1
The Wandering EUropean or The De Facto Birth of the EU Citizen
New Labor Migration Trends within the Boundaries of the Enlarged European Union
RUXANDRA PAUL
Harvard University, Government Department
Paper prepared for the ECPR Join Sessions of Workshops Lisbon, April 14th-19th 2009
Workshop # 17:
“European domestic societies in the face of European integration and globalization” (Ben Rosamond & Kennet Lynggaard)
First draft. Please don’t cite or circulate. Comments are very welcome.
Correspondence:
Ruxandra Paul Harvard University
The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies 27 Kirkland Street at Cabot Way
Cambridge MA 02138, USA Email: [email protected]
2
In a world increasingly transformed by simultaneous revolutions in the fields of
communication, technology, and transportation, reductions in transaction costs and the manifest
ever-freer movement of capital, goods and services across national frontiers have led many to
believe that transnational flows “have all but eradicated meaningful national frontiers” (Messina
and Lahav, 2006: 569). This is the vaguely defined “globalization era,” in which unprecedented
challenges have allegedly started dissolving the very foundations of the Westphalian state system,
undermining key principles of modern geo-politics such as state sovereignty, territoriality, and the
exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. What remains of the old
international order, it is argued, is nothing but a world of “borders beyond control” (Bhagwati,
2003). Indeed, scholars supporting the “globalization thesis” (Hollifield, 1998) predicate their
arguments on the assumption that contemporary transnational social and economic forces have
severely eroded the sovereignty and regulatory power of the nation-state.
Disaster movies generally have great box office success. Similarly, an aura of fascination
surrounds arguments predicting that a future “globalization era” can only emerge on the ruins of
the current nation-state system. No matter how appealing, premature conclusions and over-
generalizing statements have to be resisted in favor of developing more nuanced and scientifically
rigorous interpretations of contemporary realities. For example, if there is considerable empirical
evidence to demonstrate a state’s “loss of control” over certain policy areas or phenomena such
as flows of capital, we cannot simply assume that this authority delegation and competence
erosion extends homogenously across policy areas to affect other transborder flows like
migration. Boundaries may become more porous for some types of transnational movement (of
goods, capital, technology, information transmitted via mass media etc.), while preserving or
amplifying their degree of impermeability for others (migration, the provision of certain services
etc.). Contextualization also matters in answering the “obstinate or obsolete” question about the
state of the nation-state (Hoffmann, 1966). Over-generalizations can be especially distorting for
the examination of the triad integration-globalization-domestic change because they obscure
concepts and logical relationships that constitute useful landmarks in differentiating European
integration (and, possibly, the dynamics of other regional integration projects – Mattli, 1999)
from patterns of globalization. Partial overlaps between these processes and their respective
consequences further complicate the analytical challenge.
3
While some pundits proclaim the death of the nation-state, others point ut to numerous
indicators of the state’s obstinate resilience on a variety of dimensions and through a multitude of
institutional structures and arrangements. For instance, in coping with the transnational
challenge of migratory flows, states may build “neocorporatist” channels, recruiting nonstate
actors, local authorities, and intergovernmental forums to their service, delegating responsibilities
and engaging these new actors in regulation, implementation, or enforcement activities (Lahav,
2000). As Lahav cogently points out, such evolutions do not demonstrate a loss of regulatory state
power, but rather a transformation in the nature of state authority and an adaptation of its
concrete institutional manifestations to cope more efficiently and effectively with new challenges.
This assertion leads us to formulate a set of interrelated issues situated at the core of the present
project: are national actors “losing control” over transnational processes such as migration, as
some political scientists predict (Sassen, 1996; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1994)? Are we
witnessing any shifts in terms of acceptable practices in the international political arena or any
modifications reflected by developments in customary and codified international law? Are new
precedents being set and, if so, what are their implications? Finally, could “control” be
apparently lost at one institutional level only to be regained at another through new formal or
informal arrangements?
Ostensibly from the above puzzles, adding the EU with its realities and its institutional
structures to the debate considerably increases the complexity of the methodological challenge.
The reframed set of questions becomes: how do states respond to transnational pressures
associated with globalization and European integration, respectively? Given the overlap between
multiple dimensions of globalization and integration, how can we most effectively disentangle
these rival variables? On what conceptual or empirical basis can we begin to sketch the zones of
non-intersection on this Euler diagram? What are the expressions that these non-intersection
zones find in the realm of international law, international relations, and in the relationship
between nation-states and their citizens? And last but not least, how is this whole exercise useful?
Finally, one could shift the direction of the causal arrows in the triad to ask a different set
of questions that assumes state agency as much more consequential. In that vein, one wonders if
states define the trajectory of European integration in response to perceived challenges deriving
from globalization. Does the EU constitute a shield against otherwise out-of-control global
forces? Is this model portable and should we expect to see it implemented in other regions? In
4
other words, does European integration forecast the emergence of a world of regional blocs that
are open to the global economy in some respects, but reinvent protectionism on a bigger scale in
others?
In response to these issues, I argue that, through a thread of unprecedented developments
in international (EU) law, European integration has led to the emergence of a special kind of
“transnational space” (Portes, 1996) within the boundaries of the European Union. This paper
attempts to show how, within the crystallizing “area of freedom, security and justice,” the
evolving rules of access (“access variables” that capture state-imposed regulations of entry on and
exit from national territory – Weiner, 1985) govern “internal” migration between EU member
states in stark difference from the traditional principles of international law that still characterize
migration between non-EU countries, as well as flows originating outside the Schengen area and
having EU member-states as a destination. This new transnational space formally protected by
EU treaties offers individuals possibilities of transborder movement far superior to any equivalent
mobility-benefits derived from globalization. Basically, European integration has generated a
legal space in which we are currently witnessing the birth of the de facto EU citizen, an individual
that takes full advantage of the unprecedented transnational freedom of movement that the
Union provides. I construct a chronology of state-migrant worker relations, on the basis of which
I argue that intra-EU transborder mobility represents a final step in the emancipation of
individual workers from the constraints imposed upon them by nation-states and from the risks
associated with illegal labor markets. Free movement constitutes a cost-effective alternative to
decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990).
Mini-Discours de la Méthode The systematic analysis of migration patterns as key to decoding the
integration-globalization interface
For the purposes of this project, following Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and
numerous other scholars of international political economy, I adopt a minimalist definition of
globalization as international trade integration and openness to international capital markets.
This basic definition does not exclude the possibility of incorporating other characteristics in the
analysis of globalization trends: one could discuss, for instance, the high volume of cross-border
5
communications and information exchange, or make arguments about the higher level of
international diffusion of political, economic, and cultural frameworks and norms. In any case, to
avoid confusions, globalization should be separated from the often-associated concept of
interdependence, i.e. “the growing sensitivity and vulnerability between separate units” (Zuern,
2003).
