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The Influence of Redistricting on the U.S. House of
Representatives
Claims and Facts on Partisan Advantage,
Polarization, and Competition
Lieuwe M. Verhage
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
American Studies and the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Thesis supervisor: dr. Thomas W. Gijswijt
August 15, 2011
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Abstract i
Abstract
Redistricting is claimed to effect the composition and polarization of the U.S. House of
Representatives. However, not all academic research supports these claims. Research which
does suggest redistricting has an influence, either shows this is extremely limited, has severe
flaws, or overlooks better explanations outside of the redistricting realm. Redistricting
commissions, often suggested as the silver bullet for the current partisan gridlock in Congress,
is not only an undemocratic solution to a nonexistent problem, but also leads to worse results
when it comes to competition and polarization. If representation of voters is something that
needs to be solved, noncompetitive, homogeneous districts are shown to provide more faithful
representatives, leading to higher voter satisfaction levels of incumbents and Congress as a
whole. This thesis analyzes the most prominent research on the issue, and uses several
datasets to provide compelling evidence refuting the common assumptions on redistricting.
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Acknowledgments ii
Acknowledgments
For most normal people, redistricting is the most boring word in the English
language. But for members of Congress and state legislators, its cause for full-out
panic. This is musical chairs with switchblades. Dan Schnur1
After having done everything in order to postpone writing this thesis for over two years, I am
glad the once blank pages have filled themselves with words, tables and figures, to create
what is the finishing touch to my American Studies degree. While there are many different
reasons for why it took me almost two years after my return from my semester abroad at the
University of California, Berkeley, to sit down and start this project, the best explanation is
that there were too many other things I liked doing other than writing a thesis. From traveling
to Florida; attending lectures and events by some of my personal heroes; working at the
Roosevelt Study Center; and setting up a national organization and conference for American
Studies students, all were things I made sure would keep me away from this last item that
needed to be checked before I could graduate.
However, with the deadline of expiring grades fast approaching, my fascination for
electoral issuespartly awakened by the classes on politics and campaigning of Dan Schnur
at Berkeleyfocused on the redistricting due to a book with old Congressional Districts I
found while working at the RSC. My own opinion on the issue was based of what journalists,
pundits and historians had explained was the deteriorating impact of gerrymandering on
American politics. Quickly, however, I found research contradicting the assumptions I learned.
Particularly this search to uncover the truth about the influence redistricting kept writing this
thesis interesting, and the evidence which eventually made me change my mind on the issue,
forms the basis of this thesis.The fact that this has been such a long process makes me ever more indebted to the people
who have assisted me along the way. First and foremost I like to thank my thesis supervisor dr.
Thomas W. Gijswijt for the debates which forced me to make my thesis even more focused
and hopefully convincing. Furthermore, I would not have been able to write a political science
oriented American Studies Master thesis if prof. dr. Hans Bak and dr. Jac Geurts had not
enabled me to transfer from Groningen to Nijmegen and, together with the rest of the
1 Seema Metha, Redrawing of District Boundaries Will Shake Up California Politics,Los Angeles Times, June
10, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-maps-20110610,0,3926097.story (accessed June 25, 2011).
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Acknowledgments iii
American Studies faculty at the Radboud University Nijmegen, welcomed me with open arms.
Next to their interesting classes, I had the pleasure to assist them in the organization of the
successful 16th
NASA Amerikanistendag, which is where the idea for creating the
StudentNASA originated. While I am grateful for the possibilities the various boards of the
Netherlands American Studies Associations (NASA) have given me to pursue this idea, my
thanks goes out to the study associations, students and speakers who were willing to make the
conference we organized a great success. I hope there are ways to continue this cooperation
after my graduation.
Closely linked to the NASA is another organization which greatly influenced my academic
career, namely the Roosevelt Study Center. After working there as an intern in the summer of
2007, this unique research center on American history has not only supported me in every
possible way, but brought me into contact with interesting students, researchers and Fulbright
Scholars who, by telling about their own research, have contributed to my own ideas,
concepts and dreams. Prof. dr. Kees van Minnen, dr. Hans Krabbendam, prof. dr. Giles Scott-
Smith, and Leontien Joosse, I thank you for your continued belief in me, and I look forward to
raising a glass with you this September to celebrate the 25th
anniversary of the RSC.
The change of American Studies programs I made at the beginning of my Bachelor meant
more for me than just finding the right academic focus. It also placed me in a group of like-
minded, enthusiastic, and downright awesome people. Together we organized movie nights,
planed trips to the U.S. Consulate, stalked Twan Huys, experienced Boston, and had long
serious talks about our the future. Boston 10, Chicago 3, San Fran 5, Berkeley 2, Key West 6,
Miami 5, Samson 2, Eindhoven 3, I cannot imagine how my life would have looked without
you all in it, but I am sure it would have been really boring. Your presence and support helped
me to become who I am today, and I doubt I will ever find another group of people who will
be similarly exited over the same country that is just a six to nine hour flight away.
Someone who has been a stable force, motivator, critical reader, but foremost friend for
almost half my life is Anna de Bruyckere. I am unable to reimburse her for all the help and
support she has given me over the years, but at least can acknowledge her crucial assistance in
the final stages of this project, as well as her contributions along the way.
My parents and sister continue to encourage all my plans, are there when I need them, or
when I just feel like going home. I am blessed to have such a supportive family. This thesis is
dedicated to them.
Nijmegen, August 2011
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Contents iv
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgments ii
Contents iv
Introduction 2
Chapter 1: Gerrymandering as the Cause of the Broken System 6
Chapter 2: Effect of Partisan Redistricting on Elections in Congressional Districts 15
Chapter 3: Partisan Redistricting and Polarization in U.S. House of Representatives 29
Chapter 4: Unwanted Ramifications of Redistricting Commissions 50
Chapter 5: Better Representation through Noncompetitive Homogeneous Districts 65
Conclusion 77
Tables and Figures 80
Bibliography 83
Datasets 91
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Introduction
Representatives shall be apportioned among the severalStates according to their respective number, counting
whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed.1
1 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 2.
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Introduction 2
Introduction
In 2000, Illinois State Senator Barack Obama suffered his first, and up till now only election
loss for a seat in public office. In the four way Democratic primary election for Illinois 1st
Congressional District he received a little over 30 percent of the vote, while the incumbent,
Bobby Rush, won with more than 60 percent. Representative Rush enjoyed great popularity in
the poorest, heavily African-American parts of Chicagos South Side, which constituted the
majority of his district. However, the Obamas family apartment lay in Hyde Park, a mostly
white neighborhood at the tip of Rushs district, and an area where Obama defeated the
incumbent with a large margin. Barack Obama saw that when [they] were doing fund-raisers
in the Rush campaign his appeal to young white professionals was dramatic.2
This
growing awareness of his ability to connect to affluent white donors, while retaining a
supportive (African-American) base, would prove to be invaluable in later years, but had not
resulted in a victory over Bobby Rush. However, putting a 30 percent dent into the reelection
of a long time incumbent was and is remarkable, and provided grounds for rumors of another
attempt to win the district at a Congressional election down the line.
However, in 2001, Illinois congressional districts were redrawn following the release of
the Census results. While in 1991, the Republicans held most seats in the state legislature, the
Democratic majority in 2001 took this opportunity to create districts that would be beneficial
to them. Figure 1 shows parts of the results of this redistricting process. The blue overlay
represents the old district lines, in place for the 2000 Congressional Elections, while the red
overlay represents the new district lines for Illinois 1st
district after the redistricting process.
Obamas apartment, first part of the district, due to a curious series of irregular turns,
missed the new district lines by as little as two blocks.3
Figure 1: Illinois 1st
Congressional District and Obamas Apartment
2
Ryan Lizza, How Chicago Shaped Obama.New Yorker, July 21, 2008,http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/21/080721fa_fact_lizza.3 Ibid.
