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Three Dialogic Imperatives in International Relations Scholarship: A Buberian Program

Piki Ish-Shalom

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Prepared for " the 2010 Millennium Annual Conference: International Relations in Dialogue," 16-17 October, 2010, at the London School of Economics & Political

Science, London, England.

Preliminary Draft

Abstract: Following Martin Buber's dialogical philosophy, I will establish in the paper three dialogic imperatives scholars of IR are burdened with. The first imperative is internal to the scholar. It is the intrapersonal imperative to conduct a dialogue with and in herself/himself. The second dialogic imperative is the interpersonal one, and it functions as to establish a community of scholars. The third dialogic imperative is external to the community of scholars. It is the obligation to be engaged dialogically with the public the scholars are part of. The third dialogic imperative, that with the public will turn out to be also a dialogic imperative with truth about the public, that is with social reality. I will end the paper with a brief discussion on the Buberian dialogue within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

September 2010

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IntroductionTalk is cheap, or so we are taught in our introductory IR courses. But we are taught so

in words, in speech acts that we—students and lecturers alike—take quite seriously. I

would not question the common practices in international politics. I would, though,

take seriously the above-mentioned seriousness, treating it as a datum and opportunity

to the discussion offered here, which following Martin Buber's dialogical philosophy,

will establish three dialogic imperatives scholars of IR are burdened with. The first

imperative is internal to the scholar. It is the intrapersonal imperative to conduct a

dialogue with and in herself/himself. The second dialogic imperative is the

interpersonal one, and it functions as to establish a community of scholars. The third

dialogic imperative is external to the community of scholars. It is the obligation to be

engaged dialogically with the public the scholars are part of.

Martin Buber’s philosophy is immensely rich, multilayered, and wide-scoped.

He was one of those Renaissance man whose writings expand on such diverse topics

as theology, biblical studies, political and social philosophy, epistemology, sociology,

education, and Zionism. Any attempt by me to engage his thought, especially in an

article format, is doomed to be superficial and do harm to Buber’s intricateness. To

avoid inflicting this intellectual harm, I will not attempt to analyze his philosophy, but

rather will take Buber’s advice and try to follow the way he is pointing at.1

Specifically, I will engage his philosophy as a pointer to how we ought conduct social

research. Entering into dialogue with Buber’s philosophy I will engage some of his

principle themes, and offer the above-mentioned three dialogic imperatives. Buber

(1878-1965) was born in Vienna and his academic and intellectual career drove him

to Germany. The rise of the Nazis and their persecutions of Jews drove him in 1938 to

1 I take it to be his advice following the title of one of his books, Martin Buber, Pointing the way, trans. Maurice Friedman (London: Routledge and Paul, 1957), 120.

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Palestine where he was appointed the first chair of the sociology department in the

newly established Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Though interested in sociology

from early on, studying under Wilhem Dilthey and Georg Simmel,2 the horrors of

First World war and later those of the Holocaust intensified his interest in the human

studies and in social and political philosophy. The maladies of modern society set off

his interest in the possibilities of genuine human relation as the cure of the alienated

modern society.3

The core theme of Buber’s philosophy is dialogue as that authentic human

phenomenon that is a meeting between persons, fostered by mutually and

intentionally opening of hearts. It is dialogue that acts as the thread that gives unity to

Buber’s mature philosophy,4 and is fleshed out in his anthropological philosophy, in

his social and political philosophy, and in his understandings of epistemology and

ethics. Following his interest in epistemology and ethics I will provide both ethical

justifications and epistemological reasoning to each of the three dialogic imperatives.

I will also relate Buber to contemporary perspectives such as feminism,

constructivism, and deliberative democracy, and bring them—so to speak—into

dialogue that will enable me to translate his abstract ideas into guidelines for the

organization of scholars as a community of dialogue.

Each of Buber’s main themes and principles will be developed in due course.

However, a preliminary exposition will help the readers to navigate their way through

2 Dan Avnon, Martin Buber: the hidden dialogue, Twentieth-century political thinkers (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 24.3 Laurence J. Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought: alienation and the quest for meaning, Reappraisals in Jewish social and intellectual history (New York: New York University Press, 1989).4 On Buber's development from mysticism to existentialism and to dialogue see Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: the life of dialogue, 3d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, From mysticism to dialogue: Martin Buber's transformation of German social thought, The Culture of Jewish modernity (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989).

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the paper.5 Buber maintained that although living in social alienation man can heal

society by entering into interpersonal dialogue that is conditioned on presence, true

intention, and mutual opening of hearts. Those three traits can lead to the genuine

dialogue that constitutes relation of I-Thou as that relation of unmediated listening and

unity of existence. Constituting I-Thou relation establishes the interpersonal sphere

that Buber called the Between and it enables constructing a community as We.

Community is characterized by the quality of the I-Thou relation, and is gravitated by

a common Center that functions as that which bind the several I’s into We, envisioned

by Buber as the ethical human and social existence. The Center is the shared facet of

human society that its existence enables overcoming alienation and entering into

dialogue. The obverse kind of relation is the I-It which is based on instrumentalization

of the members of society and on distancing each other. I-It maintains the alienated

conditions of human society, preventing the constitution of the dialogical community

as We.

The quality of the I-Thou and I-It relations exists, according to Buber, not only

between persons, but also between persons and nature, as well as with intellectual

essences such as theory.6 As I will argue later, it is here, in the relation between

persons and nature, as well as with theory, that Buber’s phenomenology is most

pronounced, and where his philosophy is best suitable to the understanding of the

qualities and functioning of science and theory. Buber understands science and theory

as relating to nature in the I-It mode, characterized by distance and

instrumentalization. Admittingly this way of doing science and social science

contributes to material progress. Buber emphasizes, however, that relating thus to

5 Later I will refer more specifically to the works of Buber. The general exposition relies mainly on Buber's Martin Buber, Between man and man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: K. Paul, 1947), Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, 2d ed. (New York,: Scribner, 1958).6 Pamela Vermes, Buber, 1st ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1988).