Hard as it may seem to believe, there is one concept in political science that is even more
pestered by definitional problems than globalization, as every apprentice in EU studies finds out
from the most authoritative voices in the field (e.g. Rosamond, 2000). European integration can
be understood in the simplistic, ambiguous and broad glossary terms, as a process that “implies
the act of combining parts to make a unified whole – a dynamic process of change,” associated
with “the intensely institutionalized form of cooperation found in Western Europe after 1951”
(Cini, 2007: 460). Some additional guidance may be derived from the European Economic
Community’s founding document, the Rome Treaty of 1957, which emphasizes in its Preamble
the signatories’ commitment to “lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe.”1 The provision prefigures the two distinct dimensions of the Community’s future
development, the former more emphatically expressed than the latter:
1. European integration, i.e. in order to achieve an ever closer union, member states will
continue to delegate more power in an increasing number of areas to European
institutions
2. European enlargement, i.e. in order to form a genuinely European union, other countries
would join the community and participate in supranational decision-making.
Some may argue that opting for such a definition of European integration unjustifiably
exaggerates what differentiates it from other regional integration projects as well as from
globalization. Yet, even the father of liberal intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik,
acknowledges EU exceptionalism when he writes: “over the past half-century, the EU
successfully expanded its substantive scope and institutional mandate until it now stands without
parallel among international institutions”2 (Moravcsik, 2001: 161). The main problem that we
encounter in defining European integration is the absence of a clear and agreed-upon finalité of
1 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, full text available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm 2 Moravcsik, Andrew, “Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality”, in Nicolaidis and Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; p. 161.
6
the EU as a geo-political entity and experiment. The Union is in constant transformation in
terms of both substance and territory (integration and enlargement), so the recurring question
“Quo vadis, Europa?” (Majone, 2005) often elicits rhetorical echoes.
Methodologically, the present paper attempts to set the foundations for a strategy that
allows researchers to examine in concert the triad globalization-European integration-change in
European domestic societies. Such endeavor requires systematic multi-level investigations
predicated on research resigns that can register and evaluate related developments unfolding,
simultaneously or sequentially, on the interfaces between (and with ramifications in) multiple
arenas: global/international, supranational, national, sub-national/regional, reaching all the way
down to local communities and to the individual level. Only creative and innovative analytical
strategies that flexibly embrace interdisciplinarity and methodological eclecticism are able to
overcome the significant conceptual and methodological challenges associated with this type of
scientific endeavor. I argue that “systematic process analysis” (Hall, 2003) constitutes a good
avenue for rendering this type of research more manageable, focused, and fruitful.
What does this recommendation mean in practice? In essence, we could start by
identifying a process (or a bundle of interrelated processes) that is deeply connected via roots,
developments and consequences with each and every one of the three studied processes
(globalization, European integration, and domestic societal change in European countries). Next,
a set of theories can be formulated and predictions can be derived about the expected patterns
that signal if the theory is valid or false. Finally, on the basis of process tracing and pattern
matching (Hall, 2003), competing hypotheses must be tested to determine the congruence
between predictions and observations; this produces a judgment about one theory’s
value/superiority relative to others. This analytical strategy generates a rich set of conclusions
about the causal processes that connect the macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis, allowing
for the incorporation of multiple research techniques including variable-oriented research as well
as small-N comparisons.
This paper concentrates on migration as a process that develops in close interaction with
and having profound consequences for global market pressures, supranational governance
(particularly in the European Union’s institutional framework), and domestic political, socio-
economic, and even cultural transformations. Migration constitutes an ideal way to tackle and
untangle the bundle of issues that forms our workshop’s focus, since there are sharp differences
7
between the globalization-triggered migratory patterns and the flows facilitated by European
integration. Lahav remarks that “the strategies increasingly used to control migration make clear
that states are neither losing control nor abdicating sovereignty; rather, states seek to reduce the
costs of immigration and to control migration at the same time as they allow the free flow of
trade and goods” (Lahav, 2000). Yet, this same strategy, when implemented in two different – if
interconnected – environments, produces very different policy outcomes in the international
political arena (i.e. the globalizing world) on the one hand, and within the European project (i.e.
in the deepening and widening EU), on the other hand. In this paper, I will rely on a detailed
examination of historical trajectories, international law developments, and a related chronology
of state-citizen relations to analyze and explain contemporary varieties of migration systems.
In the aftermath of World War II, but much more noticeably after the end of the Cold
War, we are witnessing the emergence of two international migration regimes, one global, the
other continental, EU-associated. Each regime has developed its own set of principles in the
sphere of international law. As will be explained later, the global regime recognizes and protects
the individual’s right of exit from the territory of a nation-state including his own country (even
against a nation-state’s resistance, as the examination of international refugee and human rights
law shows). The regime allows exit without developing a complementary right of entry, however.
While incorporating the universally applicable right of exit that appears codified in instruments
of international law such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 1951 Geneva
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the EU-associated regime
has developed a de facto right of entry for workers who are citizens of a EU member state seeking
employment in another EU country. This is a historic step in the direction of opening up a
transnational formally-defined and legally-recognized space in which people can move just as
easily as within the boundaries of nation-states. The right of exit in association with the
developing right of entry gives intra-EU migrant workers exceptional mobility within the Union’s
boundaries. At the same time, European treaties do impose harsher restrictions on in-migration
flows originating from countries outside the EU. This simultaneous dismantling of internal
borders and reinforcement of the EU’s external border leads to a situation in which the
formation of a postnational identity (Habermas) becomes more likely inside the “fortress
Europe.” These coupled policies can reasonably be interpreted as a creative attempt by EU
member states to develop an “antidote” that counteracts the increasing globalization- and post-
8
colonialism-associated migratory pressures; this is achieved while preserving the government’s
domestic legitimacy by satisfying expectations related to economic growth through migrant
labor. To develop this facet of the argument, I will rely on Boswell’s theory concerning the
functional imperatives of the state, which emphasizes the state’s quest for domestic and
international legitimacy (Boswell, 2007).
One can also conceptualize current challenges and possible solutions in terms of voice
and exit (Hirschman, 1970). This framework provides a clear way of examining patterns of state-
citizen interaction. On the domestic scale, when the quality of the state’s policy output became
unsatisfactory, workers could mobilize and protest (exercising the voice option to push for
reform). The exit option (migration) was typically much more costly in the past. Only recently,
has it become more accessible. To end strikes and reduce discontent, governments used welfare
systems to ensure stability, provide benefits, and thus partially decommodify workers (i.e. shield
them from an exclusive dependence on markets for subsistence and wellbeing). Recently, due to
the crisis of welfare systems, governments have had to resort to other strategies to ensure societal
peace. Since domestic remedies seemed exhausted, states turned to the world economy. The
international level had been characterized by a different dynamic in the interactions between
sovereign states and individuals (migrant workers). States have historically regulated migratory
flows and still conclude bilateral deals to shape the exports and imports of workers. While
workers have been able to exercise voice within the boundaries of domestic labor markets, their
exit (opportunities for migration) have been considerably limited by states and prohibitive costs.