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Introduction 3
This is, however, where the facts stop, and two diverging narratives take over. Some argue
that Obama, together with the political consultant in charge of the redistricting process of all
Congressional Districts in Chicago, sat down in front of a computer to draw Obama a new
district composed of more of those wealthier, whiter, more Jewish, less blue-collar, and
better educated voters which had provided him the (financial) support to win 30 percent of
the vote during the campaign against Rush.4
Others argue it was incumbent Bobby Rush who
wished to make it difficult for his opponents to challenge him in future elections.5
The fact
that, next to Obama, also the other two primary contestants were drawn out of Rushs district
provides further evidence for this explanation. Whichever story is true, partisan redistricting
in Illinois may have been the most important event in Obamas early political life.6
While he
eventually did decide against another campaign to become a member of the House of
Representatives, the understanding he gained on his ability to persuade two very different
groups of voters for supportboth financially and with community actionwas of the
essence in both his 2004 Senate bid as well as his 2008 Presidential campaign.
However, not every redistricting story involves a future president, and wile there are
differences in the explanations on why Obamas apartment was drawn out of the
Congressional District he had hoped to represent, both point towards politicians influencing
district lines for their own political benefit. Currently, redistricting has gained renewed
prominence in the public sphere, mainly because most of the 435 Congressional Districts are
redrawn following the 2010 Census results. Additionally, redistricting is also claimed to be
the reason for the growing polarization of both parties in Congress, which, as the recent debt-
ceiling crisis has showed, has the possibility to create legislative gridlock in Washington, D.C.
Recent Supreme Court cases have contributed to the steady stream of editorial columns in
national newspapers claiming the harmful effects of districts being drawn by politicians,
while voters in some states have initiated or approved legislation that will the right of
redistricting away from the politicians and in the hands of special commissions.
Although the narrative on redistricting is controlled by those who compare the practice to
that of totalitarian regimes, a quick glance on academic research on the topic gives a more
balanced perspective on the matter. This thesis, which is rooted in the positive political theory
approach of Political Economy, will therefore question what the influence of redistricting is
on the U.S House of Representatives. Specifically, it describes and analyzes the most
4 Ibid.5
Michael P. McDonald, In Support of Redistricting Reform (Paper, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, May 8,2009), 1.6 Lizza, How Chicago Shaped Obama.
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Introduction 4
influential research on this topic to figure out if the claims made in the debate surrounding
redistrictingwhich have a certain logical appealare accurate, or if they are unsupported by
facts. This also includes assumptions made on the benefits of redistricting commissions over
regular legislative redistricting, as well as on the idea that competitive elections are what
leads to better voter representation in the House.
In Chapter 1, this thesis will first delve into the discussion on redistricting by looking at
the opinion pages in newspapers, the attitudes of voters and politicians, and describing recent
progress on this issue in several Supreme Court cases. Subsequently, Chapters 2 and 3 will
rebuke claims of partisan advantages and influence of redistricting on polarization, and will
provide compelling different explanations for findings by some researchers present as the
effect of redistricting. This is followed by an exposition on the undemocratic consequences of
redistricting commissions, as well as an analysis of the results on competition and polarization
in commission drawn districts in Chapter 4. The closing chapter adds another dimension to
the discussion, pointing out that more competitionsomething which, according supporters
of redistricting reform, districts currently lack due to gerrymanderingleads to worse
representation of voters. The question of the influence of redistricting will be revisited in the
conclusion, which points out that the claims made on the issue, perpetuate by politicians,
pundits, voters and some academics, are largely exaggerated or false. If lack of adequate
representation of voters is something that needs to be solved, the public should be informed
about the benefits of uncompetitive homogenous districts, rather than trying to artificially
create competitive districts through unnecessary and undemocratic redistricting commissions.
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Chapter 1: Gerrymandering as the Cause of the
Broken System
Im the majority leader, and I want more seatsTom DeLay
1
1
Adam Cohen, For Partisan Gain, Republicans Decide Rules Were Meant to Be Broken,New York Times,May 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/27/opinion/editorial-observer-for-partisan-gain-republicans-
decide-rules-were-meant-be.html (accessed July 7, 2011).
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Chapter 1 6
Chapter 1: Gerrymandering as the Cause of the Broken System in Washington, D.C.
In a widely discussed article published in August 2010, Vanity Fairs national editor Todd
Purdum described the current political situation in the nations capitol as follows:
The evidence that Washington cannot functionthat its broken, as Vice President
Joe Biden has saidis all around. For two years after Wall Street brought the country
close to economic collapse, regulatory reform languished in partisan gridlock. A
bipartisan commission to take on the federal deficit was scuttled by Republican fears
in Congress that it could lead to higher taxes, and by Democratic worries about cuts to
social programs. Obama was forced to create a mere advisory panel instead. Four
years after Congress nearly passed a comprehensive overhaul of immigration laws, the
two parties in Washington are farther apart than ever, and hotheaded state legislatures
have stepped into the breach.2
Purdums article is one of many recent articles, academic books, newspaper editorials and
other publications that have blamed the partisan gridlock in D.C. as preventing actual
solutions to real problems in the nation. Although the Presidents functions as the most visible
target in some of these denunciations, it is Congressthe legislative branch in Americas trias
politicathat has become what Thomas E. Mann and his colleagues at the Brookings Institute
have called the Broken Branch, noting the demise of deliberation and the rise of a
destructive form of extreme partisanship in the legislature at the center of todays problems.3
The general public is not satisfied with the continued bickering in the Capitol, recently
resulting in approval ratings of below 20 percent, the lowest ratings since Gallup began its
polling on Congress in 1974.4
The system is broken, and the people are dissatisfied with those
in charge. With a situation as described above, one would expect Congressional elections
especially in the House of Representatives with all 435 members only serve two year terms
to lead to electoral losses for both Republicans and Democrats. And while these anti-
establishment sentiments were expressed by Tea Party candidates during the 2010
Congressional election cycle, only a small number of seatsroughly 40 in 2010during each
election are close enough to be considered competitive, and incumbent reelection rates are
2Todd Purdum, Washington, We Have a Problem Vanity Fair, September 2010, http://www.vanityfair.com/
politics/feautures/2010/09/broken-washington-201009 (accessed August 17, 2010).3
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Orstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to
Get It Back on Track(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Sarah A. Binder, Thomas E. Mann, and Molly
Reynolds,Mending the Broken Branch: One Year Later: In Congress Still the Broken Branch (Washington, D.C.:
Governance Studies at Brookings, 2008), 7.4 Jeffery M. Jones, Congressional Approval Back Below 20%, Gallup, March 11, 2011.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/146567/congressional-approval-back-below.aspx (accessed March 12, 2011).
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Chapter 1 7
well above 90 percent. Seats are considered to be designated for one political party, and once
elected, politicians in the House of Representatives are almost certain of their reelection. The
dissatisfaction of the voters with the way Congress is doing its job and the election results are
at odds; bringing these two back in line is seen by some political pundits as the solution for
solving a host of other problems in Congress: extreme partisanship, polarization and the
legislative gridlock.
