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A Village of States: Preliminary ideas on a world politics thought experiment
2016 International Studies Association annual meeting
Atlanta, Georgia, USA March 16-19, 2016
Kendall W. Stiles
Department of Political Science
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah 84602
Much of mainstream international relations theorizing begins – at least implicitly – with an
image of the state of nature in which individuals are found competing for survival without any
guarantees of mutual support. Enlightenment theorists and contractarians in particular have often
use this thought experiment to explore the emergence of and need for states, the rights and duties
of man, and the nature and proper design of democratic or autocratic governance (Hobbes
1651/1994; Locke 1689/1988; Hume 1777/1987; Rousseau 1754/1978). This approach has
proven remarkably powerful, allowing international relations theorists, particularly in the realist,
neoliberal and English School traditions, to explain why anarchy creates such an important
obstacle to cooperation (Rolf 2014). It also helps clarify why states may be entitled to a certain
degree of freedom and possess the right of self-defense.
Still others have found this model an inappropriate starting point – one that introduces
pernicious or at least unhelpful assumptions and concepts into the international relations debate.
For example, Beitz has found the following problems:
The radical individualism of Hobbes’s state of nature helps to make plausible the prediction
of a resulting state of war because it denies the existence of any other actors (secondary
associations, functional groups, economic institutions, or extended families, to name a few
example) that might mediate interpersonal conflict, coordinate individuals’ actions, insulate
individuals from the competition of others, share risks, or encourage the formation of less
competitive attitudes. (Beitz 1999, 37)
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The second condition is that the units that make up the state of nature must be of relatively
equal power in the sense that the weakest can defeat the strongest. The assumption of equal
power is most obviously necessary for Hobbes’s claim that the state of nature is a state of
war because it eliminates the possibility of dictatorship (or empire) arising in the state of
nature as a result of the preponderant power of any one actor or coalition. (Beitz 1999, 40)
Fundamentally, the state of nature model tends to offer a misleading view of
anthropomorphized states endowed with rights more correctly belonging to individuals.
Individual privacy morphs into a prohibition against foreign intervention; autonomy becomes
self-determination; property rights become territorial prerogatives, and so forth. While these
norms and principles may have a place in world affairs, they derive from something other than
what is implied by the state of nature starting point. More important, many of the rights and
duties of individuals arrived at through state of nature reasoning have no place in international
relations, such as the notion that how one treats oneself is no business of anyone else. While an
individual may possess the right to engage in self-destructive behavior, states may not inflict
harm on themselves without jeopardizing a whole range of rights and duties belonging to
individuals. Likewise, while an individual may be free to consume excessively, even to the point
of jeopardizing his or her health, states cannot be self-indulgent without directly affecting the
well-being of other actors as well as certain members of its polity.
The implication of this brief discussion is that while thought experiments such as the state of
nature can be very useful, this is probably not the best starting point where international relations
is concerned. I propose an alternative, which I call the “village of states” (for now – “village of
households”) that I believe puts theorists on a more promising path. It draws in part from
Aristotelian notions of the polity and Rawls’ concept of the law of peoples, as well as theorizing
about the philosophical place of the nation in international relations (Manent 2013). It also
incorporates insights regarding two-level games and multi-layered politics found in the work of
Putnam (1988).
The Household
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The starting-point for our thought experiment is the household. As described by Aristotle in
Politics, the household is a natural institution, rooted in natural relationship such as husband and
wife, parents and children, household elites and servants and slaves, and so forth. It is expected
to be economically self-sustaining although free to interact with other households (the
presumption is that a non-self-sustaining household would fail and therefore cease to exist:
“…the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to
the whole.” I.2.14). The land it naturally controls is sufficient to generate at least a subsistence
income. Managing the land and expanding its productivity is a core function of the household
(I.3.4). It is also expected to be self-governing to a great degree. Its emergence as a social form is
taken for granted as inevitable since without households people would never be born, nurtured or
mature into adulthood. Without households there would be no politics and so any discussion of
aggregated polities would never happen in the first place (Pangle 1998, 378, 380).
That said, households come in many shapes and sizes. Going beyond Aristotle’s description
of ancient Greek estates, one can imagine households consisting of just one or two individuals –
so long as they can take care of themselves. On the other hand, they might be multi-generational
and even include many extended family members and others who have taken up residence on a
permanent basis. Such agglomerations may include dozens of individuals and generate
considerable economic output. A key point is that households provide a basic social unit – one
step above the individual – that provide a sense of identity and belonging, companionship,
mutual support, and economic and social needs. In due time comparisons will be made to states
(although not in this essay) – a not entirely original notion (Walzer 1983, 12).
Households may also embody a wide range of governing styles, from one consisting only of
healthy adults where all decisions are arrived at by consensus, to the more autocratic and
coercive clan structure dominated by a patriarch or matriarch. The status of household members
in these hierarchical structures vary considerably, with children, the infirm, the disabled and
workers possessing no rights with respect to household decision-making but still having a claim
on the leadership for their sustenance and/or training. Still others, what Aristotle calls
“associations”, “have necessarily some one thing the same and common to all, in which they
share equally or unequally; for example, food or land or any other thing.” (VII.8.2) He compared
them to monarchies in miniature: “The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is
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under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.” (I.7.1; see
also I.3.1) The culture and social relations of households – their very raison d’être – may also be
quite different, ranging from religiously devoted and self-sacrificing arrangements to more
hedonistic and self-indulgent ones. Nothing requires households to be governed democratically
(Beitz 1999, 104). They provide a safe environment wherein members can develop their identity,
enjoy close familial bonds (man’s greatest happiness, according to Rousseau – 1754/1978), learn
crucial life skills and experiment with different systems of government and justice
administration.
Aristotle points out that there may come a point where the lack of virtue in the ruler leads to
a loss of legitimacy of his rule, however. Conversely, a household may decay from lack of virtue
on the part of the subordinates. “For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well?
