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Agenda Regional Fire Services Committee

Monday, June 13, 2016 10:00 a.m.

Conference Room A 4th Floor, City Hall – New Gower St.

AGENDA Regional Fire Services Committee

Monday, June 13, 2016 10:00 a.m.

4th Floor Conference Room A, City Hall

1. Adoption of Agenda 2. Adoption of Minutes 3. Business Arising:

a. Recruitment Report (Verbal: Ms. Sherry Colford)

b. Final Offer Selection Update c. Paradise Station 8 Update d. Negotiations Update (Verbal: Dep Chief Byrne)

4. New Business:

a. Request for decommissioned engine from Town of Normans Cove-Long Cove

b. Northeast St. John’s Fire Station Analysis Report

5. Other Business 6. Adjournment

Minutes Regional Fire Services Committee Thursday, February 4, 2016 11:00 a.m. 4th Floor, Conference Room A, City Hall Present Councillor Andrew Ledwell, Co-Chair Councillor Jonathan Galgay, Co-Chair Deputy Mayor Ron Ellsworth Councillor Bruce Tilley Councillor Sterling Willis, Town of Paradise Neil Martin, City Manager Kevin Breen, Associate City Manager

Derek Coffey, Deputy City Manager of Financial Management Jerry Peach, Director of Regional Fire Services & Fire Chief Don Byrne, St. John’s Regional Fire Department Jason Silver, City of Mt. Pearl Rod Cumby, Town of Paradise Terrilynn Smith, Town of Paradise Gareth Griffiths, Manager of Assessment Division Karen Chafe, Supervisor of Legislative Services

Adoption of Agenda

Moved by – Councillor Willis; Seconded by Councillor Galgay

That the agenda be adopted as presented.

Adoption of Minutes

Moved by – Councillor Tilley; Seconded by Councillor Galgay

That the minutes of December 9, 2015 be approved.

Business Arising Land Expropriation for Paradise Fire Station The Committee considered the following documents in relation to the valuation of expropriated land at 1565 Topsail Road, the site of the new fire station in Paradise. Though the land has been expropriated, there is some dispute about the value and the disparity between the appraisal reports as noted below:

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• Appraisal Report prepared for Mr. Steve Saunders, Future Group Company, prepared by Altus Group re: Vacant Land at 1565 Topsail Road (July 18, 2014) valued at $490,000.

• Appraisal Report on 1565 Topsail Road from Appraisal Associates Limited dated July 29, 2014 valued at $330,000.00.

The City’s Manager of Assessment reviewed both appraisals on behalf of the Town of Paradise and under the auspices of the Regional Fire Committee and determined that the Altus valuation of $490,000 was fatally flawed based on the use of improper sales. It was suggested that another appraisal be conducted, should this matter have to go before an arbitrator. Both the City of St. John’s and the City of Mount Pearl were supportive of this recommendation which is now referred back to the Town of Paradise for their consideration/action. It was estimated that pending this course of action, there should be some resolution within the next few months. Final Offer Selection Update The Associate City Manager updated the Committee on their position presented to the Province with respect to Final Offer Selection. Collective Bargaining Update The Director of Regional Fire Services & Fire Chief updated the Committee on the progress of collective bargaining with the union. Adjournment

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 11:37 p.m. Councillor Andrew Ledwell Councillor Jonathan Galgay Co-Chairpersons

Policy: 07-02-08 Disposal of Decommissioned Assets and Equipment Issued By:Director/Chief SJRFD

Purpose To outline a consistent and equitable method for the disposal of decommissioned apparatus and tools, personal protective equipment, and other equipment as may be identified within the SJRFD.

Background SJRFD strives to follow various standards and guidelines that occasionally result in certain equipment, either in whole or in part, to be disposed of in a fair, efficient and cost effective manner. In order to ensure the Department is not held libel through gifting old and/or decertified equipment, and to ensure a consistent methodology of disposal, it is SJRFD’s position that all decommissioned equipment be sent to a City of St. John’s sanctioned auction when possible. There may be occasions where the Regional Fire Services Committee (RFSC) wishes to “gift” a particular piece of apparatus or equipment to another municipality. This is a new guideline.

Policy Statement Sale 1. All decommissioned fire apparatus and auxiliary small engine equipment will be sufficiently marked as “out of service” and stored at the mechanical facility. All decommissioned firefighting tools, equipment, personal protective equipment, or related emergency response items including clothing, issued items, or other such paraphernalia will be stored in the stock room.

2. The Manager of Mechanical Services will be responsible for following the City of St. John’s Policy outlined in Section 28, Pages 1 and 2, of the “Purchasing Procedures Manual” and thus ensuring all items identified for disposal are collected and sent to auction under the auspices of the City of St. John’s. Gift 3. All decommissioned fire apparatus, auxiliary small engine equipment tools and implements and items of personal protective equipment may be gifted to another municipality or fire department by the RFSC. Such items will be held in appropriate storage until its final disposal is determined by written RFSC directive. SJRFD personnel will assist the RFSC to collect all such items and equipment and make them available for distribution or pick up as appropriate. 4. Under no circumstances will SJRFD personnel offer, or cause to be offered, equipment to either internal or external entities or enterprise without the written consent of the Fire Chief.

Approvals The Director/Chief of SJRFD

Responsibility St. John's Regional Fire Department POG # 07-02-08 Approved By: ___________________________ _______________ Jerry F. Peach Date Fire Chief (Director of Regional Fire & Emergency Services)

Appendix/Appendicies None

St. John's Regional Fire Department

Office of the Fire Chief/ Director

Contents

Introduction 2 The Geographical District 3

Future Development 4

Response Data 5

Neighboring Towns 5

Station Design and Capital Costs 6

Conclusion 9

Recommendation 10

Appendix 11

1

Introduction

The St. John’s Regional Fire Department (SJRFD) has as its primary mandate the obligation to

provide effective and efficient fire protection services for the citizens of the cities and towns

which we serve. As the region in which we protect grows with new development and ever

increasing population expansion, our ability to meet our primary mandate becomes

challenged. As with most modern fire departments in a dynamic urban environment, SJRFD

looks to the accepted industry guidelines and standards represented by the National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA) to successfully strategize for its future.

SJRFD strives to meet the response standards as dictated by NFPA 1710 “ Standard for the

Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical

Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments” and is mostly

successful in that endeavor as evidenced by our perpetual data collection reports on “turn

out time” and “travel time”1. However the district covered by Kent’s Pond Station 6,

continues to be the largest impediment to realizing complete compliance with the

standard. That region remains a burgeoning area of the city where we cannot effectively

respond to residential and commercial emergencies due to the geographic locations and

the traffic (pedestrian and vehicular) congestion we encounter enroute. Attempts to

alleviate this slowed response time average with traffic exemption devices on responding

units - aimed at controlling traffic flow at upcoming intersections - realized very little response

time reduction. The geographic distance from the nearest station is simply too great.

A concern of sending a standard two company compliment into the area, is that Central

Station 1; (whose primary response zone is the downtown core and business district of St.

John’s), provides the logical backup, or “second run” support to Station 6’s obligations in

the north east end of the city, to the Town of Logy Bay- Middle Cove-Outer Cove and

secondary support responses to the Towns of Torbay, Pouch Cove and parts of Portugal

1 Example: Monthly 1710 reports (Appendix A)

2

Cove- St. Philips. This often leaves the entire downtown zone under the protection of other

stations more remotely situated, for extended periods of time.

An additional burden for Kent’s Pond Station 6 is that it is also one of two stations tasked

with primary response to the St. John’s International Airport for declared in-bound aircraft

emergencies. While this agreement has been existence for quite some time, with regular

responses2 from SJRFD, it is highly probable that we will be requested more frequently as

flight volume for SJIAA increases. This adds more work to an already busy station, which will

elongate response times even further as other stations have to travel longer to get to the

center and extreme reaches of Kent’s Pond’s district.

A new fire station for the northeast end of St. John’s has approval for construction to begin

in 20233. However it is for the preceding reasons, supported by the following information,

that we encourage the re-evaluation of that time-frame and shortening of it to a 2018 start.

The Geographical District

As can be seen in the attached mapping4, Station 6 has a very large geographical area to

protect. While the heaviest population density can be found well within the 4-5 minute

response time, there are still a large commercial and residential district well outside the

acceptable time frames for effective response to emergency calls. Consulting published fire

service industry data5 it can easily be seen that if citizens are to expect a reasonable chance

to survive a fire event, and/or experience reduced loss, in their homes or businesses, fire

operations have to take place quite early. True too is the fact that danger to responders and

the potential for fire spread to exposure buildings also increases proportionately with

unchecked combustion.

To add to the challenge of arriving on the scene in a timely manner to both commercial

and residential structures, is the newer types of building construction and materials we are

faced with in both occupancy types. The material used in modern homes and businesses

are mainly mass produced components, made out of lightweight materials held together

with small fasteners and glues which ignite easily, promote flame propagation readily and

fail extremely early6. Combine those properties with the basic design concept of “open

space” in the interiors, furnished with man-made fabrics and finishes that burn faster and

hotter; and we have the final and perhaps most compelling reasons to ensure we lower our

response times by strategically positioning fire stations to increase coverage.

2 SJRFD FDM data indicates response to 24 calls for assistance from SJIAA between 2014-01-01 to2016-03-22 3 City of St. John’s 10 Year Building Plan 4 Appendices B and C 5 Underwriters Laboratory, “Analysis of Changing Residential Fire Dynamics and Its Implications on Firefighter Operational

Timeframes” (Appendix E) 6 ibid

3

Future Development

In February 2012, the Fire Underwriters Survey Risk Management Services audited the St.

John’s Regional Fire Department and the City of St. John’s Regional Water Services. The

resultant report recommended that the region be awarded a One and One insurance

rating, which ostensively helped maintain stable fire and loss insurance rates. However, in

that document there was pointed commentary regarding the future needs of fire stations

within our area.

Quote:

“When considering the future locations of fire halls in the SJRFD Fire Protection Area, the

values shown in Table 2 Summary of Coverage Results, should be considered. The 2

Response Zones receiving the least overall credit are Kent’s Pond and the Goulds.”7

The table referenced was contrived by applying fire industry standard “risk to response”

equations to determine the appropriate response percentages. Kent’s Pond Station 6

achieved only 89% overall response zone credit. This is only slightly better than the worst

score; i.e.: Goulds Station 7 with 83%, which is a composite station with volunteers

responding during evenings and weekends, ultimately resulting in a slower response time

overall.

It is very worthy to note that since the publication of that report, the actual development

statistics for the defined north east region commonly referred to as “Stavanger Drive area”

or more accurately the “Hyde Park” neighborhood indicate that:

There have been 184 new structures built in the selection area since2012.

22 Commercial and 162 residential8.

As well on November 4th, 2013, the City of St. John’s and the Town of Logy Bay-Middle Cove-

Outer Cove entered into a Fire and Emergency Services Agreement whereby SJRFD

became sole provider of primary fire response for the town. That agreement enabled the

City of St. John’s to realize $283,500 toward the operational budget of the SJRFD to date,

with potential for increases as property assessed values rise in the future. As with the CSJ side

of our mutual border, LMO has enjoyed a dramatic upswing in development in that area as

well, with a further expansion of an entire subdivision planned for the near future.

The final piece of development data to apply to this part of the validation of an additional

station in the area, is the well-publicized long term development plans the City of St. John’s

has for a) the northwest side of Torbay Rd., in the Hebron Way commercial zone, and b) the

sub-division presently laid out for construction starts in the area between Stavanger Drive

and the LMO border.

7 RMS Fire Service Review 2012: “City of St. John’s and Mount Pearl Newfoundland”, Page 54. 8 Data from City of St. John’s, L.I.S. Division by email: 2016/02/26 04:00 PM

4

Response Data

In 2013, Opta Intelligence Incorporated, sub-contracted by the Fire Underwriters Survey of

Canada, completed an analysis of the future needs of the SJRFD infrastructure and station

location. They were tasked with applying empirical SJRFD response data gleaned from

actual run times, coupled with future development projects in the St. John’s region, to

accepted industrial standard formulas and equations to arrive at logical conclusions about

the placement of future fire stations. This report was tabled at the RFSC meeting in

December9, 2015.

One of the zones identified as potentially needing a fire station was the northeastern side of

the City of St. John’s. As seen by reviewing the data10, the optimal location of a station for

that area would be relatively close to the site chosen by SJRFD as being very compatible

with its needs for servicing the entire geographical area.

A further comparative study of the mapping supplied by L.I.S. of the City of St John’s11,

indicates that a fire station located around the same area identified, would provide

acceptable response times for first arriving units, as well as acceptable response times for

operationally supportive second due units, to most calls within the areas of responsibility,

including those with contractual obligation considerations. Neighboring Towns

On February 17th, 2016, the author met with town officials of both the Town of Torbay and the

Town of Logy Bay-Middle Cove-Outer Cove (LMO). The main focus of the meetings was to

determine if there was an appetite on either’s part to increase the emergency service

protection levels both currently contract SJRFD to provide. While during the course of both

meetings there was much discussion surrounding our present contractual obligations and

some thought given to future mutual strategy, the end messages were somewhat different.

Town of Torbay

At this point, the Town’s position, as relayed to me by Ms. D. Chaplin, Town Manager, is that

they are completely happy with their current contractual relationship with SJRFD and are

not interested in enhancing that affiliation at this point. However, there is a strong desire to

incorporate more inter-agency training and cooperative exercises in the future to the

mutual benefit of all. When asked directly if there was any contemplation of Torbay

entertaining a negotiation toward entering the Regional Fire Services Board partnership, the

answer was not at this time.

9 Appendix F 10Fire Underwriters Survey: “St. John’s Fire Protection Area Distribution Analysis 2015”, page 32-36 (Appendix D) 11 Appendices B and C

5

6

Town of Logy Bay-Middle Cove-Outer Cove

According to Town Manager, Ms. A. Carruthers, town officials are very aware of the

challenges within the town related to fire protection. A lack of municipal or static water

supplies, a flourishing real estate development of larger homes throughout the town and

the nearest fire station being approximately 4.9 km to the border are all of concern.

However when considering the potential of LMO entering into the RFSC partnership in the

typical configuration with a gross estimate of initial and annual costs, it was thought to be

fiscally prohibitive. In a town with a purely residential tax base for funding, the capital costs

and operational budget obligations associated with a fully staffed fire station, would be

unreasonable. However, there was some conversation around the potential to negotiate

the granting of a parcel of land within the Town’s borders, specifically just inside the

CSJ/LMO border on Snow’s Lane, to build a station. Said land and station would obviously

be owned and maintained by the City of St. John’s and the Regional Fire Services Board,

but it is thought that with negotiation; snow clearing and ice control, as well as grounds

maintenance, may be arranged to be performed by LMO council workers. This would

eliminate some of the annual expense associated with station’s upkeep and operations.

Station Design and Capital Costs

There can always be justifications for building large complex fire stations and emergency

response facilities in certain situations and requirements. In some cases the station could be

multi-purpose and house administrative or logistical support infrastructure. It may be in a

particularly strategically sensitive area requiring extra room for specialized equipment and

apparatus with a supporting staffing compliment, or lending itself to potential expansion

due to community growth. However, for the most part a fire station only needs to be large

enough to safely house and support the staff and apparatus needed to adequately service

the area it has been designated for.

Design

The needs for the area in question can be addressed by a station of a similar, yet smaller,

design to the existing Kent’s Pond Station 6; equipped with a specialized piece of

apparatus which has the ability to carry and use a larger than normal supply of water.

7

Based on a draft design supplied by senior staff of SJRFD, staff of the City of St. John’s were

able to supply the following design/construction cost estimates of building a station suitable

for the area. The concept would lend itself to moderate expansion without building

modification, but if necessary there could be an addition accommodated if future needs

point toward it.

Quote from an email from Mr. Gordon Tucker, Manager of Capital Works and Buildings

Listed below are some very rough figures that we have put together for a reduced in size footprint of a fire

station which would be in line with the information that you have provided below. It should be noted that

this estimate does not include the purchase of land as that could vary depending upon who the owner is

or where it would be located. The estimate to develop the land ie: site servicing, is included but the

number carried is based upon a reasonable lot.

The footprint of the two bay fire station would be 700 sq. meters. We have carried $ 500,000.00 for site

development. The cost to construct the station including site development would be $4400/ m2 for a total

of $ 3,080,000.00. This is considerably less than Paradise due to the site development and the enclosed

mechanical area/high roof. It certainly is worth discussing further and I would suggest that a consultant be

engaged for the exercise. I hope this is useful to you and I am available to discuss further if needed. However, as there is either no ability in the one case or no interest in the other, of

neighboring towns entering into a full partnership with the RFSC, excluding the potential for

a land grant, the entire cost of the project would have to be borne by the existing partners

of the RFSC. While this may seem an inequitable arrangement, there has to be thought

given to the fact that having another station in the region to help absorb the work load of

those stations already regularly committing equipment to calls in the north east end would

be beneficial to all.

Consider:

Paradise Station 8 – will house the only tanker in the region. Tanker 8 has also been

tasked to respond to LMO for structure fires. This means that Engine 8 and Tanker 8

will have to leave Paradise, requiring Mt. Pearl (or alternatively Kenmout) to backfill

Paradise Station 8.

8

Kents Pond Station 6 – would be designated as second response for the new station.

Alternatively the new station would back up Station 6 in its responses to the north

and east sides of its district. This negates the need for Central Station 1 to travel all

the way into the northeast end, leaving the downtown core supported primarily by

West Station 2.

Airborne emergency calls would be handled primarily by eastern most stations,

leaving Kenmount Station 5 and Central Station 1 out of the response protocol.

Having a dual purpose attack tanker which SJRFD would deploy in that station, will

not only actively support our financially viable contracts with our eastern municipal

clients, but also support all municipalities in the region during times of extraordinary

water supply needs.

Costs

The following is a simple estimated breakdown of the costs associated with building, equipping and

staffing a station in the Snow’s Lane/Stavanger Drive area.