Editorials
Many newspaper columns have been devoted to what is perceived to be the root cause of
these problemsgerrymanderingand the silver bullet: redistricting reform. The claim made
is that redistricting is extremely partisan and the reason why more ideologically extreme
politician get elected to represent districts in the House. The redrawing of (congressional)
districts usually happens after the decennial Census, and in most states is in the hands of state
governments. This process lead to districts being identified as gerrymandered. The term
gerrymanderingderiving from Massachusetts Governor Gerry, who in 1812 approved a
redistricting plan which created a salamander shaped district to benefit his own political
partyshows that this is an old political practice. However, several changes have occurred in
the past few decades that are believed to have made the practice both more pronounced and
successful. Therefore, while the 2010 Republican takeover of the House made the most
headlines, some political analysts believe the GOPs victory in many state legislature and
gubernatorial races could provide a more lasting impact. As one analyst states, the
Republicans have gained control over congressional redistrictingby way of holding the
governorship and the full legislaturein 10 more states, giving them power over 18 states
containing 202 districts. Democrats are fully in charge of the process in only six states with a
total of 47 House seats.5
For years, editorials in national newspapers and weeklies have
argued that [b]oth parties have succeeded in drawing district lines in ways that cement their
power by eliminating contested elections.6
As a result of limited interparty competition, the
created [s]afe districts tend to drive candidates to the extremes, since their biggest worries
come from primary challengers, not the general elections.7
The turnout in primaries is tiny
[] and tends to be disproportionately composed of activists who are politically slanted to
the left or the right extremes leading to politicians getting the nomination who have more
5
Bob Beneson, In Remapping, No Guarantees, CQ Weekly, March 7, 2011, 518.6 Elections With No Meaning,New York Times, February 21, 2004, sec. A.7 Gridlock in the Forecast, Washington Post, August 18, 2008, sec. A.
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Chapter 1 8
extreme political views as well.8
[A] fact that has lead to greater polarization in the conduct
of the House.9
Although the term and practice of gerrymandering is not new, [p]arty
operatives now use powerful computers to draw lines that guarantee their party as many seats
as possible.10
Until the 1990s, legislators had to draw districts using coloured pens on
acetate sheets spread out on big maps on the floor, but now [n]ew geographic information
systems for mapping and analyzing demographic data cost only a few thousand dollars, work
on ordinary Windows operating systems, and can draw up partisan maps automatically.11
Not only are political parties better able to draw districts to create as many additional seats
as possible, incumbents districts are also reshaped to decrease competition in their districts,
leading to incumbents who worry more about their extreme flanks than about the center,
while redistricting at the same time erodes political accountability for the extreme policies
approved by the incumbent to cater to the party fringe.12
Not only does this lead to bad
representation, but disgruntled voters also have to pay the bill in the form of higher taxes,
because by reducing the fear of being defeated at the polls, gerrymandering increases the
likelihood that members will vote for more and more spendingand eventually, theyll have
to vote for the higher and higher taxes to pay for that spending.13
When the turnover in the
United States House of Representatives is lower than it was in the Soviet Politburo,14
according to these editorials and newspaper articles, Congressional elections can better be
compared to the Iraqi election in 2002, when Saddam Hussein claimed 100 percent of the
vote for his re-election than those of a true democracy.15
Supreme Court Cases
These grave analyses of the current state of the American political system were partly
fuelled by two recent highly publicized cases of apparent gerrymandering; one in
Pennsylvania in and one in Texas. In Pennsylvania, Republicans controlled both chambers of
the state legislature, as well as the governors mansion, at the moment the results of the 2000
8Time to Bury Governor Gerry,Economist, September 10, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17202149/
(accessed March 29, 2011).9 Dan Balz, Partisan Polarization Intensified in 2004 Election; Only 59 of the Nations 435 Congressional
Districts Split Their Vote for President and House, Washington Post, March 29, 2005, sec. A.10 Ending the GerrymanderWars,New York Times, May 30, 3005, sec. A.11 How to Rig an Election,Economist, April 27, 2002, 29.12
A Model of Reform, Washington Post, January 19, 2005, sec. A.13 Bill Pascoe, Reinventing Conservatism: Eradicate the Gerrymander, Washington Times, January 6, 2010,
sec. A.14
Adam Nagourney, States See Growing Campaign for New Redistricting Laws,New York Times, February 7,2005, sec. A.15 Elections With No Meaning,New York Times.
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Chapter 1 9
Census were reported. While a majority of the states voters are registered Democrats the
map the Republican state government drew produced a Congressional delegation of 12
Republicans and 7 Democrats.16
When the Census results became available for Texas, the
state had a divided state government, with both the Republicans and Democrats controlling
one legislative chamber, preventing either party of adopting a partisan redistricting plan. In
2003, however, the Republicans gained control over the Texas State House, and while mid-
decade redistricting is uncommon, adopted a plan that redistricted districts so that Republican
controlled nearly two-thirds of the states Congressional delegation.17
As both maps were to
the disadvantage of the Democratic Party, it sued its way up to the Supreme Court, which in
previous cases had dealt with redistricting issues.
Until the groundbreaking 1962 one person, one vote ruling, the Supreme Court viewed
redistricting questions to be in the political thicket. InBaker v. Carrthe Justices decided that
(congressional) districts had to be redistricted following the decennial Census in order to
compensate for demographical changes within the districts. All districts within a state had to
be redrawn in order to have an almost equal number of inhabitants, which some states had
neglected to do for decades. Prior to this ruling, rural voters were overrepresented and urban
voters underrepresented in the House because of years of strong urbanization. After one
person, one vote, districts had to adhere to strict rules with only a small deviation in the
number of inhabitants, as counted by the Census, allowed. In the first few decades following
Bakerredistricting cases mostly dealt with minority representation and state obligations under
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. During the late 1980s also disputes concerning partisan
redistricting were also reviewed by the Court. In the 1986 case Davis v. Bandemer, the
Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims ought to be considered
justiciablemeaning that they were outside of the political question doctrine and that they
therefore could be brought to the attention on the Court.18
In nearly two decades following
this decision, however, there were virtually no successful claims in the lower courts, in part
because the standard announced by a plurality of Justices in Bandemer was apparently
impossible to meet.19
In 2003 Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case dealing with the 2001 Pennsylvania
redistricting plan, was the first high profile case on gerrymandering to reach the Court after
Bandemer. The subsequent 2004 ruling, however, did not provide a clear answer to the
16 Democracy Takes a Hit,New York Times, April 29, 2004, sec. A17 A Loss for Competitive Elections,New York Times, June 29, 2006, sec. A.18
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).19 Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims after
Vieth,Election Law Journal: Rules Politics, and Policy 3, no.4 (2004): 626, doi:10.1089/elj.2004.3.626.
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Chapter 1 10
problems at hand. Of the nine Justices, four retracted the decision made inDavis v. Bandemer
in their plurality opinion, and argued that partisan gerrymandering should not be considered
justiciable, because there was no workable test for judging partisan gerrymandering.20
In the years since their 1986 ruling no workable test had been created by the lower courts,
and these four judges therefore questioned if a test distinguishing between normal
redistricting and partisan gerrymandering could ever be created. They concluded that it was
not for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy for partisan
gerrymandering.21
The three dissenting opinionswritten or joined by four judgesto this
ruling proved the plurality right, because each adopted a different standard to test whether a
gerrymander had occurred. This four-four split in the Court created a pivotal position for the
Justice Kennedy to decide this case. His concurrent opinion joined the plurality opinion in
their statement that up to this point no standard had been provided that would create a
manageable and justifiable way of ruling on partisan gerrymanders. By arguing that[by] the
timeline of the law 18 years [sinceBandemer] is rather a short period, he disagreed with the
other four on the point that since such a test hand not been found yet, it would never be
found.22
However, since no workable standard had been provided by the plaintiffs, he joined
the plurality in dismissing this case concerning the Pennsylvania redistricting. The
opportunity to present a new manageable standard to the court came in 2006 with LULAC v.
Perry, which concerned the Texas mid-decade redistricting. Again, no agreed upon standard
could be adopted by the Court. It furthermore rejected the idea that a mid-decade re-
redistricting is inherently unconstitutional and that redistricting done for no motive other
than partisan gain is inherently unconstitutional.23
The dismissal in both cases of a partisan gerrymander on the basis of the absence of a test,
generated critique on the Courts actions. One editorial published after theLULACruling notes
that in previous cases [t]he court has proved itself capable of thinking up elaborate tests
when it wants toit has made up standards virtually out of whole cloth but is not a
resourceful when in comes to protecting voters rights.24
While the lack of an agreed upon
standard might lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court is unwilling to act in these cases,
the fact that those Justices in favor of judicial action could not agree on a single
20 Ibid., 629.21
Ibid., 630.22 Ibid., 632.23 Bernard Grofman and Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering afterLULAC v. Perry,Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 6, no. 1 (2007): 3,doi:10.1089/elj.2006.6002.24 A Loss for Competititve Elections,New York Times.