If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do
his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying
according their various natures.” (I.13.5). In other words, a household made up of individuals
lacking virtue will implode morally. Households – when led wisely – will interact frequently and
in substantial ways and ultimately organize themselves into a polity.
The Village of Households
Let us interrupt Aristotle in his discussion and instead consider a situation in which a number
of households exist in a pre-polity, loosely structured “village”. The village consists of a few
dozen households, each of which fits the description found above, for example, they are self-
sufficient, self-contained and self-governing. They have no interactions with each other and are
possessive of their autonomy and land. Let us also assume that this village is situated in an
isolated part of the planet – perhaps a vast island – and that technology prohibits travel beyond
the area (or is at least as difficult as human inter-planetary travel is in 2016). But travel within
the village is feasible. This is our starting point. With Aristotle, I set aside the question of
whether the formation of these households involved injustices (Pangle 1998, 384) but assume a
clean slate. Justice and norms do not apply: “if men dwell at a distance from one another, but not
so far off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws among them that they should not wrong
each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a state… if they have nothing in common but
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exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state.” (III.b.8-9 – pp. 118-9) This is
analogous to Kant’s “original position” and the pre-state social structures described by Rousseau
(Beitz 1999, 83; Rousseau 1954/1978).
Before moving forward with the implications of this “village of households”, let us consider
some advantages to this thought experiment. Principal among them is the establishment of a
three-tiered social structure, with households as an intermediate institution between individuals
and the larger polity. While individuals are certainly part of the model, they do not interface with
the rest of the system qua individuals, but as members of households. Likewise, while
households exist as natural things, they do not automatically have rules to govern their
interactions with other households. Further, interaction is possible – even likely – but households
might persist in this state indefinitely. This implies that the village begins without a clear moral
framework, other than non-intervention, consistent with Locke and Pufendorf (Beitz 1999, 60,
65; Pufendorf 1688/1934; Locke 1689, 290-5).
At this point I will explore how said village might address questions of justice, security,
cooperation and individual status while still preserving the basic principles of household
autonomy.
Responses to Injustice
The first question might be: what happens when the households and their inhabitants begin to
interact? During the initial period of separation and autarchy, peace will prevail and justice will
be irrelevant (VII.3.8 – p. 265). But inevitably someone will see a plume of smoke rising from a
far-away chimney or hear the cacophony of a hunting party in a distant wood. At this point,
ethics and moral claims become activated (Amstutz 2013, 35). The first question will be whether
the other households represent a threat. One might imagine that households that are living
particularly close to the edge of survival might be the first to erect “no trespassing” signs here
and there along the perimeter of their lands. On the other hand, households that enjoy
considerable wealth might be even more nervous about the possibility that their gold mine or
papaya plantation will be attacked by hungry neighbors and assign some of their members to
stand guard to protect them. All households will likely adopt a defensive posture. These
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defensive position might forestall meaningful interaction as households adopt an autarchic “live
and let live” norm.
Ultimately, though, it seems likely that someone – perhaps even acting on his own and
against the wishes of the other household members – will decide to cross a boundary uninvited
and pilfer something from a neighbor – perhaps apples from a tree. Thus the first claim comes
into being (Amstutz 2013, 35). And claims give rise to demands for justice. I concur with
Aristotle that justice is a virtue and that its pursuit is central to the good life (III.4.16; III.9.15;
III.12.3). Therefore what happens next is critical. The type of justice adopted at by a community
is paramount to their happiness (IV.4.14). But several alternatives present themselves to the
aggrieved party, none of which seems an obvious first choice. The victimized household, once it
becomes aware some harm has been done, may choose to seek redress, probably in the form of
payment for the stolen goods. This form of retributive or retaliatory justice is among the most
elementary in society – psychologists speculate that it could be generically innate since it is
understood even by pre-language infants (Sloan et al. 2012). It is found in legal systems going
back to Antiquity as lex talionis (Hammurabi 2000; Bloch 1984, 66).
It is also possible that the victimized household may seek to ignore the offense, reasoning
that it was not a serious threat to its existence and that this might be the price to pay for being
good neighbors. They may have internalized a system of belief that places mercy above justice.
This also is a type of response found in almost every society going back through time.
Finally, it is entirely possible that the victimized household may opt to not only seek
retributive compensation for the offense but also seek to impose some form of additional
sanction as a way of “teaching a lesson” to the offender. The additional actions may include
some form of “taking” such as a fine or other penalty, a physical injury of some sort, or perhaps
the destruction of something of value to the perpetrator. These actions are also found across time
and space. They help to explain why a thief cannot usually satisfy justice by merely returning the
stolen item or paying for it.
I would argue that the type of justice sought reflects the type of social structures and values
found within households. After all, injustice is a common enough occurrence in the human
experience that one can assume it occurs within each household with some regularity. Where
decisions are made by consensus, it is likely that injustice is addressed proportionately or
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perhaps even forgiven more so than in a hierarchically-structured and coercive household.
Depending on the internal traditions of the victimized household, one approach might be
preferred over others.
Each method of achieving justice might be carried out in one of several ways. For example, it
might be done unilaterally by the victimized household. It is also conceivable that some
collective approach might be attempted, although this will naturally call for the creation of an ad
hoc – or perhaps more enduring – institutional arrangement. Likewise, justice might be sought
publicly or more surreptitiously. This generates fifteen ideal-type methods of responding to
injustice (see Table 1):
Figure One: Ideal-type Responses to Injustice
By varying the three responses along with several dimensions on modalities, we can see that
a wide range of possibilities exists and are not pre-determined by the anarchical nature of the
village.
Some of the labels deserve explanation, although they are mostly intuitive. Imagine that the
victimized household decided to seek an open, public, retributive method of dealing with the
injustice. The household will likely send one or more representatives to the door of the other
household and hand them the functional equivalent of a bill for the pilfered apples. Alternatively,
if it is forgiveness they choose, they might still show up at the other’s door but instead offer a
gift of apples along with a statement such as “we know you took the apple without permission,
but we hold no grudge – and here are some apples to show our good will”. Of course, they might
also arrive at the doorstep with both a bill and a stick to beat the first person who answers the
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door with words such as “let that be a lesson to you!” These methods could also be carried out
covertly. Someone from the household could sneak onto the other household’s land and steals a
bundle of flowers – or perhaps kills the family dog while he sleeps, depending on whether the
justice is retributive or punitive. Conversely, the victimized household members could simply
offer a private prayer in behalf of the perpetrator and leave it at that.
