8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 1/27
The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
Gregory W. Dawes
Belief in magic
is
widespread both in history an d
in
contemporary cultures. Can
such
belief
be regarded as rational
If so , in w hat way? An examination of the
magic
of Renaissance Europe enables us to distinguish three ways in which a belief can be
rational.
It
can be a) rationally defensible, g iven a p articular set of backgro und
beliefs, b) f o r m e d by
some reliable
weans, or c) the result of
procedures
that are
collectively rational. Distinguishing these differentform s o f rationality not only
helps us to understand magical thought;
it
also assists in the controversial task of
distinguishing magicfrom science.
Magic has often been regarded as a non-rational practice . Self-styled m odern
sceptics, of course, regard it as frankly irrational, and unworthy of further
consideration (except
in
order
to
debunk it). But psychologists and social
scientists are also inclined to define magic by reference to its irrationality. If
such beliefs are to be explained, they hold,
it
cannot be by reference to any
process of reasoning: they m ust arise from psychological and social factors.'
Some psychologists go so far as to hold that magical beliefs are pathological:
a sign that something has gone wrong with the functioning of our cognitive
powers. We find this idea in the American Psychiatric Association's widely
used Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders} DSM IV does not
classify belief in magic as itself a disorder, since
it
recognises that
it
'may be
a part of normal child development' .̂ But what it calls 'magical thinking ' is
used in the diagnosis of real pathologies, such as schizophrenia and paranoid
personality disorder. ^
Given the prevalence of magic in human history and culture,
anthropologists and historians are less inclined to regard belief in magic as
' Barry Singer nd Victor A. Benassi, 'O ccu lt Beliefs: Media D isto rtion s, Social Uncertainty,
and Deficiencies
of
Hum an Reasoning Seem
to be at the
Basis
of
Oc cult Beliefs',
American
Scientist
69 (1981), 49 -5 5 (p. 49).
^ Am erican Psychiat r ic Associat ion , Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 4th
edn (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) (hereafter DSM IV),
p
768. A similar attitude is
to
be found
in
Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge's
The Euture of Religion: Secularization, R evival, and Cult Eormation (Berkeley : Univers i ty
of
California Press, 1985 ), p. 31 . Stark and Bainbridge align themselves with Max W eber's
suggestion that
it
is only fallacious attributions of causality that should be described as
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 2/27
34
Gregory
W
Dawes
pathologiccJ. But they, too, have sometimes regarded it as in some sense
non-rational, an alternative to practices that we might think of as rationally
gro unded. Stanley Tambiah, for instance, makes use of a famous distinction
from the work of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857 1939). He argues that magic
represents a different kind of orientation to reality from that found in the
sciences, one that is 'participatory' rather than 'causal' ^ In her study of magic
in ecirly medieval Europe, Valerie Flint makes a similar claim, suggesting that
magic is a kind of'unreaso n'
:
In their attempt to fïnd a place for unreason deeper than, rather than this
side of, reason, the early Middle Ages in Europe display a good deal more
enlightenment about the emotional need for that magic which sustains
devotion and delight than does the post-ReFormation Western world.*•
On this view, magic is a response to our emotional needs rather than a
response to rational enquiry.
Tambiah may be righ t about the existence of distinct ways of perceiving
the world, although it is not clear they can be as clearly distinguished as he
suggests.' Similarly, Flint may be correct tha t there exists an emotional need
for the kinds of services that are offered by magicians. We might even agree
with the modern sceptics that people today are acting irrationally if they
believe in magic. But if belief in magic is a form of 'unreason' in our own
time,
it is no t clear this was always the case. After all, as Richard Kieckhefer
has argued, 'the rational principles seen as explaining the operation of magic
.. . were widely shcired in medieval culture '. The same can be said of the
magical theo ries that became popular in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
As we shall see, these, too , can be thought of
as
a (controversial) extension of
the best natural philosophy and theology of the day.
There is, however, a problem with these debates. It is that those who
engage in them rarely reflect on the differing senses in which a belief can
be described as rational. Historians have shown that magical beliefs can be
rational in the sense of being
rationally defensible
given other beliefs that are
widely accepted in the culture in question. But the fact that behef
in
magic is
rational in this sense does not mean that it is rational in others. In particular,
we should not assume that magical beliefs were rational in the same way
^
Stanley JeyarajaTambiah,
Magic Religion
and the Scope
of
Rationality (Cam bridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 105-09.
^Valerie I. J. Flint,
The Rise of
Magic
in
Early Medieval Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1991), p. 4.
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 3/27
The Rationality of Renaissance Magic 35
as the theories of modern science or the taken-for-granted convictions of
everyday life. The aim of this article, therefore, is to set out three senses in
which a belief (or set of behefs) can be thought of
s
rational, with a view to
identifying the distinctive rationality of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
European magical tradition.
efining Magic
Before embarking on this discussion,
a
few words about my subject would
seem
in
order. There have been many attempts
to
define magic and,
in
particular, to distinguish it from rehgion and from science .' If one thing has
emerged from these discussions,
it
is the recognition that clear d istinctions
are not always possible. Magic merges into both rehgion, on the one hand,
and science and technology, on the other. Take, for example, the collection
of ancient texts published in 1928 under the title
The Greek Magical
Papyri. '
While many of these tex ts would surely count as magical, others seem to be
simple herbal remedies for com mon ailments. These could be classified as
a form of folk science. Even those who accepted the efficacy of magic have
not always been clear about such matters. Medieval thinkers, for example,
found
it
difficult
to
distinguish
a
magical potion from
a
simple poison.
Closer to our period , Giovanni Pico della Mirándola (1463—1494) defmes
magic as 'the practical part of natural science','^ whue the
Magiae naturalis
(1558) of Giambatüsta Della Porta (c. 1535 1615) combines references to
occult powers with practical instruction regarding animal breeding and plant
husbandry.
Similar remarks can
be
made about
the
porous boundary betw een religion
and magic. When Moses and Aaron had their competition with the magicians
of Pharaoh (Exodus 7-9), the actions of both sides would have appeared to
a bystander to be indistinguishable. The biblical w riters distinguish the two
^ For a dated but s t il l usefu l overv iew, see M urray Wax and Rosal ie W ax, 'The N ot io n of
M a g i c ' , Current Anthropology,
4
(1963) , 495—518. For
a
m ore recen t d i scuss ion ,
see
Jesper So rensen ,
A
Cognitive Theory
of
Magic (L a n ha m , M D : A l t a M i r a / R o w m a n
Lit t lef ie ld , 2007) , pp , 9-30 ,
^ ^ Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die Griechischen Zauberpapyri, ed. and t rans . Kar l Preisendanz, 2
vols (Leipzig: B, G,T eub ner , 1928—31); English transla t ion:
The
Greek
Magical
Papyri in
Translation, including the D emotic Spells, ed, Hans D iete r Betz (Chica go: Un ivers i ty of
Chicago Press , 1986) .
Richard Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Cu lture,
1300-1500 (Berkeley : Univers i ty of Cal ifo rn ia P ress , 19 76) , pp . 49 -5 0 ,
P ico de l l a Mi rándo la , ' Conc lus iones mag icae numero XXVI secundum op in ionem
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 4/27
3 6 Gregorjr W Dawes
groups by reference to the source of their power, rather than the nattire of
their
deeds.
'̂ In a similar
way,
'demonic magic' in medieval and early m odern
Europe was regarded as a perversion of the true faith, punishable not m erely
because it was socially dangerous, but as a form of heresy.'* Even today it
can be difficult to distinguish religion and magic. When modern Roman
Catholics carry St Christopher medals in their cars, should we regard this as
an expression of religious devotion or a magical act?