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Chapter 1 11
gerrymandering test is also significant. While the redistricting practices in Texas and
Pennsylvania seemed to be clear-cut partisan efforts, no test could distinguish between these
types of redistricting and normal deviations within a redistricting process in a winner-takes-all
system.25
The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee proportional representation, and even
without the possible influence of partisan gerrymandering, the current system leads to
variations between the popular vote within a state, and the eventual distribution of House
seats. The fact that there is no single tests that can clearly distinguish between a partisan
gerrymander and normal redistricting, suggest that the difference itself is not as big as the
narrative on gerrymandering portrays it to be. Either way, under the current conditions the
Supreme Court will not likely strike down any plan on the basis of alleged partisan
gerrymandering.
Politicians
However, the Court, in its Vieth plurality verdict, notes another and perhaps more apt
approach to curbing the perceived disturbing effect of partisan redistricting by noting that [i]t
is significant that the Framers provided a remedy for such practices in the Constitution.
Article I, 4, while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal
elections, permitted Congress to make or alter those districts if it wished.26
Just as the
newspaper editorials, politicians are also convinced of the deteriorating effect of redistricting
in the hands of state governments. Then Senator Barack Obama claimed that political
gerrymandering has led to a generation of politicians who come from safe districts where they
don't have to consider the other side of the debate, which has made compromiseand
therefore legislative progressmore difficult.27
Former House Speaker and current
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich stated that Democrats get to rip off the public in the
states where they control and protect their incumbents, and we [Republicans] get to rip off the
public in states we control and protect our incumbents, so the public gets ripped off in both
circumstances.28
And while, as Justice Scalia notes in the plurality opinion of Vieth v.
Jubelirer, [t]he power bestowed on Congress to regulate elections, and in particular to
25 See Grofman and King, The Future of Partisan Symetry, for the various tests which failed to succeed in both
SCOTUS cases.26Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267 (2004), 275.27 Joe Klein, The Fresh Face, Time, October 15, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1546362,00.html (accessed May 24, 2011).28 Juliet Eilperin, The Gerrymander That Ate America, Slate Magazine, April 17, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2140054/ (accessed April 14, 2011).
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Chapter 1 12
restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not lain dormant29
referring to several
acts approved by Congress at the end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th
century to
curtail gerrymandering practicesin recent decades Congress has hardly even considered
legislation to set national standards for redistricting.30
Currently the only congressional
regulation with regards to redistricting put in place is based on a 1967 act which prevents
states from disregarding districts all together by letting members be elected through statewide
elections.31
This is not to say that no one in Congress is drafting legislation to alter the
current redistricting process; in the past forty years bills ranging from the prohibition of more
than a once a decade redrawing of district lines (H.R. 14998 in 1976), to those that would
require states to redistrict through independent commissions (H.R. 590 in 2011) have been
drafted. However, none of those bills got any further in the legislative process than being
introduced on the House or Senate floor. This is understandable, because those who think they
benefit most from the current partisan system will not approve a bill that could well be
damaging to their political future. This has prevented national redistricting standards to be
adopted, leaving concerned voters to take matters into their own hands, demanding changes to
the redistricting process through statewide ballot measures.
Voters Demand Reforms
These voter initiatives usually demand the creation of some form of nonpartisan
redistricting committees, which they belief would lead to better representation by enhancing
competition and decreasing incumbent reelection. For example, Californias Proposition 20,
which turned the redistricting process of Congressional Districts over to a Citizens
Redistricting Committee, was approved by the voters in 2010, just in time for the new round
of redistricting following the 2010 Census. Arizona, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, New
Jersey and Washington also have commissions composed of voters, (former) justices or equal
partisan representatives in place which redraw the district lines. However, it took California
voters several unsuccessful attempts before getting such a commission approved. Given the
cost of ballot measures, especially when they are not backed by either political party, similar
initiatives in other states might take years before they get approved. Supporters justify this
effort by the claiming the representational improvements following redistricting commissions.
29Vieth v. Jubelirer, 27630Redistricting Legislation in the U.S. Congress, (Maryland: FairVote, January 2004)
http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/congress.htm.31 Congressional Research Service, Congressional Redistricting: Is At-Large Representation Permitted in the
House of Representatives? (Washington, DC: CRS, 2003), 2.
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Chapter 1 13
Conclusion
While the media, politicians and voters see redistricting done by politicians as the source
of why Washington is broken, the fact that the Supreme Court is unable to settle on a single
test that would distinguish partisan gerrymandering from regular redistricting, begs the
question if the current situation does undermine the democratic election process, and if
nonpartisan redistricting commissions would necessarily be a fairer way to redraw district
lines. Although in the case of Pennsylvania district boundaries appeared to give Republicans
an unjustified advantage, under the same district lines, Republicans went from a 12-7 edge
after the 2002 elections to a 12-7 deficit after the 2008 elections.32
In addition, the fact that
the Texas redistricting plan was approved by a special commission composed of three judges,
shows that voters demands for nonpartisan commissions do not necessarily lead to different
results than the current system. Both cases received a lot of attention because they appeared to
show the most brazen cases of partisan gerrymandering, resulting in the conclusion that
redistricting in the other 48 states did not lead to situations that appeared to be as grave as in
these two states. Furthermore, the redistricting of the Massachusetts map which led to the
coinage of the term gerrymandering, eventually failed in creating political benefits for
Governor Gerry.33
These facts contradict the claims made on the influence of redistricting. Therefore, the
following chapters will address if dominant description of redistrictingand the lack of
competition it is claimed to causeas a root cause of the problems in Washington, D.C., is
supported by academic research. Chapter 1 will address the benefits parties in control of the
redistricting process are alleged to have.
32
Beneson, In Remapping, No Guarantees, 520.33 Mark E. Rush, Gerrymandering: Out of the Political Thicket and Into the Quagmire,PS: Political Science
and Politics 27, no. 4 (1994): 682, http://www.jstor.org/stable/420367.
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Chapter 2: Effect of Partisan Redistricting
on Elections in Congressional Districts
If competitive elections matterand to much of theworld they are what America stands forthen
redistricting also matters.
Representatives Earl Blumenauer and Jim Leach1
1 Earl Blumenauer and Jim Leach, Redistricting, a Bipartisan Sport,New York Times, July 8,
2003, sec. A.
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Chapter 2 15
Chapter 2: Effect of Partisan Redistricting on Elections in Congressional Districts
Some of the common assumptions underlying the public debate on redistricting may, in fact,
be wrong. Proponents of the partisan redistricting narrative, as shown in the previous chapter,
believe that both the creation of additional partisan districts, as well as incumbency protection
are beneficial factors of controlling the redistrict process. On the one hand parties can redraw
district boundaries with representatives from the opposing party, creating additional districts
where their own candidate can win. On the other hand they can also strengthen the position of
their own incumbents by adding party voters to his or her district, creating what is known as a
safe seat. As the redistricting process usually only takes place once every decade, partisan
benefits created for districts are thought to have long lasting effect on outcome of elections.
However, creating additional districts and incumbent safety are two conflicting gains, as
shown in Figure 1. Increasing the safety of districts for a partywhen a party is sure to get at
least 80 percent of the votemeans placing more of party voters in into a select number or
districts, point A in Figure 1. This means that the total number of districts where this party has
the majority of votes decreases. However, increasing the number of additional districts where
a party will win the election (perhaps with just 51 percent of the vote) results in spreading the
limited number of party supporters amongst several districts, point B, reducing the safety of
these districts. Due to the limited number of party supporters, it is impossible to increase the
safety of districts while at the same time also winning additional districts. Furthermore, these
two assumed benefits from controlling the redistricting process also reveal conflicting
interests between the party leadership and its incumbents. Whereas a political party wants to
increase the total amount of seats, incumbents like to increase their chance of getting reelected.
