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The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army in the Pre-Modern Period

Author(s): Timothy MayReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 617-635Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4138118 .

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The Trainingof an Inner AsianNomad Army in the Pre-Modern PeriodTimothy May

AbstractOften the armies that emerged fromthe steppes of InnerAsia areviewed as throngs of horse-archers who overwhelmed their oppo-nents throughsheer ferocityorsuperiornumbers.The typicalobser-vationabouttheirmilitary bility s thatas nomads they were naturalwarriors nuredsince birth o ridingand archeryinthe harsh climateof the steppe. While this view has an element of truth,the armieswere actuallybetter trained than is generally assumed. This articleexamines the trainingof InnerAsian armies. Although t focuses onthe Mongols,italso explores the antecedents and evolutionof train-ing techniques across InnerAsia.

ONE of the biligs, or maxims, of Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan) con-cerned the training of the army:Just as ortaqs [merchants] come with gold spun fabrics and are con-fident of making profits on those goods and textiles, military com-manders should teach their sons archery, horsemanship, andwrestling well. They should test them in these arts and make themaudacious and brave to the same degree that ortaqs are confident oftheir own skill.1

1. Rashid al-Din, Jami'u't-Tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles, vol. 2, trans.William Thackston (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity, Department of Near East-ern Languagesand Civilizations, 1998), 297; Rashid al-Din Tabib,Jami' al-Tawarikh,Timothy May is an assistant professor of history at North Georgia College andState University in Dahlonega, Georgia, where he teaches Middle Eastern andCentral Asian History. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin-Madi-son where he wrote his dissertation, The Mechanics of Governance and Con-quest: The Rise and Expansion of the Mongol Empire, 1185-1265. He is also theauthor of The Mongol Art of War (South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and Sword Pub-lishing, forthcoming).The Journal of Military History 70 (July 2006): 617-36 ? Society for Military History * 617


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TIMOTHYMAY-Considering the importance that Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) placed onmilitary training, it is surprising that the training of the army is oftenoverlooked in the study of the Mongol Empire or other Inner Asian pow-

ers. In many respects, this neglect of an integral component of a militaryestablishment is odd, given that copious amounts of research have beendevoted to the training of European knights, and to a lesser extent to thetraining of the Mamlfiks of Egypt and Syria.2 Of course, much of this isdue to the relative availability of source material. For the Mongols, aboutwhom we have more information than other Inner Asian groups, there isvirtually nothing demonstrating in detail the training of the Mongol war-rior. Nevertheless, historians of the Mongols, as well as those of othermedieval military systems, would do well to observe the methodology ofJ. F. Verbruggen in his modern classic, The Art of Warfare in WesternEurope During the Middle Ages From the Eighth Century to 1340, inwhich he closely examines the equipment and training of the medievalknight, including war games.3The typical observation concerning the training of the Mongols isthat, as they were nomads, they learned to ride and shoot arrows froman early age, thus giving them adequate competence as warriors. Addi-ed. Bahman Karimi(Tehran:Iqbal, 1983), 437. For more information on the ortaqs,or merchants, see Thomas T. Allsen, "MongolianPrinces and Their Merchant Part-ners, 1200-1260," Asia Major 2 (1989): 83-126; Elizabeth Endicott-West, "MerchantAssociations in Yiian China: The Ortogh,"Asia Major 2 (1989): 127-54.2. David Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols, andEunuchs (London: Ashgate 1988); David Ayalon, "Mamlikiyyit: (A) A First Attemptto Evaluate the MamlfikMilitarySystem," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2(1980): 321-39, reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam; David Ayalon,"Discharges from Service, Banishments and Imprisonments in Mamluk Society,"Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972): 25-50; DavidAyalon, Gunpowder and Firearms inthe Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society (London: Vallentine,Mitchell and Co., 1956); David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the MamlukArmy-I," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 203-28;David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army-II," Bulletin of theSchool of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 448-76; DavidAyalon, "Studies onthe Structure of the Mamluk Army-III," Bulletin of the School of Oriental andAfrican Studies 16 (1954): 57-90; DavidAyalon, "PreliminaryRemarks on the Mam-likkMilitaryInstitution in Islam,"in War,Technology,and Society in the Middle East,ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); P. M. Holt,"The Position and Power of the MamlfikSultan," Bulletin of the School of Orientaland African Studies 38 (1975): 237-49; John France, Western Warfarein the Age ofthe Crusades, 1000-1300 (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1999); J. F. Ver-bruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from theEighth Century to 1340, 2d ed., trans. Colonel Sumner Willardand R. W. Southern(Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell, 1997); Christopher Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East,1192-1291 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992); R. C. Smail, CrusadingWarfare,1097-1193 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press 1995).3. Verbruggen,The Art of Warfare, 19-40.618 * THE JOURNALOF


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- TheTrainingof an InnerAsian NomadArmy

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tionally, their maneuvers were based on the practice of the nerge, whichwas essentially a mass hunt often referred to as the battue.4In the practice of the nerge the Mongols would fan out over severalmiles forming a circle. Gradually this circle would close and contractuntil all of the animals were trapped within this ring of men and horses.

4. Ala al-Din Ata MalikJuvaini, Genghis Khan: The History of the World Con-queror, trans. John Andrew Boyle (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997),27-28; Ala al-Din 'Ata MalikJuvaini, Ta'rikh-i-Jahatn-Gusha,ed. Mirza MuhammadQazvini, 3 vols., E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series (Leiden: Brill, 1912, 1916, 1937),1:19-20. The nerge is also referred to as the jerge or jdirge in the Mongolian andMuslimsources. See GerhardDoerfer,Tiirkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neu-persischen, Unter Besonderer Beriicksichtigung alterer Neupersischer Geschichts-quellen, vor Allem der Mongolen- und Timuridenzeit, 4 vols. (Wiesbaden:F. Steiner,1963-75), 1:291-93, forjerge. The primary meaning appears to mean rank, row, orperhaps even a military column.MILITARY HISTORY * 619