In response to these diffictilties, recent scholarship has shied away from
broad definitions of magic, favouring detailed case stu dies . But in order to
pick out the phenomena to be studied, we require some working definition
of magic, however provisional. Here is mine. Magic is the attetnpt to bring about
tangible effects by means oj actions invoking occult powers whose efficacy is thought to
depend upon
theirJorm. W hen I say that magic invokes 'occu lt' pow ers, I mean
that such powers do not correspond to the intviitively accepted (and hence
obvious) mechanisms that we employ in tmderstanding everyday events. '* By
'actions whose efficacy is thought to depend on their fo rm ', I mean tha t such
actions are thought to operate by virtue of being signs.
This definition enables us to distinguish magic from both religion and
science. Magic can be distinguished from religion by reference to the tangible,
immediate, this-worldly effects that it seeks to bring about. The distinction
between magic and science is more difficult. It carmot be found in magic's
invoking of occult powers, for modern science also invokes powers that
remain occult (that is to say, 'hidden') even when they can be demonstrated
experimentally and described in precise, mathematical terms. But modern
science differs from magic in its understanding of the powers involved. In
particular, it rejects the idea that an occult power can be invoked by actions
'^ Jacob Neusner, 'Science and Magic, Miracle and Magic in Formative Judaism:The System
and t l ie Difference' , in
Religion Science and Magic in C oncert and in Conßict
eds Jacob
Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs, and Paul Virgil McCracken Flesher (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), pp. 61-81 (p. 74).
'* Michael D. Bailey, 'From Sorcery t o W itchcraft: Clerical C onceptions of Magic in the
U te r Middle Ages',
Speculum
76 (2001), 960-90 (pp. 969-70).
Michael D. Bailey, 'The Meanings of Magic',
Magic Ritual and Witchcraft
1 (2006), 1—23
(p .
5).
' ^ Sorensen ,
A CognitiveTheory of Magic
p . 35 .
This way of making the distinction is clearest in the work of Bronistaw Malinowski. See,
for example, his 'Magic, Science and Religion', in
Science Religion and Reality
ed.
Joseph N eedham (London : Sheldon Press, 1925), pp. 19—84 (p. 38) . A different way
of distinguishing magic from religion goes back to Emile Durkheim, who argued that
magic was practised by individuals rather than by a community. See Emile Durkheim,
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 5/27
The Rationality of
Renaissance
agic
37
or objects merely
by
virtue
of
their form. Scientists may believe
in
occult
powers, but they do not manipulate them by means of ritual and symbols.'
So much
for an
initial definition
of
magic.
A
second problem
is
that
there was more than one magical tradition
in
Renaissance and early modern
Europe. The first such tradition was that of popular magic. As
in
every age,
each town had its 'ctmning m en ' and 'wise w om en ', offering remedies for
comm on human problem s: ctires, forttme telling, the detection of treasure,
success in love, and the interpretation of dreams. The acceptability of popular
magic seems to have become more contested in
the
early modern period,
as Christian clergy made particular efforts to distance orthodox reUgion
from condemned magic. This distancing of orthodox religion from magic
may be connected with the burgeoning fears regarding witchcraft, which are
characteristic of this period. And of course witchcraft belief w ent hand-in-
hand with works on demonologv, since witches were thought to be in league
o. o o
with the devil.^ To these traditions of popular magic and demonology we
might add that of alchemy, if we consider alchemy to be a magical practice.
Finally tbere existed
a
tradition
of
what
is
sometimes called 'intellectual
m agic', practised by those who thought of themselves as philosophers.
While
all
these traditions
are
interesting,
my
focus will
be on
that
of
intellectual magic. This is the magic that was wri tten about and (one assumes)
practised
by
members
of
Europe's intellectual elite.
Key
figures here
are
Marsilio Ficino (1433 1499), Cornelius Agrippa (14 86 -15 35 ),
and
Phillip
Aureolus Theophrastus
von
Hohenheim, also known
as
Paracelsus
(1493-
1541).
Ficino
has
been described
as
'high m agic's grea test Renaissance
theoretician',^' Agrippa wrote
a
popular compendium
of
magic, while
Paracelsus
is
best known
for
his medical writings. (Agrippa
and
Paracelsus
have also achieved fame
in
more recent times
as
characters
on
chocolate
frog cards
in
the Harry Potter novels.) Such learned authors may well have
been magicians,
in
the sense that they practised the rituals about which they
wrote. But what is important here is that they theorised about them , offering
us accounts
of
what magic was and why,
in
their view,
it
was effective.
My
'* My definition
of
magic excludes judicial astrology
—
the attem pt
to
predict human affairs
by reference
to
the influence of the heavenly bodies
—
insofar as astrology seeks merely
to predict and not to control. But it includes astral m agic, understood as the attem pt to
capture and channel heavenly influence.
Keith Thom as,
Religion and the ecline qf Magic
(1971
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985),
pp . 58—89; Stuart Clark, 'Witchcraft and Magic in Early Modern Culture',
in Witchcraft
and Magic
in
Europe: The Period
of
theWitch Trials eds
Bengt An kar loo
and
Stuar t Clark
(London: Athlone, 2002), pp. 97 -16 9 (pp. 11 6-2 1).
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 6/27
3 8
Gregory W Dawes
question wül
be
in what sense these theories
of
magic can
be
regarded
as
rational.
II.
Rational Belief
If the idea of a magical tradition reqtiires some clarification, so does that of
rationality. Some writers on magic employ unhelpfully broad concep tions of
rationahty.^^They may, for exam ple, speak
oí practical rationality:
the process
by which we choose particular means to achieve a desired goal.^^The prac tice
of magic can surely be rational
in
this sense. If peop le believe ritual actions
to be effective in bringing about a certain result, then if they want to achieve
that result it is reasonable for them to perform those actions.̂ ""^ But what I am
interested in here is the rationality of holding such beliefs in the first place.
Similarly, sociologists can talk about^unctionai
rationality
which refers to the
fact that a belief may function advantageously in a particular society, perhaps
by bringing about social cohesion or by relieving stress.^^ But this, too, bears
no relation
to the
question
of
whether individuals
are
acting rationally
in
holding such a
belief.
a) Rational Acts of Believing
discussing the rationality
of
belief in m agic, we also need
to
clarify
the
phrase 'rational belief for it could be used to refer to either the
content
of the
belief or the
act
by which someone believes it. When I say, 'belief in magic is
rational', do I mean that the
proposition
'magic is effective' is rational? Or do
I mean that a particular person is acting rationally in holding it? Is rationality a
property of propositions or of people?
Put
in
this way, the question practically answers
itself. It is
difficult
to
make sense of the idea that a proposition is rational.^* One can make sense of
the idea that a proposition is justified perhaps in the sense of being supported
by the available evidence. One might even think that people coun t as rational
agents only if their behefs
are
justified in this sense. Strictly speaking,
however,
it
is the act of forming or maintaining the behef that is rational, no t
^ ^ C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi,'The Problem of the Rationality of M agic', B ritish
Journal
cf
Sociology
18 (1967), 55-74 (p. 55).
^' Micha Buchowski, 'The Rationality of M agic', Philosophy of the Social
Sciences
18 (1988),
509 -18 (p. 513).
