights score civil liberties score)/12 ) 9) 1.2. This index measures the level of political and civil freedoms in South Africa from 1934 to
1997 and varies between 0 (no freedom) and 200 (freedom). The construction and
interpretation of the index is detailed by Fedderke et al. (2001: 108113).
3. According to the Economistindex of democracy for 2006, South Africa comes very closeto the countries classified as full democracies, scoring 7.91 to compare with Mauritius
scoring 8.04 (see Kekic, 2006: 3). Another attempt to measure the level of democracy in
South Africa in 2004 arrives at a score of 63 of a potential 100 (see Graham & Calland,
2005: 37).
4. For a study employing a similar design, see Vanhanen (2004).
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Appendix 1. Variables, indicators and data
Abbreviation Description Sources
Civil society Civil society organisation workforceas share of economically activepopulation
Salamon et al.,2003
Dem score The Freedom House scores have beenadded and normalised so that a lowdegree of democracy scores 1 and ahigh degree of democracy scores 10
Freedom House,2004
Elect syst Election system as a dummy variablewhere 1 proportional systemsand 0 non-proportional systems
Reynolds & Reilly,1997; Rose, 2000
ELF Ethno-linguistic fragmentation index Alesina et al., 2003Federalism Federalism as dummy variable where
1 federalism and 0 non-federalism
Watts, 1999
HDI 2001 Human development index UNDP, 2003bLgst party Estimated size of the largest party at
an election as a percentage of thetotal vote
Vanhanen, 2000
Lngnp/capita 2002
Natural logarithm of GNP/capita inUS $ expressed as purchasing
power parities
CIA, 2004
Number ofNGOs
Number of non-governmentalorganisations 2000
UNDP, 2002
Ombudsman Occurrence of the Ombudsmaninstitution as a trichotomousvariable with higher scores for anearly institutionalisation
InternationalOmbudsmanInstitute, 1999
Parliam Parliamentarianism as a dummyvariable where1 parliamentarism and 0 non-parliamentarism
Derbyshire &Derbyshire, 1999
Perceivedcorruption
Perceived corruption where higherscores indicate less corruption andlower scores more corruption
TransparencyInternational,2006
Protestants Percentage of the populationestimated to adhere to the Protestantcreed
Barrett et al., 2001
Rel fragment Religious fragmentation index Alesina et al., 2003Social capital Percentage of sample in a country
expressing interpersonal trust19901995
Inglehart et al.,2000
Trade uniondensity
Trade union membership aspercentage of non-agriculturallabour force 1995
UNDP, 2002
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