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TIMOTHYMAYAfter the Khan, or ruler, killed a few animals, others would begin theirhunt. Some animals were allowed to escape in a symbolic act ofclemency. A hunt of this size naturally required excellent communica-tion and discipline in order to maintain the circle in addition to pre-venting animals from escaping until the appropriate time.The nerge was then adapted to warfare and applied through severaltechniques. The most obvious was the encirclement of the enemy, ordouble envelopment, in which the wings of the Mongol army would wraparound the opposing army so that they overlapped. In addition to mak-ing it possible to attack the enemy from multiple angles, the surround-ing of enemy forces allowed the Mongols to employ another tactic. Byleaving a gap in their encirclement, the Mongols created a seeminglyinnocuous hole that appeared to be a means of escape for those enclosedby the Mongol ranks, much as animals were permitted to flee during thenerge. During war, however, the gap served as a trap. Realizing that whencornered, the enemy would resist stubbornly, the Mongols allowed asafety valve in order to let the enemy escape. However, the fleeing troopsquickly discovered to their detriment that the Mongols simply pursuedand hunted them. Often discarding their weapons in their haste, theenemy rarely could maintain any semblance of effective defense oncethey chose to escape.5

As in the nerge, the warriors gradually tightened their circle aroundthe enemy, forming a dense mass from which none could escape. It isthought that large numbers were required to perform this maneuver andmaintain the noose around the enemy; as in the nerge, however,although certainly beneficial, this was not required.6 Just as skilledhunters were able to hold their positions to herd or direct the route ofanimals, so skilled warriors could do the same while encircling theenemy. Because of their archery skills and great mobility, the Mongolsdid not require superior numbers of troops to encircle an enemy.Like the traditional nomadic tactic of the feigned retreat, the nergewas not an innovation on the part of the Mongols. Rather, it appears to

5. Muhammad ibn Ahmad Nasawi, Sirah al-Sultan Jaldl al-Din Mankubirti(Cairo:Dairal-Fikral-Arabi,1953), 100-101; Mohammed En-Nasawi,Histoire du Sul-tan Djelal ed-din Mankobirti, trans. 0. Houdas (Paris:l'fcole des Langues Orientalesvivantes, 1895), 74; John de Piano Carpini, "Historyof the Mongols,"in The MongolMission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia andChina in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, ed. C. Dawson (London: Sheedand Ward, 1955), 36-37. The Mongolscarried out this practice at Bukhara in modernUzbekistan and then again at the battle of Mohi along the Sajo River in Hungary.6. John Masson Smith, Jr., "Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East:Antecedents and Adaptations,"in Warand Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7thand 15th Centuries, ed. YaacovLev (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 253. Smith maintains that"encirclement, however, could reliably be achieved with superior numbers."620 * THE JOURNAL OF


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The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Armybe a standard tactic used in steppe warfare as indicated in this depictionof Scythian drills by Byzantine Emperor Maurice (582-602) :The Scythianformation s one in which the [units] are all formed in

the same manner, as in former times, not with some of themarrangedas assault troops and some as defenders. They should bedrawnup in one line, divided into two moiras instead of the usualthree. The two flanks of the meros move out as thoughbeginninganencircling maneuver,advancingtoward one another,and surround-ing an open space. Continuingalongin a circle, the rightwingon theoutside, the left on the inside, they ride into the opposite section ofone another's ine. This used to be part of the cavalrygames in win-ter quartersduringMarch.7The use of the nerge on a larger scale, however, may have been aMongol innovation. At times the Mongols used it as a tactic on a broaderfront in an invasion, as they did during the invasion of the Rus' lands.After the capture of the city of Vladimir in 1237, "they turned back fromthere and held a council, deciding that they would proceed tiimain bytiimin in jairgeformation and take and destroy every town, province andfortress they came to."sIndeed, as the circle contracted, populations fled toward the center,

typically a key city. The impact of the nerge was great. First, it cut offthe principal city from communicating with other strongholds that mightbe expected to give aid. Second, refugees from these smaller cities wouldflee to the last stronghold. Not only did the reports from these defeatedcities and the streaming hordes of refugees reduce the morale of theinhabitants and garrison forces of the principal city, but in addition, therefugees strained its resources, taxing food and water reserves and thusundermining the defense of the city.The Mongols were not the only Inner Asian group that consideredhunting a valuable technique in military training. The Khitan, during theLiao Dynasty (907-1125) of northern China, used hunting not only forthe practical purpose of feeding their troops, but also as training for mil-

7. Maurikos, Maurice's Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy,trans.GeorgeT. Dennis(Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress,1984), 61.The Scythians were an Iranian or proto-Turkic steppe nomadic group that inhabitedthe southern steppes of Russia during the ancient period. They were graduallyreplaced by other nomadic groups. The Byzantines, however, commonly referred toall nomads regardless of location as Scythians, even during the medieval period.Thus, depending on the era, the Scythians could be Huns, Avars, Bulghars, or Turks.One moira consisted of 2,000 to 3,000 men. Meros were 6,000 to 7,000 men. Typi-cally three moira formed one meros.8. Rashid al-Din, Jami'u't-Tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles, 2:327. TheRus'city of Vladimir was located about 200 kilometers east of Moscow. One tiiman is10,000 men.MILITARY HISTORY * 621


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TIMOTHYMAY-itary maneuvers, particularly during the winter hunt.9 Indeed, one Liaoemperor once said, "Our hunting is not simply a pursuit of pleasure. Itis a means of practicing warfare."10

Indeed, one of the classic tactics among horse-archers, the infamous"Parthian shot," may have originated as a hunting technique. TheParthian shot was performed by riding away from the intended targetwhile twisting backwards to the target and firing. Although all horse-archers from the steppe employed this technique, the origin of the termseems to have come from its devastating use against the Roman armiesof Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BCE by the horse-archers of the Parthianempire (250 BCE-225 CE). Robert Drews has concluded that theParthian shot was perfected by hunting dangerous animals, such as bullsor lions, that would most likely charge their antagonists. When a hunterwith a bow was charged by such a beast, his most obvious recourse wasto put distance between himself and the animal. By being able to turnand shoot, the hunter not only fended off the animal, but also enhancedhis hunting and military skills. Indeed, Drews believes that this huntingtechnique, like so many others, was then applied to military tactics. Hedemonstrates that it gave its user a significant advantage: "If both theParthian and his pursuer were riding at a gallop, the Parthian would ineffect be shooting a bow with a wind at his back, while the pursuer wouldbe shooting into the wind.""11Steppe nomads were not the only ones to consider hunting an excel-lent opportunity to train their soldiers. Indeed, based on his observationof nomadic armies, Byzantine Emperor Maurice advised his generals touse hunting to perfect tactics and strategies. They used lines of horse-men as the Mongols did in the nerge and eventually encircled the game.Maurice noted that it was very much like a Scythian battle formation.12

