Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608085
1
Thirty years of shareholder activism:
A survey of empirical research
Matthew R. Denes
University of Washington 206-543-0721
Jonathan M. Karpoff University of Washington
206-685-4954 [email protected]
Victoria B. McWilliams
Villanova University 610-519-4313
May 18, 2015
We thank Harold Mulherin and an anonymous referee for extremely helpful comments. A preliminary version of some material in Sections 3-5 of this survey was circulated in an unpublished paper by Jonathan M. Karpoff titled, “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings.”
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608085
2
Thirty years of shareholder activism:
A survey of empirical research
Abstract
We summarize and synthesize the results from 67 studies that examine the consequences of
shareholder activism for targeted firms, and draw two primary conclusions. First, activism that adopts
some characteristics of corporate takeovers, especially significant stockholdings, is associated with
improvements in share values and firm operations. Activism that is not associated with the formation of
ownership blocks is associated with insignificant or very small changes in target firm value. Second,
shareholder activism has become more value increasing over time. Research based on shareholder
activism from the 1980s and 1990s generally finds few consequential effects, while activism in more
recent years is more frequently associated with increased share values and operating performance. These
results are consistent with Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) argument that managerial agency problems are
controlled in part by dynamic changes in ownership, and with Alchian’s (1950) observation that business
practices adapt over time to mimic successful strategies.
3
1. Introduction
“But who will monitor the monitor?” This question, posed by Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz in their seminal 1972 paper, is at the core of economists’ efforts to understand the
organization of economic activity that involves joint team production. Team production yields
synergies that are undeniably beneficial, but it comes with a built-in cost. The team’s output is not
simply the sum of each team member’s separable outputs, so it is difficult to match rewards to
each person’s contribution. This creates incentives to shirk.1
The shirking problem – now more popularly recast as the agency problem – is particularly
acute in large-scale endeavors efficiently organized through the corporate form. Alchian (1950)
first proposed that organizational characteristics are selected by, and adapt to, the competitive
environment, an idea that Alchian and Demsetz (1972) developed into a broad theory of corporate
governance. According to Alchian and Demsetz, scale economies, individual wealth constraints,
and risk aversion combine to make the corporate form of organization efficient for some
production processes, but “… modifications in the relationship among corporate inputs are
required to cope with the shirking problem that arises with profit sharing among large numbers of
corporate stockholders.” These modifications include the delegation of decision authority to
corporate boards and managers, the retention of control rights by shareholders, the free transfer of
ownership rights, an external market for corporate control, a process to resolve internal disputes
including proxy battles, and direct shareholder intervention in the firm’s decision process.
Alchian and Demsetz’ “modifications” describe the major branches of current corporate
governance research.2 In this paper, we examine the latter two modifications, proxy battles and
shareholder intervention, now known as shareholder activism. We summarize and synthesize 67
empirical research papers that provide insight into both the promise and limitations of shareholder
1 Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) use of the term “shirking” predates Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) characterization of the agency problem. Demsetz (1983) defines shirking as consumption on the job (broadly defined) in excess of that which would occur in a hypothetical world of zero monitoring costs. The cost of shirking is identical to Jensen and Meckling’s residual loss, which (along with the costs of monitoring and bonding) is a component of the total agency cost. 2 These branches include research on corporate boards, executive compensation, security design, the role of share liquidity in corporate governance, and the market for corporate control, as well as the literatures on proxy fights and shareholder intervention surveyed here.
4
activism in disciplining corporate managers and mitigating Alchian and Demsetz’ shirking
problem. The evidence indicates that Alchian’s (1950) insights apply directly to this aspect of
corporate governance: Shareholder activism has changed over time as the competitive process has
adopted its more successful strategies and activists increasingly have adapted these strategies.
Figure 1 highlights one of the main results from this survey. Alchian and Demsetz (1972,
p. 788) emphasize that “control is facilitated by the temporary congealing of share votes into
voting blocks…,” particularly through changes in share ownership. Activist efforts that do not
require the formation of blockholdings include shareholder proposals initiated under Section 14a-8
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and direct negotiations with managers. As indicated
in Figure 1, these types of shareholder activism are associated with small or negligible changes in
target firm value. At the other extreme, corporate takeovers typically involve the formation of
large blockholdings and create large changes in firm valuation that average 15%. Hedge fund
activism and proxy fights lie between these two extremes in the “congealing of share votes,” as
they are associated with toehold investments by the activist that average 8.8% and 9.9%, and are
associated with average valuation effects of 5.3% and 6.8%, respectively.3
This survey makes three contributions. First, despite a large amount of research into
shareholder activism, there is little apparent consensus on the causes and consequences of such
activism. We sort through prior research claims, focus on empirical results, and identify several
findings about which there is widespread agreement in the literature. Shareholder activism
continues to attract widespread attention from both researchers and policymakers (e.g., see
Partnoy, 2015). The findings that emerge from research in this area can inform both future
research and public policy.
Second, we highlight the importance of Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) argument that the
3 We focus on shareholder activism in industrial corporations, but research into activism in other types of organizations is consistent with our main conclusions. For example, Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) examine activism by shareholders who seek to open closed-end funds. Such activism is similar to hedge fund activism in our study; indeed, the activists frequently are hedge funds. Closed-end fund activists typically take large stakes in the target fund and prompt changes that include open-ending the fund, share repurchases, and dividend increases (see also Cherkes, Sagi, and Wang, 2014). Such activism is associated with an average decrease in the targeted closed-end fund’s discount by 14.4%.
5
dynamic and sometimes temporary coalescing of ownership rights plays a crucial role in firms’
corporate governance. In their words: “Temporarily, the structure of ownership is reformed,
moving away from diffused ownership into decisive power blocs, and this is a transient resurgence
of the classical firm with power again concentrated in those who have title to the residual” (p.
788). We conclude that shareholder activism in which the activist does not own a substantial
block of shares is most often ineffectual, whereas activists that invest substantially in the target
firm tend to have positive impacts on firm value and performance.
Our third contribution is to document how shareholder activism recently has become
better associated with value improvements than in the 1980s and 1990s. Viewed broadly, the
development of hedge fund activism is a manifestation of a continuous process by which
entrepreneurial activists experiment with new ways of monitoring and engaging managers, with
successful strategies surviving to be copied by others. Such developments are consistent with
Alchian’s (1950) characterization of the competitive process, and also Gillan and Starks’ (2007),
Ryngaert and Scholten’s (2010), and Buchanan et al.’s (2012) analyses of the changing nature of
shareholder monitoring and activism over time.
Our findings address a debate over whether it is fruitful to view effective corporate
governance as reflecting the characteristics of a political democracy (e.g., see Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003), or as part of a broader contracting and enforcement problem as in Alchian (1984).
We conclude that activism that mimics a political democracy – such as a shareholder proposal – is
associated with minimal impact, whereas activism that is notably undemocratic in its explicit
concentration of shareholdings is associated with significant improvements in value and
performance. As an example, hedge fund activism blends the relatively effectual tactics of
corporate takeover bidders with the relatively ineffectual tactics of gadfly activists, and tends to
generate results that are a blend of the two types of tactics. This conclusion is consistent with
prior empirical evidence (e.g., Karpoff and Rice, 1989) and theoretical arguments (e.g.,
Bainbridge, 2006) that Jeffersonian democracy is a poor model for effective corporate governance.
Rather, value-increasing corporate change frequently requires the coalescence of power among
6
principals who internalize a sufficiently large share of the benefits to offset their costs (e.g., see
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
Our survey overlaps with and draws from excellent surveys of shareholder activism and
hedge fund activism by Black (1998), Gillan and Starks (1998, 2007), and Brav, Jiang, and Kim
(2009). Our emphasis, however, is different. We emphasize how dynamic changes in ownership
structure is a crucial component of activism that is associated with value and performance
improvements. We also emphasize that much disagreement in the literature reflects differences in
how researchers frame their research questions, differences in the type of activism considered, and
the metrics that are analyzed. These emphases allow us to identify several patterns from the
seemingly mixed set of prior results and to interpret these patterns in light of the theory of the firm
as articulated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and others.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of shareholder
activism and the empirical findings of research in this area. Section 3 provides a detailed
summary of research on the valuation effects of shareholder activism, and Section 4 summarizes
research findings regarding firm earnings, operating performance, and governance features.
Section 5 summarizes empirical findings on the characteristics of firms that attract activist efforts.
Section 6 introduces two approaches to synthesize the major findings of these broad literature, and
Section 7 concludes by identifying eight questions about shareholder activism that remain
unanswered.
2. An overview of research on shareholder activism
The rise of shareholder activism in the mid-1980s coincided with an increase in
institutional shareholdings, particularly among funds seeking to mimic stock index returns. Monks
and Minow (1991) note that the risk of inadequate diversification prohibits many fund managers
from selling shares in underperforming firms. Instead, many institutions engage in activist efforts
to prod firms into better performance. The growth of shareholder activism also coincides with the
widespread adoption of firm- and state-level antitakeover provisions beginning in the 1980s, after
7
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Edgar v. MITE decision invalidated 38 restrictive first-generation state
antitakeover laws in 1982. Pound (1992) and Black (1992) argue that shareholder activism is the
natural outgrowth of a restrictive external market for corporate control as investors seek alternate
methods to monitor managers and encourage superior performance. Activism is now widespread.
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) report that 2,436 shareholder proposals were made at 548 firms
from 1996 through 2005, and Sullivan & Cromwell (2014) reports that 243 governance or
compensation-related shareholder proposals were voted on during the 2014 proxy season.
Although the number of proposals has been roughly steady in recent years, activists have increased
the rate at which they target large firms. The Wall Street Journal reports that 24% of activist
campaigns in 2012 targeted firms with market capitalizations in excess of $1 billion, up sharply
from 11% in 2010 and 8% in 2009 (The Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2012 pg. B2). The fraction
of governance-related proposals that receive a majority of shareholder votes also has increased
over time, equaling 27% in 2013 and 23% in 2014 (Sullivan & Cromwell, 2014).