As workers became politically relevant as a group through the extension of franchise and
increasing role of trade unions in policy-making, the late nineteenth and especially the twentieth
century were marked by an overall improvement in working conditions and decommodification
efforts (Esping-Andersen). Increasingly, however, as the crisis of welfare systems set in, voice-
options ran into the political equivalents of obstacles that Hirshman mentioned in connection to
customer-firm relations: voice becomes too costly to sustain in the long run, since it depends on
the presence of institutions that allow for effective communication. Moreover, voice effectiveness
depends on chances of influence being wielded; this is more likely to happen in small markets for
expensive durable goods that attract few customers. To compensate for diminishing reform
opportunities by voice in the EU, states have developed by the extension of free movement the
exit option via intra-EU migration Exit is much more cost-effective as a mechanism, since it relies
9
on negative integration: the removal of internal boundaries in the Union. To sum it up, within
the boundaries of the nation-state, European workers were gradually and partially
decommodified through the evolution of welfare systems. More recently, as the crisis of the
European welfare state started to manifest itself in an increasing number of liberal democracies
and as it became obvious that Western European economies depended on imports of foreign
labor, EU member-states have found an alternative solution in the emancipation of their workers
at continental-level, by granting them the possibility of exit (i.e. migration to other labor markets),
while at the same time allowing workers from other EU countries to enter the country and satisfy
existing demands for labor. Nation-states have had to diversify their repertoires of action to
maintain their legitimacy despite the emergence of new economic and political challenges.
The nation-state’s quest for legitimacy
In an attempt to evaluate theories of migration policy according to their methodological
rigor and explanatory plausibility, Christina Boswell (2007) examines responses to a central
puzzle: what explains the inclusionary tendency of migration and integration policies that
diverges so strongly from the “generally protectionist bent of public opinion in democratic states”
(Boswell, 2007: 75)? She concludes that, on the one hand, neoclassical political economy theories
produce accounts characterized by theoretical neatness and robustness, while exposing
themselves to charges of reductionism or unwarranted generalization (76). On the other hand,
neo-institutionalist approaches pay the price for providing important insights about the nature of
institutions as a mediating variable by lacking in testability or predictive power (ibidem).
Boswell synthesizes insights from both varieties of migration theory to develop the
foundations of a “third way” approach in which “societal interests and institutional constraints
are incorporated only in accordance with the functional imperatives of the state” (77). She argues
that “we can best understand migration policy by adopting the perspective of the state, and
considering how it defines its choices and constraints through the prism of its functional
imperatives” (95).
According to Deutsch (1970), legitimacy can be understood as “a function of the
compatibility of political actions and practices with the expectations and values of a particular
10
public” (cited in Boswell: 88). While the content of expectations and values changes over time,
there are certain criteria of legitimacy that liberal welfare states try to satisfy. Traditionally,
nation-states have been expected to fulfill four functions:
1) Security, i.e. providing international and internal security for citizens;
2) Accumulation, i.e. providing the conditions for the accumulation of wealth;
3) Fairness, i.e. implementing policies that promote a just pattern of distribution; and
4) Institutional legitimacy (preserving the Rechtstaat), i.e. maintaining public confidence
that state practices are in accordance to the formal conditions deemed vital for the
preservation of democracy and liberty. (88-91)
As Boswell notes, “each of these four preconditions is brought into question in the sphere of
migration policy” (89). From the very beginning, these functional imperatives are difficult to
satisfy simultaneously, and migration only complicates the picture.
In particular, states find it difficult to reconcile the dual imperatives of accumulation and
legitimacy in the long term (Claus Offe, 1972). When the state becomes unable to accomplish its
ascribed role of protecting citizens from economic shock through a social safety net, the risk of a
“legitimation crisis” sets in (Habermas, 1997). “The state is expected to meet competing
requirements, and its inability to satisfactorily fulfill all four imperatives raises the risk of a
withdrawal of legitimacy” (96).
What course of action can the state adopt in response to this Cornelian dilemma in which
either course of action has some advantages but also significant detrimental effects? Peter Hall in
his critique of Offe’s theory of the state has argued that states can circumvent difficult choices by
adopting contradictory policies which, while leading to inefficient outcomes, have the benefit of
not alienating constituencies:
A state faced with multiple tasks and well-defined conflicts of interest among the social classes it governs, or the groups within these, may find it necessary to maintain a degree of deliberate malintegration among its various policy-making aims so that each can mobilize consent among its particular constituencies by pursuing policies which, even if never fully implemented, appear to address the needs of these groups. (Hall, cited in Held and Krieger, 1984)
However, even though inefficiencies undoubtedly exist, states must make certain choices that
allow them to sustain their legitimacy and capacity to govern. In particular, as Zolberg points
out, throughout history states have faced the problem of importing economically valuable but
culturally and/or politically undesirable labor, the so-called “cheap labor” coming from the
11
periphery (Zolberg: 113). Throughout history, states have found different solutions to this
persistent problem, and these implemented solutions constitute the empirical basis for
distinguishing a series of migration eras in world history. The following section of the paper
reviews, expands and reinterprets Zolberg’s chronology of labor migration.
The eras of migration and the evolution of state-migrant worker relations
The evolution of the relationship between states and their citizens who are active
participants in the domestic labor market has been extensively researched. In this section, I want
to refine and reinterpret Zolberg’s chronology of labor migration so as to concentrate more on
revealing the history of the relations between sovereign states and individual migrant workers in
the international arena. Furthermore, I will update Zolberg’s historical account in order to
include the European Union as the potential harbinger of a new era of migrant worker
emancipation from state control.
Zolberg distinguishes three eras of migration, each characterized by a particular
relationship between migrant labor and sovereign states, as well as by certain developments in
international law:
I. The age of absolutism and mercantilism
II. The liberal epoch
III. Contemporary patterns
To these I add the most recent evolutions reflecting the possible emergence of a new
transnational migration regime:
IV. The current intra-EU “free movement of people” experiment
During the first era, the age of absolutism and mercantilism, sending and receiving
sovereign states exercised quasi-complete control over migration. In fact, international migration
emerged as a distinctive phenomenon starting with the middle of the 15th century, due to internal
geo-political transformations in Europe (in particular the organization of the global space into
territories controlled by sovereign states) and to geographic expansion. Beginning with the 17th
century, the crystallization of international law reaffirms and reinforces the states’ right to control
12
the movement of people across their borders. Since population constitutes at the time a treasured
economic and military asset, rulers deploy “considerable efforts to police their territorial
boundaries and to confine subjects within them” (Zolberg: 112). Charles Tilly explains that there
were significant bureaucratic and state interests in controlling migration and citizens, because
taxing, drafting, and watching were all essential ingredients to ensure state survival and
consolidation (Tilly, 1978).