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nature may hinder fuller human progress. Accordingly, we should strive to a more

balanced and humanized science that relates with nature and social reality also in an I-

Thou mode. The remaining of the paper will dialogically engage with those Buberian

themes and offer three dialogic imperatives that will help humanize the scholarly

study of IR: the intrapersonal, the interpersonal, and dialogue with the public. The

third dialogic imperative, that with the public will turn out to be also a dialogic

imperative with truth about the public, that is with social reality. Additionally, I will

propose several derivative measures to help concretizing these dialogic imperatives,

such as, pluralism, investing our efforts and resources in workshops, and adopting

irony in our relation with theory.

Discharging the dialogic imperatives and implementing the derivative

measures will help to counteract the tendency of IR to fall prey to inter-paradigmatic

wars. In those not too infrequent wars theorists turn ideologues and shut themselves of

hearing and learning from other theoretical frameworks. This paper is a Buberian

invitation to substitute ideological interaction with a dialogical one, ensuring genuine

and truthful deliberations that can benefit both scholarly and public life.

The first dialogic imperative: the intrapersonalThe fundamental and core dialogic imperative for Martin Buber would have been the

interpersonal dialogue, the dialogue constituting the I-Thou relation. However,

preceding the interpersonal dialogic imperative lies yet another dialogic imperative,

an intrapersonal dialogic imperative. Buber did not call what goes within oneself a

dialogue. Rather, he used the notions of self-study or self-reflection, which in

contemporary terminology can be translated to self-reflexivity; the activity laid down

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mainly by standpoint feminist epistemologists.7 Linking Buber and feminist

standpoint epistemology clarifies that self-reflexivity necessitates an internal

dialogue, a genuine conversation that the researcher has to conduct within

herself/himself. In other words, self-reflexivity is the first dialogic imperative and it

obligates each scholar to explore her/his theoretical assumptions and personal biases.

For Buber Self-dialogue is necessitated by two sources, the first

epistemological and the second ethical. On epistemological grounds, Buber argued

that there can be no true knowledge of the world and of human society and

community, without self-knowledge, “philosophical knowledge of man is essentially

man’s self-reflection, and man can reflect about himself only when the cognizing

person, that is, the philosopher pursuing anthropology, first of all reflects about

himself as a person.8” To know reality one has to know one’s own assumptions that

act as filters which distort a true encounter with reality. Buber conceived theoretical

knowledge in a very similar way to feminist standpoint epistemology, the claim that

all knowledge—theoretical knowledge included—is situated both socially and

politically; all knowledge, that is, is determined by the position of the knower in the

social hierarchy and his ensuing social and political commitments. As Lawrence

Silberstein made clear, for Buber, “the sociologist lacks an Olympian perch from

7 See Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988), Mary E. Hawkesworth, 'Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth', in Gender and scientific authority, ed. Barbara Laslett, et al. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Barbara Laslett et al., 'Introduction', in Gender and scientific authority, ed. Barbara Laslett, et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), Elizabeth Potter, Feminism and philosophy of science: An Introduction, Understanding feminist philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2006), 131-32, Dorothy E. Smith, 'Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology', in Feminism and methodology : social science issues

ed. Sandra G. Harding (Bloomington Milton Keynes [Buckinghamshire]: Indiana University Press ;

Open University Press, 1987), J. A. Tickner, 'What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions', International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005).8 Buber, Between man and man, 154-55.

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which to look down and see things independent of his or her own perspective.9” The

same understanding drives feminist epistemologists to call for self-reflexivity, or in

Sandra Harding’s conceptualization strong reflexivity, which she characterized as that

which

require that the objects of inquiry be conceptualized as gazing back in all their

cultural particularity and that the researcher, through theory and methods, stand

behind them, gazing back at his own socially situated research project in all its

cultural particularity and its relationships to other projects of his culture—many

of which (policy development in international relations, for example, or

industrial expansion) can be seen only from locations far away from the

scientist’s actual daily work.10

Put differently, one has to be critically aware of those idealist assumptions and social

and cultural commitments that shape one’s research and theoretical framework. Being

aware of them will allow, in phenomenological terminology,11 bracketing: putting on

hold, in encountering social reality, theory and any other unintended biases and filters,

as to enable direct and unfiltered encounter with social reality. As I explored

elsewhere there can be no theory without those assumptions and commitments which

“affect the process of determining which data are relevant, which are less so, and

which have no relevance at all.12” One has to identify those idealist assumptions and

social and cultural commitments operating in his or her theory to be able to

understand their functioning as filters and biases that distort a genuine encounter with

reality.

9 Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, 170.10 Sandra G. Harding, Whose science? Whose knowledge? : thinking from women's lives (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 163.11 A philosophical perspective which heavily influenced Buber’s philosophy, see Emmanuel Levinas, 'Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge', in The philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice S. Friedman (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), 139.12 Piki Ish-Shalom, 'The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism', International Studies Review 8, no. 3 (2006): 441. See also Piki Ish-Shalom, 'Theoreticians' obligation of transparency: when parsimony, reflexivity, transparency and reciprocity meet', Review of International Studies (forthcoming).

