Marquette Universitye-Publications@Marquette
Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects
The Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-Naturalistic Critique of HusserlianPhenomenologyShazad AkhtarMarquette University
Recommended CitationAkhtar, Shazad, "The Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-Naturalistic Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology" (2010).Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 65.http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/65
THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SSEMI‐NATURALISTICCRITIQUE
OFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY
by
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.
ADissertationsubmittedtotheFacultyoftheGraduateSchool,MarquetteUniversity,inPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy
Milwaukee,Wisconsin
December2010
ABSTRACT
THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SSEMI‐NATURALISTICCRITIQUEOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.
MarquetteUniversity,2010ThisdissertationdealswithMerleau‐Ponty’scriticaltransformationofHusserl’sphenomenologythrougharethinkingoftheconceptof“nature,”whichHusserl,Merleau‐Pontyargues,failstointegrateorexplainsuccessfullyinhisphilosophicalsystem.ThefirstchapterreconstructsHusserl’s“transcendental‐phenomenological”projectinIdeasI,whilethesecondwidenstheinvestigationtocovertheontologically‐centeredIdeasIIandIII.Inmythirdchapter,IchartwhatIcallMerleau‐Ponty’s“organicappropriation”ofHusserlandtheuniquehermeneuticalchallengesitposes.HeretheambiguityofIdeasII,whichbothgroundssubjectivityinthelivedbodyandseparatesnaturefrom“spirit”(Geist),playsacrucialrole.ThefourthchapterconcentratesontheMerleau‐Ponty’slatermeditationsontheontologyofnatureandsubjectivity,particularlyinhisrecentlytranslatedNaturelecturesof1959‐61.Finally,thefifthchaptercomparesandcontrastsHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty,intermsofbothsubstanceandmethod,throughadetailedexaminationoftheirdifferentnotionsof(andwaystoaddress)“paradox.”IshowhowMerleau‐Ponty’s“paradoxical”thinkingstemsnotfromchanceormeretemperamentbutafundamental,systematiccommitmenttotheself‐contradictory(or“dialectical,”butinamodifiedsense)natureofbeingandtruththemselves.
i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A. Iowetheconceptionandfruitionofthisprojectabovealltomydirector,Pol
Vandevelde.ItisinhisclassesthatIfirstawakenedtotheimportanceof
phenomenologyandthepowerofitsmethod.Hehastaughtmethetextsandstyles
ofHusserl,Heidegger,Merleau‐Ponty,andmanyotherfigureswhohaveinfluenced
myphilosophicalthinkingandresearchdecisively.Ihavelearnedtremendously
fromlengthydiscussionsoverbothhisownandotherauthors’originalworks.Ifthis
dissertationissuccessfulinanysmallmeasure,thisisowingsubstantiallytothe
guidanceandinfluenceofDr.Vandevelde.
Ihavealsomysecondreader,Dr.SebastianLuft,tothankprofuselyforhis
energeticandgenerousaidtomeovertheyearsandinthecompletionofthe
presentproject.Ihavebenefittedgreatlyfrommyyears‐longconversationswithDr.
LuftonmanytopicsrangingfromphenomenologytoHegelianidealismandmuch
more.Hisfriendship,availability,andcutting‐edgescholarshiphavebeenvery
valuabletomeinmyacademicdevelopment.
Inaddition,IwouldalsoliketotaketheopportunitytosincerelythankDr.
AndyTallonandDr.StephenWatsonofNotreDamefortheirencouragementand
suggestionsduringmywritingprocess.
ii
ImustaddthatIwasgreatlyaidedincompletingthisdissertationinatimely
mannerbytheMarquetteGraduateSchoolanditsgenerousfinancialsupport,
throughtheRaynorFellowship,throughthe2009‐2010academicyear.Iamalso
deeplygratefultotheMarquettePhilosophydepartmentforhavingnominatedme
fortheawardand,moregenerally,forhavinggivenmeafirst‐classphilosophical
educationthatIwilltakewithmeandbuildupon,Iamsure,fortherestofmylife.
iii
TABLEOFCONTENTSACKNOWLEDGMENTS………..................................................................................................................iINTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………..1I.PresentStatusoftheProblem
A.Merleau‐Ponty’sInterpretationofHusserlandHusserl’sConception
ofNature………………………………………………………………………………………..4B.Merleau‐Ponty’sLaterOntologyandConceptofNature…………………………..6C.IdeasIandII………………………………………………………………………………………………7
II.SummaryoftheDissertation
A.ChaptersOneandTwo…………………………………………………………………………...8B.ChaptersThreeandFour……………………………………………………………………...11C.ChapterFive………………………………………………………………………………………...15
III.Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………….17CHAPTERONE:HUSSERL’STRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGYINIDEASI:THEBASICPOSITION………………………………………………………………………………………………...19I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology…………...19II.EpochéandPhenomenologicalReduction
A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..24B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes………………………………………26
iv
C.PhenomenologicalEpoché……………………………………………………………………….32D.Phenomenological‐TranscendentalReduction(s)…………………………………34E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction………………………………….38
III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction………………………………………………………………..40
A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence………………………….43B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical……………………………49C.TheChargeofDualism…………………………………………………………………………52D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandthe“World‐Annihilation”Experiment……………………………………………………………………………………………..55E.Husserl’sFinalPosition:“TranscendentalIdealism”………………………………60
IV.ConcludingReflections…………………………………………………………………………………..65CHAPTERTWO:THECONSTITUTIONOFNATURE,BODY,ANDSPIRITINHUSSERL’SIDEASII……………………………………………………………………………………………73I.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………79II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III
A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..79B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality
1.MaterialNature…………………………………………………………………………822.AnimalNature,ortheBody‐and‐Soul…………………………………………853.Ego…………………………………………………………………………………………...914.Spirit………………………………………………………………………………………...93
III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III
A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism……………..99
v
B.Husserl’sNaturalism………………………………………………………………………….102C.ThePriorityThesis…………………………………………………………………………….108D.SpiritandConsciousness……………………………………………………………………110E.TheQuestionoftheBody……………………………………………………………………114
IV.Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………..118CHAPTERTHREE:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SORGANICAPPROPRIATIONOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGYI.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….122II.Merleau‐Ponty’sRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewandCritique
A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………127B.The“StrongView”:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras………………………………….129C.“Weak”and“Mixed”Views:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.……………………130D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo……………………...133E.ConcludingThoughts………………………………………………………………………….140
III.Merleau‐Ponty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText
A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………141B.HusserlinPP……………………………………………………………………………………..143C.HusserlinMerleau‐Ponty’sLaterWork………………………………………………146
IV.Merleau‐Ponty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme
A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction………………………………………………………152B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction…………………………………………………….158
V.ConcludingReflections………………………………………………………………………………….161
vi
CHAPTERFOUR:MERLEAU‐PONTY’SMATUREONTOLOGYOFNATUREI.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….166II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLectures
A.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectof“Ontology”……………………………………………………………………………..168B.Defining“Nature”………………………………………………………………………………174C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife…………………………………………………………...181
III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialecticalOnto‐Phenomenology
A.Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………190B.Reversibility………………………………………………………………………………………191C.Flesh………………………………………………………………………………………………….196D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleau‐Ponty’sDialectic…………………………………………………………………………………….200
IV.Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………..205CHAPTERFIVE:MERLEAU‐PONTYANDHUSSERLONTHEQUESTIONOFTHEPARADOXOFSUBJECTIVITYANDNATUREI.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………….....207II.Merleau‐Ponty’sPhilosophyofParadox
A.OverviewofMereau‐Ponty’sReferencestoParadox…………………………....211B.Paradoxandthe“PerceptualFaith”…………………………………………………….217C.ParadoxandPhilosophy……………………………………………………………………..220
III.HusserlandParadox……………………………………………………………………………………221IV.TheParadoxofReflection
vii
A.TheReflectiveAttitude………………………………………………………………………225B.“Hyper‐Reflection”…………………………………………………………………………….229
V.Merleau‐Ponty’sParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking:Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticism
A.Merleau‐PontyandHegelianDialectic………………………………………………...234B.Merleau‐PontyandSkepticism/Quietism……………………………………………237C.Merleau‐PontyandMysticism…………………………………………………………….240
VI.Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………….244CONCLUSION
I.Merleau‐Pontyvis‐à‐visHusserl……………………………………………………….....247
II.Merleau‐PontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers……………………………………..251
III.The“PersonalisticAttitude”andtheLimitsofReflection……………………253
IV.PhenomenologyasParadox………………………………………………………………254
V.Naturalism………………………………………………………………………………………...255BIBLIOGRAPHYI.PrimaryLiterature(HusserlandMerleau‐Ponty)
A.Husserl……………………………………………………………………………………………...257B.Merleau‐Ponty…………………………………………………………………………………...258
II.SecondaryLiteratureandOtherWorks
A.BooksandMonographs……………………………………………………………………...259
B.Articles,BookChapters,andVolumeIntroductions……………………………..262
viii
C.Miscellaneous…………………………………………………………………………………….268
1
Introduction
Thecentraldynamicofthisdissertationisthecreativeencounterbetween
MauriceMerleau‐Ponty(1908‐1961)andEdmundHusserl(1859‐1938),twoofthe
mostimportantphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.Iexplorethisencounter—an
“encounter”betweentwophilosophiesasopposedtotwophilosophers,asthetwo
thinkershadneverformallymetandareseparatedbymorethanageneration—
withrespectprincipallytotheontologicalissuessurroundingtheclassicaldivision
of“nature”and“spirit.”Butinthecaseofphenomenology,ontologicaland
epistemologicalissuescannotbecleanlyseparated.Thusmajorquestionsof
epistemologicalsignificance,suchasthoseofidealismandthenatureofreflection,
arealsoaddressedandrelatedtothequestionofwhatitmeanstodo
phenomenology—andevenphilosophy—itself.Phenomenology,ontology,
epistemology—allofthesetermsarenegotiatedandre‐negotiatedinthecourseof
Merleau‐Ponty’ssustainedhermeneuticsofHusserl’swork,ahermeneuticsthat
opensupontoahiddenworldofpossibilitieslatentinthe(ostensibly)simple
phenomenaofsensing,seeing,speaking,andreflecting.
Merleau‐Ponty’sinterpretationofHusserlhasbeencommentedonbefore.
However,oneoftheuniquecontributionsofthepresentresearch,Ibelieve,isitsuse
oftheconceptof“nature,”afundamentalconcernofboththinkersbutinvery
differentways,togototheheartofthequestionsofphenomenologicalmethodand
therelationshipofhumansubjectivitytotheworld.Thischoiceallowsusto
appreciatethemotivationsofMerleau‐Ponty’srethinkingofphenomenology,
2
puttingasideitschallengetoclassicalmetaphysicalbinariessuchas“human‐
animal”and“nature‐spirit,”inthecontextofawiderphilosophical‐ontological
tradition(thoughstillverymucha“modern”one,forthemostpart).Merleau‐
Ponty’scritiqueofsomeelementsofHusserlianphilosophyclearlybelongstohis
generalcritiqueofmodernismand,inturn,blendharmoniouslywithhispositive
appropriationofHusserlianphenomenologyasakindofunified‐fieldtheoryof
Being,oncecleansedofitsCartesianpresuppositions.1
InHusserl,“nature”appearsprimarilyinthreeguises:asthe“natural
attitude”;astheregionaldomainofthe“naturalsciences”;andastheontic‐noematic
correlateof“spirit”intherealmofworldly(non‐transcendental)reality.For
Merleau‐Ponty,ontheotherhand,“nature”comestoemergeasacomplexand
nuanced“otherness”attheheartofsubjectivity,manifestingitselfmostdirectlyin
therealmof“life,”especiallyanimality,andyetalsohauntingconsciousness,or
spirit,withits“presencebyabsence,”itsimpenetrable“origin”‐ality.Itis,as
Schellingsays,a“wildBeing”untamedbythought,yetalsountamable,forthere
couldbenothoughtwithoutahorizon,andthathorizonalityisthedepththat
cannotbeknownwithoutmyvanishingfromtheworldaltogetherandsomehow
“seeingitfromabove”—animpossibilityevenforaGod,however,since,asboth
HusserlandMerleau‐Pontyremindus,visionisacorporealact.
Inmyinterpretation,“Nature”—andthen“Being,”andstillagain,the
“flesh”—come,inMerleau‐Ponty’streatment,toquietlydisplacethe“transcendental
ego”ofHusserl,itselfahold‐overoftheCartesian‐epistemologicalprioritizationof 1 Itisinthislight,too,thatwecanappreciateMerleau‐Ponty’sendorsementoftheworkofLeibniz,Hegel,andBergson,ontheonehand,andhisrejectionof(muchof)KantandSartreontheother.
3
the“inner”overthe“outer.”Natureisambiguouslybothinnerandouter—an
interiorityquaexteriority,likethelivingorganism,whose“outwardbehavior”can
onlybeunderstoodasliving‐outwithinthe“internal”horizonofanUmwelt.The
organism,mostevidentlyinthesimpler(butnottheverysimplest)forms,likecrabs
orworms,isradicallyself‐centered(“initsownworld”)atthesametimethatit
lacksacenter,an“ego”thatcandifferentiateitself“absolutely”froma“world”apart
fromitsinteriority.Theanimalisitsworld.Thelivingbeinginitsunitywithits
worldservesasareminderofthepre‐reflectivelifeofconsciousnessthat
underlies—andchallengesfromwithin—thedualismsofreflectivethought,
includingthatofthe“natural”and“spiritual,”thecentraldivisionofHusserl’sIdeas
II.2
Whileremainingaphenomenologisttotheend,Merleau‐Pontyrejectedboth
Husserl’s“transcendentalidealism”3aswellasthelatter’simplicit(andironical)
collusionwithnaturalscienceoveritsdefinitionofthe“essence”ofnature.Itisnot
onlyinresponsetoHusserlorIdeasII,ofcourse,thatMerleau‐Pontydevelopedhis
ideasofnature;afterall,hehadbeenatworkontheontologicalimplicationsof
animalityevenbeforehebecameacquaintedwithHusserl’sworksinaseriousway,
startingwithhisfirstmajorworkTheStructureofBehavior(1942).4Nonetheless,in
IdeasIIheseesHusserlstrugglingwiththeconsequencesofdividingtheworldfrom
consciousnessandnatureandanimalityfromspirit,andhisarticulationofan 2 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989 3Itcanbedebatedtowhatdegree,ofcourse;seeToadvine,Ted.“LeavingHusserl’sCave?ThePhilosopher’sShadowRevisited.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.71‐94).4Merleau‐Ponty,TheStructureofBehavior.Trans.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.
4
alternativecannotbefullyappreciatedwithoutthisworkasahermeneutical
backdrop.
Theremainderofthisintroductionoffersanoverviewofthepresentstatusin
therelevantsecondaryliteratureofthetheme(s)ofthiswork,aswellasapreview
ofthecontentsofthedissertationchapterbychapter,culminatinginasummaryof
theconclusionsIdrawfromalloftheforegoingstudies.
I.PresentStatusoftheProblem
A.MerleauPonty’sInterpretationofHusserlandHusserl’sConceptionofNature
WhilethereareanumberofgoodarticlesonMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingof
Husserl,severalofwhicharecollectedinthe2002essaycollectionentitledMerleau
Ponty’sReadingofHusserl,5thereisverylittlematerialwrittenspecificallyon
Merleau‐Ponty’scritiqueofHusserl’sconceptionofnature,6letaloneasustained
assessmentoftheirrespectivephilosophiesthroughthelensofthisidea.Thedearth
ofmaterialonthequestionofnatureisprobablyduetothefactthatMerleau‐ 5 MerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.OthergoodarticlesincludethosebyTaylorCarmanandAnthonySteinbockforinstance,whichbothcompareHusserlianandMerleau‐Pontianphenomenologiesofthebody,amajorthemeofIdeasII;CarmanevenexplicitlydiscussesMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofIdeasII,thoughonlyinpassing.Thismaterialis,however,onlypartiallyrelevantforourpresentpurposes.See:Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999(pp.205‐225);Steinbock,Anthony.“SaturatedIntentionality.”InTheBody.Ed.DonnWelton,Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,1999(pp.178‐199). 6 AnexceptionisStephenCrowell’sessay“TheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”PrintedinIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.(pp.81‐106)Thisessayalsocontainsmuchextraneousmaterial,forourpurposes,onthephilosophyofmythology.
5
Ponty’smostpointedcriticismsonthisissuearedirectlytobefoundinhislecture
coursesonnature,whichwerehoweverpublishedonlyrelativelyrecently.7The
presentdissertationclosessomeofthisgapinthescholarship.
MuchofthediscussionofMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofandphilosophical
relationtoHusserlispolemicalandinsomewaysparalleltothemorestandard
“HusserlversusHeidegger”debate.TaylorCarmanexpressesacharacteristic“pro‐
Merleau‐Pontian”view:
“UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,Merleau‐Pontylooksbeyondthesubject‐objectdividetotrytogaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperience…Indeed,takingtheproblemofembodimentseriously,asMerleau‐Pontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptualdistinctionsonwhichHusserl’senterpriserests.”8
CarmanfurtherclaimsthatgoingbeyondHusserl“wouldmeanrelinquishingthe
conceptualdualismonwhich[his]projectrests.”9ManyHusserlianswoulddispute
thischaracterizationofHusserl,thoughIpersonallybelieveitislargelyaccurate,10
thoughthereareactuallyseveral“conceptualdualisms,”notjustone,thatmustbe
contendedwithandsortedthroughontheirownterms,notallofwhichequatetoa
“substancedualism”ofasortonefindsinDescartes(andisatleastoutwardly
refutedinHusserl).IaddressthisissueinChapter2.
7 Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Trans.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003. 8 Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p206. 9 Ibid.,p.208 10 FrançoiseDastur,acarefulandrelativelynon‐polemicalreaderofbothHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty,agreeswiththelatterthatHusserlisbasicallydualistic.SeeDastur,Françoise.“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.65‐77).Merleau‐Pontyisroutinelyreadasazealousanti‐dualist,aclaimIwillpartiallychallengeinchapters4and5.
6
Husserlhasplentyofdefenders,ofcourse,someofwhom,likePanos
Theodorou,takeissuewiththewidespreadreadingofIdeasIIthatunderstandsitas
validating,essentially,thenatural‐scientificviewofnature.11J.ClaudeEvansagrees
thatthisreadingismisleading,andgoesevenfurther,arguingforthesuperiorityof
Husserl’saccountofnatureandscienceinIdeasIIoverhislaterreflectionsonthe
life‐world,definitelyaminoritypositionforthoseconcernedwiththisproblem.12
WithinHusserlianscholarship,atleastasevidencedbyMerleauPonty’s
ReadingofHusserl,achiefquestionliesinjusthowfarMerleau‐Pontydivergesfrom
Husserl.Fordiametricalpositionsonthisquestion,seeforexampleSeebohm’sand
Zahavi’sarticlesinsaidvolume.13
B.MerleauPonty’sLaterOntologyandConceptofNature
InrecentyearstherehasbeenaspateofliteratureonMerleau‐Ponty’slater
philosophyandhisgeneral“ontology.”Theseincludeseveralbook‐length
treatments,forexamplebyDillon(1998)andBarbaras(2004)14—twoofthebest
available—aswellasmanyarticles,interestinglylargelyinEnglish.(Merleau‐Ponty
hasproventobepopularinAmericaespecially,thoughoneshouldnotfailto
11 Theodorou,Panos.“PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserl’sAnalysisof“Nature‐Thing”inIdeasII.”InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophyVolume5,2005.Eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell,165‐187.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005. 12 Evans,J.Claude.“WhereistheLife‐World?”PrintedinIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996. 13 Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.51‐70);Zahavi,Dan.“Merleau‐PontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.3‐29). 14 Barbaras,Renaud.TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trans.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004;Dillon,M.C.MerleauPonty’sOntology.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988
7
mentionthatthereisalsoaJapaneseMerleau‐PontyCircle).Oneofthesearticles,by
Geraets,dealswiththethemeofnatureexplicitly,15whileothersdealmorewith“the
flesh”andotherrelatedtopicsfromthelaterphilosophy.16Acomprehensive
treatmentofMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyofnature,onelongoverdue,hasbeen
recentlyauthoredbyTedToadvine.17
C.IdeasIandII
RegardingHusserl,thereareinnumerableworksdealingwiththecentral
conceptsoftranscendentalidealismandwithIdeasI18,asatext,inparticular—
indeed,virtuallyeveryintroductorytextorstatementonHusserlhastotakethis
seminalworkintoaccount.Myrelianceonsecondaryliteratureforthesectionon
IdeasIisminimal,however,fortworeasons.First,Iexpoundonlythework’smost
basicthemes—epochéandreduction,noesisandnoema,thetranscendentalego,etc.
Second,althoughthesenotionsthemselvesareallcontroversialandcontested
throughouttheHusserlliterature,myaimisnottogiveadefinitiveinterpretationof
them,onlytofacilitatethroughmytreatmentofthemacomprehensiblediscussion
ofMerleau‐Ponty’sgeneralappropriationsandcriticismsofHusserlian
phenomenology.
15 Geraets,ThéodoreF.“Merleau‐Ponty’sConceptionofNature.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.301‐312). 16 SeeforexampleDastur,Françoise.“World,Flesh,Vision.”InChiasms:MerleauPonty’sNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.23‐50). 17 Toadvine,Ted.MerleauPonty’sPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2009 18 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology.Trans.F.Kersten.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1983
8
WorkonIdeasIIisfarlessextensivethanthatonIdeasI,buttherehasbeen
somenoteworthysecondaryscholarshipinthelastdecadeonIdeasII,someofit
includedinthevolumeIssuesinIdeasII19,whichdrawstogetheranumberofessays
onvariousaspectsofthework.Otherpenetratingreadingsincludethoseof
Rockstad20andthealready‐mentionedEvansandTheodorou.IdeasIIhasofcourse
beenwrittenaboutbymajorphenomenologists,includingRicoeur21,Landgrebe22,
and(obviously)Merleau‐Pontyhimself.Ihavefoundthatthese,alongobviously
withtheprimarytext,arestillthemostvaluableelementsinIdeasIIscholarshipat
thepresenttime.
II.SummaryoftheDissertation
A.ChaptersOneandTwo
InChaptersOneandTwo,IsketchapictureofHusserlofIdeasIandII,the
“idealist”Husserlwho,inthelatterofthesetwoworks,neverthelesslaysthe
foundationsofmostofwhatMerleau‐Pontywillforgeintoanewvisionof 19 IssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996. 20 Rokstad,Konrad.“TheHistoricityofBodyandSoul.”InPhenomenologyofLifeFromtheAnimalSoultotheHumanMind:BookI:InSearchofExperience,ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(pp.127‐159).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2007;also,Rokstad,Konrad.“Nature,SubjectivityandtheLife‐World.”InAnalectaHusserliana:TheYearbookofPhenomenologicalResearchVolLXXVII,ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(pp.41‐59).Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishing,2002. 21 Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLesterEmbree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967(Thirdchapter:“Husserl’sIdeasII:AnalysesandProblems,”pp.35‐81). 22 Landgrebe,Ludwig.ThePhenomenologyofEdmundHusserl.Ed.DonnWelton.Ithaca,NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1981.
9
phenomenologyandthenature‐spiritrelation.Asjustalludedto,thefirstchapteris
adetailedoverviewofHusserl’stranscendentalphenomenology—theeideticand
transcendental‐phenomenologicalreductions,thenaturalandtranscendental
attitudes,noesisandnoema,intentionality,thetranscendentalego,constitution,and
thelike.23Thepurposeofthischapterismostlyexpository(someinterpretationis
involved,ofcourse—asanygenuineexpositioninfactrequiresanyway);the
demandsofexplainingHusserl’sphilosophicalsystem,however,alsohappento
makeitthelongestchapterinthiswork.
ThesecondchapterisadetailedexpositionandreadingofIdeasII24,witha
focusonitsonto‐phenomenologicalmeditationsontherealmsof“materialnature,”
“bodyandsoul”,and“spirit,”alongwiththequestionoftheenigmaticrelationof
these“constitutedrealities”andthetranscendentalsubjectivity(orsimply
“consciousness”)ofthetranscendentalreductionformallyexpoundedinIdeasI.
23 ANoteontheChoiceofText:Husserlwasconstantlyintheprocessofreinventinghimself;IdeasIisonlyoneofmanypossible“introductory”textstousetopresentHusserl’s“transcendental”versionofphenomenology(CartesianMeditationsandtheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencescomemostquicklytomind,buttherehasevenbeenabook‐lengthintroductiontoHusserl,byKockelmanns,basedonhisEncyclopediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology—see:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserl’sPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994).WhychooseIdeasI?AsidefromthereasonthatIdeasIandIIbelongtogetherbytheirtitles(IdeasIIhadbeeninitiallyplannedasasequelandfurtherexplicationofthethesismaintainedinIdeasI),itisalsotruethatIdeasIissufficienttointroducemostofthefundamentalplanksofHusserlianphenomenology.WhetherornotHusserleventually,inthe1930s,shiftedhisbasicpositiontoamore“existential”and“detranscendentalized”formofphenomenology,orwhetherthelater“genetic”phenomenologyisnotmerelyanextensionofthephenomenologyoftheIdeasbutratherafar‐reachingradicalrethinkingofit,arequestionsIwillnotandneednotdealwithhere.ForitwouldsuitmypurposesiftheHusserl/sofIdeasIandIIareregardedasjustone(ortwo)ofmanyactualorpossible“Husserls,”onlybecausethepointsIwillbetryingtomakearebasicallysystematicones,whichthetextsathandbringoutsufficientlyontheirown. 24 Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trans.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.TheyearofpublicationoftheoriginalGerman‐languageeditionwas1952.
10
InIdeasII,Husserlpresentsapictureofnatureasathelifeless,meaningless
(Sinnlos)substrateofreality,abare“physicalthinghood”thatdistinguishesitself
fromlife(soul,Seele),ontheonehand,andmind(spirit,Geist),ontheother.The
lived‐body,aspresentedbyHusserl,isthe“unity”ofmindandmatter,but,
importantly,itisdistinguishablefromthe“pure”formsofeither.Whatshields
Husserlfrombald‐faced“Cartesian”dualismishisclaim,announcedalreadyinIdeas
I,thatpureortranscendentalsubjectivity—andherehefollows(roughly)Kant,
whose“Copernicanturn”hebroadlyendorses—cannotbereducedto“thinghood”
or“objectivity”ofanykind.Puresubjectivityismorefundamentalthananyobject,
sinceitistheveryconditionforthepossibilityofobjectivityinthefirstplace.
Husserl’sprioritizationoftranscendentalsubjectivityoverempiricalsubjectivity
radicalizesthisdifferencebyplacingempiricalsubjectivitysocompletelyinthegrip
ofthe“objective”andeven“lifeless”worldof“physicalnature,”thatweareforcedto
seethatsubjectivitystrictly(orpurely)speakingcannotbeoftheworld,literally.
Thisisnottosaythatitcanexistwithoutit,butitcertainlycanbeconceivedtodo
so—asdemonstratedinafamous,and,tosome,infamous,passageinIdeasIthatis
echoedinlaterwritingsaswell.ThatHusserlwasinterestedinmakingsuchan
underlyingpointisclearfromIdeasIIanditsother,complementaryarguments
againstmind‐bodyreductionisminthattext.25
25 Foragoodtreatmentofthis,seeMarcelle,Daniel.“TheOntologicalPriorityofSpiritOverNature:Husserl’sRefutationofPsychophysicalParallelisminIdeasII.”InPhilosophyToday,vol.50(suppl.),2006(pp.75‐82).Whetherconsciouslyornot,Husserlpresentsakindof“ontologicalgambit”directedagainstthenaturalisticorphysicalisticphilosopher.Inthislanguage,Merleau‐Ponty’sconcernmightbethatHusserl’sgambitfails,intheprocessconcedingfartoomuchtonaturalscience.Accordingtothisview,then,thetranscendentalego,thatis,istoothinareedtoputtheburdenon,sothatinthewakeofthefailureoftranscendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonly
11
IdeasIIwasunpublishedinHusserl’slife‐timebutreadandstudiedclosely
byMerleau‐Ponty,whosepositiveappropriationofthatworkliesmostlyinthearea
ofthephenomenologyofthebody(thelived‐body,orLeib).26Merleau‐Ponty’s
reservationsregardingtheworkasawhole,however,andinparticularonwhathe
regardedasitsunderlyingconceptualconfusions,wereconsiderable.Andthe
questionofnature—whatitis,andhowhumanbeingsaretobeunderstoodin
relationtoit—occupied(aswehaveseen)greatdealofMerleau‐Ponty’smature
thought,whosegeneralthrustgoesagainstthegrainofHusserl’sfindingsinIdeasII.
HusserldoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensionsinIdeasIIasfundamental
onesorrealizethatnatureposesaradicalproblemforthetranscendental‐
phenomenologicalmethoditself.Wemightputitthisway:whereasforHusserl
naturehastobeexplainedintermsofits“constitution”intranscendental
consciousness,forMerleau‐Ponty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichwouldneed
explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe
lived‐body,whichisitselfanemblemofnature.
B.ChaptersThreeandFour
ChapterThreeaddressesMerleau‐Ponty’sspecificformofphenomenologyin
relationtoHusserl’sown.Itessentiallyrepresentsmytakeonthedecades‐old
questionofhowbesttounderstandMerleau‐Ponty’softencontroversialreadingof
Husserl.Theissueiscomplex,butafterthoroughlydocumentingMerleau‐Ponty’s
thenaturalistic‐physicalisticoptionleft,adisastrousoption.Hencethereistheneedtorethinkphenomenologyinawhollynewlight(thoughstillrootedinperception,asHusserlhadit). 26 SeeforexampleMerleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”InSigns.Trans.RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964
12
re‐envisioningofclassicphenomenologicalmotifssuchasthephenomenological
andeideticreductionsfromthePhenomenologyofPerceptionthroughTheVisible
andtheInvisible,IarguefinallythattheFrenchphilosopher’smannerof
appropriationofHusserlispersuasivebutalso,moreinterestingly,highly“organic.”
IusethistermnotonlyinthesensethatitdrawsonHusserlinanaturalmanner,so
tospeak,butmoreparticularlyinthesensethatitembodiesorinstantiates
Merleau‐Ponty’sstyleofphilosophyandevenhisownontology.Forexample,
Merleau‐Ponty’sownnotionsofambiguity,reflection,andparadox,amongothers,
actuallyprovetobethekeytounlockingthesecretofhisHusserl‐reading.Butthis
alsomeansthattheextenttowhichoneagreeswithMerleau‐Ponty’sreading
correlatessomewhattothedegreetowhichoneacceptshisoverallphilosophical
vision,somethingthatmayaccountforatleastsomeofthedoggedoppositionto
himfromcertainmembersofthe“strongHusserlian”camp,atleast.(Merleau‐
Ponty’sreadingofhisownreadingofHusserl—hisviewofthedegreeofhisown
faithfulnessorunfaithfulnesstothesource,forexample—isalsoherelargely
confirmedthroughtheprismofhisowndialecticalviewsandhermeneutics.)
ThefourthchapterplumbsMerleau‐Ponty’swritings,mostparticularlythe
Naturelectures,toconnecthisreadingofHusserland“existentialization”of
phenomenologytohisnewlydevelopingconceptionsofnatureand,accordingly,the
natureofhumanityaswell.TheNaturelectureseriesisanexcitinglydetailedand
densetractoforiginalresearchandtextualandscientificinterpretationthat
Merleau‐PontygaveastheheadoftheCollègedeFranceoveraperiodofseveral
years,between1958and1961,shortlybeforehisuntimelydeath.Hedelivered
13
thematthesametimehewascomposinghisunfinishedmasterpieceTheVisibleand
theInvisible,alsoatextIwillalsoheavilyrelyoninbothChapters4and5(itis
effectivelyMerleau‐Ponty’smostsignificantworksincethePhenomenologyof
Perception).
Merleau‐Ponty’sexpressaiminthelecturesistoinitiateaprojectof
“ontology”startingfromtheideaof“nature”asitappearsinthehistoryofWestern
philosophyandscience,particularlyinthemodernperioddowntohisownpresent
day.Thisisasurprisingchoiceforaself‐identifiedphenomenologist,butitis
consistentwithMerleau‐Ponty’sownfamousassertionthatthephenomenological
method,includingthephenomenologicalandeideticreductions,areradically
“incomplete”andthus,oneissafetoconclude,unabletosealconsciousnessofffrom
theempiricalrealminthewayHusserl,theprogenitorofthemethod,hadintended.
(Thisisnottosaythat“natural”means“empirical,”onlythatthereisa“family
resemblance”betweendoingexistentialphenomenologyandanarchaeologyof
nature,therootofourliving“existence.”)
WhereasinTheStructureofBehaviorandPhenomenologyofPerceptionthe
focushadbeenonanimalityandthelived‐body—thesignificanceofwhichremains
inthelaterphilosophy(whichIdonot,asdosomeothers,readintermsofa“break”
withtheold,ratheronlyadeepeningthatoccasionallypromptsacorrection),
Merleau‐PontynowbroadenshisinquirytoBeingasawhole,therebyfinding
himselfinquiringintonatureasafieldoflifepriortothedivisionof“subject”and
“object.”Natureturnsouttobenothinglikeeitherthe“objectiveNature”of
scientistsorthe“noematicpole”ofHusserliantranscendentalconsciousness,since
14
itis,inaprofoundsense,foreverbeyondanypowersof“constitution.”Remarkably
andimportantly,Merleau‐Pontydoesnotabandonthephenomenologicalattitudeor
stand‐pointofreflectivethoughtinfavorofaholisticimmersioninpre‐reflective
life.Hisvisionisoneofthehumanbeing’sinevitablebelongingnessandalienation
fromnature—thatis,fromhimself/herself.Humanexistenceisthereforeself‐
interrupting,thoughnottothepointofrealizingaSartreandisconnectionfromthe
wholespectacleofBeing,inwhoseinternal“fold”humanconsciousnesstakesits
rightfulplace.Itis,however,aconditionedconsciousness,justasfreedomfor
Merleau‐Pontyisaconditionedfreedom.Ineithercase,onecanputtheemphasison
eitherthefirstorthesecondtermandfind,ineachcase,animportantnuancethat
illuminesauniquesideofexistence.
MuchofthemostinterestingmaterialintheNaturelecturespresentsthese
ideasindirectlythroughMerleau‐Ponty’soriginalinterpretationsofsuch
philosophicalfiguresasDescartes,Spinoza,Kant,Schelling,andBergson,aswellthe
findingsofcontemporaneousscientists.Merleau‐Ponty’slaterconceptionofnature,
andanewontologicalvocabularytogowithit,hadbeengestatingforalongtime,
sincehisfirstworksinfact.Nature,aswehavealreadyseen,comestotakeonthe
meaningofwhatSchellingcalledthe“barbarousprinciple”ofthereal,oragain“wild
Being,”whichcannotbebroughtinatransparentwaywithintheorbitofreflection.
Merleau‐Ponty’scritiqueoftranscendentalphenomenologyisapparenthere(much
asSchellingcriticizedthe“reflexivity”ofHegelandidealismgenerally).Itseemsas
thoughMerleau‐Ponty’s“nature”isonewhichsomehow,fromwithinitself,gives
risetosubjectivityandreflection—andthereby“transcendsitself”whileremaining
15
opaquetoitselfatthesametime.(Thisopacityisreflectedinthemotto“weare
giventoourselves.”)TheparalleltoSchelling’sownNaturphilosophieis
unmistakable,asaretheromanticresonancesofhisunderstandingofnature
generally.27Butwhatisgoneis“intellectualintuition”ortheclaimtoaninsightinto
a“higherorder”ofbeing.
C.ChapterFive
Thefinalchapterisasystematicexplorationofonefundamentaldifference
betweenHusserl(andperhapsthevastmajorityoftraditionalphilosophy)and
Merleau‐Ponty,anditpertainstotheirapproachtophilosophy—andthought—
itself.Isphilosophybestappreciatedasaproblem‐solvingenterprise,asHusserl
believes,orratherasameditationonparadoxes,themselvesbeyondanysimple
“solution”?Merleau‐Pontyfindstheultimatetruthofthehumanconditiontoconsist
inacertain“dialectical”contradictionwhich,however,unlikeHegel’sversion,does
notfindaresolutioninsomething“higher,”suchasanabsolutestand‐point.
Merleau‐Pontyisultimatelyaphilosopherofparadox,whichiswhatexplainsthe
titleofthepresentdissertation,“TheParadoxofNature...”Itisregardingthe
problemofnature—atoncethehomeofhumanspirit,aswellasitspermanent
other—thatMerleau‐Pontyfindsoneofhismostfruitfulapplicationsofwhathe
callsinTheVisibleandtheInvisiblethemethodof“interrogation.”
27 WatsonmentionsNovalisinthisconnection.(Watson,StephenH.“Merleau‐Ponty’sPhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNotto‘SingtheWorld.’”JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications,p.534‐549.)RobertVallierhaswrittenhisdissertation,notpublishedunfortunately,onthetopicofSchellingandMerleau‐Ponty.(“Institution:OfNature,Life,andMeaninginMerleau‐PontyandSchelling.”DePaulUniversity,2001)
16
Ofcourse,Husserlhimselfmakes“paradox”acentralpartofthediscourseof
phenomenology—inthenarrowsensethatheneverceasesfirstofalltoemphasize
theuttercounter‐intuitivenessofthe“revolutionary”perspectiveoftranscendental
phenomenology,oftheenormouseffortittakestooverturn(para‐)thecommon
view(doxa)thatplacessubjectivityatthemercyofthespatio‐temporal‐causal
world,ratherthanvice‐versa.YethealsospeakseloquentlyintheCrisisaboutwhat
hecallsthe“paradoxofsubjectivity”—“paradox”heremoreinthemoreMerleau‐
Pontiansenseof“antinomy”—namelytheparadoxthatsubjectivityisatonceapart
oftheworld(initsembodiedform,inindividualconsciousnesses),evenasitisthe
transcendentalconditionfortheverypossibilityoftheworld(whatHusserl
controversiallycalls“absolute”existenceasopposedtothe“relative”existenceof
theworld).Inanimportantway,this,too,isaparadoxofnature:fortheworld—
nature—isboththeconditionofthepossibilityofconsciousness,evenas
consciousnessistheconditionforthepossibilityoftheworld.ButHusserloffersa
“solution”totheparadoxbymakingadistinctionbetweentwotypesofsubjectivity,
andofferingonepriorityovertheother.Aswehavealreadyseen,suchasolution
willnotdoforMerleau‐Ponty.Andintheend,Husserlisnolesssympatheticto
antinomiesthanmostofthecanonicalthinkersoftheWesternphilosophical
tradition,fromAristotle(Metaphysics,BookIII)onward.
17
III.Conclusion
InHusserl,thethematicofnatureinitiallyassertsitselfinthatphilosopher’s
famous(thoughclearlyambiguous)rejectionofthe“naturalattitude”andhisstrong
distinctionbetween“world”and“consciousness,”anditextendsinMerleau‐Ponty’s
worktothelatter’sfine‐grainedattempts,throughhislife‐longstudiesofbiology
andpsychology,tonegotiatebetweenthissortofdualismandtheequaldanger,in
hiseyes,ofapurelyscientific“naturalism.”Merleau‐Pontyeventuallysettlesonan
interpretationofthe“phenomenologicalreduction”asadeepeningofthe“natural”
attituderatherthanaflighttopureconsciousness—or,asMerleau‐Ponty
paradoxicallystatesit(inHegelianterms),itisonlyadeparturebywayofreturning
toourselves.Inthisway,Merleau‐Ponty’slecturecourseonnature—afocaltextof
thisdissertation,alongwithIdeasIandIIandTheVisibleandtheInvisible—canbe
seentobetheculminationofanon‐goingcritiqueofHusserlian“transcendental”
phenomenologyinfavorofamore“existential‐naturalistic”—atonce
phenomenologicallythickandscientificallyinformed—variety,whichplaceshuman
subjectivityattheheartofnature,orBeing,ratherthanoutsideoraboveit.The
consequenceisthatforMerleau‐Ponty,phenomenologyisnotanewscienceora
magickeytounlockphilosophicalpuzzlesonceandforall;rather,itisthe
witnessingofthemiraculouscoherenceofcontradictorytruthsinthespectacleof
existence.
Fromthebeginning,Merleau‐Pontyrefusestoadoptamethodthatwould
allowfortheworld’sthorough‐goingconstitutioninthemind.Atthesametime,he
18
explicitlyprioritizedwhatwemightcallthe“first‐personality”ofthe
phenomenologicalmethodoverthenaïve‐realistmethodofmostso‐called
“naturalists.”The“naturalistic”methodMerleau‐PontyandHusserl(nottomention
Heidegger)opposeisthatoftakingtheworldassomethingfirstself‐constituted,so
tospeak,andthenlaterexperiencedornotexperienced,dependingoncausal
conditionsthatobtainbetween“subjects”andtheworldas“object.”InMerleau‐
Ponty’swayofthinking,humansubjectivity,or“spirit”broadlyspeaking,bearsan
intrinsicrelationwiththeworlditlives‐through,perceives,andunderstands,butat
thesametime,itisalienatedfromthisworldatalevelwhichsuggestsatwistingor
breaking‐apart(dehiscence)attherootlevelofbeingitself.Merleau‐Ponty’sanalysis
of“nature”andphenomenologymarksaturntowardswhatIcallMerleau‐Ponty’s
“semi‐naturalistic”versionofthephenomenologicalproject;“naturalistic”because
itsituateshumansubjectivityorspiritintermsthatinscribeitinalargermatrixof
being,butonly“semi‐”naturalisticbecauseitisnotthefull‐blownor“reductive”
naturalismofakindthat,onceagain,bothHusserlandMerleau‐Pontyvigorously
opposed.
19
ChapterOne:Husserl’sTranscendentalPhenomenologyinIdeasI28:TheBasicPosition
I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology
IdeasIdemandsourattentionbothfortheboldnessandoriginalityofits
ideasandforbeinganundeniablemilestoneinHusserl’scareeraswellasa
watershedmomentinthehistoryofthephenomenologicalmovement.Itisthefirst
textinwhichHusserl,theeffectivefounderofthemovementasweknowittoday,29
formallyintroducessomeofhismostfamousanddistinctivetheories,includingthe
phenomenological‐transcendentalepochéandthephenomenological‐transcendental
reduction.30Italsocontainspreliminaryattemptsatarigorousdefinitionof
28ThefulltitleoftheworkisIdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy(FirstBook).IwillrefertoitthroughoutthistextasIdeasIforshort,asiscommonpractice.29Brentano,Husserl’steacher,revivedthemedievalnotionofintentionalityandpracticedarudimentary(andarguably“psychological”)formofwhathetermed“phenomenology,”butHusserl’sLogicalInvestigationsandIdeasIaregenerallycreditedforinitiatingtheschoolknowntodayas“phenomenology,”thoughHeidegger’s1927workBeingandTimealsocontributedstronglytothewaytheideaof“phenomenology”eventuallycametobereceivedandinterpreted.30Husserlsometimesmakesastrongdistinctionbetweenthe“phenomenological”andthe“transcendental”reductions,whichissomethingIwillbringupagainbelow(IID)withrespecttoHusserl’sfamousEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology.ButinIdeasI,hetreatsthemashavingthesameextension,onlyreferringtodifferentaspectsofasingleprocess.Thushedistinguishesthemasfollows:“...weshall,onmostoccasions,speakofphenomenologicalreductions(butalso,withreferencetotheircollectiveunity,weshallspeakofthephenomenologicalreduction)and,accordingly,fromanepistemologicalpointofview[myitalicshere],weshallrefertotranscendentalreductions.”(IdeasI,66)Inotherwords,thedistinctionasgivenhereismerelyoneofperspective,andaccordinglyIwilloftenusethetwoterms—”phenomenologicalreduction”and“transcendentalreduction”—interchangeably,exceptwhentheexpositiondemandsthattheytemporarilybeunderstoodasdistinct.(Whatgoesforthereductioninthiscasegoesfortheepochéaswell,fortheyarecompanionconcepts.)
20
phenomenologyasdistinctfromothersciences(“natural”and“human”)andthe
introductionoftheterminology(noesisandnoema,naturalandtranscendental
attitudes,constitution)socharacteristicofHusserl’ssubsequenttechnical
phenomenologicaldiscussions.Itis,then,easilyonparinimportancewithHusserl’s
earlierandsimilarlypath‐breakingLogicalInvestigations.31
YetevenincomparisontootherpublishedtextsbyHusserl,IdeasIisnota
particularlyeasytexttounderstandorunpack.Itishighlyabstractandrarely
pausestoexplainthesignificanceorphilosophicalcontextofitsanalyses,takingthis
backgroundmoreorlessforgranted.AsPaulRicoeurpointsout,themotivationsof
thework,rootedinaconfrontationwithskepticism,arebestdiscernedthrough
unpublishedtextsandlecturesfromtheperiodbetween1905and1913,aswellas
withthehelpofthewritingsofHusserl’sremarkableassistantEugenFink.32Indeed,
theactualtextofIdeasIreadsattimeslikeastarter’strainingmanual,inthiscase
forthepracticeofanewphenomenologicalmethodofthinkingandanalysis.Yetthe
“manual”isalsoarecordofself‐discoveryandhasthefeelofaworkinprogress,as
Husserlwashimselfworkingthroughmanyofitsideasandtheirimplications,not
allofwhich,asisclearfromhislaterintroductorytexts,arefullyworkedoutinits
pages.
31Husserl,Edmund.LogicalInvestigations.Trans.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge,1900/01(2nd,revisededition1913)(HereafterLI)32InRicoeur’swords:“Finally,itmustbesaidthatIdeasIisabookwhosemeaningremainsconcealedandthatoneisinevitablyinclinedtolookforitsmeaningelsewhere.”See:Ricoeur,Paul.AKeytoEdmundHusserl’sIdeasI.Trans.BondHarrisandJacquelineBouchardSpurlock.(Trans.revisedbyPolVandevelde,ed.)Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1996(pp.36‐7)HereafterKey.RicoeurreliesheavilyontheHusserl‐approvedessaybyFink,“DiephänomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwärtigenKritik”(1933),tofillinsomeofthegapsleftbyHusserlhimself.Merleau‐Pontywastodothesamelateron.
21
ItwouldbeimpossibletocondenseallofIdeasIinthespaceofonechapter,
letalonetoshowhowitbuildsonHusserl’sconsiderableoutputbeforeits
publication,orforthatmatterhowhisstilllaterthinkingrelatestoIdeasI.Indeed,
IdeasIiswrittenwithreadershipoftheLIlargelybeingpresumed.Certainofthe
latter’sideasarerevisitedanew—intentionality,forexample—whileothersare
enfoldedimplicitlyintothesubstanceofnewerreflections.33Itisnecessaryforthe
purposesofthepresentworkforustosketchoutIdeasI’smainargument(ifthisis
therightword)anditsbasicorientationtowardssomeofthefundamentalquestions
itposestoitself,concerningespecially:thenatureofconsciousnessandthe
relationshipofconsciousnesstotheworld;thedefinitionofphenomenologyasa
“transcendental”(aswellaseidetic)sciencethateschewsthe“naturalattitude”
whileseekingtoexplainitscontents;theideasof“transcendence”and
“immanence”;andthequestionofthescopeandmeaningofthephenomenological
epochéandreduction,thelatterquestionbearingofcourseonthecentralissueof
thephenomenologicalmethod.Theseareallinterrelatedquestions;indeed,one
mightevengosofarastosay(inHeideggerianstyleperhaps)thattheyare“the
same”question.Forroughly,theyallconcerntheunderlyingrelationshipof
consciousnesstoworld—or,putinanotherway,subjectivityandnature.Wecannot
33Forexample,inIdeasIHusserltakesforgrantedthenotionthatphenomenologydealswith“acts”ofconsciousness,whose“meaning‐intentions”areeither“empty”or“fulfilled.”ThisprincipleisofcoursefoundationaltoHusserl’sideasonperception.Forexample,whileIcanseeor“intend”onesideofadie,Igenerallyalso“intend”itshiddensidesaswell.Theformerintentionisfulfilledbyintuitiveevidence—thegivennessofthedieinitscolor,shape,etc.,asitshowsitselftomevisually.Thelatter“signitive”intentionsarenotfulfilledandarethus“empty”—unlessoruntilothersidesofthedieareseenbyme.ThedistinctionisimportantforitallowsHusserltoexplainhowitisthatweperceivethedieandnotmerely“thissideof”thedie.Weperceiveobjects,inotherwords,notmerelyprofiles.ThisisoneofHusserl’sstrategies,sotosay,forovercomingthe“appearance‐reality”dividethathashamperedprevioustheoriesofperception.
22
hopetodofulljusticetothemanyanglesonemightusetoapproachandaddress
Husserl’smultifacetedanswertothesequestions.Totakeoneexample,wewillhave
toglossoverthesignificantcontroversiessurroundingHusserl’sconceptofthe
“noema”34orofitsrelationto“fulfilment.”35Nonetheless,manyofthesortsof
fundamentalproblemsthatariseinsuchdebateswillbetouchedoninother
sectionsoftheoverviewprovidedbelow.Thisoverview,alongwithsome
independentcommentaryandbriefreferencestosomeofthesecondaryliterature
onIdeasI,willconstitutethebulkofthischapter.
Yetgiventherelatively“intermediary”statusofIdeasIinthecourseof
Husserl’sownlifelongtask(fromIdeasIonward)ofexplainingtranscendental
phenomenology,itmightstillbewonderedwhyweareconcentratinginthischapter
onthisparticulartext.Merleau‐Ponty,forexample,regardedIdeasIasabelonging
toa“middle”or“transition”periodbetweenHusserl’s“logicism,”presumably
culminatingintheLogicalInvestigations,andthelatersupposed“existentialism”of
34Thisquestionhasbeenwrittenaboutendlessly,especiallyincontextofthedebatebetweenthosewhointerpretthenoemaas“percept”(Gurwitsch,Cairns,etal.)andthose,leadchieflybyFøllesdal,whointerpretitasavariantofFrege’sSinn.Foranicerecapofthedebate,see:Solomon,RobertC.“Husserl’sConceptoftheNoema.”InHusserl:ExpositionsandAppraisals,FrederickA.EllistonandPeterMcCormack,eds.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977(pp.54‐69).Solomonbeginshisessaybynoting:“Itisgenerallyagreedthattheconceptofthenoemaisoneofthethemes,ifnotthecentraltheme,ofHusserl’sphenomenologicalphilosophy.”J.N.Mohantyisseeminglyinperfectagreementwhenhemakesapassingreferenceto“theall‐importantideaofnoemaandnoetic‐noematicstructure,regardedbymanyasconstitutingthemostimportantandoriginalpartof[IdeasI].”(Mohanty,J.N.ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl:AHistoricalDevelopment.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008,p.372)Anothertopicwewillhavetoleaveout,thoughinthiscasebecauseitisalmostwhollyabsentfromtheIdeasitself,isthetopicoftime‐constitution,whichlaterfiguresdeeplyinallofHusserl’smostadvancedanalyses.35Foranexcellentsummaryofthedebate,seePolVandevelde’sintroductiontoKey(pp.16‐20).AlsoofnoteisRicoeur’sremark,inspiredalsobythedifficultiessurroundingthenoema,andquotedbyVandeveldeintheintroduction,that‘thus,realityalwaysseemstoescapetranscendentalconstitution.”
23
the“life‐world”philosophy,bestknownthroughtheCrisis.36Givensuchviews,why
notreviewHusserl’slaterreformulationsofmuchofthismaterial?Moreover,as
mentionedabove,Husserlhimselflateradmitstothedisadvantages—thoughnot
necessarilyinadequacies—ofthe“Cartesian”waytothereductionpresentedherein.
Healsodevelopedanewformofphenomenology,“genetic”or“dynamic”
phenomenology,whichsupplements(andsomesaysupplants)the“static”
phenomenologyofIdeasI.
Thefactremains,however,thatHusserlhimselfnevertotallyabandoned
eitherthestaticorthe“Cartesian”phenomenologicalmethod.Regardingthelatter,
forexample,nolessthantheauthoroftheheterodoxtextTheOtherHusserl,Donn
Weltonnotesthat“[t]heexistenceoftheCartesianMeditations,andthefactthat
[Husserl]recommendeditsFrenchtranslationtoreadersaslateas1933evenashe
begandevelopingthetextoftheCrisis…convincesusthat[theCartesianwaytothe
reduction]wasneveroverthrown.”37Furthermore,Husserlneverabandonedthe
basicframeworkof“transcendentalsubjectivity”anditswhollynon‐naturalistic
essence.IdeasIpresentsabroadlyfaithfulpictureofthebasicthrustof
transcendentalphenomenology,andthisfact,combinedwithitshistorical
importanceandthefactthatitisthe“prequel”toIdeasII,atextequallyifnotmore
vitalforourtask,are,Ibelieve,enoughtorecommenditfordetailedinvestigationat
thepresenttime.
36SeeMerleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962(p.320n).CrisisreferstoHusserl’stextTheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Trans.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970.37Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000(p.118).Hereafter“Welton.”
24
II.EpochéandPhenomenologicalReduction
A.Introduction
TheheartofIdeasI,andprobablythesignatureofphenomenologyitselfasit
ispopularlyknown,isthephenomenologicalreduction.Itisallbutimpossibleto
giveabriefdefinitionofit,butanyaccountmustbeginwiththeconceptof“epoché”
orthe“suspension”or“bracketing”ofallone’sbeliefsregardingexternalexistence
oftheobjectsofperception(andofcourseofanyothermentalact).Throughthisall‐
importantsuspension,oneeffectsaradicallynew“attitude,”thephenomenological
attitude,accordingtowhichtheworldisseentobeasitisfortheconsciousness,or
subjectivity,thatbeholdsit.Inthisway,all“objectivereality”is“reduced”toits
significanceforconsciousness—or,alternately,toitsmeaningfulnessasa
“noematic”correlatetothe“noetic”actsofaconsciousnessinwhichtheworldis
“constituted.”38
Thejargon‐ladendefinitiongivenabovemust,however,becarefully
explained.Furthermore,manypossiblemisinterpretationsmustbeobviated—at
leastregardingHusserl’sownintentions—suchastheinterpretationofthe
reductionasbeingameanstoexposetheillusorinessoftheexternalreality.Thisis
notatallHusserl’sintentionorreflectiveofhisactualview.Atthesametime,it
38Thislanguagewillbeexplainedbelow(IVA).Notethattheterm“reduction”doesnothavethemodernmeaningof“reductiveness”forHusserl;thereisnoquestionhereofconvertingobjectiverealityintoasubjectivesubstratum.“Reduce”means,etymologically,“tobringorleadback,”andthisisHusserl’sintendedmeaning.Thereductionleadsbackaconsciousnessthatlosesitselfinitsworld—backtoitsownachievementsasasense‐bestowingandworld‐constitutingbeing.
25
cannotbedeniedthatHusserldidinsomesenseprioritizesubjectivityoverobjective
“reality.”Husserldidnotdenytheexistenceofsuchareality,butaswewillsee,
underthereductionitacquiresawhollynewsense—namely,thatofbeingthesense
“mind‐independentreality”(alongwithinnumerableothersenseswhichgivethe
worldits“intelligibility”).Toputitanother(un‐Husserlian)way,whilewecansay
thatthereisaworldthattranscendsthemind,itonlydoessoforthemind,39
acquiringitsmeaningfulnessassuchatranscendentbeinginthiswayalone.Thus,it
caninacertainwaybecalledindependent(initsexistence,or“thatness”)fromthe
mindinonewayandyetwhollydependentonit(foritsmeaning,or“whatness”)in
another.Consciousnessitself—inits“purified”and“transcendental”form—is,by
contrast,dependentonnothing.Anditissolelybecauseofthisasymmetry,andnot
becauseofsomesupposed“non‐existence”ofexternalreality,thatHusserlcalls
consciousness(asopposedtothetranscendentworldassuch)“absolute.”Allof
thesenotionswillbefurtherexploredindividually,however,inPartIVbelow.
Inthesectionsthatfollow,Iwillproceedtodescribethereductionasitis
outlinedinIdeasI.Alongtheway,Iwillbeflaggingsomeofthemostsignificantand
controversialissuesofinterpretation,aswellaspossibleinconsistencies,mysteries,
orambiguitiesinHusserl’saccount,whichcanbe(andusuallyalreadyhavebeen)
raised.Indoingso,itisinevitablethatsomecommentarybemixedwith“pure”
description(contrarytothespiritofHusserl’sownmethodology!)evenbeforethe
39Iwillattimesusetheword“mind”for“consciousness,”despitethepotentialhazardsthatcometherewith.“Mind”caneasilybereified,whereasby“consciousness”(Bewusststein)Husserlmeansanythingbutan“object”or‘substance”intheclassicalCartesiansense.Nonetheless,itiscumbersometousetheword“consciousness”solelytotranslate“Bewusststein,”andhencesynonymswilloccasionally,thoughcautiouslybeused.
26
finalsection,whichisprimarilycommentary.Butmyunderlyinggoalistopresent
Husserl’sconceptionofthereductionasaccuratelyasIcan,andfurthermorewith
minimalrecoursetojargon(thoughHusserlis,afterall,coiningmanynewterms
here),andinawaythatisatleastplausibleasaninterpretationofjustwhatHusserl
wasafter.Nonetheless,extendedquotationsareoccasionallycalledfor,asmuchis
tobegained(andclarified)throughadirectexaminationofHusserl’sprecise
phraseologyofhisownmainideas.
B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes
Thestoryofthereduction,sotospeak,beginswithadescriptionofthe
“naturalattitude.”40Sowhat,then,isthenaturalattitude?Itwouldhelptobeginby
contrastingitwithwhatHusserlalternativelycallsthe“philosophical,”
“phenomenological,”and“transcendental”attitudes(allofthesebeingequivalentin
thecurrentcontext).41Thenaturalattitudeisthedefault,“normal”attitudeinwhich
wetacitlyornon‐tacitlyframeour(mostlyperceptual)experiences;thealternative
attitudeisoneinwhichwehavedisengagedfromthepresuppositionsofthenatural
attitude,particularlyregardingobjectiveexistenceandnon‐existence,andhave
takenupanewappreciationoftheoriginsofmeaningfulexperienceinthedepthsof
40Ofcourse,whatispossiblymostcontroversialaboutthereductionishowitcanbe“begun”atall,butwewillcometothatlater(PartV).41Thispictureof“attitudes”willbecomeimportantlyexpandedandenrichedinIdeasII,inwhichthenaturalattitudeisdividedinto“personalistic”and“naturalistic”forms.Thesewillbediscussedcloselyinthenextchapter.
27
subjectivity—inourselves:“Imustlosetheworldbyepoché,inordertoregainitby
auniversalself‐examination.”42
ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbyattitude(Einstellung)?Amazingly,Husserl
nowheredefineshistechnicalusageoftheterminthetextoftheIdeas(or
anywhere,asfarasIcantell),perhapsowingtoitsstatusasbasictounderstanding
thereductionitself.Fornow,wewillseehowHusserlusestheterm;wewillreturn
tothequestionofhowitmightbestbedefinedattheendofthissection.
Todescribethenaturalattitude,Husserlpresentsaseriesofobservationsof
whatexperienceinthisattitudeconsistsin:
“Iamconsciousofaworldendlesslyspreadoutinspace,endlesslybecomingandhavingendlesslybecomeintime.Iamconsciousofit:thatsignifies,aboveall,thatintuitivelyIfinditimmediately,thatIexperienceit.Bymyseeing,touching,hearing,andsoforth,andinthedifferentmodesofsensuousperception,corporealphysicalthings…aresimplythereforme,“onhand”intheliteralandfigurativesense…”43
Inthenaturalattitude,hecontinues,“we…[are]humanbeingswhoareliving
naturally,objectivating,judging,feeling,willing.”44Butanimatebeingsandpeople
arethereformealso:“Ilookup;Iseethem…Igrasptheirhands…”45
Thenaturalattitudeis“natural”firstofallinthesenseofitseveryday
pervasivenessaswellasitsdefaultcharacter.Itcomestous“naturally.”Roughly,
then,wecancharacterizethisasaconditioninwhichweasnormal,adulthuman
beingsfindourselvesroutinelyandasitwereautomatically,justinsofarasweare
42Husserl,Edmund.CartesianMeditations:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenology.Trans.DorionCairns.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999(p.157).HereafterCM.43IdeasI,p.5144Ibid.,p.5145Ibid.,p.51
28
aliveandawake(andmaybeasleepanddreamingaswell),inwhichweperceive
theretobeobjects,aswellaspeopleandvalue‐characteristicsofthings,toexist
outsideusand“onhand.”Husserlstressesthattheworldasweknowitinthe
naturalattitudeisnotsimplytheworldofscienceora“materialworld”;thuswe
“naturally”perceivea“worldofobjectswithvalues,aworldofgoods,apractical
world…”46Intermsof“material”objects,weperceivenotsimply(orvirtuallyever,
unlesswearescientistsina“scientificattitude”)“matter,”butthingslike“tables”
and“pianos”—objectswithculturalmeaning‐accretions.Thenaturalattitudeisalso
oneinwhichwethinkandcogitate,atleastintheeveryday(non‐
phenomenological!)way.47Butmostpertinentlywithregardtothe
phenomenologicalepoché,inthenaturalattitudeweaccepttheworldasa“factually
existentactualityandalsoacceptitasitpresentsitselfto[us]asfactuallyexisting.”48
Empiricalscienceanditsmodeofcognitionpertaintothisworld,preciselytakenas
existentinthesenseoutlined.Hencescience(asanactivityandaformofthought)
itselfbelongstothe“naturalattitude,”afactHusserlnevertiresofexploitingtothe
advantageofphilosophyasheconceivesit.
Husserlregardshisdescriptionofthenaturalattitudeaspre‐theoretical;that
is,itisnotaconstruct,butsimplywhatisdirectlyintuitedtobethecaseabout
natural,non‐transcendentalexperience:
46Ibid.,p.53(Husserl’sitalics)47Ibid.,p.5348Ibid,p.57(Husserl’sitalics)
29
“Whatwepresentedasacharacterizationofthegivennessbelongingtothenaturalattitude,andthereforeasacharacterizationoftheattitudeitself,wasapieceofpuredescriptionpriortoany“theory”.”49
Hethennotesthatby“theories”hemeans“preconceivedopinionsofeverysort.”
Husserlclaimsto“keeptheseatadistance”strictly,astancehemaintains
throughouthiscareer,inkeepingwithhiscommitmenttogoto“thethings
themselves”andby‐passthecorruptinginfluenceof“presuppositions”ofanykind.
(Hencehisfamous—andfamouslyimperiled—dreamofdevelopinga
“presuppositionlessscience.”)ButwhileHusserl’sdescriptionofthenaturalattitude
maybepre‐theoretical,itismorethanapparentfromitthatwe,insofaraswedwell
inthenaturalattitude,areallatypeof“naïverealist,”tousethemodernparlance.
Thus,Husserl’sunderstandingofthenaturalattitudemaybestbeunderstood
throughasimpleconsiderationofwhatsomebodyunbiasedby,say,“fancy”
metaphysicaltheoriesunderstandshimselftobeexperiencingeveryday,inthemost
thoroughlyordinarysenseimaginable,asalivinghumanbeing.Itisthis
thoroughgoingaverageness,thebasicmediocrityofexistence,thatHusserl
continuallycontrastswiththedisconcertingandvertiginousheightsofthe
transcendentalattitude.ItisnotasthoughHusserldismissesnaturalexperience;to
thecontrary,thewholepurposeofphenomenologyistounderstandit.Itisjustthis
embraceoftheordinarythatdistinguishesphenomenologyfrommore“speculative”
sortsofphilosophicalendeavors.Andyetthereisatranscendental,“noetic‐
noematic”dimensionofmeaning‐constitution,arealminwhichordinaryexperience
becomesclarifiedintermsofitssourceandtruemeaning.Itisthrough
49Ibid.,p.56
30
transcendentalinvestigationthatnaturalconsciousnesscomestoknowthe
foundationsoftheexperientialityittakesnaïvelyforgranted.(Iwillexplorethe
transcendentallevelinsubsequentsections.)SebastianLufthelpfullyframesthe
natural/transcendentaldistinctionintermsoftheclassicaldivisionbetweendoxa
andepisteme:
“WhenHusserlconceivesofthe‘natural’inoppositiontothe‘philosophicalattitude’,thisechoesthedistinctionbetweenpre‐transcendentalandtranscendentalstandpointsasamodern‘version’ofthedoxa/epistemedistinction.ThetranscendentalturnanticipatedbyDescartes,andtakenbyKant,appliestherealizationofthesubject‐relativityoftheworld.Theturntothesubject,the‘reduction’totheego(cogito),becomesthefoundationofscience.Theworldisnotan‘absolutebeing,’butisrelativetotheexperiencingsubject.”(Luft203‐4)
Hefurtherexplains:
“Thedistinctionofdoxaandepisteme‘translated’intothisconceptionmeans:Philosophythatbelievesitcanoperateona‘realistic’levelisboundtothenaturalattitudeanditcannotbecriticalinthetranscendentalsense.ThisisnotonlyHusserl’scritiqueofpre‐transcendentalphilosophybutespeciallyofhispupilswhoneglectedtopursuethetranscendentalpaththathehadtakenupwithIdeasI(1913).50
Luft’sexplanationisuseful,butitmustbekeptinmind,afactIwillcomebackto
lateron,thatinadditiontobeing“doxic”asopposedto“epistemic,”thenatural
attitudeforHusserlisafalsedoxa,a“wrongview.”Thisisimportantbecausethe
naturalattitude’snaïverealismisnotonly“naïve”but,preciselyinshowinga
“blind[ness]tothecorrelativityofworldandexperience,”(Luft,208)itwrongly
pronouncesagainstjustthiscorrelativity,falsely(thoughtacitly)affirming,asLuft
pointsout,theworld’sabsoluteexistence.
50Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLife‐WorldandCartesianism.”InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.204)Hereafter,“Luft.”