Initial Costs Brief details Cost

Fire Station 700 sq m footprint over 2 bays $3,580,000.00

Site development $500.000.00

Engine/Tanker Completely equipped $580,000.00

Land* Unknown Personal Protective Items 6 Breathing apparatus,

16 Firefighting clothing ensemble $ 33,000.00 $ 45,000.00

Total $ 4,738,000.00

Annual Costs

Staffing at 2016 rates of pay 16 staff members, including 25% payroll costs and 25% leave replacement

$2,400,000.00

Building maintenance (based on averaged 2016 Budget allocations in similar sized stations)

$60,000.00

Misc. costs Fuel, tools and equipment mtce, Wellness Fitness program, station uniforms

$ 58,000.00

Debt Service Reconstruction 8% Startup costs over 20 years $372,000.00

Total $2,890,000.00

*costs of land acquisition unavailable.

9

Conclusion

With Paradise Station 8 nearing completion, Kenmount Station 5 in the plans for a long needed upgrade

over the next two fiscal years, the long term development of Galway and Glencrest as well as Kenmount

Terrace still many years away from needing any dramatic enhancement of existing fire protection services,

it is a logical next step to turn our attention to the already overtaxed north east end of St. John’s for

increased fire protection. It has already been agreed to in principal that a station is needed there, as

evidenced with its placement on the 10 Year Building Plan strategy for the City of St. John’s. However, it is

the author’s opinion, supported by accredited fire service industry risk assessment professionals and the

response standards as specified by the National Fire Protection Association, that a new fire station should

be started in the next year to be completed by 2019 and not 5 years hence as originally planned.

The very preliminary discussions held with Ms. Carruthers of Logy Bay-Middle Cove-Outer

Cove held some promise of a potential land grant if it were seen as feasible to move into

the town to build a station to support the region. However, there were no formal talks held

on the subject and other items would need to be discussed as well (i.e.: realignment of the

Stavanger Dr/Snows Lane intersection and possible upgrade of the entire road.). It is worth

noting there may be a relatively short window of opportunity to formally discuss the land

option, as development is at a fast pace in the town. While this is a departure from the

normal methodology of expansion within the RFSC, in these times of financial challenge,

when we are being asked to do more with less, and be innovative in our approaches to

meeting our mandate, it can be argued that entering into this type of land acquisition

arrangement has merit.

The last piece to be formally decided upon is the actual size and staffing compliment for

the new station. Considering its location and tasking profile, with Kent’s Pond Station 6

providing primary support and back-up, it is SJRFD’s opinion that a two bay station of a

similar design and foot-print to the present Station 6 or Brookfield Station 3, with some

reduction of recognized excess space and equipment, would be more than adequate.

One proviso however, is the definitive requirement to either acquire enough land or

construct the station in such fashion as to have the ability to add apparatus or staffing

space should future needs dictate.

Recommendation

It is the recommendation of the St. John’s Regional Fire Department and this author that:

Approval be given to either approach the Town of Logy Bay-Middle Cove-Outer

Cove and negotiate a land acquisition within the town, proximal to the Stavanger

Dr./Hyde Park area, or begin surveying other sites in the same area within city

boundaries, for future station placement.

Approval be given for design work to begin on the new fire station in 2017, pursuant

to the concept as preferred by the City of St. John’s and the SJRFD.

Approval be given for apparatus acquisition, firefighter recruitment and equipment

procurement to facilitate a new station opening in 2019.

Prepared by:

Fire Chief J. F. Peach,

Director of Regional Fire and Emergency Services.

2016-03-29

10

Appendix A

11

Appendix B: KENT’S POND STATION 6 CURRENT RESPONSE TIMES CSJ- L.I.S. Division with data

from SJRFD FDM program.

12

Appendix C: PROJECTED “SNOW’S LANE” STATION RESPONSE TIMESCSJ-L.I.S. Division

13

Appendix D

Excerpt: Fire Underwriters Survey: “St. John’s Fire Protection Area Distribution Analysis 2015”

Page 31. 8.3. Stavanger Drive Area

The response analysis indicates that response to the Stavanger Drive area will likely be in

the >4min – <=6min range or potentially in the >6min range (going north), see Figure 16.

Again these levels of response may be excessive for the types of buildings considering

the Risk Rating times shown in Table 2.

A sample location for a Fire Hall (Fire Hall 9) in this area was provided as can be seen in

Figure 17. The resultant expected effect on response is also shown. It can be seen that

0-4 minute response would be expected in the area.

An optimization was then run using the location-allocation ArcGIS tool. The demand was

to cover the maximum number of properties based on first due response distance which

is derived from Table 2 using the simple Distance/Time relationship provided in this report.

The result can be seen in Figure 18. While this location maximizes based on first due

coverage it should be noted that road speeds have not been considered and as such

further analysis may be needed before this location would be considered. Another optimization was run with the demand of covering the maximum number of

properties based on 3.15km (converts to 4 minute response using the simple

Distance/Time relationship provided in this report). The result is shown in Figure 19. Again,

as above, speeds were not considered. It can be seen that the location is quite

different. The optimal Fire Hall location is very dependent on the service levels demands NOTE:

Quick examination of both Figure 17 and 18 will show that these optimizations indicate the

station should be located in areas that would be challenging to obtaining land. Another

optimization not seen here (Figure 19) indicates the station would be located on the Trans-

Canada Highway just east of the Portugal Cove Road interchange. This is not an option, as

a responding fire engine would be entering a busy twinned highway without access to both

directions of travel.

14

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Analysis of Changing Residential Fire Dynamics and Its Implications on Firefighter Operational Timeframes

page 2

Analysis of Changing Residential Fire Dynamics

Analysis of Changing Residential Fire Dynamics and Its Implications on Firefighter Operational Timeframes Stephen Kerber

There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, different home geometries, increased synthetic fuel loads, and changing construction materials. Several experiments were conducted to compare the impact of changing fuel loads in residential houses. These experiments show living room fires have flashover times of less than 5 min when they used to be on the order of 30 min. Other experiments demonstrate the failure time of wall linings, windows and interior doors have decreased over time which also impact fire growth and firefighter tactics. Each of these changes alone may not be significant but the all-encompassing effect of these components on residential fire behavior has changed the incidents that the fire service is responding to. This analysis examines this change in fire dynamics and the impact on firefighter response times and operational timeframes.

Introduction

There is a continued tragic loss of firefighters’ and civilian lives, as shown by fire statistics [1, 2]. One significant contributing factor is the lack of understanding of fire behavior in residential structures resulting from the changes that have taken place in several components of residential fire dynamics. The changing dynamics of residential fires as a result of the changes in home size, geometry, contents, and construction materials over the past 50 years add complexity to the fire behavior (Figure 1).

NFPA estimates [3] that from 2003 to 2006, US fire departments responded to an average of 378,600 residential fires annually. These fires caused an estimated

annual average of 2,850 civilian deaths and 13,090 civilian injuries. More than 70% of the reported home fires and 84% of the fatal home fire injuries occurred in one- or two- family dwellings, with the remainder in apartments or similar properties. For the 2001–2004 period, there were an estimated annual average 38,500 firefighter fire ground injuries in the US [4]. The rate for traumatic firefighter deaths when occurring outside structures or from cardiac arrest has declined, while at the same time, firefighter deaths’ occurring inside structures has continued to climb over the past 30 years [5]. Additionally, on average firefighters in the United States receive less than 1% of their training on the subject of fire behavior [6]. The changes

page 3


Figure 1: Modern fire formula

in the residential fire environment combined with the lack of fire behavior training are significant factors that are contributing to the continued climb in firefighter traumatic deaths and injuries.

As homes become more energy efficient and fuel loads increase fires will become ventilation limited making the introduction of air during a house fire extremely important. If ventilation is increased, either through tactical action of firefighters or unplanned ventilation resulting from effects of the fire (e.g., failure of a window) or human action (e.g., door opened by a neighbor) heat release will increase, potentially resulting in flashover conditions. These ventilation induced fire conditions are sometimes unexpectedly swift providing little time for firefighters to react and respond.

Background

While the physics of fire development has not changed over time, the fire environment or more specifically the single family home has evolved. Several factors including home size, geometry,

contents and construction materials have changed significantly over the past 50 or more years. Each of these factors will be examined in detail as they pertain to the safety of occupants and the responding fire service.

Home Size Many contemporary homes are larger than older homes built before 1980. Based on United States Census data [7] homes have increased in average area from approximately 144 m2 in 1973 to over 232.3 m2 in 2008. Twenty-six percent of homes constructed in 2008 were larger than 278.7 m2 (Figure 2). In addition to increased area more homes are being built with two stories. In 1973 23% of homes were two-story and that has increased to 56% by 2008. The percentage of single story homes has decreased from 67% to 44% in the same time period (Figure 3).

The larger the home is the more air available to sustain and grow a fire in that home. Additionally, the larger the home the greater the potential to have a larger fire, and the greater the potential hazard

to the responding fire service resources if the proper tactics aren’t utilized. While the average home size has increased 56%, the fire service resources available to respond have not increased proportionally in many areas of the United States. This is emphasized in suburban areas where larger homes are being built but fewer fire service resources are available [8].

The increase in the number of homes with a second story means a potential for more volume above the fire which allows the smoke layer to remain above the fire and allows a longer time for the fire to grow. It also means more above ground areas for the fire service to access for civilian rescue and egress, potentially increasing the chance of injury.

Home Geometry Newer homes tend to incorporate features such as taller ceilings, open floor plans, two-story foyers and great rooms [9]. All of these features remove compartmentation, add volume and can contribute to rapid smoke and fire spread. Commercial building codes require fire and smoke separations to

page 4


Figure 2: Average area of new single-family homes from 1973 to 2008 [7]

Figure 3: Percentage of number of stories of single family homes [7]

limit the impact of the fire on occupants, there are minimal codes requiring compartmentation in single family homes [10].

A trend in new homes is to incorporate taller ceilings and two-story spaces or great rooms [11]. Much like the impact of having a two-story home, taller ceilings create a longer smoke filling time that allow for more oxygen to be available to the fire for it to grow before being surrounded by smoke filled, oxygen deficient air. The heat release rate of a fire slows down significantly once the oxygen

content of the air decreases. Newer homes are being constructed with ceilings taller than the traditional 2.4 m, upwards of 4.3 m to 6.1 m [9]. It is also common for great rooms and open foyers to directly connect the living spaces to the sleeping spaces allowing for smoke generated in the living spaces to rapidly trap potential sleeping occupants.

Another trend in homes is to remove walls to open up the floor plan of the home [12]. As these walls are removed the compartmentation is lessened allowing for easier smoke and fire communication

to much of the home. In the living spaces doors are often replaced with open archways creating large open spaces where there were traditionally individual rooms. Combining of rooms and taller ceiling heights creates large volume spaces which when involved in a fire require more water and resources to extinguish. These fires are more difficult to contain because of the lack of compartmentation. Water from a hose stream becomes increasingly more effective when steam conversion assists in extinguishment,

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without compartmentation this effect is reduced. The simple tactic of closing a door to confine a fire is no longer possible in newer home geometries.

Home Contents

The challenge of rapid fire spread is exacerbated by the use of building contents that have changed significantly in recent years, contributing to the decrease in time to untenable (life threatening) conditions. Changes include:

(a) the increased use of more flammable synthetic materials such as plastics and textiles

(b) the increased quantity of combustible materials

(c) the use of goods with unknown composition and uncertain flammability behavior

Over time home contents have transitioned from being compromised of natural materials to dominated by synthetic materials [13, 14]. Synthetic materials such as polyurethane foam have replaced cotton as the padding found in upholstered furniture. Today more than 95 million kilograms of flexible polyurethane foam are produced in the US, enough to make 140 million sofas [15]. This difference was examined in the early 1980s when oxygen consumption

calorimetry was utilized to measure the heat release rate of furniture. A study led by Babrauskas [16] compared different constructions of upholstered chairs. The cotton padded chair covered in cotton fabric produced a peak heat release rate of 370 kW at 910 s after ignition. The foam padded chair covered in polyolefin fabric produced a peak heat release of 1,990 kW at 260 s after ignition. Both chairs had a very similar total heat released 425 MJ for the natural chair and 419 MJ for the synthetic chair.

Home Construction Materials Another change that has taken place over the last several decades is the continual introduction of new construction materials into homes [17]. The construction industry is continually introducing new engineered products that provide better structural stability, allow for faster construction time and are more cost effective. Additionally, the market for green or environmentally sustainable building materials experienced a growth rate of 23% through 2006 and is expected to continue growing at a rate of 17% through 2011 according to Green Building Materials in the US [18]. The increased market demand for environmentally sustainable products is driving engineered lumber products to

further reduce material mass that could potentially result in even further concern for fire safety in building construction today and in the future. Environmentally sustainable products take into account resource efficiency, indoor air quality, energy efficiency, water conservation and affordability [19]. Life and fire safety are not part of the material selection criteria, while using less material and being more affordable are.

Many home construction materials have changed significantly for numerous reasons such as lack of supply, ease of manufacturing, cost, improved structural or energy efficiency performance, and many other reasons [20]. Home wall linings, structural components, windows and doors are some of the construction materials that have evolved. Table 1 shows some iterations of the evolution.

Evolutions in building materials create changes in the fire environment. How all of these changes compound to impact fire behavior and firefighting tactics is not well understood.

Experimental Series Experiments were conducted to examine the changes in contents and construction materials. Six room fire experiments examined the difference between modern and legacy living room

CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL

LEGACY ---> MODERN

Wall linings Plaster and lath Gypsum board

Structural components Old growth lumber New growth number Wood trusses Engineered I-joists

Windows Single glazed (Wood framed) Double glazed (Vinyl Framed)

Interior doors Solid core Hollow core Composite hollow core

Table 1: Construction material evolutions

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furnishings. Furnace experiments were conducted to quantify changes in wall linings, structural components, windows and interior doors.

Comparison of Modern and Legacy Room Furnishings Experiments

Six fire experiments were conducted to examine the changes in fire development in a room with modern contents versus a room with contents that may have been found in a mid-twentieth century house. The modern rooms utilized synthetic contents that were readily available new at various retail outlets, and the legacy rooms utilized contents that were purchased used from a number of second hand outlets.

Experimental Description — The experiments were conducted in three pairs of living room fires (Table 2). The purpose was to develop comparative data on modern and legacy furnishings. The first four rooms measured 3.7 m by 3.7 m, with a 2.4 m ceiling and had a 2.4 m wide by 2.1 m tall opening on the front wall. The last two rooms measured 4.0 m by 5.5 m, with an 2.4 m ceiling and had a 3.0 m wide by 2.1 m tall opening on the front wall. All sets of rooms contained similar types and amounts of like furnishings. Weight measurements were not taken for the first set of experiments. However, in the second and third set of rooms, all furnishings were weighed before being

placed in the rooms. In the second set of rooms the modern room had a fuel loading of 19.0 kg/m2 while the legacy room had a fuel loading of 22.9 kg/m2. The difference was due to the legacy sofa and chair weighing 47% and 31% more than the modern furniture. In the third set of rooms, both the modern room and legacy room had a fuel loading of approximately 11.2 kg/m2. A similar amount of fuel was in both sets of room experiments however the third set of rooms was 8.4 m2 larger. Each experiment was ignited using a candle placed onto the sofa. An array of 0.8 mm gage Inconel thermocouples was located in each room with measurement locations of every

EXPERIMENT

DESCRIPTION

ROOM DIMENSIONS (M)

FRONT OPENING DIMENSIONS (M)

FUEL LOADING (KG/M2)

1 Modern 3.7 x 3.7 x 2.4 2.4 x 2.1 NA

2 Legacy 3.7 x 3.7 x 2.4 2.4 x 2.1 NA

3 Modern 3.7 x 3.7 x 2.4 2.4 x 2.1 19.0

4 Legacy 3.7 x 3.7 x 2.4 2.4 x 2.1 22.9

5 Modern 4.0 x 5.5 x 2.4 3.0 x 2.1 11.2

6 Legacy 4.0 x 5.5 x 2.4 3.0 x 2.1 11.2

Table 2: Experimental overview

Figure 4: Experiment 1 setup Figure 5: Experiment 1 furniture layout

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Figure 6: Experiment 2 setup


Figure 7: Experiment 2 furniture layout


0.3 m from floor to ceiling. Temperatures were sampled and recorded every 1 s.

The first set of rooms was 3.7 m by 3.7 m The modern room (Experiment 1) was lined with a layer of 12.7 mm painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with carpet and padding (Figure 4). The furnishings included a polyester microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sectional sofa, engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case. The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its right side. The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and a wicker basket on its

lower shelf. The coffee table had six color magazines, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it. The television stand had a color magazine and a 37 inch flat panel television. The book case had two small plastic bins, two picture frames and two glass vases on it. The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys. The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them (Figure 5).

The legacy room (Experiment 2) was lined with a layer of 12.7 mm painted cement board and the floor was covered with

unfinished hardwood flooring (Figure 6). The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sectional sofa, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand. The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its right side. Both end tables had a lamp with polyester shade on top of them. The one on the left side of the sofa had two paperback books on it. A wicker basket was located on the floor in front of the right side of the sofa at the floor level. The coffee table had three hard-covered books, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it. The television stand had a 27 inch tube television. The right front

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corner of the room had a wood toy bin, and multiple wood toys. The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them (Figure 7).

The second set of rooms was also 3.7m by 3.7 m with a 2.4 m ceiling and a 2.4 m wide by 2.1 m tall opening on the front wall. Both rooms contained identical furnishings with the exception of the sofa and the chair. The first room (Experiment 3) had a polyurethane foam filled sofa and chair with microfiber fabric covering (Figures 8, 10). The second room (Experiment 4) had a cotton padded,

innerspring sofa and chair with cotton cover fabric (Figures 9, 11). The contents were similar to those used in the first modern room. The floors were covered in polyester carpet over polyurethane foam padding. The contents included an engineered wood coffee table, two end tables, television stand and book case. The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its left side. The left end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and the right end table had a television remote, candle and vase filled with synthetic rose pedals. The coffee table had four color magazines and a synthetic plant on it. The television stand had a 37 inch flat panel

television. The book case had two baskets and a picture frame on it. The left side of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys. The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the left side walls had a wood framed picture hung on it.