^
E. E. Evans-Pritchard,
Witchcraft
Oracles and Magic among the zande (Oxford: Clarendon
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 7/27
The Rationality of Renaissance agic 39
the content
of
the behef
itself. It
follows that rationality
is a
characteristic
of persons (and perhaps inst itutions), but not of propositions. For stylistic
reasons, I shall continue to speak about 'rational belief. But the phrase should
be understood as referring
to
rational acts of believing.
b) Bounded Rationality
A further point needs
to be
made before launching into
the
historical
discussion.
It
is that human rationality is always
bounded
rationality.^* Human
beings are
not
omniscient beings, with un limited time and resou rces. They
need
to
form behefs
on the
Hy , with limited knowledge
and
under
the
pressure
of
having
to
make immediate decisions. They cannot,
in
practice,
ensure that all their beliefs form
a
coherent set, not merely
in
the sense
of
no t contradicting one another, but also in the sense of lending support to one
another.
If
this were
our
ideal
of
human rationality, then few,
if
any, agents
would count as rational. All
we
can hope
to
achieve
is the
greatest degree
of coherence
we can
achieve
in the
circumstances, even though that w ill
inevitably fall short of
a
certain philosophical ideal.
It follows that where people
end up,
when acting rationally, will
be
partly a product of where they sta rt. People will begin their reflection in
differing 'conceptual spaces', with differing inherited behefs and cognitive
resources.
If
we
did
have unlimited time
and
resou rces, these different
starting points would be unim portant. They would recede into insignificance
as rational agents presented with the same evidence converged on a com mon
view.' But since we
do not
have unlimited resources, the re is no guarantee
that such
a
convergence will occur. Equally rational agents presented with
the same evidence may fail
to
form the same beliefs
or
modify their existing
beliefs in the same
way.
If this
is
the case, then there is no answer to
the general
question, 'Were Renaissance thinkers acting rationally in believing in magic?'
The most we can do
is to
identify the factors that would enable us to judge
the rationality of
an individual s
beliefs.
i shall argue in Section III (c) that certain collective p rocedure s can also be described as
rational, but my focus here is on the rationality of individual acts of believing.
^ Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, 'Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of
Bounded Rationality', Psychological Review 103 (1996), 65 0-6 9 (pp. 650-5 1).
J o h n S. Wilkins, 'Are Creationists Rational?',
Synthese
178 (2011), 207-1 8 (pp. 211- 13) .
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 8/27
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 9/27
The Rationality of Renaissance Magic 41
Nattiral m agic was in this sense largely astral magic , if we understand 'astral'
to deno te all the heavenly bodies, not merely the stars.^'
It is tru e that Paracelsus, for instance, occasionally downplays the power
of
the
heavenly bodies, suggesting that they merely image what happens
on earth, or that they merely 'cook' rather than create the occult powers
into which the magician can tap . But even he speaks continually of astral
influence, which he regards as critical to the practice of his magical m edicine.
He beheves, for instance, that wounds can be more or less severe depending on
the heavenly constellation under which they are received.
̂
So his disparaging
remarks about astral influence do not indicate a rejection of this traditional
doctrine. What they may indicate is a rejection of astrological determinism,
for while Paracelsus believes in stellar influence, he also holds that 'the wise
man can dominate the stars and is not subject to t h e m '. ''
The causal mechanisms by which the heavenly bodies exerted their
influence were not always mysterious. Light and heat, for instance, were
obvious candidates, and most natural philosophers w ere agreed that light
produced heat, although how
it did so
was not immediately obvious.^*
Similarly, there was no agreement on the way in which the heavenly bodies ,
particularly the sun, produced heat. But that they did so was clear. Since heat
was one of the four Aristotelian primary qualit ies , it could easily be thought
of as an important means of bringing about earthly change. Intuitively, too ,
this made sense: we are all familiar with the way in which the heat of the stm
can make plants grow and help animals to flourish.
Yet alongside these familiar mechanisms, most natural philosophers
also accepted
the
existence
of
occu lt forces, forces that
we are
unable
to
perceive. These occtilt forces constituted the m ysterious influence
inßuentia)
that heavenly bodies were thought to exercise, the
inßuxus
that descended
I say astral rather than astrological , since the latter implies a kind of determinism that
not all writers on magic would accept.
^̂ W alter Pagel , Paracelsus: A Introduction
to
Philosophical Medicine
in the
E ra
of
the Renaissance
(Basel: Karger, 1958), pp. 68-69.
Pagel, p. 54
•PageUp. 71.
' ' Paracelsus , Die Bücher de Natura rerum (153 7) , book 6; see also Theophrast von Flohenheim,
genannt
Paracelsus,
Sämtliche
Werke,
ed .
Karl Sudhoff (M un ich /B er l i n :
R
O l d e n b o u r g ,
1922-33 ) (hereaf t e r Sämtliche Werke , 1 xi 378 ( re fe rences to the s tandard ed i t ion of
t he works
of
Paracelsus
are
provided
to
enable re ade rs
to
consu l t
the
full Latin t e x t) ;
English translat ion from Paracelsus: Essential Readings, t rans . Nicho las G oodr i ck -C larke
(Berkeley , CA: North At lan t ic , 1999) (hereaf ter Essential Readings ,
p. 185.
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 10/27
4 2 Gregory W Dawes
from them and which could pen etrate even dense and opaque bodies.'* As
we shall see, a few late m edieval thinkers denied the existence of such occtüt
powers, believing that m otion and light were all the heavenly influences that
were
required
^ But this scepticism does not seem to have been widespread.
There were too many puzzling phenomena — such as the magnetic power
of the lodestone — that were assumed to have some 'natural' cause, but for
which ordinary Aristo telian physics offered no explanation.''̂ *' There were
other phenomena — such as the formation of minerals in the depths of the
earth — for which appeals to light and heat seemed pointless, since they
occurred beyond the reach of such familiar forces.''^' O nce one a ttribu ted the
formation of such minerals to an occult heavenly
influentia,
it was a small step
to associate particular metals with the influence of particular planets: tin w ith
Saturn, lead with Jupiter, iron with Mars, and so on. ^^
(ii)
Words
and Rituals
A second set of background beliefs has to do v\dth the power of words and
rituals. Characteristic of Renaissance magic as of magic in all ages — is
the belief that certain rituals , accompanied by key words, have causal power.
They can bring about tangible effects merely by being performed, in the
right context and with the right intention. The idea that certain rituals and
utterances can have effects is not, of course, limited to the world of magical
thought
The performative power of utterances — their ability to bring about
new states of affairs — was a major tbeme of twentieth-century linguistic
philosophy, inspired by J. L. Austin's 1962 work.
How to Do Things with
Words. In the appropriate social setting, and when u ttered by tbe appropriate
speaker, words can indeed bring about a new state of affairs, at least in the
social world.This is why one should be careful about what words are uttered
at an auction .There is, however, nothing m ysterious about this kind of power,
which is simply a matter of social conven tion.
There is another kind of power a ttributed to words and rituals that is also
relatively uncontroversial. It is the psychological effect that rituals can have
on those who practise them. While apparently directed outwards, word and
rituals can work 'reflexively', as it were, working inwardly to alter the state
of mind of the agent. The psychological power of rituals was already noted
'«Grant , p . 611.
^ ^ t , pp. 613 -14 .
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 11/27
The Rationality of Renaissance agic 43
by Plato, ^^
and is
discussed
by
Francis Bacon (1561—1626).''^ Renaissance
writers
on
magic were
not
unaware
of
the psychological power
of
rituals.