In addition to shareholder proposals, we also survey research on three other common types
of shareholder activism: private negotiations and non-proposal pressure, hedge fund activism, and
proxy contests (also called contested proposals or proxy fights). Although these types of activism
are distinct in many ways, they frequently are used in tandem. Hedge fund activists, for example,
can engage in private negotiations with their target firms’ managers and launch shareholder-
initiated proposals. As another example, Venkiteshwaran, Iyer, and Rao (2010) report on the joint
use of proposals and negotiations by activist investor Carl Ichan.
As Black (1998) discusses, different types of activism require different levels of
investment by the activist. Shareholder proposals are submitted under SEC rule 14a-8, which
allows the initiating shareholders to include a 500-word supporting argument that is included in
the company’s proxy materials at the expense of the target firm. The subject of these proposals is
subject to SEC review and shareholder votes on these proposals are not binding. The cost to an
activist of a shareholder proposal or initiating private negotiations with the target firm’s managers
can be very low. In contrast, proxy contests are funded by the activist and are less frequent than
8
shareholder proposals. But unlike proposals, the outcome of a proxy contest is typically binding
on the firm’s managers (Buchanan et al., 2012).4 Hedge fund activists also typically invest
significantly in the target firm’s stock, acquiring a median of 6.3% of shares (Brav, Jiang, and
Kim, 2009). Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) attribute the rise of hedge fund activism
since the mid-2000s to hedge funds’ flexibility and small number of investors compared to other
institutional activists, as well as a tight connection between a hedge fund managers’ pay and the
fund’s performance.
The Appendix lists the 67 empirical studies of shareholder activism included in this
survey along with the sample period, data source, type of activism, and activist identity. The
activist’s identity can be important because different activists frequently seek different objectives.
Prevost and Rao (2000) and Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2012) argue that union and government
pension fund activists can have conflicting goals that range from improvements in firms’
governance to political outcomes that favor the pension fund’s members. Consistent with such
political motives, Prevost and Rao (2000) find that public pension fund activism is associated with
share price declines at the target companies. At the other extreme, Venkiteshwaran, Iyer, and Rao
(2010) find that proposals initiated by activist investor Carl Icahn are associated with significantly
positive valuation effects.
Data sources and sample periods also affect researchers’ findings. The data sources
frequently are related to the paper’s research question and type of activism examined. Papers that
examine hedge fund activism, for example, typically identify activist efforts through 13D filings in
which the activist reports on its toehold investment and general intentions regarding its ownership
stake. Studies that examine direct negotiations and non-proposal pressure frequently gather
samples of firms that are identified as potential targets of such well-known activists as the
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) (e.g., Wu, 2004; Barber, 2007) or the
Council of Institutional Investors (e.g., Song and Szewczyk, 2003). We also note the sample
periods in these studies because some results have changed over time. Karpoff, Malatesta, and
4 Of the 3,793 proposals in the Buchanan et al. (2012) sample from 2000–2006, 521 (12%) were proxy fights.
9
Walkling (1996), for example, draw on data primarily in the late 1980s and find no evidence that
shareholder proposals are associated with share value increases. Using a more recent sample of
shareholder proposals from 1995 through 2007, in contrast, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find
that shareholder proposals are associated with small but statistically significant share price
increases at the target firms. These results are consistent with an argument made by Gillan and
Starks (2007) and Buchanan et al. (2012), who suggest that the effects of shareholder activism on
target companies can change over time. As noted below, however, these results also could reflect
the emergence of hedge fund activists, who sometimes also initiate shareholder proposals.
3. Shareholder activism’s effects on target firms’ values
3.a. Event study results
The fundamental question about shareholder activism is whether it creates value. Table 1
summarizes the results from 36 studies that examine share value changes around key
announcements regarding activist attempts. The first column in Table 1 reports the results from 13
studies that examine short-run stock returns around key public releases of information regarding
shareholder proposals. These include initial press announcements, the date on which proxy
materials containing the shareholder proposal are mailed, and the date of the shareholder meeting
at which the proposal is voted on. Stock returns are measured over a range of two-day to 31-day
windows.
In most studies, the average abnormal stock return is negative but insignificantly different
from zero. As an exception, Prevost and Rao (2000) report a statistically significant negative
average stock return for a two-day window around the proxy mailing dates for 22 proposals made
from 1988-1994 by public pension funds, and three studies report positive and statistically
significant average returns. Thomas and Cotter (2007) report a positive average abnormal return
that is significant at the 10% level for a three-day window around the shareholder meeting date for
1,454 shareholder proposals made from 2002 through 2004. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find
a significant positive announcement return of 0.36% during the four-day window around the
10
earlier of the proxy mailing or first public announcement for 1,510 shareholder proposals
submitted from 1996 through 2005. Using a regression discontinuity design, Cuñat, Gine, and
Guadalupe (2012) report that shareholder proposals that pass earn an abnormal return of 1.30%
compared to those that fail. So, while shareholder proposals historically have not been associated
with share value increases, some more recent evidence suggests that proposals have had small
positive valuation effects.
The second column of Table 1 summarizes the results of studies that examine
announcements of negotiated settlements or non-proposal pressure by activist shareholders. Four
of these studies report positive average share value effects. For example, Wahal (1996) finds an
average seven-day abnormal stock return of 1.86% for 43 cases in which activist pension funds
announced their intentions to negotiate changes in target companies without launching proxy
resolutions. English, Smythe and McNeil (2004) examine 63 firms added to CalPERS’ annual
targeting list from 1992-1997 and find a significant two-day abnormal return of 0.98%. Similarly,
Barber (2007) reports a significantly positive 0.23% reaction at announcement for 115 firms
targeted by CalPERS.
Six other studies report negative or insignificant stock price reactions to direct
negotiations or non-proposal pressure. For example, Caton, Goh, and Donaldson (2001) report a
statistically significant mean five-day return of –0.91% for 108 firms that were listed on the
Council of Institutional Investor’s Focus List of potential target firms. Nonetheless, the evidence
indicates that non-proposal pressure and negotiations are at least sometimes associated with share
value increases.
In contrast to shareholder proposals and direct negotiations, the evidence regarding hedge
fund activism and contested proposals is consistent and robust across studies. Column 3 in Table
1 reports the results from seven studies that examine the impact of hedge fund activism. Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) report an average abnormal monthly return of 5.10% for 1,059
targetings of 882 unique firms by 236 different hedge fund activists, while Klein and Zur (2009)
report a 5.7% abnormal return during a 36-day period surrounding the filing dates for 134 targeted
11
firms. Using somewhat different samples, Greenwood and Schor (2009), Brav, Jiang, and Kim
(2009), Boyson and Mooradian (2011), and Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2015) find average
abnormal stock returns that range from 3.61%–8.68%. Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas (2015)
also report positive stock returns around announcements of hedge fund activism, but they do not
report test statistics for their overall sample. These results focus on U.S. firms, but they are similar
to findings regarding hedge fund activism in the U.K. (Becht et al., 2010), Japan (Hamao, Kutsana,
and Matos, 2011), and Germany (Bessler et al., 2015). Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2015)
examine both U.S. and non-U.S. hedge fund activism and report fairly uniform results. In their
sample, U.S. targets of hedge fund activism experience a mean abnormal stock return of 6.97%,
while European targets’ mean abnormal stock return is 6.4% and Asian targets’ mean abnormal
stock return is 4.8%. These results strongly indicate that firms targeted by hedge fund activists
have increased values, on average.
The last column in Table 1 reports on empirical examinations of proxy fights. Five of the
six studies find large positive effects on firm values. For example, Mulherin and Poulsen (1998)
examine 270 proposals from 1979 to 1994 and report a 8.0% abnormal return from 20 days before
through 5 days after the contest is initiated. The magnitudes of the measured stock price reactions
have a wider range than for hedge fund activism, from a low of 0.95% (and statistically
insignificant) in Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) to a high of 11.9% (measured over a two-month
period) in the seminal examination of 96 proxy contests for board seats from 1962–1978 by Dodd
and Warner (1983). These results indicate that, like hedge fund activism, proxy fights for board
seats also are associated with share value increases, although the range of estimates is wider than
those for hedge fund activism.
Panel B of Table 1 reports on 17 studies that examine long-run returns following different
forms of shareholder activism. Prevost and Rao (2000) report statistically insignificant three-year
buy-and-hold returns for a sample of 17 firms that each were targeted once by public pension
funds, and statistically significant negative average abnormal returns for nine firms targeted more
than once. Smith (1996) reports a positive long-run stock return for 39 firms targeted by
12
CalPERS’ shareholder proposals and Opler and Sokobin (1997) report positive long-run returns
for firms on the Council of Institutional Investors’ Focus List. Song and Szewczyk (2003),
however, argue that these results reflect benchmarking error. Using an empirical procedure similar
to that proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997), Song and Szewczyk (2003) find insignificant long-
run returns for firms on the Council of Institutional Investors’ Focus List. Of the studies that
examine long-run returns to shareholder proposals and negotiations, only Del Guercio and
Hawkins (1999), Prevost and Rao (2000) and Barber (2007) compute long-run abnormal returns
using procedures similar to those in Barber and Lyon (1997). All three of these studies yield
insignificant results. We believe the available evidence is most consistent with the conclusion that
shareholder proposals and negotiations are not associated with significant long-run stock returns.
Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) find evidence of negative long-run returns following
proxy fights, although this estimate also could reflect benchmarking problems. Mulherin and
Poulsen (1998) also point out that long-run return studies following proxy contests are subject to a
survivorship bias because surviving firms are those that are not acquired. Mulherin and Poulsen
(1998) find that evidence of negative long run stock performance after proxy contests is
concentrated among firms that are not taken over and do not remove their managers. Klein and
Zur (2009) and Greenwood and Schor (2009) report significantly positive long-run stock returns to
hedge fund activism. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Clifford (2008) also find
positive long-run returns, but their results are statistically insignificant. We conclude that there is
some evidence that hedge fund activism and proxy fights are associated with positive long run
returns when they prompt changes in control or other significant operational changes, but support
for this inference is not unanimous.