The third set of rooms was larger and measured 4.0 m by 5.5 m. The modern room (Experiment 5) was lined with a layer of 12.7 mm painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with nylon carpet and polyurethane padding (Figure 12). The furnishings included a polyester microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sofa, two matching chairs,

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Figure 16: Experiment 1 and 2 room temperatures Figure 17: Experiment 3 and 4 room temperatures

engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case. The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its left side and two polyfill pillows, one on each side. The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it. The coffee table had three color magazines, a wicker basket and a synthetic plant on it. The television stand had two picture frames and a 32 inch flat panel television. The book case had a plastic basket on it. The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys. The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side

walls had wood framed pictures hung on them (Figure 13).

The legacy room (Experiment 6) was lined with a layer of 12.7 mm painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with finished hardwood flooring (Figure 14). The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sofa, two matching chairs, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand. The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its left side. Both end tables had a lamp with glass shade on top of them and a wicker basket. The coffee table had a wicker basket filled with five books and two

glass vases. The television stand had a 13 in tube television with a plant on top of it. The right rear corner of the room had a wood/wicker toy bin, and multiple wood toys. The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them (Figure 15).

Results — The fire in Experiment 1 grew slowly for the first minute as the candle flame extended to the polyester throw blanket and sofa cushion. At 2 min the fire had spread to the back cushion of the sofa and a black smoke layer developed in the top two to three feet of the room.

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Figure 18: Experiment 3 and 4 heat release rate comparison Figure 19: Experiment 5 and 6 room temperatures

At 3 min approximately one half of the sofa was involved in the fire, the carpet had begun to burn and the hot gas layer was thickening and flowed out of the top third of the room opening. The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 min and 40 s (Figure 16). Time to lashover was indicated by ignition of the flooring just inside the opening of the room as a result of the heat flux from the flames coming out of the top of the opening.

The fire in Experiment 2 also grew slowly in the first minute as the candle flame spread to the cotton throw blanket and sofa cushion. At 5 min the fire involved the arm of the sofa and extended to the curtains behind the sofa. At 10 min the fire had spread to approximately one-third of the sofa. From 10 min to 20 min the fire continued to spread across the sofa and began to develop a hot gas layer in the room. The legacy room transitioned to flashover at 29 min and 30 s after ignition (Figure 16).

Experiment 3 was ignited on the right hand corner of the sofa where the arm, seat and back joined. The fire involved the right 1/3 of the sofa at 3 min and 45 s. The

fire spread to the television stand at 4 min and the left arm of the sofa ignited from radiant energy from the gas layer at 4 min and 16 s. Flames began to come out of the top of the front opening at 4 min and 20 s and flashover occurred at 4 min and 45 s. Room temperature was measured with a thermocouple array placed 0.9 m inside the opening and 1.5 m from the left wall (Figure 17). Flashover was observed at 285 s after ignition. Experiment 4 was also ignited on the right hand corner of the sofa. At 5 min after ignition the fire was still in the corner where it was ignited. By 10 min the fire involved 2/3 of the right arm of the sofa and back cushion and only 1⁄4 of the right seat cushion. At 20 min the fire spread to the second back and seat cushions, and the flames were burning behind the seat cushion and extending 0.3 m above the back of the sofa. The end table and television stand became involved in the fire 30 min after ignition. The room transitioned to flashover at 34 min and 15 s after ignition (Figure 17).

Heat release rate was also measured during Experiments 3 and 4 utilizing

an oxygen consumption calorimeter. Figure 18 shows Experiment 3 peaked at approximately 7.5 MW at 450 s after ignition, while Experiment 4 peaked at approximately 6 MW at 2,200 s after ignition. Both experiments released approximately the same amount of energy over the duration of the experiments. Experiment 3 released 3.2 MJ and Experiment 4 released 3.5 MJ. Experiment 5 was ignited and the fire spread to the sofa cushion and pillow by the 1 min mark. By 2 min the fire involved approximately one-third of the top of the sofa and spread to the lamp shade. At 3 min the top of the entire sofa was on fire and the carpet began to burn adjacent to the sofa. The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 min and 20 s (Figure 19).

Experiment 6 was also ignited on the left side and it spread to the throw blanket and sofa cushion by 1 min. By 5 min the fire involved the left side of the sofa and spread to the curtains burning the left panel away. At 10 min the entire surface of the sofa was burning and by 15 min the fire involved the entire sofa including the underside. The flames reached the

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ceiling but did not extend to the adjacent furnishings. The fire burned down and never transitioned to flashover so it was extinguished at 30 min after ignition (Figure 19).

New Construction Materials

Wall Linings — UL conducted a series of floor furnace experiments to examine modern and legacy construction practices [21]. Two of the experiments compared a dimensional lumber floor system with different protective linings. The first was lined with 12.7 mm unrated gypsum board that is used in most homes. The second was lined with a plaster and lath lining. Both assemblies were identical with the exception of the lining and had the same loading and bearing conditions

The gypsum board protected assembly exceeded the deflection criteria of L/240 at 35 min and 30 s after ignition and the plaster and lath protected assembly exceeded the same criteria at 75 min and 45 s. The gypsum board protective membrane was breached at 23 min and 30 s while the plaster and lath was breached at approximately 74 min.

In many other experiments conducted at UL that utilize gypsum wallboard to line walls for room fire experiments like those described in Section 4 it is observed that the gypsum wallboard fails at the seams. As drywall compound is heated it dries and falls out exposing a gap for heat to enter the wall space and ignite the paper on the back of the wallboard and the wood studs used to construct the walls. Gypsum wallboard also shrinks when heated to allow gaps around the edges of the wallboard. Plaster and lath does not have the seams that wallboard has and therefore does not allow for heat penetration as early in the fire. This change in lining material allows for easier transition from content fire to structure fire as the fire has a path into void spaces.

Structural Components — Engineered floor products provide financial and structural benefits to building construction; however, adequate fire performance needs to be addressed as well. Statistics from 2005 [22] highlight the amount of lightweight construction materials that are on the market.

According to the National Association of Home Builders, 46% of single family home floor systems are being built with engineered I joists, 15% with wood trusses and 39% with lumber joists. Adequate fire performance provides a necessary level of safety for building occupants and emergency responders responsible for mitigating fire incidents. Previous research by various organizations, including UL, NIST [23, 24], NFPA [25] and National Research Council Canada [26], provided evidence of the greater risk in structural failure of engineered floor systems in fire events.

In 2008, UL conducted a series of experiments on a standard floor furnace [21], exposing unprotected wood floor systems to the standard time temperature curve (Table 3). Loading consisted of 195.3 kg/m2 along two edges of the floor to simulate the load from furniture and two 136 kg mannequins that simulated firefighters in the center of the floor. Two unprotected floor systems compared a modern / lightweight floor system compromised

STRUCTURAL ELEMENT

TYPE

CEILING

ALLOWABLE DEFLECTION L/240 (MIN:SEC)

FIRE FIGHTER BREACH (MIN:SEC)

2 x 10 joist floor Legacy None 3:30 18:35

Wood I joist floor Modern None 3:15 6:00

2 x 10 joist floor Legacy Lath and plaster 75:45 79

2 x 10 joist floor Legacy Gypsum wallboard 35:30 44:40

Wood I joist floor Modern Gypsum wallboard 3:30 26:43

Metal gusset truss floor Modern Gypsum wallboard 20:45 29

Finger joint truss floor Modern Gypsum wallboard 24:00 26:30

Table 3: UL study experiment description and collapse times [21]

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Figure 20: Window experimental setup. Figure 21: Windows after the experiment (middle window was modern)

of 0.3 m deep engineered wood I joists to a legacy/dimensional lumber 2 by 10 floor system. The engineered I joist floor collapsed in 6 min while the dimensional lumber collapsed in 18 min and 35 s. In the same study two truss floors were tested with a protective layer of 12.7 mm gypsum wallboard, one test had metal gusset plated trusses and the other had. finger jointed trusses. They both failed in less than 30 min as compared to the dimensional lumber test with the same protection of 12.7 mm gypsum wallboard, which failed in approximately 45 min.

This study clearly highlights the inferior structural performance of lightweight structural components under fire conditions. Engineered wood floor assemblies have the potential to collapse very quickly under well ventilated fire conditions. When it comes to lightweight construction there is no margin of safety. There is less wood to burn and therefore potentially less time to collapse. The results of tests comparing the fire performance of conventional and modern construction will improve the understanding of the hazards of lightweight construction and assist

incident commanders, company officers and fire fighters in evaluating the fire hazards present during a given incident, and allow a more informed risk–benefit analysis when assessing life safety risks to building occupants and fire fighters.

Windows — With increased fuel loads in houses the amount of air available to allow a fire to grow has become the limiting factor and therefore very important. How long it takes for a residential window to fail has not been extensively examined. Most of the previous research has dealt with commercial windows or windows impacted by wildland fires [27]. The object of this series of experiments [28] was to evaluate the reaction to fire of six different window assemblies, by means of fire endurance experiments with the furnace temperatures controlled in accordance with the time–temperature curve presented in the Standard, ‘‘Fire Tests of Window Assemblies,’’ UL 9, 8th Edition dated July 2, 2009 [29]. Fire performance experiments were conducted to identify and quantify the selfventilation performance of windows, comparing legacy to modern, in a

fire event prior to fire service arrival (Figure 20). Different window construction parameters assessed include:

1. Wood frame and vinyl frame construction

2. Single and multi-pane designs

3. Single and multi-glazed designs Modern windows are defined as windows that are able to be easily purchased new and that are typically found in houses constructed after the year 2000. The legacy windows used in these experiments were purchased used and are meant to be representative of windows that would be found on houses built between the years 1950 and 1970 (Table 4).

There were a number of different window failure mechanisms and degrees of failure observed during the experiments. In order to have an impact on the fire growth there has to be a passage for air to enter the structure, therefore the failure of interest was the breaking out of the glass as opposed to the cracking of the glass. Failure is defined

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DESIGNATION

TYPE

TYPE

SIZE (MM) WIDTH(M) X HEIGHT(M) / GLASS THICKNESS

A Wooden frame, two pane, single glazed, storm Legacy 0.8 x 1.2 / 2.4

B Vinyl clad wood frame, two pane, double glazed Modern 0.8 x 1.4 / 2.2

C Wood/metal frame/nine pane over one pane, single glazed Legacy 0.7 x 1.5 / 2.9

D Premium plastic frame, two pane, double glazed Modern 0.7 x 1.4 / 2.2

E Plastic frame, two pane, double glazed Modern 0.7 x 1.4 / 2.2

F Premium wooden frame, two pane, double glazed Modern 0.7 x 1.4 / 2.3

Table 4: Window experiment sample descriptions

WINDOW [MM:SS(SEC)]

EXPERIMENT

A(L)

B(M)

C(L)

D(M)

E(M)

F(M)

1 6:34 (394) 4:24 (264) 11:49 (709) 3:58 (238) 5:16 (316) 3:39 (219)

2 10:06 (606) 4:38 (278) 14:30 (870) 3:39 (219) 4:26 (266) 5:49 (349)

3 12:11 (731) 3:56 (236) 16:00 (960) 5:05 (305) 5:55 (355) 4:02 (242)

AVERAGE 9:37 (577) 4:19 (259) 14:06 (846) 4:14 (254) 5:12 (312) 4:30 (270)

Table 5: Window failure times

as a passage through the window of 25% or more of the total glass area. In most cases this was the failure of the top or bottom pane(s) of the window but in some cases the top window sash moved downward, opening the window 25% or more. The two legacy windows with single glazing failed later than the four modern windows with double glazing (Figure 21). The two legacy windows failed at 577 s and 846 s respectively while the modern windows failed at 259 s, 254 s, 312 s, and 270 s respectively (Table 5). These experiments demonstrated a significant difference in legacy and modern windows exposed to fire conditions. In this series of experiments the legacy single glazed windows outperformed the modern double glazed windows in terms of longer failure times.

It is proposed that this occurred for two reasons. First the legacy windows had thicker glazing than the modern windows. The legacy windows had glass thicknesses of 2.4 mm and 2.8 mm, while the modern window thicknesses were 2.2 mm. Second, the method the glass was fixed into the frame differed greatly between the two eras. The legacy window glass was held in place with putty like substance and there was room in the frame for expansion of the glass. The modern glass was fixed very tightly into the frame with an air tight gasket and metal band, to provide better thermal insulation. This configuration did not allow for much expansion and therefore stressed the glass as it heated and expanded.

Interior Doors — Much like structural components, doors have been changed from a solid slab of wood to an engineered approach where doors are made hollow to use less material. To examine the impact of this change on fire resiliency three different interior door designs were exposed to the panel furnace following the temperature curve specified in ‘‘Positive Pressure Fire Tests of Door Assemblies,’’ UL 10C, 2nd Edition dated January 26, 2009 [30].

Different door construction parameters assessed include:

1. Hollow and solid core construction; and

2. Different wood types (Figure 22)

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Figure 22: Door samples prior to testing. Figure 23: Door samples after the test

DOOR

EXPERIMENT HOLLOW OAK HOLLOW COMPOSITE SOLID 6-PANEL

1 5:12 (312) 5:15 (315) 5:02 (302)

Table 6: Door failure times

Figure 24: Fire service timeline

There was only one door failure experiment conducted and the failure times are shown in Table 6. Failure was defined to have occurred when the unexposed surface of the door sustained burning. All of the doors failed at approximately 300 s (Table 6). There was very little difference between the two hollow core doors (1 and 2). The fire ignited the unexposed side and quickly consumed what was left of the door. The solid core door (3) had a similar failure time but the mechanism was different. Door 3 burned through at the panels because of their reduced

thickness. The thicker portions of the door remained intact at the termination of the experiment (Figure 23). This experiment shows the fire containment ability of interior doors during a well-ventilated compartment fire is approximately 5 min. For the doors evaluated in this experiment it can also be concluded that the type of wood had no noticeable impact on failure time.

The doors evaluated in this experiment demonstrated that the type of wood had no noticeable impact on failure time. The failure time was dictated by the thickness

of the door. The hollow core doors had the same overall wood thickness as the panels of the solid core door and therefore the fire breached them at very similar times. Without the panels cut into the solid core door it would have lasted substantially longer as indicated by the amount of wood remaining in the post test analysis of the door.

Impact on Firefighting Operational Timeframes The most significant impact of the changing residential fire environment on firefighting tactics is the dramatic shift of

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YEAR

INCIDENT COUNT

AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME

2006 42,584 6.2

2007 49,664 6.5

2008 50,775 6.6

2009 49,386 6.4

Table 7: Average fire department response times

Note: Fires in homes >$10,000 in value with >$1 in loss

Figure 25: Fire service timeline example Figure 26: Modern versus legacy fire timelines

the safe operational timeline for the fire service. The operational timeframe for the fire service begins with their arrival on scene and ends when the fire is placed under control (Figure 24). To compare the modern and legacy fire environment it is important to examine the time prior to fire department arrival.

The time t1, depends upon a number of factors such as when the fire is detected after initiation, and the time to call for fire service assistance. This time can vary greatly depending on the source of ignition, item ignited, presence of occupants, presence of fire protection devices and many other factors.

The time t2, is the time for the 911 operator to call the appropriate fire station to respond. The US national standard NFPA 1221 [31] define the maximum value for t2 as 60 s.

The time t3 is the time it takes for the firefighters to get onto the fire apparatus and respond. As per NFPA 1710 [32] this equals 60 s to begin the response.

The time t4 is the time it takes for the firefighters to drive to the scene of the fire. Following NFPA 1710, the goal for fire emergency response is to arrive at the scene within 4min after the 911 call is made. That is, t2 +t3 +t4 <6min. Following NFPA 1720 [33], the goal for fire emergency response is to arrive at the scene within 9 min in an urban area (~384 people/km2), 10 min in a suburban area (192 people/km2 to 384 people/km2), 14 min in a rural area (~192 people/ km2) and directly related to driving distance for remote areas greater than 8 miles from the closest fire station. Therefore t2 + t3 + t4 < 11 min to 16 min.

Analyzing the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) database yields a very consistent average fire department response time to one and two family detached homes (Occupancy Code 419 in NFIRS) in the United States. Table 7 shows an average response time (t2 + t3 + t4) of approximately 6.4 min from 2006 to 2009.

Some international comparisons of fire department response times are available. In 2006, the average response time to dwelling fires in England was 6.5 min [34]. A report comparing residential fire safety in several countries states, ‘‘Response time goals in Sweden and Norway are more lenient than in the United States. The Scandinavian nations require the first responding unit to arrive in 10 min, versus a goal of 6 min in the typical United States city. Scandinavia generally gives more weight to prevention and early extinguishment by homeowners, less to rapid response’’ [35]. A report written by a German Fire Officer in 2004 examined response times in Europe by contacting country officials and asking them questions about their acceptable response times and conducting an internet search. Many countries such as Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Sweden had acceptable urban response times of 10 min and response times to suburban or rural areas of 15 min to 30 min [36].

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EXPERIMENTS MODERN LEGACY

1,2 3:40 29:30

3,4 4:45 34:15

5,6 3:20 Not Achieved

Table 8 Comparison of flashover times

Conservatively assuming the fire is noticed quickly and the fire department is called quickly t1 could be 2 min. Using the average response time for the US fire service, the operational timeframe would begin at 10 min (Figure 25).

To compare modern and legacy fires as they pertain to the operation timeframe, times to flashover can be added to the respective times to collapse. Times to flashover were taken from the room fire experiments in Section 4. The modern room flashed over in 3:30 to 4:45 and the legacy room flashed over in 29:30 to 34:15. The unprotected modern floor system (Engineered Wood I joist) collapsed in 6:00 (Table 3), and adding a layer of gypsum board increased the collapse time to 26:43. The unprotected legacy floor system (Dimensional Lumber 2 by 10) collapsed in 18:35, and adding a layer of plaster and lath increased the collapse time to 79:00 (Figure 26).

Discussion

There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes, increased synthetic fuel loads and new construction materials. The larger the home is the more air available to sustain and grow a fire in that home. Additionally, the larger the home the greater the potential to have a larger fire,

and the greater the potential hazard to the responding fire service resources.