Marsiho Ficino, in particular, has a sophisticated understand ing of the power
of the imagination (the
vis imaginativa).^^
It would
be
wrong
to
assxune, however, that Renaissance thinkers
regarded
an
altered state
of
mind as
the only
effect
of
magical ritua l. They
believed that magical rituals could have a physical effect, above and beyond
their psychological
or
social effects. Cornelius Agrippa,
for
instance, relates
a story about female sorcerers
who can
turn
men
into beasts
of
burden
for
as
long
as
they need
to do
their work.*^* Those
who
tell this story,
including Agrippa, did not regard these women's magical powers as merely
psycholog ical. Similarly, Ficino speaks about the celestial power of various
stones. The agate-stone, he writes, can be used
to
draw down the power
of
Mercury to improve vision, while the eagle-stone can draw down the power
of Luna and Venus
in
order
to
bring about speedy deHvery
in
childbirth.'^*
While Ficino may believe
the
effect
of
such stones
to be
partly mediated
by the power
of
the imagination,
it
remains
an
effect that is brought about
by celestial powers. The power
of
the heavenly bodies, Ficino assumes, can
operate in ways that are independent of human consciousness. Such powers
are
an
objective fact about the world, into which we can tap but which are
not dependent on us.
(Hi) The D octrine
of
Signatures
A third
set of
wddely held doctrines that could be drawn upon
in
support
of magic
are
those regarding what
we
might call 'effective resem blances'.
This belief found its most influential historical expression in the doctrine of
signatures: the appearances of things can offer a key to their h idden (occtilt)
causal prope rties. As Paracelsus w rites, 'the re is nothing that nature has not
o, laws, 933A- B.
^
Bacon,
The dvancement o f Learning
(160 5) , I I. 11 .3 .
* ' D.
P.
W alker, Spiritual an d Demonic Magicfrom Ficino to Campanella (19 58 ; Un iver s ity Park :
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 76.
'̂ ^ Agrippa, De occulta
phiîosophia,
1.41, 45; English translation: Henry Cornelius Agrippa,
Three
Books
of Occult Philosophy w ritten hy H enry
Cornelius
Agrippa ofNettesheim,
t rans .
J F
[probably John French], ed. DonaldTyson (1651;
St
Paul, M N: Llewellyn Publications,
1993) (hereafter Occult Philosophy), pp. 122, 135.
Incidentally, while A grippa cites St Augustine in sup port of this story, he fails to mention
that Augustine
(D e
civitate
dei,
XVI11.18) does not believe it Augustine argues that if
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 12/27
4-4 Gregory W Dawes
signed in such a way that m an m ay discover its essen ce'
. ^ ̂
And N ature h ere is ,
ultimately, the Creator.
It is not God's will that all He has created for the benefit of man and
has given him as his own should remain hidden. ... And even if He did
conceal some things. He left nothing unmarked, but provided all things
with outward, visible marks, with special traits
—
just as a man w ho has
buried a treasure marks the spot in orde r that he may find it again.̂
I t is Paracelsus, too, who offers us a concise summary of this doctrine:
'everything that is w ith in ' , he w rite s , 'can be know n from what is w ith o u t ' . ' '
This is true of human beings as well as of other objects in the natural world.
Their inner character is revealed in their externa l ap pe ara nc e.
The doctrine of signatures is not unrelated to that of celestial influence,
for the stars and planets are often thought to be responsible for both hidden
po w er and ex tern al sign. We find this idea, altho ugh less clearly exp ressed , in
Agrippa's De occulta philosophia (1533) :
All stars have their peculiar natures, properties, and conditions, the seals
and characters whereof they produce through their rays even in these
inferior things, viz. in elem ents, in stones, in plan ts, in animals, and in their
members, w^hence everything receives from an harmonious disposition,
and from its star shining upon it, some particular seal, or character stamped
upon it, which is the significator of that star, or harmony, containing in it
a particular v irt ue .
hus for instance, the 'bay-tree, the lote- tree, and the marigold are solary
plants ' ,^* having a particular relation to the sun, and we know this because
they display the character of the sun in their roots. In this way, the doctrine
of signatures combines a belief in occult and mysterious powers with a claim
about how they are to be discovered. W hile the w orld 's hidden p ow ers
are
hid de n, they are also manifest, in th e sense that they can be 'rea d off
the appearances of things by those with the skill to do so. But it does raise
an important question, which has to do with the theory of knowledge.
^' Paracelsus,
Astronomia magna
(1538), book 10;
SamtlicheWerke, I
xii
9 1;
English translation
from
Paracelsus, Four Treatises together with Selected W ritings,
eds and t r ans . George Rosen ,
He nry E. Siger ist , C. Lil ian Tem kin , and G rego ry Zi lbo org (Birm ingham , AL: Class ics
of Medicine Library , 1988) (hereaf ter Four Treatises), u, 1 9 5 .
' Paracelsus , Die 9 Bücher de Natura rerum, book 6 ; SamtlicheWerke, xi 39 3; t ranslat ion f rom
Four
Treatises,
I i , 194 .
' ' Paracelsus , Von hirifallenden Siechtagen der Mutter Hysterie) \530); SamtlicheWerke,] \m 3 4 3 ;
translat ion from Four
Treatises,
i i , 194 .
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 13/27
The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
45
Particularly when the letters of the book of nature are not easuy read, how
can the magician come to know of
its
occult powers?
iv) Macrocosm and Microcosm
To answer that question, writers on magic could turn to another widely held
doctrine, that of macrocosm and microcosm. According to this doctrine
o
the human being represents the universe in miniature, both reflecting and
containing in his own person the p roperties of the cosmos at large. As
Agrippa writes , 'Go d ., . created man after his image; for as the world is the
image of God, so man is the image of the world; ... therefore he is called
the M icrocosm, that is the Lesser World' . T he human being is a microcosm
because he is a composite being , having an astral nature as well as a terrestrial
natu re.'* It follows, as Paracelsus w rites, that
all heavenly orbits, terrestrial nature, watery properties and airy essence
inhere in him. The nature of all fruits of the earth and all mineral ores
of water, all the constellations, and the four winds of the world are in
him. What is there upon earth whose nature and power does not reside
within man?
While the traditional, Aristotelian and Ptolemaic, cosmology made a sharp
distinction between the heavenly quintessence (fifth essence) and the four
earthly elements, this doctrine blurs that distinction by claiming that the
human being contains elements from bo th realms.' It is because the human
being is a microcosm, containing in himself all the powers of the universe,
that he can both come to know and tap into those powers in order to bring
about tangible effects. The privileged position of human beings means they
can master the powers in question. If a person fails to master these external
powers (such as those of the stars) and allows himself
[sic]
to be dominated
by them, it is because he forgets that he 'has the whole firmament hidden
within him self .**
v) Daemons and Demons
A final potential source of magical power, frequently discussed by at least
the opponents of
m agic,
was demonic or (more precisely) daemonic. It was
widely believed, by magicians and their opponents alike, that there existed
Agr ippa , De occulta philosophia, 111,36; Occult Philosophy, p . 5 79 .
'^ Pa ge l , Parace/sus, p. 65 .
P a r a c e l s u s , Opus paramirum (1531) , book 4 ; Sämtliche Werke, I ix 30 8; translat ion from
Essential Readings, p . 98 .