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This is a point worth emphasizing. Buber does not undermine the importance

of science (including social science) and theory. He considers them as a crucial sphere

of human activity. Science enables coping with the complexity of the world in which

we live. As such it is essential for progress.13 By sorting out different phenomena,

measuring, and comparing them, it allows humans to have a degree of control over

their environment, such that they can produce the artifacts that enable material

progress. Hence Buber evaluates science positively and he also holds in high esteem

science’s output.14 However, the essence of relations that are characterized by

controlling nature and producing out of it those artifacts that are necessary for

material progress is the essence of instrumentalization and alienation. Thus, the

scientific approach creates detached I-It relations with reality and social reality.15

Accordingly, while holding science in high regard and certainly not rejecting its

utility Buber wishes to allocate it its proper place. Science is crucial to material

progress but we should not mistaken material progress with human progress, and we

should not let the I-It scientific approach imperialize our relations with nature, reality,

and social reality.16 Side by side with the I-It instrumentalized scientific approach we

should cultivate also a direct relation with nature, reality, and social reality; direct

relations unhindered by theory and any other systematic assumptions with which we

engage our surroundings. It is this phenomenological understanding that we gain once

we discharge the intrapersonal dialogic imperative, and engage ourselves in self-

dialogue.

To approach the same understanding differently, reality is complex and to get

a hold of it we equip ourselves with theory and systematic thinking. Theory, that is, is

13 Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, 120.14 Ibid.15 Friedman, Martin Buber, 172.16 Ibid, Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, 174.

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a competent tool to heuristically organize reality and help us cope with it, for example

by shaping plans and policies to navigate the complexity and produce what Buber

calls material progress. But we should hasten to add that complexity is also richness,

and richness is not something to cope with but something to enjoy. And to enjoy the

richness of reality and social reality we should be willing to bracket theory and other

systematic thinking that stand in the way to direct and phenomenological relation with

reality and social reality. In Buber’s words, “each of us is encased in an armour whose

task is to ward off signs.17” Bracketing theory will enable cultivating human progress,

which is progress not limited solely to the material. It is human progress comprising

the ideal, intellectual and cultural aspects of our humanity; Human progress which

Buber encouraged us to seek out, and believed will help freeing modernity from

alienation. Bracketing will also enable the theorist to identify and understand the

weaknesses and limits of her/his theory, and consequently will permit community to

devise better policies, and execute those policies flexibly and successfully.

This perspective assigns theory a very important, yet confined and constricted,

social role. Drawing from Richard Rorty’s terminology of the ironic liberal18 we can

characterize Buber as an ironic theorist. Rorty attempted to reconcile his relativist

undercurrents with a political commitment to liberalism by a perspective he called

ironic liberalism. Similarly, Buber attempted to reconcile his commitment to science

with an equally forceful understanding of its narrowness; hence, ironic theorist.

Joining Buber’s perspective I maintain that this should be the nature of our

commitment to the role of theory and theorist alike.19 Heuristically speaking theory is

indispensable in confronting reality’s complexity, yet this complexity is irreducible

17 Buber, Between man and man, 27.18 Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).19 Brent Steele made a similar point in his interesting recent article, Brent J. Steele, 'Irony, Emotions and Critical Distance', Millennium - Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 (2010).

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and so we should be aware that by heuristically theorizing complex reality we lose

some its richness. Additionally, by theorizing we reduce the complexity, hence we are

engaged inescapably in distorting reality. Without being aware of the distortions, they

might overcome our encounter with reality and impede policies derived from those

theories. The awareness and ironic theorization must be complemented by a sense of

pragmatism, modesty, and flexibility in constructing theory and executing its derived

policies.

The attitude of ironic theorist does not exhaust itself with theory as a general

category. It is not enough to be aware of the limits and weaknesses of theory in

general, we should also be ironically committed to the specific theory we hold, e.g.,

realism, liberalism, constructivism, and what have you. It is too common to find

theorists who ignore the heuristic nature of theory and cling to it as a dogmatic creed.

Too often theorists shut their ears from hearing (and reading!) articles of other

theoretical frameworks. The theoretical debates turn, at times, into all out inter-

paradigmatic wars with gate keepers who do whatever in their powers to prevent

publications of theorists who do not adhere strictly enough to their own theoretical

creeds.20 Some journals turn into theoretical bastions closed to other theoretical

perspectives. As Buber claimed regarding the scorn with which Marx and Engels

treated Utopian Socialism name tags turn into weapons, “The epithet “Utopian”

thereafter became the most potent missile in the fight of Marxism against non-

Marxian socialism. It was no longer a question of demonstrating the rightness of one’s

20 One of my favorite examples from my own personal treasure box of rejections is from a report by a reviewer to my submission of research proposal to the Israel Science Foundation (ISF). It reads as follows ”…Maybe that is all he means. But then, why the jargon? His narrative of some recent history, with emphasis on the intellectual side, is clear and eye-opening. But his penchant for jargon drawn from Continental philosophy (rather than the methods and values of jargon-phobic Anglo-American analytical philosophy) merely muddies limpid water. I support the proposal but with a warning against the reliance, by someone so good at clear thinking, on needless bullshit.” Though claiming support for the research, the warning—based on an all-out rejection of whole philosophical traditions—was enough for ISF to turn down the proposal. I am sure many of us have got similar reviews.

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own opinion in the face of a contrary one,21” and render sound argumentation

unnecessary, “Happily, however, it is sufficient to brand them Utopians to render

them innocuous.22” In our theoretical world it is enough sometimes to call someone

post-modernist or realist to shut our ears from what s/he has to say, and preventing us

from the opportunity to benefit from his/her writings.

Labeling ourselves by theories turned into creeds is one of the obstacles to

truthful academic dialogue; it transforms us from theorists committed to pluralism

into ideologues. But this point takes us into the second dialogic imperative that of the

interpersonal, and before moving to the second dialogic imperative I want to present

another source for the intrapersonal dialogic imperative promulgated by a Buberian

program, namely the ethical justification for self-dialogue. Self-dialogue is ethically

required because interpersonal dialogue is constructed around the axis of I-Thou.