Collective action is far more complex and unlikely in our hypothetical village. Much would
depend on existing traditions and values. Perhaps the victimized household knows that several
others share its traditions and seeks out their cooperation, either publicly (with ad hoc or
permanent arrangements) or privately. The result could be anything from some sort of arbitration
to a religious ritual of absolution to a gangland attack in the dead of night. One might anticipate
that a group of forgiveness-oriented households would rally around a fellow forgiveness-oriented
victimized household and organize a private prayer circle to reinforce their commitment to
forgiveness while still showing respect for other households’ traditions (this might be especially
true if all the other households have a tradition of punitive justice since a public act of
forgiveness might backfire and provoke its own retribution since the perpetrators might feel
somehow wounded by the event). Conversely, where many households have a tradition of
retributive justice, they might favor not just a one-off arbitral arrangement but agree among
themselves to establish some permanent judicial body – albeit one with limited powers in order
to protect each household’s autonomy. Naturally, this could in turn lead to a sort of functionalist
mission-creep that could culminate in a federal government of some sort. But this is difficult to
predict and hinges on many other factors.
Where relations between households is concerned, by far the best method is a collective,
public, retributive approach. Both forgiveness and punitive justice, while perhaps appropriate
and even ideal within the household, are likely to give rise to resentment and future claims.
Although forgiveness may be the most noble strategy with respect to the type of character and
virtue required to implement it, there exists the possibility that those not involved in the decision
but who are affected by it may come to resent the lack of redress. This could lead to the assertion
of a claim in the future – but since the matter was already resolved those with the claim would
find themselves choosing between bad alternatives, namely dropping the matter (albeit without
the sense of cleansing and resolution of the earlier actors) and adopting some tactic such as
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revenge that would be considered unjust by most observers (especially if the previous act of
forgiveness had been public). On the other hand, punitive justice naturally runs the risk of
generating a string of tit-for-tat retribution by those who are offended by the pain inflicted
beyond what was retributive. While private and informal approaches may be efficient and
effective, they do little to establish the rationale for the action or provide a precedent for coping
with future cases. They therefore contribute little to the village’s understanding of right and
wrong. Public approaches, on the other hand, provide an opportunity to explain and justify
actions in ways that might be precedential and educational. This is consistent with Philpott’s
view that forgiveness is only effective where there has been an acknowledgement or the fault, an
apology and some sort of negative consequence for the perpetrator (Philpott 2012).
Promising
Another early form of interaction might involve some limited exchange of goods and/or
services. Imagine one household decided to plant zucchini while another planted tomatoes.
Before long an unwelcome surplus of zucchini and tomatoes is generated (as any temperate-
climate gardener will know). Rather than let them go to waste, the two households might opt to
exchange them. So long as the transaction is synchronized and of a barter nature, no institutional
arrangements or social norms need be created or altered. However, at some point such an
exchange will involve a lag. Zucchinis are usually ripe before tomatoes, to continue our earlier
example, and so it is easy to imagine that the zucchini-growing household will offer its goods
before the tomato-growing household has anything to trade. At this point we find the advent of
the first promise: “I will gladly give you zucchini today in exchange for some tomatoes in the
future.” Aristotle stressed that all forms of exchange should be based on a form of retributive
justice, taking into account the relative amount of labor, capital and other factors of production in
making goods that were to be exchanged (hence the advantage of a monetized economy that
makes the value of things commensurable (Nichomachian Ethics Book V).
At this moment a new type injustice come into being: fraud. While the taking we discussed
earlier involves tangible goods or other existing benefits (including taking from a person’s
reputation and/or status, of course), fraud – whether intentional or inadvertent – involves things
that do not yet exist and is therefore quite different. A promise involves some level of reliance or
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trust on the part of the one receiving the promise (the “promisee”) in that this individual
sacrifices something up front with the expectation that some benefit will be forthcoming
according to some predetermined schedule (Vitek 1993). Failure to make good on a promise
creates a claim on the part of the promisee against the promisor.
Once again, the response can be varied and most likely will depend on the traditions and
values of the household. But regardless of the outcome, the breaking of promises probably will
have a more direct effect on the likelihood of future transactions between households than the
mere act of taking. While one can ward against theft and other offenses with walls and guards,
the best way to prevent fraud is to simply reduce one’s degree of trust in another’s promise
(Baier 1986, Hardin 2002, Cook, Hardin & Levi 2005). This loss of trust will likely lead to more
self-reliance and more wasted zucchini, among other things. It may even lead to a reluctance to
engage in a whole range of collective action, although it could also lead to a strengthening of
collective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms – much depends on the possible gains and
losses involved and the traditions and norms of the various households.
Resolving Injustice and Fraud
Once a principle and a mechanism for addressing injustice and fraud have been selected and
implemented, the next question is simply what happens next. Keeping in mind the anarchical
nature of the village, one cannot be sure how the perpetrator will respond. Even where
forgiveness has been extended, the response may be quite negative and intransigent. As alluded
to earlier, to be forgiven is not always welcome since it involves an assignment of fault and
could cause public humiliation (particularly if those extending forgiveness are smug). More
likely is a scenario in which restitution is demanded or exacted. Depending on the method
selected and the traditions and values of the perpetrators’ household, the result may be anything
from a speedy resolution in which all parties are satisfied and everything get back to normal to
the beginning of a series of vendettas that culminate in a war between households. There is
nothing inherent in the anarchical structure to predict the outcome.