Several studies report that shareholder activism leads to statistically significant increases
in share values for selected subsamples of firms. These results are subject to data-snooping
criticisms, but they suggest that the share value effects of shareholder activism can depend on the
specific issue raised and the sponsor’s identity. These results are summarized in the Internet
Appendix.
13
4. Effects on target firm earnings, operations, and governance features
Several studies have investigated whether activism prompts significant changes in target
firms’ earnings, operations, or governance features. Table 2 summarizes the results of these tests.
Panel A examines earnings changes following shareholder proposals, negotiations, and hedge fund
activism.5 The definitions of the earnings variables group into three categories: return on assets
(or operating return on assets), return on equity, and return on sales (or operating return on sales).
Most non-hedge fund researchers report insignificant changes in all three of the earnings
variables. For example, Del Guercio, and Hawkins (1999) examine changes in operating return on
assets and operating return on sales from one year before through one year after a firm first
receives a shareholder proposal. They find that the changes are smaller than those for a set of
control firms matched by size, industry, and prior earnings performance. In none of the
comparisons is the difference statistically significant. Similar findings are reported by Carleton,
Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Smith (1996), Strickland,
Wiles, and Zenner (1996), and Wahal (1996). There are isolated exceptions to these results. Most
significantly, Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) find increased adjusted operating return on
assets relative to control firms matched by industry and performance during the three years
following activism. Most evidence, however, indicates that shareholder proposals and direct
negotiations are not associated with increases in the target firms’ operating performance.
There is stronger evidence that firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience an
increase in operating performance. Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009) report that return on assets
increases for hedge fund target firms relative to a control sample based on industry, size, and
book-to-market during the two years following the targeting event. Boyson and Morradian (2011)
report an increase in target firms’ return on assets relative to control firms matched by industry and
5 Proxy fights tend to focus on board seats and are not included in Table 2. However, proxy fights frequently prompt important organizational changes. Dodd and Warner (1983) find that dissidents win board seats in 58.3% of contests. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) report successful proxy fights in 61.7% of their sample. Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) observe that dissidents gain seats in 51.6% of proxy fights, while Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) find that 52% of activists obtain board seats. Buchanan et al. (2012) report that 48.6% of proxy contests are successful.
14
book-to-market during the year following activism. The year following activism, Clifford (2008)
finds a higher average industry adjusted return on assets for hedge fund targets. There are some
conflicting results, however. In an examination of hedge fund activism’s effect on bondholders,
Klein and Zur (2011) find no change in target firms’ return on assets. Zhu (2013) examines the
effect of the threat of hedge fund activism and reports an increase in return on assets, while
Gantchev, Grendil, and Jotikasthira (2015) find no significant change. We infer that hedge fund
activism frequently is associated with an increase in operating performance at the target firms,
although the evidence is not unanimous.
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the results of investigations into the effects of activism on
several measures of firm operations, including capital expenditures, payouts, sales growth, and
asset divestitures and restructuring. There is some evidence that shareholder activism is associated
with changes, although the evidence is mixed. The most persuasive evidence again regards hedge
fund activism. Following such activism, target firms tend to decrease their capital expenditures,
increase their payouts, and increase their incidence of asset divestitures, restructurings, or
employee layoffs. Using plant-level data, for example, Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2013) find that
plants belonging to targeted firms are more likely to be sold after hedge fund intervention.
The greatest evidence of operational change following shareholder proposals also regards
asset divestitures, restructurings, or employee layoffs. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) find that
firms targeted by pension funds are more likely to experience such events during the three to four
years following their initial targeting than a sample of control firms matched by industry, size, and
performance. These findings provide some of the strongest evidence available that shareholder
activism that does not involve hedge funds has facilitated some organizational change. Even here,
however, it is difficult to attribute all such changes to shareholder pressure. As reported in Section
5, shareholders tend to target poorly performing firms. Such firms are prime candidates for
organizational change even in the absence of shareholder activism. Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin
(2000), for example, find evidence of significant organizational change at Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
after it was targeted by shareholder activists. However, it is difficult to separate the effects of
15
institutional investors’ advocacy for change from those of a contemporaneous bid for influence by
a large shareholder, internal pressures for change arising from mounting financial losses, and the
threat of an external bid for control.
Panel C of Table 2 reports on studies that investigate whether activism tends to prompt
changes in the target firms’ corporate governance. Once again, the evidence is mixed for
shareholder proposals and direct negotiations. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Karpoff,
Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), and Smith (1996) each report that target firms do not
subsequently replace their CEOs at unusually high rates. Wu (2004) and Del Guercio, Seery, and
Woidtke (2008) find an increase in board and management turnover following direct negotiations.
In contrast, Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2011) report that director turnover is significantly less for
firms that implement majority vote shareholder proposals that have the strongest shareholder
support and for poorly performing firms.
Once again, the most significant changes are observed around hedge fund activism. Brav,
Jiang, and Kim (2013) find an increase in the likelihood of CEO turnover in concentrated
industries and Zhu (2013) similarly reports an increase for potential targets of hedge fund
activism. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) indicate that hedge fund activists are successful in
increasing target board size in 76% of the targets, obtaining board representation in 69% of the
targets, and promoting mergers in 66% of the targets.
Six papers examine whether targeted firms adopt the specific governance changes sought
by the activist. Most evidence indicates that activists achieve at least modest success in this
regard. Wahal (1996) reports that 21% of the firms in his sample adopt the proposed measure or a
substitute that is deemed acceptable by the activist. In Smith’s (1996) smaller sample of CalPERS
targets, this “success” rate is 53%. Such successes are observed for specific types of proposals as
well. Bizjak and Marquette (1998) conclude that firms receiving shareholder proposals to change
their poison pills are more likely to restructure their pills than a group of control firms that have
poison pills but did not receive proposals. Thomas and Cotter (2007) find that poison pill
proposals are more frequently supported by majority votes and implemented than they were before
16
2002. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) report that targets of TIAA-CREF’s activist efforts
frequently make changes that are satisfactory to TIAA-CREF. A majority of the firms that TIAA-
CREF asked to name women or minority board members, for example, either subsequently did so
or indicated that they were looking for such a director. Similar majorities of firms instituted
confidential voting or imposed restrictions on the antitakeover uses of blank check preferred stock
after they were contacted by TIAA-CREF. Contrary evidence is reported by Wahal, Wiles, and
Zenner (1995), who find that firms’ decisions to opt out of Pennsylvania’s 1990 antitakeover law
are unrelated to whether they were pressured to do so by CalPERS.
Again, hedge fund activism is associated with the highest rates of organizational change.
Klein and Zur (2009) report that 60% of hedge fund activist campaigns are successful, and 65% of
other entrepreneurial activist campaigns succeed. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) find that hedge
fund activists prompt significant changes 70% of the time during the period 1994–2005, while
Bratton (2007) reports a hedge fund success rate of 84% during 2002 through 2006. Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) examine hedge fund activism during the period 2001–2006 and report
a full or partial success rate of approximately 66%.
Several recent studies on hedge fund activism are not directly characterized by the features
in Table 2. Brav, Jiang, and Tian (2014) find that R&D expenditures drop significantly at firms
targeted by hedge fund activists, but proxies for innovative activity increase, including patent
counts and citations. Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai (2014) focus on hedge fund intervention’s
effect on loan spreads. They find that the effect on spreads depends on the type of activism:
spreads increase when activism is related to the market for corporate control or financial
restructuring and spreads decrease when the activism is motivated by managerial entrenchment.
Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2014) provide evidence about the effect of institutional investors on
hedge fund activists. They show that selling by institutions increases the probability of becoming
the target of a hedge fund and that hedge funds tend to buy shares when institutions sell them.
Gantchev (2013) constructs a structural model of shareholder activism in which an activist trades
off the expected benefit from a campaign against the target firm with its expected cost. He finds
17
that the average campaign costs $10.71 million and that, while the average net return to activism is
close to zero, those in the top quartile have an average return of 22.4% from a campaign.
Together, the results summarized in this section suggest that shareholder activism
frequently prompts firms to adopt specific but limited changes in their governance rules, such as
adopting confidential voting or changing the provisions of a poison pill. Activist efforts
sometimes precede, and may contribute to, such organizational changes as restructurings and
divestitures. The most persuasive evidence that shareholder activism corresponds to earnings
increases or changes in the top leaders, or that it helps to facilitate broader control changes, comes
from research that examines hedge fund activism.
5. Which firms get targeted?
Several papers examine target firms’ characteristics. Table 3 summarizes these papers’
findings and provides a profile of the typical firm that attracts shareholder activism.
First, target firms tend to be poor performers. A majority of studies in Panel A of Table 3
find that target firms’ stock returns are significantly lower than contemporaneous market returns or
the contemporaneous returns of control firms during the one to four year period before the
targeting. Klein and Zur (2009) find that firms targeted by hedge fund activists have relatively
strong stock price performance, but this finding is the exception.
Panel B reports mixed evidence on target firms’ prior accounting performance. The
majority of findings indicate that target firms have relatively low return to sales, sales growth,
growth in operating income, and market-to-book ratios. But targets of hedge fund activism have
high return on assets compared to industry or control firm benchmarks.
Panel C summarizes the results regarding several other firm characteristics and reveals
some patterns. A majority of studies find that target firms have high leverage. Targets also tend to
have low dividend yields, low R&D expenditures, a high proportion of outside directors, and many
takeover defenses. Most non-hedge fund activism targets large firms. Hedge fund activism, in
contrast, tends to target smaller firms, although this result is not unanimous (see Clifford, 2008).
18
Three studies conclude that hedge fund targets have relatively large cash flow from operations.
The evidence is mixed, however, on whether target firms tend to have high or low inside
ownership and institutional ownership.
Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) find that the likelihood of activism is positively
related to the target firm’s share liquidity, presumably because liquidity facilitates the pre-activism
accumulation of shares and allows the activist to capture more of the gain from activism. Edmans,
Fang, and Zur (2013) agree on the overall effect of liquidity, but note that, given a large stake,
higher liquidity discourages blockholders to engage in activist efforts because it lowers the cost of
simply selling their shares. The positive effect of liquidity on activism occurs because liquidity
facilitates the formation of large blockholdings in the first place.