Neither I nor Thou can exist in complete autonomy, nor can they be fully

comprehended independently. The I-Thou, as is its obverse kind of relation the I-It,

are a united concept, called in the Buberian terminology: basic or primary word.23

Neither word has full meaning outside of this relation. Dan Avnon captures this well

with regard to the I-Thou,

The "I" indicated by the basic word I-You is not the same as the "I" of the basic

word I-It. The "I" of I-You indicates a quality of presence that considers self and

other as elements of one, inclusive reality: when one addresses the other from an

inclusive state of being that is present to the unity of creation and of being, then

the interpersonal is permeated by an I-You mode of existence. This "I" is not

sensed as singular; it is the "I" of being present to being24

21 Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia, trans. R.F.C. Hull (Boston,: Beacon Press, 1958), 5. 22 Ibid., 6.23 Avnon, Martin Buber, 39, Friedman, Martin Buber, 57.24 Avnon, Martin Buber, 39.

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Consequently, genuine dialogue of the I-Thou is preconditioned on the dictate of

knowing thyself,25 of making the I present to oneself so the Thou can also become

present. Only then the I can endow the Thou with meaning, the Thou can endow the I,

and the two become dialogically united. Thus writes Buber, “”on the height of

personal existence one must be truly able to say I in order to know the mystery of the

Thou in its whole truth.26” Put differently, for the ethical obligation to dialogically

construct the Between and to be united in the mutuality of the I-Thou relation, one has

to be implicated in self-study and self-reflexivity, and to do so one has to be involved

in self-dialogue.27 The intrapersonal dialogic imperative is required to set off a

genuine opening of hearts which takes place in the interpersonal dialogue, en route to

a community freed from the alienation that has plagued, according to Buber, modern

society.

The second dialogic imperative: the interpersonalThe second dialogic imperative is the interpersonal one, the core of Buber’s

philosophy, especially his political and social philosophy. It is with interpersonal

dialogue that Buber trusted his hopes and expectations of healing the modern

alienated society by turning it into community: a multiplied I-Thou turned We and

organized around a common Center. As such, the main drive of this imperative is

ethical, though as will become clear later, there are also epistemological reasons for

the interpersonal dialogic imperative.

25 On the importance of knowing thyself in the establishment of dialogical community in Socrates and Plato, see Dan Avnon, '"Know Thyself": Socratic Companionship and Platonic Community', Political Theory 23, no. 2 (1995).26 Buber, Between man and man, 212.27 On a very interesting exercise in such a self-dialogue based on autoethnographic, see Oded Löwenheim, 'The 'I' in IR: an autoethnographic account', Review of International Studies forthcoming.

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Alexander Kohanski described the essence of dialogue when writing, “In the

act of speaking I-Thou one must be willing to step into relation with the other without

holding himself back, without putting the other in doubt, without reservation

whatsoever. This is the true state of dialogue.28” The I-It, which is the obverse kind of

relation, the one in which there is no real dialogue, is depicted by Avnon, “in an I-It

attitude to being, the person tends to distance himself from the other, to create in the

interpersonal a quality of relationship characterized by the person's desire to

distinguish him-or herself by accentuating differences, by emphasizing the uniqueness

of "I" in contrast to the other.29” In those two quotations the essence of true dialogue

is captured and clarified. When confronting each other, two humans can open their

hearts in mutual and reciprocal ways, and create between them a genuine

understanding and an unmediated relation. It should be emphasized that Buber does

not intend a necessarily loving relation or consensual agreement. He stresses that true

dialogue can occur between those who disagree with each other.30 This point would

become important later on. What is required for genuine dialogue to take place is a

mutual intention to open hearts to each other, translatable into presence and

unmediated relation.

The I-Thou as dyadic interpersonal relation bears ethical supremacy to the I-It

relation and is intimately related to Kant’s Categorical Imperative. But there is even

more to the I-Thou ethically-wise. A true dialogue which constitute the I-Thou

relation is a fundamental precondition to the establishment of human community,

The special character of the We is shown in the essential relation existing, or

arising temporarily, between its members; that is, in the holding sway within the

28 Alexander S. Kohanski, Martin Buber's philosophy of interhuman relation: a response to the human problematic of our time (Rutherford [N.J.] London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; Associated University Presses, 1982), 22.29 Avnon, Martin Buber, 39.30 Buber, Between man and man, 23.

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We of an ontic directness which is the decisive presupposition of the I-Thou

relation. The We includes the Thou potentiality. Only men who are capable of

truly saying Thou to one another can truly say We with one another31

And it is this community freed from alienation that will enable and even ensure

ethical relations between all its members, and later on also between members across

communities. This is the most forceful ethical justification for the interpersonal

dialogic imperative: the constitution of that social sphere—community—which is the

realm of the ethical.

Yet justification does not guarantee implementation, and it may seem that

Buber’s expectations are high, maybe unrealizable. Buber goes even further in his

expectation of humanity than Jürgen Habermas who is often considered an idealist.