9. Karl A. Wittfogel and Fang Chia-Sheng, History of Chinese Society: Liao(907-1125) (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1949), 119; Liao Shih[History of the Liao], trans. Karl A. Wittfogel and Fang Chia-Shang, in Wittfogel andFang,History of Chinese Society, 126-29. The Khitanswere a proto-Mongol group. In907 they conquered much of northern China from the Song dynasty. Their empirecomprised much of what is now modern Mongolia, the Inner Mongolian autonomousregion of the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as the northern part of thePRC.10. Liao Shih, 565. The importance of the hunt in military training was so greatthat the Chinese inhabitants of the empire were forbidden to hunt. See p. 568.11. Robert Drews, Early Riders: The Beginnings of Mounted Warfare in Asiaand Europe (New York:Routledge, 2004), 102. This work is essential for anyoneinterested in the development of mounted warfare. Drews examines, and in somecases, reexamines the use of horses in warfare in preclassical antiquity.12. Maurikos, Maurice's Strategikon, 165-67. As previously mentioned, theByzantines referred to basically any steppe nomadic group as Scythians.622 * THE JOURNAL OF


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- TheTrainingof an InnerAsian NomadArmyThe complex coordination of units and exercises involved with thenerge enabled the Mongol warriors to function as a single unit on the bat-tlefield. Apparently, although other Inner Asian forces used similar tac-

tics, they did not operate with the same degree of precision as theMongols. One source noted that:The Mongols romamongthe Turkishpeople accustomed their peo-ple [to fight as] a single squadronof cavalry,so that they struggledtogetheragainstthe enemy. Retiring [fromthe battle] and returning[to it] was denied to each of them. Theygainedfromthis greatexpe-rience which was not [duplicated]by others.13The Mongols' ability to operate in disciplined units certainly gavethem an advantage but is not enough to explain their amazing military

feats. While some scholars would argue that the Mongols were inferiorsoldiers who achieved victory due to overwhelming numbers or less-ableopponents, neither explanation is fully convincing.14 It is unlikely thatthe Mongols could have established the largest contiguous empire in his-tory even with overwhelming numbers, if they were indeed truly inferiorsoldiers, particularly as the Chinese Jin (1125-1234) and Song(960-1279) Empires produced even larger armies. One must also con-sider that at the beginning of their conquests, the Mongols certainly didnot possess vastly superior numbers against the Jin Dynasty of northernChina or against the Khwairazmian Empire (1194-1224) in Central Asiaand Iran. Finally, the Mongols carried out operations on several fronts.Although this could be accomplished by large armies, the size of thearmy did not automatically result in victory. Indeed, on some fronts,Mongol armies were fairly small for their theater of operation.Certainly the nerge contributed to producing a well-disciplined forcecapable of complex maneuvers over a broad front. The fact that the Mon-gols also became competent horsemen and archers due to daily practicealmost from birth is also undeniable. The seasonal migrations of thenomads also enhanced their discipline as did the practice of coordinatedmoves across great distances. However, we must ask what other factorswere involved. How did the Mongols practice their archery? We knowthat the Armenians called the Mongols "the Nation of Archers." Becausethe Armenians had several encounters with Kipchak Turks and othernomadic horse archers, they were quite familiar with them and the com-posite bow they used. To single out the Mongols as "the Nation of

13. 'Umar Ibn Ibrahim al-Ansi al-An'ari, Tafrij al-Kuruibft Tadbir al-'urfib(Cairo:American University at Cairo Press, 1961), 103. Also see p. 77.14. John Masson Smith, Jr., "'AynJalfit: MamlukSuccess or MongolFailure?"Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44 (1984): 345. Also see Charles Oman, A His-tory of the Art of War:The Middle Ages from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century(New York:Burt Franklin, 1898), 316-17; France, Western Warfare, 202.MILITARY HISTORY * 623


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TIMOTHYMAY----Archers" indicates that the Mongols were more proficient with thisweapon than other nomads."s The historian must search for other evi-dence to determine how and why the Mongols became so proficient thatthey could, in at least one chronicler's opinion, surpass other InnerAsian nomads.To determine the origins of the Mongols' success, it is not enough touse sources directly related to the Mongols of the thirteenth century, asthese provide scant information directly related to the training of theMongol army. In addition, it is necessary to examine sources on the train-ing of the Mamlfiks of Egypt and Syria as well as of the Khitans of the LiaoDynasty, since both originated in a steppe element: the Khitans, in addi-tion to ruling part of Mongolia during the Liao Dynasty, have often beenlinked to the Mongols by ethnic and linguistic ties as well, while most ofthe MamlGfksduring the thirteenth century originated from the Dasht-iKipchak, or Kipchak Steppe, before being imported to Egypt and Syria.16Second, these sources, in addition to scholarly works, provide data fromwhich to derive a clear picture of their military, and thus perhaps toestablish a paradigm to compare with data relating to the Mongols andsteppe societies in general. Thus, from these societies we may deriveadditional information that clarifies the methods that the Mongols usedin training their soldiers.

The Mamlfiks of Egypt, particularly under the first few Sultans, orrulers, as well as under the Ayyubids in the thirteenth century, instituteda strict regimen of training for their new recruits. This has been docu-mented in detail in numerous works." Only when the recruits had15. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, "The History of the Nation of the Archers byGrigor of Akanc," Harvard Journal of Asian Studies 12 (1949): 269-399. TheKipchakTurksoccupied much of the southern portion of modern Russia. They werepastoral nomads who moved into the region during the eleventh and twelfth cen-turies, replacing the Pechenegs as the dominant steppe group in the region.16. The MamlfikSultanate of Eygpt and Syria came into existence in 1250, inthe aftermathof the disastrous Second Crusade. The Mamlfikswere typically KipchakTurks, who had been purchased as slaves by the various members of the AyyubidDynasty, founded by Salith al-Din, or Saladin. They were taught the rudiments ofIslam and trained as warriors.Eventually they received manumission and then joineda corps of warriors fiercely loyal to their former masters. These units were often theelite forces in various Muslim armies. After a rebellion in 1250, the Mamlfiksdeposedthe Ayyubids in Egyptand established a sultanate that would go on to defeat the Mon-gols at Ayn Jalfit in 1260, thus allowing them to establish dominion over Syria andPalestine. The Mamlfikswould also drive the Crusaders out of the Middle East in1291. Dasht-i Kipchak is Persian for the Kipchak Steppe, which was typically how thesouthern Russian steppes were known during the medieval period.17. See the following: Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms; Ayalon, "PreliminaryRemarkson the MamlfikMilitaryInstititution in Islam";Ayalon, "Mamltikiyyidt:A) AFirst Attempt to Evaluate the Mamltik Military System"; R. S. Humphreys, "TheEmergence of the Mamluk Army," Studia Islamica 45 (1977): 67-100; R. S.