The overall evidence suggests that firms attracting shareholder proposals or direct
negotiations tend to be large and suffering from poor performance as indicated by prior stock
returns, sales growth, return to sales, and market to book ratio. Such activism appears to be
motivated by attempts to improve the performance of poorly performing firms. Other than the
facilitating effect of share liquidity, however, the targets of hedge fund activism are not as easily
characterized. The targets of much hedge fund activism are smaller firms. Many have poor prior
stock returns, sales growth, and market to book ratios, but these firms also tend to have high return
on assets. These findings suggest that hedge funds’ targets are not simply firms that are
performing poorly by all metrics. Rather, hedge funds’ targets appear more likely to have specific
operating characteristics that attract the attention of hedge funds. That is, shareholder proposals
and direct negotiations appear to be more likely motivated by overall poor firm performance,
whereas hedge fund activism targets more specific operating characteristics that create
opportunities for value creation.
6. A synthesis of prior research results
The primary inference that emerges from Sections 3 and 4 is that hedge fund activism is
associated with significantly positive changes in target firms’ value and operating performance,
19
whereas shareholder proposals generally are not. In this section, we present the evidence in two
additional formats that illustrate additional insights from this research.
6.a. Types of activism and sample periods
Figure 2 illustrates how researchers’ findings are related to the type of activism and
sample period examined. Each row of the panel represents a different research study and the
horizontal length of the bar represents the authors’ sample period. Bars highlighted in green
indicate that the authors find evidence that activism is associated with an increase in share values,
yellow indicates no significant relation to share values, and red indicates a decrease in share
values.
Panel A reports on activism via shareholder proposals. Most of the bars are in yellow,
indicating no significant relation between proposals and share values. One paper – Prevost and
Rao (2000) – finds a significantly negative average share price change around the proxy mailing
date for proposals sponsored by public pension funds. The three studies that find evidence of
positive (albeit small) share price reactions to shareholder proposals, by Thomas and Cotter
(2007), Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), and Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) all examine
sample periods that are relatively recent. One more recent paper, by Cai and Walkling (2011),
finds insignificant results, although this paper examines only say-on-pay shareholder proposals.
Panel B in Figure 2 reports on papers that examine direct negotiations and non-proposal
shareholder pressure. Here the results are mixed, with an almost equal number of papers finding
positive share price effects as those finding insignificant or negative effects. Most of these papers
focus on the activism of a single institution, so these results do not generalize widely.6 Panel C,
however, reveals a clearer pattern. All seven papers represented in Panel C examine hedge fund
activism. Since such activism is relatively new, these papers’ sample periods are relatively recent.
Also, all seven papers report results indicating that hedge fund activism is associated with share
6 CalPERS-specific studies include Anson, White, and Ho (2003, 2004), English, Smythe, and McNeil (2004), Nelson (2005, 2006), and Barber (2007). Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) examine the activities of United Shareholders Association, and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) focus on activism by CREF. In addition, Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin (2000) focus on activism at a single firm, Sears, Roebuck & Co.
20
price increases at the target companies.
Figure 2 illustrates two important themes in the literature. The first is the observation
made previously that, among the most common types of shareholder activism, evidence of positive
valuation effects is strongest with hedge fund activism and weakest with shareholder proposals.
The second theme is that there is stronger evidence of positive share value effects in recent
samples of shareholder activism than in earlier samples. This certainly characterizes the relatively
recent increase in the incidence of hedge fund activism. But it also characterizes the findings
regarding shareholder proposals.
Buchanan et al. (2012) examine a relatively recent sample of 761 shareholder proposals at
U.S. firms from 2000-2006. Although they do not examine short event windows or report formal
tests, their results also suggest that shareholder proposals recently have become associated with
value increases. Buchanan et al. (2012) argue that several developments make shareholder
proposals more effective than in the 1980s and 1990s. These developments include activists’
focus on such key internal governance features as classified boards, as well as such regulatory
changes as a 2004 SEC requirement that mutual funds disclose their voting decisions and policies.
We note, however, that an alternate hypothesis is that, since approximately 2000, some hedge fund
activists have used shareholder proposals in their attempts to prompt organizational or operational
changes at target companies. It is possible that the small positive share price reactions observed in
the more recent samples of shareholder proposals are picking up some effects of hedge fund
activism. The results in Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011, p. 176) provide some support for this
alternate hypothesis, as they report that proposals sponsored by investment funds – which likely
consist primarily of hedge funds – are associated with larger share value increases than for any
other type of sponsor.
6.b. Alternate outcome measures for shareholder activism
In this survey we emphasize the relation between shareholder activism and the target
firms’ values and operations. Table 4 presents the research on shareholder activism in a way that
21
offers insight into activism’s other effects at target firms. We group studies based on six different
types of outcomes examined by researchers: (1) increase in share values, (2) increase in
accounting measures of performance, (3) change in operations or management, (4) actions sought
by the activist are adopted by the target firm, (5) some actions are taken that are attributed to
shareholder pressure, and (6) a shareholder proposal receives high vote support. We list these
definitions in descending order of their probable association with the stated criteria for most
corporate governance-related shareholder activism, which is to increase shareholder wealth.7
Many authors provide evidence about more than one criterion for success. In Table 4, however,
we associate each study with the criterion its authors emphasize in drawing their overall
conclusions.
Table 4 also partitions the studies according to the form of shareholder activism from
which the authors draw their primary conclusions: proposals, negotiations, or hedge fund
activism. We omit proxy fights from the table. Wahal (1996), for example, examines both
proposals and negotiations but draws conclusions primarily from his findings regarding
shareholder proposals. The studies in Table 4 also are coded according to the general conclusion
regarding shareholder activism that is presented in the paper’s abstract, introduction, and
conclusion. Studies that characterize activist efforts as positively associated with the outcome
variable are tagged by plus (+) signs. Those characterizing such efforts as negatively or not
significantly related to the outcome variable have minus (–) signs.
As noted previously, most of the studies listed in the two left-hand cells of Panel A
conclude that shareholder proposals have little or negative impact on target firms’ values or
operating performance. However, there is some evidence that shareholder proposals are associated
with less consequential changes at the target firm, as nine of the 12 studies listed in the four right-
hand columns of Panel A conclude that activist efforts generally are successful at effecting some
limited changes at the target firm. The results in Panel B indicate that negotiations frequently are
7Shareholder activists have long asserted that their motives are to increase firm performance and share prices. Speaking for TIAA-CREF, for example, Biggs (1995) claimed “... that modern and sound practices of corporate governance will make a difference in the future performance of companies.” The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (1998) has also been clear: “At CalPERS, corporate governance is about making money...”
22
associated with stock price increases or improved operating performance, and almost always are
associated with other changes at the target firm. The studies in Panel C agree that hedge fund
activism is associated with increases in share values. The majority also agree that hedge fund
activism is associated with positive changes in the target firm’s operations and performance.
A casual reading of many papers in this literature suggests that there exists substantial
disagreement among researchers about whether shareholder activism is effective. We propose that
much of the apparent disagreement reflects differences in the definition of “effective,” and
different emphases on outcome metrics. Using share value or operating performance changes to
measure impact and focusing on shareholder proposals (i.e., the left-hand cells in Panel A of Table
4), most researchers conclude there is little effect on target firms. Focusing on limited changes in
the target firm’s governance structure (the right-hand columns in all panels), one is more likely to
conclude that activism has impact. These conclusions parallel the empirical generalizations
emphasized in this survey: shareholder proposals usually are not associated with significant
changes in firm values or with earnings improvements, whereas hedge fund activism usually is.
Shareholder proposals, private negotiations, and hedge fund activism, however, all are frequently
associated with some types of organizational changes, although in many cases the changes are
small.
7. Conclusions and further research questions
This paper emphasizes two primary findings that emerge from the extensive literature on
shareholder activism. First, activism that adopts some of the investment-intensive aspects of
corporate takeovers, such as hedge fund activism, is associated with improvements in target firms’
values and operations. This result is consistent with Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) argument that
agency problems in modern corporations are controlled in part by a dynamic and sometimes
transient coalescence of ownership and share votes to discipline managers and change corporate
policy. Second, studies of shareholder activism that draw from recent samples reveal more
evidence of improvements in target firms’ values and operations than earlier studies that are based
23
on activism from the 1980s and 1990s. This suggests that activists have learned and adapted their
strategies, particularly through the development of hedge fund activism. Such developments are
described by Gillan and Starks (2007) and Buchanan et al. (2012), and illustrate the economic
process of natural selection presented by Alchian (1950).
Despite the large number of studies about shareholder activism, many issues remain
unresolved. We conclude this survey with a list of eight questions for future research.
1. Why shareholder activism? Alchian and Demsetz (1972) describe several governance
mechanisms that limit agency problems and enable the corporate form of organization to survive.
These so-called “modifications” include share liquidity and the external takeover market.
Presumably, shareholder activism survives as a popular strategy because it yields sufficiently large
expected net benefits in some situations (e.g., see Gantchev, 2013). For example, Norli et al.
(2015) argue that activism is facilitated by share liquidity, and Kahn and Winton (1998) argue that
activism will not occur when the activist believes that the target firm’s shares are overvalued.
Activism is less costly than a takeover attempt, so we conjecture that activism is useful for
relatively small changes and performance improvements. We also conjecture that institutions will
engage in activism instead of selling their shares when holding the firm’s stock is important for
tracking a benchmark index. The results surveyed in Table 3, which identifies the characteristics
of activism targets, can help guide the development of a more comprehensive understanding of
why and when shareholders will initiate activist tactics instead of selling their shares or launching
a control contest. Regulatory reforms, such as the SEC’s 1992 reforms that made it easier for
shareholders to communicate during proxy fights, also can help to identify tests of the causes of
shareholder activism (e.g., see Choi, 2000).