Idealist as Habermas might be he at least aims his theory at the political, his is a

political theory. Civil society, important as it is in Habermas' theory, serves the polity

and the quality of the political process of democratic deliberation.32 Buber goes much

further than the political and aims at a total renewal of human society; his is not

merely a political theory, it is also a social one. His goals are so far reaching that he

can be justly perceived as an utopist, as he himself at times designate his thinking.33

And it is not only with regard to the political and the social that Buber goes further

than Habermas. As Silberstein rightly indicates Buber provides a corrective to the

over rationality of Habermas.34 Similarly to feminist ethics of care Buber aims at

bringing emotions into philosophy.35 It seems that in ethics as in epistemology there

31 Ronald C. Arnett, Communication and community: implications of Martin Buber's dialogue (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), Buber, Between man and man, 213.32 Jürgen Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere : an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society, Studies in contemporary German social thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).33 Buber, Paths in Utopia.34 Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, 16.35 See Kimberly Hutchings, 'Feminist Ethics and Political Violence', International Politics 44, no. 1 (2007), Piki Ish-Shalom, 'Render Unto Caesar That Which is Caesar's: On the Joint Pursuit of Morality and Security', American Behavioral Scientist 51, no. 9 (2008), Fiona Robinson, Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations (Boulder, Colorado; Oxford: Westview Press, 1999).

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are some important commonalities between Buber and feminism, and the criticism of

feminists leveled at the over rationalism in contemporary analytical philosophy36

founds its counterpart in Buber’s way of doing philosophy. He expects us to enrich

philosophizing with sensitivity to the emotional aspects of human nature, not to settle

ourselves with sympathy (in itself a suspicious concept for Kant), and to aim at

empathy.

Bordering on the utopist and multifaceted as Buber's thinking really is it may

seem indeed as unrealizable, especially to the modern cynical mind. Yet I argue that

notwithstanding its difficulties Buber's vision is not only admirable but also

realizable. And although the difficulties are immense they should and can be

overcome. Moreover, I maintain that scholars have an important role in overcoming

the difficulties and realizing Buber's vision. Henceforth the interpersonal dialogic

imperative is ethically assigned to the scholars, requiring them extra labor in

communicating with each other and burdens them with an obligation of forming a

scholarly community of dialogue.

The interpersonal dialogic imperative is assigned to each individual as sentient

being but for three reasons it burdens more heavily on scholars as scholars. The first is

that scholars have assets that can benefit the public and those assets can be better

mobilized if and when the scholars will be organized as a community of dialogue. The

second reason is that due to some features of the academic profession scholars are

better equipped than the public to discharge the interpersonal imperative. Thirdly and

closely related to the second reason, having those features scholars can act as a small

nucleus that may demonstrate the realizability of Buber’s vision and hence will help

refuting possible skepticism regarding its realizability. Alternatively put, organizing

36 Iris Marion Young, 'Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory', Praxis International 5, no. 5 (1986).

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the scholarly community as a community of dialogue can act as a critical case for the

applicability of a genuine Buberian community. Namely, if we—academic scholars—

are not able to organize ourselves as a community of dialogue, it is hard (if not

impossible) to expect the wider public to organize itself in such a way.

There are several assets and features of the academic profession that render

academia a relatively easy case for organizing itself as a Buberian community of

dialogue. The most important one is that academia is, after all, a cooperative venture

in which knowledge is pursued jointly. Even in the discipline of IR in which co-

authoring is less common than in the natural sciences, it is still widely practiced.

Moreover, even those of us who research and write by themselves rely on the

community of scholars. We study and are trained in academic intuitions with

experienced scholars, and in due course we teach the future generation of scholars.

We engage with the studies of our colleagues, and this is how research proceeds. We

circulate our work-in-progress to our colleagues expecting their useful comments, and

we comment on their work when asked to. On another level we peer-review articles

and research proposals and we are being peer-reviewed. We hope and expect that this

peer-review process is being done in good faith. The notion of peers by itself suggests

communal setting. All those practices, and others, embed our research communally

and establish it on discussion. Hence is the potentiality to organize ourselves in a

community of dialogue.37

But there are also three academic features that can act as obstacles to the

organization of scholars as a Buberian community of dialogue, and we should be

aware of them. First, academia is overburdened by ego that drive scholars into a

competitive mode that hinders the possibility of a genuine I-Thou relation. Second,

37 Later I will indicate another scholarly feature that may help the scholars to organize themselves as a Buberian community of dialogue, namely their shared commitment to truth-seeking which may function as a common Center

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many of us share the over rationality of Habermas and undermine the role of

emotions, empathy, and compassion, hence we might be too suspicious of the notion

of opening of hearts and too cynical regarding the proposed Buberian program. Third,

and as described above, we cling too strongly to theories and paradigmatic parties.

Hence, sometimes we close ourselves in clashing perspectives without the willingness

and the ability to hear each other, to enter into a true dialogue and I-Thou relations.

These are three serious obstacles, but ones that can be overcome with the help of

feminist perspective that, as is the case with Buber, brings into academia a corrective

to the over rationality and competitiveness. Standpoint epistemology jointly with the

Buberian phenomenological sensitivity to the paralyzing potentiality of theory can

bring in more flexibility regarding theory. Feminist and Buberian perspectives can

help altering the theorist into ironic theorist, and hence can enhance the possibility of

interpersonal and inter-paradigmatic dialogue.

What does it mean in practical terms to organize our community as a

community of dialogue? In practical terms, we can think of couple of measures that

will help us achieving this, including measures in, among other things, the realms of

conferences, advising graduate students, and editing scholarly journals. Firstly, I

propose workshops as the proper venues for scholarly meetings; as venues in which

genuine meetings, face-to-face ones, can take place. Rather than the mammoth-sized

associational conferences, which (let us admit) are mostly performances practiced

among huge publics (though rarely in front of them), we should give priority to small,

intimate, and recurring workshops. Those gatherings in which a small number of

scholars meet, each reading all the papers, ample time of presentation is given, and

then plentiful time is devoted to constructive discussion. We should devote more

resources to those venues than to the annual conferences, and we should organize

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them on a recurring base, resulting if possible in cooperative edited volumes.