31
Letusfirstreturntotheinitialquestionofwhatan“attitude”issupposedto
beinthefirstplace.IfwetakeHusserlforhisword,an“attitude”cannotbe
explainedmerelyasapsychologicalstate,astheword(inEnglish)isroutinelytaken
todenote.Afterall,onlythenaturalattitudeproperlydeservestobecalled
“psychological,”asHusserlhimselfonoccasiondoescallit.51Anattitude,then,I
propose,mightbestbedefinedastheorientationinwhichtheparametersof
experiencearedelimitedanddefined.Inthenaturalattitude,theseparametersare
defined,sotospeak,bytheinternalandexternalhorizonsoftranscendentthings
(andthe“halos”thatformthebackgroundinwhichweperceivethem),bypeople
andlivingbeings,byvariousactsoffantasyandmemory,andtoanextentbyour
self‐perception(andhenceourownegos).Butinthetranscendentalattitude,these
parametersshifttosomethingnew,afieldofconstitution,aswellastothe
transcendentalegoor“pureconsciousness”inwhichallworldlybeings,including
theempiricalego,arethemselvesconstituted(inwhichtheycometobeing).52A
shiftinattitudeisthusashiftoftheentirematrixofintelligibilityofthings—a
prefiguring,perhaps,ofHeidegger’slaterconceptof“world.”53
51Ibid.,p.126:“Inourcasewehave,accordingly,ontheonehand,thepsychologicalattitudeinwhichournaturallyfocusedregardisdirectedtomentalprocesses—e.g.toamentalprocessofrejoicing—asasequenceofmentalstatesofhumanorbeast.Ontheotherhand,wehavethephenomenologicalattitude…”(Husserl’sitalics)Seealsop.172forfurtherclarificationofwhatthepsychologicalattitudeinvolves.52ItistruethatHusserldoesnotrestricttheterm“attitude”tothecontrastofnaturalandtranscendentalattitudes:healsospeaksofthe“eidetic”attitude,thenatural‐scientificattitude,etc..Onemaystillapplyourdefinition,however:forexample,intheeideticattitudetheparametersofexperienceareessences,ratherthanfacts.(Itneedstobeunderstood,ofcourse—asIwilldiscussbelow—thatthetranscendentalattitudepresupposestheeidetic,whilethenaturalmayormaynotoverlapwitheideticattitude.)53IamindebtedtoDr.PolVandeveldeforthislanguageof“parameters”and“intelligibility,”aswellastohisunderstandingofHeidegger’sconceptionofa“world,”thoughIwouldnotpresumetosayhewouldendorsemyapplicationoftheseconceptsunderthesecircumstances.
32
C.PhenomenologicalEpoché
Husserlbeginshisshiftintothenewattitudebynoticingthat,contrarytoits
spiritoftotalself‐confidence,thenaturalattitudehassomeansweringtodo.For
thereare“presuppositions”toits“psychologicalexperience”54thatremainsofar
unexploredandunknown(tonaturalconsciousnessitself).Husserlwantsto
investigatethese.Herenowa“radicalalteration”iscalledfor:“anewstyleof
attitudeisneededwhichisentirelyalteredincontrasttothenaturalattitudein
experiencingandthenaturalattitudeinthinking.”55Inordertodemonstratethis
transformation,HusserlcallsfatefullyupontheexampleofDescartesandthelatter’s
MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.Subsequently,thewaytothereductionoutlinedin
IdeasIistypicallycalledthe“Cartesian”way.Husserlcertainlybelievedthat
Descarteshadopenedthewaytoawhollynewfieldofbeing,whichHusserlhimself
calls“transcendentalsubjectivity,”buthealsobelievedthatDescartesdidnot
properlyunderstandhisownachievementandhencefellawayfromthenewperch
almostassoonashereachedit,aswewillseebelow.
HusserlexploitstheCartesian“methodofdoubt”inanewandoriginalway.
Throughhisownconfrontationwithskepticism,Descartesenactedthisfamous
methodinordertoreachthefoundationofknowledge,theself‐certain“Ithink,I
am”(cogito).Husserlnowpracticesavariationofthismethodinordertoreacha
similarlyself‐evidentsphere,somethingheisabouttocallasphereofpure
consciousnessorimmanence.ButHusserldoesnotwanttoactuallydoubtanything,
certainlynottheindubitableexistenceoftheworld(whichisalwayspresupposedin 54IdeasI,xix55Ibid.,xix
33
consciousnessasitsultimatehorizon).Whatheisinterestedinisthe“attempt”at
doubt.Forwhilewecannotdoubtcertainthings,“wecanattempttodoubtanything
whatever,nomatterhowfirmlyconvincedofit,evenassuredofitinanadequate
evidence,wemaybe.”56Thenatureofsuchanact,theattemptatdoubt,isto
hypotheticallyplacetheexistenceofthatwhichisdoubtedintometaphorical
“brackets”or“parentheses.”It“effectsacertainannulmentofpositingandprecisely
thisinterestsus.”Thereisnoquestionofnegatingthatwhichexists,i.e.denyingits
existence.Butthereisasuddenneutralitywithregardtothisentirequestion—
something“whollypeculiar.”57Thequestionoftheexistenceofthingsissuddenly
“putoutofaction,”andinmywords,intoakindofpurgatorial“maybe”that
neverthelessallowsonetofocusonsomethingelse—inthiscase,onthemannersof
givennessofthings.Thisnewfocus58automaticallyimplicatesthemasexperienced
bysomeone,i.e.,showsthemintheir“self‐givenness.”
Aswehavesaid,the“parenthesizing”of“positings”ofexistenceiswhatis
calledthe“epoché.”Morespecifically,thereareseveraltypesofepoché.Whatisat
issuenow,however,isnot,forexample,thekindofepochéonespeaksofinregards
tothe“bracketing”offeaturesunrelatedtothestudyathand(forexample,a
scientistbracketsallvalue‐predicatesof“physical”objectsandfocusesontheir
spatiotemporaldeterminationssolely,aphenomenologicalpsychologistbracketsall
materialorbiochemicalaspectsofanlivingorganism,etc.),butratherthefulland
56Ibid.,p.5857Ibid.,p.5858Itmightbenotedthatthissortoflanguage—”changingfocus”—wouldnotreallybesufficientforHusserltocapturetheradicalityofthenewattitude,sinceitisitselfborrowedfromexperiencewithinthenaturalattitude.
34
totalbracketingofthequestionofexistence(ornon‐existence)oftheentireworld
(includingevenoneselfinsofarasoneispartoftheworld,thoughthiscomes
later)—the“thesisoftheworld”(Weltthesis).Butcanweeffectaglobalepochéof
thissort?Canweputthewholeofrealityinbrackets?Thisisaquestionwewill
comebacktoattheendofthischapter.
D.PhenomenologicalTranscendentalReduction(s)
ThebracketingoftranscendentthingsisnotforHusserlsufficient,however,
toreachthetranscendentalego.59Itonlygoesasfarassealingthepsycheofffrom
whatmightbecalled(fromanatural‐attitudinalstand‐point,anyway)the“external
world.”ItisherethatHusserlmakesanotherinterestingdeparturefromDescartes.
Theego,too“[is]arealObjectlikeothersinthenaturalworld.”60Thisisnottrue
onlyinthesensethatIhaveaphysicalbody,butalsointhesensethat“Ieffect
cogitationes,actsofconsciousnessinboththebroaderandthenarrowersenseand
theseacts,asbelongingtothehumansubject,areoccurrenceswithinthesame
naturalactuality.”61(Thisprincipleofthenaturalityof“psychic”—asopposedto
transcendental—consciousnesswillonceagainbecomeacentralthemeinIdeasII.)
Inlaterwritings,Husserldistinguishesbetweenthe“phenomenologicalreduction”
andthe“transcendentalreduction,”characterizingthelatterasafurtherstep
beyondtheformer,preciselyintermsofthefurtherbracketingoftheego.The
phenomenologicalreductiononthisunderstandingeffectsauniversalepochéonthe
59Moreissaidaboutthisconceptinthissectionbelow.60IdeasI,p.6461Ibid.
35
naturalworld,butnotupontheegoitself.Henceitisareductiontowhatmightbe
called“phenomenologicalpsychology”ortheintentionallifeofconsciousness,but
withoutanexplicitrecognition—onlytobesuppliedthroughthefinal,
transcendentalreduction—oftheultimatesourceofmeaning,thetranscendental
ego:
“Ifthetranscendentalrelativityofeverypossibleworlddemandsanall‐embracingbracketing,italsopostulatesthebracketingofpurepsychesandthepurephenomenologicalpsychologyrelatedtothem.”
Andso,
“Accordingly,theconsistentreflectiononconsciousnessyieldshimtimeaftertimetranscendentallypuredata,andmoreparticularlyitisintuitiveinthemodeofnewkindofexperience,transcendental“inner”experience.”62
InIdeasI,Husserllatercomestounderstandthesetwodistinctstepstohavebeen
conflated.63Onceitiskeptinmind,however,itissufficientforourpurposestokeep
thembothascomprisingwhatHusserltreatsinIdeasIasasingle
“phenomenologicalreduction”—areductiontophenomenologicalconsciousness
and,therewith,thetranscendentalego.
Husserl’sbracketingofthe(empirical)egoisamajordevelopmentthat,in
Husserl’sunderstanding,distinguisheshisownmethod,atthispoint,from
62ThesequotesarefromHusserl’sEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleof1928(trans.RichardE.Palmer),reproducedinfullin:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserl’sPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994(p.209)Kockelmann’ssourceforthetranslationisHusserl:ShorterWorks.McCormackandElliston,eds.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981(pp.21‐35).63Seefn.3,above.
36
Descartes.’64Forthereductiondoesnotretreatintoaprivate“cogito”oritstheater
ofconsciousness;neitherdoesitmerelyseizeontheessenceofconsciousness,when
takeninthemundanesense(thisisstillthetaskof“psychology”).
“Evenmoreinaccessibletohim[Descartes],andnaturallyso,wastheconsiderationthattheegoasitisdisclosedwithintheepoché,existingforitself,isasyetnotatall“an”egowhichcanhaveotherormanyfellowegosoutsideitself.ItremainedhiddenfromDescartesthatallsuchdistinctionsas“I”and“you,”“inside”and“outside,”first“constitute”themselvesintheabsoluteego.”65
HusserlunderstandsDescartestohavecorrectlydiscoveredthe“absolute
ego”asthe“indubitable”ultimatumoftranscendentalinquiry,onlytohavethen
misinterpretedhisowndiscoveryinanimportantway.Inparticular,hefailedto
properlygraspthenatureofthe“I”oftheself‐certain“Ithink,Iam.”66The“I”in
questionisnotme,Descartesorevensomepossibleindividualempiricalego,atleast
notquapsychophysicalbeing,butrathertranscendentalsubjectivity—nota
thinkingsubjectbutthethinkerassuch,transcendentallyconsidered,forwhomand
inwhomanentireworldisconstitutedand,hence,availableinfull“self‐evidence”
formyknowingregard.Furthermore,whileHusserlendorsesDescartes’thesisthat
the“I”isinsomewaymorecertainthantheveryquestionoftheexistenceofthe
world,helamentsthelatter’sfailuretoseethattheworldisstillpreservedasa
phenomenoninthereduction.WhatDescartesfundamentallymisunderstoodisthat
theindubitableselfisnotthemere“ego‐pole”ofconsciousnessorevenpsychic
empiricalconsciousnessitself.Itistranscendentalsubjectivity.67
64IdeasI,p.6865Ibid.,p.8266MyitalicsontheCartesianquote67Crisis,p.81.OnecanalsoseeherethelanguageofDescartes’“self‐misinterpretation.”
37
Yetwhatremainsafterthereductionisnonethelessa“stream”ofmentallife.
Isthisthenotorious“transcendentalego”?JustwhatHusserlmeansbythe
“transcendentalego”isoneoftheverydifficultproblemstosolveinHusserl
scholarship.AccordingtoDavidBell,“…thetranscendentalegoisnothingbutthe
ordinary,common‐or‐gardenmind,albeitviewedfromwithinaphilosophicalor
transcendentalperspective.”Insupportofthisthesishecitesthefollowingpassage
fromtheCrisis:“Astranscendentalego,afterall,Iamthesameegothatinthe
worldlysphereisahumanego.WhatwasconcealedfrommeinthehumansphereI
revealthroughtranscendentalenquiry.”68Inthisspirit,wewouldperhapsnotdo
badlytounderstandthetranscendentalegoofIdeasIastheselfquatranscendental
sphereofnoeticnoematicconsciousness,withallofitsactsandintentionalobjects
included,andunderstoodtoconstituteitselfthroughthelawsoftemporality
(thoughHusserlelaboratesonthislastpartlater).Ofcourse,thisdefinitionmight
seemtoconflictwithHusserl’senigmaticpost‐IdeasIclaimthatthemeaningof
transcendentalsubjectivityistranscendentalintersubjectivity.69Butwewillhaveto
presentlyleavethatcomplexissueaside.
68Bell,David.Husserl.NewYork:Routlege,1990(p.207),hereafter“Bell”;theHusserlquotecanbefoundinCrisis,p.26469ThesubtitleoftheFifthMeditationoftheCM(p.89)statesthepointdirectly:“UncoveringoftheSphereofTranscendentalBeingasMonadologicalIntersubjectivity.”TherecanbenoquestionbutthatHusserlviews“intersubjectivity”here(andfortherestofhiscareer)astheauthenticmeaningoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Thetranscendentalegoisnotayouorme,butneitherisitanempiricalcommunity(asthiscouldleadtorelativism,oneofHusserl’savowedenemies),butsomehowan“I”thatisa“we”inatranscendentalregister.WecannothererehearsethestepsofHusserl’selaboratedescriptionofthemannerinwhichthebeingofotheregosis“evincedandverifiedintherealmofthetranscendentalego.”(p.90)ForadetailedexpositionandinterpretationofHusserl’sviewsee:Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguisticPragmaticCritique.TranslatedbyElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001.(Seeespeciallypp.159‐66).
38
E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction
Beforefurtherexploringthephilosophicalandontologicalimplicationsofthe
reduction(seePartIVbelow),wemightatthisstageaskwhatactuallymotivatesit
inthefirstplace.Sofar,wehavepresentedthereductionlargelyasHusserl(inIdeas
I)himselfdoes,namelyasaprocedureforgettingatthetruthofexperienceandthe
world.ButwhatmakesHusserlthinkthisparticularmethodisnecessary,asopposed
toothers?HereitisimportanttounderstandthatHusserlfitsintoaveryold
traditioninphilosophy,namelythequestforwhatmightbecalledrealandsecure
knowledge.Alongtheselines,thephilosopherspeaksoftheelementalquestfor
freedom—inthiscasethe“epistemicfreedom”thatcanalsobedescribedasthe
freedomfromerrorandbias,illusionandemptyabstraction.Foritisthepursuitof
certainty,clarity,andfreedomfromprejudicethatconspiretoproducetheprecisely
HusserlianversionofphenomenologythatburstsforthoutofIdeasI.See,for
example,Husserl’sreferenceto“genuinefreedomfromprejudice”70inthefirstpart,
orHusserl’sowndeclarationthatthegoalofthephenomenologicalreductionsisto
reach“thefreevistaof‘transcendentally’purifiedphenomenaand,therewith,the
fieldofphenomenologyinourpeculiarsense.”71
Whatwecangather,then,isthat(transcendental)phenomenologyis
motivatedbyathirstforacertainfreedom,inparticularafreedomfrom
presuppositions.Butiffreedomfrompresuppositionsmotivatesthereduction,what
isthissupposedtobeafreedomto?Inshort,Husserlwasinsearchofthe
foundationofknowledge.Wemustbefreefrombiasinordertogainaccesstoa 70IdeasI,p.36(myitalics)71Ibid.,xix
39
securezoneofknowing,adirectaccesstoreality.Logic,science,andmathematics
makethemostvigorousclaimstoknowledgeinourandHusserl’sera,butHusserl
becameconvincedthateventheyneededsecuringonamorefundamentalbasis.But
Husserlwasnotsimplya“meta‐scientist.”Insteadofbeingmerelyfixatedongiving
thesesciencesafoundation,hecamealsotobefascinatedforitsownsakewiththe
realmofmeaningsinwhichconsciousnessrevealedallthingsintheiressence.He
cametoregardphilosophy—understoodinanewandnon‐dogmaticway—asthe
indispensablescienceandthefoundationofallknowledge.Italonebearsthe
customaryrole—andtheresponsibility—ofansweringtheskepticwhodeniesthe
possibilityofknowledge,andhedoesthisbyshowingthewaytoanindubitable,
undeniablesourceofapodicticevidence.Husserl’sstrivingforknowledgeissodeep
andthoroughthatheiswillingtorevisehimselfruthlessly.Husserldidnotthink
philosophywasascienceamongsciences—i.e.,asjustanother“formal”or
“material”ontologythatmakesclaimsandargumentsaboutacertainregionof
reality.Sounlikepreviousphilosophers,Husserl—inlargeagreementwithKant,his
“transcendentalist”ancestor—placedallhistrustnotinsomerealmofmetaphysical
truths,intuitedorlearnedthroughrevelation(suchasPlatonicForms,God,
AbsoluteSpirit),fromwhichtoderiveandsecureothers,butsimplyinexperience.
Philosophy’sroleistodrawitsevidencefromthewellofexperience—actsof
consciousnessandthethingsofwhichitisconscious(egocogitocogitatum)—
throughamethodinwhicheverythingbutthispurifiedexperientialityissuspended
indefinitely,and“putoutofaction”forthetranscendentalgaze.
40
InthiswayHusserl’sphilosophicalorientation,broadlyconstrued,is
radically“epistemological.”ButthisdoesnotmeanHusserlwasconcernedwith
“epistemology”inthenarrowsenseinusetoday—Husserlwasnotoverlyconcerned
withdefining“knowledge”as“justifiedtruebelief”orsomethingelse,forexample.
Andheisnot,onceagain,obsessedwiththe“subjective”sideof“knowing”(“noetic
phenomenology”)inthewaytraditionalepistemologyis(exceptingthe“causal”and
“externalist”models,ofcourse),ashegivesampleattentiontothevariousobjects
thatareknown(“noematicphenomenology”).Itdoesmean,however,thatfor
Husserl,todiscoverhowknowledgetakesplaceisbothanecessaryandasufficient
taskforphilosophyassuch,regardedinitspurestessence.
III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction
Besidesthephenomenologicalreduction,thereisanother,nolessimportant
typeofreductionwhoseperformanceisalsonecessaryforphenomenologyas
Husserlconceivesit:theeideticreduction.HusserlbeginstheversionofIdeasI
eventuallypublishedwithatacked‐onbut(tohismind)crucialdiscussionofthe
“eidetic”natureofphenomenology,tryingtoclassifyphenomenologyamongandas
againstother“sciences.”Thismaterialisveryinteresting,butwecanonlytouchon
itbrieflyhere,insofarasitisrelevanttoourtask.
41
Thereis,forHusserl,afundamentaldividebetween“mattersoffact”(in
muchthe“Humean”sense)ontheonehandand“essences”(oreidē)ontheother.72
Overlappingwiththisdistinctionisthatbetween“reality”(thereal,whichistosay
factical)or“theempirical”ontheonehand,and“essentiality,”ontheother.What
exactlyisaHusserlianessence,oreidos?Isit,forexample,a“universal”?Sucha
questionmaynotbeterriblyhelpful,giventhecontestednessofthequestionof
universalsitself,butHusserlianessencesare“universal‐like”inthattheyare
multiplyinstantiableand“non‐particular.”Thatis,theyarenot“singular”intheway
“existent”particularsare.However,itisnottechnicallytruetosaythattheyare
outsideofspaceandtime;theydonotsubsistlikePlatonicFormsinasupra‐
spatiotemporalorder,asHusserlforcefullyunderscores.73Essencesarealso
ontologicalinastrongsense—thatis,theyarenotpurely“linguistic”or
“conventional.”Wedonotdecide“asacommunity”whatisorisnotanessence,at
leastaspertainstothenaturalandspiritualfurnitureoftheworld;wediscoversuch
essences.
Thecleargraspofessencesisachievedthroughamethodknownas
“imaginativevariation.”Intheeideticreduction—whichistobeperformedbefore
thephenomenologicalreduction—oneistobracketoutallparticular,factical,and
contingentfeaturesofthingsperceived(orremembered,imagined,etc.)andtoseize
onlythosefeaturesthatbelongtotheobjectnecessarily—i.e.,thatmaketheobject
whatitis.Inotherwords,theeideticreductiondistillsthosecategorialformsthat
weintuitinthings.Yethowdoesoneclearlydistinguishbetweentheessentialand 72Ibid.,pp.7‐873Ibid.,pp.40‐42
42
inessentialaspectsofthings?Thisiswhereimaginativevariationasamultiply‐
repeatableexercisebecomescrucial:wearetoimaginethethingsinmanydifferent
circumstancesandundergoingmanychanges.Ineachchangeofcircumstance,some
featureorpropertyofthethingisaltered.Doestheobjectsurviveasjusttheobject
thatitisevenafterthisalteration?Thenthepropertyalteredmusthavebeen
inessential.Aftervaryingtheobjectenough,itistobecomeapparentwhatthe
essentialfeaturesoftheobjectare.
Hence,inkeepingwithatraditioninauguratedbytheGreeksandsustained
bythescholastics,essencesrevealthewhatofthings(andpeople),theessential
“nature”ofthings,and,tothisextent,theirbeing.Allthesame,therearetwodistinct
sensesoftheword“being”—essenceandexistence.74Itwouldseemthattheessence
ofathingcannotexistwithoutthereexistingthingsthatinstantiatethatessence.75
Thereare,then,atleastthesetwooptionsforthetheoreticalregardofan
objector“real”(athingorstateofaffairs,forexample):toviewitasfactualand
spatiotemporallylocated,ortoviewitinitsessentiality,i.e.intermsoftheessences
itinstantiates.Thedistinctiondoesnot,however,correspondtothatbetweenthe
naturalandtranscendentalattitudes;fortranscendentalreflectionisnottheonly
sciencedoneinthe“eideticattitude.”Essencesarenottheprovinceonlyof
phenomenology.Phenomenologyisaneideticscience,butnotalleideticsciences—
e.g.,logicandmathematics—arepersephenomenological.Phenomenology,in
Husserl’sconception,isthereforeoneofmanyeideticsciences.(Tobemoreprecise
74Ibid.,p.1275Attimes,itdoesseemasthoughHusserlgoesevenfurther:“Positingof…essencesimpliesnottheslightestpositingofanyindividualfactualexistences;pureeidetictruthscontainnottheslightestassertionaboutmattersoffact.”(IdeasI,p.11;Husserl’sitalics)
43
still,onemightsaythatthereisnothingphenomenologicalinthe“eidos”ofthe
“eidetic,”butverymuchsomething“eidetic”inthe“eidos”ofthe
“phenomenological.”)
Husserlmakesmuchdependnotonlyontheeideticreduction,butalsoon
thestrictandabsolutedifferencebetweenfactsandessences,theempiricalandthe
eidetic.EssentialismalsobecomesextremelyimportantforHusserl’spurposesin
termsofhisdistinguishingbetweentheessencesof“mentalprocesses”ontheone
handand“physicalthings”ontheother.76ThusitwillbecentraltoHusserl’s
delineationsoftheessencesofconsciousnessandreality,aswewillseebelow.
IV.ConsciousnessandWorld
A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence
ForHusserl,asforhisteacherBrentano,themostfundamentalfactabout
consciousnessisthatitisintentional—itisintrinsically“about”or“of”something.77
Fromtheperspectiveofthetraditionalissuesinmodern“philosophyofmind”and
epistemology,thephenomenologicalnotionofintentionality,alreadyanticipatedby
Kant78,couldbyitselfbeseentosolve,asitwere,theoldquestionofhowsomething
like“consciousness,”whichis“inner,”can‘transcend”itselfandreachouttoaworld
76Ibid.,p.9877Ibid.,pp.73‐578See,forexample:Russell,Matheson.Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.ContinuumBooks.NewYork:2006(p.47).Hereafter“Russell.”Theconceptisalsopresentinmedievalwriters.
44
thatisoutsideofit—“outer.”Forintentionalityrevealsanintimate,indeed
unbreakablebondbetweenanactofconsciousness(“noesis”)ontheonehand,and
an“intentionalobject”(“noema,”vaguelyakintoKant’s“phenomenological
object”—Gegenstand)ontheother.Onemightatfirstbetemptedtosaythatsucha
relationshiptakesplacewithinconsciousnessitself,but“consciousness”shouldnow
beseenasanequivocalterm.Consciousnessasintentionalityhousesbotha
“subjective”poleaswellasan“objective”one;consciousnessinthissenseisnot
“mere”subjectivity.Whilethisisnotsomucha“proof”thatthereexistsan“outside
world,”sincethisisbuiltintotheverydefinitionofexperience(atleastforHusserl),
itisafundamentalproblematizationofthevery“inner/outer”distinction
philosophyhadbeentakingforgrantedpre‐phenomenologically(orpre‐”critically”
intheKantiansense).Thereissimplynosenseintheideaofaconsciousness
essentiallyunrelatedtoanintendedworld,horizon,orobject.
Mostcommentatorshavegenerallyfoundthereferentoftheterm“noesis”to
beunproblematictograsp,butnotso“noema.”Asmentioned,theterm“noesis”
referstointentionalactsofconsciousnessand“noema”totheobjectssointended
(andquaintended).InHusserl’swords:
“CorrespondingineverycasetothemultiplicityofDatapertainingtothereallyinherentnoeticcontent,thereisamultiplicityofData,demonstrableinactualpureintuition,inacorrelative“noematiccontent”or,inshort,inthe“noema”—termswhichweshallcontinuetousefromnowon.”79
Husserlgivesanexample,pertainingtotheexperienceofseeingatree:
“thetreesimpliciter,thephysicalthingbelongingtoNature,isnothinglessthanthisperceivedtreeasperceivedwhich,asperceptualsense,inseparablybelongstotheperception.Thetreecanburnup,be
79Ibid.,p.214
45
resolvedintoitschemicalelements,etc.Butthesense—thesenseofthisperception,somethingbelongingnecessarilytoitsessence—cannotburnup;ithasnochemicalelements,noforces,norealproperties.”80
However,thenoemaisnotforHusserla“reallyinherent”partofconsciousness.The
noema“tree,”saysHusserl,is“nomorecontainedinherentlythanisthetreewhich
belongstoactuality.”81
Hencethe“noema”ofaperceptionissimplytheperceivedasperceived.This
wouldapplyacrosstheboardtoallthevarioustypesofact:thenoemaofa
recollectionistherecollectedasrecollected,thenoemaofafantasyisthefantasied
thingasfantasied,etc.Husserlalsocallsthenoemaor“noematiccorrelate”the
“sense”ofanact.Howthisdefinitionofitmatchesupwiththefirstisadeepsource
ofdebate,butitcannotbefurtheredaddressedhere.82
Ashintedatalready,thenoetic‐noematicbifurcationallowsHusserltoclaim
thatphenomenologyisnotmerelyaboutconsciousnessinthenarrowsenseof
“subjective”consciousness—sincethisisonlythe“noetic”poleofexperience—but
alsoabouttheobjectsexperienced(asexperienced)—the“noematic”pole.Every
consciousexperience,withoutfail,hasbothanoeticandanoematicside.Itmakes
nosensetoisolatethe“consciousness‐of”fromthatofwhichthereis
consciousness—apointMohantymakeseloquentlyinspeakingoftheirreducibility
ofthephrase“consciousnessofsomething”:
80Ibid.,p.21681Ibid.,p.23782Onceagain,Bell’swayofcharacterizingtheissueishelpfulforourpresentnarrowpurposes:“…somethingisnoematicinsofarasitisanimmanent,butnon‐realcontributoryfactorinthepossessionbyanactofsignificanceormeaning.”(Bell,p.180)
46
“Consciousnessis…acorrelationbetweennoeticactsandnoematicmeanings.Theworldisastructureandinterconnectednessofsuchmeanings,andisthecorrelateofconsciousness.Thetwo,consciousnessandworld,together,intheircorrelation,constitutetranscendentalsubjectivity…Thetruetranscendentalfoundationis:consciousnessoftheworld.Realismdeletesthehyphens…butitcannotinfactdoso.Iwanttokeepthemtiedtogether.”83
Ifconsciousnessitselfhasan“inner”and“outer”,a“here”and“there,”a
subjectandobject,thenitisalready,inasense,self‐transcending;andso
immediatelyonecanseehow“transcendence”becomesafundamentalthemeinthe
structureofconsciousness.Husserlgenerallyspeaksof“transcendence”inthe
contextofthetranscendentintentionalobject,including,mostimportantly,the
“necessarytranscendence”thatbelongstotheessence“physicalthing.”Butitis
importanttoseethatbecausetranscendenceisfirstpredicatedonintentionality,
andintentionalityisastructuralfeatureof(noetic‐noematic)consciousnessassuch,
thetranscendenceoftheworld,whateverformitwilltake,willbesuchasnotto
leaveconsciousnesstrappedinaskepticalimpasseorlockedintothe“private
theater”ofthemind.Onceagain,Husserl’stheorycouldbeseenasanadvanceover
lesssophisticated“modern”theoriesofmindandworld.
ButwhatexactlyisHusserl’sconceptionof“transcendence”?Itisimportant
heretotracetheexactsenseinwhichHusserlemploystheterm,forthiswillhave
enormousconsequencesforthegeneralphilosophicalimplicationsofHusserl’sfinal
“transcendental‐phenomenological”position.Tobeginwith,Husserldeniesthe
83Mohanty,J.N.“MyPhilosophicalPosition/Response.”InTheTranscendentalandtheEmpirical.Ed.BinaGupta.Oxford,England:RowmanandLittlefieldPublishers,Inc.,2000pp.261‐2(myitalics).Inthisway,thenoetic‐noematicstructureofconsciousness(inthewidesense)canbeseentofollowfromtheoriginalthesisofintentionalityitself.YetitalsoconfirmsHusserl’sinterestinthe“appearingasappearing”ofthings(inthewidesense).Itisnotthingsintheir“real”existence,butthings“astheyappear,”thatconcernuswithinthephenomenologicalreduction.Wedonotworryaboutwhetherornotthere“reallyis”anappletreebeforeus;weareconcernedwiththenoemaof“theappletree.”Realityquarealexistenceisnotdenied,justputoutofplay.
47
Kantiandistinctionbetweenthephenomenonandthenoumenon.84Thething‐in‐
itselfisnotunknowable—preciselytheopposite.Buthowcanitbeknowable,ifitis
alsotranscendent?Itisknowableindegreesor“adumbrations”—theprofilesof
thingsasseenfromdifferentangles;henceitisknown,inHusserl’sterminology,
“inadequately”—andnotjustforfiniteobserversbutforanyobserverwhatsoever,
includingGod.(Thisreflectstheintrinsicnatureofperception,understoodasa
generalrelationshipofconsciousnesstoextra‐consciousreality).Hencethethingis
“transcendent”onlyafterapeculiarway—notwhollyotherthanoraliento
consciousness,butinawaythatbelongstoitnoetically‐noematically,through
adumbrations,yetnotwithrespecttothewholeoftheobjectallatonce.Thingsare
encounteredastranscendent—theyhavethis“meaning”—butsuch“transcendence”
amountsonly,ultimately,toakindofregulativeIdea(roughlyintheKantiansense)
of“adequate”objectivity—theinfinitelimitoffull,adequategivennessoftheobject
inallofitsprofilesatonce.Transcendenceisthusnotapropertyofthingsbutthe
ideaofacompleteunityofadumbrations,thesumofprofilesofathing.Warnsand
clarifiesHusserl:
“…onemustnotletoneselfbedeceivedbyspeakingofthephysicalthingastranscendingconsciousnessoras‘existinginitself.’Thegenuineconceptofthetranscendenceofsomethingphysicalwhichisthemeasureoftherationalityofanystatementsabouttranscendence,canitselfbederivedonlyfromtheproperessentialcontentsofperceptionorfromthoseconcatenationsofdefinitekindswhichwecalldemonstrativeexperience.Theideaofsuchtranscendenceisthereforetheeideticcorrelateofthepureideaofthisdemonstrativeexperience.”85
84See,forexample:Husserl,Edmund.“Kantandtheideaoftranscendentalphenomenology,”trans.TedE.Klein,Jr.andWilliamE.Pohl.TheSouthwesternJournalofPhilosophy,5.3(1974),p.11(citationfoundinRussell,p.91)85Ibid.,p.106(myitalics)
48
Fundamentaltothispictureisthenotionofgivenness.Inthewordsofone
commentator,“thegiven...includesnotonlythatwhichisimmanentinarealsense
butalsothetranscendent,providedthatitisgiven.”86ThisalsoallowsHusserlto
convertalltranscendenceintowhathecalls“immanenttranscendency.”With
respecttophysicalthingsthistermdenotesthat“...thetranscendencybelongingto
thephysicalthingasdeterminedbyphysicsisthetranscendencybelongingtoa
beingwhichbecomesconstitutedin,andtiedto,consciousness...”87
Yetinthiscase,onemightsuspectthatHusserlhassecuredaccesstothe
“things”atabitofanunfairprice.Suchacriticismmightrunasfollows:Either
thingsarenottrulytranscendent,ortheyarenotnecessarilyknown—unliketheir
phenomenalappearance,whichmay,afterall,withKant,beconditionedbyourown
cognitiveapparatus.ButHusserldespisesbothsubjectivismandconstructivismas
equallyunbearableconcessionstotheskeptic(orthestrictKantian),sothese
optionsareclosedbyhim.Husserlwantsapuretransparencyofbeing—apure
knowing—aswellastheotherness,sotospeak,ofthisbeing,ortheobject.Butcan
hehavethis?
Husserlwouldprobablyarguethatthecounter‐argumentsketchedabove
restsonafalsedilemmathattranscendentalphenomenologymovesbeyond.The
criticdoesnotseeathirdpossibilitybetweentranscendentalrealismand
skepticism,namelythepossibilityofatranscendentallevelatwhichtheworldis
revealedtobeintegrallyunifiedwithconsciousness.Thisisbutabriefpre‐sketchof
86DeBoer,Theodore.TheDevelopmentofHusserl’sThought.Trans.TheodorePlantinga.TheHague,theNetherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1978,p.31487IdeasI,p.123
49
onewayHusserlcouldrespondtotheobjection.Iwillsaymuchmoreaboutthis
waytoapproachthe“consciousness/world”relationanditspotentialforsuccess,
however,intheconcludingthoughtsofthischapter.
B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical
Husserl’squasi‐”Cartesianism”doesnotendwiththe“Cartesianway”tothe
reduction.Itisalsoevidentinhisefforttodistinguishtheessencesofthe“mental”
andthe“physical”onseveralgrounds.Forinstance,itbelongstotheessenceof
mentalphenomenathattheyareindubitable,ofphysicalphenomenathattheyare
not.“Everyperceptionofsomethingimmanent[i.e.,inthesphereofconsciousness]
necessarilyguaranteestheexistenceofitsobject.”88However,“[a]ccordingto
eideticlawitisthecasethatphysicalexistenceisneverrequiredasnecessarybythe
givennessofsomethingphysical,butisalwaysinacertainmannercontingent.”89
WhatHusserlisindicating,ofcourse,isthatIcannotbewrongaboutthe
existenceofsomething’sappearingtomeassuch‐and‐suchthing.Forexample,
whileIcanbewrongthatamonsterisstandinginfrontofme,Icannotbewrong
thatitappearsasthoughonedoes.EventhePyrrhonianskepticswereindeed
comfortablewiththismuch.Butdoesthisrevealsomethingaboutthe“mental”and
the“physical,”ormerelyourcognitiverelationtoourselvesontheonehandand
transcendentrealitiesontheother?Thisquestionreachesbacktothequestionof
whetherDescartes’own“realdistinction”isinvalidonthegroundsthatheconfused
theepistemologicalpropertiesofthemindwithrealpropertiesofmindsand 88Ibid.,p.10089Ibid.,p.103
50
extendedthings.ButinHusserl,asopposedtoDescartes,thisquestioncannotarise,
becauseafterthephenomenologicalreductionandovercomingofthenatural
attitude,itmakesnosensetospeakofanythingbutmeanings.Tospeakofthingsas
beingtotallydisconnectedfromconsciousnessis,aswehaveseen,meaningless;so
wehavetotakethemannerofgivennessofobjectsinperceptionasrevealing
somethingessentialabouttheseobjectsthemselves,andnotonlyastellingusabout
“ourselves”asperceivers.90
Physicalthings,bycontrasttomentalprocessesandappearances,are,aswe
havealreadyseen,transcendent.Thatis,themeaning“physicalthing”containsthis
transcendence.Astranscendent,physicalthingssomehowdonotpossessthesealof
self‐evidentnessofimmanentmentalphenomena.Forthisissomethingthatbelongs
essentiallytothenatureof“thephysical.”Insum(noticethecontinuousemphasis):
“Overagainstthepositingoftheworld,whichisa“contingent”positing,therestandsthenthepositingofmypureEgoandEgolifewhichisa“necessary,”absolutelyindubitablepositing.Anythingphysicalwhichisgiven“inperson”canbenonexistent;nomentalprocesswhichisgiven“inperson”canbenonexistent.Thisistheeideticlawdefiningthisnecessityandthatcontingency.”91
The“real”(Descartes’term)or“eidetic”(Husserl’s)distinctionbetween
physicalandmentalisestablishedinotherwaysaswell.Letusreturntotheissueof
perception.Aswehavesaid,transcendentthings—“theworld,”collectively
regarded—presentthemselvestoconsciousnessinprofilesor“adumbrations.”We
seeonlythesidesofthings,andcannever—noteveninprinciple—viewallsidesof
athingatonce,forperceptionisirreduciblyperspectival.Therefore,wecansaythis 90Ibid.,p.9291Ibid.,Husserl’sitalics.Husserl’squotationmarksherearenotmeanttobeironic,theyaresimplydesignatingessentialtypes.
51
muchabouttranscendentobjects:theyarealwaysgiveninadequately.Wenever
haveatotalisticperceptionofanobject,butjustastruly,objectsdonotgive
themselvesinfulladequacy.92Bycontrastwithphysicalobjects,purecogitataand
mentalappearancesaregivenadequately.Forexample,Idonotconceiveofa
triangleinitsadumbrations,butadequatelyandallatonce.Husserlgeneralizesthe
pointtoincludeall“mentalprocesses,”93concerningwhichheremarks,“Where
thereisnospatialbeingitissenselesstospeakofaseeingfromdifferentstand‐
pointswithachangingorientationinaccordancewithdifferentperappearances,
adumbrations.”94
HerewithHusserlonceagainestablishesthatthereisanessential
difference—withechoeshereagainofDescartes’“realdistinction”—between
consciousnessandreality.Consciousnessisasphereofimmanence,inwhichthe
objectsofthoughtaregivenadequately,whereas(physical)realityisasphereof
transcendence—unqualifiedtranscendence,tobeprecise—whoseobjectsaregiven
toconsciousnessinadequately.Husserlactuallymakestwoimportantrelevant
essentialdistinctions:betweenthatofperceptionandnon‐perceptualmental
processesontheonehand,andbetweenperceptionand“depictivesymbolic
objectivation,”or,moresimply,“sign‐consciousness,”ontheother.95Inthisway,
Husserltriestosetphenomenologyapartfromthefollowingalternatives,long
familiarfromtraditionalormodern“epistemology”:pureidealism(whichwould
92Thisdoesnot,bytheway,meanthatweonlyperceive“parts”ofobjectswhenweseethem—wegenerallyperceivethewholeobject,throughitsprofilesoradumbrations.Hencethe“adequacy/inadequacy”relationcannotbecorrelatedwiththepart‐wholerelation.93IdeasI,p.9194Ibid.,p.9195Ibid.,p.93
52
denythefirstdistinction),representationalismofaLockeanvariety(whichwould
denythesecond),andnaïverealism(whichdoesnotconsiderconsciousnesstohave
itsownessenceinthefirstplace).Tothiswemustaddthedistinctionbetween
phenomenologyandKantianism.Foraswehavepointedout,Husserldeniesthe
phenomenon‐noumenondistinction.Thushestressesthat:
“…inimmediatelyintuitiveactsweintuitan‘initself’,andthatinperceptionthe‘ititself’isfurthercharacterizedinitspeculiarityas‘inperson’incontrasttoitsmodifiedcharacteristicas‘floatingbeforeus,’as‘presentiated’inmemoryorinfreephantasy.”96
Owingtohismaintenanceofanessentialdistinctionofconsciousnessandreality,
nottomentionhisowninvocationofDescartes,Husserlcouldeasilybesuspectedof
espousingatthispointaCartesiandualismaswell.Wewilllookatthischarge
below.Toseefullyhowhewoulddistinguishphenomenologyfromthatdeadend,
wewilleventuallyhavetoturntohisargumentsabouttheprimacyofconsciousness
overreality,inthesubsequentsections.Suchanasymmetry,ifsuccessful,would
definitivelyrendertheimpossibilityofCartesiandualism.Inthemeanwhile,Iwill
trytodispelthespecterofstraightforwardCartesiandualismbelow.
C.TheChargeofDualism
Thechargeof“dualism”couldsuperficiallybeleveledatHusserl,butifwhat
ismeantbythisisCartesian“substance”dualism,itisclearlyunfair.Husserl
decisivelyrejectsthissortofdualism,anditisalreadyclearfromhisownanalysis
thatheneverregards“externalreality”astrulyandabsolutely“external.”How
96Ibid.,p.93
53
couldweknowitinthefirstplace,orperceivetheworld—“ititself”—inactsof
perception,ifthiswerethecase?ThissortofcomparisontoDescarteswouldbe
especiallyirresponsiblegivenHusserl’strenchantcritiqueofthatphilosopher’s
view,alreadypartiallylaidoutabove(IIB).
WhateverHusserl’spositionwithrespecttohisargumentfortranscendental
phenomenology,itshouldbeclearbynowthathehasrejectednaïverealism,
Kantiandualism,representationalism,andCartesiandualismalike.Indeed,itis
bettertostartonhisownterms—thatis,intermsof“transcendentalidealism.”
Consciousnessistranscendentalinthatitmakesbothexperience—“natural”
experience—andtheworldsoexperienced,possible.Transcendentalityisnot,
however,asufficientconditionfortheexistenceoftranscendentobjects.Husserl
doesnotdenytherealityofnature—ofarealmofpurelytranscendentbeing(albeit
definedunderconditionsinwhichsuchtranscendenceobtainsinnecessarilyco‐
subjectiveterms).
Noneofthisistodeny,however,thatHusserlcansoundlikeadualistmuch
ofthetime.Withthetranscendentalreduction,Husserlfreestranscendental
consciousnessfromthe“realworld.”Thushespeaksofthe“essential
detachablenessofthewholenaturalworldfromthedomainofconsciousness”97and
proclaimsthata“veritableabyssyawnsbetweenconsciousnessandreality.”98His
wordshereadmittedlyconcernnot“natural”consciousness—orthehumanor
animalpsyche—but“pure”consciousness.Yetevenso,theyraiseconcernsabout
thepossibilitythatHusserlhasdescendedintoaCartesian‐styledualism.Husserl 97Ibid.,p.10498Ibid.,p.111
54
himselfseemstorelishemphasizingtheabsolutedistinctnessoftranscendental
subjectivityand“Nature”:
“Everythingwhichispurelyimmanentandreducedinthewaypeculiartothementalprocess,everythingwhichcannotbeconceivedapartfromitjustasitisinitself,andwhicheoipsopassesoverintotheEidosintheeideticattitude,isseparatedbyanabyssfromallofNatureandphysicsandnolessfromallpsychology—andeventhisimage,asnaturalistic,isnotenoughtoindicatethedifference.”99
Buthow,wemightwonder,wouldanon‐dualisticviewlikethisreallywork?
Andhow,asHusserlclaims,cantherebeanyformofconsciousnessessentially
disconnectedfromthehumanego,thelatterofwhichnowrelegatedtothe“real”or
“natural”world?Ifthispossibilityisdenied,Cartesianismmightbeseentobethe
inevitableresult.ButHusserlisnotonetohedgehisbets;everythingrestsonthe
possibilityoftranscendentalsubjectivityinthestrict,“irreal”100senseinwhichhe
understandsit.Husserl’senterpriseinitsradicalityofpurposewouldbecompletely
misunderstood,inmyview,byonewhosoftensorblursthisemphasisonthis
radicalseparabilityofconsciousnessandworld.Foritispreciselytheinversionof
thenaturalisticprioritizationofthe“real”oversubjectivitythatneedstobeeffected,
inHusserl’sview,beforephenomenologyisevertocomeintoitsownandappearas
itself,andhesaysthisrepeatedlythroughouthiswork.101Aphilosophythatdoes
notcrossthethresholdoftranscendentalconsciousness,makingacleanbreakonce
andforallfromnaturalism,issimplyaformof“psychology.”Itdoesnotrecognize
99Ibid.,217(myemphasis)100Ibid.,p.4101Totakeoneexample,seeCrisis,p.200:“thecompleteinversionofthenaturalattitude,thusintoan‘unnatural’one,placesthegreatestconceivabledemandsuponphilosophicalresolveandconsistency.”Thissoundsexactlylikea“conversion”experience.
55
theautonomyofthesubject,andhenceitisdestinedtoremainenthralledby
“science”and“scientism.”102
D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandthe“WorldAnnihilation”Experiment
Husserl’sultimatecontentionwithrespecttotherelationshipof
consciousnessandrealityisthatthebeingofconsciousnessis“absolute”whereas
thebeingoftheworldismerely“relative”(namely,toconsciousness).ThusHusserl
isnotcontentwithmerelymakinganeideticdistinctionbetweenthe“mental”and
the“physical.”Healsoexplicitlyassignspriority(inasenseyettobedetermined)to
theformeroverthelatter,atleastwhenitcomestotranscendentalconsciousnessin
itsrelationtothematerialworld(andthose“strata”—psychical,forexample,that
arefoundeduponit).Wehavealreadyseenthatfromthepointofviewof
experience—and,importantly,thereisnootherpointofview!—theworld’s
existenceisnot,strictlyspeaking,necessary,buttheexistenceofconsciousnessis.
Yes,perceptualconsciousness,inwhichwearecontinuallyenmesheddirectlyor
indirectly,isconsciousnessoftheworld;butperceptionsmaybemerelyfantasies.
102Howeveraccurateormisguidedthispositionmaybe,itispowerfulenoughtoexertconsiderablepressureoveralater,“post‐transcendental”phenomenologistlikeMerleau‐Ponty.Forhispart,Merleau‐Pontywasequallyopposedtoscientificnaturalism,butnotonthegroundsthatitwascorrectinitsowndomain,yetoverlypresumptuousintakingthe“natural”worldasthedomainofallbeing.Husserlwidensthenet,preservingsciencewholesaleinitsmostbasicobjectivistassumptions,whileMerleau‐Pontyattackstranscendentalism(inbothitsKantianandHusserlianforms)andscientificnaturalismalike,insearchforaholisticalternative,onemightsay.Yetallthesame,Merleau‐Pontywouldhavetostrugglewiththeproblemofdistinguishingphilosophy’staskcompellinglyfromthoseofthesciences;hewastosettlefinallyonanotionofreciprocity,contrarytoHusserl’suncompromising,buttosome,moreappealingabsolutism.
56
Forwithanygivencaseof(possible)perception,“thepossibilityofthenon‐beingof
theworldisneverexcluded.”103Oragain:
“Whathoversbeforeonemaybeamerefigment;thehoveringitself,theinventiveconsciousness,isnotitselfinventedandtherebelongstoitsessence,astoanyothermentalprocess,thepossibilityofaperceivingreflectionwhichseizesuponabsolutefactualbeing.”104
Besides,theexistenceofexternalobjectsisestablishedonlyonthebasisofcoherent
patternsofexperienceoverextendedperiodsoftime—butwhatifthesewereto
dissolveintofull‐blownincoherence,i.e.“chaos”?“Theworld”wouldnotnow
“exist”,butconsciousness(ofarealorimaginedworld)nonethelesswould.
Thislatternotion—featuredinHusserl’s“world‐annihilation”experiment—
isperhapsthemostradicalthoughtinalloftheIdeasI,aswellasperhapsitsmost
contested,evenbymanyHusserlians.Thethoughtexperimentisdesignedtoshow
theultimateasymmetryofconsciousnessandworld—andsubsequentlytolend
furtherproofoftheindependenceoftranscendentalphenomenologyfromthe
empiricalsciencesofthe“naturalattitude.”Husserlobservesthatthemeaning
“world”isestablishedasacertainharmonyofappearances.Thatis,physicalthings
canbydefinitionneverbecomecompletelyimmanent,andhencewecannotknow
themabsolutelyanddirectly.Sotheonlywaywecometounderstandthemtoexist
transcendentlyisthroughtheregularwaysinwhichtheyappeartous.Itisonthe
basisofappearancesorpresentationsofthingstoconsciousnessthatweposit(asit
were)theexistenceofatranscendentworld—onlythendoesits“meaning”as
103IdeasI,p.103104Ibid.,p.101
57
“transcendent”(Kant’s“transcendentalobject=X”105)becomeconstituted.The
appearancesmusthaveacertainregularity,andtheymust“appear”inawaythat
satisfiedaminimallevelofexpectationonourpart.Forexample,wewouldnotat
firsttakeaflashing“object,”whichpoppedintoandoutofexistencerandomlyand
rapidly,asanexternalobject,evenifitwereone;wewouldlikelytakeittobean
hallucination.106Butsupposethisregularityweretobreakdownatafundamental
level,suchthat,effectively,thereceasestobeaworld.107Doesthisautomatically
entailtheabolishmentofconsciousness?Husserlthinksnot:
“…whilethebeingofconsciousness,ofanystreamofmentalprocesseswhatever,wouldindeedbenecessarilymodifiedbyanannihilationoftheworldofphysicalthingsitsownexistencewouldnotbetouched.”108
Mentalprocessescouldstilloccur—whynot?Afterall,accordingtothemethodof
epochéandreductionthemselves,wehavenorighttoassumethatconsciousnessis
causallydependenton,orinterdependentwith,theworld.Allsuchpresuppositions,
aswellasnotionsofcausality,havebynowbeenexposedforexactlywhattheyare,
andtheyhavebeenbracketedaccordingly.WhatremainsiswhatHusserlcallsthe
“phenomenologicalresiduum,”109oracertain“stream”ofconsciouslife.
Allthesame,itisveryimportanttonotethatwearenotintheBerkeleyan
campwiththisargument.FornowheredoesHusserlsuggestthatphysicalthings
themselves,intheirtranscendentbeing,dependontheexistenceofconsciousness 105Ibid.,pp.342‐3106Ifothersreportedseeingitaswell,thiswouldbegintochangeourview.Butthenagain,theywouldnotreportit,either,unlessthereweresomereason—aharmonyofappearanceandsatisfiedexpectationsovertime—todoso.107IdeasI,p.109108Ibid.,p.109109Ibid.,p.65
58
orperception(“esseestpercipi”).Hispointisthatwewouldhavenoreasontoposit
theexistenceoftranscendentthingsinthefirstplace,wereitnotforthe
deliverancesofconsciousnessintheformofadumbratedappearance‐perceptions.
Yetinitsreflexivemomentofself‐perception,thesamecannotbesaidof
consciousnessitself:itcanbesureofitsexistence,anexistencethatistherefore,in
thissense,“absolute.”Anditcanseeself‐evidentlythatitexists,evenifthereisno
maturelyformed“ego”theretobeabletoarticulatethis.ThismuchoftheCartesian
legacysurvivesinIdeasI.110ForHusserl,consciousness’knowledgeofitself,atsome
deeplevel,isabsolute.Thisisenoughtogroundtranscendentalphenomenology—
namelyona“pure”levelofexperienceinwhichallobjects,onthenoematicside,as
wellasallperceivingsandthinkings,onthenoetic,areconstituted.
Todenythatthissortofasymmetryexistsmightbetempting,butonwhat
groundscouldwedosoaftertheepoché?Certainlytherearenogroundstospeakof
acausallynecessaryrelationshipofworldtoconsciousness,foritispreciselyany
possiblecausalrelationbetweenthetwothatHusserlpurposefullybracketsand
110ItistruethattherefollowsfromHusserl’sviewthedistinctpossibilityofsolipsism,atleastofa“transcendentalsort”:“OnlyforanEgo,orastreamofmentalprocesses,inrelationtoitself,doesthisdistinctivestateofaffairsexist;herealonethereis,andheretheremustbe,suchathingasperceptionofsomethingimmanent.”(italicsadded)TheproblemofsolipsismisoneHusserltacklesmemorablyinlaterworks,particularlytheCartesianMeditations,thoughtoquestionablesuccess.Theproblemisroughlythis:Doesthereductionrevealthenecessitysolelyofmyselfastranscendentalego,inthesensethattheworldisthe“transcendentalphenomenon”(Husserl’sterm)formytranscendentalego?Thiswouldindeedbeadisastrousconsequenceforthetranscendentalreduction,ifitweretrue.ItisintheFifthMeditationoftheCartesianMeditationsthatHusserlfinallyrevealsthattranscendentalsubjectivityresolvesintotranscendentalintersubjectivity,whichalreadypresupposesamultiplicityofego’sand,subsequently,theworldof“ObjectiveNature”asdecisivelysharedbytheseegosinacommonspaceandtime.(CM,p.130)Itisonlywiththeintroductionoftranscendentalintersubjectivitythatonecananswerinafullandpositivewaythechargethattranscendentalphenomenologyisaformof“transcendentalsolipsism”thatcollapsesthebeingoftheworldandofotherpeopletoakindofabsolutetranscendental“intra‐subjectivity.”Nonetheless,Husserl’ssolutionisstrictly“transcendental”andneverpresupposestheactualexistenceofanyoneatall.Comparewithhisremarksonthetreethatneednotexistinbeingperceived(IVAabove)andtheworldthatneednotexistformetohaveconsciousexperience(presentsection).
59
ignores.Buthowarewetoavoidtheconsequenceofacompletecollapseinto
idealism—toanembraceofthepossibilityofaself‐sufficientEgo,inwhichthe
“worldassuch”findsitstruehome?Hereitmightseem,inotherwords,thatthereis
nowaytoprove—ortodiscoverinthefirstplace—justwhat“theworld”islike,asa
transcendentworld,apartfromitsmannersofgivennesstoconsciousness,sothat,if
wearetorejectsubjectiveidealism,weseeminglymustgranttheexistenceofa
transcendentworldonlyasamatterofprejudice.Butthisisnotacceptable,
certainlynotforHusserl.Thissortofprejudiceor“blindassumption”isexactly
whatHusserlwantstoavoid,anditiswhyworldlyexistencemustproveitself
throughexperience,andnotvice‐versa.
Husserl’sexperimenthasnotbeenconvincingtomanypeople,butitshould
probablybeviewedasaperfectlyreasonableillustrationofthemorebasic
Husserlianprinciple—namelythepossibilityofaglobalepochéandtranscendental
reduction.Thatis,ifwewishtoquestiontheworld‐annihilationexperiment,
perhapsweneedfirsttoquestionthispossibilityofaglobalepoché.Itisprecisely
overthispointthatthephenomenologistJanPatǒcka,totakeoneprominent
example,takesHusserltotask,arguingthatabracketingoftheveryexistenceofthe
worlditselfisimpossible,forwecanonlydothisforasubsetoftheworld.Moreover,
Patǒckaarguesthattheexistenceoftheworldissomethingwecouldnevereven
attempttodoubt.InhisbookonHusserl,hebeginsbypointingoutthat“…theworld
asawholeisever‐present,presentasahorizon;thishorizonalgivennessis
somethingoriginal.Forthehorizonisneitheraparticularperspectivenoran
60
anticipation.Perspectivesandanticipationsarepossibleonlyonthebasisofit.”111
HethengoesontodisputeHusserl’sequationofa“chaos”withtheabsenceofa
“world”:“Achaos,though,issomethingdifferentthannoworldatall;itisprecisely
anunorderedworld.Anun‐orderedworlddoesnotmeanthenon‐existenceofthe
whole,onlythenonexistenceofawholeofacertaintype.”112InthiswayPatǒcka
correctlyconnectstheworld‐annihilationexperimentdirectlywiththenotionofa
globaltranscendentalepoché,regardingtherejectionoftheoneasentailingthe
rejectionoftheother.113
E.Husserl’sFinalPosition:“TranscendentalIdealism”
IfHusserlisnotasimpleCartesiandualist,thenwhatishe?Firstofall,he
takeshimselftobestartingasuigenerisenterprisethatiswhollyincomparableto
anypriorphilosophicalsystem.Healsotakeshimselftohavegonebeyondtheone‐
sideddebatesofrealismandidealismandtakenahigherroute,likeKant.However,
infact,hecallshisownview“transcendentalidealism”(myemphasis).Inthisway
heinvitestheviewthatheissomehow“anti‐realist,”tousethemodernturnof
phrase.
ManyofHusserl’scritics,bothonandofftheContinent,contemporaneously
aswellasmorerecently,haveregardedhimsuspiciouslybecauseofthisself‐
declared“idealism.”Inthislabeltheyhaveseenthevestigesofanoldmistake, 111Patocka,Jan.AnIntroductiontoHusserl’sPhenomenology.Trans.ErazimKohák.Chicago:OpenCourtPublishingCompany,1996.(p.105)Hereafter“Patocka.”112Ibid.,p.105113Patocka’sconclusionisthatthe“thesis”oftheworld“asawhole”“doesnotinprinciplereducetoanygivennessofaparticular,sothatitsthesiscanneverbeexcludedbysuspendingthethesesofsuchparticulars.”(Patocka,p.105)Andunderthisview,thereductionhastopresupposetheworld,fortranscendentalreflectionitselfrequiresit.
61
namelytoconflateexperiencewiththatwhichisexperienced.Indeedthe
philosopherJ.N.Findlay,EnglishtranslatoroftheLogicalInvestigations,rejected
Husserl’slaterphilosophyinpartbecauseofjustthisturntowards“idealism.”114
Andthisiscomingfromanself‐avowed“rationalmystic”!Butthesamewastrueofa
verydifferentgroupofthinkers,Husserl’sownsometimefollowers—including
AlexanderPfänder,AdolfReinach,andJohannesDaubert—oftheso‐called“Münich”
schoolof“realist”phenomenology.Dauberthadwrittenadetailedcommentaryon
IdeasIinshorthand,onlyrecentlytranslated,againtakingissuewithitsidealism.115
(Daubertarguesforthe“primacyofthereal”andforconsciousnessasamere
“function”ofreality.)Husserlhimselfrarelyusestheterm“idealism”inIdeasI,but
thereisnodoubtthatthetextembracesakindofidealism,whichwewillinvestigate
below,inhisefforttosecureforphenomenologythepositionof“first
philosophy.”116
InHusserl’saccount,consciousnessisnotclosed,butopen‐to‐the‐world.The
meaning“theworld”verymuchbelongstoconsciousexperienceasanintegraland
necessarypartofit—andcertainlyinactsofsense‐perception,inwhichthe
intentionalobjectsarethingslike“chairs”and“cats,”encounteredphysically‐
transcendently—butalso,lessdirectly,inallotheracts.Husserlwasthusnota 114See,forexample:Findlay,J.N.TheDisciplineoftheCave.NewYork:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1966,p.162:“ThisiswhyadeeplyreflectivethinkerlikeHusserl,whosewholetraininginthethoughtofBrentanomadehimwaryofallthemorefacilesnaresofidealism,nonethelessveeredtowardsidealisminhislaterphenomenology.”(myitalics)SeealsotheinterestingarticlebyDavidCarrentitled“Findlay,Husserl,andtheEpoché”(Ch.5ofStudiesinthePhilosophyofJ.N.Findlay,eds.Cohen,Martin,andWestphal,Albany:SUNYPress,1985),esp.pp.154‐5115The“code‐breaker”wasKarlSchuhmann.SeetheessaybySchuhmannandBarrySmithentitled“AgainstIdealism:JohannesDaubertvs.Husserl’sIdeasI.”ReviewofMetaphysics38(1985),pp.763‐793.116Ofcourse,therearescholarswhowoulddisputeeventhisclaim.DallasWillardinsiststhatHusserlisinfacta“realist,”forexample.ButsinceHusserlcalledhimselfatranscendentalidealist,itseemstobehooveusatleasttounderstandinwhatsensehemighthavetakenhimselftobeone.
62
subjectiveidealist,certainlynotbydesign.117Forhim,theworldexistsverymuch
independentlyofparticularactsofconsciousness.Theaprioricorrelativity(ashe
wastolatertermit)ofworldandconsciousnessisamatteroftheworld’sgiving
itselftoconsciousnessincertainfixedanduniformmanners,whicharethemselves
anchoredincertainessentialtypesofsubjectivityand“subjective
accomplishment.”118Inotherwords,itistosaythatwecannotmakesenseofa
worldthathasnointrinsicconnectiontoapotentialoractualsubjective
experiencingofthatworld,justasthereisnowaytounderstandsuchan
experiencingwithoutaconcomitantprincipleofanobjectiveornoematicpole
throughwhichtheworldbecomesmanifestandgiveninitsactualityinperceptual
experience.
ButoneoftheconsequencesofHusserl’sidealismisthedenialthatthereis
anymeaningfulsortofreality,suchasphysicalreality,thatcanbecomede‐coupled
fromthemindatalllevels.Husserl’swayofputtingthepointisasfollows:
“…thewholespatiotemporalworld...hasthemerelysecondarysenseofabeingforaconsciousness....Itisabeing...determinedandintuitedonlyassomethingidenticalbelongingtomotivatedmultiplicitiesofexperience:beyondthatitisnothing.”119
Fromthepointofviewofthephenomenologicalattitude(asopposedtothenatural
one),whatthingsareissimplywhattheyareforconsciousness.Butsincethe
phenomenologicalattitudeisphilosophicallytruerandsuperior120tothenatural
117HeexplicitlyrejectsthelabelinIdeasI,129118Crisis159‐60119IdeasI,p.112120Cf.:“Fromthetranscendentalstandpointoneunderstandsthenaturalattitudeasa‘lower’stance,orwhichsaysthesame,thenaturalattitudeisalreadytranscendental,yetwithoutknowingit.The
63
(becauseitisfreerof“presuppositions”),itfollowsthatweshouldobeyitsauthority
whenitrevealsthattheessenceofworldlybeingistobedependentonanother,ina
waythatdoesnotapplysymmetricallytoconsciousnessitself.Wearestillnot
talkingaboutexistential‐causaldependence,however.Wearenotclaimingthatthe
worldisafictiongeneratedbytheimagination,orthatitismerelyavariantof
consciousnessitself.Afterall,becauseconsciousnessisinherentlyintentional,itis
alwaysalreadyaconsciousness“of”things,ofits“surroundingworld”—which
Husserlalsomakesclearisaconstantgroundinawaythatimaginedand
rememberedworldsarenot.Sotheworldcannotbedismissedorsubjectivized;but
itcanberevealedasabeingdependentforitsmeaningonanother,andthisis
consciousness.
Yetcanwenotturnthisargumentback,andarguethatconsciousnessis
similarlydependentforitsmeaning—asconsciousness—ontheworld?Notfor
Husserl,crucially.Thereasonisremarkablysimple:acertainsortofprimordial
subjectivityremains,asaresidue,afterallotherthings—allexistentialclaims—have
beenbracketed.Actsofconsciousnessremain,andtheyremainintuitively
accessibleasjustwhattheyare,withouttheinterferenceofany“presuppositions.”
Theexistenceofconsciousnessisnotsomethingweclaim;it—the“transcendental
ego”—isthebasisforthemakingofanyvalidclaimswhatsoever.Itistheultimate,
timeless,andprimordialsourceofmeaning.Husserldoesnotclaimforitthestatus
naturalattitudeis‘implicate’inthetranscendentalperspective.”(Luft,225)Only,wemightwishtomakeadistinctionbetweenrawnaturalexperienceandsuchexperienceasladenwithrealistic“assumptions,”thelatterbeingthefull“naturalattitude”asHusserldescribesit.
64
ofagodhead,however.Strictly,itisneither“human”nor“divine.”(!)Yetitcertainly
isself‐contained:
“[C]onsciousnessconsideredinitspuritymustbeheldtobeaself‐containedcomplexofbeing,acomplexofabsolutebeingintowhichnothingcanpenetrateandoutofwhichnothingcanslip,towhichnothingisspatiotemporallyexternalandwhichcannotbeaffectedbyanyphysicalthing...”121
Nowironically,thissortofremarkhaspreciselytheeffectofcircumventingthe
possibilityofdualism.ForwhatHusserlistellingusisthat(pure)consciousnessis
notsomethingonthesamelevelaseither“physical”thingsor“mental”ones(non‐
”purified”subjectivethingslikeparticularhumanegosandtheir“real”
components),andthatitisnotindeedathingatall,butthebasisonwhichallthings
becomeknownanddefined.Whetherweagreewithhimornot,wemusttake
seriouslyhisownclaimtoberevealinganundiscoveredcountry,asitwere,whose
terrainhasneverbeforebeenseen.ItisasiftosaythatHusserlclaimstohavefound
(orrediscovered,afterDescartesandothers)theaccesspoint,itselfneitherpartof
theworldnorotherthanit,tothecomprehensibilityofthatworld(anditself).This
structureistheultimateconcernof“philosophy,”nowunderstoodas
“transcendentalphenomenology”—thestudyoftheunderlyingstructures,oragain
theoriginsof,122experienceandexperienceablereality.
WemightendthissectionwithanextendedquotefromHusserl,inwhichhe
himselfneatlysummarizesthebulkofhispositioninIdeasI.Hopefully,bynowthe
readerwillbefamiliarwiththeconceptsdiscussedherein:
121Ibid.,p112122Ibid.,p.131
65
“Therealmoftranscendentalconsciousnessastherealmofwhatis,inadeterminedsense,‘absolutebeing,’hasbeenprovidedusbythephenomenologicalreduction.Itisprimalcategoryofallbeing(or,inourterminology,theprimalregion),theoneinwhichallotherregionsofbeingarerooted,towhich,accordingtotheiressence,theyarerelativeandonwhichtheyarethereforeallessentiallydependent.Thetheoryofcategoriesmuststartentirelyfromthismostradicalofallontologicaldistinctions—beingasconsciousnessandbeingassomethingwhichbecomes‘manifested’inconsciousness,‘transcendent’being—which,aswesee,canbeattainedinitspurityandbeappreciatedonlybythemethodofthephenomenologicalreduction.Intheessentialrelationshipbetweentranscendentalandtranscendentbeingarerootedalltherelationshipsalreadytouchedonbyusrepeatedlybutlatertobeexploredmoreprofoundly,betweenphenomenologyandallothersciences—relationshipsinthesenseofwhichitisimplicitthatthedominionofphenomenologyincludeinacertainremarkablemannerallothersciences.”123
Ofparticularnotehere,forourpurposes,istherepeateddeploymentofvariantsof
“being”and“ontological,”aswellasthenotionofa“realm”of“transcendental
consciousness.”Transcendentalphenomenologyisbothanepistemologyaswellas
akindofhigher‐orderontology—ascience,tomodifyAristotle,of“beingqua
known.”