Migration flows do exist, but they mostly resemble the transfer of goods: states treat
migrant labor as a commodity, and the main imports of this precious merchandise occur
following almost the same modus operandi as in the case of any other commercial exchange.
Extremely little, if any, decision-power (choice) granted to migrant workers. According to
Zolberg, there were three main components of the Western migratory network in this period:
1. The importation of an estimated 7.5 million West African slaves to work on
plantations, initially in Europe or its outlying islands, and then in the New
World;
2. The relocation of two to three million Europeans in the New World colonies,
mostly under some form of bondage; and
3. The expulsion or flight of approximately one million persons from the newly-
forming European states in the 16th and 17th centuries. (Zolberg, 1978)
All in all, sovereign states initially treated migrant labor as a commodity. The basic forms
of worker migration were in the age of absolutism and mercantilism forms of slavery, bondage
and indenture (an arrangement under which the employer or a colonial labor agent bore the
costs of transfer and settlement in exchange for a seven-year contract). It was at the same time
that importation of mercenary armies became very popular; as Zolberg remarks, these were “the
original guestworkers” (114). Even migration patterns that seemed relatively voluntary against
the above background of slavery and “international commodification” were mostly forced and
resulted from official state policies: populations that were deemed “unassimilable” due to their
religion were either officially expelled (e.g. the expulsion of Jews from England and France; or of
the Moors from Spain) to ensure cultural homogeneity in the name of raison d’état, or oppressed
and attacked until they had to flee the national territory and seek refuge abroad.
13
The liberal epoch is often represented as a “deviant episode in the history of international
migrations,” when a group of states relinquished to a significant degree control over both exit
and entry, allowing migration to occur without too much interference in response to push-pull
factors that influenced the migrants’ choices (Zolberg). This brief interlude of relatively less
impeded transnational mobility began in the early decades of the 19th century in response to the
overlapping influences of the demographic, industrial, and democratic revolutions. Domestically,
states extended suffrage to increasingly higher numbers of citizens. Political freedoms were
complemented by other substantial changes in the relationship between nation-states and
citizens. Modern welfare states gradually developed, replacing previous schemes of poverty relief
with a quasi-universal coverage. The decommodification of workers started (Esping-Andersen).
Despite the much freer movement of people across state boundaries and the apparently
more relaxed attitude of sovereign states towards migration, in the sphere of international law
“only freedom of exit came to be established as a sine qua non of liberal regimes” (Zolberg).
There was no parallel development in the direction of establishing freedom of entry. Indeed,
even countries that practiced during that period a de facto laissez-faire policy, insisted that they
nevertheless possessed a theoretical right to control admission to their territory, and thus the right
to restrict in-migration. Exit was permitted, and occasionally encouraged, by nation-states
because it served certain functions. For example, in the case of England after the Napoleonic
Wars, once the internal labor supply was assured, emigration provided an easy way of lowering
welfare burdens, a safety valve in the face of perennial social unrest, mechanisms for Britain to
populate its colonial empire with “culturally appropriate settlers” etc. (Zolberg). Interestingly
enough, this is the first time in which burdens associated with the operation of the welfare state
(i.e. decommodification mechanisms) are reduced by opening the possibility of international
migration, i.e. making available the “exit option.”
This being said, laissez-faire migration remained fairly controversial, particularly in
countries of destination like the United States, where the mid-19th century was marked by
frequent confrontations between “immigrationists” and “restrictionists.” Temporary migration
and its residue of permanent settlers stirred negative reactions and resentment in many countries,
followed by a corresponding revival of stricter regulations. Still before World War I, the low level
of movement and modest welfare entitlement facilitated international movement free of passports
and of elaborate systems of control (Lahav, 2000).
14
In the twentieth century, one by one countries withdrew into protectionism, economic
closure and very strict control of in-migration. Not only did admission gates close, but also many
states erected more effective barriers against exit to impose immobility. There was a reassertion
of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Meanwhile, the
world started producing refugees in numbers surpassing those of voluntary migrants, as people
were displaced by the breakdown of empires and the emergence of new nation-states in the
aftermath of World War I. In the course of social revolutions or counterrevolutions, as non-
democratic regimes attempted radical transformations of societies in their ensemble, entire
classes were targeted and cast in the role of victim-groups (Zolberg). As Charles Tilly argued, the
twentieth century saw an expanding role of political controls and pressures in shaping migration,
as war, deliberate relocation of ethnic minorities and stringent national controls over
immigration and emigration reaffirmed the states’ power over migratory flows (Tilly, 1978).
Within Zolberg’s broadly defined category of contemporary patterns, I would like to draw
what I believe is a relevant distinction between the above developments that characterized the
interwar period, and those subsequent to World War II. While some features of the international
migration regime that emerged after WW I persisted and can still be found in current policies
and international norms, many realities changed dramatically after WW II and during the first
years of the Cold War. Since the post-WW II principles constitute the bases of the current
international migration regime, I analyze them in further depth in the next section of the paper
before turning to the most recent evolutions within the framework of the European Union.
“Free to leave” codified: The post-WW II international migration regime
The post-war era brings a few novelties in terms of international law. First, not only
states, but also individuals, are legal subjects under international law. Second, states are
increasingly obliged to respect a crystallizing “law of migrants” (Joppke, 1998; citing
Perruchoud). In the second half of the twentieth century, the international community came to
acknowledge and codify its special obligations towards refugees. Since the signing of the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the right to leave one’s country of origin has been
15
generally recognized as a fundamental human right (Lahav and Messina, 2006: 2). Article 12 of
the Declaration states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state” and “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country” (UN International Migration Report). A corresponding right of
persons to enter countries other than their own has never evolved (Lahav and Messina, idem
supra); in fact, a universal and unambiguous consensus has developed around the opposite
principle, namely that every state has the right to restrict the entry of foreigners (Zolberg, 1981;
Weiner, 1985).
Indeed, the early 1950s witnessed an accelerated development in the area of international
refugee law with the emergence of a supporting liberal international regime for refugees, a
regime which facilitated during the Cold War the flight of many individuals from communism
(Hollifield). The 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees reaffirmed and extended
by the 1967 Protocol constitute the international legal instruments on which the regime is
predicated. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is the major
international refugee agency. However, governments remain the dominant actors (Rogers and
Copeland, 1993). Under the current international migration system, host states generally grant
asylum and refugee status on the basis of the principle of nonrefoulement (i.e. nonreturn) – Article 33
of the Convention – and this is done for a number of humanitarian and political reasons. Yet,
refugees have generally been given few opportunities to participate in the decision-making
processes affecting them (ibidem).