Thus it is possible that the party leadership, in order to gain a higher seat advantage through
redistricting, wants to turn safe seats into competitive districts. The risk, however, of
spreading supporters too thin as to be beneficial to the opposing party, as well as incumbent
demands, will often prevent this from happening.2
A partisan redistricting plan therefore often
reflects a tradeoff between these two demands.
2 J. David Gopoian and Darrell M. West,Trading Security for Seats: Strategic Considerations
in the Redistricting Process. Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 1080, doi:10.2307/2131243.
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Chapter 2 16
Figure 1: Tradeoff Between Additional Seats
and Safety of Seats
This tradeoff works differently in the case of bipartisan redistricting plans, which have
become more common due to the increase in divided state governments. In most states,
control of both state legislative chambers as well as the governors mansion is needed in order
to approve a partisan redistricting plan. While it is not uncommon for one party to control all
three at the same time, the occurrence or dividedor split state governments has increased
since the 1960s up to the situation from the mid 1980s onwards where the majority of states
has a divided state government in place.3
In this situation, a partisan redistricting plan
favoring one political party will undoubtedly be either not approved by at least one of the
state legislative chambers, or vetoed by the opposing partys governor. In this situation,
according to those supporting the idea that redistricting is a destructive force, both parties
agree to only increase the safety of the states incumbents, regardless of their political
affiliation, and not try to draw districts lines unfavorably to each other.
Figure 2: Partisan State Governments
0
10
20
30
40
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Year
Totalnumbe
rof
states Democratic State
Government
Republican StateGovernment
Divided StateGovernment
3 Morris P. Fiorina, An Era of Divided Government, Political Science Quarterly 107, no.3
(1992): 388. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152437.
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Chapter 2 17
Measuring effects
Having established that there are two possible benefits to controlling the redistricting
processadding additional seats and creating safe seatsshowing the impact of redrawing
CDs becomes essential. While the idea that controlling the redistricting process will influence
elections sounds convincing, conclusively showing the existence of an effect proves to be
more difficult. Not only can the use of different datasets distort the final results, researchers
have also devised different methods of interpreting their data. Whereas some research focuses
on the seats-to-votes ratio as an indication of partisan redistricting, others look at the number
of competitive seats or incumbency displacement. Comparing their results is additionally
challenging due to the two conflicting objectives of a possible gerrymander, which are often
incompatible to evaluate at the same time. This section will therefore analyze several ways in
which researcher have tried to measure the influence of partisan redistricting.
Additional districts
While there are several ways to measure the effect of partisan redistricting on the creation
of additional seats, one method that sticks out in both its effectiveness and
straightforwardness, is Abramowitz 1983 method of measuring the before and after
redistricting swing ratio in Democratic, Republican and dividedly controlled states.4
The
swing ratio, or seat-to-vote ratio, measured between a pre-redistricted and post-redistricted
election, reflects whether a party was successful in creating districts where a small increase in
the percentage of votes resulted in a much larger increase in the percentage of seats. It
assumes that parties with full control over the redistricting process will use this control to
establish this situation. In its most basic form the swing ratio is the change in the percentage
of seats held by one party in two successive elections divided by the change in the percentage
of votes over the same period or, in equation form, (%seatst2%seatst1) / (%votest2
%votest1).5 A swing ratio of 1 indicates that a party gained the same percentage of additional
seats as the higher percentage of the vote it received on election day. A higher swing ratio, for
instance 5.0, means a party was able to get a larger increase in the share of seats, in this
example 10 percent, than justified on the basis of a smaller increase in votes, here 2 percent.
Abramowitz compared the 1980 and 1982 election results for the Democrats, and found that
while the national swing ratio in 1982 was 6.0 / 4.0 or 1.33 the swing ratio was much
4 Alan I. Abramowitz, Partisan Redistricting and the 1982 Congressional Elections,Journal
of Politics 45 (1983): 767. doi:10.2307/2130716.5 Richard G. Niemi, and Patrick Fett, The Swing Ratio: An Explanation and an Assessment,
Legislative Studies Quarterly 11, no. 1 (1986): 77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/439910.
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Chapter 2 18
larger [] in the seventeen states in which the Democratic Party had complete control of
redistricting.6
Table 1 shows that for every percentage Democrats gained in Democratic
controlled states, they received an additional 3.2 percent of seats. In states with Republican or
divided control, Abramowitz found swing ratios close to 1, meaning that an increase in the
Democratic vote there was reflected by a similar increase in Democratic seats.
Table 1: Party Control of State Government and the Results of the 1982 Congressional Elections
Republican
control
Divided
control
Democratic
control
Change in avg.% Dem. vote 1,9 4,7 2,2
Change in % Dem. seats 2,0 5,2 7,1
Swing ratio 1,1 1,1 3,2
Number of states 5 22 17
Number of seats in these states in 1980 52 215 161
Number of seats in these states in 1982 50 213 166
The methods simplicity, directness and concreteness led other researchers to duplicate
Abramowitz method to measure the 1970-1972 Congressional redistricting effect, while at the
same time adapting the process slightly.7
Whereas Abramowitz had used state level
aggregated election results to determine the increase in percentage of Democratic voters,
Niemi and Winsky used district level results to better account for statistical anomalies such as
uncontested seats.8
Although Democrats lost votes and seats during the 1972 congressional
elections, the swing ratios in between these two elections still clearly reflect a partisan
advantage in controlling the state government. In Republican controlled states, Democrats lost
1.7 percent in votes, but almost 5 percent in seats, resulting in a swing ratio of 2.9. While
Democrats did far worse in states controlled by Democrats, loosing 5.5 percent of the vote,
partisan redistricting prevented substantial losses and resulted in a 0.3 swing ratio.
Table 2: Party Control of State Government and the Results of the 1972 Congressional Elections
Republican
control
Divided
control
Democratic
controlChange in avg.% Dem. vote -1,7 -1,8 -5,5
Change in % Dem. seats -4,9 -2,8 -1,9
Swing ratio 2,9 1,6 0,3
Number of states 7 21 16
Number of seats in these states in 1970 92 192 144
Number of seats in these states in 1972 91 193 145
6 Abramowitz, Partisan Redistricting, 769-70.7 Richard G. Niemi and Laura R. Winsky, The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting Effects in
Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s.Journal of Politics 54, no. 2 (1992): 565-572.doi:10.2307/2132040, 565.8 See footnote 3, 567 in Niemi and Winksy (1992) for full explanation.
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Chapter 2 19
While both the results for the 1970s and 1980s redistricting provided support for the idea
that controlling the redistricting process resulted in beneficial results in the following
elections, Niemi and Abramowitz had less success in proving the same after the 1990s
redistricting. While they had expected that mapmakers [had become] more skilled at partisan
line-drawing and therefore that their previous results would be confirmed or even surpassed,
the results from the 1990s indicate that, on average, partisan control of state government did
little or nothing to enhance partisan gains from redistricting.9
Since Republicans controlled
only two states 1992, with no changes in the number of seats, states controlled by Democrats
are left to show possible partisan advantages. However, as Table 3 shows, in states the
Democrats controlled, the GOP gained 1,86 percent more seats per percentage win of votes.
This means a reverse effect of controlling the state government on the election results
harming instead of beneficial to a party. The authors give two possible reasons for the fact
that gerrymandering did not seem to have an effect in the 1992 congressional elections. On
the one hand it could be that Republican state legislatures in Democratic controlled states
actively fought against Democratic redistricting plans, although they were in the minority. On
the other hand, the 1986 Davis v. Bandemer Supreme Court verdict made gerrymandering
justiciablemeaning that legal complaints raised on partisan redistricting had standing in
courtcould have restrained state legislatures in drafting district lines predominantly
beneficial to one political party.