IV.ConcludingReflections
PartofthedeepappealofHusserl’sphenomenologyisitsappealtointuition,
toexperience,andtoevidence.This“evidentialism”(myword)givesphilosophya
mandatetobe“responsible”tothefacts,sotospeak,andaccordinglytothe“things
themselves.”ItiswhyHusserlcouldspeakofphenomenologyasthe“genuine”
123Ibid.,p.172
66
positivism.124Ontheotherhand,Husserl’sdefinitionofexperienceandintuitionare
broadenoughtoappealtonon‐empiricists(andevenKantians),forwhomsensory
experienceistheonlytrueformofintuition.Husserlincludessuchactsascategorial
intuitionandideation.Weareableto“experience”logicalentitiesandmathematical
ones,and,throughactsofimaginationandmemory,non‐existentones.Thereisonly
oneultimateprincipleofevidencetowhichonemuststrictlyadhere—theso‐called
“principleofprinciples”:
“Noconceivabletheorycanmakeuserrwithrespecttotheprincipleofallprinciples:thateveryoriginativepresentiveintuitionisalegitimizingsourceofcognition,thateverythingoriginarily…offeredtousin‘intuition’istobeacceptedsimplyaswhatispresentedasbeing,butalsoonlywithinthelimitsinwhichitispresentedthere.”125
Husserlmakesknowledgeamuchmore“democratic”enterprisethanwasever
beforeconceived—allintuitiveevidenceofanykindcantakeoncognitivevalidity.
Atthesametime,Husserlforcesthephenomenologisttobedisciplinedby
remainingtruetothisevidenceandonlythisevidenceinmakingknowledgeclaims.
Butifthisisallthatphenomenologyconsistsin—evidentiaryrigoranda
widescopeforcognition—thenitisunlikelyHusserlwouldhaveattractedsomuch
oppositionbylater(andcontemporary)phenomenologiststhemselves.To
understandthisreactiononemustturntotheboldandchallengingformof
intentional“idealism”thatIdeasIerects.Itis,essentially,anexplanatoryframework
forthepossibilityofknowledgeinlightoftheseeminggulfbetween,asMcDowell
124Ibid.,p.39125Ibid.;Husserl’sitalics
67
hasmemorablyputit,“mindandworld.”126Husserlshowsusthatinfact,thetwo
areintertwinedatalllevels,eventhougheideticallydistinct.Buthowisthis
possible?Howcantherebeaworldthatgivesitselftousevenwhilethisgivennessis
subjecttostrictrulesgovernedbythelifeofanessentiallyun‐worldlyEgo?Howis
thisnottobethoughtofasanythingmorethananarbitrarypositingofaquasi‐
Leibnizian“pre‐establishedharmony”?Whatistheessential,innerlawthatwould
makethefusionoftherealandtheidealanactuality,andnotablindhope?
ItwouldseemthatHusserl’s“transcendentalego”doesnotsomuchoffera
solutionasitliterallygivesanametojustthishope—itisapromise,anearnest,
ratherthanasolution.ItdoesnotimproveonHegel’s“AbsoluteSpirit”andinfact
lacksthelatter’sunivocal(inthiscase,ideal)nature.Husserl’stheoryasksfora
separationofessencefromfact,realfromideal,transcendentalfromnatural—all
thewhileinsistingthatnosuchcleavagescompromisehisvisionofpureanddirect
cognitionofthe“thingsthemselves.”Thisisatoughsell.Foristherenotan
unavoidabletensionbetweenanyformoftranscendentalidealismandthenotionof
“transcendentthings”?Solongasthesearemerely“immanenttranscendencies,”
doesnotHusserl’spositionveerprecipitouslytowardssubjectiveorabsolute
idealism,albeitclearlyagainsthisownintentions?Itisinfactthelatterhidden
possibility—thepossibilityofan“absolute”idealism—thathoversconstantlyover
hisworkintheidealistphase.Yetthereareevendeeperreasons—reasonsthatthe
structureofHusserl’sownsystemprovidesuswith—tobelievethatHusserl’s
“transcendentalidealism”isintrinsicallyorientedtowardsabsoluteidealism,by
126McDowell,John.MindandWorld.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity,1994
68
tendencythatis.Thiscanbeseenthroughtheinevitablelogicof“attitudes”that
Husserlleavesforthemostpartinexplicit.
Husserliantranscendentalidealism,aswehaveseen,dependsonthecrucial
distinctionofthenaturalandtranscendentalattitudes,andhenceonthepossibility
ofatranscendentalreduction.Inthisrespectitisexceedinglyimportanttoregard
thetwoattitudes—naturalandtranscendental—asbeingatdifferentlevels.Thatis,
thenaturalattitudeisnotmerelyreplacedbythetranscendental;fromthenatural
attitude,wetradeuptothetranscendentalattitude.Onitsown,thenaturalattitude
isfalse,sinceitmakesassumptionsabouttheindifferenceofmindandworldthat
arethemselvesfalse.Thenaturalattitudehastobeovercomeandreplacedbythe
transcendentalifwearetodorealphilosophyandhence“know”theworldaround
us.Somuchismerelyreview.Thetranscendentalattitudeistheoneinwhichreality
isknownasitreallyis;thenaturalattitudeisbutaprelude.Yet,doweeverstop
being“naïverealists”?Istherenotan“everydayness”thatpervadeseventhe
transcendentalphilosopher’sexistence?ItisimpossibleinHusserl’ssystemtohave
bothattitudesatonce,however,sincethenaturalattitudecontainscommitments
thathavetobegivenupinthetranscendentalattitude;theyaremutuallyexclusive.
Yetiftheyweremerelyincommensurable,onecouldnotbecalledsuperiorto
another,andtheresultwouldbeaformofrelativism.Butsincethetranscendental
attitudeisclearlysuperiorforHusserl,whowasstronglyanti‐relativistwemight
add,itwouldseemtomethatitisonlylogicaltoconcludethefollowing:thatthe
transcendentalattitudeisatahigherlevelthanthenatural,butalsocontainsallthe
truthandlegitimacy(basically,therawintuitivity,withoutforexamplethemistaken
69
theoreticalassumptionsregardingtherealexistenceofintuitedobjects)ofthe
former,andinsuchawayastosublateit.Thuswecanstillexperiencethenatural
attitudelegitimately,solongaswesubordinateittothetranscendentalassoonas
weareinapositiontobegintotrulyunderstandwhatweexperience“naturally.”
Thetranscendentalattitudeisthusanimprovementoverthenaturalattitude;itisa
clear‐eyedviewofthebilateralconstitutivenexusofexperienceandthat‐which‐is‐
experienced,groundedinintuitiveevidencewhichcomestous“naturally.”Andso
thenaturalattitudeisthusovercomebythe(phenomenological)philosopher,who
goesbeyonditwhileretainingthefirst‐orderexperientialdata,morphicandhyletic,
disclosedinitsdomain.
Whatdoesthispicturetellus,finally?ItexplainsexactlyHusserl’sown
convictionthatthetranscendentalattitude,whichisitselftheattitudeof
transcendentalconsciousness,disclosesaself‐standingrealmofbeingthatincludes
butovercomesthebeingofNature,whichismerelydependentonthe“pure”Being
ofConsciousness.Externalexistenceinthe“naïve‐realist”sense,sotospeak,is
revealedtobeafictionnativetothenaturalattitude.Itisnottobetakenseriously
bythosethatknowbetter,namelythat“externalexistence”isitselfonlya“meaning”
generatedinandthroughconsciousness—namelyperceivingconsciousness.Icall
this“absoluteidealism”notsimplytoechoHegelortheGermanIdealistsbutto
drawonHusserl’sownlanguage—hehimselfuses“absolute”todescribethebeing
ofconsciousness(quaphenomenologicalresiduum).Thephenomenological
reductionisthusakintheopeningofaneye,adeliveryfromdarkness.Itisnomere
modificationofthepsyche—indeed,itleavesthepsycheitselfbehind!
70
Thereisapressinggeneralquestion,therefore,regardingthe“bracketing”
procedure,oratleastthewayHusserlemploysitinIdeasI,namelywhetherit
necessarilyentailsasortofsubjectivismfromwhichthereis,properly,noreturn.
Husserl’stranscendentworldispreservednominallyafterthereduction,butonlyas
a“meaning.”Husserl’sunderstandingoftranscendenceiscomplex,anditmay
legitimatelybewonderedwhetherhehastrulyrepelledtheghostofsubjectivism
fromenteringhissystem.Thishasbeenperceivedasalackofappreciationofthe
depthofthe“alterity”ofthings,muchinthewayHusserlhasbeensimilarly
criticizedfornotsufficientlyexplainingtheothernessofotherpeople.
AnotherquestionthatarisesinreadingHusserlregardstheverypossibility
oftranscendentalphenomenologyinthefirstplace.Thisisthesourceofoneofthe
greatpuzzlesandchallengesoftranscendentalphenomenology.Thatis,howcanwe
overcomethenaturalattitude,asHusserlinsiststhatwemustinordertoenterinto
knowledge,ifitisalreadysosuccessful,byitsverynature,inbindingustoitsdoxic
spell?Husserlframesthetaskofbreakingfreeasamatterofbeingdisciplinedand
rigorous,butthequestionreallyhasmoretodowithprinciplethanwithdegree.For
justhowisitthatitisevenpossibletoknowone’sexperientiallifeasitislived
withoutremainingsomehowinthatveryexperientiality—thatis,inthe“natural
attitude”?Thisisnotmerelyaquestionofthepossibilityof“reflexivity.”For
reflexiveconsciousnesscanstillbeexplainedwithinthenaturalattitude:Icanthink
aboutmythinking,treatingitasanobjectlikeanythingelse.Thetranscendental
attitudeinvolvesmorethanthis;itinvolvesareflexivityblendedtogetherwitha
thoroughgoing“bracketing”ofthewholeworldItakeforgrantedineverydaylife.It
71
involvestherejectionofnaïverealisminthemostcategoricalofterms.Sohowis
transcendentalphenomenologyitselfpossible?
Itisinconnectionwiththisquestionthatwecometoacharacteristic
hermeneuticdifficultyinIdeasIandtranscendentalphenomenologygenerally.127To
beabletoseethenaturalattitudeassuch,tobeabletoformtheessentialconceptof
itandmakeitathemeofreflection,istohavetopresupposetheself‐transcendence
ofthenaturalattitude.Oneisalreadyinthetranscendentalattitude,inotherwords,
fromtheverybeginningofthetextofIdeasI—oratleast,onehastobethereto
properlygraspitscontents.Yethowarewetogetthere,withoutfirstusingthe
phenomenologicalmethod,thatis,withoutfirstbracketingourownassumptions,
etc.?
Thephenomenologicalreductionhasadistinct“doublemeaning.”Thereisan
obviousandimportantsenseinwhichtheepochéinvolvesakindof“withdrawal”
fromtheworld.Itisanexclusion,or“bracketing,”ofthenatural“factual”world,a
flighttoalevelof“pure”insight.Buttranscendentalphenomenologyisalsoamove
awayfromthe“theories”developedinthe“naturalattitude”andhenceareturntoa
moreprimordialandauthenticlayerofexperience—ofthenatural,factualworld!To
over‐emphasizetheformeraspectisofcoursetopushHusserlintomysticism,while
thelatterpresseshimtoodeeply,potentially,intothebowelsofnature,thedreaded
zoneofopaque“fact.”Yetunlessweacceptastoryofsublation,inwhichHusserl
comesdangerously(tohismind)closetoabsoluteidealism,therewouldseemtobe
anunresolvedtensionbetweentranscendentalsubjectivityandthe“naturalorder”
127ThiswasalreadypointedoutastutelybyRicoeur.SeeKey,p42&pp.48‐9
72
attheheartofHusserl’ssystem.128Itismyconsideredview,then,thatHusserlmust
beanabsoluteorunmitigatedidealist—onewhodeniesanyco‐ultimacyof“natural”
realitywithtranscendentalconsciousness/subjectivity—onpainofthepotentialfor
hissystemtodissolveintoincoherenceandpermanentvacillationbetween
transcendenceandtranscendentality.
128SomecontemporaryHusserlcommentators,forexampleDonnWelton,havearguedthatitwouldbeashametobaseone’sentireunderstandingonHusserl’stranscendentalprojectonIdeasI.InWelton’swords,the“Cartesian”approachofthistextis“trappedintranscendentalpsychologism,”andshouldbecontrastedwiththemuchmorepromising“Kantian”approachHusserllater(insufficiently)developed.(Welton,p.287)Thismaybeso,butaswehaveseenalready,evenWeltonrecognizesthattherearemultipleandparallelpathsinHusserl’sownthinking.WhetherHusserlevertrulyresolvedthetensionsIspeakofisanopenquestion.
73
ChapterTwo:TheConstitutionofNature,Body,andSpiritinHusserl’sIdeasII129
“Ifphilosophybeginswiththenaturalattitude,williteverleaveitbehind,andifitcould,whywouldit?SucharethequestionsthatbotherHusserl,andwhichexplainthecontradictorypositionsthathetookontheconstitutionofNature.” ‐‐MauriceMerleau‐Ponty130
I.Introduction
IfIdeasIaimsthroughtheepochéandreductiontointroduceHusserl’s
transcendental‐phenomenologicalmethod,thenIdeasIIaimstoshowusthebeing
oftheworldasrevealedbythismethod.Thelattertextisthus,onemightsay,the
ontologicalcomplementtoitsmoreepistemological‐methodologicalpredecessor,
whilethebriefIdeasIII131,thefinalpieceinthetriad,isakindofhybridofboth.The
129IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.(HereafterIdeasII.)ThepresentchaptercoversbothIdeasIIandIdeasIII.(IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,ThirdBook:PhenomenologyandtheFoundationsoftheSciences.Trans.TedKleinandWilliamE.Pohl.TheHague:MartinusNijhoffPublishers,1980.HereafterIdeasIII.)ButIwilltalklessfrequentlyofthelatter,owingtoitsbrevityandrelativelackofsubstance,ascomparedtoeitherofthefirsttwovolumes.Itdoes,however,containsomeusefulmaterialforourpurposes.BriefattentionwillalsobegiventooneofHusserl’slecturesfrom1919.(Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaMaterialienbände,BandIV.NaturundGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1919.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.HereafterHusserl1919.)130Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003(p.79)131Itisofcoursethemiddle,muchlongeranddensertextthatistheprimarysubjectofthischapter.
74
lattertwovolumespresupposeapriorperformanceoftheepochéandreduction,
alongwiththetranscendental‐idealisticturnthatgowiththem.ThisallowsHusserl
todiveintotheburningquestion,leftwideopenafterIdeasI,astojustwhatthe
worldissupposedtolooklikeoncethereductionhastakenplace—notonlythe
world,ofcourse,buttheworld‐occupyingselfwho,initstranscendentalguise,has
madethesenewvistaspossible.
IdeasIIisthusbothanextensionaswellasadeepeningofitsnominal
predecessor,thoughit’struethatthetwotextshardlyhaveacomparablehistoryof
development.Althoughmuchofitwaswrittenaroundthesametime(1912‐1915)
asIdeasI,IdeasIIwasbeingrevisedthroughoutHusserl’slife,andhewasnever
satisfiedtohaveitpublished.132IdeasIIIalsoremainedunpublishedinHusserl’s
life‐time,butitwasrevisedhardlyatallbetweenthetimeitwasfirstdraftedand
Husserl’sdeath.133Thepublishedandauthor‐endorsedIdeasIwashugely
influential,bothpositivelyandnegatively,butamazingly,sowasthelong‐
undergroundIdeasII.NolessthanHeideggerandMerleau‐Pontywereshaped
decisivelybythework,whilemanyothers—AlfredSchütz,PaulRicoeur,etc.—felt
compelledtocommentontheworkandrespondtoitsremarkablecontents.134As
132SomemakemuchofthefactthatEdithSteingaveagooddealoftheshape(andoveralltitle)totheworkinher1918redaction.Iwilladdressoneparticularscholar’s(ElizabethBehnke’s)thoughtsonthematterinthenextchapter.133FordetailedinformationonthepublicationhistoryofIdeasII,seetheTranslator’sIntroductiontotheEnglisheditionofthework(IdeasII,xii‐xvi).134ThecaseofMerleau‐Pontyisclearandobviousfromhisownwritings,aswewillseeinthisandsubsequentchapters.AsforHeidegger,NenonmakesaconvincingcasethatHeideggerwas“directlyandimmediately”influencedbyHusserl’snotionsofthe“personalisticattitude”and“Umwelt.”(See:IssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996,p.x.VolumehereafterreferredtoasIssues.)Luckily,alengthysynopticstudyhasbeendonebyPaulRicoeur,whosenumerousjudiciousobservationswewillhavemultipleoccasionstoconsultandinterpretinthecourseofthepresentstudy.See:Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLesterE.Embree.Evanston:Northwestern
75
fortherelativedearthofliteratureonthebookanditsringsofinfluence,inthe
wordsoftheeditorsofarecentcollectionofessaysonthework,“thereisanalmost
inverseproportionbetweentheinfluencethatHusserl’sIdeasIIexercisedon
importantphilosophicaldevelopmentsinthiscenturyandtheattentionithas
receivedinsecondaryliterature.”135
ThefactisthatIdeasIIisanamazing,aswellasfearsomelycomplex,foray
intoalargearrayofproblems,amongthemthemind‐bodyproblem,theso‐called
problemofthehumansciences(whattheyareandhowtheydiffermethodologically
andregionallyfromnaturalsciences),theproblemofpersonalidentityand
motivation,andmanyothers,allunitedintenuouswaysunderthebanner“studies
inconstitution.”IdeasIIcomplementsIdeasIbutalsogoeswellbeyonditinmany
regards.Itcanfruitfullybereadasasupplementtoorforeshadowerofallphasesof
Husserl’slaterthought.Forexample,itanticipatesandevenpartiallydevelopssome
ofthemainthemesoftheCartesianMeditations(intersubjectivity,empathy,
“monadology”)aswellastheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciences(thelife‐world,or,asit
were,the“surroundingworld”—Umwelt),andwhilemostly“static”(likeIdeasI),it
beginstoincorporateelementsofgeneticphenomenologyaswell,atleastinits
thirdpart.Itstandsonitsown,however,aswell.Itfeaturesthemostdetailed
examinationofthebodyHusserleverproduced—thisbeingtheprobablerootofits
singularimpactonsubsequentContinentalthought.Itisalsothesourceof
UniversityPress,2007.(pp.35‐81)Hereafter“Ricoeur.”ThereisalsoashorterbutimportantearlyessayonIdeasIIwrittenaroundthesametimebyAlfredSchütz,whichIwillunfortunatelynothavetimetoaddressinthischapter.See:Schütz,Alfred.“EdmundHusserl’sIdeas,VolumeII.”InPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,13:(pp.394‐413)135TheeditorsareThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.(Issues,p.ix)
76
numerousinsightfuldistinctionsbetweennature,soul,spirit,Ego,andperson—
thoughtheseareoftenimpossibletoreconcilewithoneanotherharmoniously,as
wewillsee.Forultimately,IdeasIIissimplytoostuffedwithgoodideastomakea
singleconsistentargument(or,phenomenologicallyspeaking,aconsistentsetof
eideticdescriptions),whichmaybeoneofthereasonsHusserlwasneverfully
satisfiedwithit.Indeed,muchthatisintroducedandpartlydevelopedinIdeasIIis
notdevelopedalltheway,evenbyHusserl’sstandards.Thehistoryofthetextand
itseditingbymultiplehands(Husserl,Stein,Landgrebe)alsomeansthatitishighly
unevenanddisorganizedinplaces,andcanhardlybesaidtohaveaconventionalor
evenlogicallysoundstructure.
Itiswisethen,ontheonehand,nottotreatIdeasIIasaunifiedwholeso
muchasacollectionofinvestigatorystrains.Ontheotherhand,theskeletonofIdeas
IIasatextistheclosestwewillcometoaglimpseofwhatmightbecalleda
complete“Husserlian(regional)ontology.”136Husserl’sconstitutionalanalyses,
takenattheirfacevalueasgroundedintuitively,aremeanttorevealtousthebeing
ofthewholeworldofpositivebeing,of“whatis”(pantataonta),fromthelowestor
mostfoundationalstratum,thatof“physicalistic”nature,tothehighest,the
reflectingpersonal(or“spiritual”)Ego,alongwithitscollectiveculturalformations
(“personalitiesofahigherorder”).Andallofthishasintrinsicphilosophicalinterest
foramyriadofquestionsusuallyunderstoodas“metaphysical”—materialismand
136Husserldistinguishesbetweenformalontologyandregionalontology.Inthischapterweareconcernedwiththelatter,thatis,withthekindsofbeingsthatmakeuptheworld,specificallythe“ontologicalregions”ofmaterialnature,animalnature,andspirit.(See:Drummond,JohnJ.HistoricalDictionaryofHusserl’sPhilosophy.Lanham,Maryland:ScarecrowPress,2008,pp.78‐9,151,180.Hereafter“Dictionary.”)
77
themind‐bodyproblem,forexample—inthesameway,perhaps,thatthe
phenomenologicaltheoriesofintentionalityorperceptionaddressclassical
questionsof“epistemology.”AsIwillargueinthischapter,Ireadthetexttobea
continualbalancing‐act—whichresemblesmoresoasee‐saw—betweennaturalistic
andanti‐naturalisticstrainsinHusserl’sphilosophy,bothofwhicharestronglyon
displayinthetext.ThecontradictionsofthetextareusefulforthestudyofHusserl
generallybecausetheyarereflectiveofthedeepestunderlyingtensionsofhis
phenomenologicalsystem.Theygototheveryissues—thenatureofidealismand
thetranscendentalego,thenature‐spiritdivideandthedivisionofnaturaland
humansciencesintheirrelationtophenomenology—thatoccupiedHusserl,and
remainedunresolved,untiltheendofhislife.
Ofcourse,thesearealsotheveryissuesthatconcernusinourstudyof
HusserlandMerleau‐Pontyonthequestionofthemeaningofnatureanditsrelation
to“spirit”andconsciousness.IdeasII(andIII)teachaconfusingdoublelesson—on
theonehand,the“spiritualityofnature”(asHusserlputsitinanothertext137),
particularlyintheformoftheliving,feelingorganismasliving;andontheother
hand(andthisiswhatdominatesHusserl’saccount,allthingsconsidered),thestrict
bifurcationofnatureandspirit,notnecessarilyintermsofdistinguishingthe
transcendentalego(consciousnessinits“irreal”iridescence)fromreality,butin
termsofcarvingouttwoseparateontologicalorderswithintherealmofthe“real”
itself(andwithinwhichthe“body”figuresverydifferentlyineachrespective
sphere).Combinedwiththesedifficultiesistheequallycentralconfusionbetween
137Husserl1919,186
78
thenatureof“spirit”vis‐à‐visthatof“consciousness”or“transcendental
subjectivity,”thelatterofwhichofcoursefiguressoubiquitouslyintheschemeof
Husserl’sprojectasawhole.Thisparticularissuegoestotheheartoftheambiguity
betweenHusserl’sdistinctionbetweenontologyandphenomenology,therealand
thetranscendental,and,inadditiontothepriorambiguitiesaboutnatureandthe
body,makeitpossibletoseewhereHusserl’stranscendental‐phenomenological
projectstartstounravelsomewhatfromwithin.Ormorecharitablyspeaking,these
problemsseemtocallforatransformationofHusserlianphenomenologicalproject
inamoreunifieddirection,oneofwhichhappenstoinvolveamoreimmanentized
andembodiedconceptionoftheego(whichoughtnotbeentirelyalooffrom
ontology)andamoreecstatic,“enworlded”conceptionofthebody(whichoughtnot
tobeentirelyalooffromtheego).ThisisthedirectionultimatelytakenbyMerleau‐
Ponty,forwhomthetranscendentalegomustsituateitselfsomehow(andnever
whollycomfortably)innatureitself,namelyasapoweroffinitereflection,capable
ofacertain“eideticseeing”butincapableofabsolutetransparencyorafinalvictory
overitsall‐too‐naturalGrund.Thus,Merleau‐Ponty’sentireoriginalproject,one
mightsay,isfirstmadepossiblebythevolatilerupturesofIdeasII.138Butwewill
havetowaitbeforeweexaminethis“secondhalf”ofthestoryinmoredetail,in
Chapter3(andbriefly,intheconclusionofthepresentchapter).
InpartIIofthischapterIwillprovideadetailedoutlineofthegeneral
ontologicalmatrixsketchedoutbyHusserlinIdeasII(andcontinuedinIII),
138Ofcourse,hereitiswelltokeepinmindVoltaire’shighlyappropriatemaximaboutthemistakesof“truegenius”:“C’estleprivilègeduvraigénieetsurtoutdugéniequiouvreunecarrière,defaireimpunémentdegrandesfautes.”(SiècledeLouisXIV,ch.32)
79
accompaniedbysomecriticalcommentary.Then,inpartIII,Iwillproduceatextual
analysisinwhichIbothlayoutwhatItaketobethemostinterestingproblems—in
boththeneutralandpejorativesensesoftheterms—ofHusserl’spresentation.Iwill
concludewithsomereflectionsonIdeasIIand,asmentionedabove,somethoughts
onhowMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophycanbeunderstoodasaresponsetoand
developmentofthethemes(andtensions)oftext.UltimatelyIwillarguethatwhat
emergesfromHusserl’sontologicalmatrix(incombinationwiththeposition
alreadystatedinIdeasI)isacomplex,andfinallyself‐inconsistent,combinationof
ontologicaldualismandphenomenologicalmonism,inspiteofanotherwise
promisingforayintothehybridityofthelivingbody.
II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III
A.Introduction
Aswehavealreadyindicated,IdeasII/IIIconcernsthe“constitution”of
reality.Inthewordsofonecommentator,“IdeasIIcanberegardedastheattemptto
regain[afterIdeasI]realitybycatchingitupinthesamenetwithpure
consciousness.”139Thatis,whereasthesubject(inthesenseof“topic”)ofIdeasIis
consciousnessanditsgeneralintentionalstructure,thatofIdeasIIisthereality
139Tymieniecka,Anna‐Teresa.“FromHusserl’sFormulationoftheSoul‐BodyIssuetoaNewDifferentiationofHumanFaculties.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983(p.4)
80
constitutedinconsciousness,arealitywhichhasitsownvariouskinds,strata,and
typesofgivennesstobedistinguishedandrelated.Inthisway,reductionand
constitutioneventuallyemergeastwocomplementarypolesofphenomenological
method140,andtheyhaveremainedsoeversince.
Butwhat,precisely,is“constitution”?Definingitisabittricky.AsDermot
Moranexplains,itismoreofan“operative”asopposedto“thematic”conceptin
Husserl,andthusittypicallyremainsundefinedbyhim.141Onecould,however,
defineitroughlyintermsofthespontaneousproduction(inthesenseof“making
available,”not“creation”)ofobjects.Onespeaks,forexample,ofconsciousness’
constitution“ofthematerialworld,”forexample,oragainof“otherpeople”(inthe
senseofintersubjectivity)—inthesensethatconsciousnessmakessuchbeings
available.Thus,thenotionofconstitutionemphasizesthe“objective”aspectofthe
“correlationalapriori”ofconsciousnessandobject,whilereduction,bycontrast,
emphasizesthesubjective,or“constituting”aspect.Nowtheprincipleof
constitutioniswhatallowsustospeakofHusserl’s“ontology,”thatis,ofthe“being”
ofthings“inthemselves,”intermsofwhattheyfundamentally(essentially)are,so
longasweremember,inthewordsofCobb‐Stevens,that“transcendental
philosophyrefusestobeabsorbedeitherbyasociologyofpersonalreciprocityora
philosophyofobjectivespirit.”142Thatis,wecanspeakofHusserl’sunderstanding
ofthe“being”ofthings(broadlyspeaking)butonlyintermsoftheirnoematic
140Dictionary,54‐5141Moran,Dermot.IntroductiontoPhenomenology.NewYork:Routledge,2000(p.164)142Cobb‐Stevens,Richard.“Body,Spirit,andEgoinHusserl’sIdeasII.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.(p.252)Hereafter“Cobb‐Stevens.”
81
“sense,”itselfrevealedviathephenomenological(andobviouslyeidetic)reductions.
Husserl’sontologyisthereforethestudyofreality‐as‐constituted‐in‐transcendental‐
consciousness.143Thisisnoematic,asopposedtonoetic,phenomenology.144(Atany
rate,thedisciplinesofphenomenologyandontologyareparallelforHusserl,
differingonlythrough“shiftinview”—thatis,thephenomenologicalreduction.145)
IdeasIIpresentsanexhaustiveorderingofthevarioussense‐layersof
objectivity—materiality,animality,humanity,sociality,etc.,plusmanyintermediate
layers—thatareconstitutedbyconsciousness.146BothIdeasIIandIIIhavethesame
orderofpresentation,intermsofstartingfirstwiththe“lowest”(andself‐
independent,inpurelymaterial“things”147)stratumofmaterialnature,andmoving
“upwards”topurespirit.Thisorderingiscuriouslytheexactinverseofthe
“ontologicalpriority”Husserlgivestospiritandthe“spiritualattitude”inwhich
thingsarefirstconstitutednotaspurelymaterialatall.Butthisisjustoneofthe
143Thuswhile“naïverealism”isdestroyedthroughthereductionandthetransitiontothetranscendentalattitude,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatphenomenologyisnotphenomenalism;itdoesnotreducerealitytoappearance,itstudiesrealityinitsappearing(aswellasthesubjectivitytowhichrealityappears,whichcaninturnbestudiedforitsownsakeaswell).144Amoretechnicaldefinitionof“constitution”isofferedbyRicoeur:“Toconstitutesignifiesonlytointerrogateasensebyexplicatingthesignificationalintentionstowhichthesensecorrelates.Hence,thejobofconstitutionremainsbelowthelevelofinterpretation.”(Ricoeur65)Overgaardoffersperhapsthesimplestwaytounderstandtherelationbetweenreductionandconstitution:“…theactualrelationbetweenconstitutionandtranscendentalphenomenologicalreductioncanbedescribedasonebetweenwhatwewanttounderstandandthemethodbywhichweareabletounderstandwhatwewanttounderstand.”See:Overgaard,Søren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingintheWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004(pp.59‐60)Hereafter“Overgaard.”Gadameroffersthis:““Constitution”isnothingbutthe“movementofreconstruction”[Wiederaufbaubewegung]thatfollowsafterthereductionhasbeenperformed.”(CitedbywayofOvergaard,59.)145“Butallclarifyingontologicalinsightexecutedintheframeworkofaxiomaticclaritythatisnotdirectlyphenomenologicalbecomessuchbyamereshiftofview,asconverselyinthewholeofphenomenologicalinsightstheremustbethosewhichbecomeontologicalthroughamereshiftofview.”(IdeasIII,90)146Althoughthisisnotdiscussedinasmuchdetail,consciousnessalsoconstitutesitself,insofarasitmakesitselfanobjectofobservationand(self‐)perception.147Seefn27,below.
82
manyparadoxesofthetext.148Itisalsoimportanttonotethatfromthevery
beginningofthetext,Husserl’sexaminationofontologicalregionsiscorrelatedwith
atypeofscientificortheoreticalactivity—forexample,purenaturewithphysics,
thesoulwithpsychology,thelivingbodywiththe(seeminglyinvented)scienceof
somatology,etc.—aswellas,inmostcases,anattitude,anothercentralbut
operativeHusserlianconceptordevice,alreadydiscussedinourchapter1(pp.8‐
11.)Theontologicalregionofspirit,studiedbythe“humansciences,”iscorrelated
withthe“personalistic”or“spiritual”attitude,andtheregionsofmaterialand
animalnaturewiththe“naturalistic”attitude.AsHusserlnowputsitinIdeasII,“A
changeinattitudemeansnothingelsebutathematictransitionfromonedirection
ofapprehensiontoanother,towhichcorrespond,correlatively,different
objectivities.”149
B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality
1.MaterialNature
RicoeurremarksthatHusserl’sgestureinthereductionofIdeasIisto“reject
natureas‘alien,’as‘anotherbeing.’”150Itdoesthis,ofcourse,tomakewayfora
senseof“consciousness”notreducibletothatof“nature”—toeffectaKantian
“Copernican”turn,sotospeak.InIdeasII,Husserlsoftensthe“otherness”ofnature
bygivingbotha“material”aswellas“animal”dimension.Thustherearethesethree
148Itcanactuallybeexplained,however,intermsofwhatIwilllatercallHusserl’s“naturalism”—hisimplicitacceptanceandadoptionofthemodern‐scientificconceptionofnature.149IdeasII,221150Ricoeur,57
83
divisionsofthetext:“materialnature,”“animalnature,”and“spirit.”151Alreadyfrom
thisitisclear,however,thattheunderlyingdichotomyinHusserl’sconstitutional
analysisinIdeasIIisthatof“nature”and“spirit.”Husserlhimselfconfirmsthe
impressionwhenheannounces:“…wehavetwopoles:physicalnatureandspirit
and,inbetweenthem,Bodyandsoul.”152
ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbytheterm“nature”or“natural”153?Husserl
speaksof“nature”inadoublesense,154itsreferringontheonehandonlytothe
“physical,”andontheotherhandtoboththephysicalandpsychicasasinglereality
(thepsychophysical,living‐ensouled,etc.).Theformeris“natureinthefirstand
originalsense.”155Inthelattercase,thepsychic“stratum”is“founded”onthemore
basicmaterialsub‐stratum.ThispointiscentraltoHusserl’sontologyandis
stressedbyhiminthefollowingquote(fromIdeasIII):
151Husserladdressedthe“nature/spirit”dividerepeatedlyinhiswork,fromhislecture“LogikalsTheoriederErkenntnis”(1910/11)tohislastfullwork,theCrisis(1936),usuallyinthecontextofthequestionoftherelationsbetweenthenaturalandhumansciences,andbetweenallsuchsciencesandphenomenology.ForanoverviewofhistreatmentsofthesetopicsseeMichaelWeiler’sextensiveEditor’sIntroductionto:HusserlianaXXXII,GesammelteWerke:NaturundGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1927.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2001,pp.XVI‐L.(Volumereferredtohereafteras“Husserl1927.”)152IdeasII,298153Atthispoint,afurtherterminologicalnoteisinorder.Severalterms(andtheircognates)mustbedistinguishedfromeachother,namely“nature/natural,”“physical”or“material,”and“real.”Husserlassignsthesetermsmoreorlesstechnicalmeanings.Wemaythusregardtherelationshipbetweennature,reality,andphysical(ormaterial)inthefollowingway:natureinthe“first”senseisthepurelyphysicalormaterial;natureinthesecondsenseistherealmofanimalityor“embodiedness”and“ensouledness”;nature,takeninitstwosensestogether,isstillnotallof“reality,”forrealityencompassesnatureandspirit,which,takenbyitself,isstrictlynonnaturalinHusserl’ssense.ThusforHusserlthereisadistinctionbetween“allthereis”—thetotalityof“worldly”(or“intramundane,”byanotherlocution)reality—andnatureas“thefieldoftranscendent—specifically,spatiotemporal—realities”thatis“nature.”(IdeasII,3).Allofthesedistinctionswillcomeintoplayabundantlyasweproceed.154Husserl’sexpression:Ibid.,145155Ibid.,171.Compare:“thesoul,too,isofcourseapersistentbeing.Butthispersistentbeingisno‘nature.’”(IdeasII,355)SeealsoHusserl’sremarkthat“reality”istobespokenof“inthefirstplaceasnature”(IdeasII,420)…Healsoreferstotheformersenseof“nature”asthe“strict”sense.(SeeHusserl1919,pp.136‐7)Unlessotherwisespecified,Itoowillusetheterm“nature,”inreferencespecificallytoHusserl’sviewsthereof,inthisstrictsense.
84
“…psychicrealityisfoundedintheorganismalmatter,butthisisnotconverselyfoundinthepsyche.Moregenerallywecansay:thematerialworldis,withinthetotalObjectiveworldthatwecallnature,aclosedworldofitsownneedingnohelpfromotherrealities.Ontheotherhand,theexistenceofmentalrealities,ofarealmentalworld,isboundtotheexistenceofanatureinthefirstsense,namelythatofmaterialnature,andthisisnotforaccidentalbutforfundamentalreasons.Whiletheresextensa,ifweinquireofitsessence,containsnothingofmentalnessandnothingthatwoulddemandbeyonditselfaconnectionwithrealmentalness,wefindconverselythatrealmentalnessessentiallycanbeonlyinconnectiontomaterialityasrealmindofananimateorganism.”156
Husserlalsoregardsnaturetobe(asisstatedalreadyinthefirstlineofthework!)
the“objectofthenaturalsciences.”157Suchanearlyandexplicitinvocationofnatural
science,perhapsseeminglyinnocuoustosome,infactrepresentsahugeandfateful
concessiontothemodernphysicalisticworld‐view,whichHusserlwillbeatpainsto
reverseinwaysthatcompoundthelatentdualistictendenciesofhisthinking.Allof
thiswillhopefullybecomeclearerasweproceed,especiallyinpartIII.158
Husserl’snotionofnatureisthusatoncescientific,inthesenseof“Galilean‐
Newtonian,”aswellasbroadly“Kantian.”Natureisbyitsessence“extended,”hasa
definitespatiotemporallocation,isgovernedbythelawofcausality,is“initself”
devoidofsecondaryqualities,etc.159Thoughaspeciesofthenaturalattitude,the
natural‐scientificornaturalisticattitudeinvolvesakindofepochéandreductionof
itsown,abracketinginthiscaseofallaxiologicalandpracticalpredicates.160Inthis
156IdeasIII,104157IdeasII,3158Itisnotthepurposeofthecurrentchaptertoofferanalternativeconceptionofnature,butthiswillcomeinchapter4,whichisdevotedtothistopicasitisdevelopedbyMerleau‐PontyinhisNaturelecturesandotherlaterworks.159IdeasII,80‐2.Itshouldbeaddedthatthefullsenseof“nature”isutterlyintersubjective.Thatis,asolipsisticsubjectcannotconceiveofthatbasicnaturalentity,the“thing,”asopposedtowhatHusserldescribesatlength(andforthefirsttimeinIdeasII)asthe“phantom.”160Thoughitisnotmerelyamatterofbracketingbutofsubordinatingthem:“Fromthestandpointofnature,everythingpersonalissubordinate.”(IdeasII,194)Husserldoesnotgiveanyindicationthatthenaturalisticattitudeis—asitappearstosomemodernreaderstobe—thoroughlyhistoricaland
85
way,“nature”purelyspeakingdoesnothaveanyhumansignificance,value,or
utility;itsimply“is.”161Thiswilleventuallyleadtotheneedtoplace“spirit”above
“nature”in“ontologicalpriority,”butthisdoesnotsomuchasdignifynatureas
swallowitupinhumanculturalactivity.162
2.AnimalNature,ortheBody‐and‐Soul
WhenHusserlspeaksofthebody,hesometimesdescribesitintermsofa
“plus”thatisappresentedinsomephysical“things,”towhichbelongsthenewsense
of“livingbeings”(orbodies),somethingmorethanmeremateriality,though
somethingthatis,again,alsodependentonmaterialityasits“substratum.”163
HusserlgenerallytreatstheBody164(Leib)inconjunctionwiththesoul(Seele,
Psyche).However,itisimportantforustodistinguishthis“psychophysical”
composite,i.e.,theliving“ensouled”organism,fromthe“body”regardedasadouble
reality165—i.e.,asthatwhichiseither“body”(Körper,body‐thing,Ding)or“Body”
(Leib,livingbody).Infact,therelevantdistinctionstomakeareatleastthefollowing
five:
a)ThebodyasaJanus‐faced“doublereality,”towhichpertaintwolinesofrealcircumstances,”materialandpsychic.(Iwillrefertothisassimply“thebody.”)
conditionedbythevagariesoftheepoch.Instead,hepresentsitasa“timeless”attitude,whicheventheancients,forexample,mayhaveperformed,butsimplydidnothavetherightinformationtodo.161PerhapsintheSartreansenseofabsurdlybeing“there,”detrop?ThiswouldhelpexplainSartre’sowndualisticappropriation(“initself”and“foritself”)ofHusserlian(bywayofHegelian)phenomenology.162Seefn106,below,andalsofn107.163IdeasII,97‐99164IamfollowingtheusefulconventionoftheEnglishtranslatorsofIdeasIIofsignifyingLeibwith“Body”andotherreferencestothebodywiththelower‐case“body.”(IdeasII,XIV‐XV)165Ibid.,297
86
b)Thebodyasbody‐thing,orslabofmatterinspaceandtime,subjecttoforcesofnaturalcausality.(“body”whenthecontextisclear,otherwise“Körper”or“body‐thing”)c)Thebodyasa“thing”“inserted”betweentherestofthematerialworldandthe“subjective”sphere;166also“ownbody”d)ThebodyasLeib,thelivinganimateorganism,oranimal,whichpossessesapsychicalorsoulishstratum,appresentedwithitsmaterialsubstantiality.e)Thesoulorpsycheitself,whichformstheupperstratumoftheLeib,thelowerstratumofwhichismaterialNature.
Ofcoursethepictureisstillmorenuanced.Forexample,thereisatthelevelofthe
Bodythelevelofsensations,includingkinaestheticsensations,whichisthe
“aesthesiologicalbody,”whileatahigherlevelthereisthe“volitionalbody,”which
isresponsiblefor“acting”inthesenseof“willing”andactingonthe“Ican.”167
Husserl’streatmentofthebody‐soulrelationisveryinteresting.Thesouland
theBodyareintertwined.Thusinthisrespect,HusserlsideswithAristotle,soto
speak,ratherthanPlato:“thesoulisindeedeveronewiththeBody.”168Therecan
indeedneverbeaseparationofsoulandBody,apointHusserlmakesdramatically
throughadetaileddiscussionoftheapriorieideticnecessityforevenaghostto
haveaBody.Withoutabodyofanysort,noghost,herebydefinitiona“phantom”in
Husserl’suniquesense,couldbeperceivedorapperceived(orforthatmatter
hallucinated);appresentationofthepsychealwaysoccursthroughperceptionof
certainkindsofbodies.169Thissortofdiscussioninfactraisestheinteresting
counter‐imagetothatofthemindasa“ghostinthemachine.”Forinthecaseof
166Ibid.,169167Husserlspeaksofthe“Ican”asapracticalto‐be‐able‐tothatispriortodoing(e.g.,Ibid.,273),an“originalconsciousnessofabilities”thathelpsustoconstitutetheworldwithwhichImayinteract.“WhatIcando,whatisinmypower,whatIknowmyselfcapableofandamconsciousofassuch,thatiswhatapracticalpossibilityis.”(Ibid.,270)Itisonlythisthat“canbeathemeofmywill.”168Ibid.,176169Ibid.,100‐2
87
Husserl,theimagecouldn’twork:fortheghost,beingalreadyembodied,couldnot
besaidtoneedyetanotherbody(“machine”)tobe“in.”Inthiswayitbecomes
obviousthatHusserl’sconceptionofthe“leibischseelisch”being,thepsychophysical
organism,cannotbeidentifiedwith,say,Plato’sorDescartes’explicitremarkson
theseparabilityofmentalandphysicalsubstances,ifwemeanbythiswhatHusserl
calls“soul”and“Body.”170
ButdoesHusserlactuallygotoofarinthedirectionofanti‐dualismofBody
andsoul?Thereisasense,forexample,inwhichHusserl’sviewis
epiphenomenalistic.171Remarkingforexamplethat“thethingandthewholeof
naturearesealedoff,”hegoesontoargue:“Psychicalconsequencesarejoinedto
naturalprocesses,justaspsychicalcauseshaveconsequencesinnature,butthey
aresuchthatintruththeyhavenoinfluenceonnature.”172Husserlseemstosealthe
dealashedescribesthenatureofcausalityitself:“Itisclearthatcausalityof
physicalnaturehasinfactapre‐eminentsense.Thiscausalityisaconstitutiveidea
fortheideaofnature,fortheideaofaphysicalthing…Forreasonsofprinciple,the
psychicisoutsidethisnexus.”173
170WehavealreadyseeninthepreviouschapterhowHusserldepartsfromDescartesinthisrespect;aswewillsee,however,Husserl’sissueswithontologicaldualismremain,nowwithrespecttoanalternatedichotomyof“nature”and‘spirit.”ThusHusserlclosesonedoortodualismonlytoopenanother.Ricoeurputsitwell:“thepsycheanimatingthebodyisnotequivalenttotheculturalandcommunalrealizationsofman.InreintroducingthedimensionofpersonandthatofcommunityHusserlcompletestheego‐psychepolaritywithanewschemawherespirit(Geist)isnottheempiricalcounterpartofthepuresubjectofphenomenologybutisratherasortofculturalequivalentmuchmoreawkwardtosituateinthephenomenologicalstructure.”(Ricoeur,68‐9)171Cf.Ricoeur,67172IdeasII,355173Ibid.,353.Seealso:“thesoulisabeingthatisrelatedconditionallytoBodilycircumstances,relatedinaregulatedwaytocircumstancesinphysicalnature.”(IdeasII,356)Nonetheless,“epiphenomenalism”isnottheonlypossibilityforwhatHusserlisdescribing,whichisalso,forexample,consistentwithakindofLeibnizianparallelism.
88
ButbeforewefurtherinvestigateHusserl’snotionofthesoul,letuscome
backtothebodyas(a),asdoublereality.Alreadyatthelevelofitsmaterial
thinghood(b),thebodyisspecial.Thatis,ithasaparticularlyhighvalueandcentral
importancefortheanimalorhumansubject.Itis,firstofall,centraltoperception.It
governsthesystemofunfoldingofadumbrations,forexample,dependingonits
positioninspaceandtime,thepositionoftheeyesandlimbs,andsoon.Asathing
perceived,theown‐bodyiscertainlyathingofaunique“type”—forexample,as
beingthecenter,ortheNullpunkt,oforientation,inreferencetowhichallother
“things”areconstitutedintermsoftheirnearnessorfarness,abovenessor
belowness,rightnessorleftnesstomy“absolutehere.”The‘subjectoftheBody”is
ofcoursealways“here”and“inthecenter,”evenasthebodyasmaterialthingis
constantlyinmovement.174Furthermore,because“Idonothavethepossibilityof
distancingmyselffrommyBody,ormyBodyfromme,”subsequently,thebodyisfor
me,perceptuallyspeaking,a“remarkablyimperfectlyconstitutedthing.”175There
arepartsofthebodythatIcannotsee,some(suchasmyeyes,ormyback)evenin
principle.Thereisnootherpossiblematerialobjectofwhichthismaybesaid.As
“my”Körper,then,theownbodyishighlyunique.Andthisisofcoursetosay
nothingofitsaxiologicalandpracticalimportancetous,matterswhichare
bracketedinthenaturalisticattitude.Itisnotathingjustlikeotherthings,even
insofarasitismerelya“thing.”
Asliving‐body(d),however,thebodyisnota“thing”atall—itsessenceis
whollyotherthanthis.Becausethelivingbodyandthesoulareintertwined,itis 174Ibid.,166175Ibid.,167
89
possibleandevenpropertospeakof“myself”asalivingbody.(“Iamhurt”—not
“thislegisimpaired,butIamokay.”)Aswehaveseen,whatdistinguishestheliving
bodyfromthesenseofmaterialthingistheelement,orstratum,ofsoul.Howissoul
firstconstituted?Essentially,itisfirstconstitutedbythesolipsisticsubjectwith
respecttothe“own”bodyand,onlylater,extendedthroughempathytoother
Bodies.Thequestionoftheconstitutionofthesoulsofothersisessentiallythesame
questionasthatofintersubjectivity,whichwastobedealtwithmorememorably
andextensivelyintheCartesianMeditations(andtheIntersubjektivitätHusserliana
volumes).176
Thewayweexperiencetheownbodyinitspsychicalaspect(indeedasone’s
own)isthroughthebody’sbeingthe“localizedbearerofsensations.”177Thisis
essentiallytheexperienceoftactility.Thusitisonmyhand,hereinthisspotthatI
canfeelthewarmthofaglowinglight‐bulb,orbackthereinthemiddleofmyback
thatIcanfeelthistwingeofpain.Inthisway,Icometoknowmybodyasafeelerof
sensations,andthroughthesesensations—includingkinaestheticsensations—Ican
infactexperiencemyselfasbeinginspace,occupyingthisorthatregion,myfingers
beinginsuchandsuchposition,etc.Inthisway,theBodyis,inthefirstplace,
“medium”or“organ”ofperception.”178Equally,however,mybodyisthe“oneand
onlyObjectwhich,forthewillofmypureEgo,ismoveableimmediatelyand
spontaneouslyandisameansforproducingamediatespontaneousmovementin
176Ofcourse,Husserl’snotionsofempathyvary.ButinIdeasII,theemphasisonmethodologicalsolipsismseemstobestrong.Thusatthelevelofintersubjectiveapprehension,Iseethat“…myappearancesbelongtome,histohim.”Andthusweeachbelongto“subjectiveworlds”ofourown.Andsoon.(IdeasII,166‐7)177Ibid.,152‐5178Ibid.,61
90
otherthings…”HenceHusserl’sdefinitionoftheBodyas“freelymovedtotalityof
sense‐organs.”179Inanycase,allofthesedefinitionsareultimatelytobe(ineffect)
subordinatedtohowtheBodyisconstitutedforconsciousnessinthespiritual
attitude,specificallyasthe“expression”ofspirit.
SincesomuchinthedistinctionofKörperandLeibturnsonthesoul,wemust
ask,whatexactlyisthesoul?Asaregionofrealityorobjectivity,wehavealready
seenthatitisinseparablefromtheBody.Butitisalso,Husserlsays,astratum
foundedonmaterialnature,and—intheclassicalGreeksense—itiswhat
“animates”thismatterandinvitesustoapperceivea“motivatingagent”behindit.
Husserlhimselfdefinesitformally(butcircularly)as“…thebearerofapsychiclife
togetherwiththesubjectivepossessionsofthatlife,andassuchitisaunity
extendingthroughtime(thesametimeinwhichtheBodyendures).”180Ricoeur
crypticallydescribesHusserl’spsycheas“aconstitutedrealitywovenintothe
surroundingworldofthepureego,”181whichistosay,thatitisnottobeconfused
withtheegoorthepersonalspirit.Afterall,eventhelowestofanimals(Husserl
saysremarkablylittleaboutplants)hasasoulbutnoegoorGeistigheit.182Yetapart
fromitsinterrelatednesswiththeBody,thestatusofHusserl’s“soul,”atleastin
IdeasII,ismorethanalittlemurky.183
179Ibid.,61180Ibid.,134(myemphasis)181Ricoeur,52182“Thepersonasspirit,asperson,hasself‐consciousnessoranEgo(whichisthesame);asouldoesnotneedtohaveself‐consciousness.”(Ibid.,361)183Ricoeur,too,seesabasicambiguityinthesoul(myletter‐designationsofdifferentmeaningsofthebodyareinbrackets):“Thusweareledtotheambiguityofthepsyche.Itparticipatesinsubjectivitysinceitisthesoul[e,intermsofthemenuofbody‐meaningsabove]thathasitsbody[d],andalsoinobjectivity,sinceitisthebody‐thing[b]thathassensations[c].Thisbodyisapartofthings,andyetthepsychewhichinhabitsitisthecenteraroundwhichtherestoftheworldis
91
3.Ego
Thequestionofthepsycheisinseparablefromthatofthe“ego,”especiallyin
humansubjects.184AsweknowfromtheturntowardstheegoaftertheLogical
Investigations,theegohasbeencentraltoHusserl’sphenomenologicalconcerns.In
IdeasII,Husserlarguesthattheego“cannotbethoughtofassomethingseparated
from…livedexperiences,fromits‘life,’justas,conversely,thelivedexperiencesare
notthinkableexceptasthemediumofthelifeoftheEgo.”185Husserl’segoisalso
describedasa“rulingpart”ofthesoul.186Itwouldseem,then,thattheEgobeing
discussednowisthemundaneone,the“empiricalego”asopposedtothe
“transcendental”one.Thisiscertainlytrueofthefollowing:“Wecanalso
understandthatinconstitutednature,theBodyandtheBody‐soulunityare
constitutedandthattheempiricalEgoistheEgoofBodily‐psychicnature.TheEgo
isnotitselftheBodily‐psychicunitybutlivesinit.ItistheEgoofthesoul…”187
ButtheentirediscussioninIdeasIIoftheegoassuchis,infact,framed
aroundwhatHusserlcallsthe“pureego.”Andthepureegois,Husserlexplains,
“immutable,”188beingclearlyunlikeeitherthesoulortheBody.Muchofwhat
HusserlsaysaboutintheegointhisveinisfamiliarfromIdeasI,exceptthathere,in
IdeasII,itis,again,the“pureego”ratherthanthe“transcendentalego”thatisunder
grouped.”(Ibid.,64).Husserlseemstobeawareoftheambiguityinsofarasheassignsthebodya“quasi‐nature”and“quasi‐causality.”(IdeasII,145,356)184“…theexplorationofthepsychicapperceptiveEgoisonlyonelevelofthegeneralinvestigationofthepsyche.”(IdeasIII,17)185IdeasII,105186The“personalEgo…functionsso‐to‐sayastherulerofthesoul.”(Ibid.,150)187Ibid.,350188“…initselfthepureEgoisimmutable.”(Ibid.,110)The“immutability”oftheegohasnothingofcoursetodowithimmortality,butmeansratherthat“…insteadofgeneratioandcorruptio,tothepureEgotherepertainsonlytheessentialpropertythathasitssteppingforthanditsreceding,thatisbeginstofunctionandholdswayactivelyandthatitceasestodoso.”(Ibid.,110)
92
discussion.Buttheyare,finally,probablythesame.Ricoeurtacitlyacknowledges
thishimself:“Thedistinctionbetweenthepureego,productofthephenomenological
reduction,andthehumanego,arealityofthisworld,isaconstantinHusserl’s
thought;itseparatesphenomenologyfrompsychology.”189Thatthediscussionof
thepureegoseemstobehardtodistinguishfromthatofthetranscendental,is
evidentfrompassageslikethese:
“Infact,thepureEgoisindeednothingotherthanwhatDescartes,inhismarvelousMeditations,graspedwiththeinsightofgeniusandestablishedassuchonceandforall,thebeingofwhichitisnotpossibletodoubtandwhichinanydoubtwoulditselfnecessarilybefoundagainasthesubjectofdoubt.”190
“ThereforeitisnottobeconfusedwiththeEgoastherealperson,withtherealsubjectoftherealhumanbeing.Ithasnoinnateoracquiredtraitsofcharacter,nocapacities,nodispositions,etc.”191
“TheEgo…doesnotappear…isgiveninabsoluteselfhood…AspureEgoitdoesnotharboranyhiddeninnerrichness;itisabsolutelysimpleanditliesthereabsolutelyclear.”192
Husserldoesnotmakethingsmoreclearwhenheidentifiesspiritwiththeego
cogito(evidentlythendistancingspiritfromperson193),aligningitnowwiththe
Cartesian“Ithink.”194Inthatcase,the“pureego”wouldencompassbothempirical
(spiritual)andtranscendentalpoles.Butwewillleavethematterhereuntilwetake
189Ricoeur,52(myemphasis)190IdeasII,109191Ibid.,110192Ibid.,111193Cobb‐Stevensdefinesthepersonasthe“fullconcreteunityofsoulandbody.”(Cobb‐Stevens,250)TosaythisofthetranscendentalegowouldbetomundanizeitinawayunacceptabletoHusserl.Onthedistinctionofpersonandtranscendentalego,Cobb‐Stevenswrites:“thepersonistooinvolvedintheUmweltbyreasonofpragmaticmotivationstobecompletelyidentifiedwiththephilosophicalvoicethatdescribesthestratumofspirit.”(Cobb‐Stevens,253)194Seeforexample,IdeasII,109.
93
upinpartIIIthequestionoftherelationofthetranscendentalego(consciousness)
withournextconcept‐theme,“spirit.”
4.Spirit
SuddenlyinIdeasIIHusserl(or,ifwelike,the“narrator”)signalsaradical
shiftinperspectivethatwillusherinthethirdsectionofalreadyexhaustingly
demandingwork:“theanalysisof[materialandanimal]natureinourconsideration
ofnaturethusprovestobeinneedofsupplementation.Itharborspresuppositions
andconsequentlypointsbeyondtoanotherrealmofbeingandofresearch,i.e.,the
fieldofsubjectivity,whichnolongerisnature.”195Thus,weenterintotherealmof
spirit,homeofthehumansciences,culture,personhood,andeverythingthat,inthe
classicalhumanist‐philosophicaltradition,makeshumanbeingssupposedlystand
outfromnaturequanature,materialoranimal.AccordinglyHusserlsaysofthe
distinctionofsoulandspiritthatit“isthefundamentaloneinthisentiregroup.”196
Thisatfirstsurprisingremark(isnotthedistinctionof“nature”and“spirit”infact
themostimportant?)ismotivatedbythefactthatthesoul,whilecertainlynota
“thing”inthenarrowestsense,isstillenvelopedintheclosedcircuitofthenatural
order.Thesoulisstillanaturalbeing.
Relatedtothisisthe“personalistic”attitudeasavariation,orrathera
privilegedtype,of“naturalattitude.”InIdeasI,weweremadeawareonlyofa
divisionbetweennaturalandtranscendentalattitudes,andnotofanyinternal
divisionorhierarchywithinthenaturalattitudeitself.Butnow,inIdeasII,welearn 195Ibid.,180(myemphasis)196Ibid.,181
94
thatthenaturalattitudeisdividedintoatleastthesetwo:the“naturalistic,”which
takesitscuesfromnaturalscience,andthe“personalistic,”whichisclosertothe
everydaylifeandeverydayworldinwhichwenaively,butmeaningfully,exist.Thus
Husserlannounces:
“[The]‘naturalistically’consideredworldisofcoursenottheworld.Rather,givenprioristheworldastheeverydayworld,andwithinthisariseman’stheoreticalinterestandthesciencesrelatedtotheworld,amongwhichisnaturalscienceundertheidealoftruthsinthemselves.”197
Husserladdsimmediatelythat“thispregivenworldisinvestigatedfirst[myitalics]
withrespecttonature.Thenanimaliahavetheirturn,humanbeingsbeforeall
others.”Bethatasitmay,thescientific‐theoreticworldofblosseSachenisitself
“reduced”outoftherawmaterialoflived,personalandinterpersonal,functionally
andaxiologicallymeaningfullife,alifelivedinwhatHusserlnowcallstheUmwelt
(“surroundingworld”).198
Itisevidentfromvarioussupplementalsections199thatinIdeasII,Husserlis
developinghisnotionof“spirit”throughathinking‐throughofthedistinctionof
naturalandhuman—thatis,cultural—sciences.Husserl’ssotosayconcessionto
naturalscience,grantingitfreereignoverthehumansoulintheformsofbiology
andpsychology,hasseeminglytriggeredacertainneedtoregainforhumanitya
dignityandsingularity.Afterall,itiswewhodophenomenology—or,itisinusthat
197Ibid.,219.GivenHusserl’spositionthatboththenaturalandhumansciencesaretheoretical,andthatthenaturalisticandpersonalisticattitudesarecorrelatedtothemrespectively,theclaimthatthelatterispriorto“theory”isconfusing,butperhapsjustmoreevidenceofHusserl’sconflationofthetranscendentalandspiritualattitudes.(SeePartIIIbelow.)198Cf.Dictionary,234‐4199SupplementXII,II,forexample,makesitverycleartheextenttowhichHusserl’sconceptionsof“spirit”and“theperson”aredevelopedinthecontextofdistinguishingnaturalfromhumansciences.(IdeasII,351‐82)
95
phenomenologyoccurs.Inasmuchasitisregardedasafoundedstratumofthe
Body,itselfa“doublereality”whoseaspectas“materialthing”placesitsquarely
withinthe“causalnexus”of“nature,”thehumanbeingisanobjectofnatural
science.ButHusserlwantstoaddtothispicturebyarguingthatthereisanother
sensetothe“humanbeing,”anon‐naturalisticsense,thatregardshim/heras
“subject”ofaction,feeling,valuation,andsoon,ratherthanas,say,thingoranimal.
Butonceagain,Husserlprobablygoestoofarintheprocessofcompensation(ifthat
iswhatheisdoing).Forfromtheperspectiveofthehumansciences,naturalscience
isitself,asawhole,nothingbutaculturalachievement,anaccomplishmentof
personsactinginconcert.Husserlnowcompletelysupplantstheindependent
integrityofthenaturalsciences,whichheelsewhereseeminglystrugglesto
maintain,and,aswewillseebelow,fallsintoapuresubjectiveidealism.
Aswehavealreadyseen,Bodyandsoul,andhenceanimality,areexcluded
fromtherealmofthestrictlyspiritual.Admittedly,“…Bodyandsoulare“naturein
thesecondsense”properlyspeakingonlyaccordingtothesideturnedtoward
physicalnature.”200Ontheside“turnedtowardspirit,”Bodyisinfactthe
“expression”ofspirit,likethemeaningofawordthatisexpressedbytheletterson
apage.Butjustasidealityisnotsimplylocatedinthewords,neitherisspirit
located,asisthepsyche,inthelivingbody.Itiskeytorealizethatwhenwediscuss
spirit,wearealreadyinthepersonalisticattitude.Thisiswhy,asCobb‐Stevensputs
it,spiritisnotsimplygraftedonsoul,likesoulonbody.201Spiritisnotsimply
anotherfounded“strata”onmaterialandpsychicnature,inthesensethatto 200Ibid.,298201Cobb‐Stevens,252‐3
96
constituteitisalreadytohaveshiftedoutof(sotospeak)thenaturalistic,andinto
the“personalistic,”attitude,forwhichthepsycho‐physicalcompositestudiedin
sciencesimplydoesnotappearinthisform.Itisperhapsforthisreasonthat
Husserlsays(relatively)littleabouttheinterrelationoftheregionsof“spirit”and
“soul,”butoddly,thisiscertainlynottrueabouttherelationofspirittoBody.
Indeed,Husserl’sremarksonthisparticularrelationaresomeofthemost
provocativebutalsoconfusingandcontradictoryinallofhisontological
investigations.Ontheonehand,itmightseemasthoughHusserlwantstoclaimthat
spiritandBodyaretobedistinguishedinthestrongestofterms:
“WhatwefindthenisourselvesasthespiritualEgorelatedtothestreamofexperiences—‘spiritual’hereisusedinameregeneralsense,referringtotheEgothathasitsplacepreciselynotinCorporeality;e.g.,I‘think’(cogito),i.e.,Iperceive,Irepresentinwhatevermode,Ijudge,Ifeel,Iwill,etc.,andfindmyselftherebyasthatwhichisoneandthesameinthechangingoftheselivedexperiences,as‘subject’oftheactsandstates.”202
Butuponscrutiny,itappearslikelythatthe“spiritualEgo”beingreferredtohereis
actuallynothumanspiritatall,butthetranscendentalego.Still,themixingofthe
languageof“spirituality”withthe“Ithink”initsnon‐Corporealityisaclueof
difficultiesinherentinHusserl’sconceptionofa“non‐natural”realitythatis
nonethelessdifferentthantranscendentalsubjectivity.
Atanyrate,HusserlrepeatedlystatestheviewthatBodyhasadistinctroleto
playintherealmofspiritand(whatamountstothesame)culture.“For
phenomenology…theBodyplaysanexpansiveroleintherealmofspirit.”203Forone,
itisthe“expression”ofspiritinamostprovocativesense.Itisthatbywhichone 202IdeasII,103203Ibid.,295
97
graspsthehumanityofahumanbeing,the“personthere,whodances,laughswhen
amused,andchatters…”Anditisnotthe“apprehensionofaspiritfastenedtoa
Body,”buttheapprehensionofthepersonthroughhisbody.204ThusIcansayof
man,inthisattitude,thathe“hasaCorporeality,[he]hasabodywhichisaphysical
thingwithsuchandsuchqualities…”SometimesitisnotclearwhetherHusserlis
speakingofsoulorspirit,asinanearbysectionhespeaksofthefactthat“each
movementoftheBodyis,asBody,filledwiththesoulthroughandthrough…Bodyis
fullofsoul.”Husserl’spointisthatapersonalityemergesthrough,say,aparticular
Body’smovements.Husserlpointsoutthatthisistruenotonlyofthecorporeal
Bodybutofany“body”or“materialthing,”suchastexts,whicharecultural
expressionsofauniquelysignificantkind.205Thisisausefulcluethattherelationof
BodyandspiritthatHusserlisoutlininghereisinfactarelationofspiritandbody
as(a),namelyasbothKörperandLeib.Thatis,spiritisrelatedtothematerialityof
thebodyaswellastoitssoulishaspect,asLeib.Thebodyascomplexduality‐in‐
unityistransformedfroma“natural”complextoa“spiritual”onethroughachange
inattitude,butineithercase,itretainsitsJanus‐facednature.206
204Ibid.,252205Ibid.,248‐50.Onemayspeakofart‐worksorreligiousartifactsaswellpresumably.206Inallofthiswearefocusingonindividualspirits.Husserlhimselfrecognizeswhathecalls“personalitiesofahigherorder”or,whatamountstothesamething,collective“spirits,”suchasnations,clubs,churches,families,andthelike.(Seeforexample:IdeasII,377;or,forparalleltalkofindividualandcollectivesubjects,seesHusserl1919,135.)ThisresemblestheHegeliannotionof“objectivespirit,”butforHusserl,communalsubjectivityisfoundedontheinteractionsofindividualsubjects.Outoftheseinteractions,emergentlyperhaps,higher“wholes”ororganicunitiesthatdeservethenameof“persons”appear.Husserlseemstobasethisonthefactthatwecommonlyspeakofthewill,desires,attitudes,etc.,ofgroupsofpeopleorganizedincoherentwholes,notonlyofindividuals.Thisisnotmerelyanalogousorfigurativelanguageforhim.Nowiftrue,itwouldradicallyalterourconceptionofwhatcountsasa“person”andcouldhavereallegalramifications.ThiswouldberelevanttothecurrentdebateovertheU.S.SupremeCourt’srecentrulingonthelegalrightsof“corporations”undertheU.S.Constitution.(See:CitizensUnitedv.FEC)
98
Relatedtoitssenseasspiritualexpression,theBodyisthemeansbywhich
spirit“…initsfreedommovestheBodyandtherebycanperformaworkinthe
spiritualworld.”207AsRicoeurnotes,everythingnowisa“performance”ofspirit.208
ButthisactuallypointstooneofthemorePlatonistaspectsofHusserl’s
understandingoftheBodyinthepersonalattitude,alreadyhintedatabove.The
Bodyisformeto“use”as“organonofmywill.”AndtheBodyinthespiritual
attitudeismerely“mine”;IamnotoftheBody:
“ItisabsolutelyoutofthequestionthatIamhereencounteringorintendingmyselfassomethingintheBody,asfoundedinit…theBodyismyBody,anditismineinthefirstplaceasmy‘overandagainst,’myobject,justasthehouseismyobject,somethingIseeorcansee,somethingItouchorcantouch,etc.Thesethingsaremine,butnotascomponentpiecesoftheEgo…”209
Admittedly,thiskindofdescriptionthenbecomeshardtosquarewithwhatHusserl
callsthe“unityofBodyandspirit.”210ButtheunityofBodyandspiritinparticularis
complex,inmultiplesenses(i.e.complicated,compounded)ofthatword:
“[Thebody]isatthesametimeapartofnature,insertedintothenexusofcausality,andthespirituallife,whichwegraspthroughtheBodilyexpressionandunderstandinitsnexusofmotivation,appears,invirtueofitsconnectionwiththeBody,tobeconditioneditselfbynaturalprocessesandtobeapperceivedassomethingofnature.TheunityofBodyandspiritisatwo‐foldone,and,correlatively,atwo‐foldapprehension(thepersonalisticandthenaturalistic)isincludedintheunitaryapperceptionofthehuman.”211
Whatthisindicates,perhaps,isthatBodyandspiritare“one”onlytotheextentthat
thelatterisapperceivedthroughtheformer,namelyviatheBody’sappearingasan
207IdeasII,295208Ricoeur,75209IdeasII,223.Thislanguageisalreadyintheearlypartofthetext:see“mymaterialBody,”p.111.210Forexample,Ibid.,259211Ibid.,259
99
expressionofSpirit.Thisitselfoccursinthepersonalisticattitude,butitiswiththe
naturalisticadditionthatwecomefullytograspspirituallifeasbelongingtothe
naturalcausalorder—which,withoutnaturalisticinterference,isnotinfactthe
case.Forspiritisdefinedbymotivationandfreedom,notnaturalcausality.The
bodyinthiswayisthe“pointofconversionfromspiritualcausalitytonatural
causality.”212
III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III
A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism
ThroughouttheIdeasvolumes,andhisphilosophygenerally,Husserlmakes
afirmdistinctionbetweenphenomenologyandontology.213Sciencesof(regionsof)
“beings”presupposea“transcendentalsense.”214Thusphenomenologyisfirstin
methodologicalpriority,beingthe“maternal‐groundofallphilosophicalmethod:to
thisgroundandtotheworkinit,everythingleadsback.”215Becauseofthisclear
prioritizationandtalkofa“ground,”elsewheredescribedasthetranscendentalego,
itbecomespossibletothinkofHusserlasakindof“monist,”namelya
phenomenological(ortranscendental)monist.Atthesametime,Husserl’s“ground”
212Ibid.,299213Cf.IdeasIII,117:“Forinitself…ontologyisnotphenomenology.”214Ibid.,66‐7215Ibid.,69.Husserlgoesontoindicatethatphenomenologyallows“ontologicallyfoundedinvestigation”to“unfolditsfullpower”and“receiveitsfullcertainty.”Butphenomenologyismorefundamental,and“owesnothing”toontologies!