States have occasionally decided to open entry to certain categories of individuals, but the
definition of such categories has remained subject to the discretion of national governments. For
instance, as Weiner (1985) explains in his work on the connections between international
relations and international migration, countries frequently offer open entry to those with whom
their population shares a close ethnic affinity (e.g. the French government’s decision to allow free
entry to the pieds-noirs from Algeria). Also, countries have selectively permitted entry to
individuals from another people/state with whom they have had historic ties or in cases in which
a sense of obligation or guilt exists (e.g. the Dutch admitted people from Timor).
From the point of view of migrant labor, the postwar reconstruction effort and the
increases in international economic competition pitted Western European countries against one
another in a competition for foreign workers (Messina and Lahav, 2006: 148). Many states with a
16
colonial past, such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, actively recruited foreign labor, while
others like Germany and Switzerland built guestworker systems that allowed for the rotation of
workers in and out of the receiving society, according to the demands of the labor market and the
business cycle. Yet, due to the unlimited supply of (unskilled) labor readily available, advanced
states had few incentives to cooperate and build international regimes for managing worker
migration. Instead, they relied on bilateral agreements with the sending countries for bringing in
temporary workers (Hollifield, 1998). Once more, governments maintained the first hand in
determining and regulating migration flows, which did not come as a surprise for the social
scientists who had long been discussing the structural dependence of European economics on
alien labor and the migrant workers’ reduction to the status of “subproletariat” within receiving
economies (Freeman, 1978).
With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, the refugee
regime associated with the obsolescent realities of the post WW II world underwent certain
modifications. Changes were inevitable since the regime had been established at a time when
governments thought it would be temporary; after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe, any rationale for maintaining it vanished. Over the last two decades, liberal democratic
states that are potential destination countries for migratory flows originating in the East have
adjusted to the new geo-political realities and worked towards restricting migration. Given
security concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, restrictions on migration policy
have increased in many states (Givens, Freeman and Leal, 2009).
In the era of globalization, while the logic of trade and finance is one of openness, the
logic of international migration policy remains one of closure (Hollifield, 1998). The rules for
entry and exit of economic migrants are still controlled by nation-states, not by international
organizations like the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration or the
International Labor Organization. The EU constitutes a major exception (ibidem). This is one of
the important conclusions that can inform attempts to analyze in concert the triad globalization-
European integration-change in European domestic societies, as will become more evident in the
next section in which EU-associated developments are examined.
17
The dawn of a new era? Intra-EU migration and an emerging right of entry
Against the backdrop of state-controlled international migratory flows, the European
Union and the emergence of the Schengen area stand as a unique experiment. The European
Economic Community’s decision to allow citizens of member states free movement across
internal boundaries represented for some a historic step toward restraining full member-state
sovereignty and redefining older collective identities to foster the emergence of a novel
“European nationality” (Weiner). For others, it signaled the emergence of a “postnational
membership” predicated on a postnational regime for human rights (Soysal, 1994). The EU
migrant regime functions only for nationals of states that are members of the Union, but even
within that category it allows for discrimination. Member states can impose numerous temporary
obstacles and gradual implementation schemes to limit or delay free movement of people. While
the UK, Ireland and Sweden did not restrict access for workers from Central and Eastern
Europe in the first place, when the first wave of postcommunist countries joined the Union in
2004, Finland, Spain, Portugal and Greece only decided to lift restrictions two years after
enlargement in May 2006. France decided to phase restrictions out over a transition period of
several years3 (it still has a “closed-door” policy towards workers from Romania and Bulgaria).
The Schengen group has developed a set of rules for dealing with migration of third
country nationals, especially asylum seekers. This multilateral regime is highly restrictive and
aims at helping member states restrict refugee migration and fight “asylum shopping” by giving
refugees the right to request asylum in the first Schengen state in which they enter the union, but
allowing for migrants who transit through a “safe” third country to be sent back to that state
instead, to be refoulés (Hollifield, 1998).
An overview of EU legal developments (text of the treaties and European Court of Justice
– ECJ) with respect to free movement of workers and EU citizenship is necessary before
discussing the revolutionary nature of intra-EU migration. Implementing the principle of free
movement constitutes a central objective of the European economic integration project and a sine
qua non condition for creating and consolidating the internal market. Article 14 (1) of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community asserts that “the Community shall adopt
3 EurActiv, News section (published 07/24/06), “Italy opens borders to workers from Central and Eastern Europe,” Internet source: http://www.euractiv.com/en/mobility/italy-opens-borders-workers-central-eastern-europe/article-156904
18
measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market…” The second
paragraph defines the internal market as comprising “an area without internal frontiers in which
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of [the] Treaty.” These main internal market features are commonly known as the
‘fundamental freedoms’ guaranteed by the Treaty.
In its case law on free movement of goods and persons, the ECJ initially adopted the
model based on discrimination, the stance that intruded the least into the regulatory autonomy of
Member States. According to the discrimination model, Community provisions bite whenever
national measures contain protectionist elements; that is, whenever Member States favor
domestic over imported goods, or protect their citizens and companies by discriminating against
nationals and firms from other Member States. For instance, in the case of free movement of
goods, a publicity campaign organized by the Irish government to promote sales of domestic
goods was identified by the Court as discriminatory towards imported products.4 In the case law
on the free movement of persons, the ECJ ruled that the French Maritime Code breached Article
39 by requiring a certain proportion of the ships’ crew to be of French nationality.5 The
discrimination-based model does not interfere with the substance of national measures. Member
States remain free to regulate how goods are produced and services provided, on condition that
their regulation applies equally to home and host State goods or persons (Barnard: 18). If a
measure is unjustifiably discriminatory, EC law requires the discriminatory element to be
eliminated, but the measure’s substance remains intact.
Countries could get around this judicial filter by adopting rules which did not directly or
indirectly discriminate between goods, persons or companies dependent upon the country of
origin, but which nevertheless created significant barriers to free movement. To identify such
measures, the discrimination-based model was obviously insufficient. An efficient alternative to
stimulate free trade was a model focusing more on the objective of establishing and consolidating
the common market. The market-access model, however, intrudes much more into national
regulatory autonomy: the measure is struck down even though it may not discriminate on
grounds of nationality, solely on the grounds that it is liable to impede or render less attractive
4 Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland [1982], ECR 4005. 5 Case 167/73, Commission v. French Republic [1974] ECR 359.