Table 3: Party Control of State Government and the Results of the 1992 Congressional Elections
Republican
control
Divided
control
Democratic
control
Change in avg.% Rep. vote 2,49 1,62 1,95
Change in % Rep. seats 0,00 1,55 3,63
Swing ratio 0,00 0,96 1,86
Number of states 2 23 17
Number of seats in these states in 1990 5 286 133
Number of seats in these states in 1992 5 280 141
Extending the research to the new millennium in Table 4, the redistricting advantage
becomes apparent again, especially in Democratic controlled states where Republicans gained
more than 2 percent in votes, but lost almost 4 percent in seats. Both under Republican and
divided control, however, the swing ratio was almost 1, resulting in a high level of
responsiveness to the election outcome, but low indication of partisan gerrymandering.
9 Richard G. Niemi and Alan I. Abramowitz, Partisan Redistricting and the 1992
Congressional Elections,Journal of Politics 56, no. 3 (1994): 815, doi:10.2307/2132195.
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Chapter 2 20
Table 4: Party Control of State Government and the Results of the 2002 Congressional Elections
Republicancontrol
Dividedcontrol
Democraticcontrol
Change in avg.% Rep. vote 4,15 2,17 2,17
Change in % Rep. seats 5,32 1,79 -3,93
Swing ratio 1,28 0,83 -1,81Number of states 8 27 8
Number of seats in these states in 2000 91 237 100
Number of seats in these states in 2002 89 236 103
When comparing the votes-seats relationship in all four elections, the overall low swing
ratio is often quite low, especially during the 1992 and 2002 elections. Furthermore, it varies
less in states that are not controlled by either party. This could lend support to the theoretical
trade-off between security and seats which forms the basis of the hypothesis of bipartisan
gerrymandering, although this would be circumstantial as the swing ratio in dividedly
governed states often is close to 1, the number reflecting no influence of redistricting at all.
By and large however, the fact that the swing ratio does not indicate huge benefits of partisan
control of the state government, or even a reversed effect on the swing ratio in 1992,
undermines the narrative often portrayed about the large impact of gerrymandering.
There are some additional questions that can be raised on measuring the impact of partisan
redistricting by using the swing ratio. As is true in the results for 1972 and 1992, the most
significant swing ratio is based on only a small number of states, which does make itsusceptible to small anomalies within the data. Furthermore, the test does not take into regard
those states that had commission or court ordered redistricting plans. Their removal from the
measurements might produce a more explicit effect of partisan control of state governments.10
Campagna and Grofman take opposition with what they see as Abramowitz doubly flawed
methodology by mixing responsivenessare votes reflected by seat returnswith biasis
the system biased towards one party, as well as using the swing ratio as a measurement all
together.11
Although their objections on the former is a definitional matter on which there is
no consensus, their objections with regards to using the swing ratio have been widely
accepted.12
In an article exclusively dealing with the swing ratio, Niemi and Fett argue against
using what they call historical swing ratiohistorical meaning based on historic election
resultsstating that [e]ven when the focus is on a single pair of years, as in Abramowitz
10 Janet Campagna and Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting,Journal of Politics 52, no. 4 (1990): 1243, doi:10.2307/2131690.11 Ibid.,1244.12 Niemi and Winsky, The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting, Footnote 2, 566.
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Chapter 2 21
(1983), its extreme sensitivity to small changes in input makes its use questionable.13
Had
Abramowitz method resulted in a more obvious result pointing towards a large benefit in
increasing the number of districts for a party controlling the redistricting process, these
objections would have been futile. That this is not the case tells more about the actual impact
of gerrymandering than about the method itself.
Competitive Districts
Besides to looking at the swing ratio, there are other measurements that could indicate the
influence of gerrymandering, for instance the competitiveness of districts. There are different
interpretations as to why redistricting would affect competitiveness. On the one hand, with
partisan gerrymandering plans, a party could create additional safe district in which they face
little to no opposition by packing as many of the opposing party supporters in as few as
possible districts.14
It could also split opposing party voters of one competitive district, and
divide them evenly amongst several safe districts, increasing the competition in those districts
slightly, but not enough to make them into competitive districts, and thus increasing the total
number of noncompetitive districts (a process that is know as cracking).15
With bipartisan
redistricting plans, both parties could agree to protect the incumbents and draft districts where
they would not face opposition from opposing parties. In both situations the number of
competitive districts would decline, while the number of safe and unopposed districts would
increase in the election following redistricting.
In a hypothetical state with 200 Republican (red) and 100 Democratic (blue) voters with 6
Congressional Districts, each district would be composed of 50 voters. In the most
competitive plan, as is shown in Figure 3, this would create four competitive districts, where
both parties have an equal change of winning, and creating two districts with a Republican
majority. If a Republican gerrymandering plan would be enforced, however, they could adopt
a plan in which the Democratic voters would be divided amongst six districts. In each one of
these districts, however, Republican voters are in the majority, resulting in six Republican
representatives. Figure 5 reflects another possibility in the case of a partisan or bipartisan
redistricting plan. Both supporter groups are packed into their own districts, leading to no
competitive districts, but with two Democratic, and four Republican representatives.
13 Niemi and Fett, The Swing Ratio, 78.14 Michael Cooper, 5 Ways to Tilt an Election,New York Times, September 25, 2010,
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/weekinreview/20100925-redistricting-graphic.pdf (accessed January12, 2011).15 Ibid.
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Chapter 2 22
Figure 3: Most competitive Figure 4: Cracking Figure 5: Packing
A decrease in the number of competitive districts was noticed early on after the 1962
Supreme Court ruling mandating states to redistrict. In 1973, Tufte noticed that the percentage
of districts in which the victory margin was less than 5% percent, declined from 22 percent in
1958 to only 13 percent in 1970.16
Seats in the U.S. Senate, where redistricting could not
influence the number of competitive districts, had roughly the same percentage of marginal
victories between in this period. Tufte concluded that a major element in the job security of
incumbents is their ability to exert significant control over the drawing of district
boundaries.17
Also more contemporary research notes the impact of redistricting on the
number of competitive districts. Fiorina et al. points towards a remarkable situation:
[A]s elections have gotten closer in the aggregate, the number of competitive
elections have declined. In 2000, when the presidential race was a cliff-hanger, only
seventy-four of the 435 House seats were won by margins of less than 55 percent. In
2002, following the decennial reapportionment and redistricting cycle, the number of
such competitive districts fell to forty-seven.18
According to Fiorina et al. this was the result of a bipartisan gerrymander that left almost 90
percent of U.S. House seats safely in the hands of one or the other of the two parties, despite
the close division of the aggregate vote.19
Just as was the case with measuring the swing ratio, the analysis depends on how the data
is interpreted, and, as McDonald shows, also on the decision which dataset to use. McDonald
compared before and after redistricting levels of competitiveness using three different data
sets and two brackets of competitivenessone with districts within the 45-55% election
results, and one with an even stricter measure of 48-52% resulting in a maximum of a 4
16Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,
American Political Science Review 67, no. 2 (1973): 550, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1958782.17 Ibid., 551.18
Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. Culture War? The Myth of aPolarized America. (New York: Longman, 2004), 108.19 Ibid., 109.
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Chapter 2 23
percent victory margin.20
Although Table 5 shows that not all operationalisations show a
decrease in the number of competitive districts in both brackets during all three redistricting
cycles, in general redistricting seems to have resulted in a decline in the number of
competitive districts.