At some point household members may worry about their reputations. Just as a loss of trust
can undermine future transactions, earning a reputation as a wrong-doer can severely limit a
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household’s status and future benefits in the village. They will therefore tend to resist unilateral
assignations of guilt as one-sided and arbitrary, but might also resent a public, collective method
if there is some sense that their side was not given its due. Households that are autocratic and
coercive may feel justified in – or at least accustomed to – answering such slights with
retribution of their own. Perhaps they might even seek a reputation for violence as a deterrent
against future attempts at seeking justice for future wrongs they might commit. This would
naturally be a worst-case scenario for a village populated primarily by forgiveness-minded
households, as it could lead to predatory behavior. It is just this type of situation that most state-
of-nature theorists emphasize – particularly Hobbes – which in turn leads them to call for a
strong central government with the capacity to impose order on the lawless. Alternatively, if
many households share an autocratic, violent tradition, the result might be warfare, most likely
culminating in either imperialism or a balance of power. Without a change in the traditions and
values of most households, this situation could continue indefinitely. In fact, it is possible that
only a wholesale “conversion” of all the large households would stave off this outcome (on the
assumption that they would likely be able to support an attack from a small household).
What of a situation in which justice is not realistic because of the nature of the offense or the
lack of capacity of the perpetrator? Some offenses, such as insults to person or reputation, are not
amenable to retributive justice since they involve something that cannot be easily monetized.
Likewise, if the perpetrator household is extremely poor, it may not be capable of offering fair
compensation for the thing that was taken, be it tangible or not. In such a situation one might be
forced to consider creative alternatives, such as some form of schedule of payments or some sort
of service or other compensation. In the past, debtor’s prison was the norm, although it
sometimes resulted in an excessive punishment for the perpetrator as the debt could never be
paid. On the other hand, modern courts have developed a wide range of monetary equivalences
for various acts of bodily harm. And of course the collective has sometimes acted in behalf of
victims through the means of criminal law, with incarceration as a traditional means of obtaining
justice. In none of these are actors likely to see a restitution of the status quo ante – the
touchstone of justice. But in any of them we might see satisfaction and a willingness on the part
of both victim and perpetrator to carry on.
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The Village and Security
In our earlier case, we considered a situation in which apples were stolen or tomatoes were
not forthcoming as promised. Even in these situations it is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that
violence might be used to redress the injustice as certain households opt for a punitive strategy.
But what of injuries – or even the mere threat of injury – that might cause households to fear for
their survival? Knowing that some households might overreact to a slight, the possibility that
some inadvertent affront could provoke such a response would always be on everyone’s minds –
perhaps especially those with a forgiving and tolerant disposition. I reject Aristotle’s notion that
imperialism is a natural outgrowth of prosperity and the search for the abundant life (he admits it
might be possible for a polity to enjoy happiness in isolation – Pangle 1998, 389).
A natural outgrowth of the existence of self-reliant households is the notion of the right of
self-defense. As we saw earlier, it is likely that households will take action to protect themselves
from possible threats even before they materialize by erecting fences, “no trespassing signs” and
perhaps sentries or even watchtowers. It is difficult to imagine that such actions would be
condemned by any other household, so long as they do not take the form of preparing for
attacking on a neighbor (building passive defenses as opposed to preparing siege weapons, for
example). In the event of some serious encroachment, all households will possess the right to
defend what is clearly theirs.
But what of the different methods which households might apply to rectify an injustice?
Recall the table presented earlier. Some households might adopt a forgiving approach and
appease or even capitulate rather than fight. One implication is that the tolerant and egalitarian
might become hostages to the animus and intemperance of the autocratic and violent, as
mentioned earlier.
Several possibilities emerge, although none is inevitable. First would be conquest. The most
powerful, autocratic household would simply ignore the prohibition against interference and
consume all the weakest households – probably by using some pretext of their having committed
an injustice of some sort. The other households, either out of some exaggerated concern for
violating household privacy or out of simple fear, might choose to sit back and watch. Of course,
even after absorbing households, the conqueror’s task is not done, and it might be a victim of
“imperial overstretch” (Kennedy 1987), prompting rebellion and disintegration.
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More likely, the other households not yet conquered will decide to coordinate a response –
perhaps by clustering around the strongest of their number (perhaps another punitive household
that would be less circumspect) and declaring some form of (minimal) mutual defense. An
unprincipled balance of power might emerge that would shift and change depending on the
evolving threat and distribution of power.
Other possibilities exist, however. Households that have adopted a tolerant and forgiving
normative system internally may reach the conclusion that such an approach is not appropriate in
the event of existential external threats. They might adopt a retributive approach (although
probably not a punitive system since this would be seen as morally bankrupt). The village as a
whole may even develop group norms that support this type of bifurcation. Yet another scenario
might be the formation of some joint defense pact based on a union of tolerant households,
committed to mutual defense on that basis of some principled self-defense. We can see in this the
roots of a “just war” ethic that provides for limited responses to serious injustices (Nardin 2002).
The law of natural selection predicts that passive and disorganized households will probably
cease to exist, assuming the existence of aggressive households. Those that survive will have
rejected this policy with respect to matters of survival, and so the remaining households would
be those that have embraced individual or collective self-defense (Tilly 1990). Hence, a balance
of power or some form of collective security would be a natural outcome with respect to security
matters – although this does not mean all matters of justice will be managed with violence.
The Village and Cooperation
Finally, what does the village of households tell us about the likelihood and form of
cooperation? Because the households are assumed to be self-sufficient, there is no automatic
need for cooperation for the sake of survival. However, as interactions increase we have seen
that some collective system of justice will probably be called for. At a minimum, one would
expect that households would agree to send and receive clearly authorized legates that might
allow them to communicate with some authority. Even hostile households would likely want to
turn to some form of diplomacy if only to issue credible threats to each other. The degree of
sophistication would likely depend on distances between households, the degree to which
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households are thought to be unified, the seriousness of the issue, and so forth. If some dispute
arose surrounding the ownership of a key water source and travel time between households was
several days or weeks, and one of the households had a reputation for being in turmoil, the
formality of the exchange of legates would likely be very high.