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- TheTrainingof an InnerAsian NomadArmyreached their majority did they actually begin military training. Underthe guidance of a mucallim, or instructor, they trained in these fourareas: equestrian arts, lancing, archery, and fencing. For the purposes ofthis study, only the equestrian and archery training is relevant. Onlyafter successfully completing all four branches of training was the recruitconsidered afdris, or cavalryman.s18In the equestrian training, the Mamlfiks learned how to leap upontheir horses, even in full armor. The Mamlfik recruit began with a modelhorse and then moved on to a real one. Once he graduated to a realhorse, the recruit learned to canter, trot, and gallop while using a saddle,and then he practiced with stirrups. Finally, he also learned to treat sickand injured horses.19

The process of learning archery was exceedingly long and arduous.At first, the Mamlfik recruit was not even allowed to shoot. Instead hemerely had to work on his grip and on the motion of drawing and releas-ing the bow string. Once he had perfected these movements, the recruitcould then practice shooting, but without using arrows. The next stepallowed the recruit to shoot arrows, for which the pull of the bow wasincreased. Thus the Mamlfik recruit gradually began to use more power-ful bows. Finally, the recruit was taken out into the desert to shoot beforebeing considered qualified.20

As one can surmise, the Mamlufks in their prime were possibly thebest-trained warriors in the medieval world. Despite the refined tech-niques in which they were drilled, part of their training in archery orig-inated from their homeland in the steppes.One element of their training was the drill of the al-qabaq, orgourd.21Essentially, while riding, the Mamlfik shot at a gourd affixed to

Humphreys, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," Studia Islamica 46 (1977):147-82; Hassanein Rabie, "The Training of the MamlGkFaris," in Parry and Yapp,War,Technology,and Society in the Middle East.18. Rabie, "The Trainingof the Mamlik FAris,"154.19. Ibid., 154-57. While learning to use the lance, the Mamlk was advised tosaddle his own horse. From here he learned to mount and dismount while carrying alance, how to tilt, and how to use it while holding the reins. After these steps weremastered, the recruit then learned how to use the lance as a weapon and how to hurlit. As with all of the fighting arts, the Mamliks had manuals written with detailedinstructions. Knights in Christendom, at least in the Carolingian period, underwentsimilar training. They practiced mounting and dismounting on wooden horses andwith weapons drawn. Also, they practiced using weapons from horseback. See R. H.C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse:Origin, Development, and Redevelopment (Lon-don: Thames and Hudson, 1989), 14-15.20. Rabie, "The Trainingof the MamlfikFdris,"158.21. J. D. Latham, "Notes on Mamlfk Horse-Archers,"Bulletin of the School ofOriental and African Studies 32 (1969): 258. Al-qabaq is a Turkic word meaninggourd.MILITARY HISTORY * 625


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TIMOTHYMAYa pole. Due to the height of the pole, the rider would shoot upwards andoften from different angles, including the Parthian shot. A simple train-ing drill like this very well may have originated from the steppe. Onecould easily substitute a bag or other item for the gourd. Indeed, J. D.Latham, who has contributed much to the study of archery in theIslamic world, states:

AlthoughI have hithertobeen unableto turnup any writtenaccountof its early history,there seems no reason to doubtthe assertion that"shooting he gourd"was introducedto the MiddleEast fromCentralAsia where it was practiced by the Turkmens and Mongols . . . ifacceptable the hypothesis may be carried a stage further with thesuggestionthat a pole surmountedby a suitabletargetas simple as abundleof ragsandstrawwouldbe erectedby a nomadicencampmentand used for the purposesof instruction,practice,and amusement.22A simple extension of this practice was the Mamlfik drill of shootingthe qipaj, or qighaj. This drill was similar to al-qabaq, but involved therider's shooting downward at a target as he rode by.23To accomplish this,a rider often rose in his stirrups, thus giving him a better vantage point.In addition, the Mamlfiks practiced holding the reins of their horseswhile shooting. They tied knots to shorten the reins and to unify them intoone strand. Then the reins could be slipped over the pommel of the saddle

or held by the third finger of the drawing hand, attached by a thong. Thereins could be held in this manner because the Mamlfiks used a thumb ringand the index finger to draw the bow string. This also may have been howthe Mongols learned to use their bows to full advantage.24Latham wrote his work on the Mamlfik horse-archers in the late1960s. More recent information from the modern era bolsters Latham'sargument concerning the steppe origins of many of the Mamlfik drills. Inmodern Mongolia, the revival of many archery contests that had beenrepressed during the Communist era may shed some light on earliersuch competitions.One such contest is known as the bombog kharvaa, or ball shooting.In it, three leather balls are mounted on poles. The mounted archerattempts to hit the first one while advancing upon it, then the second ashe rides by it, and the final ball after he has ridden past it, thus enablinghim to use a Parthian shot. Other contests include the sarampai khar-vaa, in which the archer shoots at a target while riding at a gallop.According to one Mongolian, the most difficult part is controlling the

22. Ibid., 258.23. Ibid., 261.24. Ibid., 263. The thumb ring, often made of polished stone, allowed the stringto slide offof the archer'shumbwithless friction.It also allowed he archer o use ahigher pull weight, as the string did not cut into his fingers.626 * THE JOURNAL OF