' Char les We bster , Paracelsus: Medicine, Magic, and (New Haven , CT:
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 14/27
4 6
Gregory W Dawes
spiritual beings having preternatural powers on whose assistance a magician
could call. This belief is
not
merely
a
product
of
Christianity;
it is
already
found among
the
practitioners
of
popular magic
in
antiquity. The Greek
magical papyri,
for
instance, include spells that are thought
to
work
in an
apparently mechanical fashion. But they also contain spells that are supposed
to work by invoking intelligent spiritual beings, namely gods or daemons.
Most early modern writers on magic make a distinction between natural
and demonic magic. Moreover, the vast majority condemn demonic magic,
even if they defend natural mag ic.
he
problem for the defenders of
magic
is
that the botindary between the tw o was far from clear. It was widely believed
that angelic intelligences m oved the planets, after all, and the m edieval world
was full
of
spirits, some of whom were benign bu t o thers m alevolent. Even
the very term 'demon'
is
here problematic,
for in
everyday usage
it
refers
only
to a
malevolent spirit.
It is
less misleading
to
use the term 'daemon',
the Latinised form
of
the Greek SaipfOV
daimôn),
for
among Renaissance
thinkers, particularly the Neoplatonists, daemons were not always regarded
as harmful
or
malevolent.'' Such thinkers drew upon the ancient idea that
there existed daemons that were good spirits and sources
of
inspiration
or
protection. Indeed,
in
Renaissance thought the ancient daemons
are
often
assimilated
to the
Christian angels. The problem was that although
not all
daemons were evil,
it
was dangerous to invoke a daemon, since even
if
your
intentions were good, you might end up with
an
evil one. For this reason,
cautious religious thinkers condemned all magic, since
it
so often seemed to
rely on demonic power.
b) Rationally Formed Beliefs
It follows that there were plenty
of
resources
in
Renaissance culture from
which one could construct
a
defence
of
magic. But
a
second and stronger
sense of the phrase 'rational belief has
to
do with how beliefs are formed.
There are two possibilities he re. Belief
in
magic may be formed as a result of
argum ents, being the product of conscious inference from some body of data.
Such a belief wotild count as rational
if
the arguments are good ones, even
when
the
premises
are
false and
the
conclusion mistaken.* ' Alternatively,
* Brian P. Copenhaver, How to Do Magic, and Why: Philosophical Pres criptions ', in
The Cambridge Companion t Renaissance Philosophy,
ed.
James H ank ins (C amb r idge :
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 137- 69 (p. 163).
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 15/27
The Rationality of
Renaissance agic
4 7
such a behef
may
be produced by some other mechanism, reliance on which
would norm ally count as rational.
i) Inferential Beliefs
Let me start with the first of these: the situation in which a behef is formed
or maintained
as a
result of a conscious process of inference. M ost commonly,
that inference will be of an explanatory kind: there wul be some puzzling fact
about the world of which the belief in question seems the best, or perhaps
the only plausible, explanation. In everyday life, for example, I might see a
broken vvdndow, note that the new television is missing, and form the beHef
that my house has been burg led. But similar inferences are found in science.
A physicist, for instance, might wdtness tracks in a cloud chamber and infer
that the best explanation of those tracks is the existence of a subatomic
particle. ^Those who value evidence and argumen t, particularly m odern
self
styled sceptics, are inchned to regard this as the paradigmatic kind of rational
believing. Perhaps it is. But as we shall see in a m om en t, relatively few of ur
beliefs, even our scientific behefs, are formed in this way.
Did Renaissance thinkers believe in magic
as
the restilt of some conscious
process of inference, one that we m ight judge to be rational? It is, of course ,
difficult to say what gives rise to a person s belief as distinct from the reasons
he or she might offer in its defence. When defending magic, writers of this
period could point to the existence of occult powers, belief in which was
seen as warranted by puzzling phenomena, such as magnetism. But behef
in occult powers is not identical with belief in magic. One could accept the
existence of occult powers but deny our abüity to tap into them. So even if
the existence of such powers was regarded
as
the best available explanation of
some phenomenon, it did not foflow that magic would be effective.
In fact, it seems that belief in the power of magic itself was rarely, if ever,
defended as the bes t available explanation of otherw ise puzzling phenom ena.
Perhaps the nearest we come to a rationahty of
this
kind is in the writings of
Paracelsus. Not only does Paracelsus compare his medical procedures vsdth
those of the trad itiona l. Galenic medicine that
he
opposes. He also argues that
his remedies are be tter than those proposed by traditional m edicine because
they are based on experien ce.
s
he w rites,
every physician must be rich in knowledge, and not only of that which is
written in books; his patients should be his book, they will never mislead
him. .. . But he who is content with mere letters is like a dead man; cind
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 16/27
48
Gregory
W
Dawes
he is hke
a
dead
physician. As a
man and
as a
physician, he
kills his
patient.
Not even a dog killer can learn his trade from books, but only from
experience. And how much more true is this of
the
physician *"'
One could regard this attitude as 'empirical',*^ if by this term one
means nothing m ore than a reliance on first-hand experience as opposed to
a priori
a rgum ent o r the authority of books. It may even stem from the same
'constructive scepticism' about the power of reason that led seventeenth-
century natural philosophers to tu rn to experiment.*"' But it is hardly empirical
in our modern sense.''*" With the work of Paracelsus, we are still a long way
from the later scientific ideal of quantifiable, controlled experiments that
could, in principle, be rep licated by anyone. W hen Paracelsus referred to
experience, he was not talking about a knowledge of the world that stems
from cautious experimentation." He was talking about a kind of intuitive
knowledge: one that does not rely on conscious reasoning and which leads
one to grasp the inner essence of things.*'
Reasoning from empirical evidence is not, of course, the only way in
which to form beliefs by way of inference. One could also form a behef in
magic by way of reasoning from other behefs, such as the belief in demons,
angels, occult powers, or the doctrine of the microcosm. As we have seen,
the world of Renaissance and early modern thought contained plenty of
resources for arguments of this kind, which w ere freely used by defenders of
magic. Marsiho Ficino, in his famous defence, could even deploy theological
arguments. He noted, for example, that three magi were the first to adore
the Christ child and that Jesus's disciples themselves enjoyed knowledge of
occult powers.*"' But of course a person may produce arguments in defence
*̂
Paracelsus, Das Buch Paragranum (1565);
SamtlicheWerhe 1
viii 70; English translation from
Paracelsus: SelectedWritings ed. Jolande Jacobi, trans. Norb ert Gu terman, 2nd edn (New
York: Pantheon, 1958), p. 50.
*̂ N icholas G oodrick-C larke, 'Intro du ctio n', in Essential Readings, pp. 1
— 7
(p. 24); Pagel,
Paracelsus, p. 53 .
'"̂ Pagel,
Paracelsus p. 51 ;
on the 'construc tive scepticism' of the age, see Richard H . Popkin,
The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), pp. 112-27; and Keith Hutchison, 'What Happened to Occult Qualities
in the Scientific Revolution?',
¡sis
73 (1982), 233-53 (pp. 248-50).
* * Pagel, Paracelsus p. 65; Harald Burger, 'Deutsche Sprachgeschichte
und
Geschichte der
Phi losophie ' , in Sprachgeschichte: ein Handhuch zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache un d ihrer
rforschung eds W erner Besch, Anne Betten , Oskar R eichmann, and Stefan Sonderegger,
2nd edn (Berlin: W alter de Gru yter, 1998), pp. 18 1-92 (p. 185).
Webster,
Paracelsus
pp. 154, 156-57.
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 17/27
The Rationality of
Renaissance
Magic 49
of
position that is being held on other grounds. There is httle evidence that
Renaissance thinker
s^r/ned
the ir belief in magic as
result of such inferences.