Combining of rooms and taller ceiling heights creates large volume spaces which when involved in a fire require more water and resources to extinguish. These fires are more difficult to contain. This also means shorter escape times for occupants as the egress routes may be compromised earlier due to lack of compartmentation. Comparing the experiments, times to flashover are very similar between the three modern experiments and the three legacy experiments (Table 8). All of the modern rooms transitioned to flashover in less than 5 min while the fastest legacy room to achieve flashover did so at in over 29 min. In these three sets of experiments legacy furnished rooms took at least 700% longer to reach flashover. Even though the third modern room was 8.4 m2 larger and had a 1.3 m2 larger front opening a similar fuel load was able to flash the room over in the same time. The 4.0 m by 5.5 m legacy experiment did not transition to flashover because it did not have enough fuel burning at the same time to create significant heat in the upper gas layer to ignite items that were not adjacent to the sofa. The chairs on the left side of the room and the television and bookcase of the right side of the room were never

heated to their ignition temperatures. The modern rooms and the legacy rooms demonstrated very different fire behavior. It was very clear that the natural materials in the legacy room released energy slower than the fast burning synthetic furnished modern room. The times to flashover show that the a flaming fire in a room with modern furnishings leaves significantly less time for occupants to escape the fire. It also demonstrates to the fire service that in most cases the fire has either transitioned to flashover prior to their arrival or became ventilation limited and is waiting for a ventilation opening to increase in burning rate. This difference has a substantial impact on occupant and firefighter safety. This change leads to faster fire propagation, shorter time to flashover, rapid changes in fire dynamics, and shorter escape times.

Four examples of new construction materials were examined; wall linings, structural components, windows and interior doors. The change in wall linings now allows for more content fires to become structure fires by penetrating the wall lining and involving the void spaces. This change allows for faster fire propagation and shorter times to collapse. The changes in structural components have removed the mass of the components which allows them to collapse significantly earlier. In these experiments an engineered I joist floor

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Figure 27: Fire service arrival times versus fire development

system collapsed in less than 1/3 the time that the dimensional lumber floor system collapsed. Modern windows and interior doors fail faster than their legacy counterparts. The windows failed in half the time and the doors failed in approximately 5 min. If a fire in a closed room is able to get air to burn from a failed window, then it can burn through a door and extend to the rest of the house. This can lead to faster fire propagation, rapid changes in fire dynamics and shorter escape times for occupants as well as firefighters.

Using the conservative value of 10 min as the start of the operational timeframe and comparing it to the modern and legacy fire timelines shows the hazard that the modern fire environment poses to firefighters. It also highlights that the operational timeframe begins after potential flashover. In many cases this means that if sufficient ventilation is available the fire will spread significantly prior to fire service arrival. If sufficient ventilation is not available the fire will become ventilation limited and be very sensitive to initial fire service operations. The potential for fast fire propagation, and rapidly changing fire conditions should be expected in the modern fire

environment while arriving at 8 min to a legacy fire, it would still be in the growth stage and less volatile.

Looking beyond fire development and to collapse further hazards are highlighted. In the modern fire environment, after arriving at 8 min, collapse is possible as soon as 1:30 later. Firefighters may not be in the house yet or may be just entering to search for occupants. The legacy fire collapse hazard begins 40 min after arrival of firefighters. This allows for a significant amount of fire operations to take place all while reading the safety of the structure. Figure 27 shows the standard response times for different types of fire departments and the location on the fire development timeline that they arrive in both the modern and legacy fires.

The conditions that firefighters are going to be faced with today and into the future have been significantly impacted by the ever changing fire environment. As society continues to make changes to building materials as a result of the desire to be environmentally conscience and to increase profit the fire environment is going to continue to change and if the current trends continue it will not be in favor of firefighter safety. Therefore it

is important that firefighters study this new fire environment and its impact on their safety and tactics. The first component of this is understanding the conditions they are arriving to are very different than several generations ago. Fire conditions can change rapidly due to the under ventilated fire conditions and floor systems can collapse quickly and with little warning. While operating conditions need to be constantly monitored to understand the impact of the tactics used and the potential need to change them. Ultimately, if the fire environment has changed tactics need to change or be reevaluated to have the greatest opportunity to be most effective on today’s fires.

Suggestions for Future Research Research should be conducted to examine the impact of changing fuel loads in full-scale structures especially how it pertains to fire service operations. The impact of ventilation is key to this fire development as well. Experiments need to focus on fire department tactics to make sure that they are still relevant with this evolving fire environment.

page 18


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http://www/

Fire Underwriters Survey A Service to Insurers and Municipalities

St. John’s Fire Protection Area Distribution Analysis

2015

SJRFD FPA

2015-06-17

Notice of Confidentiality

This document contains confidential and proprietary information (the “Information”) of SCM – Opta

Information Intelligence and has been prepared for the sole purpose of a Fire Insurance Grade

Update review. The Information contained herein is disclosed on condition that it will be used solely in

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to, transmit or transfer the Information to any third party without SCM – Opta Information Intelligence’s

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St. John’s Regional Fire Department P a g e | 1

Table of Contents

1. SCOPE OF OUR ENGAGEMENT ............................................................................................. 3

1.1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ..............................................................................................................................3

1.2. DISTRIBUTION OF USE..............................................................................................................................3

1.3. RELIANCE AND LIMITATION ......................................................................................................................3

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................................................................................... 4

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE .......................................................................................................... 5

4. FIRE UNDERWRITERS SURVEY ............................................................................................ 10

4.1. FIRE INSURANCE GRADING CLASSIFICATIONS .........................................................................................10

4.2. PUBLIC FIRE PROTECTION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM ...............................................................................10

4.3. DWELLING PROTECTION GRADING SYSTEM ...........................................................................................11

5. PROJECT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 13

5.1. PROJECT OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................13

6. COMMUNITY RISK AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT ................................................................. 14

6.1. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................14

6.2. MEASURING FIRE RISK ...........................................................................................................................14

6.3. REQUIRED FIRE FLOWS ..........................................................................................................................14

7. RESPONSE ASSESSMENT..................................................................................................... 17

7.1. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................17

7.2. 2014 INCIDENT ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE MODEL ...............................................................................19

7.3. RESPONSE ASSESSMENT – FIRE UNDERWRITERS SURVEY ......................................................................21

8. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 30

8.1. GALWAY/GLENCREST DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................................30

8.1.1. Glencrest Industrial Area ........................................................................................................30

8.1.2. Galway Development ..............................................................................................................31

8.2. KENMOUNT TERRACE AREA ...................................................................................................................31

8.3. STAVANGER DRIVE AREA .......................................................................................................................31

8.4. GOULDS AREA .......................................................................................................................................31

Tables and Figures

Table 1 FUS Grades Correlation to Commonly used Insurance Terminology and Simplified Grades .......................................................................................................................................................................12

Table 2 Fire Underwriters Survey - Table of Effective Response ...........................................................24

Figure 1 SJRFD - Distribution of Required Fire Flow Points .....................................................................15

Figure 2 SJRFD FPA – Required Fire Flow points .......................................................................................16

Figure 3 Fire Propagation Curve (source NFPA) .........................................................................................18

Figure 4 Incidents 2014....................................................................................................................................19


Figure 5 Actual Travel Time vs Theoretical Travel Time ...........................................................................20

Figure 6 Grouped Comparison of Actual Time vs Theoretical Time ......................................................21

Figure 7 FUS Distribution of Response Assessment ..................................................................................22

Figure 8 Approximate Road Travel Time to Closest Fire Hall ..................................................................23

Figure 9 2014 SJRFD Incidents........................................................................................................................26

Figure 10 Average Actual Response Time by Grid to 2014 Incidents....................................................27

Figure 11 Theoretical Response to RFF points ...........................................................................................28

Figure 12 Average Theoretical Response Time by Grid............................................................................29

Figure 13 Overlay of Glencrest Industrial Area on Theoretical Response Map ..................................33

Figure 14 Approximate Galway Development Area ..................................................................................34

Figure 15 Approximate Kenmount Terrace Area .......................................................................................35

Figure 16 Stavanger Drive Area......................................................................................................................36

Figure 17 Theoretical Response to RFF Points with Fire Hall 9...............................................................37

Figure 18 Theoretical Response to RFF Points with First Due Distance Optimized Fire Hall ...........38

Figure 19 Theoretical Response to RFF Points with 3.15km Distance Optimized Fire Hall..............39

Figure 20 Goulds Area ......................................................................................................................................40

Figure 21 Goulds Area Optimizations ...........................................................................................................41


1. Scope of Our Engagement

St. John’s Regional Fire Department (SJRFD) contracted the services of Opta Intelligence Services Inc. (formerly

IAO) – Fire Underwriters Survey to provide optimization analysis, considering specific options, for Fire Hall coverage

within the SJRFD Fire Protection Area.

1.1. Acknowledgement

Opta Information Intelligence LP wishes to thank St. John’s Regional Fire Department (SJRFD) and City of St. John’s

staff for their valuable assistance in the preparation of this report.

1.2. Distribution of Use

This report, along with the findings and conclusions, contained herein, is intended for the sole use of St. John’s

Regional Fire Department (SJRFD) to assist in the public fire protection planning needs of the community.

Judgements about the conclusions drawn, and opinions presented in this report should be made only after considering

the report in its entirety. This report is Private and Confidential and is intended for the exclusive use of St. John’s

Regional Fire Department (SJRFD).

You may not copy, sell, reproduce, distribute, retransmit, publish, modify, display, prepare derivative works based on,

re-post or otherwise use any of the Report Content, in any way for any public or commercial purpose without the

express written consent of Opta Information Intelligence Inc. and Fire Underwriters Survey.

1.3. Reliance and Limitation

We have relied on the general accuracy of information provided by stakeholders without independent verification.

However we have reviewed this information for consistency and reasonableness. The accuracy of our conclusions is

dependent upon the accuracy and completeness of this underlying data. Therefore, any discrepancies discovered in

this data by the reader should be reported to us and this report amended accordingly, as warranted.


2. Executive Summary Saint John’s Regional Fire Department (SJRFD) is experiencing growth within its Fire Protection Area (FPA) and as

such needed to review coverage levels provided from the current 7 Fire Halls. This report provides GIS based

analytics on current coverage levels and expected levels of response to proposed development areas.

The first stage of this study was to update the risk assessment for the Fire Protection Area. GIS data was provided by

the City which was used to determine if additional development had been added since previous studies. This

assessment provides a relative risk level to buildings considered for response. Required Fire Flow methodology was

used to determine the risk ratings.

Once the risk assessment was complete, GIS was used to determine the current expected levels of response provided.

Historical response data from the SJRFD was used to validate the expected response levels. The expected response to

each building was mapped and divided into 2 minute response time intervals for easier graphical analysis. This helped

to identify longer response time areas in the FPA which are discussed throughout this report.

While limited data is currently available on the proposed Galway development (including road network and access to

the area) this study show that expected response may be greater than 4 minutes which is in excess of the current

SJRFD performance measurement (see NFPA 1710 – Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire

Suppression Operation, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire

Departments). Additionally similar levels of expected response are seen in the Kenmount/Terrance area.

The current levels of coverage to the Stavanger area of the FPA were also reviewed. Again, response times greater

than 4 minutes are expected which is also what is currently being experienced by SJRFD. Various options and

optimization analyses for an additional Fire Hall were reviewed and the resultant effect on expected times provided.

Finally optimization analysis was used to review the current location of the Goulds Fire Hall.


3. Terms of Reference

Term Definition

Aerial Fire Apparatus. A vehicle equipped with an aerial ladder, elevating platform, aerial ladder platform, or water tower that is designed and equipped to support fire fighting and rescue operations by positioning personnel, handling materials, providing continuous egress, or discharging water at positions elevated from the ground.

Aid - Automatic Aid A plan developed between two or more fire departments for immediate joint response on first alarms. This process is accomplished through simultaneous dispatch, documented in writing, and included as part of a communication center's dispatch protocols.

Aid - Mutual Aid Reciprocal assistance by emergency services under a prearranged plan. This is part of the written deployment criteria for response to alarms, as dispatched by the communications center.

Basic Fire Flow The benchmark required fire flow for a community, typically the fifth highest calculated required fire flow of all areas within the community. The Basic Fire Flow is the benchmark against which all protective facilities are measured.

Building Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy.

Building area The greatest horizontal area of a building above grade within the outside surface of exterior walls or within the outside surface of exterior walls and the centre line of firewalls.

Building height The number of storeys contained between the roof and the floor of the first storey. Built Environment Buildings and structures: human-made buildings and structures, as opposed to natural

features.

Combustible A material fails to meet the acceptance criteria of CAN4-S114, “Determination of Non- Combustibility in Building Materials.”

Commercial Lines Insurance A distinction marking property and liability coverage written for business or entrepreneurial interests (includes institutional, industrial, multi-family residential and all buildings other than detached dwellings that are designated single family residential or duplex) as opposed to Personal Lines.

Community - Major or Large An incorporated or unincorporated community that has: • a populated area (or multiple areas) with a density of at least 400 people per square kilometre; AND • a total population of 100,000 or greater.

Community - Medium An incorporated or unincorporated community that has: • a populated area (or multiple areas) with a density of at least 200 people per square kilometre; AND/OR • a total population of 1,000 or greater.

Community - Small An incorporated or unincorporated community that has: • no populated areas with densities that exceed 200 people per square kilometre; AND • does not have a total population in excess of 1,000.

Company A group of members that is (1) under the direct supervision of an officer or leader; (2) trained and equipped to perform assigned tasks; (3) usually organized and identified as engine companies, ladder companies, rescue companies, or squad companies; (4) usually operates with one piece of fire apparatus (pumper, ladder truck, elevating platform, rescue, squad, ambulance); and (5) arrives at the incident scene on fire apparatus or assembles at the scene prior to assignment. The term company is synonymous with company unit, response team, and response group.


Demand Zone Levels An area used to define or limit the management of a risk situation. A demand zone can be a single building or a group of buildings. It is usually defined in terms of geographical boundaries, called fire management areas or fire management zones.

Detached Dwelling Buildings containing not more than two dwelling units in which each dwelling unit is occupied by members of a single family with not more than three outsiders, if any, accommodated in rented rooms. Aka. One- and Two-Family Dwelling

Dwelling Protection Grade (DPG)

The fire insurance grade or grades utilized by Personal Lines Insurers in Canada. The DPG is a number between 1 and 5 that is calculated by comparing the fire risk in terms of require fire flows to available resources. Unlike the PFPC system, within the DPG system, the benchmark required fire flow is a constant, and is typical for a Detached Dwelling. The DPG for communities across Canada is determined from a basic survey of the available resources related to fire risk reduction and fire protection capacity.

Dwelling, Typical Refers to One- and Two-Family Detached Dwellings: - with no structural exposures (buildings with an area exceeding 9.3 sq.m) within 3 m; - with no unusual fire risks (such as wood shake roofs); AND - with an effective area (all storeys excluding basements) not exceeding 334 sq.m (3,600 sq.ft).

Emergency Dispatch Protocol A standard sequence of questions used by telecommunicators that provides post-dispatch or pre-arrival instructions to callers.

Emergency Incident Any situation to which the emergency services organization responds to deliver emergency services, including rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical care, special operations, law enforcement, and other forms of hazard control and mitigation.

Emergency Response Facility (ERF)

A structure or a portion of a structure that houses emergency response agency equipment or personnel for response to alarms. Examples of ERFs include a fire station, a police station, an ambulance station, a rescue station, a ranger station, and similar facilities.

Emergency A condition that is endangering or is believed to be endangering life or property; an event that requires the urgent response of an emergency response agency.

Engine A fire department pumper having a rated capacity of 2840 L/min (625 Igpm) or more. Exposing building face That part of the exterior wall of a building which faces one direction and is located

between ground level and the ceiling of its top storey or, where a building is divided into fire compartments, the exterior wall of a fire compartment which faces one direction.

Exposure The heat effect from an external fire that might cause ignition of, or damage to, an exposed building or its contents.

Fire Apparatus A fire department emergency vehicle used for rescue, fire suppression, or other specialized functions.

Fire Department Vehicle Any vehicle, including fire apparatus, operated by a fire department.

Fire Department A fire department is a group of persons formally organized as an authorized service of a municipal or other local government having a sustainable source of funding, which could include taxation, fees for services provided, contracts, permit fees or other reliable sources of revenue which will support the cost of services provided. A minimum number of trained persons able and equipped to respond with motorized fire fighting apparatus to extinguish fires or to respond to other classes of circumstances which may occur within a designated geographical area.

Fire Department. - Public Fire Department

A legally formed organization providing rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical services, and related activities to the public.

Fire Force, Available A measure of the human resources that are available to participate in fire fighting operations on the fire ground or an equivalent measure.

Fire Force, Required A measure of the human resources that are needed to participate in fire fighting operations on the fire ground (or an equivalent measure) for an ideal response based on the required fire flow, number of companies and average response time as specified in the Table of Effective Response.


Fire Flow The flow rate of a water supply, measured at 20 psi (137.9 kPa) residual pressure that is available for fire fighting.

Fire Growth Potential The potential size or intensity of a fire over a period of time based on the available fuel and the fire’s configuration.

Fire Hall An "emergency response facility" where fire department apparatus and equipment are housed, protected against harm, and made readily accessible for use in emergencies. The Fire Hall is normally the location where fire fighters respond from. Other primary purposes include training and administration of the fire department.

Fire Hydrant A reliable connection to a water main for the purpose of supplying water efficiently and reliably to fire hose or other fire protection apparatus. To be recognized for fire insurance grading purposes, the device shall be designed and installed in accordance with CAN/ULC S520, UL 246 and/or AWWA C502/C503 and listed for use as a fire hydrant by UL and/or ULC.

Fire Hydrant – Public A fire hydrant situated and maintained for public use on a public right-of-way (or easement) to provide water for use by the fire department in controlling and extinguishing fires. The location of a public fire hydrant is such that it is accessible for immediate and unrestricted use by the fire department at all times. Public fire hydrants are owned and maintained by the government entity (ex. city, village, etc.) which is responsible for maintaining the hydrants and water supply distribution system in operating condition at all times and is authorised to levy taxes to fund the operation and maintenance programs.