2. Have shareholder proposals really become value-enhancing in recent years? The results in
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) and Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) suggest that recent
samples of shareholder proposals are associated with share value increases, unlike most research
based on earlier samples. Such time-varying results could reflect an improvement in targeting
practices by proposal sponsors, as argued by Buchanan et al. (2012). An alternative explanation
24
that is suggested by some of the subsample results in Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), however, is
that the results from later samples include shareholder proposals that are affiliated with hedge fund
activism. If so, the value-improving developments over time do not reflect better targeting by
proposal sponsors, but rather, the development of hedge funds’ activist strategies.
3. Does it matter if shareholder proposals receive majority support? Shareholder proposals
are advisory only and are not binding on the target firms’ managers even if they receive majority
support. Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) argue that proposals receiving majority support
carry more weight than proposals that do not, and Sullivan & Cromwell (2014) report that the
fraction of proposals receiving majority support has grown over time to 27% in 2013 and 23% in
2014. Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) show that proposals receiving majority support are
more likely to prompt organizational changes. A counterview, however, is that even well
considered proposals that do not receive 50% of the votes also can prompt organizational changes.
Overall, little is known about the level of support that is required to prompt organization change,
or whether value and operational changes are related monotonically to vote support levels.
4. Has hedge fund activism’s effectiveness changed over time? Brav et al. (2008) find that
the positive effects of hedge fund activism on target firms declined during their sample period
from 2001-2006. Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas (2015), in contrast, argue that hedge fund
activism generated increasing effects on target companies from 2008-2014. Theory suggests that
the success of early hedge fund activists would prompt supply and demand adjustments that
eliminate any surplus from such innovations in activism. On the supply side, the early success of
many hedge fund activists should have attracted additional funds and investment money into
hedge fund activism, decreasing the marginal gain from activism. On the demand side, potential
target firms may have adapted their management practices to limit the potential gains from
activism and decrease their exposure to activists’ threats.
5. What specific changes are associated with successful activism? Bebchuk, Coates, and
Subramanian (2002), Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008), and others argue that the existence of a
classified board is the single most important takeover defense a firm can have, implying that
25
activist efforts aimed at removing classified boards are more substantive than activism that seeks
other governance-related changes. Reflecting this hypothesis, the Harvard Shareholder Rights
Project helped institutional investors to target 80 firms during the 2012 proxy season to seek repeal
of these firms’ classified boards.8 The view that classified boards are a uniquely important
governance feature implies that activism that focuses on the removal of classified boards has
relatively large potential to effect meaningful change.
6. What is cause and effect in shareholder activism? Activists target some firms and not
others, raising the question of whether any changes associated with the activism reflect the
selection process and would have occurred anyway. Even event studies suffer from an
interpretation challenge because news of an activist effort reveals not only that the firm has been
targeted by activists, but also that prior efforts to effect change were ineffective. Researchers have
long been aware of these issues and attempt to address them by using control samples (e.g., Brav
et al., 2008), non-public sources of private communications involving activists and their targets
(Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998), or alternate identification strategies (Cuñat, Gine, and
Guadalupe, 2012). Nonetheless, test identification remains a challenge in research on shareholder
activism.
7. How important are spillover effects? To the extent that shareholder activism disciplines
current managers, the threat of activism could encourage better performance among non-target
companies as well. However, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) propose that diffuse stock ownership
affects stockholders’ behavior in complex ways. Building upon this argument, Hansen and Lott
(1996) note that some actions that increase a target firm’s value can impose external costs on other
firms. They suggest that diversified investors apply pressure to companies to increase the values
of the investors’ total portfolios, not just the share price of that particular firm. This argument
implies that, to evaluate the impact of shareholder activism, it is important to consider spillover
effects on other firms.
8. Do proxy access shareholder proposals matter? Proxy access proposals typically seek to
8 See http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/giving-shareholders-a-voice.
26
establish a company bylaw that would enable shareholders who meet certain criteria to nominate
candidates for the board of directors and to have these nominees and their supporting statements
included in the company’s proxy materials. The most common proxy access proposals would
require a shareholder, or a coordinating group of shareholders, to hold at least 3% of the firm’s
outstanding shares for a minimum of three years. The SEC first permitted proxy access proposals
in 2012. Since then, Sullivan & Cromwell (2014) reports that a substantial number of such
proposals have received majority support from shareholders. The empirical findings regarding
proxy access proposals is mixed, with Larcker et al. (2011) and Akyol et al. (2012) finding
negative effects on firm value and Becker et al. (2013) finding positive effects. Matsusaka and
Ozbas (2015) show analytically that shareholder access to the proxy can either help or hurt
shareholder value depending on the extent of the agency problems in the firm and whether
managers distort their investment policies to accommodate the activist investors.
We began this survey with Alchian and Demsetz’ (1972) rhetorical question, “But who
will monitor the monitor?” Along with share transferability, market monitoring, board oversight,
compensation contracts, and the market for corporate control, Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
conclude that monitoring and the control of managerial agency problems can be facilitated by
direct shareholder intervention. The past thirty years of shareholder activism have seen numerous
innovations that improve monitoring and lower agency costs. Our main conclusion, however, is
that such activism is particularly effective when it is accompanied by significant share ownership.
27
References
Akyol, Ali C., Wei Fen Lim, and Partrick Verwijmeren, 2012, Shareholders in the boardroom: Wealth effects of the
SEC’s proposal to facilitate director nominations. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47: 1029-
1057.
Alchian, Armen A., 1950, Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy 58(3):
211221.
Alchian, Armen A., 1984, Specificity, specialization, and coalitions. Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Staatswissenschaft/Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 34-49.
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz, 1972, Production, information costs, and economic organization.
American Economic Review, 777-795.
Alexander, Cindy R., Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi, and Chester S. Spatt, 2010, Interim news and the role of proxy
voting advice. Review of Financial Studies 23: 4419-4454.
Andrade, Gregor, Mark Mitchell and Erik Stafford, 2001, New evidence and perspectives on mergers. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 15(2): 103-120.
Anson, Mark, Ted White and Ho Ho, 2003a, The shareholder wealth effects of CalPERS’ focus list. Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance 15: 102-111.
Anson, Mark, Ted White and Ho Ho, 2004b, Good corporate governance works: More evidence from CalPERS.
Journal of Asset Management 5: 149-156.
Bainbridge, Stephen M, 2006, Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment. Harvard Law Review 119(6):
1735-1758.
Barber, Brad M., 2007, Monitoring the monitor: Evaluating CalPERS’ activism. The Journal of Investing Winter:
66-80.
Barber, Brad M., and Lyon, John D., 1997, Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and
specification of test-statistics, Journal of Financial Economics 43: 341-372.
Bates, Thomas W., David A. Becher and Michael L. Lemmon, 2008, Board classification and managerial
entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics 87: 656-677.
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Alon Brav and Wei Jiang, 2015, The long-term effects of hedge fund activism, Columbia Law
Review, 115, forthcoming.
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, 2002, The powerful antitakeover force of
staggered boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants. Stanford Law Review 55(3): 885-
917.
Becht, Marco, Julian Franks, Jeremy Grant and Hannes F. Wagner, 2015, The returns to hedge fund activism: An
international study, Working paper.
Becht, Marco, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, 2010, Returns to shareholder activism: Evidence from
a clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, Review of Financial Studies 23(3): 3093-3129.
28
Becker, Bo, Daniel Bergstresser, and Guhan Subramanian, 2015, Does shareholder proxy access improve firm
value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge. Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming.
Bessler, Wolfgang, Wolfgan Drobetz and Julian Holler, 2015, The return to hedge fund activism in Germany,
European Financial Management 21(1): 106-147.
Betton, Sandra, B. Espen Eckbo and Karin S. Thorburn, 2008, Corporate takeovers. Handbook of Corporate
Finance, B. Espen Eckbo, ed., Vol. 1, 289-427.
Biggs, John, 1995. Why TIAA-CREF is active in corporate governance, Participant magazine (New York: TIAA-
CREF), November.
Bizjak, John M. and Marquette, Christopher J., 1998, Are shareholders all bark and no bite? Evidence from
shareholder resolutions to rescind poison pills. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33: 499-521.
Black, Bernard S., 1992, Agents watching agents: The promise of institutional investor voice. UCLA Law Review
39: 811-893.
Black, Bernard S., 1998, Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the United States. The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Peter Newman, ed., Vol. 3, 459-465.
Boyson, Nicole M. and Robert Mooradian, 2011, Corporate governance and hedge fund activism. Review of
Derivatives Research 14: 169-204.
Bradley, Michael, Alon Brav, Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang, 2010, Costly communication, shareholder activism,
and limits to arbitrage. Journal of Financial Economics 95.1: 1-19.
Bratton, William W., 2007, Hedge funds and governance targets. Georgetown Law Journal 95: 1375-1433.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim, 2009a, Hedge fund activism: A review. Foundations and Trends in
Finance 4: 185-246.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim, 2013b, The real effects of hedge fund activism: Productivity, asset
allocation, and product market competition. Duke, Columbia and Cornell working paper.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall S. Thomas, 2008, Hedge fund activism, corporate governance,
and firm performance. Journal of Finance 63: 1729-1775.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, and Xuan Tian, 2014, Shareholder power and corporate innovation: Evidence from hedge
fund activism. Duke, Columbia and Indiana University working paper.
Buchanan, Bonnie G., Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen, and Tina Yang, 2012, Shareholder proposal rules and
practice: Evidence from a comparison of the United States and United Kingdom. American Business Law
Journal 49: 739-803.
Cai, Jie and Ralph A. Walkling, 2011, Shareholders’ say on pay: Does it create value? Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 46: 299-339.
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, 1998, CalPERS Global Corporate Governance Principles
(Sacramento, CA).
Carleton, Willard T., James M. Nelson, and Michael S. Weisbach, 1998, The influence of institutions on corporate
29
governance through private negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF. Journal of Finance 53: 1335-1362.
Caton, Gary L., Jeremy Goh, and Jeffrey Donaldson, 2001, The effectiveness of institutional activism. Financial
Analysts Journal 57: 21-26.