100
isnota“part”ofthe“world”—a“tag‐end”likeDescartes”non‐transcendental
“cogito”—andthereforecannotbeunderstoodintermsofanontologicalmonism.
Therealmofworld‐ontologyremainsrelativelyunder‐thoughtinHusserl,and
thoughnosingleconsistentpositioncanbeteasedoutofIdeasII,inmyviewthetext
comesclosertoaformofontologicaldualismthanHusserlwouldhavewantedto
admit.Someoftheevidenceforthisviewhasalreadybeenfurnishedabove,but
morewillbeprovidedbelow.Muchoftheremainderofthischapterisdevotedto
discussingsomeoftheunderlyingphilosophicalissuesandpressureswhichleadto
thedualisticposition,aswellassomeofthewaysinwhichHusserl’stextseemsto
veerawayfromsucharesult,generallywithoutsuccess.
Thechargeof“dualism”isanoldoneasappliedtoHusserl,anditshouldnot
bebandiedaboutcarelessly.Foronething,thereisacertainnebulousnessinthe
questionofHusserl’sdualismbecauseofthequestionofwhich“dualism”oneis
referringto.Inmyview,thekindofdualisminHusserl,atleastinIdeasIIII,isthat
specificallyofnatureandspirit,not(forinstance)ofbodyandsoul,orof
consciousnessandreality.WehavealreadyseenhowinseparableBodyandsoulare
fromoneanother;indeed,Husserlstressesthepointwhenheclaimsthat“whatwe
havetoopposetomaterialnatureasasecondkindofrealityisnotthe‘soul’butthe
concreteunityofBodyandsoul,thehuman(oranimal)subject.”216Noweventhis
dichotomy,thatbetween“thing”and“animal”—includinghumanbeingas
216IdeasII,146.Thiswouldseemtoruleoutaseparable‘soul‐substance,”butHusserldoesnotallowthistopreventhimfromspeaking,inthemodeofimaginativevariation,ofthe“departure”ofthe“soul”(Ibid.,100),whichleavesonly“deadmatter”behind.HereHusserl’spointisthatitisthesoulishorpsychicdimensionofthehumanoranimalbeingthatmakesitsuch,asopposedtosimply“materialnature.”
101
psychophysicalcomposite—isnottechnicallyadualism,because“thing”and
“animal”bothgounderthegenus,sotospeak,of“nature.”Finally,consciousness
andrealitydonotcompriseadualismforthereasonsalreadyindicated;thefirstis
thegroundofthesecond,andthustheyhavenoparity.Thereisnorealityorworld
withoutconsciousness;butthereisatleastconceivablyconsciousnesswithout
realityorworld(cf.theworld‐annihilationexperiment,whichHusserlupholdsinno
uncertaintermsinbothIdeasIIandtheEpiloguetotheIdeasvolumes).217
Rather,natureandspiritaredualisticbecauseneithercanbeexhaustively
explainedthroughtheother,andtheydonotoverlap.Theyareboth“absolutes,”
correlatedtoalternativeversionsofthenaturalattitude,eachretainingprideof
placeinitsrespectiveattitude.218Thisisnottosayonecannotfindtalkofanoverlap
betweennatureandspiritinHusserl;butwhenHusserlspeaksofthis,ofa
“spiritualityinnature”forexample,heistypicallyreferringto“animalnature”and
doesnotlosesightofthefactthatsuchanimalityisafoundedstratumonmaterial
nature,or,moreimportantly,thatsuch“spirituality”isfundamentallyoutsideofthe
realmof“culture”orthepersonalisticattitude,inwhichthebodybecomesmere
217IdeasII,303.FromtheEpilogue(writtenaslateas1930/31):“thenon‐existenceoftheworldeverremainsthinkable…”(IdeasII,420)Husserlheredrawsthefamiliarlessonfromthis:“…thebeingoftranscendentalsubjectivityhasthesenseofabsolutebeing,thatonlyitis‘irrelative’…whereastherealworldindeedisbuthasanessentialrelativitytotranscendentalsubjectivity,due,namely,tothefactthatitcanonlyhaveitssenseasbeingonlyasanintentionalsense‐formationoftranscendentalsubjectivity.”218ToclaimthatHusserlisaphenomenologicalmonistissimplytoaffirmthefactthatHusserlwasneverunclearabouthisprioritizationof“transcendental”or“phenomenological”or“pure”consciousnessover“reality,”which,taken“onitsown”sotospeak,lacksallsenseand“being”inthefullestsense,andishenceconsciousness‐dependent.Husserl’scommitmenttotranscendentalsubjectivity,whichwasfirstformallyintroduced(inprint)inIdeasI,neverwavered.ButforHusserl,ithadalwaysbeensomehowpre‐ortrans‐ontological;“ontology”comestohavearestrictedsenseinHusserl,alreadyprefiguringHeidegger’sdistinctionbetweenthe“ontic”(beings)and“ontological”(forHusserl,somethinglike“transcendentalconsciousness,”thesourceofallmeaning—thoughfallingshortof“Being”inHeidegger’ssense).
102
organofspirit.Theforegoingremarksarenonethelessnotwithoutcounter‐
examplesinthecourseofIdeasIIandIII.Butwewillexamineallofthesethingsin
moredetailinthesectionsbelow.
B.Husserl’sNaturalism
Husserl’soppositiontoscientificnaturalismislegendary—sohowcanone
speakofhisviewsas“naturalistic”?Theanswerhastodoultimatelywiththe
parallelismofphenomenologyandontology;allthatdifferentiatesthemisthe“shift
ofview”thatisbroughtaboutthroughtheepochéandphenomenologicalreduction.
ThusitisentirelypossibleinHusserl’sframeworktoacceptthemeaningscience
givesto“nature,”its“objectofstudy,”whilealsoclaimingtofindthesourceofthis
meaningintranscendentalsubjectivity,whichisrevealedthroughthe
phenomenologicalreduction.AndthisisjustwhatHusserldoes,asIwillnowtryto
show.
AsmentionedinpartIIofthischapter,oneoftheimportantfeaturesof
Husserl’sconceptofnatureisitstacitacceptanceofthedefinitionofnaturegivenby
thosewhocouldbedescribedasscientific“naturalists.”InDastur’swords,“[In]
IdeasII…scienceisconsideredasadefinitivethoughindirectcontinuationof
perception.”219AsOvergaardnotes,moreover,Husserlclaimselsewhere220thatthe
219Dastur,Françoise.“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(p.72)Hereafter“Dastur.”DasturclaimsinthissamequotethattheCrisisdoesthesamething,butthisisacontroversialpoint.Therelevantmaterialtointerpretincludesthistellinglinefromthelatterwork:“thecontrastbetweenthesubjectivityofthelife‐worldandthe‘objective,’the‘true’world,liesinthefactthatthelatterisatheoretical‐logicalsubstruction,thesubstructionofsomethingthatisinprinciplenotperceivable,inprinciplenotexperienceablein
103
naturalconceptionoftheworldisinnoneedofcorrection,aremarkwhich
Overgaardrightlynotesshouldbetaken“veryseriously.”221Thissortofaffirmation
ofthescientificconceptionisindeedmanifestthroughoutHusserl’s“eidetics”of
natureinIdeasIIII,sincehedefinesnature’sessencepreciselyintermsofthat
whichisthesubjectof“naturalscience”;inotherwords,natureisanontological
regionwithastrictlyprescribedessence,knownbythesciencesalreadyattheir
ownlevel:
“…whatunderliesnaturalscienceisalwaysanideaoftheessenceofnature,ifonlyanimplicitone.Correlatively,theconsciousnesswhichfunctionsasnatural‐scientificexperience,andthusalsoasthethinkingpertainingtonatural‐scientificexperience,hasitsessentialphenomenologicalunity,andthisconsciousnesshasitsessentialcorrelateinnature.”222
Husserlgoesontosayinthequotedpassagethatthetaskofphenomenologyis
merelyto“bring…toclarity”the“natural‐scientificsense”alreadysoimplicitin
naturalscientificconsciousnessitself.Andlateronhestates:
“Tomakeallthesethingsclearandtooutlineaprioritheformofapossibledeterminationofwhatisinitselftrueofnature,adeterminationwhichisrelativelytrueandrelativelynecessaryforeverystageofexperience—thisisthetheoryofnaturalscience;asmethod:thetheoryofnatural‐scientificmethod.”223
Yetinperhapsanevenstrongerstatementthanalloftheabove,Husserl’sdeclares:
“Butitmustbeunderstoodfromwithin,fromphenomenologicalsources,thatthisabstractionfrompredicatesbelongingtothespheresofvalueandpracticeisnotamatterofanarbitraryabstraction, itsownproperbeing,whereasthesubjective,inthelife‐world,isdistinguishedinallrespectspreciselybyitsbeingactuallyexperienceable.”(Crisis,127)220Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXIV,GesammelteWerke:ZurPhänomenologiederIntersubjektivität.TexteausdemNachlass.ZweiterTeil.1921‐28.Ed.IsoKern.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1973(p.278)221Overgaard,Søren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingintheWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004222IdeasII,3‐4223Ibid.,305
104
lefttoone’sowndiscretion,forassuch,itwouldinfactproducenoradicallyself‐enclosedideaofascientificdomainandthusalsonoideaofascienceself‐containedapriori.Yetwedogainsuchanaprioriclosedideaofnature—astheideaofaworldofmerethings…”224
Theargumentthata“worldofmerethings”isan“abstraction”forHusserland
thereforecanbedownplayeddoesnotcarrymuchwater,becauseanabstractionis
notnecessarilydistortiveorarbitrary,andinthecaseofnatureHusserlmakesit
clearthatsuchan“abstraction”isinfactgroundedintheessenceofnatureitself.225
Thereasonforemphasizingallofthishereistoestablishwhatwehavebeen
seeinginchoatelyallalong,namelytheimplicitly“naturalistic”bentinHusserl
himself.Indeed,considertheall‐encompassingextensionassignedbyHusserltothe
conceptofmaterialnature:“Nature…initsformsofspaceandtime,encompassesall
factualrealitiesbutalsoincludes,obviouslyonessentialgrounds,allaprioripossible
realitiesaswell.”226Andagain:“Whatwehavehereistheone“Objective”world,
withtheonespaceandtheonetime,inwhich“everything”isordered—personsas
well,who,inunionwiththeirBodies,leadtheirpersonallives.”227Becauseall
realitiesareconstitutedashigher“strata”ofmateriality,whosebasiccausal
commercedefinesthenaturalandanimalworlds,natureinthepure,physicalistic
sensehasthesenseofbeingthesubstrateofanyothertypeofbeingwhatsoever.
224Ibid.,27225Husserl1919,132.Thereis,admittedly,somedissentonthequestionofhowcloselyHusserladherestothescientificnotionofnature.ThusTheodorou,inarecentarticlearguesthat“…inIdeasII,nature‐thingsaredescribedfromaphenomenologicallylegitimatetheoreticalattitudethatdoesnotnecessarilyadopttheverdictsofnaturalscientifictheoriesaboutwhatis‘merenature.’”See:Theodorou,Panos.“PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserl’sAnalysisof“Nature‐Thing”inIdeasII.”InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,Volume5,eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005(p.169)Astheauthorfullyadmits,however,Husserlisunclearfromthebeginningaboutthisquestion,andpresentlythisisthemoreimportantfact.226IdeasII,30;emphasisadded227Ibid.,219;emphasisadded
105
“Nature”hasthesenseofbeingthegroundof“allthatis”becauseofthefactthat
anythingelsethatisperceived,co‐perceived,orapperceivedmustbeahigher
stratumofarealitythatmustbe,atitsmostbasiclevel,“natural”inthesenseof
“material.”Andagain,whatiskeyhereisasymmetry.Therecannotbeapurely
spiritualbeing,withnomaterialsubstrate,buttherecanbeandofcourseare
materialthingswithnohigherstratum.Allofthiswillmakeitveryhardto
understandHusserl’ssuddendeclarationofthe“ontologicalpriorityofspiritover
nature”(the“PriorityThesis”asIwillbecallingitforshort).
YetHusserlwouldsurelyrespondthatallofthisissupposedtobepredicated
onthenaturalisticattitudesolely,notthepersonalistic.Thedangerthenbecomes
thatofdualism.ItisherethattheactualroleofthePriorityThesiscanbeproperly
ascertained—namelytoavoidjustsuchadualism.Forunderthespiritualattitude,
thenatural‐scientificviewanditsimplicitnaturalisticbias(whichissomehowvalid)
canbeassignedadecisivelysubordinatestatus228:
“Itisthecharacterofthehumansciencestopositsubjectivityasabsolute,toacknowledgenatureonlyastheintuitivelyexistingsurroundingworld,orasrepresented,thought,andintendedsurroundingworldofpersons,andtotakemathematicalObjectivenature,whichpreviouslywasthe‘truereality,’onlyas(whatinfactitmerelyis)atheoreticalthoughrationalconstructiononthepartofmanasthesubjectofscientificactivities…”229
Andagain:
“Itisnotthenaturalsciencesbutthehumansciencesthatleadintothe‘philosophical’depths;forthephilosophicaldepthsarethedepthsofultimatebeing.”230
228SeealsoHusserl1927,192‐5229IdeasII,374230Ibid.,376
106
Ironically,itisalongtheselinesthatcommentatorslikeUlrichMelleandSteven
CrowellinfactdevelopfavorablyhumanisticinterpretationsofHusserl’sontology.
Nature“matters,”forHusserl,becauseithassignificance—utility,beauty,
goodness—forhumanbeings.Fromthispointofview,arespectforhumanspirit
emergesindirectlyasthelasthopeforarescueoftheenvironment.ThusMelle
remarks:
“…itisclearthatnatureplaysonlyasubordinateroleforHusserl.Husserl’sidealisticconceptionoftherelationshipbetweennatureandspiritisradicallyspirit‐centered.Natureinitselfandindependentofspiritanditsmeaning‐givingactsisfirstofallonlyanabstractionandsecondlyameresubstrateforthemeaning‐givingactsandgoal‐directedactivitiesofspiritualbeings….Protectionofnaturefornature’ssakewouldthereforenotmakeanysensetoHusserl,andanynaturalisticaxiologyandethicsisnonsensicalforhim.”231
Inaninterestingbook‐lengthstudyofHusserlandthebodyDoddcomestoasimilar
conclusion,comparingHusserl’sview(favorably,onemightadd)tothatofPlato
fromthePhaedo:“For,Iwouldliketosuggest,thereismuchinthispassage[Phaedo
66b‐67b3]thatshouldremindusofHusserl,andthereismuchinHusserl’sanalysis
ofthebodythatshouldremindusofPlato,oratleastofatraditionthatsoughtto
putsomesortofdistance(ofwhatevertype)betweenbodyandwhatevercanbe
identifiedasthatwhichwemosttrulyare.”232
Forhispart,CrowellcelebratesHusserl’s“disenchantment”ofnatureasa
triumphofethicalthinking.StatesCrowell:“CriticsofHusserl(e.g.Merleau‐Ponty)
havesuggestedthatthemeaninglessnatureofthenaturalisticattitudeisan
231Melle,Ullrich.“NatureandSpirit.”InIssues,p.34232Dodd,James.IdealismandCorporeity:AnEssayontheProblemoftheBodyinHusserl’sPhenomenology.Dordrecht:Kluwer,1997(p.119)
107
abstraction,thatgenuinenatureistheprimordialrealmofanoriginarylogos,the
originofmeaning.Tothissensibility,Husserl’srathertraditionalgnosticismseems
outofplace.ButperhapsHusserlisright…Husserl’scriticsseektoreviveamythical
conceptionofnature…”233CrowellcriticizesMerleau‐Pontyforsuppressingthe
“absolutismofreality”andheopposeshimunfavorablytoLevinas,whothankfully
“vindicatesthedisenchantmentofnature”foundinHusserl!234Crowellinterprets
Merleau‐Pontytobearguingforaviewofnaturesuchthat“naturealreadyharbors
acertainsensuousmeaningfulness,acertainmythical‘fulness’thatenrapturesand
fascinatesandisnotatalla‘mere’thingexperience…”235Hethenobservesthat
Merleau‐Ponty’sviewisincompatiblewithHusserl’s“phenomenologicalaccountof
nature”inmostofIdeasII,whichitselfsignifiesa“break”withthemythicalfulness
ofmeaning“adumbratedinthesensuous.”Again,forCrowell,thisbreakis
necessitatedbythediscoveryofthe“ethical,”whichitisLevinas’greatachievement
tohaveremindedusof:“ForHusserl[asforLevinas]itisthedestinyofthis
separationtoleavenaturebehindaltogether,andsoitisimportanttoaskwhether
whatliesatitsorigin—thereversibilityoftouch—issufficienttoaccountforthe
233Crowell,StevenGalt.“theMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”InIssues,p.82.Articlehereafterreferredtoas“Crowell.”Crowellmeanssomethingspecificby“mythical.”Themythicalisborneoutofadesiretosuppressthe“absolutismofreality”thatforcesitselfuponusashumanbeings.(Crowell,84)234Ibid.,85.Crowellgoeson:“Merleau‐Pontysoughttotracetheoriginofmeaningtotheelement.Hiselementalnature—as“wildmeaning,”an“idealitythatisnotalien”totheflesh—evincesamythicalimagination.”(Crowell,94)ItisinterestingtonotethatRicoeur,whodisagreedwithMerleau‐Ponty’s“existential”appropriationofIdeasII(seeRicoeur41,69),wouldnot,withhischaracteristicsenseofmoderation,gothisfar.IncontrastingIdeasIandII,Ricoeurstates,“thestyleofIdeasIrequiressubordinatingtheunionofconsciousnesswithrealitythroughincarnation[whichiswhatisdoneinIdeasII]toitsunionwithrealitythroughperception.”(Ricoeur,55)Ofcourse,the“union”thatRicoeurspeaksofmayjustbebetterspokenofasa“disjunction”—thatis,IdeasIprovidesuswiththedisjunctionofsubjectiveimmanenceandobjectivetranscendence,IdeasIIandIIIwiththatofnatureandspirit.ButthepointisthatRicoeurseesanattemptatafusionthatisclosertowhatMerleau‐PontyhasinmindthanwhatCrowelldoes.235Crowell,94‐5
108
radicalityofthebreak.”Merleau‐Pontymakesmuchofsuch“reversibility,”aswe
willseeinsubsequentchapters.Healsowilltrytoaccountforthe“radicalbreak”in
termsthatcannonethelessexplainhowitispossibleinthefirstplacetohave
identifiedwithnature;onecannotbreakfromthattowhichoneisnotalready
attached.Merleau‐Ponty’suseof“paradoxicalthinking”willultimatelybeemployed
intheserviceofthisdifficultproblem.
C.ThePriorityThesis
ThePriorityThesisisoneofthemostproblematicpositionsadvancedby
Husserlinthetext.Thepriorityofspiritovernaturefollowsfromtheprivilegingof
the“personalisticattitude,”andwhileitcertainlycircumventsdualism(bydintofits
verytitle),itraisesotherperplexities.Foronething,itsquaresbadlywiththenotion
thatspiritissomehowitselfdependenton“reality”asdeterminedprimarilyby
materiality.HusserlcanmaintainthispositionorthePriorityThesis,butnot,Ithink,
both.Considerthefollowingclaim:“Initsspiritualacts,thespiritisdependenton
thesoul…ThespiritualEgoisdependentonthesoul,andthesoulontheBody….
Consequentlythespiritisconditionedbynature…”236Husserlevengoessofarasto
stateoutrightthatspirit“belongstonature,”thoughwhathemeanshereisnot
clear,ashealsoreferstonatureandspiritas“tworealities.”237
AsecondreasonanddeeperreasontosuspectthePriorityThesisisthatit
wouldappeartocommitHusserltoanontologicalmonismofahighlysubjectivistic
sort.Husserl’sownwordsmakethedangersimmediatelyevident: 236IdeasII,295237Ibid.,296
109
“Therealmofnatureistherealmofthe‘phenomenal’;thatmeansheretherealmoftherealunitiesconstitutedinorbymeansof‘presentation.’Therealmofspirit,however,istherealmoftherealitiesgiveninabsolutemanifestation(self‐manifestationandmanifestationthroughcomprehension),realitieshavingbehindthemselvesonlythepureEgoastheirreal,absolutesubstrateofallmanifestationsofreality.”238
Itisverypossiblethat,assomewritershavecommented,Husserlhasinmind
somethinglikeamodified(transcendentallypurified)monadologicalidealismalong
thelinesofaLeibniz,whoseveryideaofthemonadheadopts,atleastinpart,not
onlyinIdeasIIbutmostmemorablyintheCartesianMeditations.Butthepassage
justquoteddoesnotpresentuswithatranscendentalidealism,insofarasitstresses
therealmofspirit;here,weareonlyatthelevelofthenaturalattitudeand,
correlatively,reality.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthe“dogmatic”idealismofthe
Leibnizianvarietyandthe“transcendental”idealismHusserlisaimingaretwo
radicallydifferentthings,atleastfromHusserl’sstatedperspective.Thefinal
referencetothe“pureEgo”isitselfunclear,duetotheambiguitiesinthisvery
concept,discussedalreadyabove.
ArelatedconfusionarisesoverhowHusserlinterpretsthesuperiorityof
spiritinthefollowingquote:
“Natureisafieldofrelativitiesthroughout,anditcanbesobecausethesearealwaysinfactrelativetoanabsolute,thespirit,whichconsequentlyiswhatsustainsalltherelativities.…Thatistosay,ifwecouldeliminateallthespiritsfromtheworld,thenthatistheendofnature.Butifweeliminatenature…therealwaysstillremainssomething:thespiritasindividualspirit.”239
238Ibid.,337239Ibid.,311
110
Heissayingnowof“spirit”—asectorofconstitutedreality—whathenormallysays
onlyoftranscendentalsubjectivity,forexampleintheworld‐annihilation
experiment.Iwillfurtheraddresstheseunsettlingconflationsbelow(sectionD).
AsidefromtheotherproblemswithHusserl’sargument,thebasicmysteryat
theheartofhisviewasstatedinthePriorityThesisisthis:howareweto
understandhowscientistscouldhavearrived,simplyfromthespiritualattitude,at
naturalisticconceptionsofnatureandmatteranditsabsolutestatus—unlessthey
weresimplywrongaboutthis,sayoutofacertainarrogance?Bydefiningthe
essenceofnatureaspurelymaterial,andnatureasthebasisofreality,Husserl
himselfhasensuredthatthescientificconceptionofnaturecouldnottrulybe
supplantedbyanother,exceptbyrecoursetotheseeminginventionofa“new”and
“different”“naturalattitude”—abifurcationthatreinforcesratherthansoftenshis
dualisticstand.
D.SpiritandConsciousness
ThePriorityThesisissoflawed,infact,thatitsveryexistencepresentsa
profoundhermeneuticalmystery.WhatisitdoinginHusserl’sphilosophyatall?I
thinkthereasonbecomesclearuponsomereflectionofwhatthesupposed
advantageofspiritovernatureissupposedtoliein,namelysubjectivity.The
personalisticattitudeissubject‐centered,integratingmeaningandsubject‐relative
values,feelings,andsoon,intothematrixofperceptionandaction.Inthisway,it
beginstoturninthedirectionofphenomenologyitself,especiallywhenone
considersthatphenomenologyisahuman,cultural,andhence“spiritual”activity.It
111
iseasy,infact,toseeHusserl’sIdeasIIconceptsofthepersonalisticattitudeand
Umwelt240ascrucialanticipationsofthelife‐worldandlife‐world
phenomenology.241Thetrouble,however,isthatinHusserl’sownview,ahugegulf
separatesphenomenologyfromothersciences,i.e.,fromreality.Strugglingwiththis
problem,Ricoeuroffershisbestattempttoreconcilespiritandtranscendental
consciousness:“…Geistis[perhaps]nothingotherthantheegoofphenomenology,
butwithoutthelightofthephenomenologicalreduction.”242Butiftrue,thiswould
haveseriousconsequences.Firstofall,Husserlinfacttakespainstodistinguishthe
humansciencesfrom(transcendental)phenomenologythroughouthiswritings.If
spiritandtranscendentalegoareroughlyequivalent,thenthenaturalattitude
wouldnothavetwosub‐species—naturalisticandpersonalistic—butwouldbe
univocal.Atleast,thepersonalisticattitudewouldhavetobesub‐dividedinto
“natural”and“transcendental”aspects.Butasthingsstand,theformeroptionwould
concedethenaturalattitudeentirelytothenaturalsciences,giventheauthority
Husserlcedesthemoverthe“natural”world,whilethelatter,moreplausibleoption
wouldnonethelessmakethetheneedforthereductionhardtounderstand.Doesn’t
thepersonalisticattitudealreadyinterprettheworldasaworldofsense,rather
240ThomasNenonconcurs:“theIdeasIIshows[sic]thattheconceptofUmwelt,whichwouldbereplacedbythatofthelifeworldinthe20’sand30’s…”(Issues,x;emphasisadded)241Theword“Lebenswelt”can,surprisingly,befoundinIdeasII.See,forexample:IdeasII,187.Inthe“Translator’sIntroduction”totheEnglish‐languageversionofIdeasIII,TedKleinandWilliamPohlclaimthat,intheirunderstanding,thelife‐worldispresentfromthebeginningofthattextaswell.(IdeasIII,viii‐ix)242Ricoeur,80.Ricoeuridentifiesthe“spirit/consciousness”ambiguityasacentralmysteryofIdeasII—orinhismorebluntwords:“Aswearegoingtosee,thispre‐eminenceitself[referringtothePriorityThesis]iswhatposesthemostembarrassingquestionofIdeasII:thatofsituatingwhatinthisworkHusserlcallsspirit(Geist)inrelationtothatwhichhisworksgenerallycall‘consciousness,’thesubjectivelifeofconsciousnessreachedbythephenomenologicalreduction.”(Ricoeur,76)
112
thanofmere“things”?Ultimately,thenaturalattitudeitselfisinneedofaradical
rethinking.243
Thefundamentalandwell‐knownambiguitiesofthe“life‐world”arerooted
intheambiguitiesofthespiritualattitudeandthenotionof“spirit”itself.Spiritisa
realmofreality,therealmofpersons,culture,andsocietiesorsocialstructures—as
wellastheirhistorical(diachronic)dimension;consciousnessinthe
“transcendental”and“phenomenological”senseisnoneofthese.The“pureEgo”of
IdeasIInowappearstobealmostpurposefullyambiguous:atoncehavingafootin
“personhood”andanotheroutsideit.Wehavealreadyaskedwhetherthe“pureEgo”
isthesameasthe“transcendentalEgo,”asconstitutingconsciousnessitself,and
decidedthatitprobablyhastobe.Ontheonehand,onewantstoinferthatwhenthe
phenomenologistcomesuponthepureEgo,he/shecomesuponhimself/herself,as
transcendentalego,intheactofself‐constitutionandself‐reflection.Thiswould
essentiallycompriseaperformanceofthereduction.(Husserldoesafterallcallthe
pureEgothe“irreal,absolutesubstrateofallmanifestationofreality.”244)Butaswe
haveseen,HusserldescribestheEgointermsofspirit,andasthe“rulerofthesoul,”
forexample,soitsroleasa“real”componentoftheobjectiveworldsitsuneasily(or
tooeasily)alongsideits“transcendentality.”
243IsuspectthatthisiswhyDavidCarr,inhis“Translator’sIntroduction”totheCrisis,distinguishessharplybetweenthe“naturalattitude”ofIdeasI(andtherefore,Iwouldsay,IdeasIIandIIIaswell),whichisstill“theoretical,”andwhathetermsthe“primordialnaturalattitude”ofthelife‐world.See:Crisis,xxxix.Betweenthenaturalisticnaturalattitudeandthepersonalistic(itselfbeingvaguelytranscendental)attitude,thereseemstobenotruenaturalattitudeintheIdeasvolumes.Thetaskofphenomenologyasaphenomenologypreciselyofthenaturalattitudebecomesmuchmoresubtleandelusivethanbefore,sinceitbecomesataskofelucidatingthepre‐theoreticalworld,whatMerleau‐Pontywillforhispartcallthe“tacitlogos”ofnature.Wewillsaymoreaboutthisinsubsequentchapters.244IdeasII,337
113
Alife‐worldconnectiondoes,however,allowustore‐interpretHusserl’s
Priority‐Thesis‐engendered“spiritualmonism”inthesafer(ormorefamiliar)
directionoftranscendentalmonism,thestandardHusserlianpositionthatallreality
isconstitutedinandbytranscendentalconsciousness,thesourceofallmeaningand
being.Underthisinterpretation,then,inelevatingthe“humansciences”abovethe
naturalsciences,whatHusserlisinfactdoingisimpreciselyexpressinghis
convictioninthesuperiorityofphenomenology,asthestudyofconsciousness,tothe
studyofreality,which,Husserlseemstofeel,hasbeenmonopolizedbythenatural
sciences.Theelevationofthehumansciencescanbeseenasaprotestagainstthis
naturalisticbias,buttothatextentitoverstatesthecaseandultimatelymakesallof
perceivedmaterialrealitytheprovinceofsubjectiveUmwelten,whichcannothave
beenHusserl’sintention.Itbecomesincreasinglyapparentthatthe“problemofthe
naturalandhumansciences”wasonethatbecamegraftedontophenomenology
afteritbecameknowntoHusserlthroughcontactwiththeworksofDilthey.Itturns
outtobehardtosynthesizetheseverydifferenttypesofdiscourseinasingle
framework.245
Thusinlightoftheforegoing,theCrisis’investigationsintothelife‐world
maynowappearinanewlight,namelyasanattempt(itselfadmittedlygroping)ata
finalsolutiontotheambiguityofspiritandconsciousness.Thetranscendental
245Whatisatstakeinallofthisismorethanjustthe“paradoxofsubjectivity,”thatis,whatHusserllatercallsthephenomenonof“real”egoitycombinedwith‘transcendental”egoity.Forthatproblem,addressedatlengthintheCrisis(Crisis,178‐85),concernsthedualityofempiricalandtranscendentalegos,notthespecificproblemoftheambiguousontologicalstatusofthetranscendentalegoitself,atranscendentalegobothworldlyandnon‐worldly,sotospeak,atthesametime.InIdeasII,consciousnessbelongstoEgos,andtheseEgosarepartofthe“real”orderoftheworld,namelythesummitofits“spiritual”.Thustranscendentalsubjectivitycanbesaidtobothbelongtotheworldandconstituteit“fromoutside,”sotospeak.
114
reductiontothelife‐worldpreserveswhatwascrucialinIdeasII’sdiscussionofthe
Umweltandthepersonalisticattitude,namelyitsinvolvementintheaxiologicaland
practicalspheresofmeaning—eveninassigningthempriorityoveraconceptionofa
purely“meaningless”nature.246
E.TheQuestionoftheBody
Husserl’sdepictsthelivingbodyoranimalorganismasitsownontological
region,distinctfrompure“materiality”ontheonehandandpure“spirituality”on
theother.Husserlelsewherecallsthebodya“connectingbridge”inthisrespect.247
However,thesecouldactuallybeseentorepresenttwoverydifferentclaims,which
cannonethelessbeeasilyconflated.Thisisexactlywhatoccursinarecent
(schematic)attempttodeveloparecentunifiedinterpretation,byLuisRabanaque,
ofHusserl’sideaofthelivingbody.RabanaquedrawsonbothIdeasIIandHusserl
1919248toarguethatthebodyinHusserlcanbeunderstoodasa“thirdnoematic
region”betweennatureandspirit(orculture).Onitsownthisisnotcontroversial
(depending,crucially,onhowoneunderstandstheinterrelationsofthe“regions,”as
Iwilladdressbelow),butthepaperequallydrawsonthe“connectingbridge”
metaphorbetweensubjectivityandphysicalthinghood.ThefullquotefromHusserl,
inwhichthismetaphorisused,goesasfollows:
246Butwhereexactly,then,doesthelife‐worldleavetheroleofthehumansciencesandthe“spirit”specificallyassuch?Thisquestionisbeyondthescopeofthischapterordissertation,butitmayhavetodowiththe“ontologyofthelife‐world”thatHusserlhintsatbutneverfullydevelopsintheCrisis.(Crisis,173)247Seefn127.248Rabanaque,Luis.“TheBodyasNoematicBridgeBetweenNatureandCulture?”In:Epistemology,Archaeology,Ethics:CurrentInvestigationsofHusserl’sCorpus(Eds.PolVandeveldeandSebastianLuft).NewYork:Continuum,2010
115
“Weseetherebyalreadythat,phenomenologicallyconsidered,subjectivity(soulishspirit)intheworldandphysicalthinghoodintheworldarenottwoseparateandexternallyrelatedgroupsofrealoccurrences,butratherthatthereisproducedintheformofCorporeality,whichinitselfhasitsowndeepestlayerofbeinginsensibilityandfreemobility,aconnectingbridge,which,throughthesingularspiritualityinnature,canhaveapositionintherealmofphysis.”249
Themetaphorofabridgeinthiscontextisapowerfulonebecauseitseemstooffer
apossibilityofresolvingoratleastsofteningtheotherwisestarkdisparitybetween
physicalthinghoodandhumanspirit.ItisnotsurprisingthatHusserlshouldlookto
animalitytofilltheroleof“missingrung”intheGreatChainofBeing‐likeladderhe
hasbuilt.ButinRabanaque’sreading,the“bodyquabody”isa“thirdnoematic
region”that“cannotbeassimilatedtoeithernatureorspirit.”Inotherwords,the
bodyissomehowdifferent,inanirreduciblemanner,fromegoicconsciousnessas
suchandphysicalthinglinessassuch.Firstofall,Husserlhimselfstatesquitetothe
contrarythatthebodyisapartofnature(“animalnature,”natureinthe“second
sense,”etc.).Andsecondly,Rabanaqueseemstohavetacitlycombinedthenotions
ofapluralityofnoematicregionsontheonehandandan“integrated”(hisword)
totality—withthebodyas“midpoint”betweenextensioandcogito,sharingin
“featurescommontoboththelowerandupperregions”—ontheother.Indoingso
heprovesofcoursethedictumthatitispossibletobetoofaithfultoatext.Forthe
ideaofthebodyasa“bridge”betweennatureandspirit,anditsbeinganirreducible
“thirdnoematicregion”inadditiontothenaturalandthespiritual,areobviously
twoverydifferent,andmutuallyincompatible,claims.Inthefirstcase,wemight
haveacaseofontologicalmonism—aslidingscaleofbeing,perhapsfromthemost
249Husserl1919,p.186(mytranslation)
116
inerttothemost“enspirit‐ed.”ThiswouldbereminiscentoftheNeoplatonism‐
tingedontologyofsomeGermanRomantics,orperhapsdistantlyofSpinozism.But
ifspiritualityandphysicalityfuseorblendinthemiddle—inthebodyas“midpoint”
ofextensionandthought,inRabanaque’simage—thenitwouldseemthatthenotion
of“noematicregions”inthepluralmustbedispensedwithaltogether.Forinthat
casematerialthinghoodandpsychicegoitywouldnotbetwodistinctnoematic
regionsatallinthefirstplace,letaloneleavingroomforathird,thebody.
Thefirst,monisticviewsuggestsakindofvitalism,orpanpsychism,that
HusserlexpresslyrejectswithrespecttoLeibniz(andBruno).250Furthermore,this
wouldbeacaseinwhichLeiblichkeitwoulddefinethewholecontinuumofwhich
extensionandthoughtaremerelypolesoneitherend.Yetthiswouldclearlybe
unacceptabletoHusserl,asitwouldcallintoquestionthefounding‐founded
relationshipofthephysicalandpsychical,thelatterofwhichbeingfoundedonthe
former,aswellasremovetheprivilegedperchoftheCartesian“Ithink.”Thefactis
thatHusserldidpositmultipleirreducible(thePriorityThesisaside)“ontological
regions”—twoinparticular,natureandspirit.Thebodyfallsintheformercolumn.
Ofcourse,thereisonemoreprovocativethoughtexperimenttoconsider.Intalking
abouttherelationbetweenthepsycheandthebody,Husserlinvokesthefollowing
image:
“Letusimagineaconsciousness…whichwouldstandinrelationtoalocomotive,sothatifthelocomotivewerefedwaterthisconsciousnesswouldhavethepleasantfeelingthatwecallsatiety;ifthelocomotivewereheated,itwouldhavethefeelingofwarmth,etc.Obviously,thelocomotivewouldnot,becauseofthemake‐upofsuchrelationships,become‘animateorganism’forthisconsciousness.If,insteadofthethingthatIatthetimecallmyanimateorganism,thelocomotive 250Ibid.,132
117
stoodinmyconsciousnessasthefieldofmypureEgo,thenIcouldnotcallitanimateorganismalso,foritsimplywouldnotbeananimateorganism.”
Theimagehasintuitiveappeal,butwhy?Husserlimmediatelygoesontoexplainthe
reasonthelocomotiveandmyconsciousnesswouldnotmakeupananimate
organismatthispoint:
“…aconsiderablepartofthelargecontent‐classbelongingtothesphereofconsciousnessunderthetitle‘materialofconsciousness’issointimatelyatonewiththematerialanimateorganismthatintheintuitivegivennessnotmerelyconnectionbutpreciselyunityisshown.”251
Notmerelyconnectionbutunity.Thisseemsaverystrongstatementindeed.An
animateorganismisalreadymorethanamaterialthinginitsessence.Ithasa
“stratum”ofthepsychic,belongingtothewholeoftheorganism“fromtheoutset.”
Butreally,allthismeansisthattheanimateorganismissuchthatinit,itsBodyand
soulareone.Wehavegonethroughallofthisalready.Inspiteofthis“unity,”there
isalso,still,afounded‐foundingrelationbetweenthefirstandsecond(“psychic”)
stratum;they’renotequal,inthissense.ThisiswhatallowsHusserltospeakofthe
bodyasa“sensingphysicalthing”thatis“coveredorfilledwithfeelings.”252Its
materialityisprimary,itspsychicdimensionanadd‐on,albeitonewovenintothe
essenceofsomebeings,the“animate”ones.Sounfortunately,theunityofBodyand
soulfailstoprovidetheneededevidenceofeitheraradicalunionofora“middle
region”betweennatureandspirit.253Indeed,itisarguablethatHusserl’streatment
251IdeasIII,104252IdeasII,105253Further(indirect)evidenceofthisistheunconvincingtreatmentof“somatology”asitsowndisciplineinIdeasIII,forexample.
118
ofthebodyisitselfdualistic,havingthetwosides,materialandpsychical,butin
truth,thiswouldprobablybetousetheterm“dualistic”tooloosely.254
IV.Conclusion
IhopetohaveshownthatHusserl’sacceptanceofthenatural‐scientificsense
ofmaterialnatureastheabsolutebasisofreality,thesubstrateuponwhichhigher
strataofrealityare“founded”inaunidirectionalway,hassevereconsequencesthat
reverberatethroughouttheIdeasseriesandmaybeHusserl’sphilosophyasawhole.
Itpushesthebodyandlivingnatureintothepurviewoftheinherentlyreductive
“naturalsciences,”allthewhileprecipitatingacrisiswhereby“spirit”mustbe
rescuedfromtheclutchesofbrutematerialism—andhencemustbedualistically
sealedofffrom“nature”itself.Husserl’sworldisbifurcatedinsuchawaythatthe
unityoftheworldcannotbefoundinit,butonlyinthefactthatbothsetsofrealities
areconstitutedincommonthroughthetranscendentalego,i.e.,phenomenologically.
Ifthetranscendentalegoandphenomenologicalmonismfail,theworlddoesnot
havetheresourcestomaintaininternalcohesion.ThisviewishighlyPlatonicina
certainveryspecificsense,thatis,inreferencetoasplituniversewhoseunityis
254TaylorCarmanarguesthattheKörper/Leibdistinctionisdualistic.(See:Carman,Taylor.“theBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p.206.Hereafter“Carman.”)IdoagreewithbothCarmanandDasturthatHusserl’soverallpositionisdualisticinsomeimportantsense.(Carman,208andDastur,73)
119
providedbysomethingfrom“above,”“participating”inwhatis“below.”InHusserl’s
case,thetranscendentalegoisnota“thing”liketheForms,itisratheranattitude,a
kindofconsciousness.ButtocallHusserl’sview“transcendentalPlatonism,”while
beingmoreaccurate,doesnotdrainthecomparisonofitspresentrelevance.
ButifIdeasIIpromisesmorethanHusserlhimselfdelivers,thatisalso
becauseitpromisessoverymuch.Itharborsthesortsoffertileambiguitiesthat
haveledquitenaturallytotheontologicalshiftinphenomenologythattookplace
throughHeidegger,Sartre,andMerleau‐Ponty,amongothers.AndovertheCrisis
andotherlater(atleastamongpublished)writings,geneticorstaticorboth,ithas
theadvantage,ironically,ofgreaterinconsistencyandthusagreatersenseof
possibility.MuchofthispossibilityarisesoutofHusserl’sjustlyinfluentialtreatment
ofthebody.ThebodyhadalreadybeenamajorconcernofContinentalphilosophers
likeBergson,Marcel,andScheler(whowasinfluencedbyHusserl,albeit),but
throughthevehicleofIdeasIIitsplaceinthehorizonoffoundationalphilosophical
problems,atleastintheContinentaltradition,waspermanentlyestablished.
Inallofthis,Husserlofcoursedoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensions
inIdeasIIasfundamentalonesortorealizethatthequestionofnatureposesa
radicalproblemforthetranscendental‐phenomenologicalmethoditself.Aswehave
seen,hepresentsakindof“ontologicalgambit”directedagainstthenaturalisticor
physicalisticphilosopher.IfHusserl’sgambitfails,itwillhaveintheprocess
concededsomuchtonaturalscienceand,inthewakeofthefailureof
transcendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonlythenaturalistic‐physicalistic
optionleft.Somethinghasclearlygonewrong.Atitsbest,theexaminationofthe
120
bodyinIdeasIIraisesthepossibilityofarethinkingofphenomenologyandthe
naturalattitude,anuncoveringofevidencethatshowspowerfullythatthereisa
kindofdeepinter‐connectivityandoverlapofnatureandspirit.Thereisacertain
volatilityinHusserl’shandlingoftheseconcepts,avolatilitythatreappearsin
intermittentburststhroughoutIdeasII.Thus,likeintentionalconsciousnessitself,
IdeasIIasatextpointsnecessarilybeyonditself.
Forhispart,Merleau‐PontyadoptsmanyofHusserl’sinsightsashisownbut
goeswiththeminadifferentdirection.Wemightputitthisway:whereasfor
Husserlnaturehastobeexplainedintermsofits“constitution”intranscendental
consciousness,forMerleau‐Ponty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichneeds
explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe
naturallived‐body.Thebodybecomesthesiteofaparadoxthatwillneverbe
“resolved,”becauseitisdefinitiveofthehumancondition.Ontologically,thebodyas
Leibblursthelineofsubjectivityandobjectivityinawayevenmoredecisivethan
(theoretical)intentionality,sinceithasno“directionality,”anditisnotsimplythe
“body‐subject”(asMerleau‐Pontyhimselfcametorecognize)butsomethinglikethe
criss‐crossingorintertwiningofbeingwithitself—aknotattheheartofthe
universe.Theintimacyofnatureandspiritallowsphilosophy,andnotjustnatural
science,tohaveasayindefiningwhatitis,evenwhileitselfbeingsusceptibleto
havingtoreviseitsownbeliefsinlightoftheseexplanations.InMerleau‐Ponty,
“naturalism”isdefeated,paradoxically,bybecomingtransformedthroughamuch
morerobustdefinitionof“nature”thanscientistshavetraditionallypermitted.This
isnovictoryofahigheridealismorspiritualism.Contrarytowhatsomehave
121
claimed,Merleau‐Ponty’sphilosophydoesnot“re‐enchant”naturesomuchas
removeanyhard,essentialistbarriersbetweenthevarious—real—divisionswithin
“being.”Itisinthissensepreciselyaphilosophyof“promiscuity,”touseMerleau‐
Ponty’sword,ratherthanofromanticalunity.
LetusnowturntoMerleau‐Ponty’sownmulti‐facetedappropriationof
Husserl’sthought,IdeasIIincluded.
122
ChapterThree:MerleauPonty’sOrganicAppropriationofHusserlianPhenomenology
“WeknowthatHusserlnevermadehimselftooclearonthesequestions.” ‐‐MauriceMerleau‐Ponty255
I.Introduction
Thequestionofwhatphenomenologyis—andwhatitsultimatetasksare—
hasneverceasedtobeposedeversinceitsinception.Naturally,peoplehavelooked
toHusserl,theeffectivefounderandpioneerofthisphilosophy,foranswerstosuch
questions—butwhilesomefindthemhere,othersseeonlymorequestions.
Merleau‐Pontywasunique,inthisregard:hefoundananswer,butithappenstobe
onethatcontinuestosurpriseusbecauseofitscounter‐intuitivity.OnMerleau‐
Ponty’sreading,Husserl’squestionsareultimatelythoseofhumanexistence,the
paradoxesofincarnatesubjectivity,thefinitudeofhumanknowledge—noneof
whichthe“textbooks”atfirstsuggesttobecentraltotheGermanphilosopher’s
agenda.Nevertheless,itisundeniablethateversinceMerleau‐Pontyintroducedhis
Husserltotheworld,phenomenologyhasnotbeenabletostopwonderingoverthe
enigmathatistheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationship. 255Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”(Hereafter“PS.”)InSigns.Tr.RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(p.165)
123
Thestakesareashighasever,asevidentfroma(relatively)recentaccount
likethisonebyLesterEmbree:
“ItisdauntingtorecallthehistoricalerainAmericanphenomenologyofouryouththatisbestcalled‘PhenomenologyandExistentialism’ifonlybecause,inthatgreatupsurgeofenergy,Husserlwas,incredibly,readbysomanyasthefatherofexistentialphenomenology,apaternitythatstillneedschallenging.”256
Therearemany,particularlyonthe“Husserlian”side(hopefullythissortoflabel
willmeanlessbytheendofthischapter),whoshareEmbree’sdisenchantmentwith
whattheyperceivetobeMerleau‐Ponty’smisappropriationofHusserlian
phenomenology.257Therearealsothosefromthe“Merleau‐Pontyside”ofthings
wholamenttheFrenchphilosopher’sconstantreferencestoHusserl,findingthem
unnecessaryandmisleadinggiventheultimatelytrans‐phenomenologicalnature,
theyclaim,ofMerleau‐Ponty’sundertaking.Others,ofcourse,stresstheindissoluble
linkbetweenthetwophilosophers.
Itiscertainlyhardtodenythatasignificantlinkexists,buttheprecise
relationbetweenMerleau‐PontyandHusserlisanuncannilydifficultcodetocrack.
“DoesMerleau‐PontygetHusserlright?”isjustthefirstofmanyquestionsthatarise.
Othersinclude:Istherea“right”Husserl—a“true”Husserl,atall?ShouldMerleau‐
Ponty’sself‐describedfidelitytoHusserl’sideasbetrusted?ShouldweseeMerleau
PontyasakindofHusserlian,finally,andevenHusserl(oroneofpossiblyseveral
“Husserls”)asaprotoMerleauPontian?
256Quotedin:Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlianPhenomenology.Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993(p.xi)Ireproduceandrespondtoafullerversionofthesamequotebelow.257Forexample,ElizabethBehnke,asdiscussedfurtherbelow.
124
Tostartattheendandworkbackwards,sotospeak,myquickanswersto
thesequestions,respectively,wouldbe:yes,Merleau‐Pontygetssomething
profoundlyrightaboutHusserl,thatisaparticularstrainofhimthatmustbe
separatedcarefullyfromtherest;no,thereisno“true”Husserl,sincemanylive
possibilitiesremainopeninhiscavernousthought;yes,Merleau‐Ponty’sself‐
understandingasaphenomenologistofaHusserlianveinisgroundedintruth;and
finally,yes,thereisasenseinwhichHusserlandMerleau‐Pontyarereciprocally
intertwined,suchthat,tousethelatter’swordswhenspeakingofhimselfand
Husserl,“itisnotpossibleeveninprincipletodecideatanygivenmomentjustwhat
belongstoeach.”(PS159)
Thisisalottoshow,however,inadissertationchapter,soIhavelimitedmy
goalspresentlytothesefour:First,tobrieflysketchthehistoricalbackgroundofthe
relationship;Second,toprovideanoverviewandcriticalassessmentofavarietyof
positionstakenonthisrelationshipintherecentsecondaryliterature;Third,to
show,throughastudyoftherelevanttexts,howIunderstandMerleau‐Pontytoread
andappropriateHusserl;andFourth,tosuggestwaysinwhichhisrelationship258to
HusserlexemplifiesandembodiescertainMerleau‐Pontian(butalso,implicitly,
Husserlian)“figuresofthought.”Thatis,Iwillwantultimatelytoshow—andhereis
atleastoneclueastowhysomereadersdon’tacceptMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingof
Husserl—thatMerleau‐Ponty’sinterpretationofHusserlfollowsthesamepatternas
258HusserlandMerleau‐Pontydidnothaveapersonalacquaintance,soby“relationship”Ihaveofcoursebeenreferring(andwillcontinuetorefer)throughoutthischaptertotherelationshipbetweentheirphilosophies.
125
hisgeneralphilosophy,suchthattoacceptoneis,toalargedegree,toacceptthe
other—oratleasttobepreparedtodosomorereadily.259
Merleau‐Pontydidnotbeginhisphilosophicalcareerstrictlyasa
“phenomenologist,”buthegraduallygrewintotherole.Hewasinterestedin
Husserlasearlyas1934,butevenaslateashisfirstbook,TheStructureofBehavior,
hisprimaryfocusseeminglylieselsewhere.However,readingHusserl(orabout
him,asthroughEugenFink’simportantKantstudienarticleof1933260)evidently
hadagreatcumulativeimpactonhim,suchthat,asonechroniclernotes,“[his]
attentiontoHusserlincreasesratherthandiminishesoverthecourse”261ofthe
progressionfromThePhenomenologyofPerception(PP),hiswell‐known1945
masterpiece,toTheVisibleandtheInvisible(VI),whichwasleftunfinishedatthe
timeoftheauthor’suntimelydeath.UnlikeEugenFink,MartinHeidegger,Aron
Gurwitsch,andotherstudentsofHusserl’s,Merleau‐Pontydidnothaveapersonal
relationshipwithHusserl,althoughhemayhaveattendedatleastoneofhis
lectures.262Complicatingmattersfurther,Husserlwasclearlyonlyoneofmany
influencesonthesponge‐likeFrenchthinker.ThisisbecauseHusserl’s
259Animportantbutdeliberateomissionfromthisdiscussionisanyextendeddiscussionofhermeneuticsforitsownsake.Forexample,Itouchonlyindirectlytheperennialquestionofwhetherthereisinfactsuchathingasa“correct”interpretationofawork,orevenwhetherthereissucha“work”tobeginwith.(Besides,Merleau‐Ponty’sisacaseinwhichitisnotthemeaningofindividualtextsthatareusuallyatstakebutthetendenciesand“innerlogic”ofthethinker’scorpusasawhole,anevenmoreelusiveanimal.)Thesearesurelyquestionsthatdeserverepliesandwouldhavesignificantbearingonthepresentinquiry,buttheyalsoliejustoutsideitsnecessarilyrestrictedscope.260See:Fink,Eugen.“DiephänomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwärtigenKritik.”In:Fink,Eugen.StudienzurPhänomenologie19301939.TheHague,Netherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1966261ThechroniclerisTedToadvine.See“Merleau‐Ponty’sReadingofHusserl:AChronologicalOverview.”In:MerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.228).Hereafter“Toadvine.”(Theessaycollectionasawholeisreferredtohereafteras“Reading.”)Toadvine’schroniclehasbeenextremelyusefulforthissection.262Ibid.,pp.227‐33
126
phenomenology,largelythroughtheinfluenceofSartre,wasonlyoneofmany
dominantphilosophicaloptionsin1940sFrance,whenMerleau‐Pontyforgedthe
coreofhisphilosophicalvision.263
Nevertheless,Husserl’sinfluenceturnedouttobethemostdecisiveinthe
end.Inthe“Preface”ofPP,Merleau‐PontyadoptedthefundamentalHusserlian
insightsandconcepts,workingthemintohisownbrandof“existential”
phenomenology,andhewasthefirstso‐called“outsider”tobegrantedprivateand
in‐depthaccesstoHusserl’sarchivesinLouvain,whichwereatthattimefilledwith
reamsofunpublishedmaterialthatMerleau‐Pontyhappilydevouredand
communicated,fragmentarily,toawidercircleofscholarsandintellectuals.264
Merleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserliscriticalofsomeofHusserl’stendencies,
particularlywhathavebeenvariouslylabeledandidentifiedashisrationalism,
idealism,essentialism,andfoundationalism.Merleau‐Pontydislikedeachofthese
“styles”ofthinking,butheclearlyregardedHusserlas“morethanthesum”ofthese
philosophicalparts.Itisalsotrue,however,thateachoftheabovelabelscanbe
challengedasoverlysimplisticstereotypeswhenappliedtoHusserl,astheyall
applychiefly(thoughbynomeansexclusively)totheearlypublishedworksof
Husserlduringhis,primarily,“staticphenomenology”period—mostespecially, 263Forexample,AlexandreKojèvehadmemorablyre‐introducedHegeltoFrenchstudents,includingMerleau‐Ponty.HeideggerandSchelerandtheircriticismsofHusserlwerealsoinfluentialtoMerleau‐Ponty,aswereSartre’sexistentialism,Bergsonianism,(eventually)Marxism,andotherphilosophies—tosaynothingofthecentralimpactofGestaltPsychologyontheyoungthinker.Onthe(mostly)negativeside,theinfluenceofFrenchNeo‐Kantianismshouldbementioned.IwillfurtheraddressMerleau‐Ponty’sconsistentoppositiontoKantianisminlatersections.264AccordingtoDanZahavi,itwasinfactIdeasII,thethen‐unpublishedsequeltoIdeasI,thathadhadthegreatestimpactonMerleau‐Ponty.(Zahavi,Dan.“Merleau‐PontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.(p.6—hereafter“Zahavi.”)ThisideaissupportedindirectlybythewayMerleau‐Pontyessentiallyreconstructshisownphilosophyonthebasisof“somelines”ofIdeasIIinPS.
127
Husserl’sIdeasI,whichwehaveexaminedinthefirstchapter.Merleau‐Ponty
recognizedinHusserl’sthoughtovertimeadistinctphilosophicalmaturation,as
wellasamovementawayfromthestyleofIdeasI.Merleau‐Pontythusdivides
Husserl’sthoughtintothreedistinctperiods:logicist,idealist(orsimply“middle”),
andexistentialistphases.265Merleau‐Pontysideswiththethird,“existentialist”
phaseinHusserl’sthought,butthefactisthatheneverdeniedthecomplexityand
evencontradictorinessofHusserl’sphilosophyevenattheend—thoughgivenhis
temperamentandpenchantforl’ambiguité,healmostcertainlyadmiredHusserlall
themoreforthisthannot.
II.MerleauPonty’sRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewand
Critique
A.Introduction
ToraisethequestionofMerleau‐Ponty’srelationshiptoorreadingofHusserl
istodosoagainstthebackdropofalivelyandvigorousdebate,onethatbegins
early266andcontinuestothisday.HereIwillexaminetheparametersofthisdebate,
265TwodistinctplacesinwhichheadvancestheideashowhowenduringitwasinMerleau‐Ponty’smind:PP,p.317,fn274;and,muchlater,PSM46and48.Seealsofn46,below.266Asof1964,EdiereportsaccusationsagainstMerleau‐Ponty,forexamplebyMauriceNatanson,thathadalreadybeguntoariseovertheaccuracyorreliabilityofMerleau‐Ponty’scitationsofHusserl’sTheCrisisofEuropeanSciences(particularlyquotestotheeffectthatforHusserl“transcendentalsubjectivityisanintersubjectivity”).SurelyJamesEdiewasprescientlycorrectinmusing:“ThatMerleau‐Ponty’sinterpretationofHusserlhasbeenandwillcontinuetobecontestedisbeyonddoubt.”SeethePrefaceof:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.xvii‐xviii,fn10)Thenamesakeessay(actuallyalectureandadiscussion)fromthisvolumeisreferredtohereafteras“Primacy.”
128
beginningalso,throughacritiqueofsomeoftheextantliterature,tooffermyown
interpretation.ThepositionsIwilladdresscannotnecessarilybeplacedonasingle
spectrum,sincethereisnosinglequestionthattheyalladdressinthesameway.
Someauthors,forexample,discusstheextentoftheinfluenceofHusserlover
Merleau‐Ponty,whileothersconcentrateonthefidelityofMerleau‐PontytoHusserl
ongivenissues(orasawhole).Butmygoalisnottoanalyzethisdiscussioninto
theirindividualcomponentsbuttoprovideamoreorlessholisticoverviewofthe
discussionitself,forallaspectsofitarerelevanttoanygeneralassessmentof
Merleau‐Ponty’srelationshiptoHusserl.
Ihavedividedvariousviewsaseither“strong”or“weak.”Weakviews,on
thisdefinition,tendtodownplaythephilosophicalassociationbetweenthetwo
thinkers,whilestrongviewstendtoemphasizeandattachgreatimportancetoit.
Somereaders,ofcourse,likeStephenWatson,combinebothaspectsintheir
consideredview.Asageneralrule,weakreadingsaremorecommonthanstrong
ones,foravarietyofreasons.Itouchonsomeofthenotableexceptionsfirst—
relativelybriefly,sinceIgenerallyagreewiththestrongorientationmyselfandseek
tobeofferingoneofmyownasIproceed.Thatis,insteadofrehearsingpositive
strongaccountsalreadymade,Ihavedeemeditmoreimportantfinallytoanswer
weakreadingsinstead.267
267Myplacementofatreatmentofthesecondaryliteraturefirst,beforeadirectanalysisoftheprimarytexts,ismotivatedbymyhopethatitwillbeusefultohavethecontextinwhichthesignficanceofsuchananalysiscanbedulymeasured.Thereviewisrestrictedmostlytorecentliterature,bothforreasonsoflimitedspaceaswellastomakeitascurrentaspossible.
129
B.The“StrongView”:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras
DanZahavi,whileacknowledgingdifferencesbetweenthetwothinkers,
surprisingly(givenhisstrong“Husserlian”credentials)stressesthecontinuity
betweenthemandarguesthatMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserlisinmanyways
prescientandaheadofitstimes.268Forhispart,A.D.SmitharguesthatMerleau‐
Ponty’sideasinPParefundamentallyHusserlian,thoughstatedwithadifferent
emphasisandthroughdifferentrhetoric.HealsoarguesthatHusserlhasthe
resourcestoaccountforthespecialsignficanceaccordedbyMerleau‐Pontytothe
“bodilyschema,”againsttheviewofShaunGallagher,forexample.269BothZahavi
andSmithhaveincommonavastcommandovertheHusserlianaarchives,and
hencecalluponmaterialthatcannotbeexpectedtobeknownbyevensome
advancedphenomenologists.ThepivotalIdeasIIhascometobeincreasinglywell‐
known,ofcourse,butthereareonthisfrontdetractorsoftheStein‐andLandgrebe‐
editedvolumewehavebeforeustoday.270
InadditiontoZahaviandSmith,whowriteprimarilyonHusserl,thereisalso
thecaseofaMerleau‐Pontianwhofullyacknowledgestheprofundityofthelink
betweenthetwophilosophers,namelyRenaudBarbaras.Thusintheconclusionof
hisbookDel’êtreduphénomène,Barbarasstates:“…Merleau‐Ponty’sontologydoes
268Textcitedaboveas“Zahavi.”ForaninstanceofhisspiriteddefenseoftranscendentalsubjectivityinHusserl,seeforexample,Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguisticPragmaticCritique.Tr.ElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001269Smith,A.D.“TheFleshofPerception:Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InReadingMerleauPonty:OnthePhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.1‐22)Noteinparticularthesummaryremark,“…IhavesuggestedthatthereisnothingradicallynewinMerleau‐Ponty,ascomparedwithHusserl.Theyoccupythesameterraininphilosophicalspace.”(p.20)270Seeforexample:Behnke,Elizabeth.“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMR,p.34;hereafterBehnke.BehnkearguesthatSteinhadalready“steered”IdeasIIinarealisticdirection,onemorecongenialtoMerleau‐Ponty’sintentionsthantoHusserl’sown.
130
notbreakwithphenomenology;itisratherphenomenology’smostsignificant
achievement…”271Ofcourse,LeonardLawlorandTedToadvine,inthe
“Introduction”totheirEnglishtranslationofthebookdescribeitashavingasoneits
mainaimsto“confrontHusserl’sphenomenology”andthatitconcernsthe
“transformationofMerleau‐Ponty’sphenomenologyintoontology.”Importantly,
however,theseremarkspertaintoBarbarashimself,ratherthantoMerleau‐Ponty.
ForBarbarastacitlyadmitsthatMerleau‐Pontydidnotfullyeffectthedesired
“transformation”himself,andhasbenefitedfromhisowneffortstofinallydoso.272
C.“Weak”and“Mixed”Views:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.
Notwithstandingthepositionsofthethreeeminentscholarsjustmentioned,
theoppositeviewisrathermucheasiertofind.ThisistrueofMerleau‐Ponty’sone‐
timestudentClaudeLefort,forexample,aswellasMarchRichir,bothofwhom
speakofMerleau‐Ponty’sultimate“break”withphenomenology.273Stillonthe
271TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trs.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004(p.312)Barbaras’fullquotebearsalmostexactresemblancetosomethingMerleau‐Pontyhadwrittenbefore.Barbaras:“Also,Merleau‐Ponty’sontologydoesnotbreakwithphenomenology;itisratherphenomenology’smostsignificantachievement.ItaimstorecognizewhatHusserlhadforeseen,namely,‘atypeofbeingwhichcontainseverything’;itaimstomakeareturnfromanobjectiveworldtoaLebensweltinwhosecontinualfluxareborneNatureandtheobjectsofperception,aswellasconstructions…”Merleau‐Ponty,fromalectureonthe“life‐world”:“…thereturnfromanobjectiveworldtoaLebsenweltinwhosecontinualfluxareborneNatureandtheobjectsofperception,aswellastheconstructionsthroughwhichwegraspthemwithCartesianexactness.”(Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance19521960.Tr.JohnO”Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970,p.108.Hereafter“Themes.”)272Ibid.,ix273See:Lefort,Claude,Surunecolonneabsente:EcritsautourdeMerleauPonty(Paris:Gallimard,1978)andRichir,Marc,“LesensedelaphénoménologiedansLevisibleetl”invisible,”inEsprit,no.66(June1982),p.125.IgetthesecitationsbywayofBettinaBergo’s“PhilosophyasPerspectivaArtificialis:Merleau‐Ponty’sCritiqueofHusserlianConstructivism.”Printedasthe“Afterword”of:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.HusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology.Ed.LeonardLawlorwithBettinaBergo.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2002,p.178.Thisarticleisreferredtohereafteras“Bergo.”
131
Merleau‐Pontyside(sotospeak),therearethecasesofGaryMadisonandM.C.