Fire Hydrant – Private A fire hydrant located on privately owned property, or on streets not dedicated to public use. Although a private fire hydrant may be connected to a public water supply system, maintenance of the hydrant and access to the hydrant are the responsibility of the property owner. Private hydrants are normally required where buildings are so located on the property or are of such size and configuration that a normal hose lay from a public hydrant would not reach all points on the outside of the building.

Fire load (as applying to an occupancy) The combustible contents of a room or floor area expressed in terms of the average weight of combustible materials per unit area, from which the potential heat liberation may be calculated based on the calorific value of the materials, and includes the furnishings, finished floor, wall and ceiling finishes, trim and temporary and movable partitions.

Fire Protection Methods of providing fire detection, control, and extinguishment. Fire Suppression The activities involved in controlling and extinguishing fires.

Fire suppression includes all activities performed at the scene of a fire or training exercise that expose fire department members to the dangers of heat, flame, smoke, and other products of combustion, explosion, or structural collapse.

First Responder (EMS) Functional provision of initial assessment (airway, breathing, and circulatory systems) and basic first aid intervention, including CPR and automatic external defibrillator (AED) capability. A first responder assists higher level EMS providers.

First Storey The uppermost storey having its floor level not more than 2 m above grade Grade (as applying to the determination of building height) The lowest of the average levels of

finished ground adjoining each exterior wall of a building, except that localized depressions such as for vehicle or pedestrian entrances need not be considered in the determination of average levels of finished ground.

Hazard The potential for harm or damage to people, property, or the environment. Hazards include the characteristics of facilities, equipment systems, property, hardware, or other objects, and the actions and inactions of people that create such hazards.

Hazardous Material A substance (solid, liquid, or gas) that when released is capable of creating harm to people, the environment, and property.

Incident Commander. The person who is responsible for all decisions relating to the management of the incident and is in charge of the incident site.

Incident Management System (IMS)

An organized system of roles, responsibilities, and standard operating procedures used to manage emergency operations.


Such systems are also referred to as incident command systems (ICS). Initial Attack An aggressive suppression action consistent with fire fighter and public safety and values

to be protected. Initial Attack Apparatus Fire apparatus with a permanently mounted fire pump of at least 250 USgpm (950 L/min)

capacity, water tank, and hose body whose primary purpose is to initiate a fire suppression attack on structural, vehicular, or vegetation fires, and to support associated fire department operations.

Ladder Company A fire department company that is provided with an aerial fire apparatus and is trained and equipped to support fire fighting and rescue operations by positioning personnel, handling materials, providing continuous egress, or discharging water at positions elevated from the ground.

Ladder Truck An alternate name for Aerial Fire Apparatus. Master Stream A portable or fixed fire fighting appliance supplied by either hose lines or fixed piping and

that has the capability of flowing in excess of 300 USgpm (1140 L/min) of water or water

based extinguishing agent.

Member A person involved in performing the duties and responsibilities of a fire department, under the auspices of the organization. A fire department member can be a full-time or part-time employee or a paid or unpaid volunteer, can occupy any position or rank within the fire department, and can engage in emergency operations.

Mobile Water Supply (Tanker) A vehicle designed primarily for transporting (pickup, transporting, and delivery) water to fire emergency scenes to be applied by other vehicles or pumping equipment.

Non-combustible A material that meets the acceptance criteria of CAN4-S114, “Determination of Non- Combustibility in Building Materials.”

Non-combustible construction The type of construction in which a degree of fire safety is attained by the use of non- combustible materials for structural members and other building assemblies.

Non-combustible Material A material, as defined in NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapours when subjected to fire or heat. Materials reported as non-combustible, when tested in accordance with ASTM E 136, Standard Test Method for Behaviour of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, are considered non-combustible materials.

Officer Officer - Company Officer A supervisor of a crew/company of personnel.

This person could be someone appointed in an acting capacity. The rank structure could be either sergeant, lieutenant, or captain.

Officer - Incident Safety Officer An individual appointed to respond or assigned at an incident scene by the incident commander to perform the duties and responsibilities of that position as part of the command staff.

Officer - Supervisory Chief Officer

A member whose responsibility is above that of a company officer, who responds automatically and/or is dispatched to an alarm beyond the initial alarm capabilities, or other special calls. In some jurisdictions, this is the rank of battalion chief, district chief, deputy chief, assistant chief, or senior divisional officer (UK fire service). The purpose of their response is to assume command, through a formalized transfer-of-command process, and to allow company officers to directly supervise personnel assigned to them.

One- and Two-Family Dwelling

Buildings containing not more than two dwelling units in which each dwelling unit is occupied by members of a single family with not more than three outsiders, if any, accommodated in rented rooms.

Optimum Level of Fire Protection

The combination of fire fighting staff and apparatus that delivers a suppression effort commensurate with the fire demand faced, yet representing the most efficient use of resources in a safe and effective manner.

Peak Fire Flow All buildings and building groups within a District or Municipality, the highest calculated required fire flow.

Personal Lines Insurance Insurance covering the liability and property damage exposures of private individuals and


their households as opposed to Commercial Lines. Typically includes all detached dwellings that are designated single family residential or duplex.

Personal Protective Clothing The full complement of garments fire fighters are normally required to wear while on emergency scene, including turnout coat, protective trousers, fire-fighting boots, firefighting gloves, a protective hood, and a helmet with eye protection.

Personal Protective Equipment Consists of full personal protective clothing, plus a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and a personal alert safety system (PASS) device.

Public Fire Department An organization providing rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical services, and related activities to the public.

Public Fire Protection Classification

The fire insurance grade or grades utilized by Commercial Lines Insurers in Canada. The PFPC is a number between 1 and 10 that is calculated by comparing the fire risk in terms of require fire flows to available resources. The PFPC for communities across Canada is determined from an extensive survey and analysis of the fire risk in the built environment and the available resources related to fire risk reduction and fire protection capacity.

Public Fire Service Communications Center

The building or portion of the building used to house the central operating part of the fire alarm system; usually the place where the necessary testing, switching, receiving, transmitting, and power supply devices are located.

Public Safety Answering Point A facility in which 9-1-1 calls are answered. Pumper Fire apparatus with a permanently mounted fire pump of at least 750 USgpm (2850 L/min

or 625 Igpm) capacity, water tank, and hose body whose primary purpose is to combat structural and associated fires.

Quint Fire apparatus with a permanently mounted fire pump, a water tank, a hose storage area, an aerial ladder or elevating platform with a permanently mounted waterway, and a complement of ground ladders. The primary purpose of this type of apparatus is to combat structural and associated fires and to support fire-fighting and rescue operations by positioning personnel-handling materials, providing continuous egress, or discharging water at positions elevated from the ground.

Required Fire Flow The rate of water flow, at a residual pressure of 20 psi (138 kPa) and for a specified duration, that is necessary to confine and control a major fire in a specific building or group of buildings which comprise essentially the same fire area by virtue of immediate exposure. This may include as much as a city block.

Storey That portion of a building which is situated between the top of any floor and the top of the floor next above it, and if there is no floor above it, that portion between the top of such floor and the ceiling above it.

Wildland/Urban Interface The line, area, or zone where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels.


4. Fire Underwriters Survey Fire Underwriters Survey is a national organization that represents more than 85 percent of the private sector property

and casualty insurers in Canada. Fire Underwriters Survey provides data to program subscribers regarding public fire

protection for fire insurance statistical and underwriting evaluation. It also advises municipalities if they desire to

review the current levels of fire defence in the community and provide direction with recommendations where

improvements will enable them to better deal with fire protection problems.

Fire Underwriters Survey offices maintain data from surveys on fire protection programs throughout all municipalities

across Canada. The results of these surveys are used to establish the Public Fire Protection Classification (PFPC) and

Dwelling Protection Grade (DPG) for each community. The PFPC and DPG is also used by underwriters to

determine the amount of risk they are willing to assume in a given community or section of a community.

The overall intent of the grading systems is to provide a measure of the ability of the protective facilities within a

community to prevent and control the major fires that may be expected to occur by evaluating in detail the adequacy,

reliability, strength and efficiency of these protective facilities.

4.1. Fire Insurance Grading Classifications

Public Fire Protection Classification:

The PFPC is a numerical grading system scaled from 1 to 10. Class 1 is the highest grading possible and Class

10 indicates that little or no fire protection is in place. The PFPC grading system evaluates the ability of a

community’s fire protection programs to prevent and control major fires that may occur in multifamily

residential, commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings and course of construction developments.

Fire Underwriters Survey also assigns a second grade for community fire protection, referred to as the Dwelling

Protection Grade (DPG), which assesses the protection available for small buildings such as single-family dwellings. Dwelling Protection Grade:

The DPG is a numerical grading system scaled from 1 to 5. One (1) is the highest grading possible and five

(5) indicates little or no fire protection is provided. This grading reflects the ability of a community to handle

fires in small buildings such as single family residences.

4.2. Public Fire Protection Classification System

The Public Fire Protection Classification grading system is a measure of a community’s overall programs of fire

protection. The ability of a community’s fire defences are measured against recognized standards of fire protection

relative to fire hazard and the fire/life safety risk present within the community. The following areas of fire

protection are reviewed in the survey and have the following weights within the PFPC grading system:

Fire Department 40%

Water Supply 30%

Fire Safety Control 20%


Fire Service Communications 10%

The above classifications are conveyed to subscribing companies of Fire Underwriters Survey. FUS subscribers

represent approximately 85-90% of the fire insurance underwriters in Canada. Subscribers use this information as a

basis in their fire insurance underwriting programs to set limits in the amount of risk they are willing to assume within

a given portion of a community, and to set fire insurance rates for commercial properties. Improved fire protection

grades may result in increased competition for insurance underwriting companies to place their business within a

community. Our analysis indicates that an improved fire protection grade has a positive effect on fire insurance rates.

In addition, PFPC classifications are a measure of the level of fire protection within a community. Many progressive

communities use the classification system to assess the performance of their fire protection programs, and to plan the

direction of fire protective services for the future of the community.

It should be noted that PFPC Grades do not apply beyond 5km road response distance from a recognized Fire Hall.

Ideal response distances for application of the PFPC system are 2.5km. Beyond this the PFPC grade is increased by 1.

4.3. Dwelling Protection Grading System

Dwelling Protection Grades are based on a 1 to 5 grading system; DPG 5 indicates little or no fire protection being

available. Most small and midsize communities that have a gradable emergency water supply are assigned a DPG 3A

rating, which the insurance industry has termed fully protected. DPG 3B refers to communities, or portions of

communities, that have a recognized fire department but are not protected with a recognized water supply. The

insurance industry has termed this ‘semi-protected’. Within the Fire Underwriters Survey grading, a grade of 3B

indicates that the fire department is equipped, trained, prepared and adequately staffed to provide “Standard Shuttle

Service” to a fire event within a reasonable response time (i.e. utilize a pumper, tender and various related equipment

to deliver water to a fire site and provide structural fire fighting at the fire event).

The protected assignment refers to DPG 1 to DPG 3A. An unprotected designation refers to DPG 5. DPG 3B and 4

are given the semi-protected designation. The lower the DPG assignment is, the larger the discount given in fire

insurance rates. The discounts given for an identical property considered fully-protected over those considered

unprotected can be approximately 60%. Where there is sufficient population and sufficient taxation base, the savings

generated can more than offset the operating and capital costs of an effective fire service.

Many insurers have simplified the Dwelling Protection Grading system to a simple three tier system. This is typical for

setting insurance premium rates for detached single family residences only.

Different insurers utilize the Dwelling Protection Grades differently to set their own rates based on the marketplace

and their own loss experiences. The three tier system that is typically used by many insurers is shown in Table 1 FUS

Grades Correlation to Commonly used Insurance Terminology and Simplified Grades.


Table 1 FUS Grades Correlation to Commonly used Insurance Terminology and Simplified Grades

Fire Underwriters Survey Dwelling Protection Grades

System Used by Many Insurance Companies “3 tier” system

Insurance Companies typically refer to this grade as

1 Table I Fully Protected, Career 2 Table I Fully Protected, Composite 3A Table I Fully Protected, Volunteer 3B1 Table II Semi–Protected, (Shuttle) 4 Table II or III Limited–Protection, Volunteer 5 Table III Unprotected

The fire insurance industry has minimum requirements that communities must meet in order for their fire protection

program to receive recognition.

It should be noted that DPG Grades do not apply beyond 8km road response distance from a recognized Fire Hall.

1 Note that communities qualifying for Dwelling Protection Grade of 3B may also be able to achieve an equivalency to 3A through Superior Tanker Shuttle Service Accreditation.


5. Project Scope and Methodology

5.1. Project Objectives

This Fire Hall location analysis provides comment on the expected effects of future development within the St. John’s

Regional Fire Department Fire Protection Area. Additionally current coverage levels are established and excessive

response areas identified. The coverage parameters used are mainly based on the level of property fire risk within the

community.

The following was completed as part of the analysis:

Update the risk assessment layer used from previous studies using provided address and zoning data.

Provide current coverage analytics and maps for the area.

The following items will be discussed.

Item Scenario

Item 1 The proposed Galway and Glencrest development is considered and

comments provided concerning distribution of Fire Department facilities

This is a high level overview as limited data is available on the proposed

development.

Item 2 The proposed Kenmount/Terrace development is considered and

comments provided concerning distribution of Fire Department facilities.

This is a high level overview as limited data is available on the proposed

development.

Item 3 This analysis looks at the needs of a Fire Hall in the Stavanger

Drive/Aberdeen Avenue area as response times are reported to be

approximately 7-8 minutes.

Item 4 Considering career staffing of the Goulds Fire Hall, this analysis looks at a

more beneficial location for second due coverage to the remainder of the

SJRFD FPA.

The following key contacts were made and provided information throughout the survey and development of the

report:

Fire Chief Jerry Peach, Director of Regional Fire and Emergency Services

Greg Keating, Manager of Land Information Services


6. Community Risk and Hazard Assessment

6.1. Background A fire risk assessment was conducted in the SJRFD Fire Protection Area to aid in determining the community’s fire

protection needs. A risk and hazard assessment, along with a response distance review, lays the groundwork for

determining fire protection needs within a community. This assessment is important in ascertaining organizational

structure, personnel requirements, training requirements, fire apparatus and fire equipment needs, response time

requirements and adequacy of fire station locations.

6.2. Measuring Fire Risk

Adequate response to a fire emergency is generally measured by the speed with which a responding fire fighting

crew(s) can arrive at the fire emergency with the correct type and amount of resources, to have a reasonable degree of

opportunity to control or extinguish a fire. Simply put, the response provided by a fire fighting crew should equal the

potential severity of the fire or fire emergency.

The potential severity of a fire event is generally associated with the fuel load present and exposures to the fire.

Factors such as building construction materials; quality of construction; building renovation history; building size,

height and age; occupancy and hazards associated with the occupancy, will all contribute to the potential severity of a

fire. In addition, other buildings sufficiently exposed to a burning building can contribute to the magnitude of a fire

and the resources necessary to be in place to control or extinguish a given fire. Alternatively, building controls and

automatic fire protection systems (both active and passive) that limit fire spread will reduce the potential severity of a

fire. For building controls to be considered effective, their design, installation and maintenance must also be reviewed

as any weak link may result in the system being ineffectual.

Much of the research into fire protection requirements for individual buildings and communities and the

corresponding number of pumper companies and response times has been conducted by Fire Underwriters Survey

and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Fire Underwriters Survey evaluates adequacy of response by

comparing the potential severity of fires that may occur with a rating of the ability of fire crews and their resources

responding within a specified time period relative to the fire and life safety risk potential that may be needed.

The base point for measuring fire risk and the resultant available and adequate response is the determination of

Required Fire Flows.

6.3. Required Fire Flows

Required fire flows may be described as the amount and rate of water application, and company response, required in

firefighting to confine and control the fires possible in a building or group of buildings which comprise essentially the

same fire area by virtue of immediate exposures.

Required Fire Flows were determined for buildings in SJRFD Fire Protection Area using the methodology described

in the Fire Underwriters Survey 1999 Guideline “Water Supply for Public Fire Protection” (refer to APPENDIX A).


The available data used to determine Required Fire Flows varies for the SJRFD FPA. In some cases building

footprints were available improving the accuracy and in other cases values were determined solely based on expected

values considering zoning types. The intent and use is simply to provide analytics on distribution analysis considering

the relative risk levels outlined in Table 2 Fire Underwriters Survey - Table of Effective Response. Required Fire Flow

(RFF) values determined in projects completed for the City of St. John’s (2011) and for a project concerning the

Town of Paradise (2013) were merged. New address points and parcel data was provided for certain areas in this

analysis. Where parcels existed that did not contain an RFF point the address point was assigned an RFF value based

on the zoning that existed in the area. All RFF points were merged to represent demand points (properties) in the

SJRFD FPA. The final risk assessment is shown in Figure 1 SJRFD - Distribution of Required Fire Flow Points and

Figure 2 SJRFD FPA – Required Fire Flow points.