Furthermore, we should pay more attention that each workshop will gather scholars of

different paradigmatic parties, of different cohorts and career stages. That will ensure

a plurality of theoretical voices, enabling true discussions, and the development of

healthy irony regarding theory. The same opening of the field should be ensured in

the journals, which must be committed in practice to plurality of theoretical

perspectives. This must be the responsibility of the editors (as well as the editorial

boards and the reviewers themselves) to send ms. to fair reviewers; to reviewers who

are not liable to reject ms. on the sole basis of their own theoretical affiliation, but

rather to genuinely judge the quality of argumentation presented in the ms. And lastly,

a true dialogue can take place within the framework of advising graduate students.

The genuine advising can take two non-excluding forms. First, long lasting relations

of I-Thou between the advisor and the advisee, including person to person meetings

and second, creating groups of graduate students that can act as a We dedicated to

scholarly cooperation. Those two forms can ensure close presence and listening.

Moreover, advising should not be understood as indoctrination to this or that

theoretical party, but rather as helping the students to become scholars that fulfill their

potential and as educating them to a true pluralism.

Aside of the ethical justification of assigning the interpersonal dialogic

imperative with scholars, there is also an epistemological reasoning. For Buber, truth

is a joint endeavor. Gaining truth is done by a meeting in which a genuine dialogue

takes place, “Men need, and it is granted to them, to confirm one another in their

individual being by means of genuine meetings. But beyond this they need, and it is

granted to them, to see the truth, which the soul gains by its struggle, light up to the

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others, the brothers, in a different way, and even so be confirmed.38” As pointed out

by Emanuel Levinas, “Truth, therefore, is not grasped by a dispassionate subject who

is a spectator of reality, but by a commitment in which the other remains in his

otherness…Thus the problem of truth raised by the Parmenides is resolved in terms of

a social or intersubjective relation.39” It is truth beyond objectivity and subjectivity,40

namely it is the product of the Between or in a more contemporary constructivist

terminology, the intersubjective.41 And there is no better social locus for such an

intersubjective endeavor than a community of scholars related to a Center defined by

common values,42 which in academia is nothing else than truth-seeking.

However, an important note of clarification is necessary. Theorists comprise a

community not in the sense of a homogenous group that shares a total belief system.43

Theorists do not share a totality of norms, values, assumptions, and commitments.

The community of scholars is a group of people with certain core beliefs which unite

them, but which diverge on many other important beliefs. It is a plural community

which is joined by certain norms, values, and commitments, namely those of truth-

seeking and doing it publicly, openly, and with a sense of healthy irony and

skepticism. Those norms, values, and commitments are the Center in the Buberian

terminology, and being jointly committed to this Center is a second feature that 38 Martin Buber, The knowledge of man, trans. Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), 69.39 Levinas, 'Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge', 141.40 Friedman, Martin Buber, 4.41 Actually, several authors describe Buber's thought as intersubjective. See, for example, S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Introduction: Intersubjectivity, Dialogue, Discourse, and Cultural Creativity in the Work of Martin Buber', in Martin Buber: On intersubjectivity and cultural creativity, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), Levinas, 'Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge', Gabriel Marcel, 'I and Thou', in The philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice S. Friedman (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967).42 There is an unsettled academic discussion as to what Buber meant by Center, was it a charismatic leader, God, common experience, etc. See Mendes-Flohr, From mysticism to dialogue: Martin Buber's transformation of German social thought, 121, Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, 77.

My interest is not interpretive, and hence I will not try to decide what Buber really meant by Center. I would only suggest that in the context of the scholarly world common values can act as a Buberian Center.43 See also Ish-Shalom, 'Theoreticians' obligation of transparency'.

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facilitates the organizing of scholars in a community of dialogue. Yet it is a

community diverged by numerous assumptions and commitments, such as how to

reach truth, the content of that truth, and what to do with that truth once it is attained.

The combination of agreement and disagreement is the internal pluralist composition

of the community of IR theorists and moreover, the disagreements give reason for

dialogue. There is no epistemological point in dialogue where consensus exists.

The Center is a gravitational axis around which disagreement can be

discussed, at least if intention to do so exist. It is a gravitational axis around which the

scholars can gather and form a community: a Between that facilitate and facilitated by

multiple I-Thou relations. It is a community devoted to truth-seeking, and also, in a

constructivist orientation, for the construction of truth as the product of collective and

pluralist endeavor; a truth, that is, which is beyond objectivity and subjectivity;44 a

truth which is a meeting point of different theories escaping the risk of becoming

dogmatic ideologies. From this Buberian perspective disagreement is healthier than

agreement resulting in a consensus that breeds monophonic and monolithic

understanding of reality. Consensual agreement can turn out being immune from

questioning and critique, hence ossified into the archenemy of progress, namely a

dogmatic ideology. On the other hand, if we understand our theories in the modest

and flexible way proposed above, theories that are advocated by ironic theorists,

disagreements can contribute to the clarification of the different perspectives, of the

different perspectives’ heuristic merits as well as their weak points and lacunas. Thus,

a continuous and dynamic dialogue will take place and truth will be alive and

developing, rather than an ossified object. In other words, truth will stand as Thou

genuinely related to the scholar as I and to the community of scholars as We. There is

44 On the notion of truth as beyond objectivity and subjectivity see Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond objectivism and relativism: science, hermeneutics, and praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

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a sort of dialogue between the truth and seekers of truth, and as will be discussed

shortly, this dialogue is based on mutuality and (unequal) reciprocity. It is a social

science transfigured from the exclusive domain of the I-It to include also I-Thou.45