19
the exercise of Community freedoms. Currently decisions on the free movement of persons rely
more on the principle of market access (Barnard).
“The free movement of persons has always been an area of greater sensitivity than the
free movement of goods. People raise security and welfare implications in a way that goods do
not” (Barnard: 232). As the European Community progresses from its initial economic dimension
towards developing a political facet, the connection between economic activity and free
movement of persons gradually erodes. A shift in perception has occurred: the European
institutions evolved from treating migrants as mere factors of production to viewing them as
individuals with rights against the host State. A Member State can invoke reasons of public
interest to justify a national measure only if that measure is compatible with fundamental rights
(idem, 244).
Yet, if decisions to enforce national immigration laws are caught by Community law, 6
any national measure could arguably be perceived as obstructing trade. By analyzing the ECJ
case law on freedom of movement in the framework of the European integration project, one can
notice that European institutions have tried to maintain the equilibrium between the negative
and positive dimensions of integration, between removing obstacles to trade and positively
harmonizing economic legislation. The ECJ is the European institution that can eliminate
obstacles to market integration. Its approach to performing this function has evolved from a
discrimination to a market access based model, an evolution leading to an accentuated intrusion
into the Member States’ autonomy.
The symbolic move from a European Economic Community to a European Community
and, in particular, the “making of the Europeans” in constitutionalized form entailed, among
other treaty provisions, the introduction of the status of citizenship of the Union. Contained in
Part Two of the European Community Treaty, the citizenship provisions (Articles 17 to 22)
establish and describe a new, unprecedented kind of citizenship, that depends on and
complements national citizenship without substituting it, while adding rights and duties to the
legal heritages of each individual who is a national of one of the Member States: “Citizenship of
the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be
a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
citizenship” (Article 17, paragraph 1) and also “citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights
6 Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279.
20
conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby” (Article 17,
paragraph 2). This section of the Treaty continues by predicating the rights of movement and
residence on the newly-created notion of European citizenship. Article 18 (ex Article 8a) provides
that “every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory
of the Member States, subject to limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect.” The remaining citizenship provisions establish a limited set of
political rights of relative practical and symbolic significance.
Although the notion of European citizenship ostensibly opened a new path towards
furthering integration, its initial impact seemed rather unimpressive, particularly given the fact
that a comprehensive regime on the rights of movement and residence of Member State
nationals (formed on the basis of the fundamental freedoms, implemented by secondary
legislation and foregoing directives) already existed. In some situations in the early days of the
European Union, the European Court of Justice made it hard to distinguish between concrete
and profound reliance on Article 18 and immediate cross references to existing relevant other EC
legal provisions. While critics of EU citizenship have emphasized the initial paucity of rights
created, in time, the subsequent ECJ case law as well as legal developments through
modifications of the secondary legislation (i.e. Directive 2004/38/EC: European Parliament and
Council Directive of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States) helped to flesh out
and expand the concept of European citizenship. Currently, it constitutes a dynamic notion,
capable of evolving in synch with the progress of European integration.
Let us briefly review the political rights that EU citizenship directly confers. Article 19
gives the citizens of the Union the right in a Member State other than that of their nationality to
vote and stand as a candidate both in municipal and in European Parliament (EP) elections.
Article 20 provides that EU citizens have the right to the protection of diplomatic authorities of
any Member State in a third country where their own Member State is not represented. Article
21 grants citizens the right to petition the EP and apply to the European Ombudsman. Union
citizens have the right to write to any Community institution in one of the official languages and
to receive the answer in that same language. Finally, Article 22 requires the European
Commission to report every three years on the application of these provisions on Union
citizenship.
21
What is the most significant, however, about the EU citizenship and expanding free
movement of people within the EU are the precedents they set in the sphere of international law
and the modifications they bring about in the relationship between states and individuals.
Implicit in the idea of free movement of individuals across national boundaries is the existence
not only of a right to exit, but also, and most importantly, of a right of entry. This does not
happen only in exceptional situation, as is the case in international refugee law, but rather as a
part of normal routines. This constitutes a major break from the universally recognized right of
sovereign states to determine whether and which foreign citizens can enter or reside within their
territories. For the first time, migrant workers who are EU citizens become gradually
emancipated from the restraints previously imposed upon them by national governments.
Certainly, there are still significant differences between the mobility enjoyed by workers from
Central and Eastern European member states and that available to citizens of older members as
well as within the Eastern European camp, but one by one older EU members have opened up
to accept intra-European migration. How does the current regional migration regime differ from
the typical temporary guest-worker programs run by states? In what follows, I will show that the
divergence is stark; again the EU transforms profoundly state-individual relations by empowering
the latter and preventing several forms of ‘commodification’ (of treating workers like mere
merchandise) by the former.
In 2006, Italy decided to lift restrictions on intra-EU migration one week after the
discovery by the Italian police of a slave-labor camp in Puglia, in which 113 Polish nationals were
forced to work in terrifying conditions, tortured, raped, abused and guarded by armed ‘kapos’
and dogs. Workers were forced to work up to 15 hours a day and were fed little more than bread
and water.7 Such enslavement is rendered possible in the context of illegal labor markets, but also
through the functioning of legal guest-worker programs. Temporary worker programs often
“create a sub-class of workers who are effectively unable to defend their rights.” As Guskin and
Wilson point out, critics of guest worker programs compare these to “a modern form of slavery,
because workers are generally not allowed to change jobs, and have no real way to fight back
when they are cheated out of promised wages and faced with substandard living and working
conditions” (Guskin and Wilson, 2007:109). Migrant workers are afraid to report abuses to the
7 “Italian Police Free 113 Poles Living in Slave Labor Camps,” The New York Times, July 19, 2006 (online edition); EUobserver.com; The Chicago Tribune.
22
police for fear of losing their job and being deported. Sometimes employers hold onto the
workers’ passports and other documents to prevent them from running away (idem, 115).
The free movement of individuals eliminates the risks of illegal labor markets, as well as
the abuses associated with temporary worker programs ran on the basis of bilateral agreements
between sovereign states. For the first time, migrant workers have the possibility to make their
own choices, and freely pursue advantageous employment opportunities within the boundaries of
the European Union. Going back to Boswell’s theory of the functional imperatives of the state,
one can see that extending the right to free movement to individuals contributes towards meeting
several functions. First, for Western and Eastern European countries alike, migration facilitates
the realization of accumulation. As a report by Deutsche Bank points out, freedom to move has
the same effect as free trade, with the usual integration benefits expanded from tradable to non-
tradable goods (Deutsche Bank Research, 2003). Free movement of people also serves as a cost-
effective alternative to decommodification: the crisis of welfare states across Europe has made it
clear that existing systems are not be sustainable in the long run. As states become increasingly
unable to shield workers, a cheaper alternative to institutionalized domestic decommodification
needs to be found to ensure the citizens’ wellbeing. The removal of boundaries and negative
integration provide another route to empowering citizens. By granting free movement across
national boundaries on EU territory, member states fulfill both the function of accumulation and
that of institutional legitimacy (Hammar).