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The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Army

horse, which is done entirelywith the knees as both hands are occupiedwith the bow while the reins are tied to the saddle.25Consideringthis, it is highlyprobablethat the al-qabaq drill used by

the Mamlfikswas of steppe origin.While it is impossible to determine atthis time if the Mongolsmade trainingsuch as the bombog kharvaa astandardexercise for their army, it is likely that contests such as thesewere commonplacefor entertainmentpurposes if not for actualmilitarytraining.Furthersupportingthe probable steppe origin of the al-qabaqdrill is the analysis of Mongoltactics and MamlUfkrainingby John Mas-son Smith, Jr.In regardsto the Mamlfiks' raining,Smith wrote:Practiceookplaceon fields,alreadydescribed, f from131 to 284yards n length,downwhicha singleriderand his horsewouldgal-lop in a straightline, letting off one shot at the target two-thirds ofthewaydown he fieldandthenslowingandturning ff the course.ByInnerAsianstandardshiswasa rudimentaryxercise,makingfor the dexterity with the bow, but providingno training in evolu-tions withthehorse n conjunctionwith theshooting-[onesource]says only that the ridershould not let the horse run into the pole-andnopracticen coordinatedmovement ndshootingbygroups fhorse-archers.heMamlfiksid notpractice he repeated"charge-and-shoot"acticsusedbytheMongolsecause,unlike heMongols,they could not keep galloping ong enoughto makesuch tacticsworthwhile.26Smith contends that the Mongolsessentially performedthis drill incombat, shooting several arrows while charging, and then retreatingwhile another wave of Mongoltroops performedthe same action, in themanner of the sixteenth-centurycaracole, or "chargeand shoot," usedby pistol-wielding European cavalry. The main reason, according toSmith, why the Mamlfiksdid not do this, is that they did not possessenough horses to carryit off. Indeed, the constant chargingand retreat-ing could easily exhaust a horse throughthe course of battle, necessitat-ing the stringsof horses that the Mongolsused.The intention of Smith'sstudy was to demonstrate that the Mongolswere inferior and poorly trained soldiers, particularlycompared to theMamlfiksof Egyptwho defeatedthem at Ayn Jalfitin 1260. However,byindicatingthat the Mamlfiksdid not train in "chargeand shoot"tactics,Smith indirectly demonstrates that a great deal of practice would beneeded in order to conduct this tactic, particularly duringthe stress ofcombat. A high degree of coordination and discipline would be requiredto maintain any semblance of coherence as wave after wave of cavalryperformed this attack. Without appropriate training, the most likely

25. "OldSongs of Arrows,"Mongolia Today 7 (2002):http://www.mongoliatoday.comissue/7/archery.html .26. Smith, "AynJalfit:Mamluk Success or MongolFailure?" 322.MILITARY HISTORY * 627


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TIMOTHYMAYresult would be mass chaos with retreatingriders impedingthe advanceof the next wave.Additional evidence that the Mongolsdid not lack training comesfrom the Liao Shi, the history of the Liao Dynasty.Muchlike the Mon-gols, the Khitans also attackedin caracole fashion: one wave advancingfiring,and then retiringwhile another came forth.27Considering he highdegree of sophisticationin Khitan administrationand also the organiza-tion and supportof their military,it is unlikely that the Khitanswouldhave viewed hunting as the only means of military training.Indeed, theKhitansalso held periodic militaryreviews.During hese, not only did theethnic Khitans conduct militarydrills, but the Chinese soldiers in theirarmies also practicedwith catapults,crossbows,swords,and spears.28

While evidence that the caracole was used among the Kipchaksisdemonstrated only in the drills used by Mamlfiks recruited from theDasht-i Kipchak, there is evidence that a caracole-style tactic did existin the western Eurasian steppes prior to the Mongols. Maurice, theByzantineemperorand author of the Strategikon, the Byzantinemanualof warfare referredto earlier, wrote that another steppe people calledAlans performedsimilartactics, and advised that his own militaryprac-tice them.Inthe Alansystem hetroops, ome asassault troops] nd someasdefenders, re drawnupin a singlebattle ine. This is dividedntomoiras,inedupabout woor fourhundredeetfromeachother.Theassault roopsadvanceat a gallopas in pursuit,and then turnbackfilteringnto the intervalsor clearspacesin the main line. Then,togetherwiththedefendersheyturnandcharge gainst heenemy.In anothermaneuverhe assault roops urnaround n thoseinter-vals andchargeoutagainstbothflanksoftheunit,themenkeepingtheir originalrelativepositions.29

Further evidence that this method of attack requireda high degreeof training comes from sixteenth-century Western Europe. In the six-teenth century,trainingandpracticewere necessary in orderto performthe caracole effectively in conjunction with other attacks. When theReiters, or heavy cavalry,who used the caracole were used with non-Reitertroops,their maneuvers could disruptthe actions of other cavalrytroopswho were not accustomedto them. Indeed, at the battle of Ivryin1590 between KingHenri IV (1589-1610) of France and the CatholicLeague,KingHenri

27. Wittfogeland Fang,History of Chinese Society, 533.28. Liao Shih, 567.29. Maurikos,Maurice's Strategikon, 62. The Alans occupied the steppe regionnorth of the Caucasus Mountains. They were of non-Turkicorigin and remained a dis-tinct nation into the fourteenth century.628 * THE JOURNAL OF


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- The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Armyordered the 250 Reiters in his pay to dispense with the caracole tac-tic andchargehome with the rest of his cavalry.Thiswas significant,for when performing heir customary maneuver the Reiters alwayswheeled to the left after dischargingtheir pistols. But the dangerhere was that they often collided with other oncoming friendlycav-alry, throwingthe latter'sattack into disorder andbluntingits effect.Indeed, the due de Mayenne,the Leagueleader, later attributedhisdefeat at Ivry precisely to this cause in an effort to shift the blamefor the debacle onto others. Evenso, his claim was not withoutsomefoundation:afterperforming he caracole, [the duc's]Reitersdidcol-lide with the long lines of charging Leaguelancers, destroyingtheirmomentum and renderingtheir weapons useless.30

Other relevant tactics and training methods also existed. HerbertFranke reveals another form of training in his study of Chinese texts,which indicate some habits of the Khitans that might also apply to theMongols. The Khitans practiced archery while mounted by shooting atwillow rods. He believes this was part of a religious ceremony after a sac-rifice, conceding, however, that it may have been a form of militarytraining or even a game for recreation. Franke believes that this waspracticed by the Mongols as well as the Jurchen, a Manchurian semi-nomadic people who conquered northern China and established the JinDynasty.31