Dillon,bothofwhomunderplaytheroleofthephenomenologicalreductionin
Merleau‐Ponty.274ForDillon,eventheearlyMerleau‐Ponty“uncritically
appropriated”Husserlianterminologyfordifferentpurposes.275Suchsentiments
arecommonamongMerleau‐Pontyscholars.InhisbookonMerleau‐Ponty,for
example,LawrenceHassarguesthatMerleau‐PontygoesbeyondHusserldefinitely
fromphenomenologyto“expression”276,whileHubertDreyfuscommentsthat
Merleau‐Ponty’santi‐dualismconflictsdirectlywithwhatmakesthetranscendental
reductioninHusserlpossible277.TaylorCarmanandFrançoiseDastur,bothfrom
verydifferentperspectives,bothagreeonacertain“dualism”inHusserlwhich
clasheswithMerleau‐Ponty’santi‐dualistagenda.ArguesCarman,forexample:
“UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,Merleau‐Pontylooksbeyondthesubject‐objectdividetotrytogaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperience…Indeed,takingtheproblemofembodimentseriously,asMerleau‐Pontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptualdistinctionsonwhichHusserl’senterpriserests.”278
Forhispart,XavierTilliettereinforcesthisdividewhenheremarksthat
“…HusserlwasnotaninstructorofMerleau‐Pontyasmuchasaninitiatoranda 274GaryMadison,ThePhenomenologyofMerleauPonty:TheSearchfortheLimitsofConsciousness(Athens:OhioUniversityPress,1981),194‐5and332‐3,andMartinDillon,MerleauPonty’sOntology(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988),71‐2,120(hereafter“Dillon”).Citedbywayof:SaraHeinämaa,“FromDecisionstoPassions:Merleau‐Ponty’sInterpretationofHusserl’sReduction.”(Hereafter“Heinämaa.”)In“Reading”(pp.127‐148)275Dillon,p.83.Dillondoeshowevernoteonp.87the“usual”wayinwhich,almostasakindofmodusoperandi,Merleau‐Pontypicksupanddevelopsa“seminalthought”ofHusserl’s.276Hass,Lawrence.MerleauPonty’sPhilosophy.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2008(pp.198‐9)277Dreyfus,Hubert.“Merleau‐Ponty’sCritiqueofHusserl’s(andSearle’s)ConceptofIntentionality.”InRereadingMerleauPonty.Amherst,NewYork:HumanityBooks,2000(p.37)278Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p206.ForDastur’ssimilarbutslightlymorenuancedposition,see:“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983(pp.65‐77).
132
revealer,”goingontoaddthat“Merleau‐Pontyhastracedoutnewfurrows,
concernedtofreeuptheimplicitHusserlwhoresembledhimlikeabrother,”279an
interestingtwistofcourseinwhichHusserlissaidtoresembleMerleauPonty,as
opposedtheotherwayaround!280Tillietteisambiguous,however,abouttheissue
ofMerleau‐Ponty’soriginality,aswhenhewrites,“Inreality,[Merleau‐Ponty]did
notcarryoutdetailedpioneerwork,butratherpickedoutpassagesandformulas
thatelectrifiedhisownmeditation.Hewasnotanddidnotwanttobeascholiast
norevenanhistorianofphilosophy.”Didhecarryoutpioneeringworkordidn’the?
Inarecentessay,StephenWatsonofferssomethinglikeanintermediary
position,a“mixture”ofthestrongandtheweakingredients.281Ontheweakerside,
heemphasizesthecriticalaspectofMereau‐Ponty’sengagementwithHusserl:
“Merleau‐Pontyhasgivenuponphenomenologyasastrictlyfoundationalsciencein
ordertoarticulatephenomenologyaspartofourconceptualhistoryandcoherence,
asituatedknowingandasituatedknowledge.”282Watsonseemstosuggestthat
Merleau‐Ponty’sradicalrethinkingoftheroleofhistory,factuality,andgenerally
the“relationofstructureandsense,”283whilestillperhaps“phenomenological”ina
loosesense,issufficientlyradicaltoindicateaprofounddisengagementfromthe 279Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TextsandDialogues.Ed.HughSilvermanandJamesBarry,Jr.Tr.MichaelSmithetal.NewJersey:HumanitiesPress,1992(p.162)280Wealsomustbecarefulinfollowinghimashecontinuesthispassage,however:“HeapproachedHusserlwithulteriormotives,knowingbydivinationwhathewouldfindthere…”(CitedbywayofLesterEmbree’sPrefaceto“Reading,”p.xiii)Tillietteadmitstohaveacquiredthislatterinsightsecond‐handfromaformercolleagueofMerleau‐Ponty,whoknewhimasof1938.HisbeliefthatMerleau‐Pontychieflybroughtoutthehidden“implications”ofothers”thoughtsisnotincorrect,butifonedoesthisatamasterlyenoughlevel,itbecomesunclearwhoismoreresponsibleforthefullydevelopedthought—theoriginalauthororthecommentator.281Watson,StephenH.“Merleau‐Ponty’sPhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNotto‘singtheWorld.””JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications.(pp.535‐549)282Ibid.,544283Ibid.,545
133
original,morepositivisticversionofphenomenologythatHusserlhadlaidout.“We
mustconcludethatonitsownphenomenologyisnotexplanatory[intheway
Husserlhadclaimed].Itattainsnoexplanatory‘role’—certainlynotthatof
determiningourconcepts—withoutbeingbroughttogetherwiththefactsandtheir
history.”284Watson’srichargument,whichitselfcombineshistoricalfactand
systematicanalysisintracingMerleau‐Ponty’scriticalbreakfromelementsofboth
Husserl’sandhisownearlierphenomenology,neverthelessmakesacompelling
indirect(and,forlackofabetterword,performative)casefortheinextricabilityofa
comprehensionofMerleau‐Ponty’staskwithoutreferencetoHusserlasakindof
permanenthorizon—muchinthesamewayperhapsthatMerleau‐Ponty(citedby
Watson)arguesforthedialectical‐relationalimportanceofscienceto
phenomenology.285Itisthisthatcanbesaidtocomprisethe“strong”elementin
Watson’sreadingoftheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationship.
D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo
IntherestofthissectionIwilldealatgreaterlengthwiththe“weak”viewsof
threephenomenologistsofhighrepute:LesterEmbree,ElizabethBehnke,and
ThomasSeebohm.Iquotetheseauthorsatlengthinordertodealwiththeirclaims
inclosedetail.
284Ibid.,545285Ibid.,540.TheoriginalcitationisfromPrimacy,29.WatsonalsocitesGurwitsch’swell‐knownremarktotheeffectthatthe“life‐world”inHusserlcannotbeunderstoodapartfromitspolemicalrelationtothescientificattitude.
134
ForEmbree’sview,Iwillsimplyreproduceanexpandedversionofthequote
providedattheoutsetofthischapter:
“ItisdauntingtorecallthehistoricalerainAmericanphenomenologyofouryouththatisbestcalled‘PhenomenologyandExistentialism’ifonlybecause,inthatgreatupsurgeofenergy,Husserlwas,incredibly,readbysomanyasthefatherofexistentialphenomenology,apaternitythatstillneedschallenging.ThatwaschallengedchieflyonthebasisofwhatMerleau‐PontyconfectedinreferencetoabookwhoseEnglishtitleactuallyisTheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciences.Nocompetentreadercanstudythepresentwork[anintroductiontoHusserl’sphenomenology]andfailtocomprehend(a)thatHusserl’swasfromabout1905throughtotheendofhislifeatranscendentalphilosophyand(b)thatHusserl’sfocuswasinthephilosophyofscience.Existentialphenomenologyisnottranscendentaland,althoughnotlackingininterestinsciencetheory,ismoreconcernedwithhumanexistence.”286
Severalthingscanbesaidtochallengethesesentiments,thoughnonedefinitive.For
example,ononereading,Merleau‐Pontydoesnotrenouncethetranscendental
attitude,andattimesinfactembracesitexplicitly.287Onthisview,itisthe
“absoluteness”or“priority”ofitthathechallenges,notitsrightfulplacein
phenomenologicalpraxis.Also,itisarguablethatMerleau‐Ponty’sintensive
engagementwiththesciences—atleastatthefirst‐orderlevel(meaning,the
creativeinterpretationofits“results”)—notonlymatchesbutsurpassesthatof
Husserlhimself.288Finally,toarguethatHusserlwasconcernedwith“science”as
opposedto“humanexistence”mightbeafalsedilemma,especiallyinMerleau‐
286Quotedin:Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlianPhenomenology.Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993(p.xi)287Seeforexamplethefollowingpassageonp.63ofPP:“Butnowthatthephenomenalfieldhasbeensufficientlycircumscribed,letusenterintothisambiguousdomainandletusmakesureofourfirststepsasfarasthepsychologistisconcerned,untilthepsychologist’sself‐scrutinyleadsus,bywayofsecond‐orderreflection,tothephenomenaofthephenomenon,anddecisivelytransformsthephenomenalfieldintoatranscendentalone.”(italicsadded)ReferenceprovidedbyHeinämaa(p.129)SeealsoTedToadvine’sarticle,alsoinMR(pp.71‐94),entitled“LeavingHusserl’sCave?ThePhilosopher’sShadowRevisited.”ToadvinearguesthatthePSisanexampleofMerleau‐Ponty’s“reformulatingtherelationbetweenthetranscendentalandthemundane.”(p.71)288Andheisnostrangertothe“philosophyofscience”assuch,either.SeeforexamplewhatMerleau‐PontysaysaboutscienceinhisEyeandMind(InThePrimacyofPerception,tr.CarletonDallery.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964)pp.159‐61.
135
Ponty’scase,butalso,arguably,inHusserl’s.Embree,oneofthemosteminent
scholarsofphenomenologytoday,isobviouslyawareofallofthis,sothisismore
thanamatterofliningupcitationstoproveonesideortheother.AsIwilltryto
arguelater,howonereadstheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationshipispartlya
functionofone’sreceptivitytothekindof“ambiguity”—agoodambiguity,mind
you289—thatMerleau‐Pontywantstointroducetophilosophyandhermeneutics
alike.
Behnkebeginsarecentessaybyarguingthat“Merleau‐Ponty’s‘reading’of
Husserlissimultaneouslya‘writing’ofHusserl—awritingthatappropriatesand
develops,butalsodeformsandoccludes.”290ItisinterestingtonotethatMerleau‐
Pontyhimselfendorsesthenotionthatitisafalsedilemmatosaythat
“interpretationisrestrictedtoinevitabledistortionorliteralreproduction.”(PS
159)Yetonewishestoaskhowitispossibletodevelopsomeone’sideasby
deformingthem?Doesnotthenotionof“development”presupposeacertainlackof
completedform,andhenceamalleabilityor“potentiality”thatmakesithardto
defineinthefirstplace?Withthisominousphrasing,Behnkegoesontoexplainwhy
shefaultsMerleau‐Ponty’sapproachandmannerofappropriation,asinthistelling
quote:
“Onthewhole,then,Merleau‐Ponty’sHusserl‐readingischaracterizedbyaninterpretiveengagementwiththecontentofHusserliantextsratherthanaconcernforadoptingaphenomenologicalattitude,consultingexperientialevidenceforourselves,andcarryingHusserl’sresearchtraditionfurther.…AndsinceMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserlhashadaprofoundinfluenceonthewayHusserl’sworkhasbeenreceivedingeneral,theoveralleffecthasbeento
289Fortheexpression“goodambiguity,”seePrimacy,11.290“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMR,p.31
136
perpetuateaclimateofinterpretationinwhichHusserlianthemesandtermsaretypicallyapproachedinlightofreceivedphilosophicalproblemsandreceivedwaysofposingthem,allattheexpenseofthepossibilityofappropriatingphenomenologyasalivingresearchhorizon.”(Behnke,49‐50)
Readclosely,thisemergesasaparticularlystingingcritiqueofMerleau‐
Ponty,atleastqua“phenomenologist.”Bynotconsulting“experientialevidencefor
ourselves”or,whatBehnkementionsjustbefore,cleavingto“description”rather
than“explanation”(Behnke,49),Merleau‐Pontyisperhapsnotsomucha
“phenomenologist”atall,butclosertoasimpledogmatist,thatisametaphysician
whoengagesin“receivedphilosophicalproblemsandreceivedwaysofposing
them.”Behnke’sstickingpointisMerleau‐Ponty’sabandonmentofHusserl’sstrict
methodologicaldirectives,somethingneitherhenorIwouldentirelydispute.
Behnkeaddsyetanotherdarktwist,however,bysuggesting,likeEmbree,thatthe
receptionofMerleau‐Pontyasarepresentativephenomenologisthasdamaged
Husserl’slegacy.ObviouslyBehnkeisnottryingtocastaspersionsonMerleau‐
Pontyhimself,butsimplytodescribewhatsheseesasacaseofall‐too‐successful
appropriation(herword)ofHusserl’sprogram.ButMerleau‐Pontyhas,inBehnke’s
words,performeda“disservice”toHusserl’swork.291Thereisperhapsacertain
assumptionherethatHusserl’sownself‐definedproject—withoutinterventionby
Merleau‐Ponty—isvitalonitsown,apowerfulphilosophicalsystemor
methodologythathasbeenovershadowedbyaninferiorproduct.However,itisnot
clearinthiscasethatMerleau‐Pontywouldhavemarkedoutanysortof
291Behnkesinglesoutthat“majorelementofHusserl’sworkasawhole”thatis“constitution.”(Behnke,48)Behnke’sremarksherearesomewhatsurprisinggivenherintensiveengagementwithMerleau‐Ponty,particularlyovertheissuesofembodimentandnature,inrecentyears.Seeforexample:“FromMerleau‐Ponty’sConceptofNaturetoanInterspeciesPracticeofPeace.”InAnimalOthers:OnEthics,Ontology,andAnimalLife.Albany:StateUniversityPress,1999(pp.93‐116)
137
“development”ofHusserl’sthought,somuchaswrong‐headedlymisconstruedwhat
Husserlwasfinallyupto.
Thesesortsofsentimentsstandofcourseinsignificantcontrastwith
Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstandingofhisownrelationshiptoHusserl’sthought,which,
aswewillseeinthenextsectionofthischapter,isclosertothestrongviewsbriefly
coveredabove.Itisinlightofthisself‐interpretationofMerleau‐Ponty’sthat
ThomasSeebohmdevelopsaninterestingpsychologicalhypothesis,suggestingthat
Merleau‐Pontyknewofthedistanceatsomelevelinhismind,buttriedinanycase
to“coverup”thisdistance.Whywouldhedothis?Again,alongbutrichquote:
“AsinthecaseofFichteandKant,thetoposservesasacover‐upofacritique,andthiscritiquehasthecharacterofdeconstruction.FichteshowedwithrespecttoKant,andMerleau‐PontywithrespecttoHusserl,thatwhattheybelievedtobethelastwordinphilosophyisbuilton‘unthought’suppositions.Theselurkbehindthehiddencontradictionsofthecriticizedposition…Thenewtaskistherecognitionandexplicationofthesepresuppositions,thusaskingforthepossibilityofthecriticizedpositions.Adeconstructivecritiquehas,takenforitself,thecharacterofamoreorlesscompleteruptureandradicalrejectionofthepositionsinquestion.Butthegoalisalsotoclaimsomekindofcontinuity.”292
Andheaddselsewhere,
“Merleau‐Pontyisineveryrespecthonestinhisattemptsto‘savetheface’ofhishonoredmasterinthelightofthenewdevelopmentsintroducedbyhimandothers.”293
ThusMerleau‐PontyoverplayedtheconnectionbetweenhimselfandHusserlinat
leastoneway:forthe(ironically)benevolentpurposesofdisguisingcertainjarring
discrepanciesbetweenthetwo.(Merleau‐PontyevidentlywantedtosaveHusserl’s
292Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMR(p.59)293Ibid.,p.55
138
facebygivinghimakindof“face‐lift”!)Ifitisbeingimpliedthatthiskindofface‐
saving,well‐intentionedasitmaybe,isnonethelesscounter‐productive,becausefor
exampleittendstomisleadreadersastowhatHusserlreallymeant,thenwecome
fullcirclebacktoBehnke’scriticismaboutlegacyandocclusion.The“face‐saving”
hypothesisistempting,givenMerleau‐Ponty’sgenerallynon‐confrontationalstyleof
engagingfriendsandenemiesalike,butitfacesarealdifficulty:whyshould
Merleau‐PontyhavefeltobligedtodiscussHusserlinthefirstplace,andtothe
extentthathedoes?OutofsomestrangeemotionalattachmenttoHusserl,amanhe
hadnevermet,andwhoseworkhehadeveryreasontodownplaywithrespectto
figureslikeHeidegger,Hegel,andothers?294Thisdoesnotseemwhollyconvincing.
IfthereisanypersonalresponsibilityMerleau‐Pontywouldfeeltowards
Husserl,itwouldprobablybeasagratefulstudenttoa(virtual)teacher.Having
benefittedfromreadingHusserl’sprivatemeditationsintheHusserlarchives,
concealedtomostofthepublic,andwhichoftenconflictedwiththetendenciesof
thepublishedworks,Merleau‐Pontyprobablyfeltincreasinglyresponsibleto
revivifyHusserlintheeyesofapublicthatremembershiminaone‐sidedway.This
isthedistinctimpressionthatIgetasIreadtheopeningofthePS.Hedidnothaveto
citeHusserlasoftenashedoes,butnottohavedonesowouldhaveeventually
appeared,tomany,asabitdishonest,giventheroleHusserlplaysinhisown
thinking.AndifitistruethatMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughtisakindof“deconstruction”
ofHusserl,Merleau‐Pontyhimselfdoesnotreallygivethisindication.Evenwhenhe
294Thereferenceto“deconstruction”shouldnotbeignored,asitgoestotheissueofMerleau‐Ponty’smannerofinterpretingphilosophers,butwewillcometothisinthenextsectionwhenweexaminePSindetail.
139
claimstoexposeacontradictioninHusserlhimself,295forexample,hequicklyadds
thatHusserlwasatleastsemi‐awareofitandmovingtowardsasatisfactory
resolutionofit,namelyinthelastphaseofhisphilosophy.Merleau‐Pontyisnot
deconstructingsomuchasreconstructingHusserl—fromoutofHusserl’sown
writings,noless.
BettinaBergo’sinterpretationoftheMerleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationbuilds
onsomethingMerleau‐Pontyhimselfcommentson,namelyacertaintensionin
Husserl’sthought,which,says,Bergo,“liesbetweenthesearchforaground,a
unifyingprinciple...and,ontheotherhand,theconvictionthattheground…is
ultimatelyneverwhollyreducibleandsocannotserveasanepistemicfoundation.”
(Bergo,159)OnBergo’sview,Merleau‐Pontyeffectivelychosesides(mywords)by
takingthe“an‐archicphenomenologicaloption.”(Bergo,160)ThetensionBergo
citesisreal,yes—butshe,unlikeMerleau‐Ponty,expressesithereinsolely“static”
or“synchronic”terms.Merleau‐Ponty,instead,providesamorediachronicaccount,
accordingtowhichHusserl’stextswereemergingintoacertain“an‐archism”quite
ontheirown.296Ifthisistrue,thenMerleau‐Ponty’sautonomyasa“chooser”is
diminished;heisfollowingHusserl’sleadeveninthinkingagainstHusserl.That,
indeed,isafittingwaytocharacterizethedepthofHusserl’sinfluenceover
Merleau‐Ponty,ifbyacircuitousroute.Bergointerestinglycallsthisinfluenceinto
questionovertheissueofHusserl’slatetextErfahrungundUrteil,atextthathas 295Seeforexample:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RoberVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003(p.79)296OneinstanceofMerleau‐Ponty’spositioncomesattheconclusionofalongassessmentofHusserl’sthinkinginPS:“Originallyaprojecttogainintellectualpossessionoftheworld,constitutionbecomesincreasingly,asHusserl’sthoughtmatures,themeansofunveilingabacksideofthingsthatwehavenotyetconstituted.”(PS180)
140
beenshowntohavemanyparallelswith(oranticipationsof)Merleau‐Ponty’s
writings.ButbecauseMerleau‐Pontywasnotawareofthetext’sexistence,Bergo
concludesthatthecoincidencesaysmoreaboutMerleau‐Ponty’sindependenttrain
ofthoughtthanHusserl’sinfluenceonMerleau‐Ponty.However,athirdoption
seemstobethatMerleau‐Pontywasatsomepoint“keyedin”toacertainlogicof
Husserl’sthoughts,andsocouldanticipatemanyofthethingsHusserlmighthave
said,withouthavingactuallyhadacquaintancewiththem.IamnotsureBergohas
convincinglyforeclosedthispossibility.
E.ConcludingThoughts
Notwithstandingitsmanytwistsandfolds,theMerleau‐Ponty/Husserl
debate’sdominantundercurrentissomethinglikewhetherMerleau‐Pontyshould
beunderstoodasa“thingapart”fromHusserlorsomehowacontinuation,evena
mereecho,ofthelatter.OneofBergo’sintriguingideas,drawnfromsomeaccounts
ofLefort,isthatMerleau‐Pontyisapeculiarsortofreaderofphilosophersgenerally,
onewhoseappropriationofothersondistinctlyMerleau‐Pontiantermsisso
seamlessastomakeonebelievethatthesourceauthor“reallymeant,”allalong,
whatMerleau‐Pontysaystheymeant.(Bergo,158‐9)Ofcoursethismightbesaidof
manyphilosophers;Iamsure,forexample,thatAristotle’sstudentswereconvinced
byhistendentioustreatmentofthepre‐socratics.ButIthinktheclaimisthat
Merleau‐Pontyisparticularlyeffectiveineffacinghimselffromtheequation,almost
intermsofasortof“appropriationbystealth”—asopposedtoanovertAristotelian‐
Hegelianteleologism(“allofthisleadstomytheory.”)Animagethatisbroughtto
141
mindisoneofaplanet(Merleau‐Ponty)whosepullbringsphilosophers(Hegel,
Heidegger,Bergson,Schelling,Scheler,Marx,etc.)andnon‐philosophers(Uexküll,
Proust,Freud,Cézanne,Valéry,etc.)alikeintoitsorbit,revealingthemtobe(or
bendingthemtobecome)justsomanycompliantmoons.Allofthismaybetruein
thecaseofthefiguresjustlisted,butitisnottrue,Iwouldinsist,withrespectto
Husserl.ItwouldgotoofartosayHusserlistoMerleau‐Pontywhatastaristothis
planet,soperhapsamorefittingimageisthatofthetwinstarsofthebinarySirius
starsystem,workingintandemtoproduceapotentluminosityinthenightsky.
III.MerleauPonty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText
A.Introduction
Iwouldliketobeginthissectionwitha(second)epigraphofsorts,anearly
(1947)quotationfromMerleau‐Pontywhichsetsthestagefortherestofhis
(prematurelycurtailed)philosophicalcareer.
“Whenphilosopherswishtoplacereasonabovethevicissitudesofhistorytheycannotpurelyandsimplyforgetwhatpsychology,sociology,ethnography,history,andpsychiatryhavetaughtusabouttheconditioningofhumanbehavior.Itwouldbeaveryromanticwayofshowingone’sloveforreasontobaseitsreignonthedisavowalofacquiredknowledge.Whatcanbevalidlydemandedisthatmanneverbesubmittedtothefateofanexternalnatureorhistoryandstrippedofhisconsciousness.”297
297See:“ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.”(Tr.JamesEdie)In“Perception,”p.24.Thiswasatalk(andensuingdiscussion)originallyrecordedin1947,shortlyafterthepublicationofPP.Hereafter“Primacy.”
142
Inacertainway,thispassageconveystheessenceofMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyof
man298:theenigmaticnexusoftheinnerlifeofconsciousnessandtheouterbeingof
Nature,theambiguousmiddle‐spaceinwhichhumanexistenceunfoldsand
(partially)findsitself.InMerleau‐Ponty’sview,Husserlsawthesameenigma,and
increasinglycametoseethatitcouldnotbesolvedthroughanappealto“absolute
consciousness,”areflective‐constitutive“possession”oftheworld,299anymorethan
itcouldbesolvedbyscientificnaturalismanditsdeterministiclaws.Hencethe
“existential”thrustofMerleau‐PontianphenomenologyandthepersistentMerleau‐
PontianclaimthatHusserlhimselfenters“existentialism”inthethird,“life‐world”‐
themedphaseofhisphilosophy.ButhowdoesMerleau‐Pontygetallofthisfrom
Husserl,andhowdoesheparlayitintoanewvisionof“humanreality”?
ThecurrentsectionisoneoftwothatreconstructMerleau‐Ponty’s
philosophyasa“Husserlian”phenomenology.BecauseMerleau‐Pontygenerally
writespiecesandnotpiecemeal(areflectionofhislargelybecominganessayist
betweenPPandVI),itisimportanttoexaminethismaterialtextbytext;butatthe
sametime,thisapproachtendstooccludethegenuinelysystematicwayheengages
withtheprincipalthemesofHusserl’sphenomenology,suchasthetworeductions.I
havethustriedtocombinebothapproaches—textual‐historicalandthematic‐
systematic—byorganizingthesecondsectionaroundthesamematerialdiscussed
298Hereaselsewhere,Iuse“man”insteadof“humanity”onlyinordertoreflectthestyleofthesourceauthor.IdoofcourseusethelattertermwhereverIamrepresentingmyownviewsalone.299“Originallyaprojecttogainintellectualpossessionoftheworld,constitutionbecomesincreasingly,asHusserl’sthoughtmatures,themeansofunveilingabacksideofthingsthatwehavenotyetconstituted.”(PS180)SeealsoMerleau‐Ponty’swarninginthesameessay:“Tothinkisnottopossesstheobjectsofthought;itistousethemtomarkoutarealmtothinkaboutwhichwethereforearenotyetthinkingabout.”(PS160)
143
inthefirst,onlynowbytheme.Differentthingsbecomeapparentthrougheach
approach.300
B.HusserlinPP
PPisdominatedbythepreoccupationsandmethodologicalinnovationsof
phenomenology.AndMerleau‐Pontymakesitclearinhisfamous“Preface”thatitis
Husserl’sversionofphenomenologythathehaschieflyinview.301Mostifnotallof
themajorissuesintheHusserl/Merleau‐Pontynexus,andMerleau‐Ponty’smanner
ofinterpretingHusserl,arepresentinatleastgerminalformintheshortbut
pregnant“Preface.”Merleau‐Pontyenumeratesthethreemajorthemesof
Husserlianphenomenology—thephenomenologicalreduction,eideticreduction,
intentionality—and,onebyone,endorsesandrepackagesthemin“existential”
terms.Thuswelearnthatthephenomenologicalreductioninfact“belongsto
existentialistphilosophy.”302
300Intermsoftexts,Iwilldrawprimarilyonthe“Preface”toPP,theessaysPSand“PhenomenologyandtheHumanSciences”(InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964;hereafter“PSM”),andVI.(Note:IwillbecitingfromthepaperbackeditionoftheSmithtranslationofPP;amazingly,pagenumbersofthehardcoverandpaperbackeditionsforthemostpartdonotalign.)301Afterall,heexplicitlyrelegatesBeingandTime(HeideggerbeingtheothermajorphenomenologicalalternativetoHusserl,exceptingSartre,whohimselfappropriatesHusserlandHeidegger)tothestatusofadetaileddevelopmentofHusserl’sownphilosophy.ThisstatedpreferenceforHusserloverHeidegger(andScheler)isrepeatedelsewhere,forexample,inPSM:“Husserl,whodefinedphilosophyasthesuspensionofouraffirmationoftheworld,recognizedtheactualbeingofthephilosopherintheworldmuchmoreclearlythanHeidegger,whodevotedhimselftothestudyofbeingintheworld.”(PSM,94)Merleau‐PontycallsHeidegger“dogmatic”inthesamepassage.ThisattitudetowardsHeideggersuggeststhatMerleau‐Pontyis,inaway,“takingHeideggerback”forHusserl.ThuswhenMerleau‐Pontyusesatermlike“being‐in‐the‐world”or“facticity”inthe“Preface,”itisalways,ironically,tothebenefitofHusserl.AgainstthosewhowouldargueforanequalHusserlandHeidegger(atleasttheHeideggerofBeingandTime)influenceonthethinker,Ithinktheseindicationshelpdispelthatimpression,thoughthereisadmittedlymuchroomfordebateonthematter.302LestweimaginethistobeaveiledattackonHusserl,weneedonlyconsultalaterfootnotelaterinwhichMerleau‐PontydefinesHusserlhimselfas“existentialist”—inhislastor“third”periodof
144
OnwhatbasisdoesMerleau‐Pontyargueforaspecificallyexistentialist
understandingofphenomenology?Inafootnote(oneofmanywithrevealing
remarksaboutHusserl)laterinthebook,Merleau‐Pontyexplainsthelinkas
follows:
“Husserl’soriginalityliesbeyondhisnotionofintentionality;itistobefoundintheelaborationofthisnotionandthediscovery,beneaththeintentionalityofrepresentations,ofadeeperintentionality,whichothershavecalledexistence.”(PP141n)
This“deeperintentionality”isofcoursewhatMerleau‐Pontyvariouslycalls“motor
intentionality”or“operativeintentionality,”thespontaneous,pre‐conscious(or
“anonymous”—anotherHusserlianword)intentionalityofthebodyoriented
towardsitsenvironment.Husserlhimselfhadagreatdealtosayaboutsuch
“operativeintentionality”—itisinfacthisidea.ThusMerleau‐Pontyis—underthis
meaningof“existence”—merelyemphasizingacertainlineofHusserlian
investigation.
OneoftheconsistentthemesofMerleau‐Ponty’sthinking—itis,infact,one
ofthefundamentalpremisesofhisgeneralphilosophicaloutlook—ishisopposition
to“idealism.”Thereason—oroneofthem—isthatofthe“opacity”oftheworldto
consciousness.Idealisms(speakingnowespeciallyofthe“transcendental”rather
than“phenomenalist”sort)managetorenderconsciousness“transparent”tothe
philosophizing,thatis.Indeed,this“tripartite”divisionofHusserl’sthoughtbecomes,aswehavealreadyseen,aregularmotifinMerleau‐Ponty’sHusserl‐interpretation.ForasinPP,inPSMMerleau‐PontysinglesoutfortheirimportanceHusserl’s“lasttenyears”(PSM46),thoughhealsoclaimsthat“fromthebeginningtotheendofhiscareer,Husserltriedtodiscoverawaybetweenlogicismandpsychologism”(PSM48)—thatis,betweenstrictlogicalnecessityandthepurecontingencyoffacts.Thusitisusefultonotethatalreadyinthe“Preface”Merleau‐PontymakesreferencetoHusserlasacontradictoryphilosopher.(PPviii)
145
world.303Merleau‐Ponty’soppositionto“idealism”isthereforeclear,butwhose
“idealism”heisreferringto—Kant’sorHusserl’s,forexample—isnot.Thereare
somewhotakeittobemotivatedagainstHusserl304,butA.D.Smith,totakean
excellentrecentexample,showsconvincinglythatitisonlyaKantian(orNeo‐
Kantian)kindofidealism—whichMerleau‐PontytargetsrepeatedlythroughoutPP
asthequintessentialformof“intellectualism”—thatthreatenstoimplythiskindof
transparency,namelybybuildingitintoperceptionasaconditionofanysortof
experienceatall.305Husserl’soppositiontoKantian“humanist”constructivismin
factpavesthewayforMerleau‐Ponty’sownappreciationofperceptionasan
“openness”totheworld.(PPxix)Weareopentotheworld,butitisnotenclosed
withinusorpre‐fittedtoourcategorialthought.Thisisexactlywhythe
determinationoftheworldthroughessencesisalwaysfraughtwithperilandshot
throughwithcontingency.306ButitisalsowhyHusserl’sreturntothe“things
themselves”issoimportantandrevolutionary.
303“…alogicallyconsistenttranscendentalidealismridstheworldofitsopacityanditstranscendence.”(PPxiii)304See,forexample,Bergo,162:“ItseemsfairtoconcludethatMerleau‐PontysetabouttoclearanyidealistresiduefromthepathofthelaterHusserl,and,insodoing,pushednumerousconceptsofhisown.”Isthissortofcharacterizationright?I,atleast,certainlydon”treadMerleau‐Pontyashaving‘setabout’tore‐interpretHusserl;onmyreading,hesimplysetabouttophilosophize,andHusserlgavethisphilosophizingitsshapeandtexture.305Smith,A.D.“TheFleshofPerception:Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InReadingMerleauPonty:OnPhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.10‐11)306Merleau‐Ponty’sstrongemphasison“opacity”and“contingency”does,ofcourse,exposehimtothedangersofskepticismandrelativism,bothofwhichheconfrontsasnecessarythreatstoface.HesideswiththeskepticslikeHumeandMontaigneuptoapoint—arguingthattheyarenevertheless“tootimidinthereturntothepositiveaspectaftertheirskepticalcriticisms.”(Primacy,29)HeaddressesthechallengeofrelativismandthethreatofscientismexhaustivelyinPSM,whichwewillcometobelow.(Wemightwishtokeepinmindthatthesame“softrelativism”thatemergesinMerleau‐PontymayhavebeguntocreepintoHusserlalreadyinthelatter’sinvestigationintothemultiplicityofhistoricalandcultural“life‐worlds”—theZulu,etc.)
146
Asageneralrule,mostofMerleau‐Ponty’sdeclarationsinthe“Preface”can
beseentobeinconflictwithmanyfeaturesof,say,theHusserlofIdeasI,though
muchlesssowiththe“geneticphenomenology”ofHusserl’slaterperiod.Take,for
example,Merleau‐Ponty’sstatementthatphenomenologyisa“phenomenologyof
origins,”orthatitcapturesmeaning“asitcomesintobeing.”(PPxxiv)Thisis
nothingbutHusserl’s“Sinngenesis,”asMerleau‐Pontyhimselfackowledges.(PPxxi)
AndwhileitishardtoseeHusserlsaying“theworldisnotwhatIthink,itiswhatI
livethrough”(PPxix)usingjustthesewords,whatdoescometomindisHusserl’s
intensivelaterinvestigationsinto“passivesynthesis”—thepre‐theticconstitutionof
theworld.Thatis,I“livethrough”theworldevenasIconstituteitbecauseI
constituteit“anonymously,”muchinthewayIsoorientmyselftotheworld
through“bodilyintentionality.”
C.HusserlinMerleauPonty’sLaterWork
ItisonlyappropriatetobeginherewithPS,whichchroniclesthelasting
philosophicalsignificanceofHusserl(andhis“shadow”).Byitselfitdemonstrates
muchofwhatIamtryingtoshowinthischapter,namelytheinseparabilityof
Merleau‐Ponty’sphilosophicalcontributionandhisreading/appropriationof
Husserl.
ThepiecebeginswithsomecrucialremarksonMerleau‐Ponty’sown
hermeneuticalapproachtopastphilosopherslikeHusserl,someofwhichhavebeen
citedalreadyabove.Merleau‐Pontywarnsagainstourbeingseducedinto“reducing”
aphilosopherstrictlytowhathesaid—towhatis“objectivelycertified”ofhim.
147
Merleau‐Ponty’s“middleway”inthisparticularcaseisbetween“objectivism,”on
theonehand,andpurearbitrariness,ontheother.Thus:an“objective”historyof
philosophywould“rob”greatphilosophersof“whattheyhavegivenotherstothink
about.”Yetneithershouldweengagein“meditationdisguisedasadialogue.”He
pointsout(asweindicatedabove)thatitisafalsedilemmatoclaimthat
interpretationsofothers’workleadseitherto“inevitabledistortion”or“literal
reproduction.”307
Merleau‐PontythenquotesfavorablyfromHeideggeronthe“unthought‐of”
elementsinphilosophers’works;inHusserlthereisan“unthought‐ofelementinhis
workswhichiswhollyhisandyetopensupontosomethingelse.”(PS160,myitalics)
Notetheparadoxical“iswhollyhis”and“ontosomethingelse.”Merleau‐Pontyis
tracingoutHusserl’sownprocessofself‐transcendence—andtherebymaking
manifestwhatislatent,butofcoursethefull“manifestation”turnsouttobe(more
immanentin)thetextsofMerleauPonty.Theboundariesof“self”and“other”are
porousindeed.The“unthought‐of”inHusserlistherebygivenvoiceinMerleau‐
Ponty,butitisimportanttorealizethatthereisnocleardividinglinebetween
“unthought‐of”and“thought‐of”inthis,orperhapsinanyother,case.Thusin
Husserl,existentialphenomenologyishalf‐thought,orsomewhat‐thought,whilein
Merleau‐Pontyitismore‐fully‐thoughtorre‐thought.308
307PS159‐161.Bothofthesepositionshavethecommonpremiseof“positivism”—here,anotherwordfor“objectivism”—accordingtowhich,Itakehimtomean,thereissomefullydeterminateandfinishedtextbeforeus,whichwemayeitherduplicateordistort,butnothinginbetween.308ReadingMerleau‐Pontyonthe“unthought,”Bergoechoesthecommonviewwhenshestatesthat“thequestionofMerleau‐Ponty’sreading…isaquestionoffindingthelatenciesinthetextanddevelopingthemsuchthattheyappeartobringtolightanunthoughtdimension.”(Bergo158‐9)Takenonitsown,thisistoosimplistic.Thisbecomesevidentwhenoneobservesthesheervolumeof
148
Aswehaveseenalready,Merleau‐Pontyconsistentlymaintainedthebelief
thatHusserlevolvedovertimeintothe“existential”Husserlofthe“life‐world”
philosophy.InreferencetoHusserl’sideaofthelife‐worldMerleau‐Pontyurges:
“Theselateanalysesareneitherscandalousnorevendisturbingifweremembereverythingwhichforetoldthemfromthestart.Theymakeexplicitthat‘world’sthesis’priortoeverythesisandtheory,thissideofunderstanding’sobjectifications,whichHusserlhasalwaysspokenof,andwhichhassimplybecomeinhiseyesoursolerecourseintheimpasseintowhichtheseobjectificationshaveledWesternknowledge.”(PS180)
HeknowsthatHusserlwouldprotest.Hence,lateron,weencounterthisrevealing
phraseology:“Willy‐nilly,againsthisplansandaccordingtohisessentialaudacity,
Husserlawakensawild‐floweringworldandmind.”(PS188‐9,myitalics)Husserl’s
laterthought—verymuchbuildingontheearlier—suggestsanewdirectionwithout
necessarilyfullytakingit.Merleau‐Pontyrevelsinshowingthroughliberal
quotationsthatinIdeasII,Husserlfreelygrantsontologicalprioritytomaterial
NatureoverSpiritinonebreath,evenasheprioritizestranscendental
consciousnessinanother.(PS164‐5,171)Fromtheseandotherhintsheconcludes
that:“Husserl’sthoughtisasmuchattractedbythehaecceityofNatureasbythe
vortexofabsoluteconsciousness.”(PS165)Merleau‐Pontythenstressesthemutual
“encroachment”(PS176)andreciprocalFundierung(PS173,176‐7)ofdifferent
ordersofbeing,sensibleandideal,309citingHusserl’sownwordsagaintosealthe
case.(PS177)
quotationsMerleau‐Pontyusesinawaythatemploystheirliteralandovertmeaning.OneistemptedtosaythatsomanyofHusserl’s“latencies”manifestthemselvesquitewell!309ItwouldofcoursetakeadetailedstudyofIdeasII(asundertakeninChapter2)toconfirmMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofit;butevenanotedHusserlscholarlikeStevenGaltCrowellconcedesthatthereisatleasttheappearanceofthissortofparadoxinthetext:“Inthecourseofhisattemptto
149
PSM,anessayfrom1961,offersamoreprosaicbutalsothoroughly
revelatoryassessmentofHusserlianthoughtandhisownself‐circumscription
withinitsberth.Itrepresentsthethinker’smatureconclusionsononeofthemajor
themesofphenomenologysinceitsinception,namelyitspreciserelation(ornon‐
relation,asthecasemaybe)tothesciences—bothnaturaland“human.”310Itis
primarilypsychologythatMerleau‐Pontyisconcernedwith,notsurprisingly(given
hislongengagementwithGestaltpsychologyinparticular).Thecentralproblematic
hereisthe“paradox”ofessenceandfact.Theessayisparticularlyilluminating
becauseofthewayitdemonstratesMerleau‐Ponty’sstrategyofstrikinga“middle
way”—through,andnotdespiteHusserl—betweenhistoricismandrelativism,on
theonehand,andessentialism(and,implicitly,determinism),ontheother.What
Merleau‐Pontywantstomaintain,andclaimsthatHusserlhimselfachievesevenif
belatedly,istruthinthemidstofindeterminacy,essencewithinexistence,and,
strikingly,“eternity”alongwith“contingency.”(PSM92)Inallofthis,heviewsthe
humansciencessympathetically(andinfactallsciences—thereisnoclear
separationmadeherebetweennaturalandhumansciencesontologicallyspeaking,
eveniftheirmethodologiesdiffer).Thereasonforthissympatheticviewisthat determinetheideaofnatureinIdeasII,Husserlencountersanapparent“viciouscircle”…Arepersons“componentsofnature,”then,“subordinated”toit,ordoestheveryconstitutionofnaturepresupposethenon‐naturalrealmofspirit?”See:Crowell,StevenGalt.“TheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”InIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996(p.81).310Bythe“sciencesofman”Merleau‐Pontyhasprimarilypsychologyand,toalesserdegree,sociologyandethologyinmind.Anotherlecturecourseentitled“PhenomenologyandSociology”focusesonsomeotheraspectsofthesameproblem,thistimeemphasizingthenamesakescience,thoughitusesmuchofthesamelanguageasPSM,andismuchshorter.Ofcourse,whatisarguablymostimportantofallforMerleau‐Pontyistherelationofphilosophytohistory.Butalthoughwecallhistoryoneofthe“humanities”asopposedto“socialsciences,”itispreciselytheempirical,contingentfactorofhistoricalitythatmakesitakintothehumansciencesinMerleau‐Ponty’ssense.Thisisalsowhyhetreatsthethreatof“historicism”alongwiththatof“relativism”asheopenstheessay.
150
humansciences,intheirownway,aredoingpreciselythesamebalancingact,albeit
withouttheself‐reflectiveanxietythatphilosophybringswithit.Itisinthissense
thatMerleau‐Pontydeclaresthatthereisnocleardividinglinebetweenthetwo.
(PSM72)OnceagainheseemstobeatoddswithHusserl,whoinsistsonthe
separatenessoftranscendentalphenomenologyfromallsciences,butMerleau‐
Pontytellsadifferentstorythatrelies,asusual,heavilyon“evolutionary
developments”withinHusserlhimself.Merleau‐Pontyseesaburgeoning
recognitioninHusserlofthe“reciprocalenvelopment”ofpsychologyand
phenomenologybutalso,morebroadly,factandessence.Thushemakesseveral
detourstochroniclethestoryofHusserl’s“profounddevelopment”awayfrom
absoluteessentialism,forexamplewiththecaseoflanguage311.(PSM80)
InPSM,whatiskeytonoteinallofthisisnotjustwhatMerleau‐Pontysays
butwhyheissayingit:hedrawsHusserlintohisownfightagainstthenaturalismof
psychologyandtheempiricalsciences,invokeshimtomakehisowncase—indeed,
todefendhisownphenomenologicalapproachtothequestionsathand.Itisinthis
lightthatwecanappreciateMerleau‐Ponty’sdescriptionofphenomenologyitselfas
anegotiatedmeanbetweenskepticismandabsolutism.Merleau‐Pontydoesnotso
muchwanttomodifythephenomenologicalmethodasbringitintolivingcontact
withtherestoftheintellectualconversation:
“Husserlisseekingtoreaffirmrationalityatthelevelofexperience,withoutsacrificingthevastvarietythatitincludesandacceptingalltheprocessesofconditioningwhichpsychology,sociology,andhistoryreveal.Itisaquestionoffindingamethodthatwillenableustothinkatthesametimeof 311ThusforthelaterHusserl,arguesMerleau‐Ponty,“Thereisnoquestionanymoreofconstructingalogicoflanguage,auniversalgrammar,butratheroffindingalogicalreadyincorporatedintheworld.”(PSM82)
151
theexternalitywhichistheprincipleofthesciencesofmanandoftheinternalitywhichistheconditionofphilosophy…”(PSM52)
Husserltherebyfindsthe“rootsofreasoninourexperience”(PSM52)—justas
Merleau‐Ponty,wemightadd,findshisownrootsinHusserl.
VIisthehardestofMerleau‐Ponty’sworkstoassessintermsofits
relationshiptoHusserl.Partlythisisbecausetheworkisunfinished,withexplicit
referencestoHusserllyinginalargenumberof“WorkingNotes”whoseproper
interpretationisanythingbutclear312;butalsobecauseitsreferencesorallusionsto
HusserlarebynowsointerwoveninMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophicalimagination
thattheycomeandgoveiledorunannounced.Thisisnotthecaseentirely:thelast
pageofthefinalfamouschapter“TheIntertwining—theChiasm,”forexample,has
fulsomepraisefortheGermanfounder.313
Nonetheless,atleasttwoofthechapters,thefirstandthird—“Reflectionand
Interrogation”and“InterrogationandIntuition”—canbereadfruitfullyascritical
meditationsonHusserl.JustasonecouldeasilysaythatPSdealsprimarilywiththe
phenomenologicalreductionandPSMwiththeeidetic,thesame,Ithink,canbesaid
forchapters1and3oftheVI,respectively.Onceagainitbecomesclear,whenone
seesitthisway,justhowsystematicMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingandre‐readingsof
Husserltrulyare.ThesubstanceoftheVIchapterswillbebroughtoutthroughout
thefollowingsection.
312Ihavetriedpresentlytoavoidtheuseofthefragmentary“WorkingNotes”thataccompanythesechaptersduetotheirindeterminatenature.Ihavealsostayedawayfromtheimportantbutslightlyover‐exposed(nopunintended)notionof“theflesh.”Thereisluckilyplentyofremainingrelevantmaterialforthepresenttaskfromtherestofthetext.313“Inasensethewholeofphilosophy,asHusserlsays,consistsinrestoringthepowertosignify,abirthofmeaning,orawildmeaning,anexpressionofexperiencebyexperience…”(VI155)
152
IV.MerleauPonty’sHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme
A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction
ItisabromidebynowthatthereisnoissuemoreimportantinHusserl’s
thoughtthanthephenomenologicalreduction(andepoché).314Sosuspicionshave
arisenoverMerleau‐Ponty’shavingsupposedlycurtailedorcompromisedthepurity
ofthereduction,chieflyandmostfamouslyinthe“Preface”ofPP:
“…wemustbreakwithourfamiliaracceptanceofit[theworld],andalso,fromthefactthatfromthisbreakwecanlearnnothingbuttheunmotivatedupsurgeoftheworld.Themostimportantlessonwhichthereductionteachesusistheimpossibilityofacompletereduction.”(PPxv)
Butthesefamousorinfamoussentencesdonot,inMerleau‐Ponty’seyes,indicatea
breakfromHusserl.Theymerelystressconsciousness’“…dependenceonan
unreflectivelifewhichisitsinitialsituation…”(PPxvi)AccordingtoMerleau‐Ponty,
again,Husserlalreadythematizedthislifeastheproblemofthe“life‐world,”having
stressedtheprimacyoffacticityandexistenceovertheonce‐ortwice‐removed
approachesof,say,scientificempiricism,ontheonehand,andKantianidealism,on
theother.Thepointofthepassageistorevealtheparadoxicalityofthereduction,
namely,thefactthatitisonlythroughanactoftotalcommitmenttoreflectivelife
thattheimpossibilityofsuchacommitmentisrevealed.Inthisway,thereduction
314Againforthischapter,asfortherestofthisdissertation,Iamnotmakingadistinction,asMerleau‐Pontydidnot,betweenthe“phenomenological”andthe“transcendental”reductions,butratheramtreatingthemasone.
153
givesusovertoourexistentialselfhood.Andthisiswhythephenomenological
reduction“belongstoexistentialistphilosophy.”
Idon’tthinkweshouldundervaluethefactthatMerleau‐Pontyendorsesthe
phenomenologicalreduction.Indeed,heregardsitascentraltohisphilosophy.Itis,
afterall,thereductionthatbringsustothe“naturalattitude”before“naturalism”
anditsblosseSachen.(PS163)Itiswhatallowsusto“slackentheintentional
threadswhichattachustotheworld”evertootightlytoseeourselves.(PPxv)He
laterdescribesthereductioninsimilartermsas“thelink,whichisindeeda
schism[,]establishedbylifebetweenourthoughtandourphysicalandsocial
situation,”addingthatitnevertheless“neverleadsusinanywaytonegatetimeor
passbeyonditintoarealmofpurelogicorpurethought.”(PSM49)Inotherwords,
then,Merleau‐Pontyacceptseventhe“schismatic”aspectofthereduction315,so
longasitisnottakentomarkatotaldeparturefromthefinitudeoflivedhorizons.
Merleau‐Ponty’sreductionconsistsintwomovements:themovement“out
of”nature—thatis,themomentinwhichonebreaksoutofone’s“natural”
condition,thepassiveslumberofeverydaylife;andthemovementbackintoit,that
is,toarecognitionofone’sfinitude.316Initially,throughbracketingandtheshift
fromthenaturalattitudetothetranscendentalattitude,I“see”or“gainpossession
ofmyself”;reflectionsharpensmyconsciousnessandbringsitintoself‐
315Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyinsistselsewherethat“thesensibleorderisbeingatadistance”(PS167‐8)inordertostressthefutilityofteleologicalaccountsoftheworldthatbindthe“inner”andthe“outer”byasecret“aim.”316Onemightcallthisa“circleoffinitude”which,moreover,bearsobviousandopenaffinitieswithaspectsofHegelianthought.
154
consciousness.Buttheselfisnotapartfromnature;insomewayitcannotaccount
foritself,itbelongstonatureevenasit(apparently)transcendsit.
ThesecondpartofthismovementiswhatMerleau‐Pontythinksmustbe
reassertedagainstcertaintrends—andnotjustthoseof“transcendentalHusserl”:
“…theessentialdifferencebetweenmypointofviewandthatofaphilosophyofunderstandingisthat,inmyview,eventhoughconsciousnessisabletodetachitselffromthingstoseeitself,humanconsciousnessneverpossessesitselfincompletedetachmentanddoesnotrecoveritselfatthelevelofcultureexceptbyrecapitulatingtheexpressive,discrete,andcontingentoperationsbymeansofwhichphilosophicalquestioningitselfhasbecomepossible.”(Primacy40)
Closelytiedupwiththephenomenologicalreductionisthedialecticofthe
“naturalattitude”andthe“transcendentalattitude.”Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstanding
oftheseattitudespreserveselementsofbothcontinuityanddiscontinuitybetween
them,inkeepingwiththeparadoxicalnatureofthereduction.317Ontheonehand,
thereductiontakesusbeyondnaturalattitude,butthisisonly“halfthetruth.”(PS
162)Merleau‐Ponty’sconsideredjudgmentisthat“Itisthenaturalattitudewhich,
byreiteratingitsownprocedures,seesawsinphenomenology.Itisthenatural
attitudeitselfwhichgoesbeyonditselfinphenomenology—andsoitdoesnotgo
beyonditself.”(PS164)Thetranscendentalattitudeisnotabandonedordeclared
nonsense;butoneattitudedoesnotrelatetotheotheras“false”to“true.”318Inthe
317Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance19521960.Tr.JohnO”Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970.(p.108)Hereafter“Themes.”Merleau‐Pontyapprovinglyspeaksofthemomentwhen“philosophybecomestheenterpriseofdescribinglivingparadoxes.”318ItisinterestinginthisregardtonotethatHusserlhadalreadybeenwriting—privately—of“Der“transzendentaleIdealismus”alsSynthesisvonnatürlicherundtranszendentalerEinstellung.”(Husserl’semphasis)See:Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXXXIV:ZurPhänomenologischenReduktion(TexteausdemNachlass19261935).Ed.SebastianLuft.Dordrecht:Kluwer,2002,p.15(Hereafter“Husserl”)
155
end,wemustembracethe“contradictorycharacteristics”—which,saysMerleau‐
Ponty,Husserlhimselfpurposefullyassignsit—ofthereduction.(PS161)
ItistruethatMerleau‐PontycannotacceptsomeofwhatHusserlregardsto
betheconsequencesofthereduction,suchastheprivilegedperchof“absolute”
(reflective)consciousness.319Afterall,the“incompleteness”ofthereductionalso
meansthelimitedness,inthatsense,ofreflectivethought.Butinreadingthelater
Merleau‐Pontyinparticular,itbecomesincreasinglycleartoonethathehas
essentiallyfoldedthetranscendentalattitude,thestand‐pointofphenomenological
consciousness,ontothatofself‐consciousnessor“reflection”assuch.Thisisneither
meresemanticsloppinessnoranobvioustransgressionagainstHusserlhimself.Itis
aconsequenceofhisrejectionofthestrongdivisionbetweenpsychologyand
philosophy,manifestthroughoutPSM,forexample;reflectionisnotmerelya
“naturalistic”psychicact,tobesharplydelineatedfromtheheroicheightsofthe
transcendentalreduction.Giventhisre‐orientation,Merleau‐Ponty’sattacksinVIon
the“philosophyofreflection,”ashecallsit(VI43),appeartobedirectednotat
HusserlassuchbutatakindofidealismthatHusserlsometimesaffirms,butwhich
stemsmoreoriginallyfromKant.
Atfirst,thisisadmittedlynotobvious.Takethefollowingpassages:
“Aphilosophyofreflection,asmethodicdoubtandasreductionoftheopennessupontheworldto‘spiritualacts,’tointrinsicrelationsbetweentheideaanditsideate,isthriceuntruetowhatitmeanstoelucidate:untruetothevisibleworld,tohimwhoseesit,andtohisrelationswiththeother‘visionaries.’”(VI39)
andagain: 319Merleau‐Pontycritiquestheannihilationoftheworldexperiment(see,forexample,PS173‐4)butotherwisegiveseventhedescriptionofthereductioninIdeasIawarmreception.(SeePSM56)
156
“…letusrepeatthatwereproachthephilosophyofreflectionnotonlyfortransformingtheworldintoanoema,butalsofordistortingthebeingofthereflecting‘subject’byconceivingitas‘thought’—andfinallyforrenderingunthinkableitsrelationswithother‘subjects’intheworldthatiscommontothem.”(VI43)
ItmayseemnowthatMerleau‐Ponty,afteryearsof“face‐saving”acrobatics,isnow
“finally”jettisoningHusserlforgood.ButthefactisthatnoneofMerleau‐Ponty’s
criticismsherearenew.Merleau‐Pontyhasalreadyrejectedtranscendental
idealisminPP,withitsassumptionsofthe“transparency”oftheworldtoreflective
thought.320Indeed,theghostofthe“Preface”hauntsthischapteroftheVIinmore
waysthanthis:“Itisessentialtothereflectiveanalysisthatitstartfromadefacto
situation”(VI44)and“Thesearchfortheconditionsofpossibilityisinprinciple
posteriortoactualexperience…”(VI45)arenothingmorethanrestatementsofthe
“existential”turntakeninPPandalreadydiscussedabove.
ButacarefulreadingofthischapterrevealsthatMerleau‐Ponty’srealtarget
isKantianconstructivism,whichhegivescredittoHusserlforpiercingthrough:
“ThisiswhatHusserlbroughtfranklyintotheopen…thatis:everyefforttocomprehendthespectacleoftheworldfromwithinandfromthesourcesdemandsthatwedetachourselvesfromtheeffectiveunfoldingofourperceptionsandfromourperceptionoftheworld,thatweceasebeingonewiththeconcretefluxofourlifeinordertoretracethetotalbearingandprincipalarticulationsoftheworlduponwhichitopens.”(VI45)
Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyisnotsomuchagainst“reflection”(orthetranscendental
attitude)asheisagainstacertainphilosophyofreflectionwhicheffectivelyexcises
allconsiderationfortheroleofthe“pre‐reflective”inepistemologicallife.Thisisthe
320“Alogicallyconsistenttranscendentalidealismridstheworldofitsopacityanditstranscendence.”(PPxiii)
157
heartofhisoppositiontoKantand,indeed,theKantianinflectionsofHusserl’sown
self‐styled“transcendental”phenomenology.321Aphilosophyofreflectionbyitself
“…leavesuntouchedthetwofoldproblemofthegenesisoftheexistentworldandofthegenesisoftheidealizationperformedbyreflectionandfinallyevokesandrequiresasitsfoundationahyperreflectionwheretheultimateproblemswouldbetakenseriously.”(VI46)
This,ineffect,isMerleau‐Ponty’sidentificationofthe“limitsofphenomenology”—
andafulfilmentofhispromisetomakeofphenomenologya“phenomenologyof
phenomenology.”322Butbecausethe“foundation”Merleau‐Pontyreferstoisinfact
lessdeterminatethanreflection,andmoreofanexplorationofitsnever‐fully‐
recoverableunder‐side,itisnotareplacementofwhatisprovidedbythe
“existentialHusserl”butisinfactmerelyafurtherdevelopmentofit.Merleau‐
Ponty’sdisagreementiswith“purecorrelation”of“subjectandobject,”atleastinan
idealisticorquasi‐idealisticconstruction(VI47),andagainwiththenotionofa
“universalmind”(VI49).ButheseesHusserlasonthepathofquestioningthese:“In
recognizingthateveryreflectioniseideticand,assuch,leavesuntouchedthe
problemofourunreflectedbeingandthatoftheworld,Husserl…agreestotakeup
theproblemwhichthereflectiveattitude323ordinarilyavoids—thediscordance
betweenitsinitialsituationanditsends.”(VI46;compare:PS163and179)
321Merleau‐Pontyannounceshispositionclearlyalreadyinthe“Preface”ofPP:“DescartesandparticularlyKantdetachedthesubject,orconsciousness,byshowingthatIcouldnotpossiblyapprehendanythingasexistingunlessIfirstofallexperiencedmyselfasexistingintheactofapprehendingit.”(PPx)Merleau‐Pontycallsthisthe“idealistreturntoconsciousness”whichheexpresslydisavows.Seealso:“Husserl’stranscendentalisnotKant’s…”(PPxv)ItisofcoursetheKantofthefirst“Critique”thatMerleau‐Pontyhasinmindinsuchremarks.Heisfarmoresympatheticandevenindebtedtothethird“Critique.”322Husserl’sphrase,infact.SeeHusserl,p.176323Notetheterminology—”reflective”for“transcendental.”
158
Merleau‐Pontyfinallycomestotheidea—bywayofSchelling,itwould
seem324—thatphilosophyas“reflection”mustultimatelygivewaytoathinkingof
therichmiddlebetweentheknowableandtheunknowable,theidealworldof
thoughtandtherealworldof“wildbeing.”Forthisisthespringofhumanspirit,the
soiloftheself.RemarksToadvine,“Thisstateofcontinualbeginning,oftheneedfor
continualreexaminationoftheparadoxicalfoundationsofareflectionthatattempts
tograspitsownunreflectiveorigins,couldbeconsideredtheorientingthemeof
Merleau‐Ponty’sownphenomenologicalmethod.”(Toadvine240)Itcanscarcelybe
missedthatthissortofmethodconvergeswithMerleau‐Ponty’sown“re‐
examination”ofHusserl,theoriginofphenomenologyitself,andthe(atleast
hitherto)“un‐reflected.”
B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction
CommentatorsaredividedoverwhetherMerleau‐Pontyacceptstheeidetic
reduction,buttheevidenceisplainthathewasdeeplypreoccupiedbythe
Husserliannotionof“essences”fromfirsttolast.Itistruethathehaslittlepatience
fortheintuitionistresonancesofHusserl’sWesenschau,whichheherecallsa“myth”
(VI115‐6)andthereredescribesasthe“emergenceoftruthinandthroughthe
psychologicalevent.”(PSM53)WhatbecomesclearisthatMerleau‐Pontyisseeking
amiddlewaybetweenessentialismandnominalism,andhethinksHusserl,inthe
324SchellingisdiscussedindetailinMerleau‐Ponty’slectureson“Nature.”(Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003,esp.pp.36‐52)ForanexcellenttreatmentofSchelling’sroleinMerleau‐Ponty’slaterphilosophysee:PatrickBurke,“CreativityandtheUnconsciousinMerleau‐PontyandSchelling.”InSchellingNow:ContemporaryReadings,ed.JasonM.Wirth.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2005
159
end,wasdoingexactlythesame.ThisiswhyhecitestheHusserliandistinction
between“exact”and“morphological”essences(PSM67),theunlikenessof
mathematicstophenomenology(PSM67),Husserl’sownstrictparallelismbetween
therealmsoftheeideticandtheempiricalandarandompassagetothiseffectin
“DiePhilosophiealsstrengeWissenschaft,”(PSM72)andsoon.Furthermore:
“[Husserl’s]notionofanexperiencedessence,oraneideticexperience,containsin
germtheconsequencesIhavejustdrawnfromit.”(PSM72)
WhatMerleau‐PontyiscommunicatingisashiftheseesinHusserlfroma
purephilosophyofreflection—anorientationtowardsthelogical,theoretical,
transcendental,eidetic—toaphilosophyofexistenceinwhich,wefindout,
reflectionplaysacrucialbutnon‐foundational325role.ItisinthislightthatMerleau‐
Pontyunderstandsboththephenomenologicalandeideticreductions.Totakethe
latterfirst,Merleau‐Pontyexplainsthatphenomenologyisaboutnotonly“essences”
butalso“facticity.”Thisfollowsfromphenomenology’sbeingabout“achieving
directandprimitivecontactwiththeworld.”(PPvii)Idealityisnowcharacterizedin
purelyinstrumentalterms:theeideticreduction“prevail[s]overfacticity”through
ideality,thoughthe“prevailing”isforthesakenotofidealitybutratherfora
graspingofthethingsthemselves—the“fish”thatarecaughtinthe“fisherman’s
net.”SurelyMerleau‐Pontyisrightthatwedonotreachthethingsbydwellingonly
inessences.Wemaynotreachthethingsascompletelyaswewish,butthereis
somethingbetweenabsoluteknowledgeandtotalignorance.Inthisrespectitis
325Inastrictlyontologicalsense,thatis—reflectionisstillforMerleau‐Pontythefoundationoftheactivityofphilosophy,since“unreflectiveexperienceisknowntousonlythroughreflection…”(PP49)Itisthissortofinsightthatsetsthestageforthelaternotionof“hyper‐reflection.”
160
helpfultorememberthatHusserlhimselfembracedaversionoftheterm
“empiricist,”whichmusthavemeantthatheprivilegesfactsoveressences,butwas
vaguelyawareofthefactthatreflectioncanonlyknowessences—hence
engenderingthemostenduringepistemologicalparadoxofMerleau‐Ponty’s
meditations.326
Justwhatareessences?Essencesarethemannerandstyleofbeingonly:the
SoseinandnottheSein.Andjustasthereisanessential“incompleteness”with
respecttothephenomenologicalreduction,sothereisalimitalsoonimaginative
variation—thusthereisnopureeidos,no“totalvariation.”Furthermore,eidetic
variationisnotjustdoneinphenomenology,butinallsciences.Inoneplace
Merleau‐Pontyadmits:“InpresentingthematterasIhave,IampushingHusserl
furtherthanhewishedtogohimself.”(PSM72)Merleau‐Pontywantstoadmitofa
“fundamentalhomogeneity”ofthe“inductiveandessential”modesofknowledge,
whichHusserlalwaysmaintainedwasimpossible.ButHusserl’sownthinking,
includinghisfocusontheconcreteandlivedstreamoflife,forcesonusan
“inevitabledialecticoftheconceptofessence.”
AllofthisallowsMerleau‐Pontyfinallytosay:
“…wecansaythattheproblemwithwhichwewereconcernedatthebeginning[ofPSM]—mustwebeforfactorforessence,fortimeoreternity,forthepositivescienceofmanorphilosophy?—wasbypassedinthelaterthoughtofHusserl.Herehenolongerconsidersessenceasseparatedfromfact,eternityfromtime,orphilosophicthoughtfromhistory.”(PSM93)
326SeePP57fn44
161
V.ConcludingReflections
IbeganthischapterbysuggestinganintegralrelationshipbetweenMerleau‐
Ponty’sphilosophyandhisreadingofHusserl.Ihopetohaveshownthisthrough
thecourseofmyrecapitulationofandcommentaryonthisreading,butthesemay
nowbesupplementedandreinforcedwithsomeanalogies.Thus,Merleau‐Ponty
standstoHusserl,Iwanttosay,muchashumanity,inMerleau‐Ponty’sHusserlian
philosophy,standstothe“world,”thatis“the…pre‐existentLogos”(PPxxiii)or“that
jointingandframingofBeingwhichisbeingrealizedthroughman”(PS181).Or
again,Merleau‐PontyistoHusserlaslanguage(orlogos—the“themeof
philosophy”)istothe“pre‐languageofthemuteworld”(VI126),orfinally,asSpirit
istoNature,thefirstfindingavoiceinthesecond,thesecondfindingitsdepthinthe
first.Theholisticvisionthatemergeshere—ofmanandworld,spiritandnature—is
onlyprefiguredorsketchedinoutlineinMerleau‐Ponty’swritings,butitis
determinateenoughtoshowhowMerleau‐Pontycouldhaveascribedsomuchofhis
philosophy327—inmyviewvalidly—toanotherphilosopher,Husserl,whoforhis
partneverthelesswentsomuchofthetimeinacontrarydirection.Merleau‐Ponty’s
viewsofreciprocityandreversibility,identityanddifference,paradoxandthe
“between”—theyareallrelevanttoandimplicitinhisdevelopmental—and
organic—appropriationofHusserlianthought.
327ObviouslyIdonotmakeasharpdistinctionbetweenthephilosophiesofthe“earlier”and“later”Merleau‐Ponty.Thematerialpresentedinthepresentchapteraloneafford,Ithink,ample(thoughperhapsnotsufficient)evidencethatthisisso.
162
IsMerleau‐Pontyfinally,intheend,justamere“reader”or“commentator”of
Husserl?Thisisthewrongquestiontoask.ShouldPlotinusberelegatedtobeinga
commentatorofPlatoandAristotle?ShouldAverroësbedismissedasa
commentatorofAristotle?Surelygreatphilosophycanbedonethrough
commenting,bringingasitwere“newtruthsintobeing,”asMerleau‐Pontyhimself
putsit.Thecommentatorisnotlikelytobecelebratedasatrailblazer,butwithout
goodcommentators,itisunlikelythatanycoherent“trails”couldbediscernedfrom
thedense,sometimescontradictoryoutpouringofathinkerlikeHusserl.Allthe
same,Merleau‐Pontydoesnotmerelycomment—hehasthetalenttodevelop,to
takefurtherandradicalizeandseethehiddenimplicationsof,thetextsheanalyzes.
Thetextsspeaktohim,andhespeaksback.