By implementing the Schengen regime and reinforcing the Union’s external border, EU
member states also attempt to fulfill the function of security and fairness: a hard outer frontier is
believed to protect EU countries from security threats and transnational crime, and harsh
restrictions of in-migration ensure what a large part of the public thinks is a “fairer distribution of
wealth,” i.e. the state benefits from the advantages of limited labor market integration in a more
homogenous environment, while protecting society from the more “dangerous” global migratory
flows associated with globalization.
23
Wandering EUropeans
This paper constitutes the beginning of a longer journey. It is the author’s attempt to
build a conceptual and methodological framework in which one can examine the new migratory
patterns that are currently emerging within the boundaries of the European Union. In particular,
I would like to continue my work in the direction of integrating into existing typologies and
theories of international migration the EU experiment and the associated developments it has
triggered in the field of international law and in the history of relations between sovereign states
and citizens. To achieve this, it is necessary to develop a research design capable of examining in
concert the triad globalization-European integration-change in domestic European societies.
Systematic process analysis seems to be the methodological strategy that allows the productive
incorporation of both neoclassical political economy and neo-institutional approaches à la
Boswell. Next year, with the generous support of a Chateaubriand Fellowship, I will work on
developing an updated more ample typology of international migration to compare and contrast
emerging intra-EU migratory trends with post-colonial patterns as well as with other flows
associated more generally with globalization.
On another dimension, I am interested in identifying and analyzing the political,
economic, social, and cultural consequences of intra-EU free movement of persons. There are
already signs that European domestic societies are radically transformed by the opportunities
derived from the availability of the “exit option” (Hirschman). Through the development of a
right of entry without equivalent in international law, the EU experiment has generated a new
and institutionally protected transnational-European space where individuals can relocate and
make their own decisions with respect to employment. Within the continental oasis somewhat
shielded from the pressures of globalization, a new category of de facto EUropean citizens has
emerged.
In the enlarging European Union, as “postnational membership” (Soysal) became a
palpable reality for citizens of postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe, traditional bonds
between individuals and states were redefined. These new EU citizens were eager to take their
country’s Union membership very seriously (after all, post-communist countries are still working
hard to demonstrate their European-ness), and make the most out of the rights and opportunities
that came with it. I call this new kind of European citizen the wandering EUropean because he
24
(and increasingly more frequently she due to the pronounced feminization of migration) is a
genuine migrant who lacks the potential-settler aspirations that have generally characterized
most international migratory patterns, past and present. Increasingly liberated from the
constraints of nation-states and the dangers of illegal labor markets, wandering EUropeans
(usually citizens of Eastern European new EU countries) pursue employment opportunities
abroad and return home to use their earnings in the most advantageous way, as the case of Polish
migrants in Britain demonstrates.
Certainly, these individuals are not decommodified in the traditional sense of the word,
since they still depend on selling their labor in the market for making a living. Yet, for the first
time, they are in control: they can exert both voice (within the nation-state) and exit (to work
temporarily abroad), and combine these options in accordance with their preferences. Due to the
political rights derived from EU citizenship, they have many more opportunities to participate in
supranational politics at the EU level (as always, the big question is whether they are willing to do
that). Wandering EUropeans make a tremendous contribution to the development of their
communities of origin through remittances and investments: in Poland and Romania, for
example, what used to be impoverished small towns and previously underdeveloped rural
communities are witnessing unprecedented prosperity and development. In turn, East Central
Europe has become a main destination for migration into the EU. These countries are witnessing
unprecedented increases in heterogeneity, as thousands of migrants from Asia and Africa arrive.
As a result, the region finds itself at the intersection between major flows of intra-EU migration
and more traditional globalization-associated guest-worker migration flows originating in less
developed regions of the world and having the EU as destination.
These socio-economic developments and the reconfiguration of wealth distributions as a
result of increased migration have not gone unnoticed. In particular, the political scene of the
origin countries of wandering EUropeans has started to change. Aware of the potential of
migrant constituencies, an increasing number of politicians have reoriented a great part of their
electoral campaign efforts toward diasporas and migrant workers. In 2008, for instance, the
Romanian President Traian Basescu informally launched the electoral campaign for his party
(the Democratic Liberals) by paying a visit to the very large Romanian community in Spain (the
main destination country for Romanian migrant workers). For the electoral year 2008, the
number of voting offices for Romanians in Italy and Spain has tripled compared to the previous
25
parliamentary elections. Special representation of Romanians abroad into the legislature
currently includes four seats in the Deputy (lower) Chamber of Parliament (two for the EU area
and two for the Middle East, Asia, and North America), and two seats in the Senate (one for the
EU and the other for the Middle East). 8
In the next phase of the project, I want to focus on collecting data about the political,
socio-economic and cultural consequences of free movement of workers in countries of origin. In
particular, I would like to find out if there is a EU-specific “culture of migration” emerging in the
migrants communities of origin, like the one documented by Massey in his work on change in
repertoires of behaviors, sentiments and values in sending regions (Massey et al., 1987; Alarcon,
1992). It would be fascinating to find out if the experience of free movement within the
boundaries of the EU triggers changes in the wandering EUropeans’ values, political behavior or
level of involvement in local, regional or national politics. More recent research on the pro-
immigrant sentiment in the United States has found, for instance, that people who have lived
abroad are significantly more pro-immigrant (Haubert and Fussel, 2006). I would like to see if
similar correlations exist among wandering EUropeans (e.g. Eastern Europeans who have
worked abroad are more tolerant of societal diversity and pro-immigrant).
Conclusion: How EU-like is the future of the international migration regime?
Simply asserting the exceptional nature of the EU and the Schengen (Hollifield, 1998:
181) is never sufficient. This paper has traced the evolution of labor migration flows over time, to
put contemporary developments in an ampler historical perspective. It has expanded classic
migration chronologies (Zolberg, 1983) by incorporating the developments that have occurred
under the aegis of the European Union. The state and its responses to internal/domestic and
external/international pressures are located at the center of this analysis. To maintain legitimacy
on both fronts, sovereign states engage in a complicated attempt to balance the different
functions that they are expected to fulfill. As Peter Hall has pointed out, the results of this
compromise do not need to be efficient or coherent.
