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Page 1: Usable Securit y

USABLE SECURITY

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References

Cranor & Garfinkel, Security and Usability, O’Reilly

Sasse & Flechais, “Usable Security: Why Do We Need It? How Do We Get It?”

McCracken & Wolfe, User Centered Website Development: a Human-Computer Interaction Approach, Prentice Hall.

Theofanos & Pfleeger, “Shouldn’t All Security be Usable”, IEEE Security & Privacy

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People

People are the “weakest link in the chain” of system security.

Even a very usable security mechanism is likely to create extra work from the users’ point of view. It is human nature to look for shortcuts and workarounds, especially when they do not understand why their behavior compromises security.

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Usability and Security

Usability and security are often seen as competing design goals.

Security mechanisms have to be usable to be effective.

Mechanisms that are not employed in practice or that are used incorrectly, provide little or no protection.

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Human Computer Interaction Many website, applications, and

devices have complicated and confusing interfaces.

HCI goal is to improve usability.

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Why HCI?

Competitive advantage. Reduce maintenance cost. Improve productivity. Reduce support cost.

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How?

User-centered design methodology. User testing early and often. Interdisciplinary

Psychology Graphic Design Technical Writing

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Highly Iterative

DESIGN

PROTOTYPE

EVALUATE

READY TO IMPLEMENT

MEET USER SPECIFICATIONS?

NO YES

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User Analysis

Type of users Users are probably not like us. Not

computer professionals. Design the product with user in mind. Determine who the users are may not be

a trivial task. Understand user goals

Design the product the user wants and will use.

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Organization

Content Organization User terminology How users group information

Visual Organization Proximity Alignment Consistency Contrast

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Organization

Navigation How can users effectively find what they

need or do their task.

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User Testing

High fidelity Low fidelity

Computer prototype Paper prototype Paper Prototyping: A How-To Video

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User Testing with prototype Give the user a task Have them think out loud Do not coach Record whether the user was

successful or got confuse Redesign prototype and test on other

users.

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Usable Security

Do user testing of security mechanisms.

Look at the usability of security messages.

Incorporate usable design principles into security mechanisms.

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Problem #5

Incorporating usability and security into the software design process.

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Software Development

Often and security and usability are added at the end of the software development process.

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Human Problem

Current security mechanisms are too complex for many users.

Users may not behave in a way for the security mechanisms to be effective.

Example: Medical staff remained logged in

throughout the day. Circumventing security controls allows efficient patient care.

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Usability Design Goal

Reduce the mental workload to make a security decision.

Is this easier said than done? Example:

Password policies Long passwords More complex passwords Change passwords frequently

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Mental Workload

We do not recall our passwords 100% of the time. We mistype our passwords.

Given a large number of attempts, most users log in successfully.

When the number of allowed attempts was increased from 3 to 9, the percentage of successful logins was increased from 53% t0 93%.

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Awkward Behaviors

Policy “User should lock their computers

screens when they are away from their desks.”

Many users in shared offices do not comply with this policy.

Why? Will my colleagues think that I do not

trust them? Most users prefer to have a trusting

relationship with their colleagues.

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Handheld fingerprint ID Device for Law Enforcement

Shouldn’t All Security Be Usable – page 12

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Social Behavior

People that follow security policies to the letter are described as “paranoid” and “anal” by their peers.

If secure systems require users to behave in a manner that conflicts with their norms, values , or self-image, most users will not comply.

Where a positive culture is in place, compliance can be a shared value and a source of pride.

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Users and security

Do users have to be security experts to use systems securely?

Users must believe that their assets are under threat and that the security mechanism provides effective protection against the threat.

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Security is too challenging Security makes unreasonable

demands on users, system administrators and developers.

Users cannot always tell legitimate email from phishing.

Security devices are difficult for system administrators to configure.

Building secure applications is difficult for developers

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Problem #6

E-Mail Fraud Hides Behind Friendly Face

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Status of Security Today

The security perimeter has expanded Mobile workforce

Laptops Smart phones

We cannot depend upon technology to protect us Firewalls & IPS are limited Hackers are attacking users rather than

network vulnerabilities

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Users’ Goals

Security is not the primary goal of users.

Security must be designed to support production tasks.

Security regulations should not interfere with getting your job done.

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Mental Models for Security Psychological acceptability relies on

mental models for computer constructs, such as a computer “file system” with files stored in folders.

We need similar effective mental models for the user perception of security, trust, and risk.

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Complexity and Usability

As the security mechanisms grow more complex, they become harder to configure, to manage, to maintain, and to implement correctly.

Complexity has the greatest potential to weaken not only usability but also security.

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Empowering the user

We need to make it easier for the user to do the right thing, hard to do the wrong thing, and easy to recover when the wrong thing happens anyway.

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Problem #7

Netcraft Anti-Phishing Toolbar http://toolbar.netcraft.com/

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Security Messages

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms995351.aspx

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Problem #8

Error messages


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