These factors would likely influence the form any resulting agreements would take. Again,
whether the households are egalitarian or autocratic, retributive or punitive would matter less
than whether it is clear who can speak for the household and whether this is likely to change in
the near future. As the seriousness, distance and uncertainty increase, households would be more
likely to want to “get it in writing”. A desire to get things in writing would stem less from any
sense that the agreement is “legal” than from a desire to minimize ambiguity for the sake of
future generations of households. At the same time, households may come to agree that these
documents matter in that past commitments should be honored – a basic form of “pacta sunt
servanda” – if only because they involved considerable effort and address serious issues. The
alternative would be a string of meaningless statements of little value beyond mere symbolism,
which most parties would find unacceptable and a waste of time.
In relatively short order, then, we would expect our village to have created some rudimentary
form of diplomacy, treaties and the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, consistent with what
many English School authors call “primary institutions” (Buzan 2004, 174. See also Mayall
1990; Holsti 2002; James 1999).
But what of the administration of justice? It seems likely that there would be considerable
difference of opinion about the best way to proceed on the assumption that households have very
different traditions. Those committed to either punitive justice or forgiveness would probably see
no need for any village-wide formalized mechanisms but would prefer to operate in an ad hoc
fashion. In both cases, the details of the case at hand would matter relatively little and so there
would be no call for independent or impartial fact-gathering to determine the extent of the harm
or claim. While both types of households might seek moral or material support to implement
their system of justice, it seems unlikely that this would need to be institutionalized.
On the other hand, households that stress a retributive approach to justice might be open to a
more formal mechanism, such as a rotating chair or some other method of “taking turns” (this is
consistent with Aristotle’s view of how equals should treat each other – Pangle 1998, 389).
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Chances are they would only find a sympathetic ear from other households that favor retributive
justice, which may not make up a particularly large cohort. But on the chance that the vast
majority of households favor retributive justice – something that might evolve as more and more
households recognize the benefits of not going to the extremes – then the possibility of a village-
wide system of arbitration or even adjudication would become likely. Of course, much effort
would have to be invested in determining the procedural character of such a body since much
would hinge on such things as the rules of evidence, the composition and backgrounds of the
judges, and how a decision would be implemented. Households might want to be able to opt out
of using the panel or limit the scope of its authority to relatively trivial matters that do not
threaten household survival. Likewise they might prefer a body that is merely consultative,
leaving them the freedom of applying the recommendation or not. At any rate it seems the key to
the success of such a body for retributively-oriented households would be the chance to gather
and present all the facts of the case in order to determine what would constitute a fair response.
Anything more than this would likely be seen as a threat to the household’s autonomy.
As households interact and develop, they may find the need to create collective works. Adam
Smith argued that the first three purposes of any political governance structure are security,
justice and public works (Adams 1776/1981). We have already discussed the possibility that
alliances, balance of power and/or collective security are reasonable responses to insecurity. It is
also likely that some rules will emerge to cope with emergencies, whether they be natural
disasters or human-caused accidents. The words of Franklin Roosevelt in explaining the Lend-
Lease program in December 1940 illustrates what I would argue is common human impulse with
respect to decisions regarding rendering aid in such situations:
Suppose my neighbor's home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five
hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may
help him to put out his fire...I don't say to him before that operation, "Neighbor, my garden
hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it."... I don't want $15--I want my garden hose
back after the fire is over. (FDR December 17, 1940)
Given the ubiquity of disasters, and the human impulse and sense of moral responsibility to
rescue those in distress where possible (Singer 2002, 150), I would argue that one of the earliest
forms of village governance would involve some form of relief organization, akin to a volunteer
16
fire department or private ambulance service. Naturally, such an institution would require
considerable structure. I would envision the need to establish an early-warning system as well as
the recruitment and training of volunteers – particularly healthy adults (which would place
unequal burdens on households, depending on their composition). And such arrangements would
naturally require a captain to activate, and her appointment would be a matter of some
controversy. Will the office be an elected one? One based on skills? Will it rotate among the
households? Will there be compensation, and if so, who will cover the cost? It is likely that fears
over excessive encroachment on household autonomy would limit such emergency measures to
only the most essential universal tasks, while most households would take care of more limited
dangers particular to them. So while we could anticipate the creation of a team of hunters to go
into action to fight off a lion or a bucket brigade to squelch a fire, most households would take it
upon themselves to fend off pests and local brushfires.
But what of the demand for public works projects? While most households would do their
best to provide the essentials of what was needed for subsistence (and those that failed would
probably cease to exist), there might come a point when some households – most likely those
governed along egalitarian liberal principles, would be willing to pool their resources to create
some public work that would increase everyone’s productivity and economic security. Irrigation
and water storage are among the most basic tasks societies seek to fulfill, and it would be no
surprise that our village of households might see some advantage to this. Wittfogel (1957) has
pointed out that the rise of government often coincides with the need to regulate water resources.
As soon as the proposal to regulate water is made, however, a multitude of issues arise. Should
this be done through trade? Should the water-rich households simply sell off their surplus? But
what if this would lead to the wasting of water? And what if more water can be captured through
the construction of some reservoir system, the cost of which would be prohibitive to each of the
households? Depending on the answers to these questions and the urgency of the need for water,
the village might opt to invite households to contribute money, materials or manpower to a
water-reclamation and –distribution system. But who would issue such a call? And who would
ensure that sufficient resources are mobilized? Perhaps even more important, who would
administer the arrangement once it is put in place?
17
The village might decide to create an ad hoc planning committee, including representatives
of some or all of the households. Of course, the decision-making procedures would have to be
ironed out: Would the decisions be based on voting or some other system (Expertise? Seniority?