As we have seen, Professor Smith has vigorously contended that incomparison to the Mamlfiks, the Mongols were poorly trained.32In manyways, this comparison cannot be made as the Mamlfiks were an elite forcespecifically recruited and trained for no other purpose than to serve assoldiers. Although the Mongols performed admirably in battle, they, by nomeans, could be considered an elite unit. By contrast, the Mamlfiks, par-ticularly under Baybars (1260-77), ranked among the most highlytrained warriors in the Middle Ages. However, one cannot compare aMamlGfkwith a random Mongol trooper who, when not serving on militaryduty, very well might have spent his time tending his flocks. Certain ele-ments of Smith's argument collapse under closer examination.One such argument concerns a comparison of the Mongol militarytraining with that of the Mamlfikfaris. While practicing with swords, the

30. Ronald S. Love, "'All the King'sHorsemen': The Equestrian Army of HenriIV, 1585-1598," Sixteenth Century Journal 22, no. 3 (1991): 519.31. Herbert Franke, "Chinese Texts on the Jurchen (1) A Translation of theJurchen Monograph n the San-Ch'aoPei-MengHui-Pien,"Zentralasiatische Studien9 (1975): 180, in Studies on the Jurchens or the Jin Dynasty, ed. Herbert Franke andHok-lam Chan (Aldershot:Ashgate, 1997).32. John Masson Smith, Jr., has written two articles which deal with this issueas well as other issues concerning the Mongol military that will be discussed else-where at length. Smith, "'AynJalfit: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?" 307-45;Smith, "MongolSociety."MILITARY HISTORY * 629


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TIMOTHYMAYMamlafkstruck one thousand times into a clay bar. In addition, the Mam-fiks practiced launching their arrows in a shower, with a high are, ratherthan a flat trajectory. In defense of the Mongols, it is rather odd to com-pare the swordsmanship talents of the Mongols with Mamliks becausethe Mongols avoided hand-to-hand combat unless necessary. Instead,they preferred to shoot their enemies, often using an arrow shower, atypical steppe tactic. Considering that all opposing forces could also firefrom a fairly stable platform, it is unlikely that, unless they were charg-ing, the Mongols would have any interest in closing with the enemyexcept under favorable circumstances. Quite simply, the closer onecame, the more those on the opposing side could use their bows todeadly effect.33

Military training among the Mongols began at an early age.34 Themost common example cited for steppe nomads in general originates inSsfi-ma Chien's (145-85 BCE) account of the Xiong-nu, or Huns, as theybecame known in the West. He wrote that little boys learned to ride onthe backs of sheep and practiced archery by shooting at small game:"Thus all the young men are able to use a bow and act as armed cavalryin time of war."35

Quite simply, one would not survive in the steppe without being ableto ride a horse. Indeed, for males, mastery of hunting (the handling of abow) and riding were primary duties. Concerning the Mongols, John dePlano Carpini confirmed that by the thirteenth century, little had changed:

The men do not make anythingat all, with the exception of arrows,and they also sometimes tend the flocks, but they hunt and practisearchery,for they are all, big and little, excellent archers, and theirchildrenbegin as soon as they are two or three years old to ride andmanagehorses and to gallopthem, and they are given bows to suittheir stature and are taught to shoot; they are extremely agile andalso intrepid.3633. Smith, "MongolSociety," 256.34. While most studies remark, almost in shock, that Mongol children learnedthe arts of warat an earlyage,this is not drasticallydifferent romthe knightlycastein Europe. Children began their apprenticeships as pages at a very young age and sys-tematically learned to ride and fight until approximately the age of twenty, by whichtime they had acquired enough physical maturity to bear the weight of the knight'sarmor.At thattime,theyusuallyreceivedknighthood.HansDelbrtick,MedievalWar-fare, trans.Walter . Renfroe,Jr.(Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress,1990), 228;Verbruggen,TheArt of Warfare, 27-28; Davis, TheMedieval Warhorse, 19.35. Ssfi-ma Chien, Records of the Grand Historian, trans. Burton Watson, 2vols. (New York:Columbia University Press, 1961), 2:153.36. Iohannesde PianoCarpini,"YstoriaMongalorum,"n Sinica Franciscana:Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum Saeculi XIII et XIV ed. P.Anastasius Van Den

Wyngaert, 27-130 (Florence: Apud Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1929), 49-50;Carpini,"History f the Mongols," 8.630 * THE JOURNAL OF


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The Trainingof an Inner Asian NomadArmyThis account is corroborated by Chinese sources as well. The Songenvoy and general Zhao Hung noted that Mongols were born and raisedin the saddle. From spring until winter they spent their days riding and

hunting. In addition, most of them learned how to fight, thus creating anarmy trained in mounted warfare.37Furthermore, from The Secret History of the Mongols, one can learnthat indeed, Temiijin, the boy who would become Chinggis Khan, couldshoot arrows with deadly effect before he attained his majority, asdemonstrated in the murder of his half-brother Bekhtar.38Jochi Qasar,Temiijin's brother, demonstrated his prowess with the bow not only inthat episode, but also during a Tayichi'ud attack. During the latterTemiijin also demonstrated that he rode well enough to avoid capture forseveral days.39In addition to becoming an expert riders as well as horse-archers,Mongol males received constant exposure to shooting a composite bowfrom an early age, enabling them, and indeed all steppe nomads, toacquire the requisite strength to pull and hold the string at full-draw.Referring to Mamlfik and Turkic archers in the Muslim world, J. D.Latham andW. F. Paterson wrote that "Regular practice from boyhood culminated inthe archer's ability as a man to handle bows requiring a pull of 60, 80,and even 100 lbs., to hold them at full draw." They also mentioned thatsome could draw a bow with a 160-pound draw, but this was rare.40Although the Mamlfiks underwent extensive training, much of their abil-ity originated from their previous life on the steppe. The observations ofLatham and Paterson can be applied to nomads of Mongolia as well.Although training began at an early age, formal induction into theMongol military occurred later. Grigor of Akane noted that Mongol cen-suses registered men between the ages of fifteen and sixty as being suit-able for military duty.41 The Chinese source Yuan Shi confirms this butextends the upper age bracket to seventy years old. The basic idea wasthat men served until they were too old to ride or bend a bow in combat.The Yuan Shi also notes that the age of induction usually ranged