Cherkes, Martin, Jacob S. Sagi, and Z. Jay Wang, 2014, Managed distribution policies in closed-end funds and
shareholder activism. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, 1311-1337.
Choi, Stephen, 2000, Proxy issue proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC proxy reforms. Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 16: 233-268.
Clifford, Christopher P., 2008, Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists. Journal of
Corporate Finance 14: 323-336.
Cronqvist, Henrik and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2009, Large shareholders and corporate policies. The Review of
Financial Studies 22: 3941-3976.
Crutchley, Claire E., Carl D. Hudson, and Marlin R.H. Jensen, 1998, The shareholder wealth effect of CalPERS’
activism, Financial Services Review 7(1): 1-10.
Cuñat, Vicente, Mireia Gine, and Maria Guadalupe, 2012, The vote is cast: The effect of corporate governance on
shareholder value. The Journal of Finance 67: 1943-1977.
DeAngelo, Harry and Linda DeAngelo, 1989, Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations.
Journal of Financial Economics 23: 29-59.
Del Guercio, Diane and Hawkins, Jennifer, 1999, The motivation and impact of pension fund activism. Journal of
Financial Economics 52: 293-340.
Del Guercio, Diane, Laura Seery and Tracie Woidtke, 2008, Do boards pay attention when institutional investor
activists “just vote no”? Journal of Financial Economics 90: 84-103.
Demsetz, Harold, 1983. The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics 26,
375-390.
Dodd, Peter and Jerold B. Warner, 1983, On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests. Journal of Financial
Economics 11:401-438.
Edmans, Alex, Vivian W. Fang, and Emanuel Zur, 2013, The effect of liquidity on governance. Review of Financial
Studies 26(6): 1443-1482.
English, Philip C., Thomas I. Smythe, and Chris R. McNeil, 2004. The “CalPERS Effect” revisited. Journal of
Corporate Finance 10: 157-174.
Ertimur, Yonca, Fabrizio Ferri and Volkan Muslu, 2011, Shareholder activism and CEO pay. The Review of
Financial Studies 24: 535-592.
Ertimur, Yonca, Fabrizio Ferri and Stephen R. Stubben, 2010, Board of directors’ responsiveness to shareholders:
Evidence from shareholder proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance 16: 53-72.
Gantchev, Nickolay, 2013, The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential decision model. Journal
of Financial Economics 107: 610-631.
30
Gantchev, Nickolay, Oleg Gredil, and Chotibhak Jotikasthira, 2015, Governance under the gun: Spillover effects of
hedge fund activism. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill working paper.
Gantchev, Nickolay and Chotibhak Jotikasthira, 2014, Hedge fund activists: Do they take cues from institutional
exit? University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill working paper.
Gillan, Stuart L., John W. Kensinger and John D. Martin, 2000, Value creation and corporate diversification: The
case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. Journal of Financial Economics 55: 103-137.
Gillan, Stuart L. and Laura T. Starks, 1998, A survey of shareholder activism: Motivation and empirical evidence.
Contemporary Finance Digest 2: 10-34.
Gillan, Stuart L. and Laura T. Starks, 2000, Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of
institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57: 275-305.
Gillan, Stuart L. and Laura T. Starks, 2007, The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States. Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance 19: 55-73.
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 118(1): 107-155.
Greenwood, Robin and Michael Schor, 2009, Investor activism and takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics 92:
362-375.
Hadani, Michael, Maria Goranova and Raihan Khan, 2011, Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and
earnings management. Journal of Business Research 64: 1352-1360.
Hall, Curtis and Mark A. Trombley, 2012, Accounting responses to hedge-fund activism. University of Arizona
working paper.
Hamao, Yasushi, Kenji Kutsuna and Pedro Matos, 2011, U.S.-style activism in Japan: The first two years.
University of Southern California working paper.
Hansen, Robert G. and John R. Lott, Jr., 1996, Externalities and corporate objectives in a world with diversified
shareholder/consumers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(1): 43-68.
Helwege, Jean, Vincent J. Intintoli, and Andreq Zhang, 2012, Voting with their feet or activism: Institutional
investors’ impact on CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance 18: 22-37.
Ikenberry, David and Josef Lakonishok, 1993, Corporate governance through the proxy contest: Evidence and
implications. Journal of Business 66: 405-435.
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
John, Kose and April Klein, 1995, Shareholder proposals and corporate governance, New York University working
paper.
Johnson, Marilyn F., Susan Porter, and Margaret B. Shackell, 1997, Stakeholder pressure and the structure of
executive compensation. University of Michigan working paper.
Johnson, Marilyn F. and Margaret B. Shackell, 1997, Shareholder proposals on executive compensation. University
31
of Michigan working paper.
Kahn, Charles and Andrew Winton. 1998. Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder intervention. Journal
of Finance 53(1): 99-129.
Karpoff, Jonathan M., Paul H. Malatesta and Ralph A. Walkling, 1996, Corporate governance and shareholder
initiatives: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 42: 365-395.
Karpoff, Jonathan and Edward Rice, 1989, Organizational form, share transferability, and firm performance:
Evidence from the ANCSA corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 24: 69-105.
Klein, April and Emanuel Zur, 2009a, Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private
investors. The Journal of Finance 64: 187-229.
Klein, April and Emanuel Zur, 2011b, The impact of hedge fund activism on the target firm’s existing bondholders.
The Review of Financial Studies 24: 1735-1771.
Krishnan, C.N.V., Frank Partnoy and Randall S. Thomas, 2015, Top hedge funds and shareholder activism,
Working paper.
Larcker, David F., Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel J. Taylor, 2011, The market reaction to corporate governance
regulation. Journal of Financial Economics 101: 431-448.
Matsusaka, John G. and Oguzhan Ozbas, 2015, Managerial Accommodation, Proxy Access, and the Cost of
Shareholder Empowerment, University of Southern California working paper.
Monks, Robert A.G. and Nell Minow, 1991, Power and Accountability (Dunmore, PA: HarperCollins), 292 pp.
Mulherin, J. Harold and Annette B. Poulsen, 1998, Proxy contests and corporate change: Implications for
shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 47: 279-313.
Nelson, James M., 2005a, Does good corporate governance really work? More evidence from CalPERS. Journal of
Asset Management 6: 274-287.
Nelson, James M., 2006b, The “CalPERS effect” revisited again. Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 187-213.
Nesbitt, Stephen L., 1994, Long-term rewards from shareholder activism: A study of the “CalPERS” effect. Journal
of Applied Corporate Finance 6(4): 75-80.
Norli, Øyvind, Charlotte Ostergaard and Ibolya Schindele, 2015, Liquidity and shareholder activism. Review of
Financial Studies 28(2): 486-520.
Opler, Tim C., and Jonathan Sokobin, 1997, Does coordinated institutional activism work? An analysis of the
activities of the council of institutional investors. Ohio State University working paper.
Partnoy, Frank, “The Surprising Market Response to Activist Hedge Funds.” Editorial. Wall Street Journal 22 Apr.
2015: A13. Print.
Pound, John, 1992, Raiders, targets, and politics: The history and future of American corporate control, Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance 5: 6-18.
Prevost, Andrew K. and Ramesh P. Rao, 2000, Of what value are shareholder proposals sponsored by public
pension funds? The Journal of Business 73: 177-204.
32
Prevost, Andrew K., Ramesh P. Rao, and Melissa A. Williams, 2012, Labor unions as shareholder activists:
Champions or detractors? The Financial Review 47: 327-349.
Renneboog, Luc and Peter G. Szilagyi, 2011, The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance. Journal of
Corporate Finance 17: 167-188.
Ryngaert, Michael and Ralph Scholten, 2010, Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched
management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids. Journal of Corporate Finance
17: 167-188.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political
Economy 94(3): 461-488.
Smith, Michael P., 1996, Shareholder activism by institutional investors: Evidence from CalPERS. Journal of
Finance 51: 227-252.
Song, Wei-Ling and Samuel Szewczyk, 2003, Does coordinated institutional investor activism reverse the fortune of
underperforming firms? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 317-335.
Strickland, Deon, Kenneth W. Wiles, and Marc Zenner, 1996, A requiem for the USA: Is small shareholder
monitoring effective? Journal of Financial Economics 40: 319-338.
Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, 2014, 2014 Proxy Season Review, June 25, 2014. Available at
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2014_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf.
Sunder, Jayanthi, Shyam V. Sunder, and Wan Wongsunwai, 2014, Debtholder responses to shareholder activism:
Evidence from hedge fund interventions. Review of Financial Studies 27: 3318-3342.
Activist Investors Go After Big Game, The Wall Street Journal July 16, 2012.
Thomas, Randall S. and James F. Cotter, 2007, Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support,
board response, and market reaction. Journal of Corporate Finance 13: 368-391.
Thomas, Randall S. and Kenneth J. Martin, 1998, Should labor be allowed to make shareholder proposals?
Washington Law Review 73: 41-80.
Venkiteshwaran, Vinod, Subramanian R. Iyer, and Ramesh P. Rao, 2010, Is Carl Icahn Good for long-term
shareholders? A case study in shareholder activism. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 22: 45-57.
Wahal, Sunil, 1996, Pension fund activism and firm performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
31: 1-23.
Wahal, Sunil, Kenneth W. Wiles, and Marc Zenner, 1995, Who opts out of state antitakeover protection?: The case
of Pennsylvania’s SB 1310. Financial Management 24(3): 22-39.
Woidtke, Tracie, 2002, Agents watching agents? Evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value. Journal of
Financial Economics 63: 99-131.
Wu, YiLin, 2004, The impact of public opinion on board structure changes, director career progression, and CEO
turnover: Evidence from CalPERS’ corporate governance program. Journal of Corporate Finance 10: 199-
227.
33
Zhu, Heqing, 2013, The preventive effect of hedge fund activism, University of Oklahoma working paper.
34
Appendix: Time periods, data sources, types of activism and sponsor examined by 67 different studies This table lists 67 different studies examined in this survey. The time period of events covered, data source, type of activism and sponsor (if applicable) are detailed below. The type of activism is abbreviated by: shareholder proposal (SP), direct negotiations or non-proposal pressure (NP), proxy contexts (proxy) and hedge fund activism (HFA).