Merleau‐Ponty’s“version”ofphenomenologyhasbeendisavowedbycertain
Husserlians,butitmustbesaidthattheir“Husserl,”whileconsistentforthemost
partwithHusserl’sownself‐declarationsofthenatureandconsciouslystated
intentionsofhisownphilosophizing,isnotalwayseasytodefendphilosophically.A
narrowinterpretationofHusserl,Merleau‐Pontywouldargue,wouldfatefullyturn
itsbackonHusserl’sownunderlyingsensitivitytotheinadequaciesofhisown
earlierconceptions,ashehimselfsurgedforward.Inotherwords,the“strict
Husserlian”wouldfallwellshortofHusserl’sownlevel,tosaynothingofexpanding
onhim!SomeHusserlianshaveofcourseembracedMerleau‐Ponty,butselectively,
ifonlytodemonstratethatHusserleitheranticipatedorfullyexplicatedthesame
thingsMerleau‐Pontydiscusses,andperhapsinanevenbetterway.Merleau‐Ponty
wouldofcoursehavebeenhappytoacknowledgehisdebt(egotismisnotoneofhis
163
vices),buthewouldalsoinsistthatHusserlhimselfremainstooinconsistentforus
totrytorelyonhimexclusivelyasthe“voiceofphenomenology.”Therearetoo
manystrainsinhim,anditisnecessarytoeditorialize,toeditandtobringtolight
whatistrueandfalse,necessaryanddispensableinhisthinking.
Thereareobviousbutfatefulconsequencestothissortofreadingofthe
Merleau‐Ponty/Husserlrelationship.IfweacceptMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingof
Husserl,weimplicitlyrejectmuchofHusserl’sself‐interpretation—hisstated
intentions,andhisframingofthetranscendental‐phenomenologicalproject.Butis
thisnotfamiliarhermeneuticalterritory?Itisindeedaninvokingofthe
hermeneutictoposof“knowingthephilosopherbetterthanhe/sheknew
himself/herself.”Buteventhisisnotsosimple,since,onMerleau‐Ponty’saccount,
HusserlalreadyknewwhatMerleau‐Ponty“knows”aboutHusserl,justnotwiththe
sameclarityorunivocity.ItistoMerleau‐Ponty’slastingcreditthat,decadesbefore
DonnWelton’sTheOtherHusserl328,theFrenchthinkerhadalreadypaintedavivid
portraitoftheinnerconflictednessofHusserl’sthought.Hehadalreadyidentified
andembraced“theotherHusserl,”whoheknewalreadyasthe“pre‐jection”(my
word,butMerleau‐Pontianinspirit)ofhimself.ItistruethatMerleau‐Pontydoes
notfeelhimselfconstrainedbythehistoryof“traditional”interpretationof
Husserl’sworks,orbywhatHusserlmayhavebelievedhehimselfwas
accomplishingthroughhisownphilosophizing.ButinthiswayMerleau‐Ponty’s
attitudetowardsHusserlismuchlikethatofahealthychildtowardsitsparent:
328See:Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000.
164
adulationisbalancedbycriticaljudgment,emulationbycreativeinitiative.Would
wewantanythingelse?
InoneplaceMerleau‐Pontynicelysummarizeshisunderstandingofthe
meaningandprogressofHusserl’sphilosophy:
“Thus,aphilosophy[Husserl’s]whichseemed,morethananyother,bentuponunderstandingnaturalbeingastheobjectandpurecorrelateofconsciousnessrediscoversthroughtheveryexerciseofreflexiverigoranaturalstratuminwhichthespiritisvirtuallyburiedintheconcordantfunctioningofbodieswithinbrutebeing.”329
Traditionally,theplausibilityofMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingofHusserlhasbeen
thoughttoturnonthis:whetheroneseesHusserlasaself‐divided,Janus‐faced
figure,workingprogressivelytoanadequatelytranscendental‐existential
conceptionofphenomenology,orwhetheroneseeshimratherasamoreorless
consistentOlympianthinkerofabsoluteconsciousness.ButwhatIhavetriedtodo,
inmysmallway,istosayratherthatwhatmakesMerleau‐Ponty’sreadingplausible
isanacceptanceofMerleau‐Ponty’sownstyleandsubstanceofthought.Butthis
bringsoutakindofspecialparadox,wherebythelinebetweenthetwothinkers
becomeswhollyblurred,exactlyasifwewereenteringthe“intermonde”Merleau‐
Pontywritesaboutinthelaterworks.330ForifMerleau‐Pontyisrightthatheis(in
somanywords)aHusserlianthinker—atleast,athinkerofHusserl’sinner
thoughts—thenitturnsoutthattoacceptMerleau‐Ponty’s“Husserl”underthe
bannerofacceptinghim(Merleau‐Ponty)istohavealreadyacceptedHusserl.This
329Themes,p.83330HeusestheterminVI(48,84)ThetermismentionedalreadyatthetimeofPP,butinaslightlydifferentsense.Seealsothereferenceto“intercorporeality”inPS(168)
165
mightforsomebehardtobelieve,butthenagain,perhaps,initsownway,itmay
onlybetheradicalfulfilmentoftheideaofa“hermeneuticcircle”!
166
ChapterFour:MerleauPonty’sMatureOntologyofNature“WewillshowhowtheconceptofNatureisalwaystheexpressionofanontology—anditsprivilegedexpression.” ‐‐MauriceMerleau‐Ponty331
I.Introduction
SomeofMerleau‐Ponty’smostimportantfinalwritings,Iwouldargue,are
foundinTheVisibleandtheInvisible332,whichMerleau‐Pontyhadbeenworkingon
asamajorstatementofhisphilosophyatthetimeofhissuddendeath.Thegoalof
thepresentchapteristoconveysomeoftheessentialfeaturesofMerleau‐Ponty’s
ontology,asdevelopedintheaforementionedwork,aswellashisincreasingly
“dialectical”understandingofnatureandspirit,allthewhileemphasizingthe
“(semi‐)naturalistic”elementtherein.Accordinglyitwillundertakeadetailed
examinationoftheNaturelecturesof1956‐1960(astheycomedowntous,mostly
intheformofmeticulousstudentnotes),inconjunctionwithVI,exploringtheways
inwhichMerleau‐Pontythinksthroughthequestionsofbeing,consciousness,and
theirreciprocalrelationshipwiththehelpofanintensiveinvestigationof“Nature,”
particularlyinthebiologicalsciencesandthehistoryofphilosophy.
Merleau‐Ponty’streatmentof“nature”istothisdaylittleknown,despitethe
factthattheNaturelecturescollectivelycompriseavolumeofroughlyequallength
331Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RoberVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003.(p.204)Hereafterdesignatedas“N”inallcitations,and“theNaturelectures”insidethebody.332Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheVisibleandtheInvisible.Tr.AlphonsoLingis.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1969.Hereafter“VI.”
167
toVI.Itistruethatthelectureswerenotintendedtobepublishedasabook
preciselyintheformwehavethem,butitisalsotruethatMerleau‐Pontyintended
tousemuchofthematerialfromthemaspartsofhispublishedwritings,including
sectionsofVIitself.333FromadetailedexaminationofbothtextsIconcludethat
Merleau‐Ponty’softencommented‐uponrejectionofdualism—whichofcourse
hardlydistinguisheshiminthehistoryofphilosophybothbeforeandafter
Descartes—isinfactmostproperlycharacterizedasaphilosophyof
complementarity,onethatseekstounderstandtheprinciplesofidentityand
difference,bothinthebroadestofontologicalcontextsaswellasnarrowerones
(suchastheontologyofthebody),inawaythatdoesjusticetotherolethateachof
themplaysinthestructurationofBeing,thatis,thestructureofthe
“visible/invisible”world.Thisdiscussionwillalsotakeuswellintothefifthchapter
anddissertationconclusion,whichascertainthe“upshot”ofMerleau‐Ponty’s
dialecticforthephenomenologicalmethod.
ItismyviewthatMerleau‐Ponty’sphenomenologyis“dialectical”butina
whollynewsense,onethatisdrivenbytheexigenciesofthinkingthe“natural”
originsofsubjectivity(inthesenseofspirit,orhumanconsciousness)fromwithin,
andoftherebyrecastingthephenomenologicalprojectasonethatinheresin
“ontology”inabroadersense.FromthecourseandprogressionoftheNature
lectures,onecanseeMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughtgrowmoreorganicist—concerned 333Seeforexample:N,xvi(fromthe“Translator’sIntroduction”byRobertVallier).Someofthematerialdoesinfactmakeitintovariousessays,suchas“BergsonIntheMaking”andthealreadyexamined“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow,”andcertainconcepts—the“flesh,”forexample—arediscussedinbothtextsinsomedetail,aswewillseebelow.See:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“BergsonintheMaking.”Tr.RichardC.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.(pp.182‐191);Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”Tr.RichardM.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.159‐181)
168
withtheprincipleof“wholeness”anditsrealizationinthe“organicforms”of“life.”
Ofcoursethe“naturalism”Merleau‐Pontyespousesisnotthe“naturalism”
embracedbyscientifically‐mindedmodernwriters,whoseformwealsofindin
Husserl’swritings,butanother,moreatoncephenomenologically‐rootedand
romantically‐inspiredkind,whichdevelopsthroughouttheNaturelectures
explicitlyandintherestofMerleau‐Ponty’sotherworkimplicitly.Ontologywill,itis
true,“takeprecedence,”inacertainway,butnotbecauseitisthe“foundation”of
phenomenology,inthewayHusserlconceivedphenomenologytobethefoundation
ofontology.Merleau‐Ponty’sintentionisnottoinvertthisorderofdependence,but
rathertomakephenomenologyanswertoitsexistentialsituation,whichnowcomes
tomean,tobeartheshadowofitsnatural,wild,andpre‐reflectiveorigins.
II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLectures
A.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectof“Ontology”
IntheNaturelectures,Merleau‐Pontydeclares,“Theontologicalproblemis
thedominantproblem,towhichallotherproblemsaresubordinated.”(N134)What
exactlyistheontologicalproblem?Merleau‐Pontydoesnotanswerthisquestion
directly,butwehavesometellingclues.WhatMerleau‐Pontywantstoavoid,he
indicates,areatleastthree“isms”:“Naturalism,humanism,theism…Thesethree
wordshavelostallclearmeaninginourculture,andtheyceaselesslypassintoone
169
another.”(N135)Wehaveanevenbetterspecificationoftheprobleminaroughly
contemporaneousworkingnote,inwhichMerleau‐Pontywrites:
“Necessityofareturntoontology—Theontologicalquestionanditsramifications:thesubject‐objectquestion,thequestionofinter‐subjectivity,thequestionofNature.OutlineofontologyprojectedasanontologyofbruteBeing—andoflogos.DrawupthepictureofwildBeing,prolongingmyarticleonHusserl.Butthedisclosureofthisworld,ofthisBeing,remainsadeadletteraslongaswedonotuproot‘objectivephilosophy’(Husserl).AnUrsprungklärungisneeded.”(WN165,myitalics)
ThereferencetoHusserlisclearlypositive.Whatisneededisanalternative
ontology—clearlyinspiredbyHusserlianphenomenology,particularlythe“genetic”
variety—tothatofobjectivism.The“questionofNature”issupposedtofitrightinto
thisproject.Theproblem,inshort,ishowtoforgethisnewontology,howto
overcomethe“strabism”ofWesternontologysinceDescartes(N165),butalso,to
someextent,ofphenomenologyitself(N72),whichinits“idealist”(i.e.,Husserlian)
formisstillsomewhathaunted,wemightsay,byDescartes’ghost.
VIhasproventobeastumblingblockforsome,asitcancomeacrossasa
curiousamalgamofphilosophyandpoetry.Attimeshighlyesoteric(especially
whenthe“workingnotes”arefactoredin,someofwhicharebrilliantlyclear,others
allbutinscrutable),itleavesreaderswithacertainsenseofpuzzlement,even
bewitchment,throughitsextensiveuseofmetaphorandnewterminology.Agood
waytoappreciateMerleau‐Ponty’sincreasinglynuancedandtechnicalexplorations,
hisnewphenomenologicalontology,isinfacttoconsulthisinvestigationsofnature.
Ofcourse,thesearenotatallsufficientinthemselvestoexposeMerleau‐Ponty’s
ontologicalproject,sincetheyareintendedexplicitlytobepreparatory334to
334ExplainsMerleau‐Ponty:“…theontologyofNatureasthewaytowardontology—thewaywepreferbecausetheevolutionoftheconceptofNatureisamoreconvincingpropaedeutic,[sinceit]
170
somethingelse,namelyafullerengagementwithsomeofthethemesMerleau‐Ponty
ismorewellknownfor,includingperceptionandembodiment.Merleau‐Ponty’s
treatmentofthesetopicsintheNaturelecturesisindirect,forexamplethroughthe
studyofanimal“Umwelten”orthestudyoftheontologicalimplicationsoftheir
physiology.
Thereareotherinterestingdifferencesbetweenthetwotexts,when
comparedside‐by‐side.ThuswhileVIemphasizesdiscontinuitybetweenpastand
presentphilosophyandspeaksofradicalrenewal(VI83,165),etc.,thelectures
reflecttheflip‐side,offeringacriticalcommentarythatestablisheslinkstothepast
andseeksto“rectify”it.(N186)Throughacriticalengagementwiththe
philosophicaltraditionandexaminationofthescienceofhisday,Merleau‐Pontyin
thelattertextstrivesforabalancingofoppositesand,ineffect,anewequilibrium,
betweentheoreticalpoleslike“finalism”(teleology)and“mechanism.”
Themulti‐disciplinaryNatureseminarscoveravastamountofterrain,
exploringnolessthanthescientific,theological,andphilosophicalunderpinningsof
Westernnotionsofnature,animality,God,andthehumanmind.Throughanearly
rejectionoftheviewsofLaplace—akindof“stand‐in”formodern‐scientificviews
analogoustoAugustine’sroleatthestartofWittgenstein’sPhilosophical
Investigations—Merleau‐PontyrevealshimselfintheNaturelecturestobea
championoftemporality,becoming,andholicity,asagainstan(exclusiveorlop‐
sided)emphasisonspatiality,being,andanalyticity.335Inthiswayheisworkingin
moreclearlyshowsthenecessityoftheontologicalmutation.”(N204)(Itisnotclearfromthispartofthetextwhattheauthorisreferringtoasthe“ontologicalmutation.”)335Take,forexample,N,89;inhisstatingofLaplace’sviews,heisnegativelyalsogivinghisown.
171
obviousconcertwith“lifephilosophy”aswellasfiguressuchasBergsonand
Whitehead,onlynowinamoredeeplyphenomenologicalregisterthat,onceagain,
comesmoresignificantlytotheforeinVI—notwithstandingthosereadingsofthe
textthat,ratherunjustifiablyinmyopinion,downplayitsphenomenological
character.ThecontentsofVIinfactbearcontinuityinsubstance,ifnotalwaysin
style,toThePhenomenologyofPerception336anditsquestionsofmindandbody,
perceptionandreflection,language,andthenatureofphenomenologyandHusserl’s
thought.However,thelattertextismoreintentthanever,itseems,todescribethe
ultimatenatureofrealityitself—oratleast,todescribethetaskof“interrogation”
thatcirclesaroundthisontologicalultimacy.Thequestionsof“Being”and“Nature”
cometotheforefrontinthelaterphilosophy;theissuesofperception,embodiment,
intersubjectivity,etc.,aretreatedasillustrativeordisclosiveofthedepthsofBeing
andhumaninvolvementinit.TheinfluenceofHeideggerisunmistakable,butfor
themostpartunspoken;thisisprobablybecauseitismoresoHeideggerianthemes
(manyofwhichareanchoredinHusserl)thatMerleau‐Pontyappropriates,andless
soHeideggerianconclusions.ItisalsoimportanttorealizethatMerleau‐Pontyhas
beeninterestedinontology,particularlythenature‐spiritquestion,fromthefirst;
TheStructureofBehaviorisakindof(evidentlyinadequate)phenomenological
ontologyinitsownright.337
336Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962(Hereafter“PP.”)337Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheStructureofBehavior.Tr.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.ForagooddiscussionofthattextwithrespecttoMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyofnature,see:Toadvine,Ted.MerleauPonty’sPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2009
172
Afterthatearlierwork,however,Merleau‐Pontytookhispointofdeparture
moreexplicitlyfromHusserlandthephenomenologicalreduction,aswehave
alreadyseen.PPisessentiallymotivatedbytheparadoxofperceptionwherebythe
world—thethings—becomereally(andnotmerely“subjectively,”asthrougha
representation)availabletome,despitethefactthattheyaretranscendenttome.
Thisspecificallyphenomenologicalparadoxmadeitnecessarytorethinkthereal
natureofthe“I‐think”oregowhoperceives—farfrombeingadisembodiedcogito,
the“I”mustbeabody,the“body‐subject,”whoseverybeingisworldlyinthesame
sensethattheworld’sis.Bodyandworldformacircuit,asystemofreciprocity,
which,aswewillsee,Merleau‐Pontycontinuesinthelaterwritingstomeditateon
intensively,thoughwithreferencetowhathetermsanessential“fold”or“hollow”
inBeing.338
However,onitsown,PPis,inacertainrespect,lockedinitsownformof
Husserl‐inheritedsubjectivism,permittingtheworldtoariseinconsciousness,
albeitpre‐intentionally(orthroughadeeper“motor”or“operative”intentionality),
butnotexplainingatallhowitisthatthisworld,ortranscendentBeing,couldand
doesgiverisetoconsciousness—and,morebasically,toorganiclife.That
phenomenologyinstructsitselfexplicitlytoavoidthiskindofquestiondoesnot
preventMerleau‐Pontyfrombroachingitfulsomelyanyway.Duponddescribes
338HerearetwoofthemanyinstancesinwhichMerleau‐Pontymakesuseofthisidea,bothtakenfromworkingnotes:“Itisnottheeyethatsees(theeyething).Butitisnotthesoul.Thereisa‘bodyofthemind’(Valéry),somethingthatisgatheredintheapparatusofvisionandhollowsouttheplacetherefromwhichonesees.…”(VI222);“—Andwhatreplacestheantagonisticandsolidaryreflectivemovement(theimmanenceofthe‘idealists’)isthefoldorhollowofBeinghavingbyprincipleanoutside,thearchitectonicsoftheconfiguration….Therearefieldsinintersection…”(VI227)
173
thuslythedifferenceinapproachtonaturethatwefindbetweenMerleau‐Ponty’s
earlierandlaterphilosophy:
“InthePhenomenologyofPerception,therelationbetweennatureandspirit[esprit],asthereciprocalfoundation(Fundierung)andthegatewaytotheenigmaoftheworld,wasdealtwithbywayofspirit(incarnatedinnature)ratherthannature—aposturewhichreiteratesthedualityofsubjectandobject).Inthe[Nature]coursesattheCollègedeFrance,therelationbetweennatureandspiritisoneofreciprocalenvelopment,andthegatewaytothisenigmaisnatureratherthanspirit.”339
Ifitistruethatphenomenologyabstainsonprincipledgroundsfromquestions
aboutlifeorbeing“before”consciousness—andgoingagainstthis,tosomeextent,is
thesignificanceofaninquiryinto“Nature”fromMerleau‐Ponty’sphenomenological
vantage‐point—thisdoesnotmeanitcannotcontemplatetheparadoxicaldistance
(unknowability,opacity,“depth”)ofNatureasthesourceoflifeandthoughtandyet
alsothecontinuityofconsciousnesswithNatureitself—or,putdifferently,the
“prolongation”ofconsciousnessin“thethings”thatMerleau‐Pontyclaimsto
characterizevision,forexample.(VI271)Merleau‐Pontyspendsagooddealoftime
thinkingaboutboththeactivityor“autoproduction”ofsenseinandbyNatureitself,
ontheonehand(thisismostevidentthroughtheactivitiesoforganiclife,whose
seemingly“miraculous”developmentalprocessesdefycausalexplanation),andthe
naturalityofhumanexistence,asrevealedthroughthe“intertwining”ofbodyand
worldalreadylaidoutforus;hefurtherconsiderstheimplicationsofthisunityfor
thereconceptualizationofthequestionsofsubject/objectandintersubjectivity(the
latterofwhichwewillbeabletosaylittle,unfortunately,inthepresentchapter).
339Dupond,Pascal.DictionnaireMerleauPonty.Paris:Ellipses,2008.(p.153;mytranslation)Hereafter“Dupond.”
174
B.Defining“Nature”
Aswehavealreadyseen,Merleau‐Pontyisthoroughlyopposedtoconceiving
Natureas“object,”includinglifeless“massofmatter,”andsoon.Whatitis,initself,
isnotthe“in‐itself”ofthetradition,strictlyopposedtoa“for‐itself,”butratherwhat
Merleau‐Pontycalls(afterSchelling)“wildBeing,”orthe“barbaricprinciple,”which
ismorebasicthanthesubject‐objectdistinction(similarlytothe“flesh,”arelated
notion,aswewillseebelow).(VI200)The“wildness”ofnatureisnotsuchthatitis
somethingthatmustbe“molded”or“informed”inaKantianwayinordertobe
madesenseoutof,butratherthatitcontainsallpotentialities,itisallthings,but
withouthavingbecome,quaNatureitself,anyofthem.(N212)Attheoutsetofthe
lectures,Merleau‐Pontyoffersseveralimportantindicationspertainingtohis
developingconceptofnature.HereIwillquotetheminfullandthencommenton
subsequently:
“Thereisnaturewhereverthereisalifethathasmeaning,butwhere,however,thereisnotathought;hencethekinshipwiththevegetative.”(N3)
“Natureiswhathasameaning,withoutthismeaningbeingpositedbythought:itistheautoproductionofmeaning.”(N3)
“[Nature]hasaninterior,itisdeterminedfromwithin;hencetheoppositionof‘natural’to‘accidental.’Yetnatureisdifferentfromman:itisnotinstitutedbyhimandisopposedtocustom,todiscourse.”(N3)
“Natureistheprimordial—thatis,thenonconstructed,thenoninstituted;hencetheideaofaneternityofnature(theeternalreturn),ofasolidity.…Itisoursoil[sol]—notwhatisinfrontofus,facingus,butrather,thatwhichcarriesus.”(N3)
175
Thesentimentsexpressedinthesefourquotationsareclearlymeanttosetthe
directionoftheinvestigationsthataretofollow.Torecapitulate,theydescribe
Natureinthefollowingpositiveandnegativeterms:1)possessingorembodyinga
meaning,2)producingameaninginoroutofitself,3)nothavingtodowithorbeing
positedbythought,4)possessinganinteriority,5)beingdistinguishablefromthe
artificial,conventional,orman‐made,6)beingeternalandprimordial,and7)lying
not“before”usbutrather“beneath”us—and,asMerleau‐Pontywillalsosay,within
us.(N212‐3)Theseareadmittedlyschematicproperties,anditisnotyetclearhow
oriftheyinterlock,butalreadytheyrevealquiteabit.Merleau‐Ponty’sconception
ofNatureisthatofanontologicalground(ofsorts)thatisnon‐objective(cf.its
“interiority”)andradicallyprimordial—andthuspre‐reflective:“…atypeof
englobingbeinginwhichwediscoverourselvesalreadyinvestedpriortoall
reflection.”(N84)Thatis,itisboth“non‐instituted”(areferencetoHusserl’snotion
ofStiftung,institutionorestablishment)andessentiallyso(itisnon‐institutable).
Butevenmoreimportant,itispresupposedineveryinstitution,ineveryhuman
project,indeed,inembodimentandperceptionthemselves.Attimes,Merleau‐Ponty
singlesoutthispropertyofNaturemost,namelyitshaunting“presencebyabsence,”
or,temporallyspeaking,itsbeinga“permanentpast,”alwaysbehindus.
WhatMerleau‐Pontyistryingtogetathereisperhapsbestseenthroughhis
critiqueofBergson,whoheclearlyadmiresbutalsofaultsforhavingmissedthisall‐
importantfeatureofthenatural.Merleau‐Pontyattributesthisblindnessof
Bergson’stoacertain“positivism.”Merleau‐Pontybeginshiscritiqueby
acknowledgingfavorablythat“Bergson…positsconsciouslyaparadoxinherentto
176
perception:Beingisanteriortoperception,andthisprimordialBeingisconceivable
onlyinrelationtoperception.”(N55)ButhegoesontocriticizeBergsonfor
“makingofthisprehumanabeingwithwhichwecoexist.”(N58)Therecanbeno
simultaneityofreflection(or“intuition”)withNature—amajorpointthatMerleau‐
Pontywillstressagainandagain,comingfromtheepistemologicalsideofthe
questionofNature.Merleau‐Ponty’sverdict:“InBergson,theofficialpositionof
positivismalsoruinstheideaofNature.”(N70)
Husserl,Merleau‐Pontyclaims,improvesonBergsoninthisregard,ina
passagethatcallstomindwhatwehavealreadysaidaboutthecontinuityofworld
andconsciousness:
“HusserlrehabilitatedtheideaofNaturebythisideaofjointuretoacommontruththatsubjectswouldcontinuebutofwhichtheywouldnotbetheinitiators.Allthathappensisnotexplainedbyinteriority,orbyexteriority,butbyachancethatistheconcordancebetweenthesetwogivensandisassuredbyNature.”(N78)
Thatchanceplaysapartinthe“explanation”oftheinner/outerstructureofBeing
onceagainunderscoresthatthereisnocomplete“logos,”nocompleteexplanation,
ofBeing,orNature,initself—not,however,becauseitisjustoutofour“finite”
humangrasp,suchthatGodcouldunderstanditwhereas“we”cannot,butbecause
thereisa“savage”principleofbeingthatunderliestheessentialpolarities
encounteredinreflexivethought,somethingconnectedwith“theflesh,”whichwe
willdiscusslateron.
Merleau‐Pontyisalsointerestedinthe“productivity”ofnature:
177
“TheconceptofNaturedoesnotevokeonlytheresidueofwhathadnotbeenconstructedbyme,butalsoaproductivitywhichisnotours,althoughwecanuseit—thatis,anoriginaryproductivitythatcontinues[tooperate]beneaththeartificialcreationsofman.Itbothpartakesofthemostancient,andissomethingalwaysnew.Natureis,asLucienHerrsaidinhisarticlededicatedtoHegelinLagrandeencyclopédie,anuntamedthing:‘Natureistherefromthefirstday.’Natureisnotexhaustedorusedupbytheveryfactthatendures.”(N125)
Thus,partofwhatlendsopacitytonatureisitsnever‐ceasingcapacityforinvention
andself‐renewal.ThisissomethingBergsonofcoursewashighlyimpressedwithas
well(nottomentionWhitehead,whoMerleau‐Pontyfavorablycommentsonandfor
whomtheprincipleof“creativity”isthe“ultimatecategory,”highereventhan
divinity).Asisclearfromthepassagecitedabove,therelationofnatural
productivitytohumancreativityforMerleau‐Pontyresemblesthatassignedby
someoftheGermanRomanticstoart.340Likeartisticcreation,indeed,Nature’s
“autoproduction”ofmeaningisopen,fluid,andalwaysunfinished—apoint
Merleau‐PontymakesthroughareferencetoHeraclitus:“Heraclitussaysthat
natureisachildatplay;itgivesmeaning,butinthemannerofachildwhois
playing,andthismeaningisnevertotal.”(N84)
Finally,Merleau‐Ponty’snotionofNatureshouldbeunderstoodinrelationto
thatof“spirit”—mind,consciousness,language,thought.Towardtheendofthe
Naturecoursesheoffersthefollowingtellingrecap:“Oursubject:RegardingNature,
theconcernwastostudyitasanontologicalleaf—andinparticular,regardinglife,
340ThoughIcannotexplorethisconnectionfullyhere,therearemanyotherindicationsthatMerleau‐PontyisturningtotheGermanRomanticswheretheyleftoffintermsofthephilosophyofnature.Aboveall,hewritesveryglowinglyaboutSchelling’sconceptionofnature,aswewillseebelow.AndliketheGermanRomanticsandGermanIdealists,hecitesKant’sthirdCritiquerepeatedly,andinmuchthesamespiritastheydo:inordertodrawitoutbeyonditself,inordertoattainamoresatisfactoryresultofKant’sinauguralinvestigationsintotherealnatureoflife,theorganism,creativity,andteleology.Also,itisimportantinthisrespecttolookatthewaythatKant’sthirdCritiquesomewhatchallengestheframeworkofhisowntranscendentalidealism,inawaythatSchellinglaterdoesmoredefinitively,andinthewaythatMerleau‐PontytriestodoinrelationtoHusserl.Forsomereferencesalongtheselinessee:N,83,84
178
theconcernwastostudytheunfoldingoftheleafofNature—regardingthehuman,
theconcernistotakehimathispointofemergenceinNature.”(N208,myemphasis)
Dupondhelpfullycapturesthesenseinwhichtheconceptof“spirit”(l’esprit)tiesin
withthatofwhatMerleau‐Pontyiscalling“thehuman,”andwhichHusserlhas
identifiedwiththe“personal”:
“Thenotionofspirithabituallydesignatesafigureofbeinginwhichmanrecognizeshisoriginalityorhisownpropermodeofbeing.Itthusformsanetworkwithothernotionswhichalsohavethefunctionofnamingthe‘escape’ofmanfromnature:culture,history,Logos,reason.”(Dupond,70)
DupondfurtherexplainsthesenseinwhichMerleau‐Ponty’sattitudetowards
Naturevis‐à‐visSpiritshouldbeappreciatedhistorically:“[Merleau‐Pontyinverts]
themovementofthehistoryofmodernthought,whichentersphilosophyviaspirit,
[andstartsfrom]nature,inallowinghimselfthepossibilityofcomprehendingthe
emergence,thesurgissementofspirit…”(Dupond70,mytranslation)
Merleau‐Ponty’sprincipalhistoricalinspirationconcerninghisconceptionof
NatureappearstobeSchelling.Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyseemstoidentifyatleast
partiallywith“romanticnaturalism”asopposedto“scientificnaturalism”—a
distinctionhehimselffitfullymakes.(N135)Thushearguesthatwemustpreserve
theideaof“savagenature”fromtheRomantics,savingitforexamplefromKantian‐
humanistdesignsofathinkerlikehisowncontemporaryNeo‐KantianLéon
Brunschwig.(N35)WhatMerleau‐PontyfindsmostimpressiveaboutSchelling’s
notionofNaturearethesamethingshetendstoemphasizeinhisownexplorations
ofit,forexampleitsdescriptionas“wildBeing”thathauntsconsciousnessasan
irrecoverableground,aswellastheideaof“…thesubjective‐objectivethatNature
179
willalwaysbe.”(N70)WhatMerleau‐Pontyfindsinthisideaofthe“subjective‐
objective”isillustratedbyhimwithreferencetoakindofreciprocityofthetwo
orders,subjectiveandobjective,inaquotethatalsohelpstoremindusofhowfar
Merleau‐Pontyisfromabandoningaphenomenologicalfirst‐personperspectivefor,
say,third‐person“realism”:
“WearetheparentsofaNatureofwhichwearealsothechildren.Itisinhumanbeingthatthingsbecomeconsciousofthemselves;buttherelationisreciprocal:humanbeingisalsothebecoming‐consciousofthings.”341(N43)
Scientificnaturalism,asthistermiswidelytaken,ofcoursewoulddenybothof
theseconclusions.Itdoesnotseethesenseinwhich“wearetheparentsofNature”
becauseitdeniesanyontologicalorconstitutionalroletoperception(fearing
idealism),anditdoesnotthinkofhumanbeingsastheseatofNature’sown
reflexivitybecauseithastacitlyacceptedtheCartesianprincipleofthepure
exteriority,andhencedeadness,ofnaturalbeing.Thereisno“autoproduction”in
Nature,thereareonlycausal‐mechanisticprocessesgovernedbythe“lawsof
nature,”setinmotionbythemysteriousburstofenergycalledthe“BigBang.”
Ofcourse,thereisalwaysthedangerof“anthropomorphizing”nature,
makingitintoakindofintelligenceofconsciousness,whichMerleau‐Pontyiswell
awareof:“IfNatureisnotanobjectofthought,thatis,asimplecorrelativeofa
thought,itisdecidedlynotasubjecteither,andforthesamereason:itsopacity,its
enveloping.Itisanobscureprinciple.”(N120)Merleau‐Ponty’s“Nature”isnot,
therefore,likeHegel’s“Spirit,”thatis,a“self”thatfindsitselfreflectedbacktoitself 341Compare:“NotonlymustNaturebecomevision,buthumanbeingmustalsobecomeNature…”(N47)Andnoticethephraseologyhere:“Becoming‐natureofmanwhichisthebecoming‐manofnature.”(N185)
180
in(oras)nature.Rather,itisan“obscureprinciple”thatunfoldspartiallyin
consciousness,yetalsopartiallyoutsideofit—becauseitismore“ancient”than
consciousnessitselfandstandsinirreducibletensionwithit.
Schelling’sphilosophyofNaturethusteachesMerleau‐Pontykeylessons
aboutthelimitsofobjectivethoughtandofreflection,whichobjectifynaturebut
mustfailtocaptureitsdepths.Thus,invokingSchelling,Merleau‐Pontyobserves:
“Apoeticconsciousnessrecognizesthatitdoesnotpossessitsobjecttotally,thatitcanunderstanditonlybyatruecreation,andthatitcreatesclaritybyanoperationthatisnotdeductivebutcreative.Poeticconsciousness,overcomebyitsobject,mustgetholdofitselfagain,butwithouteverbeingabletoseparateitselffromitshistory.”342(N50)
Thethemeofnon‐coincidenceofreflectionandobject‐of‐reflectionisofcoursea
majoroneinMerleau‐Ponty’slaterontology(andepistemology)generally,lyingat
therootofhisconceptionof“hyper‐reflection”andthemethodof“interrogation.”
WhatMerleau‐Pontyfinds,inotherwords,isthatSchelling’sisa“phenomenologyof
pre‐reflexiveBeing”(N41)thateffectsa“reflectiononwhatisnotreflection.”(N
45)ThusMerleau‐Ponty’sownparticularfascinationwithSchellingdoesnotlie
simplywiththelatter’santi‐Cartesianismbutalso,onemightsay,withhisanti‐
Kantianism(andanti‐idealismgenerally).343Schelling,likeMerleau‐Ponty,denies
thatconsciousnessiscoextensivewithmeaning.(Husserl,withgenetic
phenomenologyandtheconceptofthe“life‐world”lyingbeneaththeconstructions
342TheseideasreappearinreferencetoWhitehead’sphilosophy.“Itisthisstubbornnessthatsubtendsallcreation:‘itbelongstotheessenceoftheuniversetopassintoafuture.’”(N121)Instarkcontrast,thereisthedevastatingassessmentofSartre’sphilosophythatithas“noplaceforaconceptionofNatureorforaconceptionofhistory.”(N70)ThisfollowsfromSartre’sdualismofthein‐itselfandfor‐itself,ofwhichMerleau‐Pontynevertiresincriticizing.343SeeinthisregardMerleau‐Ponty’sinterestingremark:“[Schelling’s]conceptionistheonlypossibleformofrealism.”(N50)
181
ofthought,hadsurelybeenheadinginthisdirection,Merleau‐Pontywouldadd,but
theseductionsofanall‐encompassingtranscendentalconsciousnessremained.)
Inmyview,whatiskeytoMerleau‐Ponty’sappreciationofSchellingisthe
factthattheGermanthinkerstoodatthesummitof—andheeffectsacertain
reversalof—amaturetraditionofidealistthinking,beginningatleastwithKantand
culminatinginHegel’s“System.”ThatMerleau‐Pontyunderstandshisownroleto
parallelSchelling’sinthisregardisevidentfromapassagelikethisone:
“Schellingstartedfromtranscendentalidealismaround1800andwonderedhowtorehabilitatetheideaofNatureintheframeworkofreflexivephilosophy.YetthisproblemoftranscendentalidealismisalsoHusserl’s.”(N71;myemphasis)
IntermsofSchelling’sinfamousrelation344toHegelandthelatter’s“dialectical”
system,Merleau‐Ponty’sverdictisaccordinglyfavorabletotheformer:“Schelling
thoughtthisthesisofspeculativephilosophyatahigherlevelofrigorthandidHegel
becauseofhisconceptionoftheempirical;theidentityofthefiniteandtheinfinite
isthoughtbyhiminamoredecisiveway.”345(N47)
C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife
Becauseofitspre‐reflectiveandnon‐objectivecharacter,Natureishardto
investigate“frontally,”sotospeak,whichiswhatallowsMerleau‐Pontytobeginto 344HegeldrewcopiouslyfromtheyoungerSchellingbutfamouslycriticizedthelatterintheprefaceofthePhenomenology,albeitveiledly,callingSchelling’sAbsolute“thenightinwhichallcowsareblack.”SchellingwouldgoontoheavilycriticizeHegelianphilosophy—oratleastitspretensionstocompleteness—throughouthislongcareer,wellafterHegel’sowndeath.345Hegelisofcoursefamousforhavingidentifieda“trueinfinity”whichincorporatesfinitedifferenceintoitsmake‐up,asopposedtothe“badinfinity”thatmerelynegatesthefinite.Schelling’sthinkingdoesnot,however,allowinfinitytohavethe“lastword,”sotospeak,inanysense.Itisinthissensethathethinkstheir“identity”morethoroughly.(Wewillexaminethethemeof“identityanddifference”morecloselybelow.)
182
trylateralapproachestoit,includingthestudyoftheworkofthenaturalsciences,
aboveallmodern(inhistime,up‐to‐date)biology.ButhowexactlydoesMerleau‐
Pontyseeasthelinkbetweenbiologyandhisownphilosophicalinvestigationof
nature?Hebeginstoexplainitthroughthenotionof“experience”:
“…Natureisanall‐encompassingsomethingwecannotthinkstartingfromconcepts,letalonedeductions,butwemustratherthinkitstartingfromexperience,andinparticular,experienceinitsmostregulatedform—thatis,science.”(N87)
WhatMerleau‐Pontymeansby“science”isbroadlyencompassesallcontrolled,
observation‐basedproceduraldisciplines,includingpsychology.
Merleau‐Ponty’suseofscienceisextremelysubtleandsophisticated.It
certainlydoesnotconsistofasimpleappropriationofthe“scientificmethod,”butis
insteadaninterrogationofexperience—thedomaincommontophilosophy(atleast
asphenomenology),science,andevenreligion,art,andliterature(Merleau‐Ponty
famouslyturnstopaintersandwritersforinspiration,andtheNaturelecturesare
noexceptioninthisregard,asdemonstratedbyanextendeddiscussionofProust
therein).Thoughheundertakesanoverviewofthephysicalsciences,including
relativitytheoryandquantummechanics,ofwhichwewillsayabitmorelateron,
heprimarilyexaminestheresearchesofscientistswhofocusonanimalityand
behavior,familiaroldthemesinMerleau‐Ponty’swork.
Merleau‐Ponty’smethodisnotinductive.Philosophydoesnotsimply
generalizefromresults,ifthisisindeedwhatscientistsdo;itinterpretsscience
accordingtophilosophicalcategorieswhoselegitimacydependsnotmerelyon
183
externalverification‐proceduresbut,wemightsay,alsoonphenomenological
authenticity.Philosophyandsciencearetobeconceivedaspartnersinadialogue.
Indeed,onscienceandscientificconsciousness,therearewaysinwhich
Merleau‐Ponty’spositionhasinfactnotchangedsignificantlyfromHusserl’s(from
thelaterperiodespecially).Take,forexample,thefollowingremark:
“Scienceisnotanunmotivatedinstance.Wehavetopsychoanalyzescience,purifyit.Scientificconsciousnesslivesinthenaturalattitude,asHusserlsaid,anditignoresNaturebecauseitisthere:itisanaïveanduncriticalenjoymentofthenaturalcertitude.”(N85)
Andagain:
“Theconcernofthephilosopheristosee;thatofthescientististofindafoothold.…Thephilosophermustseebehindthebackofthephysicistwhatthephysicisthimselfdoesnotsee.”(N86‐7)
Inotherwords,thewarofphilosophyandscienceisafalseone;even
Husserl’sstrictdivisionbetweeneideticandnon‐eideticdisciplines,aswehave
seen,isbelievedtobeexaggeratedbyMerleau‐Ponty.Scientificevidenceaidsand
instructsthephilosopher,evenasphilosophyputsscientificresearchinto
perspective.Indeedphilosophers,too,canberecklessintheirownway,asMerleau‐
PontymakesclearinhisrebukeofHeidegger’sspuriousetymologies,concluding
fromthisthat“…itisdangeroustoleaveallfreedomtothephilosopher.”346(N86‐7)
ThephilosophyofNatureisthusnotakindofsecretknowledgeor“superscience”to
rivalscience(N204),intheway,perhaps,Heideggerianphilosophy(or“poetry,”
346Thereisalsohereadialecticofthenegativeandthepositivewithrespecttotheproperroleofscience.Forexample,onecanfindMerleau‐Pontyonmorethanoneoccasionstressingthenegativeroleofscienceinhelpingtoeliminatefalseoremptypossibilities.See:N,100,106.
184
Dichtung)mightbeasecretknowledgeof(oraccessto)Beingthateludesscientific
andmetaphysicalunderstanding.347Thusitissimplyamatterofhavinga“reading
ofscienceitselfasacertain(reduced)ontologyinthebroadercontextoftherelation
withthemostprimordialbeing,”thatis,withNatureitself.(N206)
Oneofthemorechallengingsections(atleastforphilosophers!)ofthe
Naturelecturesisitslongassessmentofthebiologyofhisday.Agreatdealof
groundiscoveredinashortamountoftime,allthemoreimpressiveasMerleau‐
Pontyishardlystingywithdetails.348Whatisthepointofthisstudyofanimality,
accordingtoMerleau‐Ponty?Thekeylinesinthisrespectarethese:
“Theorganismisnotdefinedbyitspunctualexistence;whatexistsbeyondisatheme,astyle,alltheseexpressionsseekingtoexpressnotaparticipationinatranscendentalexistence,butinastructureofthewhole.Thebodybelongstoadynamicofbehavior.Behaviorissunkintocorporeity.Theorganismdoesnotexistasathingendowedwithabsoluteproperties,asfragmentsofCartesianspace.Anorganismisafluctuationaroundnorms,whichareeventsenframedbyastructurethatwouldnotberealizedinanotherorder,buthasrelationswiththeseevents.”(N183)
Whatiskeyherearethespecificallyontologicalimplicationsoforganiclife.What
theworkofleadingbiologistsshow,hefinds,isthatorganismsexhibitaspecifically
holisticandnon‐localizablestyle:“Therealityoftheorganismsupposesanon‐
347Comparewiththeseremarksfromaworkingnote:“Thesearchfora‘wild’viewoftheworldnowiselimitsitselftoareturntoprecomprehensionortoprescience.…Areturntoprescienceisnotthegoal.–theprescientificisonlyaninvitationtocomprehendthemeta‐scientificandthislastisnotnon‐science.”(VI182)ItistruethatMerleau‐Pontyhimself,atonepoint,identifieshisown“Being”withHeidegger’s.Butthemethodologicaldifferencehasdeeperimplications:byinvolvingnaturalscience,nottomentionmetaphysicalthinkerslikeLeibniz,Schelling,Whitehead,andBergson,Merleau‐PontyisunderminingtheHeideggeriansuspicionofnaturalismthelatterinherited,arguably,fromcertainfeaturesofHusserl’s(andKant’s)transcendentalistframingofphenomenology.348ThoughitwouldrequireacertainamountofbiologicalexpertisetodeterminethecontemporaryvalidityofthescienceMerleau‐Pontydealswith,muchofitconcernssimple(thoughsystematic)observationofanimalbehavior,inwhichinterpretationplaysasignificantrole.
185
ParmenideanBeing,aformthatescapesfromthedilemmaofbeingandnonbeing.”
(N183)
Theprincipleofwholenessortotality(whichareequivalentforMerleau‐
Ponty)iscentraltoMerleau‐Ponty’sreflectionsonorganiclifeandindeedontology
generally.Thusheexplains:
“Hencetheorganicistideasupportedby[biologistG.E.]Coghill,accordingtowhich,inasmuchasweanalyzetheorganismspiecemeal,wefindopposedonlyphysiochemicalphenomena,butwhenwerisetotheconsiderationofthewholeoftheorganism,thetotalityisnolongerdescribableinphysiologicalterms;itappearsasemergent.Howarewetounderstandthisrelationoftotalityofpartsasaresult?Whatstatusmustwegivetototality?SuchisthephilosophicalquestionthatCoghill’sexperimentspose,aquestionwhichisatthecenterofthiscourseontheideaofnatureandmaybethewholeofphilosophy.”(N145;myitalics)
Merleau‐Pontyspendsagreatdealofattentionononeparticular1929study
byCoghill,ontheaxolotllizard.349Theaxolotl“…isaverylonglizard,aboutseven
inches,whichasatadpolelivesinthewater,then,onceithasfourlegs,developson
land.”(N140)Whatiscuriousabouttheanimal(whichisreallymoreofa
paradigmaticcasethanananomaly)isthewaythatitsanatomicaldevelopments
mysteriously(andnon‐causally)parallelitsadaptedbehaviors;thereseemstobeno
strictlycausal‐physiologicalexplanationofthecoordination.Thelizard’s
embryology,recountedbyMerleau‐Pontyinpainstakingdetail,reallysuggests,for
CoghillandMerleau‐Ponty,that,“A‘referencetothefuture’…alreadyexistsinthe
embryo.[Thus]Wecannotdefinetheanimalbyitsimmediatefunctioning:herethe
apparatushasmeaningonlyforafuture.”(N144)Forexample,the“orderofthe
nervouscephalo‐causaldevelopmentenvelops[i.e.,anticipates]swimming;thereis
349“Thisbook[AnatomyandtheProblemofBehavior]hasstillnotbeenexceeded,butwehaven’tyetmeasuredallitsweight.”(N140)
186
thepossibleintheorganism.”Thisnotionof“thepossible,”a“whatitcando”that“is
realizedatthesametime”asthelizarddevelopsphysiologically,alreadyplacesus,
Merleau‐Pontypointsout,“beyondthephysiologicaldefinitionoftheorganismby
itsrealfunctioning.”(N144)Merleau‐Pontyseesheretheimportanceofasenseof
thetotalityoftheorganism,onethatisimmanentalreadyintheorganism’s
behavioralaswellasanatomicaldevelopment,evenintheearliestphases.Buthe
doesnotwanttosuggestasimpleteleology,forreasonsthatwillbecomecleareras
weproceed.
Itisusefulinallofthistohavebeforeone’smindoneofMerleau‐Ponty’s
favoriteimagesormetaphorsforthekindofwholenessortotalitythathehasin
mind,namelythatofthemelody.Themelodyisametaphorfortheorganism;
indeed,Merleau‐PontyadaptsitfromfamousbiologistandethologistJakobvon
Uexküll,whosaysoftheNaturfaktor—hisownexplanatorynotionfororganic
development—thatitisnotanentelechybuta“melodysingingitself.”(N173)What
iskeyaboutthemelodyisthis:“Atthemomentwhenthemelodybegins,thelast
noteisthere,initsownmanner.”(N174)Thisisclearenough:a“firstnote”ofa
melodyisnotthefirstnotewithoutthecompletemelody’sbeingatleastimplied—
evenifnotyetfullythoughtout,sincethemelodymaybeinthemiddleofbeing
created!350(ThisofcourseisoneofthereasonsthatMerleau‐Pontyopposes
teleologyor“finalism”:thatitpresupposesacompletenessthatdoesnotmake
intelligibletheimperfectionsoftheprocessesofeithernaturalproductivityor
350Thereisaconnectionherewiththe“flesh.”See:“ThenpastandpresentareIneinander,eachenveloping‐enveloped—andthatitselfistheflesh.”(VI268)
187
artisticcreativity.)Merleau‐Pontyexplainsanimalbehaviorexactlyintermsofthe
melody,inthefollowingpassage:
“Behaviorcannotbeunderstoodifweunderstanditmomentbymoment.Certainlywestillfindsufficientconditionsfrommomenttomoment,butthenwedonotgrasptherelationofmeaning.Eachpartofthesituationactsonlyaspartofawholesituation;noelementofactionhasaseparateutilityinfact.”(N175)
ItisofcoursecharacteristicofMerleau‐Pontytofuseartandscienceinthis
inimitableway!
Forhisstudentstogainatoeholdinthisnotionofwholeness,Merleau‐Ponty
suggeststhatperceptionishelpful:“Wefindmodelsofthisideaoftotalityinthe
worldofperception.”Forexample,
“Psychologydoeseasilywhatsciencefindsdifficulttodo,namelytoallowforanorganizingprinciplewithintotality.Ineffect,perceptiondoesnotgiveusthethings,butwhatwesee.Inthephenomenalmilieu,nothingimpedesthewholefrombeingotherthanthesumofthepartswithoutbeingforallthatatranscendententity.”(N153)
ItisclearthatMerleau‐PontyisreferringtothethesisofGestaltpsychology,with
whichheregainedinterestatthetimeofhislaterwork.Butwhatiskeyforushere
isthatwecanseewhatsortofconceptionoftotalityinterestsMerleau‐Ponty:one
thatisnon‐transcendentandyetalsonon‐immanent(ifonemeansbythisentirely
engulfedbythesumoftheparts).Thesameideaappliesattheleveloforganiclife.
TheorganismdoesnotembodyatimelessPlatonicForm,orevenanAristotelian
one,butthisdoesnotmeanthatitsdevelopmentoritsbehaviorcanbeexplainedin
reductive,nominalistic,ormechanistic‐causalterms.Thusthereisa“…truthofthe
wholethatdoesnotsignifyatruthofthedetail.”(N31)Butthoughtheanimalhasa
188
“why,”asitwere,this“why”isanopen,groping,andincompleteone.Merleau‐Ponty
callsonHegel’simageofthecyclonetoillustratewhathehasinmind:“Hegel
alreadycomparedlifetoacyclone.Thecycloneisnothingotherthanwater,butits
formisnotexplainedbywater.”Wemustnotseekanorganictotality“behindthe
observablephenomena”(N152),anymorethanwewouldseektoreducethewhole
toits“individualcomponents.”ThusMerleau‐Pontyconcludes,“Theorganism
wouldnotbeatranscendenttotality,anymorethanitwouldbeatotalityby
summation.”351
Thefactthatorganictotalityisnotanchoredinapositiveprinciple,suchas
“life”(vitalism)oranentelechy(Aristotelianism),resonatesthroughouttheNature
lecturesinanumberofways.ThusMerleau‐Ponty’sconceptof“life”isessentiallya
reactionagainstvitalistpositivism—again,astypifiedbyBergson—aswellas,as
always,scientificnaturalism.Thushepronouncesthat“…itisnotapositivebeing,
butaninterrogativebeingwhichdefineslife.”(N156)Indeed,Merleau‐Ponty
repeatedlystressesthis“negativeprinciple”withintheorganism.(N155)What
doeshemeanbythis?The“negativeprinciple,”heexplainssomewhatobliquely,“is
lessidentity‐with‐selfthannon‐difference‐with‐self.Thisabsencebecomesafactor
onlybynegationofitsownnegation.”ButunlikewhatisfoundinHegel,the“double
negation”neverbecomesresolvedintoa“concretewhole,”suchasLife,God,Spirit,
orDerBegriff.InthecaseofaHegelianism,Merleau‐Pontyobservescritically,
351Thereareseveralstunning“holistic”metaphorsandimagesinVI,forexamplethatofmirrorsfacingoneanother,inwhichwefind“…acouplemorerealthaneitherof[themirrorsindividually].”(VI139)
189
“LifewouldbeSpirit‐in‐itself,andSpiritwouldbelifefor‐itself.ButlifeisnotyetSpiritin‐itself.WefindinHegelthesameretrospectiveillusionasinAristotle.Tograsplifeinthethingsistograspalackinthethingsassuch.”(N157)
WhatMerleau‐Pontyseemstomeanishere1)thattheorganismlacksan“in‐itself,”
andhence(obviously)cannotbethe“in‐itself”ofSpirit,and2)thatthis“lack”
constitutes(orisaconditionof)whatitmeanstobe“alive.”Thisnegativityis
intertwinedwithacertaininteriority;forthereis“…anaturalnegativity,an
interiorityofthelivingorganism…”(N210)Butthisisnottosaythatlifeisa“for‐
itself,”aconsciousness.JustasNaturewassaidtobeneithersubjectnorobject,the
sameholdsfortheorganismassuch.(WemightrecallthatHusserlstruggledwith
thisveryissueinIdeasII,whendiscussinganimalityandthesoul.)Butthis
interiorityhastodowiththesymbolicdepthoflivingbeings,ameaning‐
generativitywhichisreflectedinthestructureofbehavior(andthequasi‐interiority
oftheUmwelt352),notinthepresenceofa(substantial)“consciousness.”Comparing
machinesandanimals(exceptingthelimit‐caseasitwereofthesimplestof
organisms,whichMerleau‐Pontycalls“animal‐machines”),thephilosopher
352Inadditiontoorganicholism,Merleau‐PontyassignsaparticularimportancetotheconceptoftheUmwelt,asdevelopedbylegendaryethologistJakobvonUexküll.(N167)Theuntranslatableterm(whichwe,followingKersten,hadearliertranslatedas“thesurroundingworld”inreferencetoHusserl’snotioninIdeasII),isdefinedbestthroughMerleau‐Ponty’sowndescriptionsofitanditssignificance.Hedescribesitas“[marking]thedifferencebetweentheworldsuchasitexistsinitself,andtheworldastheworldofthelivingbeing.”Thatis,itisbeyondthedistinctionofthe“objective”andthe“subjective.”Essentially,itistheworldofananimal—ananimallifeworld,ineffect.“TheUmweltistheworldimpliedbythemovementoftheanimal,andthatregulatestheanimal’smovementsbyitsownstructure.”352(N175)Andagain:“[It]existsforthebehavioroftheanimal,butnotnecessarilyinitsconsciousness;itistheenvironmentofbehavioras‘opposedtothegeographicalenvironment.’”(Uexküllhimselflabelsthe“Umwelt”ofhigheranimalsthe“Gegenwelt.”(N172))TheUmweltiskeytotheexplanationofanimalbehaviorbecause“…betweenthesituationandthemovementoftheanimal,thereisarelationofmeaningwhichiswhattheexpressionUmweltconveys.”(N175)Andfinally:“ThenotionoftheUmweltnolongerallowsustoconsidertheorganisminitsrelationtotheexteriorworld,asaneffectoftheexteriorworld,orasacause.TheUmweltisnotpresentedinfrontoftheanimallikeagoal;itisnotpresentlikeanidea,butasathemethathauntsconsciousness.”(N178)
190
concludes:“Thereisnooperatingmeaningwithinthemachine,butonlywithinthe
livingthing.”(N163)Themachineispureexteriorityinrelationtolife,amere
simulacrum,whileonthesideofpureinterioritywouldliepresumablyafully
developedandreflectiveegoicconsciousness.Merleau‐Ponty’sbriefbutfascinating
commentaryonmachinesandlifeculminatesinaperceptiveremarkonartificial
intelligence.Thereisacertain“badfaith,”heargues,inthemodernzestforcreating
artificialorganisms:
“Weareamusedtogivebirthtoaphenomenonoflife,andwedenythatthisphenomenonreferstoanauthenticphenomenon,eventhoughitisinterestingonlytotheextentthatitisanimitationoflife.ItisinthiswaythatMalebranchewouldnothavebeatenastoneashebeathisdog,sayingthatthedogdidn’tsuffer.”(N166)
III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialecticalOntoPhenomenology
A.Introduction
WhatistheplaceofNatureinageneralontology?HowdoeswhatMerleau‐
PontyisdoingintheNaturelecturesinformhisdetailedinvestigationsofthe
“visible”andthe“invisible,”the“sensible”and“sentient,”“touching”and“touched”
thatwefindinVI,themuchbetterknownwork?TheexistenceoftheNature
lecturesposesacertainhermeneuticalchallengeforthoseseekingtopiecetogether
Merleau‐Ponty’smatureontology.Thisisbecausemanyofthetermsthathave
becomefamiliartousfromanacquaintancewithMerleau‐Ponty’slaterwork,such
191
as“flesh,”“chiasm,”“reversibility,”andsoon,appearonlysparselyinhislecture
coursesonnature,lectureswhichemployandadopttheworkingterminologyofthe
sciencesand,insomecases,thehistoryofphilosophy.EvenintheNaturelectures,
however,wecanfindthesamesortsofinsightsthatdriveMerleau‐Ponty’s
ontologicalvisioninthemorewell‐knownwork.Thepurposeofthepresentsection
istodiscussthebasicideasofthisontologyinawaythatweavestheNaturelectures
andVItogether,oratleastunderstandsthemaspossessingacommonfront.
ThereareseveralpowerfulideaswhichdominateMerleau‐Ponty’smature
thinking,andalmostallofthemcanbeconsideredaswaystounderstandthe
“identityanddifference”ofthetwoordersofbeing—sensibleandsentient,objective
andsubjective—andofcoursethe“dimensionality”openedupbytheirbeautifulbut
oftenbafflingstyleofcommerce.Iwilltrytoshowinthefollowingseveralsections
howMerleau‐Ponty’skeyconceptsarebasedonthisunderlying“identity‐and‐
difference”themeandacorrespondingtypeofdialecticthatemergestherefrom.
Thiswillopenupadiscussionthatwilleventuallytakeusthroughtotheendofthis
dissertation.
B.Reversibility
ThefoundationofMerleau‐Ponty’sdialecticisthephenomenon,orconcept
(itisinfactboth),of“reversibility.”Inmyownreading,therearetwofundamental
pointsofreferenceforMerleau‐Pontyregardingthisconcept,theonehistoricaland
theothersystematic.Theformeristhemind‐bodyproblemasinheritedby
Descartes,whilethelatteristhephenomenonofself‐sensing,theobservationof
192
whichMerleau‐PontyborrowsfromHusserl(butexpandsinwayswewillsee
below).Wewilldealwiththelatterpointofreferencefirst.
Merleau‐Ponty’sclassicphenomenologicalexampleofreversibilityis
Husserl’sownobservationofthereversibilityoftouch,orthephenomenonofthe
“lefthandtouchingtherighthand…”353Merleau‐Pontynotes,likeHusserl,thatto
“touch”something,whenthatsomethinghappenstobeanotherpartofone’sbody,
isalsotobe“touched”bythatsomething.“Subject”herebecomes“object,”andvice‐
versa.Themostdramaticcaseisthatofhandstouchingoneanother;butMerleau‐
Pontyextendsthisphenomenonof“reversibility”beyondthesenseoftouchto
includevision,whichexplainsthetitleofhisprojectedworkandtherepeated
referencesto,forexample,the“strangeadhesionoftheseerandthevisible.”(VI
140)Husserlhadinitiallydistinguishedtouchingfromvisionbynoticingthatwhile
touchisreversible,visionisnot.Thatis,wecannotseeourselvesseeingintheway
wecantouchourselvestouching.ButMerleau‐Pontyquestionsthevalidityofthis
distinctionontwocounts.First,visioncouldnottruly“see”theworldiftheworld
didnot“adhere”toitsglance;andsecond,eveninself‐touching,thereisno
completecoincidenceofsensingandsensed—“non‐coincidence”isinfactoneof
Merleau‐Ponty’sfundamentalideas,anditappliesastrulytothiscaseastoany
other.Asheexplainsinonecharacteristicpassage:
“Tobeginwith,wespokesummarilyofthereversibilityoftheseeingandthevisible,ofthetouchingandthetouched.Itistimetoemphasizethatitisareversibilityalwaysimminentandneverrealizedinfact.Mylefthandisalwaysonthevergeoftouchingmyrighthandtouchingthethings;butInever 353Mereau‐Ponty’sreferencestothistropeandtoreversibilityarefrequent.Someofthemostinterestinginthetextsweareexaminingincludethefollowing:N217;N224;VI272;VI141‐2;VI147,148;VI4154,155;VI223.
193
reachcoincidence;thecoincidenceeclipsesatthemomentofrealization,andoneoftwothingsalwaysoccurs:eithermyrighthandreallypassesoverintotheranksofthetouched,oritretainsitsholdontheworld,butthenIdonotreallytouchit—myrighthandtouching,Ipalpatewithmylefthandonlyitsoutercovering.”(VI148)
Thuswhileitistruethatwecannottruly“seeourselvesseeing,”inthattheeye
cannotbenditsvisionbackuponitself,neither,finallycantouch.354Andtothe
extentthateithersenseisreversible,itisreversibleinthiscomplexmanner—that
is,withacombinationofidentityanddifference.Asfortherelationoftouchand
visiontooneanother,Merleau‐Pontynotesthatwhiletheyareinsomesense
incommensurable(wewillseebelowthathemakessimilarremarksconcerningall
ofthesensestakentogether),theyarenonethelessunitedinoneaesthesiological
nexus,renderingbacktousaunifiedworld:“Sincethesamebodyseesandtouches,
visibleandtangiblebelongtothesameworld.”(VI134)
Reversibilityis,ofcourse,aphenomenonwenoticefirstofallwithregardto
thebody,whichforitspartis“…interposed[notas]athing,aninterstitialmatter,a
connectivetissue,butasensibleforitself…”(VI135)Thelivedbodyisthusalways
already“aware”ofitselfandtheworld,which,throughitsUmwelt,is“present”
beforeitimmanentlyandnotmerelyasanexternality.ButMerleau‐Ponty’s
discourseaboutthe“body‐subject,”whilelegitimateinitsownright,hadtendedto
obscurethe“world”sideofthis(literal)equation.Theworld,nature,thesensible—
thesearethecomplementarypolestothebody,themind,andsentience.Therefore
whatwefindaboveallinthelaterwritingsisMerleau‐Ponty’sparlayingtheinsight
354Reversibilityisthus,inthewordsofDastur,“neverfinishedandalwaysinthemaking.”See:Dastur,Françoise.“Merleau‐PontyandThinkingfromWithin,”tr.PaulB.Milan.PrintedinMerleauPontyinContemporaryPerspective.Eds.PatrickBurkeandJanVanDerVeken.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1993(p.26)Hereafterreferredtoas“Dastur.”
194
ofreversibilityandthebodyintoageneralontologicalprinciple,usingittomeditate
onthereflexivedepthsofBeingasawhole,thesubjectivity‐objectivityIneinanderas
such:
“Totouchistotouchoneself.Tobeunderstoodas:thethingsaretheprolongationofmybodyandmybodyistheprolongationoftheworld,throughittheworldsurroundsme…”(VI255)
Thismovetowardsgeneralizationisaccompaniedbyamoreontologicallygeneral
(thoughsomehowstillthicklycarnal)languagethanwefindinhisprior
phenomenologicalanalyses.Thislanguagewhichmayevencomeclosetosounding
likeanew“metaphysics.”Instead,itisintendedtobetakenasawaytoframethe
resultsofphenomenologyinacoherentorsystematicway.AsIwillarguebelow(as
IhavealreadybeguntodoinChapter3),Merleau‐Ponty’sobjectiontohisownprior
researchesisdirectedprincipallytotheirlackofbalance,nottotheirradical
misguidedness.355
AsIreadit,therearebasicallythreefundamentallessonsorthemesMerleau‐
Pontytakesfromreversibility.Thefirstisthatoftheunityor“chiasm”ofsubject
andobject,touchingandtouched,sentientandsensible,etc.;thesecondis,in
apparentoppositiontothefirst,“non‐coincidence”;andthethirdistheinterplayof
identityanddifference,chiasmandnon‐coincidence,thatproducestheparadoxical
“samenesswithoutidentity”(VI261)thatweexperiencewithrespecttotheworld
aswellasotherpeople(forexample,intheparadigmaticcaseofashakingofhands).
355ThecaseofHeideggerisagoodoneforthesakeofcomparison;hisown“Kehre”fromDasein/BeingtoBeing/DaseinisnotentirelyunlikeMerleau‐Ponty’sownturnfromthebody‐subjecttothestructuresofbeingitself,thoughinMerleau‐Ponty’scaseitismoreofamatterofmundaneself‐correctionthanitisinHeidegger’s.
195
Afterall,thephenomenonofreversibilitycouldnotbecomeknowntousifitwere
merelyadifferenceormerelyanidentity.Clearlythesensibleandthesentientare
notsimplytwobutratherinsomewayone(orelsehowcouldtheybereversibleand
simply“tradeplaces”?),andyettheyaretwo,sinceiftheyweresimplyone,they
couldnotproduceanexperienceorthe“distance”ofmindandthings.This
intercrossingofidentityanddifferencealsohelpstoexplainwhyMerleau‐Ponty
speaksofthe“indivision”(VI208,255)ofBeinginthesamebreathasits“self‐
splitting.”Further,itisembodiedinMerleau‐Ponty’sreciprocalexpressions
“differencewithoutcontradiction”and“identitywithoutsuperposition.”(VI135)
AsImentionedabove,Merleau‐Pontyalsodevelopshisbasicontological
ideasinexplicitreferencetothehistoryofphilosophy,especiallymodern
philosophyandthemind‐bodyproblemasitemergesinDescartes.Thisbecomes
abundantlyclearintheNaturelectures,whereDescartesemergesashismain
philosophical“rival”—thoughhardlyintheManicheantermsthistermcouldbe
takenin.356Merleau‐PontystatesDescartes’difficulty(whichisalsohisown)inthe
followingterms:
“Thereisanextraordinarydifficultyinthinkingaccordingtoboththefirstandthesecondorder[physicalandmental]atthesametime.Itisdifficulttoconceivethesoulandthebodyasoneandthesamething,whileatthesametimethinkingofthemasdistinct.Unionanddistinctionare,however,bothrequired,yettheyareunthinkablebothatthesametime.”(N17‐8,myemphasis)
ThisquotereferstoMerleau‐Ponty’sideaofnon‐coincidence,aswellasthatof
intertwining—hence,theCartesianproblematicteachesusthesamelessonstaught 356ItisinterestingtonoteinthisregardthatM.C.DillonpresentsMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyasa“criticalassessmentofCartesianism”throughouthiswork,MerleauPonty’sOntology.(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988)(Thequotedphraseisfromp.6ofthatwork).
196
bythephenomenonofself‐sensing.Cartesiandualismhastobereplacedwith
another,moreflexibleanddialecticalmodel.Accordingly,Dasturassertsthat
Merleau‐Ponty’s“entirephilosophicalundertakingledhimtopromoteakindof
thoughtwhichwouldnolongeropposeinteriorityandexteriority,thesubjectwith
theworld,structureswithlivingexperience.”357(Dastur25)
C.Flesh
Thenotionofthe“flesh”(chair)ismeanttoconveythecommonalityofboth
“ordersofbeing,”subjectiveandobjective,whilerefusingtosynthesizethemintoa
solidorsubstantial“this.”ItisnotacausasuioraSpinozistic“substance,”muchless
aneutral“substrate”ofbeing.Ithas“…nonameintraditionalphilosophy”sinceitis
neithersubjectnorobjectbutsomethingelseentirely,akindof“element”(VI146)
orthesiteofanontologicalexchangethatitselfcomesclosetodefiningwhat
Merleau‐Pontymeansby“wildbeing.”358ThisbecomesclearerwhenMerleau‐Ponty
alignsthefleshwiththeideaof“life”heisdevelopingintheNaturelectures:
357DasturalsousesoneofMerleau‐Ponty’smoreinterestingtropes,thatofnarcissism,throughwhichtounderstand—andsubvertourownpotentialmisunderstandingof—Merleau‐Ponty’sbasicinsightintothewaythe“seerandthevisible”relate.Thuswhileatfirstitseemsasthoughthenarcissistis“egocentric”inthewayheseeshimselfintheobject(thinkofNarcissusstaringintothepond),nonethelessthisisnotthe“second,moreprofoundmeaningofnarcissism,”whichisthe“feeling[thatoneis]lookedatbythings,byaninversionofthelookthattransformssubjectiveactivityintoontologicalpassivity,sothatvisionnolongerhasanidentifiableauthor,sothatvisionbecomesgeneralvisibility.”(Dastur30)ThisnotionthatitisnotonlywethatlookatthingsbutthingsthatlookatusisoneofthemostoriginalandchallengingofMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughts,thoughitcanbeseentofollowlogicallyfromthenotionof“reversibility.”358Thefleshcanbeimaginedasafieldof“assemblage”and“dehiscence”ofsentienceandsensibility,similarperhapstowaterorair(hencethenotionof“element”),inthesenseofpermittingandfacilitatingformsofcreationanddestruction,coming‐togetherandcoming‐apart.