Figure 1 SJRFD - Distribution of Required Fire Flow Points

SJRFD - Distribution of Required Fire Flow Points

7084

129

8078

35609

St. John's

Petty Harbour-Maddox Cove

Mount Pearl

Paradise

- 5000+

N

A

0-999 1000- 1999 2000- 2999 3000- 3999

- 4000-4999

c::::J Fire Protection Boundaries Road

City of St. Johns

Figure 2 SJRFD FPA- Required Fire Flo\1\6

Scale= 1:40,000 '


7. Response Assessment

7.1. Background While various standards and guidelines exist for measuring the number of apparatus needed and the placement of Fire

Halls, each share the same basic theory. The process is typically as follows:

Identify level of risk in the community

• Required Fire

Flows • Hazard

Occupancy Groupings

Identify Service Level

Objectives

• Adopt Standards

• Adopt a Standard of Response expected in the community

Measure

Performance and

Reliability based on

data

• Adjust Service

Level Objectives • Improve Service

Level Objectives

Most response standards identify 2 levels of responses:

Initial Response – usually a time to scene for the first apparatus Total Concentration Response – usually the total number of apparatus needed on scene within a specified

time

Within the Fire Underwriters Survey methodology the following are identified for each Required Fire Flow (RFF)

(building):

First due response – Initial number of companies within a specified time/distance depending on RFF value Second due response – Secondary number of companies within a specified time/distance depending on RFF

value

Total concentration response – Total number of companies within a specified time/distance depending on RFF value

NFPA identifies needed response in a similar manner (from 1710):

“240 seconds or less travel time for the arrival of the first arriving engine company at a fire suppression

incident and 480 seconds or less travel time for the deployment of an initial full alarm assignment at a fire

suppression incident”…4.1.2.1(3)

“The fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within a 480-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents”…..5.2.4.2.2

The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook further identifies typical response capabilities based on elevated risk levels

identified as:

High-hazard occupancies Medium-hazard occupancies Low-hazard occupancies

Rural operations

Overall a municipality should identify the level of response that it will strive to provide and establish a standard of

response policy statement. The following is an excerpt from the Commission on Fire Accreditation International


manual “Creating and Evaluating Standards of Response Coverage for Fire Departments”, Chapter One – Service

Level Expectations:

“After understanding the risks present in the community, what control measures do the citizens and elected

officials expect? For example, does the agency confine the fire to the compartment of origin, area of origin,

floor of origin, or building of origin? Some agencies in sparsely populated areas with response times of 30

minutes or more might have to accept (not like) an exposure level of service where the building fire does not

spread to the adjoining forest and start a conflagration……Each risk category found in a community should

have an outcome expectation developed for it.”

The intent of fire department response is to arrive at a fire scene with the necessary resources before the point of

flashover, see Figure 3. Beyond the point of flashover, it can become very difficult to combat a fire as fire growth

increases exponentially as can be seen.

Figure 3 Fire Propagation Curve (source NFPA)

It can be seen from Figure 3 that in order for a fire department to arrive with the necessary resources at a specific

point of fire growth would require knowledge/control of all aspects of two systems: the fire and the response. In both

cases neither system is completely controllable and as such most response standards are based on empirical data and

research from mutual agencies. Response standards form the basis of fire station location/staffing/apparatus.

Within Canada two sets of response benchmarks are generally measured which are as follows:

Fire Underwriters Survey – benchmark response distances NFPA response times

Both attempt to quantify the needed response at a certain point of fire growth. These two systems have the same

origin and are essentially the same. NFPA sets out response time targets in NFPA 1710:


“240 seconds or less travel time for the arrival of the first arriving engine company at a fire suppression

incident and 480 seconds or less travel time for the deployment of an initial full alarm assignment at a fire

suppression incident”

Just as Required Fire Flows quantify the level of risk and hence the required response, the initial full alarm assignment

is defined in NFPA 1710 only for:

“structure fire in a typical 2000ft2 (186 m2), two-story single-family dwelling without basement and with no

exposures”

The resources needed for full alarm assignment within 480 seconds are not further defined.

Discussions with SJRFD indicated that the department measures itself against the NFPA 1710 road response time of

4 minutes.

For response assessment within the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, the Table of Effective Response is used as the

benchmark, see Table 2 Fire Underwriters Survey - Table of Effective Response. The single family dwelling structure

described in NFPA 1710 would have a RFF value of 1100 IGPM. The benchmark response for 1100 IGPM is read

from the Table of Effective Response (see Table 2) as follows:

Initial response to alarms for Pumper companies is 2, i.e. 1 Pumper company in a first due response time of 4

minutes (same as NFPA 1710) and 1 Pumper company in a second due response time of 6 minutes.

The total number of Pumper companies required is 2 in 6 minutes. In the case of 1100 IGPM (84 L/s) a Ladder company is required only if the building is 3 stories or greater.

7.2. 2014 Incident Analysis and Response Model Response data for the year 2014 was provided. In total 4797 records were mapped and grouped by the length of time

on the response as can be seen in Figure 4. It can be seen from Figure 9 that the highest concentration of incidents

was in the CENTRAL WEST END response area.

Figure 4 Incidents 2014

2014 Incidents (Duration on scene)

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

<=10 min >10min - <=20min >20min - <=30min >30min - <=40min >40min - <=50min >50min

<=10 min

>10min - <=20min

>20min - <=30min

>30min - <=40min

>40min - <=50min

>50min


GIS

Tra

vel T

ime/

min

s

The response distance from the closest Fire Hall to each of these incidents was determined using ArcGIS. Where the

closest Fire Hall (determined from ArcGIS) was the same as the actual responding Fire Hall from the provided

incident data, these records were selected for comparison (total 3681). Records where the closest responding Fire Hall

was not the actual responding Fire Hall were assumed to be due to a fire company already committed to an incident.

The response distances determined by GIS were then converted into time using the following formula: Where

D=distance in kilometres

T=time in minutes

𝐷 =

𝑇 − 0.65

1.065

The actual response time was then plotted against the theoretical response time as shown in Figure 5. This analysis

shows an R square value of 50.4%, i.e. the Distance/Time relationship accounted for 50.4% of the variance.

Figure 5 Actual Travel Time vs Theoretical Travel Time

25.00 Actual Travel Time vs Theoretical Travel Time

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00

Actual Travel Time/mins

A 1km x 1km grid was overlaid on the actual incident data and the response time to each incident was averaged for

the grid. This can be seen in Figure 10. The girds were numbered for reference with the grid number being listed first

and the average response time (min) listed second, see Figure 10. As can be seen, response times well in-excess of a 4

minute response are seen in the Town of Paradise. Additionally there were incidents in the western portion of the Fire

Protection Area that received excessive response times, see grid 133, 114, 115, 136. Incidents east of the Kenmount

area show average response times in the 6-7min range, see grid 215, 202, 203, 173. Grids south along Highway 1 also

show longer response times, see grid 89, 69, 46. Furthermore the northern portion of the Fire Protection Area show

average actual response times in the 6-8min range, see grid 265, 263, 264, 260.


Per

cen

tage

RFF

po

ints

0.0

4

0.0

4 0.2

3

0.3

6

0.4

9

0.6

3

0.6

9

0.7

9

0.8

2 0

.90

0.8

9

0.9

6

0.9

4 0

.98

0.9

6 0.9

8

0.9

7 0.9

8

0.9

8 0

.99

0.9

8 0

.99

1.0

0 1

.00

Overall a comparison of the actual response to these incidents versus the theoretical response is grouped and

summarized in Figure 6. It can be seen that theoretical response actually underestimates the actual response time

which should be considered when commenting on the expectation of response from the response model. Looking at

the 90% coverage time it can be seen that the theoretical response shows an expectation of 90% coverage in 5

minutes to the historical incidents; while the actual response is closer to 90% coverage in 6 minutes.

Figure 6 Grouped Comparison of Actual Time vs Theoretical Time

SJRFD - Actual Road Travel Tiome vs Theoretical Road Travel Time.

1.20

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

CDF_Theor

CDF_Actual

0.20

0.00

As the theoretical response results are showing very similar and reasonable results to the actual incident data the

theoretical response model is used to estimate the first on-scene to each property in the SJRFD Response Area, i.e. to

all points shown in figure 2. The results are shown in Figure 11. Note that response ZONES were not considered;

this analysis is based on the geographically closest Fire Hall. Based on the theoretical response, those points shown in

orange can expect a response in the range >4min – <=6min, while those in red could expect a response in the range

>6min range. Again as shown in Figure 6 these times could be greater considering actual response time.

The same 1km x 1km grid as previously used was overlaid on the theoretical response to RFF points, with the

theoretical response time to each point averaged for the grid, see Figure 12. Very similar response delays as those

shown in Figure 10 can be seen in the theoretical response grids.

7.3. Response Assessment – Fire Underwriters Survey For response assessment, the Table of Effective Response is used as the benchmark; see Table 2 Fire Underwriters

Survey - Table of Effective Response. The following is provided as an example to illustrate how the Table of

Effective Response is interpreted:

A sample building has a Required Fire Flow of 2200 IGPM

The requirements for Pumper and Ladder companies is read from the Table of Effect Response:


Nu

mb

er o

f R

FF P

oin

ts

5090

0

3545

8 4204

1

2810

3

16

00

981

Initial response to alarms for Pumper companies is 2, i.e. 1 Pumper company in a first due response time of

3.5 minutes and 1 Pumper company in a second due response time of 5 minutes.

The total number of Pumper companies required is 3 in 6 minutes.

In the case of 2200 IGPM a Ladder company is required only if the building is 3 stories or greater. The total

number of Ladder companies that would be required in this case (3 storeys) would be 1 in 4 minutes.

The response times are then converted into distance using the following formula: Where

D=distance in kilometres

T=time in minutes

𝐷 =

𝑇 − 0.65

1.065

The results of the response assessment based on first due, second due, and total concentration is shown in Figure 7.

First on-scene groupings are shown in Figure 8. When looking at the response to all points it can be seen that the

90% response expectation shown in Figure 8 now closer resembles that shown in the actual response data, i.e.

approximately 90% in 6 minutes. Figure 7 also shows that approximately 70% of points meet the needs of first due

response when compared to the benchmarks shown in Table 2 Fire Underwriters Survey - Table of Effective

Response.

Figure 7 FUS Distribution of Response Assessment

SJRFD - Distribution of Response

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

Required

Met Benchmark

10000

0

First Due Pumper Second Due Pumper Total Concentration Pumper (remaining apparatus needed)


Per

cen

tage

RFF

po

ints

1.3

0%

0

.01

17

.93

%

0.1

9

28

.18

%

0.4

7

20

.95

%

0.6

8

11

.75

% 0

.80

7.7

2%

0

.88

3.5

2%

0

.91

1.5

7%

0

.93

1.3

0%

0

.94

2.0

0%

0.9

6

1.8

7%

0

.98

1.9

1%

1

.00

Figure 8 Approximate Road Travel Time to Closest Fire Hall

SJRFD - Approximate Road Travel Time to Closest Fire Hall

30.00%

1.20

25.00% 1.00

20.00% 0.80

15.00%

10.00%

0.60

0.40

Percentage

CDF

5.00% 0.20

0.00% 0.00


RISK

RATING

BUILDING DISTRICT

EXAMPLES

FIRE FLOW

INITIAL RESPONSE TO

ALARMS

1st DUE 2nd DUE 1st DUE TOTAL

Approx.

Engine

Pumper

Ladder

Pumper

Companies.

Ladder

Companies

L/min

Igpm Pumper Ladder

Company,

Company,

Company,

X1000

Range

Companies

Companies

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes No. Min. No. Min.

1 (a) Very small buildings, widely

detached buildings.

2 400 1 0 7.5 - *9 1 7.5 *1 9

(b) Scattered development (except

where wood roof coverings).

3

600

1

0

6

-

*7.5

1

6

*1

7.5

2 Typical modern, 1 - 2 storey

residential subdivision 3 - 6 m

10 - 20 ft. detached).

4-5

800-1,000

2

0

4

6

*6

2

6

*1

6

3 (a) Close 3 - 4 storey residential

and row housing, small

mercantile and industrial.

6-9

10-13

1,200-2,000

2,200-2,800

2

2

1(if required

by Hazards)

3.5

3.5

5

5

*4

*4

2

3

5

6

*1

*1

4

4

3 (b) Seriously exposed tenements.

Institutional. Shopping Centres

Fairly large areas, fire loads, and

exposures.

14-16

17-19

3,000-3,600

3,800-4,200

2

2

1

1

3.5

3.5

5

5

4

4

4

5

7

7

1

**1

4

4

4 (a) Large combustible institutions,

commercial buildings, multi-

storey and with exposures.

20-23

24-27

4,400-5,000

5,200-60,00

2

1

2.5

2.5

4

4

3.5

3.5

6

7

7.5

7.5

2

2

5

5

4 (b) High fire load warehouses and

buildings like 4(a).

28-31

32-35

6200-6800

7000-7600

3

1

2.5

2.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

8

9

8

8

3

3

7

7

5 Severe hazards in large area

buildings usually with major

exposures. Large congested

frame districts.

36-38

39-42

43-46

7,800-8,400

86,00-9,200

9,400-10,000

3

3

2

2

2

3.5

3.5

3.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

10

12

14

8

9

9

4

5

6

7.5

8

9

Table 2 Fire Underwriters Survey - Table of Effective Response

The following Table aids in the determination of Pumper and Ladder Company distribution and total members needed. It is based on availability within specified

response travel times in accordance with the fire potential as determined by calculation of required fire flows, but requiring increases in availability for severe life

hazard.


Notes to Table of Effective Response

* A ladder company is required here only when exceptional conditions apply, such as 3 storey heights, significant life hazards.

** For numerous or large single buildings over three stories use two ladder companies in 5 minutes.

When unsprinklered buildings over six stories have fire flow requirements less than Group 4, the number of Pumper and Ladder Companies under “Total Availability

Needed” should be increased at least to the next group to provide the additional manpower required except where this additional manpower regularly responds in the

time allotted, as occurs in some volunteer or composite fire departments.

The table gives travel times for apparatus AFTER dispatch and turn-out. Under very exceptional conditions affecting total response time, these nominal figures should

be modified.

WE

¯

KENT'S POND CENTRAL

CENTRAL KENT'S POND

CENTRAL KENMOUNT CENTRAL WEST END

KENMOUNT CENTRAL

WEST END CENTRAL

Legend <=10min >10min - <=20min >20min - <=30min >30min - <=40min >40min - <=50min >50min Fire Protection Boundary FDM Zone

ST END BROOKFIELD

NAME

CENTRAL WEST END Road

Figure 9 - 2014 SJRFD Incidents

City of St. Johns Scale = 1:4,000

0 50 100 200 300 400

Meters

0

¯

265 - 6.76

260 - 8.77 262 - 5.94 263 - 6.38 264 - 11.32

249 - 9.3 251 - 4.87 252 - 4.43 253 - 5.7 254 - 4.9 255 - 5.33 256 - 5.68 257 - 5.92

241 - 8.07 242 - 4.52 243 - 4.05 244 - 3.62 245 - 4.12 246 - 4.67 247 - 4.84 248 - 6.2

235 - 4.23 236 - 4.57 237 - 2.04 238 - 2.64 239 - 4.3 240 - 5.65

")

228 - 4.03 229 - 3.74 230 - 1.7 231 - 2.4 232 - 4.26 233 - 5.07

214 - 13.43 215 - 6.53 216 - 5.96 217 - 7.53 219 - 4.75 220 - 2.57 221 - 3.19 222 - 2.88 223 - 3.81 224 - 4.82

199 - 9.3 202 - 5.99 203 - 6.16 204 - 3.78 205 - 3.57 206 - 3.06 207 - 3.24 208 - 3.48 209 - 1.9

")

210 - 2.12 211 - 4.45 212 - 3.16

184 - 11.71

188 - 5.85

189 - 4.04

190 - 2.3

") 191 - 1.98

192 - 3.22

193 - 2.82 194 - 2.01

195 - 2.6

")

171 - 10.1 172 - 12.19 173 - 7.18 175 - 5.2 176 - 3.5 177 - 3.77 178 - 5.23 179 - 3.29 180 - 2.33 181 - 2.44 182 - 5.63

154 - 11.6 155 - 11.68 156 - 7.62 157 - 7.78 158 - 6.98 159 - 5.97 160 - 6.21 161 - 4.5 162 - 6 164 - 3.6 165 - 3.08 166 - 3.5 167 - 3.47 168 - 4.31 169 - 5.46

137 - 10.57 138 - 14.14 139 - 9.47 140 - 8.41 141 - 7.14 142 - 5.57 143 - 5.28 144 - 4.88 145 - 5.03 146 - 5.57 147 - 2.65 148 - 3.05 149 - 1.83 150 - 2.33 151 - 4.62 153 - 6.8

")

116 - 13.47

118 - 13.12

121 - 5.04

122 - 4.36

123 - 3.2

124 - 3.12

125 - 3.91

126 - 3.23

127 - 2.16

128 - 2.13

129 - 4.81

133 - 12.03

136 - 9.79

99 - 4.27 101 - 11.53 103 - 4.7 104 - 3.92 105 - 2.81 106 - 1.97 107 - 3 108 - 3.43 109 - 3.76 110 - 4.17 111 - 5.19 112 - 5.47 114 - 10.88 115 - 13.15

")

88 - 17.42

89 - 5.02

92 - 1.23

93 - 2.27

94 - 3.47

95 - 2.79

96 - 4.38

97 - 5.92

98 - 6.05

78 - 9.02 79 - 4.03 80 - 3.93 81 - 4.08 83 - 7.1 84 - 5.83

69 - 7.7 71 - 4.17 72 - 3.98 73 - 6.5 74 - 5.74

63 - 6.48 64 - 7.07

45 - 17.98 46 - 9.55 49 - 5.69 50 - 2.73 51 - 3.2

34 - 30.45 38 - 4.77 39 - 2.97 40 - 4.24 41 - 4 42 - 5.73

24 - 17.25 26 - 9.96

29 - 8.18

30 - 5.45

") 31 - 2.43

33 - 9.48

18 - 14.12 19 - 6.12 20 - 3.15 21 - 2.37

14 - 3.48 15 - 15.94

13 - 2.6

Legend

") Fire Hall Road Fire Protection Boundary

Average Response Time Lowest

Highest

Figure 10 - Average Actual Response Time by Grid to 2014 Incidents


500 1,000 2,000 3,000

Meters

0

TORBAY STATION

LOGY BAY MIDDLE COVE STATION ¯

AIRPORT

PORTUGAL COVE ST. PHILLIPS KENT'S POND KENMOUNT

KENT'S POND CENTRAL

")

KENMOUNT KENT'S POND

CENTRAL KENT'S POND

") CENTRAL WEST END

")

KENMOUNT WEST END

")

KENMOUNT MOUNT PEARL

WEST END KENMOUNT

MOUNT PEARL KENMOUNT

CONCEPTION BAY SOUTH STATION

PARADISE UNSERVICED

")

BROOKFIELD MOUNT PEARL

WEST END CENTRAL

)" BROOKFIELD WEST END

MADDOX COVE

MOUNT PEARL BROOKFIELD

")