Attractiveness?) And if it comes to a vote, what system would be used? One-household-one-
vote? Votes based on household size or wealth? Votes based on household contribution to the
enterprise? It is not at all clear how such a system would be determined, although it seems likely
that households that are committed to egalitarian decision making at home would favor some
form of voting – and probably one that maximized participation and ownership. On the other
hand, autocratic households might favor a system based on expertise or seniority or physical
prowess. It is very likely that, depending on the number of households committed to one or
another ideal and depending on their relative need or supply of water that the discussions would
simply break down at this point.
But if the households that are most likely to supply the water, labor, materials and funds are
also committed to egalitarian decision-making principles, then the project will likely go forward
along democratic lines (Lipson 2003). Of course, this still leaves open the question of how the
burden will be allocated, how the water will be distributed and how free-riders will be punished.
But so long as the founders remain dominant, the chances of a functional institutional structure
seem promising. On the other hand, if the village is composed of enough autocratic households
that have little to offer and much to demand, then the project will likely fail.
A key element in this story is the degree to which households are willing to engage in risky
behavior and their confidence in others’ willingness and ability to follow through on
commitments. I would argue that households that are rooted in egalitarian and liberal governing
principles routinely engage in this sort of trusting behavior. The opposite is true of autocratic and
violent households. In fact, it may be that the willingness to trust precedes the choice of
governing institution (Rathbun 2012). This is one reason why certain households are more
willing to engage in collective activities.
Individuals in the Village
18
Thus far we have paid little attention to the internal composition and dynamics of the
household, other than to say that some are hierarchical and some are egalitarian and so forth. But
one of the advantages of the village of households as a thought experiment is that it allows us to
understand more clearly how individuals and their rights and duties fit in to the international
system.
To begin, let us ask who has rights within the household. As we have seen, Aristotle assumed
households would be hierarchical – like micro-kingdoms – and that rights would be calibrated to
the status of the member of the household. Fathers would naturally be given full rights of
membership as well as the right to lead. Mothers would have full rights of membership but no
leadership rights. Children would be members without a voice while others would exist to serve
the family, with slaves and livestock occupying essentially the same position. I have relaxed this
archaic assumption and allowed for households that operate without slaves and that grant even
children, let alone adults, a voice in management.
Suppose the village becomes aware that the rights of one of these individuals is being
violated by the members of her household. Let’s say that a child is being beaten to the point of
permanent injury, or let’s say that a wage-earner is reduced to slavery. At this point the village
reaches a key juncture and must ask itself: do those outside the household have any duties or
rights with respect to those who are being victimized? In light of the desire to maintain
maximum autonomy for themselves and out of fear of setting a precedent, the answer will
probably be initially no, with the implication that much injustice will likely be tolerated, so long
as it takes place within the household. This might be true even for cases where there is no doubt
that abuse is taking place and the individual has the capacity to remedy the situation – such as
when a strong, healthy passerby hears screams and threats from inside a nearby home where she
knows an elderly husband and wife live alone. While this will create a moral dilemma for the
individual in question, fear of setting a precedent of uninvited intervention will probably lead to
restraint. This is the tragic implication of the rules governing autonomy and non-intervention.
But imagine two other scenarios. Let us say that one of the children being abused is able to
escape and runs to the nearest neighbor, begging to be let in (see Singer 2004, 156). Does this
create a duty on the part of the household? Alternatively, imagine that children visit each other
from household to household and that while visiting a child is beaten by one of the adults. Is
19
there any recourse? These scenarios naturally hint at modern rules governing asylum on the one
hand and rules governing the treatment of “foreigners” (the so-called “minimum standard”). It is
reasonable to imagine that the claims of the latter would be seen as stronger than the claims of
the former. In other words, when a member of a household is visiting another household there is
an expectation that she will be safe. On other hand, since all are agreed that how one treats one’s
own household members is one’s own business, opening the door is not required.
What might it take for attitudes to shift in our hypothetical village? Perhaps the individual
knocking at the door is actually engaged to a person in that home and so leaving her on the
doorstep would be intolerable. On the other hand, imagine that the individual in question is the
local dealer in stolen goods who has caused harm in the past. Perhaps she is a well-known
trouble-maker who has started brawls in the past. Or maybe the person is a young child or a
senior citizen. Much will depend on how the household values different people’s rights and
status and what type of relationship exists between them. It is reasonable to think that,
particularly if the household is egalitarian and tolerant, at some point someone would appear
who would be granted entry. One can imagine that the more defenseless and vulnerable the
victim, the more likely s/he will be granted some primitive version of asylum.
Once this threshold is crossed (literally), the sanctity of a household’s privacy will be forever
questioned. From this point on, debates will center not on whether individuals have status in the
village but merely how much and under what circumstances. It is unrealistic to think that
households will be forever closed to external scrutiny.
What about our case of the passerby? What duties and rights are now in play? To be sure,
just witnessing such an event is distressing enough that it might generate a claim on the part of
the passer-by against the perpetrator of the domestic violence. But most would see that as a
rather trivial claim. If respect for household autonomy and privacy are truly paramount in the
village, the only ethical response would be to keep walking and let the members of the household
sort out their own troubles. Doing so would certainly reaffirm the precedent should the situation
ever be reversed. Alternatively, the passer-by might surmise that it is only a matter of time before
the domestic violence spills over and becomes a threat to everyone, and so intervention –
whether unilateral or collective – is called for as a precautionary measure. The key question that
will need to be answered is whether the precedent of intervention when one’s own household is
20
not directly affected can be universalized. In other words, the passerby will have to ask whether
he would accept intervention into his own household were the roles to be reversed. And various
households will likely respond differently to this question depending on whether they are
governed through violence or persuasion. If enough of the latter can be found, one might
anticipate the emergence of a very restricted duty to intervene.
The Village and Governance
By now it should be clear that the quality of life in the village of households depends to a
great degree on the internal governance of each household. Injustice and autocracy at home are
likely to create injustice and insecurity in the broader village. This can be addressed with an
alliance of households that are averse to punitive justice or dictatorial decision-making, both for
defense and for joint administration of justice and the provision of collective services. But is
such a village firmly rooted in morality?