These background behefs seem to have made more plausible
behef
in
magic
that was formed on other g rounds.
ii) Basic Beliefs
What were those o ther grounds? There are two other ways of forming beliefs
that are often regarded as rational. The first gives rise
to
what philosophers
call 'basic'
or
'non-inferential' beliefs. These are formed spontaneously as
a
result
of
being placed
in a
particular situation. The best-knovni instance
is
that
of
a behef that we form as
a
result
of
sense perception. My belief that
there is
a
coffee cup on my desk, for instance, was not formed as a result of
evidence
or
argum ent. Undoubtedly,
it
does involve some sort
of
cognition,
perhaps matching
the raw
sensory stimuli with learned categories such
as
'coffee cup'. But the cognition involved is generally
unconscious:
the belief in
question is not formed as a resu lt of any
reflective
process of inference.' The
same may be said of beliefs that arise from memory. These, too , are formed
spontaneously, no t as a result of conscious inference and argument.
It is at least possible that behefs about magic might have been formed in
the same way, spontaneously, as
result of
sense
perception. This could occur
in situations
in
which the individuals
in
question had witnessed phenomena
that they perceived to be the result of magical operations. Benvenuto Cellini
(1500 1571),
for
example,
the
Florentine artist
and
goldsmith, relates
a
story of such an occasion. Cellini had fallen in love with a Sicüian girl, whose
mother had (wisely, one suspects) tried to rem ove her from his influence.
In
an effort to ensure they were reunited, Cellini calls upon an acquaintance,
a
priest who was familiar with magical arts. They went
to
the Colosseum
by
night, where by means of various elaborate ceremonies, the priest conjured
up
a
host
of
dem ons, the sight
of
which terrified everyone involved.
It
was
so impressive that
the
priest later invited Cellini
to
engage with him
in
consecrating a book
to
the devil', with the aid of which they could become
rich through treasure hunting.
This whole account may, of course, be fictional, but even if it is, Cellini
clearly intended
it to be a
plausible fiction.
It
is, after all, included
in his
autobiography. But if it is reliable record , it shows an educated person of the
Renaissance relating experiences that
he
himself a ttributed
to
magical powers.
On the idea of unconscious cog nition, see Rhianon Allen and A rthu r S. R eber, ' Unconscious
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 18/27
50
Gregory
W
Dawes
What is important here is that there is no indication that Cellini engaged
in any conscious process of theorising, weighing up potential explanations
of the phenom ena he was experiencing. Rather he perceived them , in some
immediate fashion,
as
magical. More precisely, he perceived them as the
workings of a powerful, demonic magic. If this is tru e, then Cellini s belief in
magic may have been a form of
hasic
or
non iriferential
belief
Of such a belief it makes little sense to ask if we are rational in forming
it. After all, we do not in any sense
choose
to form such a belief: we have
no choice, but do so spontaneously. But we can ask if a person is acting
rationally in continuing to hold a belief that is formed in this way. common
view ctmong philosophers is that non-inferential beliefs arising from sense
perception enjoy a kind of
prima
Jade justification. ̂ Acceptance of such
beliefs is , as it were, rational until further no tice , that is to say, untu we
have reason to doubt them . There are times when we do have good reasons
to doub t them , to assume that our senses are deceived or are malfunctioning.
But we are entitled to accept the deliverances of our senses unless we have
such reasons. On this view, people who witness what appear to be magical
operations are acting rationally in taking what they see at face value, unless
they have reason to question it.
The question then becom es whether those who v\dtnessed what appeared
to be magical operations had reason to doubt the evidence of their senses.
There are two kinds of reasons that might cause a rational agent to entertain
such doubts. The first is based on
a posteriori
reasoning, and derives from the
observation that magiccil rituals repeatedly fail to bring about their claimed
effects. If this is the case, then it
is
unlikely that what
I
am witnessing
is ,
in fact,
a magical operation. It is more likely to be the result of deception or illusion.
The second is based on
a priori
reasoning. If my background beliefs are such as
to make successful magic highly improbable, then a similar conclusion should
be drawn. In this situation, too, it seems more likely that the phenomena in
question have a non-magical cause.
Let me begin with the first of these: the
a posteriori
reasoning. On the
assumption that magical rituals are, in fact, ineffective, we might think that
Renaissance and early m odern thinkers should
have
realised this. Notoriously,
however, practitioners of magic have ways of accounting for apparent failures,
which do not call into question the general efficacy of their rituals. Witch
doctors, for example, might explain the failure of their practices by arguing
that they were countered by further acts of witchcraft. But even setting this
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 19/27
The Rationality cxf Renaissance Ma gic 5
aside, the inefficacy of m agic wa s by n o m ean s an easy thing t o establish in a
world that lacked controlled experiments and clinical tr ials.
In any case, magic sometimes works: it brings about its desired effects.
It may do so, for instance, in ways that we would think of as psychologically
me diated and therefore natural.^^ As on e anthropologist w rite s , peo ple do
occasionally die of witchcraft . . . and they are some tim es healed by faith P^
Ftir thermore, magic r i tuals are of ten accompanied by medicinal or dietary
remedies, as in the work of Ficino. Even if the ritual remedies had no
psychological effect on their own, these other measures may have influenced
the outc om e. Since no attem pt was ma de to el iminate such confotmding
factors , as we w ould call th em , i t m ust have been n o s imple m atter to decide
if magical r ituals did or did not w ork .
W hat abo ut the secon d kind of evidence for scepticism: that based on a
priori reasoning Irom background beliefs? Once again, the background beliefs
of this period offer little reason for scepticism. A ra tional agent of the twe nty-
first ce ntury w ho w itnesses wh at appears to be a successftil m agical op eratio n
surely has reasons for d ou bt.T ho se rea sons have to d o with a be t ter know ledge
of the way in which the world operates, or ( if one prefers) a different set of
background beliefs. But the thinkers of the Renaissance period occupied a
very different conceptual universe from our own.
These differences should not, however, be overstated. Even some who
shared these background beliefs were sceptical about magic. As we shall see
shortly, scepticism abo ut m agic w as a Uve possibüity in th e societies in w hich
Ficino, Agrippa, and Paracelsus w ro te. So while there w ere back grou nd
beliefs that lent support to belief in magic, there were other backgrotmd
beliefs that might lead one to be sceptical. I t might be argued that those
who expressed such scepticism were acting more rat ionally than those who
did not .
Hi) Belief on Testimony
I shall com e back to the reason s for scepticism in a m o m en t.T he re
is,
however,
another way of forming beliefs. In addition to behefs formed on the basis of
iriference and those formed spontaneously as the result of experience., there is a
third category, that of belief on the basis of testimony. I t i s impor tant to note
how significant this ca teg ory is. W e may, for ex am ple , believe that science is
based on exp erim en tal ev idence and careful reasoning. T he re will surely be
peo ple for wh om this is tr u e, at least some of the tim e. But for non -scientists
(or for scientists themselves outside of their own field) beliefs about science
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 20/27
5
Gregory W Dawes
are much more likely to be based on testimony. I believe, for example, that
the equation e = mc^ represents the rate at which m atter can be converted into
energy. But I do not believe this as a result of following the reasoning that
gave rise to it. I believe it on the testimony of those whom I judge to have the
requisite knowledge and skills. Such behef may fall short of a certain ideal —
it would, perhaps, be better if
I
could follow the reasoning for myself
—
but it
does not seem to be irrational.