GOULDS STATION

Legend ") Fire Hall

Road Fire Protection Boundary FDM Zone

Theoretical Response >0min - <=2min >2min - <=4min >4min - <=6min >6min

Figure 11 –Theoretical Response to RFF points


500

1,000 2,000

Meters

¯

265 - 1.31

259 - 0 260 - 5.38 261 - 7.13 262 - 5.32 263 - 5.73 264 - 5.88

249 - 9.33 250 - 7.34 251 - 5.34 252 - 4.91 253 - 5.06 254 - 4.61 255 - 4.61 256 - 4.86 257 - 4.85 258 - 6.35

241 - 5.15 242 - 4.11 243 - 3.53 244 - 3.37 245 - 3.35 246 - 4.03 247 - 4.94 248 - 5.65

235 - 3.81 236 - 2.88 237 - 1.86 238 - 2.35 239 - 3.36 240 - 4.31

226 - 13.87 227 - 8.43 228 - 4.19 229 - 2.7 230 - 1.51 231 - 2.01 232 - 3.11 233 - 4.1 234 - 5.35

213 - 12.86 214 - 13.11 215 - 6.46 216 - 4.66 217 - 4.32 218 - 3.54 219 - 3.9 220 - 2.94 221 - 2.42 222 - 2.25 223 - 2.91 224 - 4.05 225 - 4.85

198 - 12.21 199 - 11.78 200 - 11.47 201 - 6.51 202 - 5.83 203 - 4.62 204 - 3.53 205 - 2.62 206 - 2.22 207 - 2.53 208 - 2.37 209 - 1.57 210 - 1.57 211 - 2.89 212 - 4.57

183 - 11.03 184 - 10.79 185 - 10.16 186 - 9.41 187 - 0 188 - 4.63 189 - 3.85 190 - 1.6 191 - 1.74 192 - 2.47 193 - 2.11 194 - 1.42 195 - 1.57 196 - 3.62 197 - 5.26

170 - 10.21 171 - 9.63 172 - 9.06 173 - 6.48 174 - 6.71 175 - 4.34 176 - 3.78 177 - 2.84 178 - 3.67 179 - 3.11 180 - 1.71 181 - 1.5 182 - 3.39

154 - 10.53 155 - 9.79 156 - 7.84 157 - 6.75 158 - 6.09 159 - 5.99 160 - 6.23 161 - 4.75 162 - 4.92 163 - 3.41 164 - 2.95 165 - 2.93 166 - 3.01 167 - 2.68 168 - 2.95 169 - 3.6

137 - 12.26 138 - 10.09 139 - 8.82 140 - 7.89 141 - 6.8 142 - 5.4 143 - 5.16 144 - 5.3 145 - 4.32 146 - 4.74 147 - 2.95 148 - 2.24 149 - 1.54 150 - 2.6 151 - 3.41 152 - 4.3 153 - 4.57

116 - 12.33 117 - 11.5 118 - 11.6 119 - 7.33 120 - 7 121 - 4.55 122 - 3.26 123 - 2.46 124 - 3.01 125 - 3.71 126 - 3.21 127 - 1.8 128 - 1.63 129 - 3.72 130 - 5.62 131 - 5.58 132 - 9.43 133 - 12.28 134 - 12.95 135 - 14.82 136 - 16

99 - 13.12 100 - 12.67 101 - 12.65 102 - 7.01 103 - 5.88 104 - 3.69 105 - 2.74 106 - 1.79 107 - 2.73 108 - 3.53 109 - 3.85 110 - 2.86 111 - 4.45 112 - 4.35 113 - 9.46 114 - 10.35 115 - 11.59

86 - 6.95 87 - 10.89 88 - 13.8 89 - 4.45 91 - 0 92 - 1.13 93 - 2.19 94 - 3.14 95 - 3.86 96 - 4.63 97 - 5.52 98 - 5.19

77 - 9.45 78 - 10.64 79 - 4.19 80 - 3.68 81 - 3.62 82 - 5.03 83 - 5.68 84 - 5.74 85 - 9.88

67 - 11.71 68 - 11.34 69 - 6.62 70 - 5.09 71 - 4.49 72 - 4.15 73 - 4.12 74 - 5.45 75 - 4.91 76 - 10.87

55 - 18.92 56 - 12.34 57 - 9.21 58 - 8.36 59 - 9.46 60 - 0 61 - 7.05 62 - 5.49 63 - 4.32 64 - 3.7 65 - 3.95 66 - 9.89

45 - 19.57 46 - 9.53 47 - 11.13 48 - 12.52 50 - 3.53 51 - 2.92 52 - 3.65 53 - 7.43 54 - 8.71

35 - 10.77 36 - 11.37 37 - 3.48 38 - 2.23 39 - 1.66 40 - 2.97 41 - 4.09 42 - 5.35 43 - 6.8 44 - 7.06

23 - 20.65 24 - 20.08 25 - 18.97 26 - 16.55 28 - 8.12 29 - 2.93 30 - 1.47 31 - 1.2 32 - 3.04 33 - 4.88

17 - 21.26 18 - 18.06 19 - 3.17 20 - 2.03 21 - 2.83 22 - 5.31

14 - 3.37 15 - 2.86 16 - 3.05

12 - 6.42 13 - 3.81

10 - 6.44 11 - 5.02

8 - 6.75 9 - 6.31

6 - 8.01 7 - 7.45

5 - 9.28

4 - 10.32

2 - 11.29 3 - 10.84

1 - 10.33

Legend

") Fire Hall Road Fire Protection Boundary FDM Zone Lowest

Highest

City of St. Johns Figure 12 –Theoretical Response to RFF points

0 500 1,000 2,000 3,000

Scale = 1:36,000 Meters


8. Conclusion It is clear from Figure 11 that the most immediate needs of a response facility are in the Town of Paradise. It was

noted that a facility is planned to be operational within the next 2 years. The current first due response measurement

(see Figure 7) of 70% would be considered relatively low for a community with a PFPC Grade of 1.

8.1. Galway/Glencrest Development

While limited data is available for these developments, the Galway development website (www.galwaynl.ca) provided

the following:

“Galway is a new, comprehensive 2400-acre development in St. John’s, NL, featuring an innovative blend of

industrial, retail and residential components.

More than just a subdivision, Galway will be Newfoundland and Labrador’s preferred place to live, work, and

play. With the potential for more than 5,000 residential units, Galway will include a blend of apartments,

townhouses, condominiums, as well as semi-detached, detached, and executive homes to accommodate a

variety of family needs, available for sale in 2015.

Phase 1 of the development, located directly off the Trans-Canada Highway, will also include the 150-acre

Glencrest Industrial Centre and a premier retail shopping centre, featuring more than 650,000 square feet of

stores by leading North American retailers, with plans to include some unique retailers to the province. Work

is already well underway and serviced lots will be ready for use later this year in the Industrial Centre, with

retail stores set to open in 2016.”

8.1.1. Glencrest Industrial Area The Glencrest Industrial Area website provides numerous images for the proposed Glencrest site (www.glencrest.ca).

Some of these images showed access to the area off both Highway 1 and Pitts Memorial Drive while others only

showed access off Highway 1.

Figure 13 shows an overlay of the Glencrest Site (source: www.glencrest.ca) on the theoretical response map. With

access off highway 1 it is expected that response would be in the >4min – <=6min range or potentially in the >6min

range. Response to this area is expected to be in excess of NFPA 1710 4 minute response. Additionally, these

properties are expected to lie beyond the ideal response distance of 2.5km for application of the PFPC Fire Insurance

Grade system. Furthermore when looking at the Risk Rating Group from Table 2 it can be seen that ideal response to

expected building types should be less than 4 minutes for the first arriving apparatus.

http://www.galwaynl.ca/

http://www.glencrest.ca/

file://///IBSVAN02/fus/Assessments/2015/St.%20Johns,%20NL/Working/Report%20docs/www.glencrest.ca


8.1.2. Galway Development Limited details were available on the Galway development; however, it would again be expected that estimated

response times as described in section 8.1.1 would likely be beyond the ideal Risk Rating times as listed in Table 2, i.e.

3.5 minutes. This area can be seen in Figure 14.

8.2. Kenmount Terrace Area It is estimated that the area bounded by Thorburn Road, the Outer Ring Road, Kenmount Road and Kelsey Drive

will be developed. The type of development is unknown at this time. The response analysis completed in this report

indicates that response to the area will likely be in the >4min – <=6min range or potentially in the >6min range.

Again these levels of response may be excessive for the types of buildings considering the Risk Rating times shown in

Table 2. Furthermore it can be seen from Figure 15 that currently properties in the north east section of the Town of

Paradise are experiencing response in excess of 6 minutes.

8.3. Stavanger Drive Area

The response analysis indicates that response to the Stavanger Drive area will likely be in the >4min – <=6min range

or potentially in the >6min range (going north), see Figure 16. Again these levels of response may be excessive for the

types of buildings considering the Risk Rating times shown in Table 2.

A sample location for a Fire Hall (Fire Hall 9) in this area was provided as can be seen in Figure 17. The resultant

expected effect on response is also shown. It can be seen that 0-4 minute response would be expected in the area.

An optimization was then run using the location-allocation ArcGIS tool. The demand was to cover the maximum

number of properties based on first due response distance which is derived from Table 2 using the simple

Distance/Time relationship provided in this report. The result can be seen in Figure 18. While this location maximizes

based on first due coverage it should be noted that road speeds have not been considered and as such further analysis

may be needed before this location would be considered.

Another optimization was run with the demand of covering the maximum number of properties based on 3.15km

(converts to 4 minute response using the simple Distance/Time relationship provided in this report). The result is

shown in Figure 19. Again, as above, speeds were not considered. It can be seen that the location is quite different.

The optimal Fire Hall location is very dependent on the service levels demands.

8.4. Goulds Area

Based on the road distance/speed analysis it can be seen from Figure 20 that response from the Goulds Fire Hall to

the Goulds area is in the range >0min - <=4min, although some properties south of this area receive excessive

response. The current BROOKFIELD WEST END response area also experiences excessive response.


The current location of the Goulds Fire Hall is relatively far from the remainder of the Fire Halls in the service area.

SJRFD wanted to explore options for a better location for the Goulds Fire Hall that would be closer to the

BROOKFIELD WEST END response area in order to better provide second due response to the remainder of the

service area. In order to provide feedback two optimization analyzes were completed, i.e. one based on maximizing

first due distance coverage and one based on maximizing 3.15km response.

Optimization results area both shown on Figure 21. Both scenarios show results just north of the current location of

the Goulds Fire Hall. It appears that there is significant demand points in the area. If SJRFD wishes to further review

location possibilities in the area it is suggested that locations be provided for analysis.

Ae og d IGN IGP swiss opo and he GIS Use Commun

KENMOUNT MOUNT PEARL¯


PARADISE UNSERVICED


Legend GOULDS STATION ") Fire Hall



Glencrest Industrial Area 0 1

Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, r ri , , , t , t r ity

City of St. Johns Figure 13 - Overlay of Glencrest Industrial Area on Theoretical Response Map

0 100 200 400 600 800



¯


PARADISE UNSERVICED


Approximate Galway Development Area

GOULDS STATION

Legend ") Fire Hall

Road Fire Protection Boundary FDM Zone Galway - approx


City of St. Johns Figure 14 - Approximate Galway Development Area

0 100 200 400 600 800



¯ KENT'S POND KENMOUNT



KENMOUNT WEST END

KENMOUNT MOUNT PEARL

BROOKFIELD MOUNT PEARL


Legend

") Fire Hall Road Fire Protection Boundary FDM Zone



City of St. Johns Figure 15 - Approximate Kenmount Terrace Area

0 100 200 400 600 800 1,000


ad

Hall'sRo

da Kil

re

St r e t es c u lo G

l Mc

Vir Gl gin ia

P lac e

nDrive

Ca

s sino

Place

ERE, DeLo me TomTom MapmyInd a © OpenSt eetMap

Quarry Road Extension

St. Francis Road

I1:2:41 Highway

Fox Avenue

¯

TORBAY STATION

LOGY BAY MIDDLE COVE STATION

AIRPORT

KENT'S POND CENTRAL

Legend ") Fire Hall


Theoretical Response >0min - <=2min >2min - <=4min >4min - <=6min >6min Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community, Esri, H r , , i , r

contributors, and the GIS user community

City of St. Johns Figure 16 - Stavanger Drive Area

0 100 200 400


ENMOUNT WEST END

CENTRAL

0

¯

TORBAY STATION


AIRPORT

")

KENT'S POND KENMOUNT KENT'S POND CENTRAL

")

KENMOUNT KENT'S POND CENTRAL KENT'S POND

Legend

") Fire Hall ") Potential Fire Hall 9


Theoretical Response >0min - <=2min >2min - <=4min >4min - <=6min

K >6min

KENMOUNT CENTRAL

CENTRAL WEST END

")

WEST END

Figure 17 - Theoretical Response to RFF Points with Fire Hall 9


125

250 500 750

Meters

") KENMOUNT WEST END

NTRAL

¯ TORBAY STATION


AIRPORT

KENT'S POND KENMOUNT ")

KENT'S POND CENTRAL

")

KENMOUNT KENT'S POND CENTRAL KENT'S POND

Legend ") Fire Hall ") First Due Distance Optimized Fire Hall



KENMOUNT CENTRAL

WEST END CENTRAL

")

CENTRAL WEST END

WEST END CE

City of St. Johns Figure 18 - Theoretical Response to RFF Points with First Due Distance Optimized Fire Hall

Scale = 1:8,000

KENMOUNT WEST END

TORBAY STATION ¯


AIRPORT

")

KENT'S POND KENMOUNT KENT'S POND CENTRAL


CENTRAL KENT'S POND

Legend ") Fire Hall ") 3.15km Distance Optimized Fire Hall



KENMOUNT CENTRAL WEST END CENTRAL

CENTRAL WEST END

City of St. Johns Figure 19 – Theoretical Response to RFF Points with 3.15km Distance Optimized Fire Hall

Scale = 1:8,000

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Power's Road

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Car

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Non

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Rob

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. H

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Bac

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Masonic Park ¯

WEST END CENTRAL


Ridgemount Street

None

GOULDS STATION

Legend ") Fire Hall


Theoretical Response >0min - <=2min >2min - <=4min >4min - <=6min >6min Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community, Esri, HE , r i , tr

contributors, and the GIS user community

City of St. Johns Figure 20 - *RXOGV Area

0 100200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800


¯

!(

!(

GOULDS STATION

")

Legend ") Fire Hall

!( Goulds Area Optimizations RFF Point Road Fire Protection Boundary FDM Zone

City of St. Johns Figure 21 – Goulds Area Optimizations

0 150 300


APPENDIX A Fire Underwriters Survey - 1999 Water Supply for Public Fire Protection


WATER SUPPLY FOR

PUBLIC FIRE PROTECTION

1999

FIRE UNDERWRITERS SURVEY A SERVICE TO INSURERS AND MUNICIPALITIES

For further information on this document or any matters relating to the Fire Underwriters Survey please contact the appropriate offices of CGI Risk Management Services (formerly the Insurers’ Advisory Organization) as follows:

Western Canada CGI Risk Management Services

Fire Underwriters Survey 3999 Henning Drive Burnaby BC V5C 6P9

Local: 604-6841581 Toll Free: 1-800-665-5661 Fax: 604-688-6986

Central Canada CGI Risk Management Services

Fire Underwriters Survey Suite 800, 7015 Macleod Tr. SW Calgary Alberta T2H 2K6

Local: 403-296-1300 Toll Free: 1-800-465-4264 Fax: 403-296-1316

Quebec CGI Risk Management Services

Fire Underwriters Survey 1611 Crémazie Blvd. East Montreal, Quebec H2M 2P2


Ontario CGI Risk Management Services

Fire Underwriters Survey Lock Box 200 150 Commerce Valley Drive, West Markham, Ontario L3T 7Z3


Atlantic Canada CGI Insurance Business Services

Fire Underwriters Survey 238 Brownlow Avenue, Suite 300 Park Place Center Dartmouth, Nova Scotia B3B 1Y2

Telephone: 902-423-9287 Toll-Free: 1-800-639-4528 Fax: 902-423-7376

Entire contents © 2007 by CGI Group Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this publication in any form without prior written permission is forbidden.

FIRE UNDERWRITERS SURVEY is financed by the Canadian Insurance industry and utilizes technical staff of CGI Risk Management Services (formerly the Insurers’ Advisory Organization Inc.) Its purpose is to survey fire protection conditions in Canadian communities and municipalities, providing data and advisory services to fire insurance underwriters and public officials concerned.

The text of this publication includes copyright material of Insurance Services Offices with its permission.

Entire contents © 2007 by CGI Group Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this publication in any form without prior written permission is forbidden.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE 5

PART I 6 GENERAL 6

ADEQUACY AND RELIABILITY. 6 STORAGE. 6 PRESSURE. 7

SUPPLY WORKS 7 NORMAL ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY WORKS. 7 RELIABILITY OF SOURCE OF SUPPLY. 7 GRAVITY SYSTEMS. 8

PUMPING 9 RELIABILITY OF PUMPING CAPACITY. 9 POWER SUPPLY FOR PUMPS. 9 FUEL SUPPLY. 10

BUILDINGS AND PLANT 10 BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES. 10 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEM COMPONENTS, PIPING AND EQUIPMENT. 10 OPERATIONS. 11 EMERGENCY SERVICES. 11

PIPING 12 RELIABILITY OF SUPPLY MAINS. 12 INSTALLATION OF PIPE. 12 VALVES. 13

HYDRANTS 14 SIZE, TYPE AND INSTALLATION. 14 INSPECTION AND CONDITION. 14 HYDRANT DISTRIBUTION. 14

RECORDS 15 PLANS AND RECORDS. 15

TABLES 16

PART II 17 GUIDE FOR DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED FIRE FLOW COPYRIGHT I.S.O. 17

Notes to Calculation 19 OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE 20

APPENDIX 21 TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION 21 OCCUPANCIES 21 EXPOSURES 23 CONVERSION FACTORS 24

WATER SUPPLY FOR PUBLIC FIRE PROTECTION

PREFACE

This guide summarizes the more significant recommendations of Fire Underwriters Survey with respect to fire protection requirements in municipal water works system design. It reflects the manner in which FUS assesses the water supply aspect of a municipality’s fire risk potential during surveys on behalf of the Canadian property insurance industry and represents the accumulated experience of many years of study of actual fires. Water supply is one of a number of components evaluated by FUS in the municipal fire protection system. Recommendations applying to the fire departments and code enforcement are covered in other publications of Fire Underwriters Survey. FUS local offices are prepared to assist municipal officials or their consultants with advice on special problems, as time limits permit, in accordance with the intent of this guide. The minimum size water supply credited by FUS must be capable of delivering not less than 1000 L/min for two hours or 2000 L/min for one hour in addition to any domestic consumption at the maximum daily rate. Static suction supplies to fire department pumpers are recognized as a supplement to the piped system.