Author(s) Time period of events covered Data source(s)
Type(s) of activism Sponsor(s)
Alexander, Chen, Seppi, and Spatt (2010)
1992-2005 DEFC14A, ISS Proxy
Anson, White, and Ho (2003a)
1992-2001 CalPERS Focus List NS CalPERS
Anson, White, and Ho (2004b)
1992-2002 CalPERS Focus List NS CalPERS
Barber (2007) 1992-2005 CalPERS Focus List SP, NS CalPERS Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015)
1994-2007 13D filings HFA
Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2015)
2000-2010 13D Monitor HFA
Bizjak and Marquette (1998)
1986-1993 IRRC SP Pension funds (including CalPERS and CREF), USA,
Unions, Individuals Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
1994-2005 13D filings HFA
Bratton (2007) 2002-2006 13D filings, Factiva, Lexis/Nexis
HFA
Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009a)
2001-2007 13D filings HFA
Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2013b)
1994-2007 13D filings, U.S. Census Bureau HFA
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)
2001-2006 13D filings, Schedule 14A, Factiva
HFA
Brav, Jiang, and Tian (2014)
1994-2007 13D filings, NBER Patent Database
HFA
Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, and Yang (2012)
2000-2006 IRRC, DEFC and DEFN filings (US); ISS, Factiva (UK)
SP, Proxy
Cai and Walkling (2011)
2006-2008 ISS, IRRC SP
Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998)
1992-1996 Internal data from CREF, IRRC, CDA/Spectrum
NS CREF
Caton, Goh, and Donaldson (2001)
1991-1995 CII Focus List NS CII
Choi (2000) 1991-1995 Georgeson & Company of New York, New York
SP Shareholder activist organization, Public
pension, Private pension, Union and Religious
organization Clifford (2008) 1998-2005 Dow Jones Newswires, 13D and
13G filings HFA
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009)
1996-2001 IRRC, Compact Disclosure, 13D filings
NS Activists, Pension funds
Crutchley, Hudson, and Jensen (1998)
1992-1997 CalPERS Focus List NS CalPERS
Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012)
1997-2007 RiskMetrics SP
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989)
1978-1985 Weekly Bulletins of NYSE and AMEX
Proxy
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)
1987-1993 IRRC, 13F filings SP Pension funds (including CalPERS and CREF)
Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008)
1990-2003 IRRC, ISS, Lexis/Nexis, Factiva NS
35
Appendix (Continued) Author(s)
Time period of events covered Data source(s)
Type(s) of activism Sponsor(s)
Dodd and Warner (1983)
1962-1978 Logbooks from NYSE and Georgeson and Company
Proxy
English, Smythe, and McNeil (2004)
1992-1997 CalPERS Focus List NS CalPERS
Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011)
1997-2007 RiskMetrics, Factiva, Lexis/Nexis
SP, NS Union pension funds, Individuals, Religious organizations, Public pensions, and Other
Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2010)
1997-2004 RiskMetrics SP Individual, Labor unions, Public pensions, Religious organizations, and Other
Gantchev (2013) 2000-2007 13D, PREC14A, PREN14A, DFAN14A, and DEFN14A filings, SharkRepellent.net
HFA
Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira (2015)
2000-2011 13D, PREC14A, PREN14A, DFAN14A and DEFN14A filings, SharkRepellent.net
HFA
Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2014)
2000-2007 13D, PREC14A, PREN14A, DFAN14A, and DEFN14A filings, SharkRepellent.net
HFA
Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin (2000)
1981-1994 Sears' press releases, Wall Street Journal
NS CalPERS
Gillan and Starks (2000)
1987-1994 IRRC SP Pension funds, including CalPERS, CREF, NY city
and unions, USA, Individuals, and Religious
organizations Greenwood and Schor (2009)
1993-2006 13D and DFAN14A fildings HFA
Hadani, Goranova, and Khan (2011)
2001-2004 The Corporate Library SP
Hall and Trombley (2012)
1995-2007 13D filings HFA
Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)
1982-2006 Forbes executive compensation surveys, Wall Street Journal,
Thomson Financial (13F filings), SDC (13D filings),
Lexis/Nexis
Proxy, SP, NS
Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993)
1968-1988 Weekly Bulletins of NYSE and AMEX, DEF14A
Proxy
John and Klein (1995) 1991-1992 Request to firms, Lexis-Nexis SP Individuals, Religious organizations, Pension funds, USA, Unions
Johnson, Porter, and Shackell (1997)
1992-1993 IRRC, Laser Disclosure and SEC (for compensation data)
SP
Johnson and Shackell (1997)
1992-1995 IRRC, ExecuComp SP Public institutions, Private institutions, Individuals,
Mixed Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996)
1986-1990 IRRC, Q Data Corp. (1986-1987 proposals), Lexis/Nexis
(1988-1990 proposals)
SP Public institutions, Private institutions, Individuals,
Mixed Klein and Zur (2009a) 2003-2005 13D filings, Factiva HFA Klein and Zur (2011b) 1994-2006 13D filings, Factiva HFA Mulherin and Poulsen (1998)
1979-1994 14B filings (1979-1989), SDC's Proxy Fight Database (1990-
1994)
Proxy
Nelson (2005a) 1992-2004 CalPERS Focus List, Wall Street Journal
NS CalPERS
36
Appendix (Continued) Author(s)
Time period of events covered Data source(s)
Type(s) of activism Sponsor(s)
Nelson (2006b) 1990-2003 CalPERS Focus List, Wall Street Journal
NS CalPERS
Nesbitt (1994) 1992-1993 CalPERS SP CalPERS Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015)
1994-2007 PREC14A, PREN14A, PRRN14A, DEFC14A, DEFN14A, DFRN14A,
DFAN14 and DEF14C filings
HFA
Opler and Sokobin (1997)
1991-1993 CII Focus List NS CII
Pound (1992) 1981-1985 IRRC, SEC filings Proxy Prevost and Rao (2000)
1988-1994 IRRC SP Public pension funds, including CalPERS and
CREF Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2012)
1988-2002 IRRC SP Labor union funds
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011)
1996-2005 RiskMetrics, Georgeson Shareholder Communications,
proxy statements
SP Union pension funds, Public pension funds, Investment
funds, Coordinated investors, Socially
responsible/religious, Non-financial firms, Individuals
Smith (1996) 1987-1993 CalPERS internal documents, proxy statements, Dow Jones
News Retrieval System
NS, SP CalPERS
Song and Szewczyk (2003)
1991-1996 CII Focus List NS CII
Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996)
1990-1993 14A-8 filings, USA Target List, proxy statements, Wall Street
Journal
SP, NS USA
Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai (2014)
1995-2009 13D filings, DealScan HFA
Thomas and Cotter (2007)
2002-2004 IRRC SP Individuals, Private institution, Public
institution, Religious groups, Social activist, Unions/Union workers
Thomas and Martin (1998)
1994 IRRC SP Public institution (including CalPERs), Private
institution, Labor union, Individual
Venkiteshwaran, Iyer, and Rao (2010)
1995-2007 13D filings SP, NS Carl Ichan
Wahal (1996) 1987-1993 ISS, Request to funds, Wall Street Journal, Lexis/Nexis, Dow Jones News Retrieval
Service
SP, NS Public pension funds (including CalPERS) and
CREF
Wahal, Wiles, and Zenner (1995)
1989-1991 Proxy statements, Wall Street Journal, Pennsylvania Chamber
of Business and Industry
NS
Woidtke (2002) 1989-1993 IRRC, 13F filings SP Public pension funds (including CalPERS)
Wu (2004) 1988-1995 CalPERS Focus List, proxy statements
NS CalPERS
Zhu (2013) 1994-2007 13D filings HFA
37
Table 1: Effects of shareholder activism on target firm value
This table summarizes the central empirical results from 36 studies that investigate the share valuation effects of four types of shareholder activism. The results are for the overall sample investigated in each study. Authors’ name abbreviations are: ACSS - Alexander, Chen, Seppi and Spatt (2010); AWH-a, AWH-b - Anson, White, and Ho (2003, 2004); BBJ - Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015), BFGW - Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2015); BM - Bizjak and Marquette (1998); BoM - Boyson and Mooradian (2011); BJK-a, BJK-b - Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009, 2013); BJPT - Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); CW - Cai and Walkling (2011); CNW - Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998); CGD - Caton, Goh, and Donaldson (2001); CF - Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009); CHJ - Crutchley, Hudson, and Jensen (1998); CGG - Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012); DD - DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989); DH - Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); DSW- Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008); DW - Dodd and Warner (1983); ESM - English, Smythe, and McNeil (2004); EFM - Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011); EFS - Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2010); GGJ - Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira (2015); GJ – Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2014); GKM - Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin (2000); GS - Gillan and Starks (2000); GrS - Greenwood and Schor (2009); HGK - Hadani, Goranov, and Khan (2011); HT - Hall and Trombley (2012); HIZ - Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012); IL - Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993); JK - John and Klein (1995); JPS - Johnson, Porter, and Shackell (1997); JS - Johnson and Shackell (1997); KMW - Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996); KZ-a, KZ-b - Klein and Zur (2009, 2011); MP - Mulherin and Poulsen (1998); Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015); OS - Opler and Sokobin (1997); PR - Prevost and Rao (2000); PRW - Prevost, Rao, and Williams (2012); RS - Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011); SS - Song and Szewczyk (2003); SWZ - Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996); TC - Thomas and Cotter (2007); TM - Thomas and Martin (1998), VIR - Venkiteshwaran, Iyer, and Rao (2010); WWZ - Wahal, Wiles, and Zenner (1995). The studies in each column are ordered by the year of publication. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shareholder proposal Negotiated settlements or non-proposal pressure Hedge fund activism Contested proposals
Study Abnormal return (%)
Study Abnormal return (%)
Study Abnormal return (%)
Study Abnormal return (%)
Panel A: Short-term valuation effects Initial press announcements: SWZ 0.92**
BJPT 5.10** DW 11.9***
KMW -0.22 Wahal 1.86**
Clifford 1.75** DD 4.85*** Smith -0.08 CNW -0.04 GrS 3.61*** IL 4.69*** Wahal 0.30 DH 0.11 KZ-a 5.7*** MP 8.04*** DSW 0.31 CGD -0.91*** BJK-a 5.04*** ACSS 10.48*** Proxy mailing date: AWH-a 0.26
BoM 8.68*** RS 0.95
KMW -0.12 ESM 0.98*** BFGW 6.97*** SWZ 0.13 Nelson-a -0.67 Wahal -0.30 Nelson-b -0.19 DH -0.00 Barber 0.23** GS -0.19 PR -1.10** CW -0.12 RS 0.36*** PRW 0.89 Shareholder meeting date: KMW -0.06 SWZ -0.13 DH 0.07 TC 0.16* CGG 1.30*** Panel B: Long-run returns Smith 2.84*** OS 11.59** BJPT 0.5 IL -18.31** Wahal -0.1 DH -3.52 Clifford 4.68 MP -3.43** PR 19.9 SS 18.4 GrS 10.26*** PRW 4.44 ESM -16.88 KZ-a 11.4*** Nelson-b -4.28 BBJ 7.24 Barber 4.1
38
Table 2: Effects of shareholder activism on target firm earnings, operations, and governance features Summary of empirical results from 33 studies that investigate the effects of three types of shareholder activism on target firms’ earnings, operations, and governance features. Inferences drawn are related to the statistical significance reported by the study. The studies in each column are ordered by the year of publication. Author abbreviations are described in Table 1.