197
“Itisnotthatlifeisapowerofbeingoraspirit,butrather,thatweinstallourselvesinperceivedbeing/brutebeing,inthesensible,inthefleshwherethereisnolongerthealternativeoftheinitselfandtheforitself,whereperceivedbeingiseminentlyinbeing.”359(N210,myemphasis)
Indeed,whatMerleau‐Pontyisgettingatwiththisconceptofthefleshisoftenbest
understoodlaterally,throughother,relatednotions,including“nature”or“wild
Being,”aswecanseefromthefollowing(dense)“workingnote”:
“Solution:recapturethechild,thealterego,theunreflectedwithinmyselfbyalateral,pre‐analyticparticipation,whichisperception,ueberschreitenbydefinition,intentionaltransgression.WhenIperceivethechild,heisgivenpreciselyinacertaindivergence(écart)(originatingpresentationoftheunpresentable)andthesameformyalterego,andthesameforthepre‐analyticthing.Hereisthecommontissueofwhichwearemade.ThewildBeing.”(VI,203)
ThispassagerevealsthatforMerleau‐Pontywearealwaysalready,inperception,
separatedofffromourselves—orfromsomething,asitwere,withwhichwearestill
connected,withwhichweshareatogetherness,andofcoursewhichisalsothevery
siteofourconjunction,sinceitmakespossibletheexperienceofthings—or
“phenomena”—inconsciousness.Thusitseemswhatflesh,wildbeing,the“common
tissue”or“element,”etc.,aretryingtoname,ispreciselythephenomenonof
identity‐and‐differenceofsensibleandsentientorders,aprimordialintertwining
thatexpressesitself,paradoxically,inacertain“separation.”Thefleshturnsoutto
beaninevitablecorollarytoreversibilityitself;itisthefleshthat“is”reversible,
movingbetweenthe“fleshofthebody”andthe“fleshoftheworld.”360Thattheflesh
359InoneplaceheevenequatesthefleshwithNature.Hetellshimself:“DoapsychoanalysisofNature:itistheflesh,themother.”(VI267)Merleau‐PontybroachestheconceptofthefleshtowardstheendofhisthirdNaturelecture,itselfcontemporaneouswiththewritingofthedraftofVI.Indeed,someofhismostrevealingthoughtsonthefleshoccurintheselectures.360FredEvansmakesmuchthesamepointwhenheobserves:“Thefleshholdsseersandthevisibletogether(theyareofthesameflesh),whilestillrespectingtheirdifferenceandkeepingthemapart(asrespectively,thefleshofthebodyandthefleshoftheworld).”Evans,Fred.“ChiasmandFlesh.”
198
isattheheartofreversibilityalsoexplainswhyMerleau‐Pontycallsthefleshthe
“miraclethatisthesenseorgan.”(N209)Aswehaveseen,thesenseorgan,for
exampletheskininitstactility,demonstratesthisreversibilityinaparadigmatic
way.
Theidentity,asitwere,ofintertwiningandseparation(ségrégation)is
parallelwiththatofdistanceandproximity,whichdefinesourstrangeintimacy
withthings,evenastheyremainoutsidewhatinHusserlianparlanceiscalledthe
“sphereofimmanence.”Indeed,Merleau‐Pontytakesthenotionofan“immanent
transcendency”ofthingsinconsciousnesstoitslogicalconclusion:
“Bydefinitionperceptionputsusinthepresenceofadefinitivelyopaqueterm.Inotherwords,theNaturethatweperceiveisasdistantandascloseaspossible,andforthesamereasons.ThereisnothingbetweenmeandtheNaturethatIperceive.WhenIperceiveathing,Icannotconceiveofaperceptioninterposedbetweenmeandtheobject.”(N118)
HereiteratesthesameideaintheVI:
“…thisdistanceisnotthecontraryofthisproximity,itisdeeplyconsonantwithit,itissynonymouswithit.”(VI135)
Andinasimilarvein:
Visiondoesnotcompletelyblendintovisible;nonethelessweareclosetoit,palpation,gazeenvelopsthings,clothesthemwithitsownflesh.(VI131)
In:MerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(p.191)Hereafter“Evans.”
199
Itisimportanttorealizethat“distance”isinthissenseacrucialconcept361insofar
asitispreciselysuchdistantiationthatisdenied,overlooked,suppressed,and
“forgotten”bybothflat‐naturalisticandidealisticontologies.ButMerleau‐Ponty’s
innovationistounderstand,inadeeplyHeracliteanway,thisdistanceas
constitutiveofanddefiningofitsseemingopposite,proximity,inthematrixof
perception.Wearewhatwesee,whichalsomeans,onceagain,thatwhatwesee
seesusaswell,inawaythattranscendsmeremetaphor.Perceptionisofcourse
equivalenttothebody,Leib,inthesensethattoperceiveistobecorporeal,and
vice‐versa.ThusMerleau‐Pontyobserves,“…Thethicknessofthebody,farfrom
rivalingthatoftheworld,isonthecontrarythesolemeansIhavetogountothe
heartofthings,bymakingmyselfaworldandbymakingthemflesh.”(VI135)Inthis
waythebodyisnotsimplythe“body‐subject”ofthePhenomenologyofPerception,
butthatpoleofthe“body‐world”circuitnowhavingbeennamedthe“flesh”;indeed,
itisthe“fleshofthebody.”362
InstressingtheentwinementofsensibilityandsentienceoverCartesian‐
styledualism,Merleau‐Pontybecomesacutelyawareoftheneedtostresstheir
differenceaswell,yetofcoursewithoutlapsingbackintodualism.Toexpressthe
complexityofthisrelationship,whatMerleau‐Pontysearchesforisakindof
dialectic—butwhatkindofdialecticemerges?Tobeginwith,itcannotbeadialectic
of“synthesis,”sinceitmustincludenon‐coincidence,somehow,atitscore.Yetnon‐
361Theideaof“distance”hasbeenemphasizedrecentlyinaworkbyRenaudBarbaras:DesireandDistance:IntroductiontoaPhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.PaulB.Milan.StanfordUniversityPress,2006362Compare:“Theworldseenisnot‘in’mybody,andmybodyisnot‘in’theworldultimately:fleshappliedtoaflesh,theworldneithersurroundsitnorissurroundedbyit.”(VI138)
200
coincidenceisafunction,ironically,ofacertainidentityofseerandseen.As
Merleau‐Pontyexplainsinaworkingnote:
“Theverypulpofthesensible,whatisindefinableinit,isnothingelsethantheunioninitofthe‘inside’withthe‘outside,’thecontactinthicknessofselfwithself.—Theabsoluteofthe‘sensible’isthisstabilizedexplosioni.e.involvingreturn.”363
Thatsucha“coincidence”isincomplete,never‐finished,always‐in‐the‐making,etc.,
helpstoexplainwhyfacticityalonecannotexplainexistence,thatis,why
transcendenceorself‐distantiation—whicharethetwinbasesofthepossibilityof
reflectionandthe“transcendentalattitude”asareflectivestance—areequally
necessarydeterminantsoftheexistentialsituation.
D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleauPonty’sDialectic Theunityor“chiasm”ofmindandworld,spiritandnature,generatesasense
ofakindof“pre‐establishedharmony”(VI133)aswellasasenseofprimordial,but
strictlyunthematizable,mutualbelonging,ofthetwononetheless‐distinguishable
orders.Merleau‐Pontytreatsthisharmonyusuallyasabrutefactofsorts,thoughhe
doesattimesunderstanditasexpressingadeeperlogicofreciprocity:“…since
visionisapalpationwiththelook,itmustalsobeinscribedintheorderofbeing
thatitdisclosestous;hewholooksmustnothimselfbeforeigntotheworldthathe
looksat.”(VI134)Merleau‐Pontyexpressesthisideaofharmonyinmanyways—for 363VI268.ElsewhereMerleau‐Pontyreferstothis“explosion”asthe“dehiscence”or“écart”thatmarkstheflightofbeingfromitself—whichisnevertheless,asHegelsays,areturntoitself.Seealso:“Thetruephilosophy[isto]apprehendwhatmakestheleavingofoneselfbearetiringintooneself,andviceversa./Graspthischiasm,thisreversal.Thatisthemind.”(VI199)Relatedly,elsewhereMerleau‐Pontydescribesthefleshasan“anonymityinnatetomyself.”(VI139)
201
example,withregardtonaturewithinandwithout:“Bythenatureinus,wecan
knowNature,andreciprocallyitisfromourselvesthatlivingbeingsandevenspace
speaktous…”364(N205)Centraltothisnotionistheultimatecontinuityofthe
visibleandtheinvisible:“Thesuperficialpellicleofthevisibleisonlyformyvision
andformybody.Butthedepthbeneaththissurfacecontainsmybodyandhence
containsmyvision.Mybodyasavisiblethingiscontainedwithinthefullspectacle.”
(VI138)Again,thisisacontinuity“interrupted,”butnotbeforeitmakesitself
knownasacontinuity.ThusIwouldwhollyagreewithFredEvansthat“…the
directionoftruthMerleau‐Pontyspeaksof,evenifitcanneverbefulfilledin
principle,doesseemtoputapremiumonperceptualandepistemological
convergenceratherthandivergence…”(Evans,191)
Ofcourse,thenotionofthefleshhasgeneratedmanycontroversiesand
misunderstandings,oneofthembeingthatMerleau‐Pontyisamonistandthatthe
fleshis,asalreadyalludedtonegativelyabove,akindofontologicalsubstrate.
Merleau‐Pontycertainlyisanondualist;hedoesnotusetheword,nowassociated
withstrainsof“Eastern”(especiallyBuddhist)philosophy,butIthinkthismuchcan
beadmitted.Forexample,hemakesclearinoneplace:“Thereisnointelligible
world,thereisthesensibleworld.”365(VI214)Yetfromthisaloneitdoesnotfollow
thatMerleau‐Pontyisamonist.Hispointinthisquote,forexample,isthatthe
“invisible”isofthisworld,itis“thatwhichinhabitsthisworld,sustainsit,and
rendersitvisible,itsownandinteriorpossibility,theBeingofthis[visible,sensible]
364Compare:VI99“…thehomogeneityofthemeasuredandthemeasuringimpliesthatthesubjectmakescommoncausewithspace.”365Insomeplaces,“Nature”isequated(oraligned)withthe“sensible.”See,forexample:“Thesensible,Nature,transcendthepastpresentdistinction…”(VI267)
202
being.”(VI151)Orstatedinotherterms:“Meaningisinvisible,buttheinvisibleis
notthecontradictoryofthevisible:thevisibleitselfhasaninvisibleinner
framework(membrure),andthein‐visibleisthesecretcounterpartofthevisible,it
appearsonlywithinit…”(VI215)Whatweseehereisakindofreflexivitythatis
totallyforeignto,say,Spinoza’smonisticsystem,thoughtobefair,Spinoza’s“dual
attribute”theoryisnotwhollyincompatiblewithMerleau‐Ponty’sintentions.The
matterishighlycomplex,chieflybecauseMerleau‐Pontyistryingtore‐drawthe
termsofthisverydistinctionbetween“monism”and“dualism.”
Itisimportant,however,todosomedisambiguationatthisstage.Thereare
actuallytwodifferentkindsofquestionswithrespecttothequestionof“monism.”
Thereismonism(orpluralism)oftypesofbeing—Spinozamaynotfitthiscategory,
butBerkeley,James,orQuinedo—andamonismofjusthowmanybeingsthereare,
thatis,justone(acosmicwhole,substance,etc.)ormany(monads,Aristotelian
substances,etc.).Regardingthislatterquestionofmonismorpluralism,whatis
reallykeyforMerleau‐Pontyistheprincipleofaunityinthemany.Evansputitthis
way:
“What[Merleau‐Ponty]offersis…closertowhatwemightcalla‘unitycomposedofdifference’ratherthanacollectionofseparate,merelyexternallyrelatedentitiesoraunityformedthroughdominationbyoneoftheelementsofthatunity—heeschews,inotherwords,bothpluralismandmonism.”(Evans191)
Merleau‐Pontyillustratestheideaofunity‐in‐manythroughtheexpression“total
part,”thatis,apartofawholewhich,evenasitisapart,capturesthewhole,asit
were,“partially.”AsanexampleofwhatMerleau‐Pontymeansby“totalpart,”letus
203
considerwhathesaysaboutthecaseofthesenses(thequoteislongbutvery
importantinillustratingwhatMerleau‐Pontyisgettingat—possiblyatruly
revolutionarynewcontributiontotheancientpuzzleoftheone‐and‐the‐many):
“Each‘sense’isa‘world,’i.e.absolutelyincommunicablefortheothersenses,andyetconstruingasomethingwhich,throughitsstructure,isfromthefirstopenupontheworldoftheothersenses,andwiththemformsonesoleBeing.…The‘World’isthiswholewhereeach‘part,’whenonetakesitforitself,suddenlyopensunlimiteddimensions—becomesatotalpart.Nowthisparticularityofthecolor,oftheyellow,andthisuniversalityarenotacontradiction,aretogethersensorialityitself:itisbythesamevirtuethatthecolor,theyellow,atthesametimegivesitselfasacertainbeingandasadimension,theexpressionofeverypossiblebeing.—Whatispropertothesensible(astolanguage)istoberepresentativeofthewhole,notbyasign‐significationrelation,orbytheimmanenceofthepartsinoneanotherandinthewhole,butbecauseeachpartistornupfromthewhole,comeswithitsroots,encroachesuponthewhole,transgressesthefrontiersoftheothers.”(VI218)
ThesepowerfulstatementsessentiallycomprisetheheartofMerleau‐Ponty’s
answertothequestionoftherelationofthemany—forexample,manysubjects,or
multipleordersofbeing—totheoneorthewhole,andwhathesaysofthesenses,or
ofcolors,appliestomanyotherthings,fromthecoordinatedanatomical/behavioral
developmentoforganisms,alreadylookedat,tothe“becomingofapainting”outof
manystrokesofthebrushandeventosexuality.366Itisimportanttostressallofthis
becauseofMerleau‐Ponty’sownremark,quotedabove,thattheprincipleof
“totality”mightbethecentraloneinallphilosophy.
Thisquasi‐holisticapproachischaracteristicofhowMerleau‐Pontydeals
withissuesofoppositionanddialectic.Foritinfactgoesspecificallytohis
understandingofwhatconstitutesthe“complementarity”ofopposites.“Thereare
366ThereissomethinganalogousinMerleau‐Ponty’sdescriptionofwhatMatisse’smethodofpaintingandthe“bodyofbehavior”intheorganismhaveincommon:“Threadsaretiedup,whichcomefromeverywhere,andwhichconstituteindependentforms,andthesametime,hefindsthatthesethreadsrealizesomethingwhichhasaunity.”(N154)Elsewhere:“Thusthesexualiscoextensivewiththehumannotasauniquecause,butasadimensionoutsideofwhichnothingexists.”(N282)
204
two‘sides’ofanexperience,conjugatedandincompossible,butcomplementary.
Theirunityisirrecusable;itissimplyastheinvisiblehingeonwhichtwo
experiencesarearticulated—aselftornapart.[myemphasis]…contradiction,
understoodasinteriortoNature,mustbeassumed.Wemustadmittheideaofan
operatingnegationinNature...”367(N65‐66)Merleau‐Ponty’suseoftheterm
“complementarity,”isnot,Ibelieve,accidental.Ibelieveitisadeliberatereference
toBohr’stheoryofquantummechanicsbythesamename,asubjecttowhichhe
devotesagoodamountofattentionintheNaturelecturesthemselves.(N89‐100)In
asense,heapplieswhatistrueofsub‐atomicparticles,inparticularthesymmetrical
applicabilityofmutuallyincompatiblewave‐theoryandcorpusculartheorytothe
descriptionofelementaryparticles,tobeingitself:“…thetwomapsarecomplete,
andyettheydonotmergeintoone.Thetwopartsaretotalpartsandyetnot
superposable.”(VI134)(Noteagaintheideaofa“totalpart.”)
Inaninterestingkindofconvergence,HusserlscholarSebastianLufthas
expressedtheviewthatHusserl’sphilosophyasawhole,withitstwinpolesofthe
“CartesianWay”tothereductionandthe“Life‐World”method,canitselfbe
summarizedintermsoftwoincommensurableandyetcomplementary“maps”:
“Thus,theinterpretation[Ipresent]attemptstoovercomethecommonassertionthatthereisa‘contradiction’betweenHusserl’sCartesianpositionandhisaccountofthelife‐world.Ihavetriedtoshowthataphilosophicalthematizationofthelife‐worldisnotpossiblewithoutatranscendentalquestionastoitsoriginin(inter‐)subjectivity.InHusserl’seyes,bothagendasarecorrelative.Atthesametime,IwouldliketoinsistthatHusserl’sCartesianaccountofthesubjectandhislife‐worldontologypresenttwodistinctandinthissense,separateprograms.TheyareprojectsHusserlpursueswithdifferentaims:Whereasthe‘CartesianHusserl’pursuesapathofscientificgroundingandfoundationalism,the‘life‐worldHusserl’isinterestedinwhatcanbeencalledahermeneuticsoftheworldofeverydaylife.Bothprojectsaresetsquarelyagainsteachother,notinthesensethat 367ThenotionthatBeingcontainsitsownnegationtiesinwiththesecondofMerleau‐Ponty’slessonslearntfromthereversibilityoftouch—thatis,theimpossibilityofpurecoincidenceorasimple“identityofopposites.”(VI250‐1)
205
theycontradictorcanceleachotherout,butinthattheypursuetwodifferentagendas.Theyarelocatedontwodifferent‘maps.’Onecanpursueonewhilecompletelyneglectingtheother.368
Inthisway,adistinctlyMerleau‐Pontianconcept(presumablyindependently
arrivedatbyLuft)ironicallycomesusefullytodefinethecareerarcofHusserl
himself.
IV.Conclusion
Merleau‐PontybeginstheNaturecourses,aswehaveseen,withan
investigationintothehistoryofphilosophy.Helatershiftshisinteresttoan
examinationofcontemporaryscience.Buttheseprimafacieunconnecteddiscourses
are,asiscustomaryinMerleau‐Ponty’ssingularlysyncreticapproach,unitedina
commonpurpose.Theconjunctionisrevealedintellingworkingnote,inwhichthe
philosopherspeaksofwhatistobediscussedinVI:
“ImustthereforeshowintheintroductionthatthebeingofscienceisitselfapartoraspectoftheobjectifiedInfinity[ofDescartes]andthattheOffenheitoftheUmweltisopposedtobothofthese[i.e.,Cartesianontologyandscience].WhencethechaptersonDescartes,Leibniz,Westernontology,whichindicatethehistorico‐intentionalandontologicalimplicationsofthebeingofscience.”369(VI176)
368Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLife‐WorldandCartesianism.”InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.226)369Relatedly:“IclarifymyphilosophicalprojectbyrecoursetoDescartesandLeibniz.”(VI177)
206
Merleau‐Ponty’snotionofNatureis“polymorphous.”Phenomenasuchaslifeand
animality,wholenessandorganicform,growthandcreativity,“natural”originsand
processes—theseareallphenomenathatrevealdifferentcluesaboutthenon‐fully‐
constitutablecoreoftheworldandofourownhumanity.Naturalitydoesnot
exhaustthemeaningofBeing,butitdoesencircleallbeingsinitsberth,and
ultimately,nooneeverfullybreaksawayfromit,justasMerleau‐Pontyalready
observedaboutthe“naturalattitude”ofHusserl.Thusitisfittingtoendwiththe
followingquotation,whichneatlysummarizesMerleau‐Ponty’sattitudetowards
natureanditsplaceinontology:
“Nature…Byexaminingit,wehaveretrievedeverything,notthateverythingisinnature,butbecauseeverythingisorbecomesnaturalforus.TherearenosubstantialdifferencesbetweenphysicalNature,life,andmind.[myemphasis.]Wepassedbetweencausal‐realistthinkingandphilosophicalidealism,becausewefoundinbrute,savage,vertical,presentBeingadimensionthatisnotofrepresentationandnotthatoftheIn‐itself.”(N212)
207
ChapterFive:MerleauPontyandHusserlontheQuestionoftheParadoxofSubjectivityandNature
I.Introduction
Merleau‐Ponty’sembraceof“paradox”isradical,bothinthesensethatit
goestotheheartofhisphilosophicalprojectandinthesensethatitisverythorough
indeed.Itcouldbearguedthatpost‐KantianContinentalphilosophy,especiallyin
thetwentiethcentury,hascometotakeamorefavorableviewofparadoxthandid
itspredecessors;onemaythinkhereofKierkegaard’sfamousembraceofthe
“absoluteparadox”ofChrist,Marcel’s“MysteryofBeing,”Heidegger’s“hermeneutic
circle”andparadoxical“alwaysalready,”evenaspectsofRicoeur’shermeneuticsof
identity(asevidencedinthetitleofoneofhismajorworks,OneselfasAnother).The
differenceisthatMerleau‐Pontymadeofparadoxacentralthematicinitsownright.
Thatthehumanmindisledtoexpressorelucidateitssituationinparadoxical
terms—somethingMerleau‐Pontysteadfastlymaintains—isamomentousfactfor
someonewhoargues,asMerleau‐Pontydoes,fortheintimacyofsubjectivityand
Beingitself.ForitmeansthatBeing,andnotonlyconsciousness,iscontradictoryon
theinside.DoesthismeanMerleau‐Pontyrejectsthelawofnon‐contradiction?
Merleau‐Ponty’sapplicationofthislaw(whichherarelydealswithinjustthose
terms)goesasfarastheintelligibilityofBeingtorationalthoughtgoes;butheis
208
willingtoconcede(andinfactinsists)thatBeinginitsprimordialityisineffableand
evennecessarilyso—andthat,accordingly,rationalthinking(“reflection,”“the
transcendentalattitude”)islessthanultimate.
Iftruthisunavailabletousthroughconcepts,however,itisnevertheless
availablyunavailable.Itdoesnotmerelyeludeus,iteludesusbecauseitsurrounds
usandpenetratesustothecore.Moreover,thereisawayinwhichthoughtcan
understanditselfandemployitsconcepts—through“dialectical”and“hyper‐
dialectical”thinking—thatservestobringthe“contradictions”ofunreflectedBeing
intoafruitfulrelationshipwithreflectivity.Theresultofthisexchangearethe
paradoxesofphilosophy,whoserigorousexpressionisnolesschallengingthanany
mannerof“problem‐solving”thatwecouldadopt.
By“Being”Merleau‐Pontydoesnotmeantosayanythingdifferentthan
“experience”asknownin“perceptualfaith.”Being,whichcanbeequatedtoalarge
extentwithwhatwehavebeencalling“Nature”(“wildBeing”),isexperiencedand
“lived‐through,”indeeditmaybe“life”itself(oragain“time,”thesinequanonof
lived‐experienceassuch)whoseprimordialunity‐in‐differenceconcealsatruth,
evena“logos”orlanguage,thatrevealsitself,intheparadoxesofthought,precisely
asconcealed.Thesayabilityandintelligibilityofcoreexperientialityandwhatit
disclosesispreserved,therefore,partiallyandasifintrace‐likeoutline,intheform
oftheparadoxesofbeing,experience,time,mind,freedom,andsoon—andthesein
turngivelifetophilosophicalthought,whichariseandmustreturntothedepths
theyopenup.Paradoxisthus,inMerleau‐Ponty,both“problem”and,asitwere,
“solution.”Itisthequestionandtheanswer,the“mysteryofbeing”aswellasthe
209
explanationofthemystery.Inthisway,paradoxisnotintentional—itdoesnot
“pointbeyonditself”toatelos,apurpose,aform,oraplan.Itsfinalityisequallya
functionofitsoriginality—thereisonlytheBeginning,asitwere,thebirththat
eludestimebycreatingit.
Philosophyisthereforemisunderstoodbythose,includingHusserl,whothink
ofitasanessentially“problem‐solving”enterprise.Merleau‐Ponty’sconceptionis
closerinthiscasetothatofthelater(circaPhilosophicalInvestigations)
Wittgenstein,inthathewouldagreethatphilosophyisbetterusedforthepurpose
of“dissolving”philosophicalpuzzlesthansolvingthem.ButMerleau‐Pontywould
notthinkofparadoxesaslinguisticconfusions,ratherasmomentsof“contradiction”
or“crisis”signifyingthebreakdownandlimitsofsignificationbeforethe
unsignifiableverityattheheartofthebeingoftheworld.Merleau‐Pontyand
Wittgensteinareperhapsequallyinsistentonthecentralityoflanguagetothought
andevenhumanexperience.Inthecaseoftheformer,ofcourse,onemustalways
keepinmindhisfamousthesisofthe“primacyofperception,”aprimacythat
ultimatelyexpressesa“faith”inBeingthatisitsownmeaningormeaning‐fount,
fromwhichlanguageandits“ideal”meaningsariseand,overtime,alsodissolve.
ThisisanotherwayofsayingthatforMerleau‐Ponty,thereisstill,afterall,an
“absolute,”a“real”thatcannotbedemarcatedsomuchaslived,anditispromisedin
thesimplestactofperception,which,throughthe“phenomenon,”promises
disclosureoftheworld—thefirstcontradiction(subjectivityandobjectivity)that
theperceptualfaithharmonizesinitseffortlessway.Merleau‐Pontyistothisextent
210
a“realist”—thoughthe“real”canneverbeknownpurelyasthereal,butonlythat
whichescapeslanguagelinguistically,sotospeak.
ThelaterWittgensteinisofcoursenotoriouslymuteaboutmetaphysical
questions,butforMerleau‐Ponty,theknowableunknowabilityofBeingisthe
overridingthemeofallreflection,whilethestrugglesofphilosophyitselfaretaken
assymptomaticnotofpathologicalhabitsoflinguisticbehaviorbut,attheirbestand
mostauthenticallyapproached,oftherigorsofthinkingthroughthedialectical
structureofphenomena.
Inthisfinal,culminatingchapterofthepresentdissertation,myfocusis
mostlyonMerleau‐Ponty,butIalsobrieflyexamineandcompareHusserl’s
approachtoparadoxtoMerleau‐Ponty’sthroughtheformer’sfamousdiscussionin
theCrisis370ofthe“paradoxofsubjectivity.”Fundamentally,Iwillshowthatwhile
forMerleau‐Pontyparadoxitselfplaysafundamentalroleinexplicatingthe
meaningofphenomenology,forHusserl,phenomenologyispreciselyameansto
solveparadoxes—amethodtoendallphilosophicaldisputes,infact.371Inthisway
Husserlrepresentsthemainstream,onemightsay,ofphilosophyinthe“Western”
philosophicaltradition—aswellas,importantlyforthethemesofthisdissertation,
theimplicitparadigmof“scientificthinking,”whichseesitselfinsimilarly“problem‐
solving”terms.Thereis,ofcourse,aninterestingwayinwhichevenHusserl
370Husserl,Edmund.TheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Tr.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970.Hereafter“Crisis.”371See:Husserl,Edmund.EncyclopaediaBritannicaArticle.In:CollectedWorks,Vol.6.Tr.ThomasSheehanandRichardE.Palmer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1997
211
embracessomethinglikethecentralityof“paradox”—butonlyinthesenseofits
beinga“reversalofcommonsense”;thisisacaseofsimplehomonymy.
Merleau‐Ponty’sincreasinglysophisticatedrelianceondialecticbecomes
entirelyexplicitinTheVisibleandtheInvisible372,inwhichheendorsesit
wholeheartedly,whiletryingtodistinguishitfromitsHegelian(andevenSartrean)
versions.ThusIbrieflyexaminethisphilosophicalappropriationandthewaysin
whichMerleau‐Pontydoesanddoesnotconceiveofphilosophyasadialectic.
Finally,andrelatedly,IlookatMerleau‐Ponty’suseandanalysisofthenotionof
“reflection,”alongwith“hyper‐reflection,”hislabelforthephilosophicalattitude
oncephilosophyhasbeentransformedfromaproblem‐solvingtoaself‐
problematizing(andthereby“self‐recovering”)enterprise.373
II.MerleauPonty’sPhilosophyofParadox
A.OverviewofMerleauPonty’sReferencestoParadox
TheseedofMerleau‐Ponty’sapproachtoparadox,andBeingasaparadoxical
phenomenonthatis(quasi‐)intelligibleinthoughtthroughamovementof
372Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheVisibleandtheInvisible.Tr.AlphonsoLingis.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1969.Hereafter“VI.”373Note:Merleau‐Pontyachievesgreatluciditywhenitcomestohismatureepistemologicalviews.Infact,hespeaksmoreclearlyforhisownpositionsthananyparaphrasecoulddo.Forthisreason,IrelyinthischaptermorethanIhavetothispointonlengthydirectquotationsfromthesourcehimself.ThisisparticularlythecaseforcertainsectionsfromtheVI,especiallychapter1,“ReflectionandInterrogation.”
212
controlledcontradiction(dialectic),aretobefoundalreadyinthisdenseand
startlingpassage,whichisworthquotinginfull,fromThePrimacyofPerception374:
“Itistruethatwearriveatcontradictionswhenwedescribetheperceivedworld.Anditisalsotruethatifthereweresuchathingasanon‐contradictorythought,itwouldexcludetheworldofperceptionasasimpleappearance.Butthequestionispreciselytoknowwhetherthereissuchathingaslogicallycoherentthoughtorthoughtinthepurestate.ThisisthequestionKantaskedhimself…OneofKant’sdiscoveries,whoseconsequenceswehavenotyetfullygrasped,isthatallourexperienceoftheworldisthroughoutatissueofconceptswhichleadtoirreduciblecontradictions375ifweattempttotaketheminanabsolutesenseortransferthemintopurebeing,andthattheyneverthelessfoundthestructureofallphenomena,oreverythingwhichisforus.…Iwishonlytopointoutthattheaccusationofcontradictionisnotdecisive,iftheacknowledgedcontradictionappearsastheveryconditionofconsciousness.[myemphasis]…Thereisavainformofcontradictionwhichconsistsinaffirmingtwotheseswhichexcludeoneanotheratthesametimeandunderthesameaspect.…Thereisthesterilenon‐contradictionofformallogic[versus]thejustifiedcontradictionsoftranscendentallogic.Theobjectionwithwhichweareconcernedwouldbeadmissibleonlyifwecouldputasystemofeternaltruthsintheplaceoftheperceivedworld,freedfromitscontradictions.”(Primacy18)
Thatwecannotputupsuchasystemof“eternaltruths”islessacriticismof
Husserlianmethod,perhaps,whicharguablyalreadyproblematizesthequestionof
“eternity”throughitsembraceoforiginarytemporality,thanofclassical
metaphysicalthought,particularlyitsanti‐paradoxicalandanti‐dialectical
character.Theabove‐quotedpassagestatesallofthefundamentalthemesof
paradoxicalthinkingthatMerleau‐Pontywouldcontinuetodeepenandthat,finally,
cometoastartlinglyfreshnewexpressioninhislaterwritings.Merleau‐Ponty
makesitclearthatheisnotinterestedinthesterilecontradictionof“AandnotA”
foritsownsake.Itisonlyundercertainconditions,forceduponusbytheexigencies
oflivedexperience,thattherearisethe“justifiedcontradictions”ofphilosophy,
374Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.”Tr.JamesM.Edie.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.Hereafter“Primacy.”375Compare:“Everyattemptatelucidationbringsusbacktothedilemmas.”(VI11)Itisinterestingthatoneoftheearlywordsheusesforhismethodisinfact“elucidation.”(See,forexample:VI23)
213
beginningalreadywiththeawakeningofreflectionfromtheoblivionofourpure
“perceptualfaith,”Merleau‐Ponty’stermofartfortheconditionofnatural
consciousnessand,indeed,thenaturalattitude:
“Weseethethingsthemselves,theworldiswhatwesee:formulaeofthiskindexpressafaithcommontothenaturalmanandthephilosopher—themomentheopenshiseyes;theyrefertoadeep‐seatedsetofmute‘opinions’implicatedinourlives.Butwhatisstrangeaboutthisfaithisthatifweseektoarticulateitintothesesorstatements,ifweaskourselveswhatisthiswe,whatseeingis,andwhatthingorworldis,weenterintoalabyrinthofdifficultiesandcontradictions…WhatAugustinesaidoftime—thatitisperfectlyfamiliartoeach,butthatnoneofuscanexplainittotheothers—mustbesaidoftheworld.”(VI3,myemphasisonlatter)
Merleau‐Pontyiswidelyknownasaphilosopherof“ambiguity,”asIhave
mentioned,butlesssoasoneof“paradox.”Yetthecontradictionsofphilosophyare
organized,dialectical,andfitapattern.Ambiguity,inMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophy,
appearstomeasamoreinchoate‐soundingversionofwhathemeansby“paradox”;
oralternately,ithasadifferentdiscursivefunction.Thatis,tosay(forexample)that
thehumanbeingisan“ambiguous”phenomenonistodeny,inessence,various
strictlydelineatedandone‐sideddescriptionsofhim/herorhisorherexperience
(“intellectualism,”“empiricism,”“naturalism”).Butitdoesnotclearlyposean
alternativeview.SinceMerleau‐Pontyhasnomonolithicalternative,thealternative
issomethinglike“paradox”or“justifiedcontradiction”—thatis,alogosofambiguity.
Merleau‐Ponty’srepeatedpositiveinvocationsofparadox,paradoxicalthinking,
dilemmas,contradiction,anddialecticityareconstantthroughouthiswritings—but
initiallyonlyinthebackground,almostlikeanafter‐thought.Thischangesas
Merleau‐Pontyseekstoemphasizethathonestreflectioncannolongerpretendto
dophilosophyinthemannerthattraditionhasimaginedituptothispoint—thatis,
214
withthetacitassumptionthatitcaninreflectionmaintainaholdontheparadoxical
truth,soeffortlesslyinhabitedbyeverydaypre‐reflectivelife.
ItisimpossibletomentionallthewaysinwhichMerleau‐Pontyembraces
paradoxorallofthecountlessparadoxeshementions,butitisworthnotingthathis
mainpreoccupation—perception—wasexplainedbyhimasfundamentally
paradoxicalalreadyinthePhenomenologyofPerception,inthiscasewithrespectto
immanenceandtranscendence,theparadoxmentionedascentralto
phenomenology.376Herepeatsthesameideaoftheparadoxicalityofperceptionin
Primacyandreferstothe“internalparadoxofmyperception”inVI377,wherehealso
speaksofthe“paradoxesofvision”andthe“figuredenigmas,thethingandthe
world.”378Theessay“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow,”devotedtoHusserl,also
stressesenigmasofperceptionaswellasthehidden/revealeddualityofthings.379In
anotherplacewecanfindareferencetothe“fertilecontradictionofhuman
consciousness.”380Inthe“MetaphysicalinMan,”Merleau‐Pontycharacterizesthe
taskofmetaphysicsasoneofinquiringintoparadoxes,which,heexplainsina
footnote,heevenoutrightcallscontradictions:
376Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962.Hereafter“PP.”(p.425)Notealsothewordingheusesinthesamepassage,furtherdown:“Atthelevelofbeingitshouldneverbeintelligiblethatthesubjectshouldbebothnaturansandnaturatus,infiniteandfinite.Butwerediscovertimebeneaththesubject,andifwerelatetotheparadoxoftime,thoseofthebody,theworld,thething,andothers,weshallunderstandthatbeyondthesethereisnothingtounderstand.”(myemphasis)377VI,11378Ibid.,4379Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”Tr.RichardM.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.167‐8)380Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.SenseandNonSense.Tr.HubertL.DreyfusandPatriciaAllenDreyfus.NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.p.96Hereafter“SNS”
215
“Ihavetherighttoconsiderthecontradictionsofmylifeasathinkingandincarnatesubject,finiteandcapableoftruth,asultimateandtrue[myemphasis]becauseIhaveexperiencedthemandbecausetheyareinterconnectedintheunquestionableperceptionofathingorintheexperienceofatruth.Icannolongerintroducea‘transcendenceinimmanence’behindmeasHusserldid(eventranscendencequalifiedashypothetical),forIamnotGod,andIcannotverifytheco‐existenceofthesetwoattributesinanyindubitableexperience.”381
AndinoneofMerleau‐Ponty’slesserknownessaysonMontaigne382,inthe
beginningoftheessay,hechidesDescartesfortryingto“solve”paradoxinsteadof
acceptingit,averytellingsentiment.(Montaigne,201)
DuetothelimitedfocusofthisdissertationIhavehadmostlytobracketthe
questionofintersubjectivity,buthere,too,Merleau‐Pontythinksintermsof
paradox.InSorbonnelectures,itseemsthatMerleau‐Pontyacceptsthatthereisa
“contradiction”inthefactthatIcannotexperienceotherpeople,yetnaturallydo
experiencethem,inthecourseoflife.383Thereisalsoa“contradiction”ofself/other
attheheartofintersubjectivityaswell.(Toadvine,248).Interestinghereisthe
methodologyofsimplyacceptingacontradictorysituationandproceedingfrom
there.Inthe“Preface”ofPPhediscussesthe“paradoxanddialectic”ofthe“Egoand
theAlter.”(PPxiii)Amongotherthings,“theother”isparadoxicalasan“I”thatis
“notI”(notme),aswellasan“other”thatis“notother”(forIcannotbemyself
withouttheother).Allhumansolidarity,andallhumanviolence,onemightsay,
stemessentiallyfromthesamesource,theparadoxoftheother(or
intersubjectivity).
381“TheMetaphysicalInMan.”In:SNS(p.96)382Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ReadingMontaigne.”Tr.RichardC.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.198‐210).Hereafter“Montaigne.”383Referencefoundin:Toadvine,Ted.“Merleau‐Ponty’sReadingofHusserl:AChronologicalOverview.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.227‐286).Hereafter“Toadvine.”
216
Merleau‐Ponty’sacceptanceofparadox—evencontradiction,inthesensewe
haveseen—canbegleanedindirectlyaswell,forexamplethroughhiscommentary
onotherphilosophers.WehavealreadyseenthiswithKantandMontaigne.Butin
hisalready‐examinedcritiqueofBergsonfromtheNaturelectures,forexample,he
comments,“WecannotreproachBergsonforthiscontradiction,buthedoesnotgive
ittheplacethatitmerits.”384InBergson’svoiceMerleau‐Pontyinoneplaceremarks
favorablythat:“Here,perceptioniscontradictionrealized.”385Oragain,onCoghill’s
experiment,alsodiscussedinChapterFour:
“Coghillgoesfurther.Heshowsthatthematurationoftheorganismandtheemergenceofbehaviorareoneandthesamething.Fortheaxolotl,toexistfromheadtotailandtoswimarethesamething.Thisdoublephenomenon,whichamountstoaparadox,developsatthesametimeintwocontradictorydirections.…”(N144,myemphasis)
Merleau‐Pontyevencallstheaxolotllizarditselfaparadox!(N144‐5).Finally,inhis
criticalcommentaryonGuéroult’sconciliatingapproachtoDescartes,alsointhe
Naturelectures,hecommentsthat“Thecontradiction[ofthetwoorders,subjective
andobjective]isconstitutiveofthehuman.Thedomainofthehumanisalways
equivocal...”(N129)
384Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003.Hereafterthe“Naturelectures”inthebodyoftextor“N”incitations.385Ibid.,p.57
217
B.Paradoxandthe“PerceptualFaith”
Ifthebasicparadoxofperceptionisthequestionoftranscendence‐and‐
immanence,aswehaveseendescribedabove,thefactisthatinperceptualfaith,this
isnotaproblemassuch:
“The‘natural’manholdsontobothendsofthechain,thinksatthesametimethathisperceptionentersintothethingsandthatitisformedthissideofhisbody.Yetcoexistasthetwoconvictionsdowithoutdifficultyintheexerciseoflife,oncereducedtothesesandtopropositionstheydestroyoneanotherandleaveusinconfusion.”(VI8)
Merleau‐Pontyinterestinglycallsournaturalcertitude“unjustifiable”:an
“unjustifiablecertitudeofasensibleworldcommontousthatistheseatoftruth
withinus.”386Itis“unjustifiable”ofcoursebecauseitisprimordial—presupposedin
anyjustification(especiallythejustificationofthe“skeptic,”whichwewillsee
pointedoutbelow).
Merleau‐Pontyalsocallsperceptualfaith“opennessuponbeing.”(VI88)But
opennessentailsnotonlyaccessbutocclusion:accesstoworldexistssidebyside
withoccultation(inaccess):“…thesetwopossibilities,whichtheperceptualfaith
keepssidebysidewithinitself,donotnullifyoneanother.”(VI28)Wehavealready
ofcoursevisitedthisnotionofasidebyside“contradiction”inwhichthesides
neverthelessdonotnullifyeachother—Merleau‐Pontyhascalledthis
“complementarity,”afterthesamenotioninquantummechanics(withwhose
lessonshecontinuestobepreoccupied).Thus“complementarity”and“paradox”
386Seealso:VI14“insolubleantinomies”inperceptualfaith.
218
(“contradiction”)arecloselyintertwined,andtogethertheybegintorevealnew
foldsinMerleau‐Ponty’supdatedconceptionof“dialectic.”
AswesawintheNaturelectures,Merleau‐Pontycontinuestoregardthe
phenomenonofwholenessortotalityasacluetonotonlythestructureofbeingbut
alsotheinabilityofthoughttothinkBeingotherwisethanparadoxically.Totalityis
of“anotherorder”hestatesinoneplace,inthiscaseintermsofbinocular
perception.(VI7)Justasoneeyeseesandsodoestheother,evenasneitherbyitself
seesthe“miracleoftotality”anddepthpresentedinperception(VI8),so
philosophersaretrappedinone‐sidedwaystograspBeing:“…‘objective’and
‘subjective’[shouldbe]recognizedastwoordershastilyconstructedwithinatotal
experience,whosecontextmustberestoredinallclarity.”(VI20)Notethatitisthe
contextwhoseclarityistoberestored,notthetotalexperienceitself.Theexperience
isalreadyclarified,ironically,throughthecontradictionstowhichitgivesrisein
philosophy,fortheseare“complementary”descriptionsofthewholeitself—we
havealreadyseenhowMerleau‐Pontydisposesofthe“problemoftheoneandthe
many”inthisway.
Asatotality,“theperceivedworldisbeneathorbeyondthisantinomy[of
being‐objectandbeing‐subject].”(VI22)Itisthisfactwhichcallsfora“…re‐
examinationofthenotionsof‘subject’and‘object.’”SaysMerleau‐Ponty,“Every
question,eventhatofsimplecognition,ispartofthecentralquestionthatis
ourselves,ofthatappealfortotality[myemphasis]towhichnoobjectivebeing
answers...”(VI104)AgainstHusserl’sframingofphenomenologyasa“rigorous
science,”Merleau‐Pontyoffers,“Philosophyisnotascience,becausescience
219
believesitcansoaroveritsobjectandholdsthecorrelationofknowledgewith
beingasestablished,whereasphilosophyisthesetofquestionswhereinhewho
questionsishimselfimplicatedinthequestion.”(VI27)Butevenifphilosophyisnot
abletograspits“object”inself‐coincidentreflection(notleastbecausethe
reflectionmusttakeaccountofitselfasafactor),itcanandmust—aswewillsee,in
regardsto“hyper‐reflection”—takestockofitssituationandfindexpressionforthe
inexpressible“totality”inwhichitfindsitselfalwaysalready.“Suchisthetotal
situationthataphilosophymustaccountfor.Itwilldosoonlybyadmittingthe
doublepolarityofreflection[reflectionandperception/reflectedandunreflected]
andbyadmittingthat,asHegelsaid,toretireintooneselfisalsotoleaveoneself.”
(VI49)
Thewindingmannerinwhichphilosophydoesanddoesnothaveawayto
addressthecontradictorilyself‐unified“subjective‐objective”realityofthepre‐
reflectiveperceptualsituationleadsMerleau‐PontytoofferatwistontheSartrean
notion,deridedbythatauthorasamorbidimaginalconstructidenticaltothe“God”
notionofChristianity,ofthe“In‐Itself‐For‐Itself.”OfcourseitisHegelwho
announcedhissystemasoneinwhich“substance”becomes“subject”(tyingthe
lattertothehistoricaladventofChristianity).Merleau‐Pontyfindsawaytosteer
betweenSartreandHegelonthispoint,whilealsotryingtomaintainadistance
fromKant’snegativist/idealistinterpretationoftheTranscendentalDialectic:
“ThetruthoftheSartreanIn‐Itself‐for‐itselfistheintuitionofpureBeingandthenegintuitionofNothingness.Itseemstousonthecontrarythatitisnecessarytorecognizeinitthesolidityofmyth,thatis,ofanoperativeimaginary,whichispartofourinstitution,andwhichisindispensableforthe
220
definitionofBeingitself.Withthisdifference,weareindeedspeakingofthesamething…”(VI85,myemphasis;check)
C.ParadoxandPhilosophy
Merleau‐Ponty’snotionofparadoxorcontradictioncaneasilybe
misunderstoodandcaricatured.Onecouldalwaysarguewitha“pro‐paradox
position”thatit“permitseverything”387oristooschematicandabstract,allowingall
binariestobeswallowedupwithinit,butthatispreciselywhyMerleau‐Ponty’s
phenomenologicalmethod,whichatleaststrivestobetruetoexperience,isso
important.Dialecticallogicisalogicofthethingsthemselves.388
Merleau‐Ponty’sprioritizationofparadoxshapesthewayheunderstandsthe
natureofthephilosophicalenterprise.Heapprovinglystatesthat“philosophy[atits
best]becomestheenterpriseofdescribinglivingparadoxes.”389Philosophysimply
“interrogates”theperceptualfaith.Or,evenmoreprecisely,“philosophyisthe
perceptualfaithquestioningitselfaboutitself.”(VI103)InanotherplaceMerleau‐
Pontycomments:“Philosophybelieveditcouldovercomethecontradictionsofthe
perceptualfaithbysuspendingitinordertodisclosethemotivesthatsupportit.”
(VI50)Merleau‐Pontythusalsospeaksofthe“reflectiveviceoftransformingthe
387Fordiscussionofsuchacritiquefromacontemporaryphilosopher,see:Sainsbury,R.M.Paradoxes.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995(pp.136‐7)388Insupportofthisidea,seeforexampleonN94‐5,whereMerleau‐Pontyexpresslyrejectsthenotionofrefutingdeterminismwitha“dogmaticindeterminism”which,asitwere,“logicallydisproves”determinism,showingsomething“contradictory”init.Seealsofirstfullparagraphon92.Alsonotethefollowingremarks:“Wewantthereforetoopenlogicwithoutconsideringitsimplyasasimplyformalwayofdefiningphysicalreality.”(VI166)389Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance19521960.Tr.JohnO’Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970(p.108)HerehealsocitesHeraclitusandcallsforan“openBeing”—oneofmanysuchauspiciousreferencestothemasterphilosopherofparadoxhimself.
221
opennessoftheworldintoanassentofselfwithself,theinstitutionoftheworld
intoanidealityoftheworld,theperceptualfaithintoactsorattitudesofasubject
thatdoesnotparticipateintheworld.”(VI51)TheimplicitcritiqueofHusserlin
thesewordsisevident;noticealsotheappealonceagaintothe“opacity”oftheself
toselfwhichmustaccompanythereflectiveflightfromperceptualfaith.
WewillrevisittheissueofMerleau‐Ponty’sreconceptionofthetaskof
philosophyinthefuturesectiononreflection.
III.HusserlandParadox
Husserlrecognizesplentyof“paradoxicalenigmas”inhisownpresentation
ofphenomenology.390Hisapproachtothemistypicalofphilosophicaltradition,
however,stemmingallthewaybacktoAristotle’sMetaphysics(BookIII),inseeking
toremovetheseenigmasinthenameoftruthandclarity.391Husserlneverquestions
thenotionthattheparadoxes,whichappearonly“atfirst[as]insoluble”(Crisis,175)
needtobe“resolved”onceandforall,lesthisownprojectoftranscendental
phenomenologyfail.Husserlcouldnot,forexample,bemoreexplicitabouthowhe
feelsaboutparadoxeswhenhecriticizesthesciencesinthe“Epilogue”toIdeasII
(IdeasII,427‐8),whereheclaimsthattheirresulting“paradoxes”arepreciselythe
390Crisis174391Aristotle,CompleteWorksofAristotle.Tr.JonathanBarnes.PrincetonUniversityPress,1971.(pp.1572‐1584)
222
deleteriousresultofbeing“unphilosophical”intherequiredsense.Whenproper
proceduresaretaken,“Insuchacasetherecannotbeanyunclear,problematic
conceptsoranyparadoxes.”392(IdeasII,428,myemphasis)
AllofthisbecomespertinentintheCrisiswhenHusserlconfrontshisown
philosophyanditsapparentparadoxes,thosewhichcriticshadonseeminglygood
groundspointedout.Inthistext,theparadoxHusserlpaysthegreatestattentionto
istermedmemorablybyhimthe“paradoxofsubjectivity.”Howisit,theparadox
goes,thattheentireworldisconstitutedbyonlyonepartoftheworld,namelythe
partthatconsistsofhumansubjects—thatis,“real”humanbeings,the“community”
ofmonadsastheyareelsewheredescribed?Ofcourse,verymuchthesameparadox
wasonHusserl’smindeveninIdeasI:
“Thus,ontheonehandconsciousnessissaidtobeabsoluteinwhicheverythingtranscendentand,therefore,ultimatelythewholepsychophysicalworld,becomesconstituted;and,ontheotherhand,consciousnessissaidtobeasubordinaterealeventwithinthatworld.Howcanthesestatementsbereconciled?”(IdeasI124)
The“solution”totheparadox(a“paradoxwhichcanbesensiblyresolved”—Crisis
180)takesafamiliarformintheCrisis.Husserlmerelyreaffirmsthedistinctionhe
hasbynowmadelongagoandmanytimessince,namelybetweenempirical‐real
humansubjects,eachofwhomalsotranscendentallyco‐constitutestheworld(along
withotherhumansubjects),andthetranscendentalsubjectivity/intersubjectivity
forwhomindividual,particularegosaremerely“phenomena,”ego‐polesof
noematic‐noematicaprioricorrelativityofconstitution.
392Husserlfollowsthisbyannouncingthatheseesspreadoutbeforehimthe“promised”land.(IdeasII,429)
223
“Concretely,each‘I’isnotmerelyanego‐polebutan‘I’withallitsaccomplishmentsandaccomplishedacquisitions,includingtheworldasexistingandbeing‐such.Butintheepochéandinthepurefocusuponthefunctioningoftheego‐pole,andthenceupontheconcretewholeoflifeandofitsintentionalintermediaryandfinalstructures,itfollowseoipsothatnothinghumanistobefound,neithersoulnorpsychiclifenorrealpsychophysicalhumanbeings;allthisbelongstothe‘phenomenon,’totheworldasconstitutedpole.”(Crisis183)
Husserl’ssolution,inotherwords,comesdowntoadistinctionbetween“real”and
“phenomenal”sensesinwhichwecanunderstandthe“I”ofthehumansubject.
Thereishereatrulyirresolvableparadoxofsubjectivityonlyifweareforcedto
understandthetranscendental“I”asidentical,withoutqualification,withthereal
“I.”ThisissuetrulyiscentraltoHusserl’senterprise.“Iftheparadox…were
insoluble,”Husserlexplains,“itwouldmeanthatanactuallyuniversalandradical
epochécouldnotbecarriedoutatall,thatis,forthepurposesofasciencerigorously
boundtoit.”(Crisis180).Forphenomenologywouldreducetopsychology.Itis
interestingtorememberthatMerleau‐Pontydeniedpreciselythepossibilityofa
“radical”oruniversalepoché,whichshowsfromacertainanglewhyhedidnothave
toworryaboutHusserl’sversionofthe“paradoxofsubjectivity.”
ThedistinctionasphilosophersbetweenHusserlandMerleau‐Pontycanbe
illustratedthroughcontrastingstatementstheymakeontheirultimatetask.
Husserl’srelentlessgoalistounderstand,andtohimthismeans,toalargeextent,
framingthingseidetically—thatis,seeingthemintheirconceptualform:
“Fromthebeginningthephenomenologistlivesintheparadoxofhavingtolookupontheobviousasquestionable,asenigmatic,andofhenceforthbeingunabletohaveanyotherscientificthemethanthatoftransformingtheuniversalobviousnessofthebeingoftheworld—forhimthegreatestofenigmas—intosomethingintelligible.”(Crisis180)
224
OfcourseMerleau‐Ponty,inacceptingthereduction,parallelsHusserlwhenhesays
thatphilosophy“dispossesseshumanity…byinvitingittothinkofitselfasan
enigma.”(VI3)Buthefollowsthisupwiththedistinctlyun‐Husserliansentiment:
“Thisisthewaythingsareandnobodycandoanythingaboutit.”(VI4)
IncontrasttoHusserl,thatis,forMerleau‐Pontytheobviousnessofthe
world,orratherthe“perceptualfaith”withwhichwetaketheworldandour
relationwithit,intheiressentialoneness,forgranted,is,strictlyspeaking,beyond
intelligibility.ItisinterestinginthisregardthatHusserlcantacitlyconcedethis
point,atleastinacertainlimitedrespect,yetwithoutacceptingitsconsequences.
Thushewrites,
“Noteventhesinglephilosopherbyhimself,withintheepoché,canholdfasttoanythinginthiselusivelyflowinglife,repeatitalwayswiththesamecontent,andbecomesocertainofitsthis‐nessanditsbeing‐suchthathecoulddescribeit,documentit,sotospeak(evenforhisownpersonalone),indefinitivestatements.”(Crisis178)
ItismorethanapparentthatHusserlthrivesontheself‐imageofbeinga
“paradoxical”philosopherinthesenseofmilitatingagainstcommonopinionandthe
“naturalistic”and“realistic”biasesofthecommonmanandthescientist.Butforhis
part,Merleau‐Pontyshowslittlepatienceforrestingcontentwiththissortofstrict
reversality.Considerforexamplehisremarksonthewayspeopleinterpretthenew
physics:“Thusthe‘strange’notionsofthenewphysicsarestrange…onlyinthe
sensethataparadoxicalopinionsurprisescommonsense,thatis,without
225
instructingitindepthandwithoutchanginganythingofitscategories.”393(VI17,my
emphasis)This,inessence,isexactlywhatIhavearguedgoesoninIdeasIIwith
respecttothattext’shybridmixtureofanti‐naturalismandtacitnaturalism,which
conspiretooccludeaskingthemeaningfulquestionsofnaturelefttoMerleau‐Ponty
(andothers)toraise.Withacriticaltone,Merleau‐PontysummarizesHusserl’s
attitudetowardsphilosophyandparadoxalikeinthefollowingmanner:
“Thus,withthecorrelationbetweenthoughtandtheobjectofthoughtsetupasaprinciple,thereisestablishedaphilosophythatknowsneitherdifficultiesnorproblemsnorparadoxesnorreversals:onceandforall,Ihavegraspedwithinmyself,withthepurecorrelation…thetruthofmylife,whichisalsothetruthoftheworldandoftheotherlives.”(VI48)
IV.TheParadoxofReflection
A.TheReflectiveAttitude
Thecomplex,ambiguousrelationshipbetweenMerleau‐PontyandHusserl,
whichwehaveexaminedatlengthinChapter3andelsewhere,becomesonceagain
stronglyapparentinMerleau‐Ponty’sremarksonreflection.Considerthefollowing
quote:
393Merleau‐Pontymakessimilarlyderogatoryremarksonthesuperficialversionof“paradoxical”thinkingintheNaturelectures.See:N108,114.Thereferencesherearetothe“paradoxes”generatedbyrelativitytheory.
226
“Thoughtcannotignoreitsapparenthistory,ifitisnottoinstallitselfbeneaththewholeofourexperience,inapre‐empiricalorderwhereitwouldnolongermerititsname;itmustputtoitselftheproblemofthegenesisofitsownmeaning.”(VI12)
Ontheonehand,thisistheverytaskofHusserl’sgeneticphenomenologyinits
morematurephases,a“questioning‐back”ofthoughtbythought.ButMerleau‐Ponty
placesacertainemphasison“experience,”which,initspurepre‐reflectiveform,
thoughtcannot—withoutincurringcertainpregnantcontradictionsthatmuststay
withitasremindersofitsdistance‐in‐proximityfromtheorigin—trulyaccess:
“Throughtheconversiontoreflection,whichleavesnothingbutideates,cogitata,ornoematasubsistingbeforethepuresubject,wefinallyleavetheequivocationsoftheperceptualfaith,whichparadoxicallyassuredusthatwehaveaccesstothethingsthemselvesandthatwegainaccesstothemthroughtheintermediaryofthebody,whichthereforeopenedusuptotheworldonlybysealingusupinthesuccessionofourprivateevents.”(VI30)
The“solution”totheantinomy,notesMerleau‐Ponty,is“ideality,”forwhich“the
worldisnumericallyonewithmycogitatumandwiththatoftheothersinsofarasit
isideal(idealidentity,beneaththeseveralandtheone).”Butthisisnotagenuine
solution,inasmuchasitisactuallydeployedasadodgeoftheactualproblem:
“Thismovementofreflectionwillalwaysatfirstsightbeconvincing:inasenseitisimperative,itistruthitself,andonedoesnotseehowphilosophycoulddispensewithit.Thequestioniswhetherithasbroughtphilosophytotheharbor,whethertheuniverseofthoughttowhichitleadsisreallyanorderthatsufficestoitselfandputsanendtoeveryquestion.Sincetheperceptualfaithisaparadox[myemphasis],howcouldIremainwithit?”(VI31‐2)
Itisclearbynowthatthe“perceptualfaith”isanothernameforthe“natural
attitude,”conceivednowinitsfullest,andnotfullyelucidatable,depths.And
reflection,asIhavemaintainedallalong,iswhatMerleau‐Pontymeansbythe
227
“transcendental”attitude394,andclearly,itcannotforhimpulleffectively
consciousnessoutofitsimmersionintheworld,itspre‐reflectivehome:“AndifIdo
notremainwith[perceptualfaith],whatelsecanIdoexceptre‐enterintomyself
andseektheretheabodeoftruth?”(VI31)Theproblemwith“philosophiesof
reflection”isthattheytryto“comprehend”theself‐worldbondby“undoing”itfirst,
thenfalselytryingtore‐fabricateit:“…thereflectionrecuperateseverythingexcept
itselfasaneffortofrecuperation,itclarifieseverythingexceptitsownrole.The
mind’seyetoohasitsblindspot…”(VI33)Furthermore,“reflective
thought…performsallitsoperationsundertheguaranteeofthetotalitythatit
claimstoengender”(VI33),whereasclearlythetotalityexceedsit.
Itisclearthatthe“reflectiveattitude”appliestoDescartes,Kant,Husserl,and
evenHegelindifferentways.Themomentofrecoveryorrecuperationrepresented
byreflection,andultimatelytheself‐interrogationofthoughtinthenaturalattitude
thatHusserlidentifiesasthephenomenologicalreduction,isproblematic,indeed
paradoxical395,insofarasitcontainsamomentofdisruptionor“non‐coincidence”396
whichwehaveseenbefore:“Whatisgivenisnotamassiveandopaqueworld,ora
394Iftherestillisanydoubtaboutthis,Merleau‐Ponty’sownwordsshouldputittorest:“Withonestrokethephilosophyofreflectionmetamorphosestheeffectiveworldintoatranscendentalfield;indoingso,itonlyputsmebackattheoriginofaspectaclethatIcouldneverhavehadunless,unbeknowntomyself,Iorganizedit.”(VI44)395Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance19521960.Tr.JohnO’Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970(p.106):Reduction“involvesaparadox.”396Merleau‐Pontymakesthepointthatphilosophyismoreorlessatranslation.Onemightgosofarastosaythattheproblemsoftranslationarecoextensive,forMerleau‐Ponty,withthoseofhisstyleofphilosophy,whicheffectsa“translation”ofthe“mute”senseofnature/beingintothelanguageofconcepts(i.e.,languageinitspropositional‐cognitiverole).Forapowerfulandrelevantexaminationoftheissueoftranslationfromwithinthephenomenological‐hermeneuticaltraditionsee:Vandevelde,Pol.TheTaskoftheInterpreter:Text,Meaning,andNegotiation.Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,2005
228
universeofadequatethought;itisareflectionwhichturnsbackoverthedensityof
theworldinordertoclarifyit,butwhich,comingsecond,reflectsbacktoitonlyits
ownlight.”(VI35,myemphasis)Merleau‐Ponty’sverdict:
“Thiswholereflectiveanalysisisnotfalse,butstillnaïve,aslongasitdissimulatesfromitselfitsownmainspring,andaslongas,inordertoconstitutetheworld,itisnecessarytohaveanotionoftheworldaspre‐constituted—aslongastheprocedureisinprincipledelayedbehinditself.”(VI34)
Merleau‐Pontydoesconsiderchallengestothispointofview.Forexample,
headdressesthekeychallengethatsaysthathowreflectiongetstoitsperchis
irrelevant,astheprocessislikealadderthatcanbekickedaway;buthenoteson
thecontrarythatinthatcase,“there[wouldbe]nolongertheoriginatingandthe
derived”andhenceno“philosophyofreflection,”strictlyspeaking,atall.(VI35)In
otherwords,the“ladder”isbuiltintothedefinitionofreflectivityinrelationto
somethinglike“first‐order(unreflected)experience.”
Yethedoesnotendorsequietism,either.“Itisaquestionnotofputtingthat
perceptualfaithinplaceofreflection,butonthecontraryoftakingintoaccountthe
totalsituation,whichinvolvesreferencefromtheonetotheother.”(VI35,my
emphasis)(Recallthatwehaveseenthisreferencetothe“total”situationabove.)
Thisisofcourseexactlywhatsetsuptheproblematicofnature—namely,the
problemofatotalitythatcannot,intermsofspirit,fullyenvelopitself,butwhich
knowsitselftobebonded,rooted,andevenensconcedtherein.Thatbondisof
courseexactlywhatmakespossiblethe“truth”—evenasthe“truth”inthisdeeper
ontologicalsense(deeperthanlinguistic‐conceptualtruth)devolvesinto
contradictoryconceptswhenweattempttoexpressitlinguistically‐logically.The
229
unityofthisbond,apre‐reflectiveunitythattranscends,finally,thedistinction
between“identity”and“non‐identity”thatpreoccupiestheGermanIdealists,is
irrecoverable:“…therelationbetweenathoughtanditsobject…containsneitherthe
wholenoreventheessentialofourcommercewiththeworld…whichweshallhere
calltheopennessupontheworld(ouvertureaumonde)…”397(VI35)
B.“HyperReflection”
SowhatdoesMerleau‐Pontyopposetoreflection,pureandsimple,without
“replacing”reflection(thetranscendentalattitude)with“perceptualfaith”(the
naturalattitude)?Hisansweris“Hyper‐reflection.”Hyper‐reflectionisthus,Iwould
propose,akindof“thirdattitude”tomatchthe“thirdway”Merleau‐Pontymentions
elsewhere:a“natural‐transcendental”attitudeifyouwill,whichcomestobeingan
awarenessofwhatHeideggercalls“radicalfinitude.”398InMerleau‐Ponty’sparlance,
whatneedstobegraspedis,asusual,theprimacyofperception.