To begin, since households are meant to be autonomous, allowing each to govern internally
as they wish is fair and reasonable – by definition. The result is understood to be that some
members of some households will be oppressed and/or abused. To the degree that membership in
a household has inherent benefits, such as basic needs being provided, the other households may
prefer to maintain the system for fear of opening up debates on whether their own governance is
appropriate. But the effects of oppression and abuse begin to radiate from the unjust household,
other households are justified in questioning and challenging the status quo, whether in defense
of their own who happen to stray into the line of fire, as it were, or when innocent and vulnerable
victims seek rescue from the village. To go beyond this, however, would involve a serious
reconsideration of the nature of household privacy and self-government.
Should such a reconsideration take place? So long as the household is the central entity in the
village, the answer must be no. Individuals do not hold the same status as the household.
However, since village life is so heavily influenced and shaped by internal governance
structures, one can imagine another line of reasoning that might result in the justification of a
more interventionist approach. As we have seen, it is reasonable to expect that households that
oppress their own members will be quick to take offense and favor a punitive approach in the
21
administration of justice. They will also likely be less inclined to respect the status and rights of
other households and eschew participation and support for collective activities. In so doing, these
types of households undermine opportunities for other households to enjoy the fruits of their
collective efforts and block village progress and prosperity. This naturally affects whether other
households will achieve their worthwhile aims.
Acting deliberately as a spoiler for collective efforts and creating a feeling of tension and fear
is unjust. While it does not constitute a taking or a breach of promise, it nonetheless results in the
village being less than it could be. The rest of the village therefore has a claim – albeit a weak
one – on households that are threatening or obstructionist, even if they don’t directly harm
anyone. Therefore the village is justified in taking actions to redress the situation, although these
should be limited to steering actions to create incentives for good behavior and penalties for bad.
At their heart, they should preserve the household’s freedom of choice while attempting to shape
its aims. Only in the event of direct aggression or other serious injustice can more coercive
intervention be justified.
That said, if the households that reject punitive justice and autocracy are numerous enough
and prosperous enough, they should move forward with their own more limited systems of
justice and collective action. In doing so they are almost certainly going to achieve many
worthwhile ends and become a model for the non-participating households. This will in itself
create incentives for inclusion, which in turn could be made conditional on internal reforms. In
no way would any of this violate the privacy or autonomy of the non-member household.
Likewise the limited collective could engage in propaganda to encourage internal reforms. Care
should be taken not to foment rebellion, however, since this would constitute a violation of the
household’s rights.
As the cooperating households enjoy increased peace and prosperity, the time may come
when an imbalance of resources and influence emerges between this group and the non-
participating households. Does this inequality constitute an unjust outcome? On one level the
answer is yes, since benefits will accrue to members of certain households and not others, again
for no fault of their own but due largely to the decisions of household elites. For that matter, the
aggregate success of households that participate in collective actions probably stems from the
actions of a few energetic and creative members of the household, so even the elites cannot take
22
all the credit or blame. Much depends on the nature of the specific projects. For example, let us
imagine that the household leaders decide to contribute to the construction of a dam to create a
reservoir, send out a call for volunteers and find just two very strong men step forward and put in
ten hour days for the next year. They end up doing half of the work. The dam is built and the
farms of all the participating households are watered – including those of elderly widows and
others who contributed only token efforts. Let us further imagine that elites in another household
opted out of the activity and are excluded from receiving irrigation water. Such a “club good”
will almost certainly lead in due time to fairly dramatic differences in household prosperity – and
outcome that can be considered just, at least at the outset, but that will almost certainly breed
resentment and envy over the long term and may prompt those who did not participate to make a
claim on those who did.
Furthermore, how will the addition of households that change their minds be carried out? As
mentioned, it is permissible to demand internal reforms as a condition of inclusion in collective
actions, but these standards should not differ measurably from conditions that could describe the
households at the time the structures were instituted. For example, if all the cooperating
households were egalitarian and committed to retributive justice when they came together,
although some have developed a forgiveness model of justice, then it would be unreasonable to
ask new households to commit to a forgiveness ethic as a condition of membership. It would not
be unreasonable, however, to grant the new members fewer powers and less status than the
founders. After all, those who created the collective in the first place undertook considerably
more risk and invested far greater effort than those who joined only after the project was up and
running. Naturally, this may also prompt resentment and claims of injustice, but these would be
baseless. That does not mean that the founders may not elect to extend full membership status
and benefits, but this would flow from prudence and generosity rather than the requirements of
justice.
Is Household Autonomy Justified?
Stepping back for a moment from the thought experiment, it is time to ask whether this set of
arrangements and their implications form a society that is just from top to bottom (Rawls 1971).
At its heart is the question of household autonomy. To what degree is justice served with the
23
elevation of the household as a social unit deserving of these rights and duties? And what are the
consequences to the various members of the village (cui beneficia et cui sumptibus)?
Households are considered “natural” – almost inevitable – units by Aristotle – membership is
a birthright and helps to define the members in turn. Walzer and other communitarians are partial
to this view as well (Walzer 1977, Rawls 1999, Frost 2009). They therefore should enjoy
identity, freedom, security, prosperity, education, etc… At any rate, the elimination of a
household for any reason would be injurious to most people and create heavy burdens on
everyone else. They are the sources and defenders of individual rights since the village has few
institutions to protect them.
But what of household members who live in fear and want because of choices being made by
other household members? What of the minorities or the weak? Do households lose their
legitimacy when they cross a certain line? While households are “natural” social units, they also
exist to serve a particular set of functions: they exist to serve the interests of their members –
especially their physical survival. A “household” is, after all, a social construct at its core – both
in historical reality as well as in this thought experiment – therefore they can be “un-constructed”
(Russett 1972). I argue that households that fail to fulfill the basic purpose of doing what they
can to keep household members alive – especially if the source of the peril stems from deliberate
abuse or neglect – are in danger of losing their privileges.