8 Oprea, Cristian, “Basescu a inaugural campania electorala a PD-L in Spania,” Cotidianul, online edition: 10/05/08.
26
The possibility of free movement of people within the boundaries of the EU offers a new
avenue for fulfilling these expectations for member states. With the collapse of welfare systems
across Europe, governments have witnessed the erosion of their possibility to ensure the expected
(high) degree of decommodification for their workers. The European sovereign state’s ability to
carry out the accumulative, fairness and institutional legitimacy functions has also been
threatened by the pressures of the international economy (forces associated with the current era
of globalization). Intra-EU free movement of individuals has been the solution that member
states pursued, while reasserting in the international political arena their right of controlling
globalization-associated flows of migration originating outside the Unions’ borders.
The EU has developed a right of entry that remains unique in international law. At the
continental level, this has created a “transnational space” (Portes 1996) that allows migrants who
are citizens of EU member-states the possibility to transcend traditional national regulatory
obstacles to individual mobility. This space does not function without the consent of nation-
states, though, and does not indicate a “loss of control.” Indeed, states do appear to have a
choice: while the logic of international trade and global finance is one of openness, the logic of
migration policy remains, on an international scale, one of closure.
Some argue that the intra-EU evolution of free movement of people across national
boundaries amounts to the construction of an international migration regime. The above analysis
demonstrates that the EU is in fact a new migration regime; however, it is a regional, not a global
regime. The EU adopts the same standards as nation-states in international relations when
interacting with non-EU countries. As Hollifield observes, “most international regimes have had
a long gestation period, beginning as bilateral or regional agreements” (1998), so we cannot
exclude the possibility that the Union’s internal migration regime may evolve and apply on a
broader scale at some point. Given the unclear long-term consequences of the current economic
recession, however, countries will most likely refrain from experimentation in the proximate
future.
27
Selective bibliography
Barnard, Catherine, 2001, “Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?” in European Law Review, 26.
Boswell, Christina, Spring 2007, “Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?”
International Migration Review, Volume 41, Number 1; pp. 75-100. Bhagwati, Jagdish, 2003, “Borders Beyond Control,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1. Body-Gendrot, Sophie and Martin A. Schain, 1992, “National and Local Politics and the
Development of Immigration Policy in the United States and France: A Comparative Analysis,” in Horowitz, Donald, and Gerard Noiriel, eds., Immigrants in Two Democracies: French and American Experiences, New York: NYU Press; pp. 411-438.
Brubaker, Rogers, Dec. 1990, “Immigration Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and
Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis,” International Sociology 5, no. 4, pp. 379-407. Cini Michelle, ed., 2003, European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Craig, Paul, and de Búrca, Gráinne, 2002, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edition, Oxford:
Oxford University Press Deutsche Bank, 2003, “International Migration: Who, Where and Why?” Current Issues:
Demography Special, Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank Research, August 1st, 2003. Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press and
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Freeman, Gary, Oct. 1978, “Immigrant Labour and Working-Class Politics: The French and
British Experience,” Comparative Politics 11, no. 1: 25-41. Givens, Terri E., G. P. Freeman and D. L. Leal, 2009, Immigration Policy and Security: US, European,
and Commonwealth Perspectives, New York & London: Routledge. Guskin, Jane and David L. Wilson, 2007, The Politics of Immigration: Questions and Answers, New
York: Monthly Review Press. Habermas, Jurgen, 1997, Legitimation Crisis, Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Hall, Peter, 2003, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics,” in Mahoney,
J., and D. Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, New York: Cambridge University Press; pp. 373-404.
28
Hammar, Tomas, 1985, ed., European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Haubert, Jeannie, and E. Fussell, Fall 2006, “Explaining Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in the U.S.:
Social Class, Cosmopolitanism and Perceptions of Immigrants,” International Migrations Review, Vol. 40, No. 3: 489-507.
Held, D., and J. Krieger, 1984, “Theories of the State: Some Competing Claims,” in Bornstein,
S., D. Held, and J. Krieger, eds., The State in Capitalist Europe, London: George Allen and Unwin; pp. 1-20.
Hirschman, Albert O., 1970, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to the Decline of Firms, Organizations,
and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hollifield, James F., summer 1998, “Migration, Trade and the Nation-State: The Myth of
Globalization,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 3, no. 2; pp. 595-636. Kaufman, Robert R., and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, July 2001, “Globalization, Domestic politics
and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973-97,” World Politics 53; pp. 553-587.
Joppke, Christian, Jan. 1998, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” World Politics
50, no. 2, pp. 266-293. Lahav, Gallya, 2000, “The Rise of Nonstate Actors in Migration Regulation in the United States
and Europe: Changing the Gatekeepers or Bringing Back the State?” in Foner, Nancy, R. Rumbaut, and S. J. Gold, eds. Immigration Research for a New Century: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Majone, Giandomenico, 2005, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of
Integration by Stealth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Massey, Douglas S., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino & J. E. Taylor, September
1993, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review, 19, no. 3: 431-466.
Massey, Douglas S., Rafael Alarcon, Humberto Gonzalez, and Jorge Durand, 1987, Return to
Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Mattli, Walter, 1999, The Logic Of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Messina, Anthony and Gallya Lahav (eds.), 2006, The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies,
Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
29
Offe, Claus, 1972, Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Portes, Alejandro, 1996, “Transnational Communities: Their Emergence and Significance in the
Contemporary World System,” in Korzeniewicz, R. P. & W. C. Smith, eds., Latin America and the World Economy.
Piore, Michael J., 1979, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Rogers, Rosemarie & Emily Copeland, 1993, “The Evolution of the International Refugee
Regime,” in Rogers and Copeland, Forced Migration: Policy Issues in the Post-Cold War, Medford, Mass.: Fletcher School at Tufts University; pp. 25-40.
Rosamond, Ben, 2000, Theories of European Integration, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu, 1994, The Limits of Citizenship, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tilly, Charles, 1978, “Migration in Modern European History,” in W. H. McNeil and R. S.
Adams, eds., Human Migration, Bloomington: Indiana University Press; pp. 48-72. United Nations, 2002, “International Migration Report, 2002,” New York: United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Weiner, Myron, 1985 (September), “On International Migration and International Relations,”
Population and Development Review 11, no. 3; pp. 441-455. Zolberg, Aristide R., 1982, “Patterns of International Migration Policy: A Diachronic
Comparison,” in Fried, C., ed., Minorities: Community and Identity, Report of the Dahlem Workshop on Minorities, Berlin: Springer-Verlag; pp. 229-246.
Zolberg, Aristide R., 1981, “International Migration in Political Perspective,” in Kritz, Mary M.,
C. B. Keely, and S. M. Tomasi (eds.), Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements, New York: Center for Migration Studies; pp. 3-27.
Zuern, Michael, 2003, “From Interdependence to Globalization,” in Carlsnaes, Walter; Thomas
Risse; and Beth Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations, Sage Publications.