As it happens, testimony seems to have been the most common basis
for belief in magic during the Renaissance. Brian Copenhaver, for example,
refers to what he calls the doxographic evidence for m ag ic . This consisted
of documents that were wddely beheved to be ancient, dating back to
Hermes Trismegistus or Z oroaster or M oses, of which the orpus Hermeticum
translated by Ficino was the best-known collection. Such documents were
thought to embody a ptisca or antiqua
theologia,
which gave the practice of
magic an ancient and venerable lineage. The appeal to doctunents of this
kind is particularly p rom inen t in the work of Agrippa, which repeatedly cites
ancient authors and reports of magical operations.
Were Agrippa and his contem poraries acting rationally in accepting such
reports? As I noted a moment ago, there is nothing intrinsically irrational
about believing something on authority, partictilarly if we have reason to
regard the authority in question as rehable. But, as David Htime writes, a
wise man .. . proportions his behef to the evide nc e , and this may involve
taking a critical attitude to repor ts of extraord inary events. It would be clearly
anacbronistic to expect the thinkers of this period to have the critical attitude
of the modern historian. But was it possible for them to doubt the evidence
of the many docum ents that apparently witnessed to magical effects?
iv) Scepticism about Magic
It seems that it was, for alongside the many Renaissance thinkers who
believed in m agic, there also existed a num ber of
sceptics.
Wben faced wdth
reports of marvellous events
{miiabilia),
at least some Renaissance thinkers
were p repared to question them . Already in the fourteenth century, Nicolas
Oresme (c. 1320—1382) complained about the excessive credulity of many
5 Brian
P.
Cop enhave r, Did Science Have a Renaissance? , fas, 83 (199 2), 38 7- 40 7 (p. 396);
Copenhaver, Na tural Magic, He rm etism , and Occultism in Early M odern Science , in
Reappraisals of the Scientific R evolution, eds David C. Lindberg and Ro be r t S . W estma n
(Camb ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 261-3 01 (p. 275).
* See the preface to Eicino s
Pimander
cited in Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt,
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 21/27
The Rationality <xf Renaissance Magic
53
of his contem poraries. Even many holy m en and theologians, he writes, have
been too quick to believe reports of extraordinary events: If you ask how
they know [something to be
true],
they can give no bette r response than a
simple wom an'.'
Oresme was, perhaps, ahead of his tim e. But in the fifteenth century a
growing number of thinkers display a new sense of the past, which includes
a critical attitude towards reports of past even ts.''The most famous example
was Lorenzo Valla (1 406-1 45 7), who in 1440 exposed the so-called
Donation
of
Constantine
as an eighth-century forgery by pointing to the 'various
contradictions, impossibilities, stupidities, barbarisms, and absurdities' that
docum ent contains. W riters on magic, too , can exhibit something of this
new sensibihty. In his
Disputations Against Divinitary Astrology
(1496) , for
example, Pico della Mirándola criticises no less a figtire than Roger Bacon for
his tmcritical acceptance of authorities. '
This scepticism was no t merely about the doctunents that spoke of magic.
There existed thinkers who were sceptical about the very possibüity of magic.
Religious thinkers, of
course,
often condemned m agic, on the grotmds that it
involved interaction with
demons.
But such scepticism did not necessarily cast
doubt on the efficacy of
magic,
for it
was wddely believed that demons cotild
bring about effects that were 'praeter naturam' ('preternatural'), outside of
the ordinary operations of nature. ^ But it is no t the theological criticism of
magic that interests me here; it is scepticism about the very possibility of
magic. Luden Febvre famously argued that it was not possible to be an atheist
in the sixteenth century. ^ But whatever the truth of Febvre's claims about
religion, it was certainly possible to be a sceptic about m agic.
Noteworthy here are those thinkers who doubted the very existence
of the occult powers to which theorists of magic appealed. I have already
mentioned O resme's criticism of
the
credtility of his contem poraries. But on
at least one occasion, Oresm e denies that the re is any need to posit occult
' 'Si queras quomodo scitis hoc , ipsi non plus respo ndeb unt quam simplex m uli er' , cited
in
LynnThorndike, A History
o f
Magic and Experimental
Science 8
vols (New York: Colum bia
University Press, 192 3-58 ),
m
(1934), 453 .
' ' Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense
o f
the Past (London: Edward Arno ld, 1949), pp.
7,
50—76.
Lorenzo Valla, On
the
Donation
of
Constantine (144 0), trans. G.
W.
Bowersock (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp.
8-9
' Pico della Mirándola, Disputations
1.64—66,
cited
in
Farmer, Syncretism in theWest p.
144.
^Anthony Ossa-Richardson, 'Pietro Pomponazzi
and the
Rôle
of
Nature
in
Oracular
20
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 22/27
54
Gregory W Dawes
heavenly influences, arguing that the effects of the heavens on the ea rth can all
be accounted for by reference to manifest qualities.***
s
he w rites,
in order to explain action or production in these inferior beings and their
diversity one ought not to posit any qualities or influence in the heavens
other than light and motion ... thus ... heaven brings about whatever
effects [it brings about] through its form or essence by means of
its
light
and motion and not through other unknown qualities, which are called
influences.*^
While this attitude is unusual, Oresme was not the only one to make such
suggestions. Writing at a later date, Alessandro Achillini (1463—1512)
attributed the formation of metals in the earth not to occult influence, but
to the power of heat. * While the denial of occult astral influence did not
rule out the possibility of magic (which could appeal to other powers) , it did
undercut a central pillar of Renaissance magical theory.
Other authors of the period expressed scepticism about demonic
magic. W hue n ot denvinp the existence of demons, Oresm e cast doubt on
their abuity to bring about tangible effects. ' He also calls into question the
efficacy of the spells that are thought to summon dem ons, citing as evidence
the diversity of the invocations that are employed in different places or by
different sects.** So while Oresm e does not deny the possibility of
magic,
he
is inclined to reduce all magic to natural m agic. In this respect, he anticipates
the more radical arguments of
an
author closer to our period, namely Pietro
Pomponazzi (1462-1525). Pomponazzi offered Aristotelian arguments that
called into question, not just the power of demons to bring about tangible
effects, but their very existence.*** It is difficult to know how widespread such
scepticism was, for the denial of the existence of demons was hazardous in a
world in which Church authorities frequently spoke about demonic power.
But such authors show that it was certainly possible to entertain doubts about
magic.
What
is
striking
is
that even those who wrote about magic we re, at times,
capable of expressing scepticism about
its
power.The best-known example is,
once again, C ornelius Agrippa. The same Agrippa w ho wrote the
De occulta
philosophia
also auth ored the
De inceititudine et vanitate
scientiarum
declamatio
^ ^
T h o r n d i k e ,
Magic and Experimental Science
III , 414.
* ' N i c o le O r e s m e ,
^uaestio contra divinatores
horoscopios (1 370 ) , c i ted in G ran t ,
Planets Stars
and Orbs
p. 61 3, n. 177 (translation author's ow n).
'' Achillini, íifeer de orbibus (1494), cited in Grant, p. 614.
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 23/27
The Rationality
cJRenaissance Magic 55
invectiva
(15
27).
In
this work, he seems to renounce many of his earlier beliefs,
casts doubt upon many ancient authorities, and describes magic as nothing
but
a
m ixture
of
Idolatry, Astrology, and superstitious Physick'.'^^
It is not
clear whether Agrippa's purpose in penning the
De vanitate
(as
it
came to be
known) was serious, playful,
or
perhaps prophylactic:
a
defence against the
charge of having written in support of
magic.