To begin, if members of a household take steps that will have the predictable result of
seriously undermining the capacity of the household to provide for itself or to retain the loyalty
of its members, the basic purpose of the household is frustrated. In itself, this may be enough to
conclude that the household as presently organized has lost its legitimacy. It does not matter
whether the decisions were deliberate or whether they were driven by greed, foolishness or evil
intent. The village has a stake in every household acting in such a way that, at a minimum, their
own demise is not clearly foreseeable. Obviously, this does not include cases of inadvertent
failure. It also does not cover cases of internal instability or upheaval, or cases of overthrow or
conquest by another household. In those situations, a presumption exists that a household should
be able to reconstitute itself and resume its original functions.
Furthermore, the members of the household have a stake in their household’s survival –
particularly those who are vulnerable and/or powerless. Since they depend entirely on the
existence and functioning of the household, such a situation would give rise to a legitimate
24
claim. The claim would first be lodged with the decision-makers in the household, but could
conceivably be transferred to anyone who had the awareness of and capacity to prevent the
household from collapsing. We can see from both of these scenarios that the village may be
required to take action if a household implodes as a result of profoundly poor, autocratic
decisions on the part of its leadership. More important, since it has an interest in preserving
households, the village may be required to take action to forestall such a scenario.
To be more specific about what constitutes household collapse, two factors come to mind.
First, since the household is productive economic unit, anything that would seriously undermine
its capacity to generate income and/or goods needed for survival should prompt the attention of
the village. This could include failure to water crops for successive seasons, destruction of roads,
ports or other infrastructure, or abuse of workers culminating in their inability to perform.
Second, since a certain minimal degree of household cohesion is almost certainly required for it
to perform basic survival activities, anything that would cause profound disruption in household
dynamics could threaten its survival. For example, abuse or neglect that leads members of the
community to refuse to work – even though they still be capable of working – or such profound
discontent that it prompts members of the household to flee, would constitute profound
disruption that would warrant the attention of the village as a whole.
Finally, rebellion or intrigue that involves a sizeable number of household members could
lead to household paralysis which in turn jeopardize its ability to perform basic functions. In this
last case, the village would have a stake in preserving the household as it is or perhaps stepping
in to assist the rising members. The key is preservation of the household’s basic capacity to
function. It is worth noting that in the event of rebellion, those within the household who suffer
as a result of non-performance would have a claim against the rebels. This would be an
especially difficult claim to satisfy, however, if the rebels seized control of the household. On the
one hand, the rebels would almost certainly indemnify themselves of any blame while on the
other hand the village would probably be loath to impose sanctions that might jeopardize the new
leadership’s capacity to govern. But clearly the victims would be inclined to appeal to the village
for redress, no matter how futile the enterprise.
We can see that there may be many situations that would give rise to a permissive right for
the village to intervene in the internal affairs of a profoundly dysfunctional household – this in
spite of the general rule of non-interference. Also note that this emerges even without appealing
25
to the human rights and/or dignity of the individual. If in addition there emerged in the village
some sense that individuals matter more than households, then the entire foundations of the
system might well be upended. I would argue that this is probably not warranted since a
functioning household will almost certainly serve the basic needs and protect the basic rights of
most household members.
Should such action be warranted, I would argue that the village would still have a duty to
preserve, so far as possible, the identity of the household while taking steps to prevent the abuse
and neglect that precipitated the crisis (Beitz 1999, 95). I would envision some form of
“receivership” or “foster care” for the members of the household until such time as they can
organize their own more ethical governance structures. Thus the ties that bind household
members and their identity as household members – which are admittedly great virtues – would
be preserved.
If more than basic survival rights are at issue, then, as the saying goes, all bets are off.
Consider, for example, the possibility that some household members are denied the opportunity
to express dissent – a rather likely scenario, especially with respect to children in an autocratic
household. While immoral, should the denial of freedom of expression lead to intervention by
the village in the governance of the household? Autocratic households would naturally see this as
an affront to their autonomy while egalitarian and inclusive households would be ambivalent
since they were not under danger of intervention. Perhaps autocratic households would band
together against a coalition (cabal?) of egalitarian households lined up against them (assuming
the latter would be most likely to put forward such a proposition). Then again, such a program
might prompt autocratic households to undertake internal reforms. But the more likely scenario
is that they would refuse to change – and perhaps even turn the tables on the other households by
claiming insult and loss of status. Clearly to demand more than basic survival rights would imply
that the village has prioritize individual over household rights, which would almost certainly lead
to the establishment of some form of legal or democratic “empire” (Alvarez 2009) or degenerate
into civil conflict. At any rate, since the thought experiment has led us to the premise that
households are and have a right to be autonomous, so long as they are not abusing or neglecting
their members, anything that would so dramatically inhibit the rights of households should not
come about without the consent of every household – an unlikely scenario so long as some
autocratic households exist.
26
Final Thoughts
Aristotle’s notion of households, combined with some state of nature assumptions, offers a
more promising avenue for understanding and explaining international relations – especially
international ethics – than do a focus on Aristotle’s philosophy or the state of nature theory
alone. It helps one appreciate the dilemmas of security, the various paths to justice, and the
possibility of cooperation without neglecting the place of the individual. In so doing it points to
promising answers to key questions in international ethics.
While most of the arguments are based on logical inferences, many points could be part of an
empirical research program and could contribute to social science theory of international
relations. For example, arguments about the link between household/nation-state domestic
governance and approaches to inter-household/international justice could be tested against
historical trends and cross-national evidence. Likewise, the origins of cooperation with respect to
security, emergency measure and public works could be studied historically. Finally, the
emergence of individual rights under international law, along with the emergence of primary
institutions, could be part of an historical treatise.
Aristotle imagined the possibility that various polities might ultimately see themselves as
belonging to a “single cosmic community” (Pangle 1998, 390). We have seen that some sort of
multi-household governance could emerge and culminate in the “end of anarchy” as we know it
(Hurd 2008). But such an eventuality seems remote – and perhaps unnecessary if the aim is to
achieve human happiness and justice. But at any rate this “village of states” conceptualization
allow us to imagine how this might arise.
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