Shareholder proposals Direct negotiations or non-proposal pressure Hedge fund activism
Study Inference Study Inference Study Inference Panel A: Earnings variables Return on assets or operating return on assets KMW No change CNW No change Clifford Increase
Smith No change SWZ No change BJPT Increase SWZ No change OS Increase GrS No change Wahal No change DSW Increase KZ-a No change DH No change BJK-a Increase PR Decrease BoM Increase KZ-b No change Zhu Increase GGJ No change BBJ Increase Return on equity KMW No change CNW No change Smith No change SWZ No change SWZ No change DH No change PR No change Return on sales or operating return on sales KMW No change CNW No change BJPT Increase Smith No change DH No change PR No change Panel B: Operations variables Capital expenditures Smith No change GrS Decrease CGG Decrease KZ-a No change GGJ Decrease BJK-b Decrease Payout of earnings or cash flows Smith No change GrS No change DH No change KZ-a Increase BJK-a Increase KZ-b Increase Zhu Increase GGJ Increase BJK-b Increase Growth in sales KMW Decrease DH No change Asset divestiture, restructuring, or employee layoffs Smith No change CNW No change Clifford Increase
DH Increase OS Increase KZ-b Increase BJK-b Increase Panel C: Governance features CEO turnover KMW No change OS Decrease BJK-b Increase Smith No change Wu Increase Zhu Increase DH No change DSW Increase EFS Decrease HIZ No change Board composition PRW Increase
independence BoM Increase size
Control change attempted or succeeded DH Increase BoM Increase Actual control change DH No change CEO compensation JS No change CF Increase JPS No change EFM Decrease Governance changes acceptable to activist Wahal 21% “successes” Bratton 84% “successes” Smith 53% “successes” BJPT 66% “successes” KZ-a 60% “successes” BoM 70% “successes” Other governance features BM Increase WWZ No change (e.g., poison pills, board diversity) TC Increase CNW Increase
39
Table 3: Characteristics of firms attracting activist shareholder efforts Summary of central empirical results from 29 studies that investigate the characteristics of firms attracting shareholder proposals and other types of shareholder activism compared to a control group. The results are for the overall sample investigated in each study. High indicates that the measure is relatively high for target firms, Same denotes that the measure is not significantly different relative to other firms, and Low signifies that the measure is relatively low for target firms. The studies in each column are ordered by the year of publication. Author abbreviations are described in Table 1.
Shareholder proposal
Direct negotiations or non-proposal pressure Hedge fund activism
Study
Measure for Targets Study
Measure for Targets Study
Measure for Targets
Panel A: Stock price performance Prior market-adjusted stock returns Smith Same SWZ Low BJPT Low SWZ Low OS Low Clifford Low Wahal Low CNW Same KZ-a High BM Same CGD Low BBJ Low TC Low DSW Low Prior control-firm adjusted stock returns
KMW Same OS Low BoM Low Barber Low SS Low
EFS Low EFM Low RS Low Prior industry-adjusted stock returns SWZ Same SWZ Same GrS Low Wahal Same Panel B: Accounting measures of performance Return to sales KMW Low Sales growth JS Low SS Same BJPT Low KMW Low BJK-a Low BoM Low Zhu Low Growth in operating income BM Low Market-to-book ratio JS Same SWZ Same BJPT Low KMW Low Clifford Low Smith Same GrS Low SWZ Same KZ-a Same BM Low BoM Low KZ-b Low Return on assets SWZ Same SWZ Same BJPT High Wahal Low OS Low Clifford High TC High SS High BJK-a High EFM Low DSW Low KZ-a High BoM High KZ-b High Return on equity SWZ Same SWZ Same Clifford High Panel C: Other firm characteristics Leverage JK High SWZ Same BJPT High KMW High SS Same BJK-a High SWZ Same KZ-a Same EFS High BoM Low RS High KZ-b High Zhu High Insider ownership KMW Same CNW Low Smith Same BM Low TC Low EFS Low (Table 3 continued on next page)
40
Table 3 (Continued)
Shareholder proposal Direct negotiations or non-proposal pressure Hedge fund activism
Study
Measure for Targets Study
Measure for Targets Study
Measure for Targets
Panel C: Other firm characteristics (Continued) Firm size (e.g., book value of assets, market value of equity)
JK High SWZ High Clifford High JS High SS High BJK-a Low
KMW High KZ-a Low Smith High BoM Low SWZ High KZ-b Low BM High TC High EFS High CW High EFM High RS High Institutional ownership JK High CNW High BJPT High JS Low BJK-a High KMW High Smith High BM High TC High EFM Low RS Low Dividend yield BJPT Low BJK-a Low KZ-a Same Zhu Low R&D expenditures SWZ Low SWZ Low BJPT Low BJK-a Same KZ-a Same BoM Low Proportion of outside directors BM High EFS High EFM High RS High Takeover defenses EFS High BJPT High RS High BJK-a High Cash flow BJPT High Clifford High Liquidity GJ High NOS High
41
Table 4: Authors’ different definitions of shareholder activism and success Summary of 52 studies of the effects of shareholder activism on target companies. A plus sign (+) indicates that the authors interpret their findings as indicating that shareholder activism has substantial impact on target companies. A minus (–) sign indicates that the authors interpret their findings as indicating that shareholder activism has negligible or negative impact on target companies. The studies in each column are ordered by the year of publication. Author abbreviations are described in Table 1. Criteria emphasized as measures of shareholder activism success:
Increase in share values
Increase in accounting measures of performance
Change in target firm's operations or management
Specific actions sought by activist adopted by target firm
Some actions by target firm attributed to activism
Percent of votes cast in favor of shareholder proposal
Panel A: Authors drawing conclusions primarily from empirical findings regarding shareholder proposals
+ Nesbitt (1994) – KMW (1996) – KMW (1996) + BM (1998) + DH (1999) + TM (1998) – KMW (1996) – Wahal (1996) + DH (1999) + DH (1999) + PRW (2012) – GS (2000) – Wahal (1996) – PR (2000) + EFS (2010) + TC (2007) – GS (2000) – Woidtke (2002) – EFM (2011) + EFS (2010) – PR (2000) – VIR (2010) + HIZ (2012) – CW (2011) – TC (2007) + HGK (2011) + CGG (2012) + VIR (2010) – CW (2011) + RS (2011) + CGG (2012) – PRW (2012)
Panel B: Authors drawing conclusions primarily from empirical findings regarding negotiated settlements and non-proposal
+ Smith (1996) + OS (1997) + DSW (2008) – WWZ (1995) + Smith (1996) + SWZ (1996) + SWZ (1996) – SS (2003) + Smith (1996) + CNW (1998) + OS (1997) + DSW (2008) + EFM (2011) + GKM (2000) + CHJ (1998) + Wu (2000) + GKM (2000) + CF (2009) – CGD (2001) + AWH-a (2003) – SS (2003) + AWH-b (2004) – ESM (2004) – Nelson-a (2005) – Nelson-b (2006) + Barber (2007) – DSW (2008)
Panel C: Authors drawing conclusions primarily from empirical findings regarding hedge fund activism
+ BJPT (2008) + Clifford (2008) + BoM (2011) + Bratton (2007) + HT (2012) + Clifford (2008) + BJK-a (2009) + BJK-b (2013) + BJPT (2008) + BJK-a (2009) – GrS (2009) + Zhu (2013) + KZ-a (2009) + GrS (2009) – KZ-a (2009) + BJT (2014) + KZ-a (2009) + BoM (2011) + GGJ (2014) + BoM (2011) + Zhu (2013) + Gantchev (2013) + GGJ (2014) + BBJ (2015) + BFGW (2015)
42
Figure 1: Valuation effects of different types of shareholder activism This figure presents the findings from 33 studies that examine the short-window share price reaction at firms targeted by four types of shareholder activism, plus the results from two surveys of research on corporate takeovers by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008). The types of activism are shareholder proposals, direct negotiations with managers, hedge fund activism, and proxy fights. For a given type of shareholder activism, each point in the figure corresponds to the main point estimate of the impact on share values, in percent, from each of the 33 studies that are summarized in Table 1. The types of activism are ordered by the activists’ average shareholdings in the target company. For shareholder proposals and negotiations, such shareholdings typically are not reported by the researcher and appear to be close to zero, on average. Hedge fund activists’ shareholdings in their target companies average 8.8% (Boyson and Mooradian (2011), and activists who initiate proxy fights hold 9.9% (Buchanan et al., 2012) of their target companies’ shares, on average.
43