37. Zhao Hung,Meng-DaBei-Lu: Polnoe Opisanie Mongolo-Tatar,trans. NikolaiTs. Munkuev (Moscow:NAUKA,1975), 65-66.38. The Secret History of the Mongols, trans. Francis W. Cleaves (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press, 1982), 22-23.39. Ibid., 25-26. The Tayichi'udwere a rival Mongolclan or tribe to the Borjigidfrom which Temiijin, or Chinggis Khan, originated.40. J. D. Latham and W. F. Paterson, Saracen Archery:An English Version andExposition of a Mameluke Workon Archery (London: Holland Press, 1970), xxv.41. Grigor of Akane, "The History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor ofAkanc," trans. and ed. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Stud-ies 12 (1949): 325.MILITARY HISTORY * 631


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TIMOTHYMAYbetween fifteen to twenty years old, depending on the need and numberof men required. Not all men entered the army; some were required tostay at home to tend the herds or oversee appanages of the Mongolprinces.42 In contrast, Michal Biran notes that the armies of Qara Khitaibegan their recruitment around the age of eighteen.43In addition to a mastery of archery and riding, another key element,and perhaps the most important one, was the instillation of discipline inthe otherwise individualistic nomad warriors. As in most of the medievalworld, warfare in the steppes of Mongolia often degenerated into a groupof individuals battling other individuals rather than organized militaryunits combating other organized forces. Indeed, victory often wassnatched away as the apparent winners stopped to plunder and loot thecamp or city of the enemy before assuring final victory. Even great mili-tary leaders such as Salih al-Din, or Saladin (1138-1193), suffered fromthis. At Mount Gisard, near Ramla, in 1177, he was defeated as his armybecame too preoccupied with looting. Then again, he lost at Jaffa as hisarmy did not get an opportunity to plunder.44 Thus, the instillation of dis-cipline into the tribes of Mongolia may have been Chinggis Khan's great-est achievement. Even before his rise to absolute master of theMongolian steppe, Chinggis Khan expected his orders to be obeyed, evenby his relatives. In 1202, while still a vassal of Toghril Ong-Qan, Qayanof the Kereit, Chinggis Khan, or Temiijin as he was known then, made aradical departure from the traditional method of waging war45:when theMongols attacked the Tatars at Dalan Nemiirges in eastern Mongolia, heinsisted that his men wait until after the enemy was defeated rather thanplunder the enemy during the attack. Furthermore, he ordered his mento be prepared to regroup at a designated location rather than dispersingacross the steppe if they suffered defeat; those who disobeyed would suf-fer the consequences:

If we conquerthe enemy, we shall not stop to plunder.If the victoryis complete, that booty will be ours in any case and we will share it

42. YuanShi, trans. Ch'i-QingHsiao, Chapter 98 in TheMilitary Establishmentof the YuanDynasty, 72-91 (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press, 1978), 74.43. Michal Biran, "'Like a Mighty Wall': The Armies of the Kara Khitai(1124-1218)," Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 25 (2001): 53-54. Qara Khi-tai was an empire formed in Central Asia, consisting of much of modern Kazakhstan,Kirghizstan,and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China.Founded by refugees of the Liao royal family after the collapse of the Liao Dynasty in1125, Qara Khitai was ruled by a predominantly Buddhist minority among Muslimtownspeople and shamanistic steppe nomads from 1128 until its collapse in 1218 dueto Mongolexpansion into the region.44. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 79.45. The Kereit were a powerful Turko-Mongol ribal confederation that was cen-tered on the Tula river in Mongolia.632 * THE JOURNAL OF


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- TheTrainingof an Inner Asian NomadArmyamongourselves.If we are forcedby the enemy to retreat,let us turnback to the point where we began the attack. The men who do notturn back to the point where we beganthe attack will be cut down.46

Indeed, Chinggis Khan expected absolute obedience to his com-mands. He desired his followers to put loyalty to him above all other ties,whether familial, clan, or tribal. According to the Persian chroniclerJfizjani, Chinggis Khan declared upon his coronation as Qayan, oremperor, in 1206: "Ifyou are obedient to my mandates, it behooveth that,if I should command the sons to slay the father, you should all obey."47Anecdotes about the discipline of the Mongols are numerous. Thediscipline instilled in the Mongol army permeated Mongolian society.Jfizjain recorded that one could leave a riding whip on the ground andonly its owner would pick it up, no matter how long it had lain there.48But how did they maintain this discipline? Certainly with the greatQayan present, few dared to risk offense, but as the Mongol armiesranged across a continent, they must have been tempted to abandon dis-cipline and to plunder and destroy the paltry forces of a city-state in Rus'or a distant town in China. One of the most commonly held hypothesesis that draconian measures held the troops in check. A perfect exampleof curbing the temptations of the Chinggisid princes while distant fromthe ruler and using the threat of harsh punishment involves an expedi-

46. Igor de Rachewiltz, trans., "The Secret History of the Mongols,"Papers onFar Eastern History 13 (1976): 46-47. (Henceforth, SHM-R ollowed by the year ofpublication in Papers on Far Eastern History.) The Tatars dominated the eastern partof Mongoliaand were constant threats and rivals to the Mongols until Chinggis Khanfinally defeated them in 1202.47. Minhij Siraj Jfizjani, Tabakgat-i-NasiriA General History of the Muham-madan Dynasties of Asia, Including Hindustan; from A. H. 194 (810 A.D.) to A.H.658 (1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals Into Islam, ed. and trans.Henry G. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Corp., 1970), 952-53 (hence-forth, Jfizjaini/Raverty,Tabakat-i-Nasiri); Minhij SiraijJfizjani, Tabaqdt-i-Nasiri, 2vols. (Lahore: MarkaziUrdu Bord, 1975), 2:117. Jfizjani, of course, did not witnessthis. Furthermore, considering that he wrote his chronicle from the safety of Delhi,one must question how accurate this statement is. Nevertheless, it does demonstratethat outsiders or non-Mongols recognized that the discipline of the Mongols and theexpectations of their leaders were quite high. This anecdote is also similarly toldabout Motun, a Xiong-nu prince who directed his bodyguard to shoot whomever hesingled out, without hesitation. He first pointed at his favorite horse and then at hiswife. Those who failed to carry out the order were executed. After he felt confident oftheir obedience and discipline, he eventually pointed out his father, Tumen, theShan-yti or ruler of the Xiong-nu.Without fail, Motun'sbodyguardfired, killing the oldQaYanand thus effectively raisingMotun to the throne. See E. H. Parker,A ThousandYearsof the Tartars (New York:Dorset Press, 1987), 9; and Ying-ShihYii, "TheXiong-nu," 118-50, in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990), 120.48. Jfizjani, Tabaq&t-i-Nasiri,2:181; JfizjfLnt/Raverty,abakat-i-Nasiri, 1078-79.MILITARY HISTORY * 633