In a sense this Buberian epistemological perspective has its analogy in John

Ralws’ political liberalism. For Rawls political liberalism acknowledges that values

and virtues are always politically contested. And reasonable pluralism enables

political liberalism to function as a political scheme for attaining a just, fair and

cooperative coexistence between different reasonable doctrines. It allows regulating

and guiding democracy with its “Fact of Democratic Unity in Diversity," which is the

fact “that in a constitutional democratic society, political and social unity does not

require that its citizens be unified by one comprehensive doctrine, religious or

nonreligious.46 " For Rawls tolerating, under the dictate of reasonable pluralism, is to

acknowledge and respect the moral worthiness of the differing stands, or doctrines.47

At least, that is, of those doctrines which are reasonable, namely themselves

embracing reasonable pluralism. According to Rawls this reasonable pluralism works

towards "a fair and stable system of cooperation between free and equal citizens who

are deeply divided by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines they affirm.48" And the

same holds true with cooperation between theorists with different (reasonable)

theories. Pluralism as an organizing principle of the dialogical community of scholars

will facilitate exactly that, a fair and stable system of cooperation and dialogue.

Accordingly, it will enable the functioning of this community in a fruitful and

enriching ways, overcoming—even utilizing—theoretical disagreements.

45 See also Friedman, Martin Buber, 172.46 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 124.47 Ibid., 59.48 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 44.

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Interpersonal and communal dialogue, then, has an epistemological worth that

joins hands with its ethical justification.

The third Dialogic imperative: with the publicThe third dialogic imperative is one that dictates a dialogue between the community

of scholars and the public as well as with social reality and truth.49 This imperative

arises from the notion of responsibility as a fundamental public duty. Again Buber’s

language is instructive, “That man may not be lost there is need of the person’s

responsibility to truth in his historical situation. There is need of the Single One50 who

stands over against all being which is present to him—and thus also over against the

body politic—and guarantees all being which is present to him—and thus also the

body politic.51” The straightforward argument for assigning responsibility and

dialogic imperative with the scholars can go as follow, truth is a public good, and

though it is achieved by scholars it is done so with the help of public resources. Hence

it should be treated as public good to be reached out by responsible scholars to the

public. Truth about reality, that is, is discovered by scholars and is a property to be

owned by the public. Therefore, scholars are burdened with a dialogic imperative to

communicate all their discoveries to the public to be beneficially used by it. However,

from a Buberian perspective this argument is flawed for two main reasons. The first is

its objectivist foundation and the second is its elitist undertones.

I will start with the first flaw, that of the objectivist objection to the

straightforward argument. As was explored above, the relations between scholars and

49 Piki Ish-Shalom, 'Theorization, Harm, and the Democratic Imperative: Lessons from the Politicization of the Democratic-Peace Thesis', International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008).50 Single One for Buber is a person who is able to have complete relations to his/her own life and to those of others. Hence, the Single One can genuinely respond to others. See Buber, Between man and man, 60-108, Friedman, Martin Buber, 93.51 Buber, Between man and man, 108.

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truth should be constituted on I-Thou relations,52 and I-Thou relations are founded on

mutuality. It is no longer the detachedly collected data which produce objective truth

that is being instrumentalized for the sake of humanity. No longer there is the

positivist futile attempt by scholars to gain this detached view that will gain them

access to the objective truth. Truth is a living entity constructed in an engaged and

dynamic process and should be treated accordingly. As rightfully noted by Silberstein,

“Buber envisioned a critical investigation of problems to which the sociologist is

existentially committed. Concerned with far more than description, the sociologist’s

responsibility is to enquire into the human meaning of social life in order to help

shape that life.53” The fact-value distinction cannot hold as the social scientist is

committed existentially, that is morally. And furthermore, the facts that are enquired

and gained are social facts that encompass the meaning of human and social life,

namely the values of theses lives. Social research, according to Buber is (among other

things) about values and is value-implicated, and henceforth the positivist distinction

collapses along with its objectivist ideal.

The mutuality and (unequal) reciprocity that exist in such a dialogical relation

means that truth also affect the community of scholars. There is, in the language of

Hans-Georg Gadamer, a fusion of horizons54 with which both the scholars and the

reality they study affect and change each other.55 Or in the language of Buber, truth

about reality and the community of scholars enter into presence with each other,

endowing each other with the relation of I-Thou. It is no longer reality as an

instrumentalized It in the service of humanity as an alienated I. It is reality and truth

as valued entities that enter into presence with the scholars and mutually constitute a

52 At least, that is, along side I-It relations with truth.53 Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, 170. 54 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and method, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 306.55 Piki Ish-Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic Peace and the Politics of Democratization', European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 4 (2006).

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moral Between in which an ethical and dialogic We arise. It is a non-detached social

inquiry that by constructing I-Thou relation with truth may be beneficial to the

scholars and public as a whole.

The second flaw of the straightforward argument explaining and justifying the

social responsibility of the scholars to the public is the sense of elitism it conveys.

Allegedly, the scholars are those active transmitters who gain access to truth and in a

benevolent act give it away to the public that is but a passive recipient. But this is not

how we should understand Buber. Again we should understand dialogue as a relation

founded on mutuality and reciprocity. As such, the public is far from being a passive

and ignorant crowd. And the communication of knowledge is not a one way street.

The dialogue takes the form of participatory and deliberative democracy, but one

which is not limited to the political, which is the paradigm of the I-It relation.56 It is a

deliberative and participatory democracy tuned to the social and forming I-Thou

communal relation. There is a sincerity and mutuality in the Between that guards

against instrumentalization and alienation. And it is the work, among other things, of

the engaged community of scholars, informed and enrich as they are by their I-Thou

relation within themselves and with truth. But, it should be added, community of

scholars informed and enriched also by their I-Thou dialogical relations with the

public. As a dialogic imperative it ensures a two-way mutual and reciprocal dialogue

that enriches the two sides of the relation, two sides each of which is I to the Thou and

Thou to the I. Moreover, entering into dialogue with the public ensures that the

community of scholars will be weaved into the broader tissue of society-turned-

community, making true what Habermas claimed, “In the model of communicative

action, social actors are themselves outfitted with the same interpretive capacities as

social-scientific interpreters; thus the latter cannot claim for themselves the status of 56 Buber, Pointing the way, 161-76.