Table 5: Number of Competitive Districts, 1980-2002
While the numbers both Tufte and McDonald point towards a decrease in the number of
competitive districts due to redistricting, others have found evidence confirming a decline in
competitive districts, but suggests that this is not due to redistricting. In a rebuttal to Tuftes
findings, John A. Ferejohn suggests that in order for gerrymandering to have an influence on
the decline of competitiveness of districts, one must see a difference between districts that
have been redistricted, and those that have not.21
While he also finds that the percentage of
competitive districts drops after being redistricted, almost the same drop can be measured for
districts that had not been redistricted between 1962 and 1970. As the decline occurred in
unredistricted areas as well, this suggest[s] that redistricting has no influence at all on the
number of competitive districts.22
This analysis is furthermore supported by more
contemporary research by Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning. A visualization of the
changes between the number of competitive seats before and after redistricting, as shown in
Figure 6, does seem to confirm McDonalds numbers, but also shows that [t]he most
significant changes in the competitiveness of House districts occurred between redistricting
20 Michael P. McDonald, Drawing the Line on District Competition, PS: Political Science and
Politics 39, no. 1 (2006): 92, doi:10.1017/S1049096506060161.21
John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections,AmericanPolitical Science Review 71, no. 1 (1977): 168, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1956960.22 Ibid.
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Chapter 2 24
cycles.23
For instance, the number of competitive districts declined with 34 from 1992 to
2000.24
Both Ferejohn and Abramowitz et al. show that redistricting can not be blamed for the
decrease in competitive districts, as it also happens in unredistricted areas, as well as between
rather than during redistrict cycles.
Figure 6: Number of Competitive Districts Before
and After Redistricting, 1980-2002.
Incumbency
Part of the influence of the redistricting narrative as portrayed in the media, is the
incumbency protection it would provide both in partisan but even more so in bipartisan
redistricting plans. Since bipartisan redistricting has become more common due to the
increase in states with split governments (figure 2), recent redistricting cycles should have
been good times for incumbent House members. With reelection rates having increased since
the 1960s to sometimes more than 95 percent, the data seem to support this effect of partisan
redistricting. Lyons and Galderisi, in their 1995 article on the partisan redrawing of
Congressional Districts lines in the 1990-92 redistricting cycle, measured the incumbent
displacementthose candidates who were not reelected as representativesunder partisan
and bipartisan redistricting plans.25
Although they expected incumbency protection to be part
of a partisan redistricting plan, they believed the creation of additional partisan districts (as
shown in figure 4) would be at the forefront in those plans. This might have an adverse affect
23 Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting,
and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections,Journal of Politics 68, no. 1 (2006): 79,
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00371.x.24 Ibid., Don't Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections. PS: Political Science and Politics 39, no. 1
(2006): 88, doi:10.1017/S1049096506060185.25 Michael Lyons and Peter F. Galderisi, Incumbency, Reapportionment, and U.S. House
Redistricting, Political Research Quarterly 48, no. 4 (1995): 850, http://www.jstor.org/stable/448978.
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Chapter 2 25
on incumbency reelection. On the other hand, with bipartisan redistricting plans, incumbency
protection might be the only benefit both parties can gain, so the authors expect less
incumbent displacement in those states. During reapportionment process some states gain
while other states loose CDs. Since this might affect the focus of the redistricting planwhen
seats are lost more attention is paid towards retaining the partys incumbentsthis too is part
of the research. As shown in table 6, incumbent displacement was at its lowest in states which
held the same number of seats before and after reapportionment, and were redistricted in a
bipartisan fashion. This outcome supports the idea that incumbents receive most protection
from bipartisan redistricting plans if the political landscape is not in turmoil. The variations
between partisan and bipartisan plans in other categories, however, do not always appear to
support general ideas about which type of plan would be favorable towards incumbents. For
instance, in states losing seats, incumbents are better of with partisan instead of bipartisan
redistricting plans. However, from these numbers Lyons and Galderisi concluded that
incumbents do seem to benefit from partisan redistricting.
Table 6: Incumbent Displacement in 1992 by Type of Plan
This result is remarkable, because research in decade following the 1962 Supreme Court
decision regarding redistricting focused on an averse affect of redistricting on incumbency
reelection. As Charles S. Bullock notes in his 1975 research on this topic, redistricting had
the potential of introducing uncertainty into all multi-member congressional delegations.26
While he finds no support for higher incumbency defeat or even more retirements due to
redistricting, other research does support the idea that redistricting does not have a positive,
but rather a negative effect on incumbency reelection. For instance Friedman and Holdens
article discussing the rise in incumbency shows that redistricting since the 1970s resulted in
26 Charles S. Bullock, Redistricting and Congressional Stability, 1962-72,Journal of Politics 37, no. 2 (1975):
569, doi:10.2307/2129009.
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Chapter 2 26
almost 7.6% less reelection success for incumbents in the 2000s.27
Although their specific
model prevents easy comparison with other research, the basis of their method is similar to
other arguments against an effect of redistricting on incumbency reelection. Since
redistricting usually only happens after the Census, its effect on incumbency would be easily
identified as a once a decade impact. Measuring the direct consequence or redrawing district
lines, they conclude that its disruptive nature has negative implications for incumbents. While
models as this one measure the impact of partisan redistricting through a regression analysis
hard to explain in laymens terms, there is other research available that is easier to grasp,
while at the same time more effective in rebutting the idea that incumbents would benefit
from bipartisan redistricting. The increase in incumbency reelection is not limited to the U.S.
House of Representatives, where redistricting could have had an effect, but an increase of
roughly the same degree is also measured for incumbents in the U.S. Senate and all statewide
offices in the United States. Such a striking, common trend suggests that there is likely a
common cause, which could impossibly be redistricting as senators and statewide offices get
elected on the basis of statewide districts which are not redrawn every decade.28
While Lyons
and Galderisi provide compelling evidence that suggests incumbents have a higher reelection
rate under (bi)partisan redistricting plans than those under nonpartisan plans, other research
shows that incumbency is negatively affected by redistricting. Although these two outcomes
are incompatible, the general increase in incumbent reelection rate sine the 1960s amongst
both redistricted and statewide political offices suggests that if redrawing district lines has an
influence, this is extremely limited. This does not support the narrative which suggests that
partisan redistricting provided increased incumbency protection.
Conclusion
Combining the results of the several measurements does not result in the kind of clear
conclusion expected from the elegant narrative describing the effects of redistricting.
Although there are decades in which research shows modest support for the idea that partisan
governments are able to redistrict in ways that result in a larger increase in seats than in votes,
the method showing this effect is not without flaws and does not provide convincing results
for all redistricting cycles. Furthermore, although at first sight the numbers seem to suggest a
27 John N. Friedman and Richard T. Holden, The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: Whats Gerrymandering
Got to Do With It?,Journal of Politics 71, no. 2 (2009): 602, doi:10.1017/S0022381609090483.28
Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency Advantage in U.S.Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 19422000,Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and
Policy 1, no. 3 (2002): 319, doi:10.1089/153312902760137578.
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Chapter 2 27
decline in competitive districts due to redistricting, the fact that this number also declines in
areas unaffected by redistricting proves that redistricting has little to do with this decline.
Besides, most of the changes in competitiveness occur outside rather than during the
redistricting process. Because incumbency reelection rates changed almost roughly at the
same time that redistricting became required practice, a connection between the two was
made early on. While both the redistricting narrative as well as different studies claim a
beneficial effect of redrawing district lines on incumbency reelection, other research in the
decade following the Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions. The disruptive effect of
redistricting would be harmful instead of beneficial towards incumbents. While the research
results are difficult to compare, more compelling evidence that redistricting does not affect
incumbency reelection is given by the overall rise of reelection rates in both district as well as
statewide elected offices. This suggests that there is another reason for the increase in
incumbency reelection. Overall, the research shows that the effect of redistricting on the
composition of the U.S. House of Representatives is not as clear as the (media) narrative
portrays it to be. If there is an effect of redistricting at all, this is likely to be extremely limited
in scope. However limited, this effect is claimed to increase polarization in the House, which
is and issues that will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3: Partisan Redistricting and Polarization
in U.S. House of Representatives
A house divided against itself cannot stand.Abraham Lincoln
1
1 Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, ed. Roy P. Basler (New York: The Library of America, 1989), 461.