“Tofoundthelatter[perception]ontheformer[reflection],andthedefactoperceptionontheessenceofperceptionsuchasitappearstoreflection,istoforgetthereflectionitselfasadistinctactofrecovery.Inotherwords,wearecatchingsightofanotheroperationbesidestheconversiontoreflection,morefundamentalthanit,ofasortofhyperreflection(surréflexion)thatwouldalsotakeitselfandthechangesitintroducesintothespectacleintoaccount.Itaccordinglywouldnotlosesightofthebrutethingandthebruteperceptionandwouldnotfinallyeffacethem,wouldnotcutthe
397ItseemsthatforMerleau‐Ponty,quantummechanicsshowsthatthereisno“representationofreality”throughmeasurement,exactlyinthesameway(perhaps)thatthoughtitself(asreflection)cannot“retrieve”nature.(N94‐5)Butitisnotsimplyamatterofitsbeing“unable”toretrieveit,intheway“God”(anintellectusarchetypus)forexample,could.ItisveryimportantthatevenGodcouldnotretrieveit,becauseNatureitselfisinvirtueofitselfirrecoverable,a“permanentpast.”398Insomesenses,itcouldalsobeconceivedasananswertoFoucault’scritiqueofthe“transcendental‐empiricaldoublet”fromTheOrderofThings.See:Foucault,Michel.TheOrderofThings:AnArchaeologyoftheHumanSciences.NewYork:VintageBooks,1994(p.318)
230
organicbondsbetweentheperceptionandthethingperceivedwithahypothesisofinexistence.”399(VI38)
Thetaskforphilosophy,byimplication,istothinktheworldoftranscendenceinits
transcendence,difficultlyandevenimpossibly,using“thesignificationsofwordsto
express,beyondthemselves,ourmutecontactwiththethings,whentheyarenotyet
thingssaid.”Wemightcallthisthe“paradoxofreflection”:“Thereflectionfinds
itselfthereforeinthestrangesituationofsimultaneouslyrequiringandexcludingan
inversemovementofconstitution.”(VI45)400
Merleau‐Pontyfindsinhisnotionof“hyper‐reflection”awaytocritique
Husserl’sidealisticinterpretationofphenomenologicalmethod.401Whatthenotion
thateverytranscendentalreductionisalsoaneideticreductionmeans(aHusserlian
principlewehavequotedelsewhere),forhim,isthatwecannotcapturethe
“concreteflux”ofexistence.ToreflectinHusserl’sstark,transcendentalsenseisto
“…disengagefromthethings,perceptions,world,andperceptionoftheworld,bysubmittingthemtoasystematicvariation,theintelligiblenucleithatresist…Itthereforebyprincipleleavesuntouchedthetwofoldproblemofthegenesisoftheexistentworldandofthegenesisoftheidealizationperformedbyreflectionandfinallyevokesandrequiresasitsfoundationahyperreflectionwheretheultimateproblemswouldbetakenseriously.”(VI45‐6)
399Compare:45reflection:“[as]reflection,re‐turn,re‐conquest,orre‐covery,itcannotflatteritselfthatitwouldsimplycoincidewithaconstitutiveprinciplealreadyatworkinthespectacleoftheworld…”400ComparetoMerleau‐Ponty’sdescriptionofphilosophyasconcerningthe“far‐offasfar‐off.”(VI102)401Seebohmmentionsthattherearehintsof“paradox”and“contradiction”inMerleau‐Ponty’smethodology,butclaims(Ithinkcorrectly)thatithasmoretodowiththe“what”thanthe“how.”See:Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.66)
231
NotethatevenhereMerleau‐Pontydoesnotstrictlyspeakingopposeeitherthe
eideticorphenomenologicalreductions;hesimplywantstopushfurtherand
deeper,inanefforttobetrulytruetothe“thingsthemselves”andtheirparadoxical
(becauseaccomplishedthroughdifference)unitywithus.AsLangerpointsout
helpfully,Merleau‐Ponty’slaterprocedureofthinkingtheorigin,usingreflectionto
gobeyondit,isradicallyparadoxicalonlyinawaythatmatchesourown(i.e.,
humanity’sown)paradoxicalbeing‐in‐the‐worldinthefirstplace.402(Langer165‐6)
Indeed,onceagain,aswehavecometoexpect,Merleau‐Pontyfindsthereversalof
theHusserlianimpulseinHusserl’sownphenomenologicalimperative:“In
recognizingthateveryreflectioniseideticand,assuch,leavesuntouchedthe
problemofourunreflectedbeingandthatoftheworld,Husserlsimplyagreesto
takeuptheproblemwhichthereflectiveattitudeordinarilyavoids—the
discordancebetweenitsinitialsituationanditsends.”(VI46)Eveninanearlier
essay,Merleau‐Pontymakesasimilarpoint,saying,withwhatMerleau‐Ponty
interpretsasthematureHusserl:“Wemust,rather,becomeawareofthisparadox—
thatweneverfreeourselvesfromtheparticularexceptbytakingoverasituation
thatisallatonce,andinseparably,bothlimitationandaccesstotheuniversal.”403
“Hyper‐reflection”becomesanothernameofphilosophyitself.Ittakes
accountofdimensionsoffaciticity,spatialityandtemporality,andidealityalike,
sparingnodimensionofexistenceinitsrayofregard.(VI46)Hereisthe“third
dimension”wheretheantinomiesofreflectiveanalysisare,inasense,lifted.But
402Langer,MonikaM.MerleauPonty’sPhenomenologyofPerception:AGuideandCommentary.Tallahassee:TheFloridaUniversityPress,1989.(164‐5)403Merleau‐Ponty.“PhenomenologyandtheSciencesofMan.”Tr.JohnWild.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.(p.82)
232
hyper‐reflectiontakesplacethrough,andnotoutsideof,reflectionitself;inorderto
seethatwhich“delivers[thethinker]overtoperceptionandtophantasms…hemust
reflect.Butassoonashedoesso,beyondtheworlditselfandbeyondwhatisonly‘in
us,’beyondbeinginitselfandbeingforus,athirddimensionseemstoopenup,
whereintheirdiscordanceiseffaced.”(VI29)
HowdoesallofthissquarewithMerleau‐Ponty’snotionofasilentLogosof
theworld?Thatis,hedeclaresinmanyplacesvariationsofthisthought:“Thereisa
Logosofthenaturalaestheticworld,onwhichtheLogosoflanguagerelies.”(N
212)404WhatiskeytoseeisthatMerleau‐Pontydoesnotwanttodenyintelligibility
tothegroundor“mainspring,”hesimplywantstodenythatitiscompletely
isomorphic,asitwere,withhumanunderstanding.Inthiswayitisakintothe
being‐in‐itself‐and‐for‐itselfMerleau‐Pontyspokeofbefore.Alreadyin“InPraiseof
Philosophy,”Merleau‐Pontyobservesthat“mancontainsinsilencealltheparadoxes
ofphilosophy.”405Thatis,humanity’sownbeinghasadialecticallogicthatcanbe
expressedinwords,butonlyobliquely.Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstandingofthe
tightlywoundunityofcontrariesinBeingactually,inhiseyes,servestopreserveas
opposedtowoundtheintelligibilityofBeing.Thusheremarks(VI268)thatIdeasII
trieswronglytodisentangleknots,sincedisentanglementdestroysintelligibility!
Cartesiandualism,forinstance,hasincreased“intelligibility”ofpartsattheexpense
ofmakingentirelyunintelligiblethewhole—thatis,thewholebeingthatisalive,
embodied,thinking,andsensing.Hyper‐reflectionrestoresthe“sense”ofthiswhole,
404SeealsoVI,145:“mindorthought”is“sublimationoftheflesh.”405Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.InPraiseofPhilosophyandOtherEssays.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1988(pp.63‐4)
233
eventhough,atthesametime,thisisa“sense”thateludesthelogicofnon‐
contradiction.
Merleau‐Ponty’sthoughtonreflectionandtheparadoxicalperceptualfaith
precedenttoithasmaturedsincePP,thoughsubtly.Noticewhathesaysinthe
earliertextabouttheissue:
“Itwillperhapsbemaintainedthataphilosophycannotbecenteredaroundacontradiction,andthatallourdescriptions,sincetheyultimatelydefythought,arequitemeaningless.Theobjectionwouldbevalidifwewerecontenttolaybare…alayerofprelogicalormagicalexperiences.Forinthatcasewewouldhavetochoosebetweenbelievingthedescriptionsandabandoningthought,orknowingwhatwearetalkingaboutandabandoningourdescriptions.…[Thus]wemustreturntothecogito,insearchofamorefundamentalLogosthanthatofobjectivethought…”(PP425)
Inaslightbutimportantcontrasttothesestatements,theMerleau‐PontyoftheVIis
morecomfortablelivingintheabsenceofanother,deeper,non‐objective“Logos.”
Thisisnottosaythereisnosuchlogos,orthat“wildBeing”lacksmeaninginits
wildness(wehavealreadyseenthatNatureforMerleau‐Pontyautoproducesits
ownmeaning),onlythatthedistancebetweenitsmeaningandthe“meanings”ofthe
ideal,reflectiveorderisinacertainsenseunbridgeable,andthathereinliesthe
ultimateparadoxofreflection:thatwhilethereisameaningwithoutthought,justas
thereistranscendencewithoutimmanence—thesetruthscanonlybeappreciated
throughthought,immanently.Consciousnessisbondedtoitsunconsciousorigin;
weareprivilegedtoknowthedepthsofourignorance.
234
V.MerleauPonty’sParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking:Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticism
A.MerleauPontyandHegelianDialectic
Merleau‐Ponty’sunderstandingof“paradox”and“philosophy”alikeisdeeply
informedbyhisreadingandresponsetothe“dialectical”philosophyofHegel.Hugh
SilvermanexplainstheprecisesenseinwhichMerleau‐Ponty’sphilosophyisa
“dialectic”:
“[Merleau‐Ponty]verymuchseeshimselfaspartofahistoricalsuccessioninwhichthediscoveryofsubjectivityandthediscoveryofhistoryturnintoadialecticofexistenceanddialectic.But…hisdialecticisnotofaHegeliansort.Hisdialecticissuchthathefindsthephilosopherencounteringwhatisalreadythere;hisdialecticisoneofexperienceandphilosophybecomingthatexperience,philosophyinterrogatingwhatisandfindingitselfthereinwhatisinterrogated.Hisdialecticismoreofatensionbetweenexistenceanddialectic,anambiguitybetweenthetwo.”406
Thenotionofadialecticwhichincludesdialecticasoneofthetermsofthedialectic
itselfischaracteristicofthesortofreflexivelyself‐criticalendeavorMerleau‐Ponty
launchesinespeciallyhislaterperiod.UnlikeHegeliandialectic,Merleau‐Pontian
dialectichasno“goal”otherthanitsownmovement,whichisnothaphazardbut
purposefullyself‐inverting—butonecannotevensaythismuch,itturnsout,
withoutaffixinganessencetowhateludesessentialdescription:
406Silverman,Hugh.“IsMerleau‐PontyInsideorOutsidetheHistoryofPhilosophy?”InChiasms:MerleauPonty’sNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(p.138)
235
“[Thedialecticis]Selfmanifestation,disclosure,intheprocessofformingitself.…Thedialecticisindeedallthis,anditis,inthissense,whatwearelookingfor.Ifnonethelesswehavenothithertosaidso,itisbecause,in[the]historyofphilosophy,ithasneverbeenallthatunadulteratedly;itisbecausethedialecticisunstable(inthesensethatthechemistsgivetotheword),itisevenessentiallyandbydefinitionunstable,sothatithasneverbeenabletoformulateitselfintotheseswithoutdenaturingitself,andbecauseifonewishestomaintainitsspirititisperhapsnecessarytonotevennameit.”(VI92)
Merleau‐Pontyformallyendorsesthemethodofdialecticinchapter2ofVI,entitled,
“ReflectionandInterrogation.”(VI89)(Thechapteritselfisasustainedresponseto
Sartre’sBeingandNothingness.)Merleau‐Pontygoesontogiveadetailedaccountof
whathemeansbythe“instability”(quotedabove)ofdialectic,itsnatureof
subverting,mediating,andtransforming,notforthesakeofrestinginonefinalized
thesis,butforthesakeofexpressingtheinnernatureofBeingitself.Heremorethan
anywhereelse,Merleau‐Ponty’sadoptionofacertainradicalHeracliteanism,one
thatbreaksawayfrombothPlatonicandHusserliancontainers(whichopposean
existentialHeracliteanfluxtoanidealParmenideanorder,sotospeak)becomes
clear.Indeed,heallbutsayssohimselfbyapprovinglypointingoutthatHeraclitus
alreadyshowedtheway,“oppositedirectionscoincidinginthecircularmovement.”
(VI92)
Asweexaminedbefore,Merleau‐Ponty’sthoughtembracesaparadigmof
oppositionthathecalls“complementarity”;itisadialecticthatrefuses,wemight
nowsay,toremain“static”bycrestingintoanyformofsynthesisofhorizons.Itisin
thisspiritthatIreadMerleau‐Ponty’sremarkableintertwiningofhiscritiqueof
Sartreanontologyandhisownburgeoningdialecticalmethod:
“Hasnotourdiscussionconsistedinshowingthattherelationshipbetweenthetwoterms[BeingandNothingness](whetheronetakestheminarelativesense,withintheworld,orinanabsolutesense,
236
oftheindexofthethinkerandwhathethinks)coversaswarmofrelationswithdoublemeaning,incompatibleandyetnecessarytooneanother(complementarity,asthephysicistssaytoday),andthatthiscomplextotalityisthetruthoftheabstractdichotomyfromwhichwestarted?”(VI92,myemphasis)
WealreadysawinthepreviouschapterexamplesofMerleau‐Ponty’s
suspicionoftheHegelianformofdialectic,albeitindirectly,withregardspecifically
tohisapprovalofSchelling’sefforttobreakawayfromHegelianism.Inthisrespect
Merleau‐Pontyrevealinglyruminates:
“Position,negation,negationofthenegation:thisside,theother,theotherthantheother.WhatdoIbringtotheproblemofthesameandtheother?This:thatthesamebetheotherthantheother,andidentitydifferenceofdifference‐‐‐‐this1)doesnotrealizeasurpassing,adialecticintheHegeliansense;2)isrealizedonthespot,byencroachment,thickness,spatiality‐‐‐‐“407(VI264)
Whatismostofnoteforushereinhisself‐comparisonwithHegeliandialecticand
hisrejectionofanultimateteleology,a“surpassing.”408Merleau‐Pontyiscarefulto
identifywhathecallsa“trapinthedialectic”andthe“baddialectic”(VI94)that
ensues,ironicallyechoingHegel’sownterminologicalstyle(“badinfinity,”etc.).As
againstthese,Merleau‐Ponty,characteristicallyadvancesanewformofthinking
called“hyperdialectic”:
“Whatwecallhyperdialecticisathought…thatiscapableofreachingtruthbecauseitenvisageswithoutrestrictionthepluralityoftherelationshipsandwhathasbeencalledambiguity.Thebad
407Compare,alsoinanobviousreferencetoHegel:“Againstthedoctrineofcontradiction,absolutenegation,theeither/orTranscendenceisidentitywithindifference.”(VI225)408Inotherrespects,ofcourse,manyofMerleau‐Ponty’sdialecticalobservationsmirrorHegel’smethodstrongly,includingtheHegelianprincipleoftheconvergenceofoppositesattheirextremes(mostfamously,theconvergenceof“Being”and“Non‐Being”in“Becoming”).ThusintheNaturelectures,forexample,wecanseethewayheshowshowtheefforttopreservedeterminisminphysicsendsupgoingironicallytowardstheoccult(N92),oragainhowsciencemovestowardsidealisminthenameofrealism(N91).Inanotherplaceheobservesthatpossibilityandnecessityarecloselyaligned,sincenecessityisjustoneofmanypossibilities.(N88)Similarly,rigoroustheismthreatenstobecomepantheism(sinceGodisthesameasBeingitself),andsoonandsoforth.
237
dialecticisthatwhichthinksitrecomposesbeingbyatheticthought,byanassemblageofstatements,bythesis,antithesis,andsynthesis;thegooddialecticisthatwhichisconsciousofthefactthateverythesisisanidealization,thatBeingisnotmadeupofidealizationsorofthingssaid,astheoldlogicbelieved,butofboundwholeswheresignificationneverisexceptintendency…”(VI94)
Merleau‐Ponty’scritiqueofHegelthusliesinthelatter’snotbeingthoroughenough
orauthenticinthinkingdialectically.Thus“theonlygooddialecticishyperdialectic.”
(VI94)Hyperdialectic,the“good”dialectic,iscalledthisbecauseitcriticizesand
seesbeyonditself.Merleau‐Pontyemphasizes“process”andprocessualityagainand
again.Merleau‐Ponty’s“good”dialecticityisthusamovementofthoughtandthe
mannerinwhichthoughtmustpursuethewholewithoutpretendingtohaveagrasp
ofitunilaterally:
“Thepointtobenoticedisthis:thatthedialecticwithoutsynthesisofwhichwespeakisnotthereforescepticism,vulgarrelativism,orthereignoftheineffable.Whatwerejectordenyisnottheideaofasurpassingthatreassembles,itistheideathatitresultsinanewpositive,anewposition.…Whatweseekisadialecticaldefinitionofbeingthatcanbeneitherthebeingforitselfnorthebeinginitself—rapid,fragile,labiledefinitions…”(VI95)
B.MerleauPontyandSkepticism/Quietism
Merleau‐Ponty’sviewsonphilosophy,reflection,anddialecticraise
importantquestionsabouttheextenttowhichMerleau‐Pontyhaseffectively“given
up”onphilosophyasnormallyunderstood,atleastasaknowledge‐acquiring
enterpriseforexample,andwhetherhisinterpretationofphenomenology,which
beginsinperceptualfaithandendsintherecognitionofitsownfutileattemptsto
reproducethisfaithinlinguistic‐conceptualterms,isquietistic.Thisisnotthecaseif
by“quietism”wemeanthepositionthatnothingcanbeaccuratelysaidofbeingor
thetruth.ItistruethatMerleau‐Pontybelievesthat“…the‘object’ofphilosophywill
238
nevercometofillinthephilosophicalquestion,sincethisobturationwouldtake
fromitthedepthandthedistancethatareessentialtoit.”(VI101)Butwecanand
dospeakaboutthissituation—perhapsaclueastothemysteryofthe
“intelligibility”ofaNaturethatmakesitselfunknowntotheprogramsof
intelligibilityimposeduponiteideticallyby“grasping”thought.
Relatedtothe“quietism”chargeisthatof“skepticism.”Merleau‐Ponty
himselfhastoworryaboutskepticism,ofcourse,becausehehasopenedhimselfto
thecriticismofhispositionthatarguesthatit(Merleau‐Ponty’sstanceon
philosophy)effectivelyamountstoaversionofskepticism.Thekindofskepticism,
namely,thatthrowsitshandsupanddeclaringthatphilosophyresolvesmerelyto
“unresolvableparadoxes.”Onemightcallthis“Carneadeanskepticism,”afterthe
famousAcademicwhowouldlectureonedayforaposition,thenextdayagainstit,
demonstratingthefutilityofphilosophizing(underonestandardinterpretation)in
thefirstplace.Thiskindofskepticismeventuallydevelopedintothecanonical
Pyrrhonianviewoftheunresolvabilityof“equipollent”viewsinphilosophical
disputes,aviewthatresemblesMerleau‐Ponty’supuntilonerealizesthatMerleau‐
Pontygoesfurtherthantheskepticbyaffirmingacertainequipollenceinthetruth
itself.Inotherwords,Merleau‐Pontymakesametaphysicalclaim—supporting
himselfonthewingsofapre‐reflectivefaith—aboutNature,thoughadmittedly
withoutthe“dogmatic”supportof,say,an“infallible”firstpremise.Merleau‐Ponty’s
“metaphysics”isstill,inthisregard,“post‐metaphysical.”
StrictPyrrhonismaside,thefactisthatwhileMerleau‐Pontyisvigorously
anti‐dogmatical,eventothepointofembracinganinfinitedialectics,heiscertainly
239
notskepticalinsofaras“skepticism”isanegativisticapproachtophilosophical
problemsthatdeniesonlywhatitcanfirstidentifyasmeaningfulinthefirstplace.
Theskepticinthissenseis,inSartre’sterms,in“badfaith,”playing(nowin
Wittgenstein’slanguage)thelanguage‐gameofphilosophyinordertoundermine
philosophy.ThusMerleau‐Pontyexplicitlyopposesskepticismfornegatingor
callingintothequestiontheexistenceoftheworld(andoftruth)toperceptualfaith
astheeffortlesspre‐reflectiveconfidenceintheworldthateventheskeptic
presupposes.(VI95)Indeed,Merleau‐Pontyconcernshimselfwithrefuting(or
defusing)skepticismfromthebeginningoftheVI.409Laterhequestionsatleast
Cartesianskepticismfortacitlypresupposingthe“positivityofthepsychic.”(VI95)
Onemightcallthisaclassically“phenomenological”critiqueofthe“psychologistic”
assumptionsoftheskeptic,whomustimplicitlyadvanceametaphysicsofsolipsistic
idealismtogroundhis/herpoints.
Merleau‐Ponty’sattitudetowardsphilosophyisnotdismissivebutrather,
onemightsay,bothcelebratoryandironic.Heunderstandsphilosophytobeatfirst
akindofefforttoreplaceperceptualfaithwithawebofstatementsandconcepts,
withanidealorder,whereasthereisneverreallyanyquestionofreplacingthe
world—andphilosophyitselfcandeterminethis,too.Theworldissomething
experienced,whilephilosophyistocapturemomentsofthisexperientiality,this
primordialcontactwithtruth,inpartbutnotinwhole.Thatwhichunitesustothe
world—intentionalityisonenameforit—isthatwhichseparatesusfromitaswell.
409SeeVI4,6;95
240
Andlanguage,whichweasktodispelthemysteryofbeing,isjustasmuchpartof
thismystery,anexpressionthereof:
“Farfromharboringthesecretofthebeingoftheworld,languageisitselfaworld,itselfabeing—aworldandabeingtothesecondpower,sinceitdoesnotspeakinavacuum,sinceitspeaksofbeingandoftheworldandthereforeredoublestheirenigmainsteadofdissipatingit.”(VI95)
Intheend,however,itcannotbedeniedthatthereisacertainkinship
betweenradicalPyrrhonianskepticismandMerleau‐Ponty’sprocedure—especially
inthespiritofopennesspreachedfamouslybytheoriginalPyrrhonists,fromwhom
theterm“skepticism”(literally“searching”)derives.Thelink,asexplainedby
Merleau‐Pontyhimself,issummedupthusly:“If[skepticism]multipliescontrasts
andcontradictions,itisbecausetruthdemandsit.”AndthusMontaigne,askeptic
whoMerleau‐Pontyadmires,aswehavealreadyseen,“beginsbyteachingthatall
truthcontradictsitself;perhapsheendsuprecognizingthatcontradictionistruth.”
(Montaigne198,myemphasis)
C.MerleauPontyandMysticism
IsMerleau‐Pontyamystic?Isthereareligiousdimensiontothisthought?
Thereiscertainlyameditative,almostprayer‐likequalityofMerleau‐Ponty’slater
discourse,nottomentionrespectfortheineffableunityofbeing,astapleideaof
mysticismacrosscultures,fromTaoismtotheNeoplatonically‐tingedmysticismof
the“Abrahamic”religions.Merleau‐Ponty’srejectionofcontraries(neither
intellectualismnorempiricism,neitherrealismnoridealism,etc.)resemblesthe
methodof“negativetheology”andthe“neti,neti”(“notthis,notthat”)methodology
241
oftheUpanishads,whilehisembraceofanidentity‐of‐oppositescrossesthefinal
barrierofclassicallogic(inNeoplatonism,logismosasopposedtoNous)thatstands
inthewayofaphilosophicalexpression(whichmustalsooccludeor“obturate”)
whatonemightcallthe“One.”
Merleau‐Ponty’slackofspiritualisticreferences,however—atleast
comparedtohisinterestinart,literature,politics,psychology,andthesciences—
betrayadeeplysecularmind.Atthesametime,evenherethereliesaparadox.For
Merleau‐Pontystatesinoneplace:“Forme,philosophyconsistsingivinganother
nametowhathaslongbeencrystallizedunderthenameofGod.”410Theambiguity
ofthestatementspeakseloquentlyforitself:Merleau‐Ponty’s“philosophy”ispure
religion—inamannerreligionitselfdoesnotthink.Inthisspirit,Iamtemptedto
callMerleau‐Pontya“methodologicalmystic,”orathinkerwithtendenciestowards,
butnorealtiesto,aphilosophicalmysticism,perhapslikeHeideggerand
Wittgensteininthelastcentury,butunlike,say,SimoneWeil,EmmanuelLevinas,or
MuhummadIqbal.
Ofcourse,thereisnoshortageofreligiousimagery,intendedassuchornot,
inMerleau‐Ponty’swritings.Wehavealreadyseenhisreferenceto“miracles,”for
examplethe“miracleofthesenseorgan,”“themiracleoftotality,”etc.Thereare
othersuchreferencesaswell,almosttothepointofinvokinga“celebratory”
attitudetowardsexistenceakintoChristianNeoplatonistPseudo‐Dionysiusthe
410Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheMerleauPontyReader.Lawlor,LeonardandTedToadvine,eds.NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007(p.240)
242
Areopagite.411Italsocannotbeignoredthathismetaphysicsof“flesh”hasaclear
symbolicconnectiontothe“flesh”ofChrist,theman(visible)who,moreover,
was/isGod(invisible).Oragain,therearetheinvocationofperceptualfaith,the
ultimatemysteryoftheworldandbeing(PPxxiii),“pre‐establishedharmony,”grace
andthe“gift”ofvision,andfinally,tomoreindirectandesotericreferences,suchas
therepeateduseof“depth”todescribetheabsolute—aclassicallygnostic
(Valentinian)descriptionofthedivine,accordingtoElainePagels.412
ButIthinkthatGaryMadisongoestoofarwhenheclaimswecanonly
appreciateMerleau‐PontyinaChristiancontext.413Itistruethathisattitudeseems
ultimatelytobeoneofgratitude,humility,andwonderbeforeBeing.Butthisisalso
trueofplentyofsecularphilosophers,nottomentionmysticsfromotherreligions.
Also,thereisawayinwhichMadison’sclaimmightalsobetooweak,inadditionto
beingtoostrong.ForvirtuallyanyphilosopherwritingintheChristianWest—even
anatheistlikeSartre—canbesaidtobeindeliblymarkedbythedialecticsof
Christianity.Byitselfthisilluminesverylittle.
Therearecertainlythosebesidesthepresentauthorwhohaveidentifieda
distinctaffinitybetweenMerleau‐Pontianphenomenologyandcertainmystical
schools;acaseinpointisNewYorkUniversityHebrewStudiesprofessorElliotR.
Wolfson,whousesMerleau‐Ponty’sthoughttoilluminetheKabbalah.Comments
Wolfsoninthe“Prologue”tohismonumentalworkLanguage,Eros,Being:
411Forexample,the“miracle”ofthemany‐and‐the‐one—inreferencetopaintingandbiology.(N154)ThemostrelevantPseudo‐DionysiantextisprobablyTheCelestialHierarchy.(GeneralBooksLLC,2009)412Pagels,Elaine.TheGnosticGospels.NewYork:RandomHouse,1979(p.32)413Madison,Gary.ThePhenomenologyofMerleauPonty:TheSearchfortheLimitsofConsciousness.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,1981(p.222‐5)
243
“Ishalllabor…moreonthepathwaysofMerleau‐Ponty’sthinking,asinhisthoughtIfindanaffinitywiththeunderstandingIhavederivedfromthestudyofkabbalisticliteratureandconsequentlyfeelitislegitimatetousehisjargontoformulatehermeneuticalandphenomenologicalsuppositionsinreadingthesesources.”414
Inanotherplacehenotes,“Sensiblebeings,orwhatweperceivetobesuch,are[for
Merleau‐Ponty]‘radiationsofverbalessences’—anotionthatresonateswitha
centralimaginalmodalityofJewishesotericism…”(xxiii)Wolfsonastutelyobserves,
moreover,thatforMerleau‐Ponty’sontologicalphenomenology,asforJewish
mysticism,thereisacentraldialecticofrevealingandconcealing,whichinthelatter
stemsfromtheessentialnatureofthe“effablyineffable”godhead,EinSof,andinthe
formerexpressesitselfintermsoftheattemptofphilosophytograsptheparadoxof
perceptualfaith/thelifeworld:
“Inthereconquestofthelifeworld,wethusdiscernamutualityofostensiblyconflictingimpulses:theurgetouncover,ontheonehand,andthediscoverythateveryuncoveringisacoveringover,ontheother.Asithappens,inEnglish,theword‘recover’uncoverstheparadox,foritmeansboth‘toexpose’and‘toconceal.’”415(xxiii)
ThequestionofMerleau‐Pontyandhis“methodologicalmysticism”hasmuch
todowithaquestionofattitudeandaffect.Merleau‐Pontyisasenthralledbyakind
ofnuminosityofnature,thehidden‐and‐revealedsourceofbeingandthemiracles
ofcreativityandtotality,justassurelyastheSufimysticisfixatedonthemajesty
andmysteryoftheoneineffableGod.ThereisinMerleau‐Pontyawonderatthe
414Wolfson,ElliottR.Language,Eros,Being:KabbalisticHermeneuticsandPoeticImagination.NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2005(p.xxi)Wolfson’smassivevolumewasthewinneroftheNationalJewishBookAwardbytheJewishBookCouncil.415Seealso:WolfsonelsewherecommentsonMerleau‐Ponty’s“mysticaltone”invariouscitedpassages.(xxvi)
244
“miracle”ofexperience,asifitwereawonderfully(thoughimperfectly)coordinated
dance,involvinggreatsuccessandeven“knowledge”ofakindthatnevertheless
cannotbeexplainedintermsofreflectionalone.Merleau‐Pontyrecognizestheway
inwhichhumanbeings(andsubjectivity)areessentially“of”thesamestuff(the
“flesh”)astheworld,or“Nature,”andthatthereinliesacluetothefundamental
compatibilityandevenonenessofselfandworld.Butthereisalsoaradicalbreak,a
‘dehiscence,’orseparation,whichsomehow,inaparadoxicalmanner,makesthis
relationshippossible.Thatis,thereisnotmerelyoneness,butamultiplicity
constitutingoneness—thusthereiswholeness,theultimatethemeofallphilosophy.
VI.Conclusion
Inhisarticle,“PhenomenologyandHyper‐Reflection,”TedToadvinenicely
summarizeshisown(andtoalargeextentmineaswell)approachtoMerleau‐
Ponty’slaterwritings:
“Despitehisongoingcriticalexaminations,Merleau‐Pontypresentsphenomenologyinapositivelightthroughouthislaterwritings…ThisisnottodenythatMerleau‐Pontyrecognizes,andincreasinglyaccentuates,certainparadoxicaltensionsofthephenomenologicalmethod.Butthesetensionsinevitablypointusbacktothecontradictoryintertwiningofimmanenceandtranscendencethatistheperceivedworld.”416
416Toadvine,Ted.“PhenomenologyandHyper‐Reflection.”InMerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(pp.28‐9)
245
ForMerleau‐Ponty,philosophyisnotamatterof“solving”aproblem,butof
understandingtheproblemasitsowntruth.(Thisisdifferent,ofcourse,than
understandingtruthasaproblem,perhapsamorecharacteristicpostureforradical
“postmodernism”thanthe“perceptuallypious”Merleau‐Ponty.)WhenMerleau‐
Pontystatesaproblem,itisstatedverymuchassomethingtobefurtherdeepened,
tobeexplored(the“absoluteisdepth”),etc.Towardsaddressinganissueinbiology,
forexample,hesaysapprovingly,asifhungeringtolearnfromthelessonofanother
discipline:“Let’ssayfirstthattheexpressionsemployedbythenewschoolof
biologyarenotsolutions:thenotionsoffieldandgradientaretheindexofaproblem,
notresponses.”(N151,myemphasis)ContrarytoBehnke,Idon’tbelieveMerleau‐
Pontyabandoned“description”for“explanation”417;onthecontrary,heshowswhy
aproperdescription,attentivetotheparadoxicalnuancesofthetruthmade
availabletous,makes(ultimate)explanationsmoot.Explanationisthegoal,one
mightsay,ofreflection;hyper‐reflection,bycontrast,comesbacktodescriptionby
wayofself‐descriptionoraradical,uncompromisingembraceofthefinitudeof
reflectionitself.
ItalsomayseemthatMerleau‐Pontyismoreradicalandsubversivethan
Husserl(forexample,by“throwingout”theuniversalisticortrans‐historical
pretensionsofphilosophyonceandforall),butthis,aswehaveseen,canbeturned
around.Husserl’sintentionsare,intheend,revolutionaryand“subversive”inaway
thatMerleau‐Ponty’sarenot.ForHusserlseeksa“radicalreshapingofourwhole
417Behnke,Elizabeth.“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(p.49)
246
wayoflookingattheworld”(Crisis175),whileMerleau‐Pontyinstructsussimplyto
“relearntolookattheworld.”418PerhapsMerleau‐Pontyisthemoreconversativeof
thetwothinkersafterall.
418Moreprecisely:“Truephilosophyconsistsinrelearningtolookattheworld.”(PPxxiii)
247
Conclusion
Wehavenowreachedtheendofourinvestigations.Inthisconcluding
sectionIwilloffersomewiderreflectionsonbothsomeofthesystematic
philosophicallessonstobelearnedfromtheHusserl‐Merleau‐Pontyencounter.
I.MerleauPontyvisàvisHusserl
InthisdissertationwehaveseenhowHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty
understandandapplythephenomenologicalmethodandhowtheyinterpretits
results.Inparticular,wehaveseenhowMerleau‐Pontyreconsidersandmodifies
thebasicHusserlianprogram—whilesomehow,Ihaveargued,remainingtrueto
fundamentalaspectsofit.Heremains“true”toHusserlatleastinthesenseof
embracingtheHusserliancentralizationoflivingconsciousnessandthe
phenomenologicalreductionthatbringsthisconsciousnessanditsworld‐relationto
activeawareness(reflection).
AlthoughwedidnotexamineHusserl’sso‐called“laterperiod”inmuch
detail,wedidreviewIdeasII,which,throughthenotionsofthe“personalistic
attitude”andtheUmwelt,alreadycontainsmuchofthecoreofthelife‐world
philosophythatwastolateremerge.ThroughouthiswritingsHusserldisplaysan
ambivalence,asMerleau‐Pontypointsout,regardingthenaturalattitudein
particular:isitleftbehind,somehow,inthetranscendentalreduction,orisitmerely
illuminedtherein?Dowecomethroughthereductiontoknowourselvesas
“natural”consciousnessesmorefully,ordowerealizeourselvesasself‐split
248
betweenhigherandlowerlevels,thelatterofwhichissubsumedinthemore
comprehensive(becauseintersubjectiveandorientedtowardstheuniversal)
former?IhavearguedthatwewouldberemisstounderstandHusserlasanentirely
consistentthinkerwithapredeterminedagenda;ontheotherhand,onecannot
ignorehispersistentlyrationalisticorientationandpreference,ifyouwill,forthe
realmof“ideas.”
Itistooeasy,however,toassignMerleau‐Pontythelabelsof“anti‐
essentialist,”“anti‐rationalist,”etc.Rather,Merleau‐Pontyseesthesamething,asit
were,thatHusserldoes;heknowstheworldtobeaphenomenalfieldormilieu,not
animpermeableObjectseparablefromitsmannersof“givenness,”andheknows
consciousnesstobeintertwinedwiththeworldthroughitsbodyanditsintuitive
graspoftheworld’s(inexactly)eideticstructure.ButMerleau‐Pontyalso,critically,
seesthematrixofbeing‐and‐consciousness(or,simply,“Being,”theontological
“totality”)tobe,inacertainsense,ineffable.Asawhole,Beingcannotbeproperly
thought—aKantianpointfromthelatter’s“TranscendentalDialectic”—butneither
does“reason”have“autonomy”suchthatitmaytametheformsofexperienceinto
anidealistictemplateofdeterminacy.Andthe“whole”isnotaregulativeidea,such
thatadivorcebetweentheoryandpracticebecomestheonlywaytoaccommodate
it.Rather,thoughtispartofthewhole,itispartof“nature,”evenifitisthatpartthat
hasthemeaningofwhatisapartand“contrary”tonature—acontrarinessendemic
tonatureitself.
ThiskindofterritoryobviouslylendsitselftocomparisonswithHegelian
dialectic,withwhichitisnotunrelatedevenforMerleau‐Ponty.Hegel,famously,
249
understandsthespirittoknowitselfthroughitsidentificationwitha“higherform”
ofnature,namelytheculturalworldandthedomainsofart,religion,and
philosophy.AsIreadhim,Merleau‐Ponty,bycontrast,understandswhatHegel
meansby“self‐knowingspirit”tobeitselfaformofalienationfromitsownnature,
thoughatthesametimeanecessaryonethatholdsnatureandspiritalikeina
tensionthatstemsfromanoriginary“unityofopposites,”whichcannolongerbe
thoughtexceptparadoxically,andwhichleavesitslegacyoflastingambiguityinthe
humanexperience.
ThusforMerleau‐Ponty,Natureisneithertheobjectofthoughtnorasubject,
noreventheircoincidenceinahighersynthesis,butrathertheparadoxical“depth”
(“theabsolute”)and“otherness”(whichisnonethelessparadoxicallyinclusive)of
thehumanspirit.ByitselfthisisnotaHusserlianview,butitistheculminationofa
systematicmeditationMerleau‐Pontyreferstofromveryearlyonasthe
“phenomenologyofphenomenology”—areachingofthelimitsofwhatisthinkable
insubjectiveorconstitutionalterms,limitswhichrevealthedependenceofspiriton
apre‐reflectivenaturewhichisalso,atthesametime,preciselynotamenableto
theoreticizationalongthelinesofascientific“naturalism.”Inthisway,Merleau‐
Ponty’sphilosophypreservesthesenseofconsciousnessrevealedinthe
“transcendental”attitudeandthroughthetranscendentalepochéandreduction,but
withoutgoingsofarastoallowingthoughtto“takepossessionoftheworld.”The
transcendentalattitudebecomessubsumedintheparadoxofnature—ina
wholenessortotality,thatis,whichcanonlybethoughtasan“unthinkable.”
250
AllofthisexposesasignficantfaultlinebetweenHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.
ForHusserlseemstobroadlyacceptthescientific‐physicalisticdefinitionofnature,
addingonlythatitssenseas“physicalnature”isderivedfromtranscendental
subjectivity.ButthiswillnotdoforMerleau‐Ponty.Naturecannotbelimitedtosuch
asense,becauseitcannotbefullygraspedinthefirstplace.Astheconditionforthe
possibilityofconsciousness,itisnecessarilybeyondit.Atthesametime,the
transcendentalattitude—takentotheextremeofhyper‐reflection,whichthen
problematizesthescopeofthetranscendentalattitudeitself—isabletounderstand
this“beyond”asthehiddendepthsofitsownself,the“soilofsubjectivity.”Dueto
thisintertwiningbetweenthetwo—thisisMerleau‐Ponty’s“speculative”move,if
youwill—subjectandnature(note:not“object”)arenotsimplymutuallyalienated
“substances,”butrathermembersofanidentityrelationthatisnevertheless,atits
core,self‐splitting(dehiscence,theparadoxofthe“other,”etc.).Comparisonsto
whatHeideggercomestocall“samenesswithoutdifference”or“belonging‐
together”areprobablyapthere.
ItisclearthatMerleau‐Pontyisinakindofstruggleonlyorprimarilywith
the“transcendentalidealist”Husserlofthemiddleperiod(andofthelaterperiod,to
theextentthatthis“Husserl”remains).WecanonlyproperlyassessMerleau‐
Ponty’sphilosophyonceweacceptthepremiseoftherebeingcertain“self‐
contradictions”withinHusserl’sthoughtitself.Phenomenologybecomesin
Merleau‐Ponty’shandsameditationontheparadoxesofhumanexistenceand
incarnationleftbarebyHusserl’sanalysis.Colloquiallyspeaking,onemightsayin
thissensethatMerleau‐Ponty“pitcheshistent”inHusserl’s“backyard.”
251
Thusthisdissertationisaboutacritique,butitisastrangely“internal”one.
Merleau‐Pontyoperateswithinaframeworklargely(thoughnotwholly)definedby
phenomenology.Heshouldbeseen,Ithink,assomeonewhoquietlybutdecisively
reformsphenomenologyandbringsitintoasphereofinteractiverelevancewiththe
sciencesandwithotherrealmsofculture—history,politics,art,religion—by
softeningthedichotomiesthatHusserlrigidlyputsintoplace.
II.MerleauPontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers
ForMerleau‐Ponty,philosophy—asphenomenology—isanexercisein
dialectics.Notpositiveornegativedialectics,sotospeak,butthedialecticsofself‐
meditation.LikeMontaigne,Merleau‐Pontyfindsaninfinityinhimself.Heis
fascinatedby“experience”anditsopen‐endedness.Hefindsthissame
wondrousnessinHusserl’swritings,buthealsoidentifiesrationalist,Cartesian
presuppositionstherethatdictateacertainresult.Incontrast,Merleau‐Ponty’s
dialecticisnotamovement“towards”anything.Experienceneitherbeginsnorends
inthought,butoutsideofit.Thusphilosophyisamattersimplyofovercomingits
need,asitwere,toovercomeexperience—itisamatteroffindingitshomenotin
itself(thisistheHegeliansolution,the“satisfaction”ofconsciousness)butinthe
questforitself,whichnecessarilydoesnotendinitself(asaconsciousness).
ThisisnotKant:forwhileKant,too,placesalimitonreason,helimits
experienceitselftoanartificiallycontrolleddomain,adiscursivefiction.InMerleau‐
Ponty,humanityisplungedintoaseaofunknowing,sotospeak,ontheraftof
252
perceptualfaith.Therearenoepistemicguarantees,notevenofa“transcendental”
kind.
Merleau‐Ponty’sembraceoftheHeideggerian“being‐in‐the‐world”inthe
“Preface”ofthePhenomenologyofPerceptioniswell‐known,butMerleau‐Ponty’s
conceptionofnatureandspiritdepartsfromHeidegger’sinasignificantway.For
whereasHeideggerprivileges“Being”over“beings,”suggestingaradicalbreak
betweenthemthatisconstantlycoveredoverby“metaphysics,”Merleau‐Ponty
doesnotunderstand“Being”tobeanythingotherthantheinterplayofnatureand
spirit,orexteriorityandinteriority,inacarnalfieldhefamouslytermsthe“flesh,”
andwhichhealsoidentifieswith“nature”inanexpanded,holisticsense.Inthisway,
Merleau‐PontyisclosertoHegel,butagainwithacriticaldifference.ForMerleau‐
Pontyrejectstheideathatnature(andhencetheself,sinceweare“of”nature)can
befullyknown,sinceitisnecessarilyunknowntoitself.InthisregardMerleau‐
PontycallsonSchelling’snotionoftheAbgrundor“abysswithinGod”thatisthe
“savageprinciple”ofnature.Merleau‐Pontyislessinterestedinthetheologicalor
moralimplicationsofthisthantheepistemologicalandontologicalones:natureisa
“wildbeing”thatcannotbeknownbyspiriteventhoughspiritisofit.
Inthisway,Merleau‐PontybecomesinterestedintheFreudianconceptofan
“unconscious,”inthathesawastructuralparallelbetweennature(orthebody)as
the“unconscious”ofspiritandtheinternalstructureofthepsyche,aninterplayof
consciousandunconsciousdimensions.
253
III.The“PersonalisticAttitude”andtheLimitsofReflection
WehavespentagooddealoftimeexaminingMerleau‐Ponty’sreformulation
ofphenomenologyintermsoftheinterplayofperception,reflection,andwhatI
havecalledathirdandnewtypeofattitude,“hyper‐reflection.”Hyper‐reflectionisa
kindof“meta‐attitude,”anattitudeinwhichthenaturalandreflectiveattitudestake
theirrespectivepositions.
Husserl’srecognitionoftheuntenabilityofthesharpnessofthenatural/
transcendentaldivideisreflectedinhisnotionofthe“personalisticattitude.”Of
course,here,the“naturalattitude”comesperilouslyclosetomergingwiththe
“transcendental”;someofHusserl’sdescriptionsof“spirit”smackofasimilaror
identical“absolutism”and“ontologicalprivilege.”Merleau‐Pontyisfundamentally
righttoidentifyacentraltensioninHusserl’sphilosophybetweenanunderstanding
ofthe“naturalattitude”asonethatisopposedandsupersededinthe
phenomenologicalreduction,ontheonehand,anda“naturalattitude”thatissub‐
divided,initself,betweenlowerandhigherpoles(asIhavementionedabove).But
Husserl’s“poles”—thenaturalisticandthepersonalistic—arenotwhatMerleau‐
Pontywouldhaveinmind.Afterall,the“naturalistic”attitudeisnottrulynaturalat
all.Itispreciselyunnatural,thepurelytheoreticallensofthescientist.Unlikethe
transcendentalorphenomenologicalorreflectivestand‐point,itdoesnotseekto
understandtheworldasexistentiallyknown,muchlesstounderstandthenatural
attitudeitself.Itdoesnotthematizenaturalexperienceorbeing,itsimplyrestricts
thefieldofexperiencetoacertainsetofeidēthatframetheresultsofexperiments
performedintheworld.Anotherwaytoputitisthatthereisnotrue,separable
254
“scientificattitude.”ThisiswhatMerleau‐Pontymeanswhenhesuggestsinthe
Naturelecturesthatscience(bywhichhereferstoscientificpraxisandnottheory)
iscontinuoussimplywith“experience.”Clearly,itisthe“personalisticattitude”that
isthetruer,deeperformoftheeverydaynaturallifeoflivingsubjects—ofhuman
subjects,thoughofcourseevenanimalspossessUmwelten.
Butwesawthatwithhisdescriptionofit,Husserlmakesofthepersonalistic
attitudeakindofbasisforasubjectiveidealism.HowcanMerleau‐Pontyavoidthis
result?Hecandosopreciselybylimitingthescopeofreflection,byassigning
reflectivityorthe“thinkingattitude”toaneideticmatrix,itselfhistorically
conditioned,anattitudewhichatitsouterlimitsofreflexivityopensupintoan
interrogationintoitsorigins.Nature,astheultimatesourceofmeaningandbeing
(asopposedto“transcendentalsubjectivity,”eitherindividualorintersubjective),is
notcoincidentwiththeegocogito.Itappearsinvariousguisesasthehidden“other”
thatisalsothehidden“self,”theunknowabledepththatissimultaneously
inescapablytranscendent,andothersuchparadoxesthatresultfromtheattemptof
reflectiontothinktheunthinkable.Itisknownthroughactsofcreativity,through
thepulseoflifeandwilledmotion,andthroughtheprincipleof“totality”which
eludesratiocinativeanalysisandyetmustbeunderstoodasbeingatthebasisofthe
significanceoflanguage,behavior,art,politics,andevensexuality.
IV.PhenomenologyasParadox
Withbodilysubjectivity,Merleau‐Pontysupplementsthefirstparadoxof
phenomenology,thatof“immanenttranscendency”(or,theprincipleoftheworld’s
255
havingtobewithinusjustinordertobewithoutus)withitsflip‐side,namelythe
principlethatfortheretobea“within”atall,this“within”mustfirstbe“without,”
spreadoutintheworld,sotospeak.
Ofcoursebothformulationsareincompleteandeven,technically,
misleadinglydualisticintheirownright.ButthisiswhyMerleau‐Ponty’slater
reflectionsconcentratepreciselyonthemysteryoftheunsayabilityofthisunion—
which,asHeraclitushadmaintainedofallcontraries,is“one”becauseofdifference
ratherthaninspiteofit—anditsrelationtothought,whichmustcontradictitself,
finally,torecreateasenseoftheunity,sotospeak,“afterthefact.”
V.Naturalism
Merleau‐Ponty,unlikeHusserlorKant,doesnotopposeatimelessrealm(or
sphereofconsciousness)toatemporalone.Sothereisalsoamoveinhimtowards
naturalizationandimmanentism,thoughnotinthe“naturalistic”senseofthosewho
wouldcircumscribeconsciousnesswithinanunconscious“reality.”Merleau‐Ponty’s
“naturalism”defiesbothrealistandidealistinterpretationsoftheterm.Merleau‐
Ponty’snaturalismisphenomenological;hecannotbesafelyappropriatedby
modern“cognitivescientists”andthelike.Thisisaquestionofstarting‐point;
modernnaturalismstartslaterthanitthinksitdoes.Itobscurestheoriginby
theorizingit,indeedbyprivilegingtheoryoverexperience.Forwhatdoes
experiencetellusabouta“nature”or“world”thathasnoshareinthe“mind”or
“soul,”whichisafteralldoingtheexperiencing?
256
HusserlandMerleau‐Ponty,whilehavingverydifferentapproaches,areboth
respectfulofthecomplexityfacinganytheoryofnatureinwhichhumansubjectivity
istakenseriouslyasnon‐reducibletoscientific‐naturalisticcausality,whileatthe
sametimeinvolvedinthethickofperceptualexperience(asopposedtobeing
directedtoanetherealPlatonicrealmofIdeas).Husserl,however,believedthatthe
waytoovercomescientificnaturalismwastoswallowitwhole,asitwere,inthe
gulpoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Merleau‐Ponty’sapproachisrathertoquestion
bothnaturalismandtranscendentalphilosophyatonceasvictimsoffalse
absolutizationandavoidanceofthefundamentalparadoxesofhumanexistence.
257
Bibliography
I.PrimaryLiterature(HusserlandMerleauPonty): A.HusserlHusserl,Edmund.CartesianMeditations.Tr.DorionCairns.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999Husserl,Edmund.TheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Tr.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970Husserl,Edmund.EncyclopaediaBritannicaArticle.In:CollectedWorks,Vol.6.Tr.ThomasSheehanandRichardE.Palmer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPulbishers,1997Husserl,Edmund.Husserl:ShorterWorks.Eds.McCormackandElliston.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981(pp.21‐35,the“EncyclopaediaBritannica”article)Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXIV,GesammelteWerke:ZurPhänomenologiederIntersubjektivität.TexteausdemNachlass.ZweiterTeil.1921‐28.Ed.IsoKern.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1973Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXXXII,GesammelteWerke:NaturundGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1927.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2001Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaXXXIV,GesammelteWerke:ZurphänomenologischenReduktion.TexteausdemNachlass(19261935).Ed.SebastianLuft.Dordrecht/Boston/London:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002Husserl,Edmund.HusserlianaMaterialienbände,BandIV.NaturundGeist:VorlesungenSommersemester1919.Ed.MichaelWeiler.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology.Tr.F.Kersten.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1983Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution.Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989
258
Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,ThirdBook:PhenomenologyandtheFoundationsoftheSciences.Tr.TedKleinandWilliamE.Pohl.TheHague:MartinusNijhoffPublishers,1980Husserl,Edmund.LogicalInvestigations.Tr.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge,1900/01(2nd,revisededition1913)
B.MerleauPontyMerleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“BergsonintheMaking.”Tr.RichardC.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964.(pp.182‐191)Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“EyeandMind.”Tr.CarletonDallery.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.159‐192)Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.HusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology.Ed.LeonardLawlorwithBettinaBergo.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2002Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.InPraiseofPhilosophyandOtherEssays.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1988Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheMerleauPontyReader.Lawlor,LeonardandTedToadvine,eds.NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“TheMetaphysicalInMan.”InSenseandNonSense.Tr.HubertL.DreyfusandPatriciaAllenDreyfus.NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.LaNatureoulemondedusilence(pagesd’introduction).InMauriceMerleauPonty.Ed.EmmanueldeSaintAubert.Paris:HermannÉditeurs,2008(pp.44‐53)Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance.CompiledandwithnotesfromDominiqueSéglard.Tr.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.Notedecours,19591961.Ed.StéphanieMénasé.Paris:Gallimard,1996Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“PhenomenologyandtheSciencesofMan.”Tr.JohnWild.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964
259
Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.”Tr.RichardM.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.159‐181)Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ThePrimacyofPerceptionandItsPhilosophicalConsequences.”Tr.JamesM.Edie.InThePrimacyofPerception.Ed.JohnWild.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ReadingMontaigne.”Tr.RichardC.McCleary.InSigns.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964(pp.198‐210)Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.“ResuméoftheCourse:HusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology.”Tr.JohnO”NeillwithrevisionsbyLeonardLawlor.InHusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology,Ed.LeonardLawlorwithBettinaBergo.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2002Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheStructureofBehavior.Tr.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TextsandDialogues.Ed.HughSilvermanandJamesBarry,Jr.Tr.MichaelSmithetal.NewJersey:HumanitiesPress,1992Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.ThemesfromtheLecturesattheCollègedeFrance19521960.Tr.JohnO’Neill.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1970Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheVisibleandtheInvisible.Tr.AlphonsoLingis.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,1969Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TheWorldofPerception.Tr.OliverDavis.NewYork:Routledge,2008II.SecondaryLiteratureandOtherWorks: A.BooksandMonographs:Barbaras,Renaud.TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trs.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004Bell,David.Husserl.NewYork:Routlege,1990Bernet,Rudolf;IsoKern;andEduardMarbach.AnIntroductiontoHusserlianPhenomenology.Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993
260
Carbone,Mauro.TheThinkingoftheSensible.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2004Carman,Taylor.MerleauPonty.NewYork:Routledge,2008DeBoer,Theodore.TheDevelopmentofHusserl’sThought.Tr.TheodorePlantinga.TheHague,theNetherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1978Dillon,M.C.MerleauPonty’sOntology.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988Dodd,James.IdealismandCorporeity:AnEssayontheProblemoftheBodyinHusserl’sPhenomenology.Dordrecht:Kluwer,1997Drummond,JohnJ.HistoricalDictionaryofHusserl’sPhilosophy.Lanham,Maryland:ScarecrowPress,2008Dupond,Pascal.DictionnaireMerleauPonty.Paris:Ellipses,2008Findlay,J.N.TheDisciplineoftheCave.NewYork:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1966Foucault,Michel.TheOrderofThings:AnArchaeologyoftheHumanSciences.NewYork:VintageBooks,1994Franck,Robert.PhénoménologieetOntologie:MerleauPontylecteurdeHusserletHeidegger.Paris:L”Harmattan,2005Hass,Lawrence.MerleauPonty’sPhilosophy.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2008Heidegger,Martin.BeingandTime.Tr.JoanStambaugh.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1996Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserl’sPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994Langan,Thomas.MerleauPonty’sCritiqueofReason.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1966Landgrebe,Ludwig.ThePhenomenologyofEdmundHusserl.Ed.DonnWelton.Ithaca,NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1981Langer,MonikaM.MerleauPonty’sPhenomenologyofPerception:AGuideandCommentary.Tallahassee:TheFloridaUniversityPress,1989
261
Madison,Gary.ThePhenomenologyofMerleauPonty:TheSearchfortheLimitsofConsciousness.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,1981Marcel,Gabriel.TheMysteryofBeing.Chicago:St.Augustine’sPress,2001McDowell,John.MindandWorld.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity,1994Mohanty,J.N.ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl:AHistoricalDevelopment.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008Moran,Dermot.IntroductiontoPhenomenology.NewYork:Routledge,2000Overgaard,Søren.HusserlandHeideggeronBeingintheWorld.Dordrecht:Springer,2004Pagels,Elaine.TheGnosticGospels.NewYork:RandomHouse,1979Patocka,Jan.AnIntroductiontoHusserl’sPhenomenology.Tr.ErazimKohák.Chicago:OpenCourtPublishingCompany,1996Priest,Stephen.MerleauPonty.NewYork:Routledge:1998Pseudo‐DionysiustheAreopagite.TheCelestialHierarchy.(GeneralBooksLLC,2009)Ricoeur,Paul.AKeytoEdmundHusserl’sIdeasI.Tr.BondHarrisandJacquelineBouchardSpurlock.(Tr.revisedbyPolVandevelde,ed.)Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1996Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trs.EdwardG.BallardandLesterE.Embree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2007Ricoeur,Paul.OneselfasAnother.UniversityofChicagoPress,1995Russell,Matheson.Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.ContinuumBooks.NewYork:2006Sainsbury,R.M.Paradoxes.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995Toadvine,Ted.MerleauPonty’sPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,2009Vandevelde,Pol.TheTaskoftheInterpreter:Text,Meaning,andNegotiation.Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,2005
262
Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000Wittgenstein,Ludwig.OnCertainty.HarperPerennial,1972Wittgenstein,Ludwig.PhilosophicalInvestigations.BlackwellPublishers,2001Wolfson,ElliottR.Language,Eros,Being:KabbalisticHermeneuticsandPoeticImagination.NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,2005 B.Articles,BookChapters,andVolumeIntroductionsAristotle.Metaphysics,BookIII.InCompleteWorksofAristotle.Tr.JonathanBarnes.PrincetonUniversityPress,1971(pp.1572‐1584)Barbaras,Renaud.“APhenomenologyofLife.”InTheCambridgeCompaniontoMerleauPonty,eds.TaylorCarmanandMarkHansen,eds.CambridgeUniversityPress,2005.(pp.206‐230)Barral,Mary‐Rose.“Body—Soul—ConsciousnessIntegration.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.119‐128)Behnke,Elizabeth:“FromMerleau‐Ponty’sConceptofNaturetoanInterspeciesPracticeofPeace.”InAnimalOthers:OnEthics,Ontology,andAnimalLife.Albany:StateUniversityPress,1999(pp.93‐116)Behnke,Elizabeth.“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologicalReadingofConstitutioninPhénoménologiedelaperception.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.51‐70)Bello,AngelaAles.“SeeleundLeibinderkategorialenundinderoriginärenPerspektive.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.37‐48)Bernet,Rudolf.“TheSubjectinNature:ReflectionsonMerleau‐Ponty’sPhenomenologyofPerception.”PrintedinMerleauPontyinContemporaryPerspective.Eds.PatrickBurkeandJanVanDerVeken.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1993(pp.53‐68)Bergo,Bettina.“PhilosophyasPerspectivaArtificialis:Merleau‐Ponty’sCritiqueofHusserlianConstructivism.”Printedasthe“Afterword”of:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.
263
HusserlattheLimitsofPhenomenology.Ed.LeonardLawlorwithBettinaBergo.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2002(pp.155‐182)Burke,Patrick.“CreativityandtheUnconsciousinMerleau‐PontyandSchelling.”InSchellingNow:ContemporaryReadings,ed.JasonM.Wirth.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2005Carman,Taylor.“TheBodyinHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999.(pp.205‐225)Carr,David.“Findlay,Husserl,andtheEpoché.”In:StudiesinthePhilosophyofJ.N.Findlay.Eds.Cohen,Martin,andWestphal.Albany:SUNYPress,1985Churchill,Scott.“NatureandAnimality.”InMerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(174‐183)Cobb‐Stevens,Richard.“Body,Spirit,andEgoinHusserl’sIdeasII.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.243‐258)Crowell,StevenGalt.“TheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.”InIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996(pp.81‐106)Dastur,Françoise.“HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.65‐77)Dastur,Françoise.“Merleau‐PontyandThinkingfromWithin”(tr.PaulB.Milan).PrintedinMerleauPontyinContemporaryPerspective.Eds.PatrickBurkeandJanVanDerVeken.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1993(pp.25‐36)Dastur,Françoise.“PhilosophyandNon‐PhilosophyAccordingtoMerleau‐Ponty.”InReadingMerleauPonty:OnPhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.152‐163)Dastur,Françoise.“World,Flesh,Vision.”InChiasms:MerleauPonty’sNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.23‐50)Dauenhauer,Bernard.“TeleologyofConsciousness:HusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”InAnalectaHusserliana,Vol.IX.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Reidel,1979(pp.149‐168)
264
Depraz,Natalie.“WhataboutthepraxisofReduction?BetweenHusserlandMerleau‐Ponty.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.115‐126)Dreyfus,Hubert.“Merleau‐Ponty’sCritiqueofHusserl’s(andSearle’s)ConceptofIntentionality.”InRereadingMerleauPonty.Amherst,NewYork:HumanityBooks,2000(pp.33‐52)Evans,Fred.“ChiasmandFlesh.”In:MerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(184‐193)Evans,J.Claude.“WhereistheLife‐World?”PrintedinIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996(pp.57‐66)Fink,Eugen.“DiephänomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsinderGegenwärtigenKritik.”In:Fink,Eugen.StudienzurPhanomenologie19301939.TheHague,Netherlands:MartinusNijhoff,1966Froman,Wayne.“AlterityandtheParadoxofBeing.”InOntologyandAlterityinMerleauPonty.Eds.GalenJohnsonandMichaelSmith.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1991Geraets,ThéodoreF.“Merleau‐Ponty’sConceptionofNature.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.301‐312)Grene,Marjorie.“Merleau‐PontyandtheRenewalofOntology.”ReviewofMetaphysics,29,June1976(pp.605‐625)Gutting,Gary.“WhatHaveWeBeenMissing?ScienceandPhilosophyinTwentieth‐CenturyFrenchThought.”InTheOxfordHandbookofContinentalPhilosophy,eds.BrianLeiterandMichaelRosen,OxfordUniversityPress,2008(pp.180‐209)Heinäama,Sara.“FromDecisionstoPassions:Merleau‐Ponty’sInterpretationofHusserl’sReduction.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.127‐148)Heelan,Patrick.“NaturalScienceandBeing‐in‐the‐World.”ManandWorld,16,1983(pp.207‐220)Köchler,Hans.“TheRelativityoftheSoulandtheAbsoluteStateofthePureEgo.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.95‐109)
265
Kojima,Hiroshi.“FromDialectictoReversibility:ACriticalChangeofSubject‐ObjectRelationinMerleau‐Ponty’sThought.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.95‐114)Low,Douglas.“Merleau‐Ponty’sPhilosophy:MethodandGround,AComprehensiveOverview.”InPhenomenologicalInquiry,Volume31.Hanover,NewHampshire:October2007(pp.51‐89) Luft,Sebastian.“FromBeingtoGivennessandBack:SomeRemarksontheMeaningofTranscendentalIdealisminKantandHusserl.”InInternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies,15/3,2007(pp.367‐394)Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sConceptofthe‘TranscendentalPerson’.AnotherLookattheHusserl‐HeideggerRelationship.”InInternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies13/2,2005(pp.141‐177)Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sNotionoftheNaturalAttitudeandtheShifttoTranscendentalPhenomenology.”InAnalectaHusserliana,Vol.LXXX,Dordrecht:Kluwer,2002(pp.114‐119)Luft,Sebastian.“Husserl’sTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLife‐WorldandCartesianism.”InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(pp.198‐234) Marcelle,Daniel.“TheOntologicalPriorityofSpiritOverNature:Husserl’sRefutationofPsychophysicalParallelisminIdeasII.”InPhilosophyToday,vol.50(suppl.),2006.(pp.75‐82) Melle,Ullrich.DasWahrnehmungsproblemundseineVerwandlunginphaenomenologischerEinstellung.TheHague,Netherlands:MartinusNijhoffPublishers,1983(Ch.13,“DerLeibalsSubjektderWahrnehmung,”pp.120‐130) Melle,Ullrich.“NatureandSpirit.”InIssuesinHusserl’sIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996(pp.15‐36) Moyle,Tristan.“Re‐EnchantingNature:HumanandAnimalLifeinLaterMerleau‐Ponty.”BritishJournalofPhenomenology.Vol.38,No.2,May2007 O’Dywer,Luciana.“TheSignificanceoftheTranscendentalEgofortheProblemoftheBodyandSoulinHusserlianPhenomenology.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.109‐117)
266
Park,Ynhui.“Merleau‐Ponty’sOntologyoftheWildBeing.”SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.(pp.313‐326) Philips,StephenH.“IndianPhilosophies.”InFromAfricatoZen,eds.RobertC.SolomonandKathleenM.Higgins.LanhamMaryland:RowmanandLittlefieldPublications,Inc.,1993(pp.221‐266) Priest,Stephen.“Husserl’sConceptofBeing:FromPhenomenologytoMetaphysics.”InGermanPhilosophySinceKant.Ed.AnthonyO”Hear.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999.(pp.209‐222) Rabanaque,Luis.“TheBodyasNoematicBridgeBetweenNatureandCulture?”In:Epistemology,Archaeology,Ethics:CurrentInvestigationsofHusserl’sCorpus(Eds.PolVandeveldeandSebastianLuft).NewYork:Continuum,2010 Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Tr.EdwardG.BallardandLesterEmbree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967(Thirdchapter:“Husserl’sIdeasII:AnalysesandProblems,”pp.35‐81) Rokstad,Konrad.“TheHistoricityofBodyandSoul.”InPhenomenologyofLifeFromtheAnimalSoultotheHumanMind:BookI:InSearchofExperience,ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2007(pp.127‐159) Rokstad,Konrad.“Nature,SubjectivityandtheLife‐World.”InAnalectaHusserliana:TheYearbookofPhenomenologicalResearchVolLXXVII,ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishing,2002(pp.41‐59) Schirmacher,Wolfgang.“MonisminSpinoza’sandHusserl’sThought.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.345‐352) Schuhmann,KarlandSmith,Barry.“AgainstIdealism:JohannesDaubertvs.Husserl’sIdeasI.”ReviewofMetaphysics38(1985),pp.763‐793. Schütz,Alfred.“EdmundHusserl’sIdeas,VolumeII.”InPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,13:394‐413 Seebohm,ThomasM.“ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.51‐70)
267
Silverman,Hugh.“IsMerleau‐PontyInsideorOutsidetheHistoryofPhilosophy?”InChiasms:MerleauPonty’sNotionofFlesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.131‐143) Solomon,RobertC.“Husserl’sConceptoftheNoema.”InHusserl:ExpositionsandAppraisals,FrederickA.EllistonandPeterMcCormack,eds.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977(pp.54‐69) Smith,A.D.“TheFleshofPerception:Merleau‐PontyandHusserl.”InReadingMerleauPonty:OnPhenomenologyofPerception.Ed.ThomasBaldwin.NewYork:Routledge,2007(pp.1‐22) Steinbock,Anthony.“SaturatedIntentionality.”InTheBody.Ed.DonnWelton,Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,1999(pp.178‐199) Theodorou,Panos.“PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserl’sAnalysisof“Nature‐Thing”inIdeasII.”InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,Volume5,eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005(pp.165‐187) Toadvine,Ted.“LeavingHusserl’sCave?ThePhilosopher’sShadowRevisited.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.71‐94) Toadvine,Ted.“Merleau‐Ponty’sReadingofHusserl:AChronologicalOverview.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.227‐286) Toadvine,Ted.“PhenomenologyandHyper‐Reflection.”InMerleauPonty:KeyConcepts.Eds.RosalynDiproseandJackReynolds.Stocksfield:Acumen,2008(pp.17‐29) Trotignon,Pierre.“L”oeildelachair.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.49‐64) Tymieniecka,Anna‐Teresa.“FromHusserl’sFormulationoftheSoul‐BodyIssuetoaNewDifferentiationofHumanFaculties.”InSoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,1983.Ed.Anna‐TeresaTymieniecka(pp.3‐12) Vandevelde,Pol.“Introduction”of:Ricoeur,Paul.AKeytoEdmundHusserl’sIdeasI.Tr.BondHarrisandJacquelineBouchardSpurlock.Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1996(pp.16‐20)
268
Waldenfels,Bernhard.“InterrogativeThinking:ReflectionsonMerleau‐Ponty’sLaterPhilosophy.”InMerleauPontyinContemporaryPerspective.Eds.PatrickBurkeandJanVanDerVeken.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1993(pp.3‐12)Watson,StephenH.“Cancelations:NotesonMerleau‐Ponty’sStandingBetweenHegelandHusserl.”ResearchinPhenomenology,Vol.XVIII,1987.Watson,StephenH.“Merleau‐Ponty’sPhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNotto‘SingtheWorld.””JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications.(pp.535‐549)Zahavi,Dan.“Merleau‐PontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.”InMerleauPonty’sReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.(pp.3‐29)
C.MiscellaneousMerleau‐Ponty,MauriceandChapsal,Madelaine:“Merleau‐PontyInPerson:AnInterviewwithMadeleineChapsal,1960.”InMerleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TextsandDialogues.Ed.HughSilvermanandJamesBarry,Jr.Tr.MichaelSmithetal.NewJersey:HumanitiesPress,1992Mohanty,J.N.“MyPhilosophicalPosition/Response.”InTheTranscendentalandtheEmpirical.Ed.BinaGupta.Oxford,England:RowmanandLittlefieldPublishers,Inc.,2000(pp.253‐280)Priest,Stephen.“TakingMerleau‐PontyLiterally:ReplytoDermotMoran.”InternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies,Volume8,Issue2,July2000(pp.247‐251)Tilliette,Xavier.“Husserl’sConceptofNature(Merleau‐Ponty’s1957‐58Lectures).”Appendix3of:Merleau‐Ponty,Maurice.TextsandDialogues.Eds.HughJ.SilvermanandJamesBarryJr.Tr.MichaelB.Smith.London:HumanitiesPress,1992(pp.162‐3)
269