But there is no need to decide
this question here. What is important is that
it
constitutes fiirther evidence
that there existed reasons
for
doubting
the
efficacy
of
magic.
It
could
be
argued that those who faued
to
take such reasons seriously failed
to
act
as
rationally as those who did.
(c) ollective Rationality
Traditional definitions
of
rationality have assumed that
it is an
attribute
of
individuals
or of
the decisions made
by
individuals. So
far in
this article
I
have done the same. More recently, however, some philosophers have begun
working with
a
broader understanding.
On
this view, rationality involves
the employment of those procedures that reliably give rise to true belief. Note tha t
'reliably' here means
for the
most p art ' rather than 'always'. O utside
of
simple deductive reasoning, no procedures of this kind will be Infallible.
If
we adopt a broad definition of this kind, then
it
becomes clear that rational
belief-forming procedures can be
social
rather than m erely
individual.
i) Science as Social Process
This is certainly true of the modern sciences, which are successful not
merely because they employ particularly reliable forms of reasoning or good
experimental m ethods.
key factor in their success is that their practitioners
are organised into particular kinds of communities, which have distinctive
procedures. David Hull, for example, highhghts two collective processes
that con tribute to the success of science . The first is that of granting credit,
particularly to those who can claim priority in proposing an idea. Scientists
gain credit not only by pubhcation, but by the number of times their
^
Henry C ornelius Agrippa,
The Vanity of Arts and Sciences,
trans, James Cottrell (London:
j
C,
for
Samuel Speed, 1676), p, 127,
' I have singled out the work of David Hull merely as an exam ple. Othe r ph ilosophers w ho
have contributed
to
this discussion
are
Helen
E.
Longino Science as Social Knowledge:
Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
(Princeton,
Nj:
Princeton University Press,
1990) ) , Phi l ip Ki tcher
Tbe Advancement
of
Science: Science without
Legend
Objectivity
without Illusions
(New York: Oxford University Press, 199 3)),
and
Miriam Solomon
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 24/27
5 6 Gregory W Dawes
publications are both cited and used by others. Gaining credit for priority
might encourage secrecy, but in fact credit can be gained only by making
public one's data and by citing the works of others (which in turn extends
their c red it). The im portance of gaining credit m ight also encourage fraud,
but scientific commtmities are generally severe on those who offer fraudulent
restilts. It follows that if scientific fraud is comparatively ra re, it is not because
scientists are particularly virtuous, but because of the collective procedtires
of their com munities.
The second major mechanism is that of collective checking, a process by
which others attempt to replicate and verify published results. This restilts in
a degree of objectivity. This objectivity arises, not merely from the fact that
scientific theories can be inter-subjectively tested,'^ but from the fact that
they have been through a communal process of testing. As Htill write s,
the objectivity that matters so much in science is not primarily a
characteristic of individual scientists, but of scientific communities.
Scientists rarely refute their own pet hypotheses, especially after they have
appeared in print, hut that is all right.Their fellow scientists will he happy
to expose these hypotheses to severe testing.
For the same reason, science 'does not require that scientists be tmbiased'
it
requires only 'that different scientists have different biases'.*^
To H ull's two m echanisms, we may add a third Scientific commtmities are
so constituted that they can engage in what computer scientists call 'parallel
processing' . The y can ptirsue independent and even mutually contradictory
lines of research, without needing to worry about their consistency. This
means that the norms of rationality within a collective project may be
different from those that wotild apply to an individual working alone . A
solitary individual might not be acting rationally in purstiing a hypothesis
that seems highly unlikely to produce results. But a scientist, who belongs to
a com munity of researchers, can feel free to pursue such a line of inquiry, in
the confident expectation that o thers will pursue m ore apparently promising
lines of inquiry.'''
'2 Karl R. Popper, The Logic ofSdentißc Discovery (19 35; London: Routledge, 20 02), p. 22.
David L. Hu l l ,
Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual
Development
of
Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 4.
'^ Hull, p. 22.
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 25/27
The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
57
(ii) Collective Rationa litj in the Rena issance
The birth of modern science is customarily dated to the seventeenth century,
for it was that century which saw the rise of the scientific institutions that
embodied such processes.'' One thinks, for instance, of the
Accademia dei
Lincei, with w^hich Galileo was associated, which was founded in 1609, the
Royal Society in Britain, founded in 1660, and the
Académie des Sciences
in
France, founded in 1666. But at least some of these social processes pre-
existed the seventeenth century. When Galileo applied for the chair of
mathem atics at Bologna in 1587, his propositions on centres of gravity w ere
sent for review to Giuseppe Moletti (1531-1588), the holder of a similar
chair at the University of Padova.'^ It seems, then, that in late medieval
universities there existed at least an informal and occasional process of peer
review.
If early modern nattiral philosophy benefited from tbis collective scrutiny,
what we might call 'the science of magic' seems to have lacked it. Many
theorists of magic
—
thinkers such as Paracelsus or Giordano Bruno (1548—
1600) spurned the establisbed institutions of learning. They were 'wayward
geniuses and intellectual vagabonds','' working and publishing outside of the
universities. It is true that other theorists of mapic did belong to institutions
of learning.' ^ But even when they did, the ctdture of magic (like that of
alchemy) valued secrecy rather than
publicity.
'' Tbe preface to Agrippa's
De occulta philosophia
includes a letter from his teacher Abbot Trithemius of
Sponheim (146 2—1516) advising
him
' to communicate vulgar secrets to vtilgar
friends, but higher secrets to higher, and secret friends only'.' ^ This was, of
course, in one sense pretence, for these words are fotind in the preface of a
published book. But there w ere reasons why a magus might be cautious about
publication. Even among the intellectual elite, 'imprisormient and execution
were real demgers facing those interested in magical practices'.' ' It foflows
' Naom i Ore skes and Erik M. Conway , Merchants qf Doubt How a Handful qf Scientists Obscured
the T ruth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming
(New York: Bloomsbury , 20 10 ) ,
pp. 268 -69 .
^^ W. R. L ai rd , ' In t rod uc t io n ' , in The Unfinished Mechanics of Giuseppe M oletti: An Edition and
English Translation o f his Dialogue on Mechanics
(1576) , ed . and t rans . Lai rd (Toronto :
University ofToronto Press, 2000), pp. 3-62 (p. 40).
''^ Th orn dik e,
Magic and Experimental Science,
V, 12 7.
Benedik Lang, Unlocked Books: Manuscripts of Learned Magic in the M edieval Libraries of Central
Europe (Un iversity Park: Pennsylvania State U niversity Press , 2008), pp . 268—69.
'**' Peter J. Erench,
yo/in
Dee The World of an Elizabethan Magus (Lo ndon: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1972), pp. 81-82.
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 26/27
8/10/2019 The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-rationality-of-renaissance-magic 27/27
C o p y r i g h t o f P a r e r g o n i s t h e p r o p e r t y o f A u s t r a l i a n & N e w Z e a l a n d A s s o c i a t i o n f o r M e d i e v a l
& E a r l y M o d e r n S t u d i e s a n d i t s c o n t e n t m a y n o t b e c o p i e d o r e m a i l e d t o m u l t i p l e s i t e s o r
p o s t e d t o a l i s t s e r v w i t h o u t t h e c o p y r i g h t h o l d e r ' s e x p r e s s w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . H o w e v e r , u s e r s
m a y p r i n t , d o w n l o a d , o r e m a i l a r t i c l e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l u s e .