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neutral, extramundane observers in their definitions of actors' situations.57” Scholars

and society in large, are part of the same social entity and as such are mutually

responsible for each other. These are the reasoning and justifications for the dialogic

imperative of the community of scholars to (or more accurately: with) the public;

reasoning and justifications that are founded on a non-objectivist and non-elitist logic,

namely on a constructivist, dialogic and participatory logic of both epistemology and

ethics.

Note that in social science, in which the subject of inquiry is the society or the

public, epistemology and ethics join hands. The sought-after truth for social scientists

is truth about the social in its different manifestations, one of which is the public. The

phenomenological sensitivity of Buber translates into a constructivist, dialogic, and

participatory logic appropriate both to leading social research and organizing political

governing. Thus, the logics of ethics and epistemology intertwine. This is an

important rectification to the methodology employed up to now, by which I referred

to ethics and epistemology as separate domains and moved from one to the other and

back again. Put differently I treated ethics and epistemology as related to each other

detachedly, as I-It. But the last section disclosed that ethics and epistemology should

actually be related dialogically, as I-Thou; they should be present to each other and

endow each other with meaning. Consequently, the third dialogic imperative is

essentially Janus-faced: it is both with the public and with truth about the public that

the community of scholars is obligated to be in dialogue with.

57 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston Beacon Press 1984), xiii.

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Conclusions This third dialogic imperative joins with the two other imperatives of the intrapersonal

and interpersonal. Together the imperatives ensure a healthy community freed from

social alienation, where the scholars are organized in a community of dialogue, are

integrated to the wider communal fabric, and contribute to its democratic deliberation.

But, and with that I will conclude, Buber did not settle his vision with the community,

not that of the scholars and not that of the nation. His was a cosmopolitan vision with

an anarchical bent,58 were humanity as a whole will be organized in communities

weaved together; humanity, that is as a community of communities. And this was not

only an abstract ideal for him. Though an enthusiastic Zionist, Buber did not embrace

the political Zionism of Theodor Herzl which focused almost solely on gaining

sovereignty and establishing a homeland for the Jewish people as a shelter from

external persecution. Buber, along with other thinkers such as Ahad Ha'am,59

advocated a cultural, or spiritual, Zionism aimed at a cultural and spiritual internal

renewal. In the later half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth

century these two strands of Zionism, the political and cultural, competed each other

for the heart of the Zionist movement, and it was Herzl’s Zionism that gained the

upper hand and later succeeded in securing its vision with the establishment of the

state of Israel on May 14 1948. However, this achievement came with a high cost for

both the Palestinian people who inhabited the land and lost their homes and their

homeland, and for the state and people of Israel that found themselves locked in a

continuous bloody conflict and military struggle with their neighboring states and

peoples. It was against these two moral harms that Buber and other intellectuals

struggled by a search for a dialogue between the Jewish and Palestinian national

58 See especially Buber, Paths in Utopia.59 Ahad Ha'am (Literary: One of the People) is the pen name of Asher Zvi Grinsberg (1856-1927), one of the leading intellectuals of Cultural Zionism.

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communities. Buber, along with other members of Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace)

and Ichud (Union), two associations of few prominent Jewish scholars, warned

against exclusive sovereignty and national seclusion, and advocated a bi-national

federative state.60 But the two national communities were already locked in a cycle of

violence and Buber’s warnings were of no avail. The lethal war of 1947-8 has

erupted, ending in the establishment of the state of Israel, and with hundreds of

thousands of Palestinian refugees. Buber did not abandon his vision of

intercommunity dialogue even after the establishment of the state of Israel and sought

an accommodation with the Palestinian minority within Israel. Again his efforts ran

against the harsh reality of martial law that was enforced on the Palestinian minority;

a martial law that prevented any prospects of true and genuine dialogue and was lifted

only in 1966, a year after Buber’s death.61

What can we, scholars of IR, can learn from Buber's experience? We can learn

the futility of dialogue between nations locked in bitter and bloody conflict, or we can

try to understand better the conditions under which inter-communal dialogue is

possible and fruitful. The dialogical intertwining of ethics and epistemology burdens

us not to despair and to study and communicate the conditions under which inter-

communal dialogue and peace are possible. Maybe thus we can contribute to the

Palestinians and Jews standing in I-Thou mutual relations and hence to a genuine,

just, and lasting peace between the two national communities. But, I hasten to say, to

be able to contribute so, we must first demonstrate that we—as a community of

60 Buber's writings on these issues are compiled mainly in Martin Buber, On Zion: the history of an idea, trans. Stanely Godman (New York,: Schocken Books, 1973), Martin Buber and Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, A land of two peoples : Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).61 Buber’s dialogical vision attracted a little more attention around the world, especially in the 1950, as can be learned, for example, by the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who was inspired by Buber and in 1958 quoted Buber in length in Cambridge University. See Silberstein, Martin Buber's social and religious thought, Jodok Troy, 'Dag Hammarskjöld: An International Civil Servant Uniting Mystics and Realistic Diplomatic Engagement', Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 3.

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scholars—can overcome our own internal disagreements and be able to relate to each

other dialogically, as I-Thou. Only then can we hope to discharge our dialogic

imperatives outwards and contribute to a peaceful and dialogical international

existence.

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