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Chapter 3 29
Chapter 3: Partisan Redistricting and Polarization in U.S. House of Representatives
With claims on the partisan advantages of controlling the redistricting process proved to be
inconclusively supported by research, this chapter turns to a perhaps even more destructive
attributed claim of redistricting: its influence on the polarization of the U.S. House of
Representatives. In much of the opposition to redistricting in the hands of politicians the
creation of additional party seats is seen as only the first step of its destructive impact. The
democratic process in Washington, according to advocates of the influence of partisan
redistricting theory, is not helped by a procedure that they belief decreases competitive
elections. What really worries many editorial writers, politicians, and voter groups advocating
for nonpartisan redistricting practices, however, is the influence of gerrymandering on the
partisan and ideological divide between the two parties. While their claims will be developed
in further details further on in this chapter, the basic premise consists of a three step argument:
First, partisan redistricting increases the number of safe, noncompetitive and politically
homogenous Congressional Districts. Second, primary voters, who due to a lack of substantial
opposition in the general election de facto elect representatives in these districts, have
stronger and more extreme political beliefs than the general public. Representatives elected in
these districts therefore cater to these primary voters, and are more partisan and ideological
members of the House. This pulls the two parties to opposite ends of the political spectrum
and creates a legislative gridlock.
Similar to the claim of electoral advantages gained from controlling the redistricting
process, this reasoning sounds both reasonable and logical. However, research shows the
redistricting effect on polarization is not supported by evidence. Presented evidence can be
explained through more compelling and better supported studies which conclusively show
that partisan redrawing of district lines has no effect on the level of polarization in the House.
This is not to say that Congress has not become increasingly polarized over the last couple of
decades; redistricting, however, is not to blame.
This chapter will analyze the academic debate on the partisan redistricting causes
polarization narrative, and subsequently provide evidence to the contrary. It will start,
however, with an explanation on the median voter theorem, and the polarization of the House,
since both provide the foundation of this debate.
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Chapter 3 30
Median voter theorem
Although not coined by Anthony Downs, the median voter theorem received its popularity
due to his bookAn Economic Theory of Democracy from 1957. It describes inter alia the
situation that in a two party system both parties move to the political median of all
constituents in order to win the majority. The median is the position most voters hold on a
scale from left to right with on either side the extreme (ideological) positions on a single
issue. Figure 1 shows that the median of each party is either left or right of the ideological
scale. However, Figure 2 shows that if you combine the frequency of positions of both parties,
the median shifts to the exact middle of both extremes. The median, in short, is where most of
the voters are positioned. This means that, in order to win the majority, candidates from both
parties have to win the votes of those constituents in the middle of both parties ideologies.
Moving away from the center median by taking more ideologically extreme positions, in line
with the parties own median, would mean less votes. Since extremist voters would be forced
to vote for the one [party] closest to them, no matter how distasteful its policies seemed in
comparison with those of their ideal government, there is politically speaking little risk of
this move to the center.2
Figure 1: Ideological Position of Each Party Figure 2: Ideological Position of Total
Constituency
Extreme differences between the two parties are not expected in the median voter
theorem. However, Democrats and Republicans in Congress are now more distant than they
have ever been in recent history. Moving away from the median would suggest that parties
either disregard moderate voters in favor of more ideological partisan supporters, or that the
constituency became more partisan and ideological. These two competing explanations for
polarization are discussed below, but both use redistricting as an explanation for polarization
in addition to existing levels.
2 Anthony Downs,An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 118-9.
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Chapter 3 31
Polarization of Congress
With the current debate focusing on the dire consequences of party polarization in
Congress, it seems hard to imagine a time when [c]ommentators derided the two parties as
Tweedledum and Tweedledee and warned that a lack of opposing, coherent visions of
policy threatened to undermine Americans faith in their democratic institutions.3
This was,
however, the case only a few decades ago. Since then, parties have not only become more
partisan and cohesive, they have also ideologically drifted apart, with Republicans getting
more conservative, and Democrats becoming more liberal.
The continuing polarization in Congress is widely acknowledged. Although there are
several methods for measuring the polarization of both Houses, either based on ideological
self-identification or special interest scoring cards, the DW-NOMINATE program is most
often used in academic research. This dataset contains all votes of members of Congress,
which are ranked according to ideology. The scale goes from -1, extreme liberal, to 1, extreme
conservative. The distance between the mean score of both parties politicians is the amount
of polarization in both chambers of Congress. Figure 3 shows how both the House and the
Senate have polarized substantially especially since the mid-1970s. While in recent years the
Senate seems less polarizedan issue that will be addressed later on in this chapterthe
ideological differences in the House have reached nearly 1. Figure 4 and 5 show how in forty
years the representatives have moved away from the ideological center towards more liberal
or conservative extreme positions.
Figure 3: Distance Between Parties
3
Michael P. McDonald, Representational Explanations of the Ideological Polarization of the House ofRepresentatives,Legislative Studies Section Newsletter22, no. 2 (1999), http://www.apsanet.org/
~lss/Newsletter/jul99/polar.html.
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Chapter 3 32
Figure 4: DW-NOMINATE Scores 89th
House, 1965-1967
Figure 5: DW-NOMINATE Scores 109th
House, 2005-2007
The reason why politicians have polarized, however, is widely debated. There is no
agreement whether it is limited to elite polarization, or if the general public has polarized as
well. Most common object of discussion is the importance of the realignment of the South
after the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Some point out that [o]nce the Democrats became the
party of civil rights, their conservative Southern members began leaving the party that had
called home since the Civil War, to become, or be replaced by, conservative Southern
Republicans.4
If issues of race, and the top-down Republican Southern Strategy focusing
on states rights, is the reason for this realignment, or if it was caused by economic changes
in the South which led to the creation of a sizable new wealthy suburban class who began
4 Paul Waldman, How Congress Became Polarized,American Prospect, October 19, 2010,
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=how_congress_became_polarized (accessed June 29, 2011).
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Chapter 3 33
to vote for the party that best represented its economic interests, is part of further debate.5
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal point out that the realignment-induced replacement effect
cannot be the whole story.6
Figure 6 shows that the polarization of the House with and
without the Southern members is highly correlated, meaning that they are almost the same,
which suggests that polarization among non-southern legislators is the driving force of this
polarization trend, not the Souths change from a Democratic into a Republican stronghold.7
Figure 6: Distance Between Parties
With and Without the South, 1959-2007
The discussion on other reasons for the polarization of Congress is again split between
those who believe that rising polarization is due to large demographic and social changes of
the American publiclike Stonecash et al. who inter alia combines increasing district
disparities in immigration figures, median family income and urbanization numbers to show
why voters elect more polarizing legislators,8
and those who blame political elites. Fiorina etal. sees little indication that voters are polarized now or that they are becoming more
polarized, but points to the political classoffice holders, candidates, party activist, and
interest group leaders who with rhetoric, strategies and behavior have created elite
5 Clay Risen, The Myth of the Southern Strategy,New York Times, December 10, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/10/magzine/10Section2b.t-4.html (accessed August 4, 2011).6 Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and
Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 32.7
Ibid.8 Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer and Mack D. Mariani,Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment,
and Party Polarization (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 69-80.
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Chapter 3 34
polarization that is largely without foundation in a polarized electorate.9
Hetherington, who
points to at least 12 different possible sources of polarization both on the political level
changes in the Rules Committee in the Houseas well as on the level of the general public
the influence of polarizing mass media, believes that there is a connection between both levels
of polarization through the great sorting outa movement of politicians and voters into
two ideological camps.10
With polarization on the elite level, the general public better
understands the ideological differences between the two parties and sorts accordingly to their
own ideology, while with party sorti