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TIMOTHYMAYtion on which Chinggis Khan sent his general Stibedei against the Merkitand Naiman who had fled from Mongolia into what is now Kazakhstan.49He instructed Siibedei to spare his remounts so that they would not beoverworked and become too lean. In addition, he prohibited Siibedeifrom allowing his troops to hunt except in moderation and only in orderto maintain their food supply. Even orders on daily routines were to becarried out in strict obedience. He further instructed Siibedei:do not allow the soldiers to fix the crupperto the saddleand put onthe bridle,but let the horses go with their mouths free. If this orderis issued the soldierswill not be able to gallopon the way. Once youhave so ordered, then whoever transgressesthis command shall beseized andbeaten. Send to Us those who transgressOur commandifit looks that they are personallyknown to Us; as for the many whoare not known to Us, just cut them down on the spot.50

From this command we can determine a few things. The first is thatclearly Chinggis Khan gave his general authority to deal with misconductand that disobedience was considered a serious crime. Second, ChinggisKhan also realized that princes, other relatives, or others who might holdhis favor could undermine the authority of the general in charge of thecampaign by flaunting their own special rank.51Thus, if they did disobeythe general, then they were either to return to Chinggis Khan's orda, orcamp, on their own accord, or one could be sure that a messenger wouldbring the news of the violation to the Qayan's attention. Even after thegreat Chinggis Khan died, princes were unable to usurp the authority ofthe generals.Outsiders confirmed that the Mongols maintained discipline in theranks and among officers with draconian measures. Carpini wrote:Ifanyone is foundin the act of plunderingor stealingin the territoryunder their power, he is put to death without any mercy. Again, if

49. The Naiman and Merkits were primarily Turkic pastoral nomads who livedin Mongoliain the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Merkit-Mongolconflict beganbefore the lifetime of Chinggis Khan, as Yesiigei, Chinggis Khan's father, kidnappedH6'elfin,Chinggis Khan'smother, from her Merkit husband. This would later result inthe Merkitkidnapping B6rte, Chinggis Khan's wife during his youth. The Merkit livedin what would now be part of the Buryat Republic in Russia and northern Mongolia,between Lake Baikal and the confluence of the Selenge, Orkhon, and Tula rivers. TheNaiman, which means "eight"in Mongolian, dominated western Mongoliauntil theirdefeat by Chinggis Khanin 1204. With their defeat, the Naiman led by Giichiiliig andremnants of the Merkit fled from Mongolia nto CentralAsia to escape ChinggisKhan'scontrol.50. SHM-R 1980), 19.51. H. D. Martin,Rise of Chinggis Khan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Uni-versity Press, 1950), 6-7. Martin believes that Chinggis Khan specifically had his sonJochi in mind when he uttered this command as Jochi was fond of hunting and didaccompany Siibedei on this particular mission.634 * THE JOURNAL OF


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- The Training of an Inner Asian Nomad Armyanyonereveals heirplans,especiallywhen heyintendgoing owar,he is givena hundredtripeson hisback,asheavyas a peasant angivewith a bigstick.52

In addition, he noted that in battle, if a few men flee as part of anarban, or unit of ten, and the entire unit does not flee, then all are putto death. If an arban flees and the 100 do not flee, then also all are exe-cuted. Also, if a few members are captured,the rest of the unit must res-cue them.53The key was that they must function as a unit.Valery Aleexev, however, questions the idea that only draconianpunishment maintaineddiscipline in the Mongolarmy:Without doubt, harshness played a role. But in the conditions ofnomadic ife,harshmeasures,f noneotherswereused,couldwelllead to thedisintegrationf militaryunits..... It wouldbe farmorerealistic o presume hat the disciplinen the armyrestedon somedeeply held collective psychology.54

Several possible factors could be involved in Alexeev's idea of col-lective psychologyand its role in the discipline of the Mongolarmy.Oneis simple loyalty.As ChinggisKhan elevated members from all levels ofnomadic society to positions of importance, his followers may haveremained devoted to him out of gratitude and loyalty. In return, theyensured that their own units remained disciplined. Another factor,which is often downplayed,could have been a sense of destiny, since theMongolsthought they were destined to control the world.In the end, the trainingof the Mongolsoldiers (whether ethnic Mon-gol or Turk)produced soldiers whose quality surpassed those of otherstates. Decades afterCarpiniand ZhaoHungwrote their accounts of theMongols,MarcoPolo observed,"Ofall troops in the world those are theywhich endure the greatesthardshipandfatigue,andwhich cost the least;and they are the best of all for making wide conquests of country."55Thus, while it is true that the Mongolsand other Inner Asian warriorswere fine soldiers because of the harshconditions of the steppe, in truthit was the military trainingthat evolved out of hunting in the steppe thatmade them perhapsthe best warriors of the premodern period.

52. Carpini, "Historyof the Mongols,"17; Carpini, "YstoriaMongalorum,"49.53. Carpini, "YstoriaMongalorum,"77; Carpini, "Historyof the Mongols,"33.54. Valery Alexeev, "Some Aspects of the Study of Productive Forces in theEmpire of Chenghiz Khan," 186-87, in The Rulers From the Steppe: State Formationon the Eurasian Periphery, ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles: Uni-versity of Southern CaliforniaPress, 1991), 194.55. MarcoPolo, The Travels ofMarco Polo, trans. Henry Yule, ed. Henri Cordier,2 vols. (New York:Dover Publications, 1993), 1:260-61.