In the FUS assessment of a water supply system, the major emphasis is placed upon its ability to deliver adequate water to control major fires throughout the municipality on a reliable basis via sufficient and suitable hydrants. What is ultimately available to the fire department is the critical test in this fire protection evaluation.

Rates of flow for firefighting purposes are expressed in litres per minute as this is the adopted unit for the firefighting field.

In this edition all quantities are specified in S.I. units.

6

PART I

GENERAL

ADEQUACY AND RELIABILITY. An adequate and reliable water supply for firefighting is an essential part of the fire protection system of a municipality. This is normally a piped system in common with domestic potable water service for the community.

A water supply system is considered to be fully adequate if it can deliver the necessary fire flow at any point in the distribution gridiron for the applicable time period specified in the table “Required Duration of Fire Flow” with the consumption at the maximum daily rate (average rate on maximum say of a normal year). When this delivery is also possible under certain emergency or unusual conditions as herein specified, the system is considered to be reliable. In cities of population in excess of 250,000 (or smaller places with high fire incident and severe hazard conditions) it is usually necessary to consider the possibility of two simultaneous major fires in the area served by the system.

Fire flows are amounts of water necessary to control fires. These are determined as shown in Part II. System design should contemplate meeting the required fire flows existing or probable with the possible exception of gross anomalies where there is no fire threat to the remainder of the community. In these cases, the properties should preferably be modified in hazard to reduce the required flow as part of a coordinated community fire protection system.

The protection of buildings by automatic sprinkler systems is a significant contribution to the fire protection of the community and should be encouraged, not penalized by onerous service charges or metering requirements.

In order to provide reliability, duplication of some or all parts of the system will be necessary, the need for duplication being dependent upon the extent to which the various parts may reasonably be expected to be out of service as a result of maintenance and repair work, an emergency or some unusual condition. The introduction of storage, either as part if the supply works or on the distribution system, may partially or completely offset the need for duplicating various parts of the system, the value of the storage depending upon its amount, location and availability.

STORAGE. In general, storage reduces the requirements of those parts of the system through which supply has already passed. Since storage usually fluctuates, the normal daily minimum maintained is the amount that should be considered as available for fires. Because of the decrease in pressure when water is drawn down in standpipes, only the portion of this normal daily minimum storage that can be delivered at a residual pressure of 150kPa at the point of use is considered as available. As well as the quantity available, the rate of delivery of water to the system from storage for the fire flow period is critical to this consideration.

7

PRESSURE. The principal requirement to be considered is the ability to deliver water in sufficient quantity to permit fire department pumpers to obtain an adequate supply from hydrants. To overcome friction loss in the hydrant branch, hydrant and suction hose, a minimum residual water pressure of 150 kPa in the street main is required during flow. Under conditions of exceptionally low suction losses, a lower residual may be possible. This includes the use of 100 mm and larger outlets for fire department pumper use and hydrants with large waterways.

Higher sustained pressure is of importance in permitting direct continuous supply to automatic sprinkler systems, to building standpipe and hose systems, and in maintaining a water plan so that no portion of the protection area is without water, such as during a fire at another location. Residual pressures that exceed 500 kPa during large flows are of value as they permit short hose-lines to be operated directly from hydrants without supplementary pumping.

SUPPLY WORKS

NORMAL ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY WORKS. The source of supply, including impounding reservoirs, and each part of the supply works should normally be able to maintain the maximum daily consumption rate plus the maximum required fire flow. Each distribution service within the system should similarly support its own requirements. In large cities where fire frequency may result in simultaneous fires, additional flow must be considered in accordance with the potential. Filters may be considered as capable of operating at a reasonable overload capacity based upon records and experience. In general, overload capacity will not exceed 25 percent, but may be higher in well designed plans operating under favourable conditions.

The absolute minimum supply available under extreme dry weather conditions should not be taken as the measure of the normal ability of the source of supply such as supply from wells. The normal or average capacity of wells during the most favourable nine month period should be considered, or the normal sustained flow of surface supplies to the source.

RELIABILITY OF SOURCE OF SUPPLY. The effect on adequacy must be considered for such factors as frequency, severity and duration of droughts, physical condition of dams and intakes; danger from earthquakes, floods, forest fires, and ice dams or other ice formations; silting-up or shifting of channels; possibility of accidental contamination of watershed or source; absence of watchmen or electronic supervision where needed; and injury by physical means. Where there is a risk of disruption, special precautions or alternate supplies should be arranged.

8

Where the supply is from wells, some consideration should be given to the absolute minimum capacity of the wells under the most unfavourable conditions; also to the length of time that the supply from the wells would be below the maximum daily consumption rate, and the likelihood of this condition recurring every year or only at infrequent intervals. It should be recognized that some water is generally available from wells and that the most extreme conditions are not as serious as a total interruption of the supply, as would be the case in the breaking of a dam or shifting of a channel. The possibility of clogging, salinity, and the need for periodic cleaning and overhauling must be considered. Dependence upon a single well, even where records are favourable, may be considered a feature of unreliability.

Frequent cleaning of reservoirs and storage tanks may be considered as affecting reliability.

Continuity of, and delay in implementing water supplies obtained from systems or sources not under the control of the municipality or utility should be considered also from these aspects.

GRAVITY SYSTEMS. A gravity system delivering supply from the source to distribution directly without the use of pumps is advantageous from a fire protection point of view because of its inherent reliability, but a pumping system can also be developed to a high degree of reliability.

9

PUMPING

RELIABILITY OF PUMPING CAPACITY. Pumping capacity, where the system or service is supplied by pumps, should be sufficient, in conjunction with storage when the two most important pumps are out of service, to maintain the maximum daily consumption rate plus the maximum required fire flow at required pressure for the required duration. For smaller municipalities (usually up to about 25,000 population) the relative infrequency of fires is assumed as largely offsetting the probability of a serious fire occurring at times when two pumps are out of service. (The most important pump is normally, but not always, the one of largest capacity, depending upon how vital is its contribution to maintaining flow to the distribution system.)

To be adequate, remaining pumps in conjunction with storage, should be able to provide required fire flows for the specified durations at any time during a period of five days with consumption at the maximum daily rate. Effect of normal minimum capacity of elevated storage located on the distribution system and storage of treated water above low lift pumps should be considered. The rate of flow from such storage must be considered in terms of any limitation of water main capacity. The availability of spare pumps or prime movers that can quickly be installed may be credited, as may pumps of compatible characteristics which may be valved from another service.

POWER SUPPLY FOR PUMPS. Electric power supply to pumps should be so arranged that a failure in any power line or the repair or replacement of a transformer, switch, control unit or other device will not prevent the delivery, in conjunction with elevated storage, of required fire flows for the required durations at any time during a period of two days with consumption at the maximum daily rate.

Power lines should be underground from the station or substation of the power utility to water plants and pumping stations and have no other consumers enroute. The use of the same transmission lines by other consumers introduces unreliability because of the possibility of interruption of power or deterioration of power characteristics.

Overhead power lines are more susceptible to damage and interruption than underground lines and introduce a degree of un-reliability that depends upon their location and construction. In connections with overhead lines, consideration should be given to the number and duration of lightning, wind, sleet, and snow storms in the area; the type of poles or towers and wires; the nature of the country traversed; the effect of earthquakes, forest fires, and floods; the lightning and surge protection provided; the extent to which the system is dependent upon overhead lines; and the ease of, and facilities for, repairs.

The possibility of power systems or network failures affecting large areas should be considered. In- plant auxiliary power or internal combustion driver standby pumping are appropriate solutions to these problems in many cases, particularly in small plants where high pumping capacity is required for fire protection service. When using automatic starting, prime 'movers' for auxiliary power supply and pumping should have controllers listed by Underwriters' Laboratories of Canada to establish their reliability.

10

FUEL SUPPLY. At least a five day supply of fuel for internal combustion engines or boilers used for regular domestic supply should be provided. Where long hauls, condition of roads, climatic conditions, or other circumstances could cause interruptions of delivery longer than five days, a greater storage should be provided. Gas supply should be from two independent sources or from duplicate gas-producer plants with gas storage sufficient for 24 hours. Unreliability of regular fuel supply may be offset in whole or in part by suitable provisions for the use of an alternate fuel or power supply.

BUILDINGS AND PLANT

BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES. Pumping stations, treatment plants, control centres and other important structures should be located, constructed, arranged, and protected so that damage by fire, flooding, or other causes will be held to a minimum. They should contain no combustible material in their construction, and, if hazards are created by equipment or materials located within the same structure, the hazardous section should be suitably separated by fire-resistive partitions or fire walls.

Buildings and structures should have no fire exposures. If exposures exist, suitable protection should be provided, Electrical wiring and equipment should be installed in accordance with the Canadian Electrical Code. All internal hazards should be properly safeguarded in accordance with good practice. Private in-plant fire protection should be provided as needed.

MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEM COMPONENTS, PIPING AND EQUIPMENT. Steam piping, boiler-feed lines, fuel-piping (gas or oil lines to boilers as well as gas, oil or gasoline lines to internal- combustion engines), and air lines to wells or control systems should be so arranged that a failure in any line or the repair or replacement of a valve, fuel pump, boiler-feed pump, injector, or other necessary device, will not prevent the delivery, in conjunction with storage, of the required fire flows for the specified duration at any time during a period of two days with consumption at the maximum daily rate.

Plants should be well arranged to provide for effective operation. Among the features to be considered are: ease of making repairs and facilities for this work, danger of flooding because of broken piping; susceptibility to damage by spray; reliability of priming and chlorination equipment; lack of semi-annual inspection of boilers or other pressure vessels; dependence upon common non-sectionalized electric bus bars; poor arrangement of piping; poor condition or lack of regular inspections of important valves; and factors affecting the operation of valves or other devices necessary for fire service such as design, operation, and maintenance of pressure regulating valves, altitude valves, air valves, and other special valves or control devices, provision of power drives, location of controls, and susceptibility to damage.

Reliability of treatment works is likely to be influenced by the removal from service of at least one filter or other treatment unit; the reduction of filter capacity by turbidity, freezing or other conditions of the water; the need for cleaning basins; and the dependability of power for operating valves, wash-water pumps, mixers and other appurtenances.

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OPERATIONS. Reliability in operation of the supply system and adequate response to emergency or fire demands are essential. Instrumentation, controls and automatic features should be arranged with this in mind. Failure of an automatic system to maintain normal conditions or to meet unusual demands should result in the sounding of an alarm where remedial action will be taken. The operating force should be competent, adequate, and continuously available as may be required to maintain both the domestic and fire services.

EMERGENCY SERVICES. Emergency crews, provided with suitable transportation, tools and equipment, should be continuously on duty in the larger systems and be readily available upon call in small systems. Spare pipe and fittings, and construction equipment should be readily available. Alarms for fires in buildings should be received by the utility at a suitable location where someone is always on duty who can take appropriate action as required, such as placing additional equipment in operation, operating emergency or special valves, or adjusting pressures. Receipt of alarms may be by fire alarm circuit, radio, outside alerting device, or telephone, but where special operations are required, the alarm service should be equivalent to that needed for a fire station.

Response of an emergency crew should be made to major fires to assist the fire department in making the most efficient use of the water system and to ensure the best possible service in the event of a water main break or other emergency. The increase of pressures by more than 25 percent for fires is considered to increase the possibility of breaks.

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PIPING

RELIABILITY OF SUPPLY MAINS. Supply mains cut off for repair should not drastically reduce the flow available to any district. This includes all pipe lines or conduits on which supply to the distribution system is dependent, including intakes, suction or gravity lines to pumping stations, flow lines from reservoirs, treatment plant piping, force mains, supply and arterial mains, etc. Consideration should be given to the greatest effect that a break, joint separation or other failure could have on the delivery of the maximum daily consumption rate plus required fire flow at required pressure over a three day period. Aqueducts, tunnels or conduits of substantial construction may be considered as less susceptible to failure and equivalent to good mains with a long history of reliability.

INSTALLATION OF PIPE. Mains should be in good condition and properly installed. Pipe should be suitable for the service intended. Asbestos-cement, poly-vinyl chloride (PVC), cast and ductile iron, reinforced concrete and steel pipe manufactured in accordance with appropriate Canadian Standards Association or ANSI/AWWA standards, or any pipes listed by Underwriters' Laboratories of Canada for fire service are considered satisfactory. Normally, pipe rated for a maximum working pressure of 1000 kPa is required, Service records, including the frequency and nature of leaks, breaks, joint separations, other failures and repairs, and general conditions should be considered as indicators of reliability. When mains are cleaned they should be lined.

Mains should be so laid as not to endanger one another, and special construction should be provided to prevent their failure at stream crossings, railroad crossings, bridges, and other points where required by physical conditions; supply mains should be valved at one and one half kilometre intervals and should be equipped with air valves at high points and blow offs at low points. Mains should not be buried extremely deep or be unusually difficult to repair, though depths to ten feet may be required because of frost conditions.

The general arrangement of important valves, of standard or special fittings, and of connections at cross-overs, intersections, and reservoirs, as well as at discharge and suction headers, should be considered with respect to the time required to isolate breaks. The need for check valves on supply or force mains and for other arrangements to prevent flooding of stations or emptying of reservoirs at the time of a break in a main should also be considered, as well as the need for relief valves or surge chambers. Accessibility of suitable material and equipment and ease of making repairs should be considered.

Arterial feeder mains should provide looping throughout the system for mutual support and reliability, preferably not more than 1000 metres between mains. Dependence of a large area on a single main is a weakness. In general the gridiron of minor distributors supplying residential districts should consist of mains at least 150mm in size and arranged so that the lengths on the long sides of blocks between intersecting mains do not exceed 200 metres. Where longer lengths of 150mm pipe are necessary 200mm or larger intersecting mains should be used. Where initial pressures are unusually high, a satisfactory gridiron may be obtained with longer lengths of 150mm pipe between intersecting mains.

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Where deadends and a poor gridiron are likely to exist for a considerable period or where the layout of the streets and the topography are not well adapted to the above arrangement, 200mm pipe should be used. Both the ability to meet the required fire flows and reliability of a reasonable supply by alternate routing must be taken into account in this consideration.

VALVES. A sufficient number of valves should be installed so that a break or other failure will not affect more than 400 metres of arterial mains, 150 metres of mains in commercial districts, or 250 metres of mains in residential districts. Valves should be maintained in good operating condition. The recommended inspection frequency is once a year, and more frequently for larger valves and valves for critical applications.

A valve repair that would result in reduction of supply is a liability, but because of the probable infrequency of occurrence, it might be considered as introducing only a moderate degree of unreliability even if it resulted in total interruption. The repair of a valve normally should be accomplished in two days. Valves opening opposite to the majority are undesirable and when they do occur they should be clearly identified.

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HYDRANTS

SIZE, TYPE AND INSTALLATION. Hydrants should conform to American Water Works Standard for Dry Barrel Fire Hydrants or Underwriters' Laboratories of Canada listing. Hydrants should have at least two 65mm outlets. Where required fire flows exceed 5000 l/min or pressures are low there should also be a large pumper outlet. The lateral street connection should not be less than 150mm in diameter. Hose threads, operating and cap nuts on outlets should conform to Provincial Standard dimensions. A valve should be provided on lateral connections between hydrants and street mains.

Hydrants that open in a direction opposite to that of the majority are considered unsatisfactory. Flush hydrants are considered undesirable because of delay in getting into operation; this delay is more serious in areas subject to heavy snow storms. Cisterns are considered unsatisfactory as an alternative to pressure hydrants. The number and spacing of hydrants should be as indicated in the table titled "Standard Hydrant Distribution".

INSPECTION AND CONDITION. Hydrants should be inspected at least semi-annually and after use. The inspection should include operation at least once a year. Where freezing temperatures occur, the semi-annual inspections should be made in the spring and fall of each year. Because of the possibility of freezing they should be checked frequently during extended periods of severe cold. Hydrants should be kept in good condition and suitable records of inspections and repairs be maintained. Hydrants should be painted in highly visible colours so that they are conspicuous and be situated with outlets at least twelve inches above the grade. There should be no obstruction that could interfere with their operation. Snow should be cleared promptly after storms and ice and snow accumulations removed as necessary.

HYDRANT DISTRIBUTION. Hydrant locations and spacing should be convenient for fire department use. Hydrants should be located at intersections, in the middle of long blocks and at the end of long dead-end streets. To allow for convenient utilization of water supplies, distribution density of hydrants should be in accordance with the required fire flows indicated in the table titled "Standard Hydrant Distribution" (page 16). The maximum recommended spacing of hydrants in commercial, industrial, institutional and multi-family residential areas is 90 metres; in single family residential areas 180 metres is recommended. In areas where fire apparatus have access (e.g. large properties, private developments, etc.), hydrants should be required by bylaw. The planning of hydrant locations should be a cooperative effort between the water utility and fire department.

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RECORDS

PLANS AND RECORDS. Complete, up-to-date plans and records essential for the proper operation and maintenance of the system should be available in a convenient form, suitably indexed and safely filed. These should include plans of the source as well as records of its yield and a reliable estimate of the safe yield; plans of the supply works including dams, intakes, wells, pipelines, treatment plants, pumping stations, storage reservoirs and tanks; and a map of the distribution system showing mains, valves, and hydrants. Plans and maps should be in duplicate and stored at different locations.

Detailed distribution system plans, in a form suitable for field use, should be available for maintenance crews. Records of consumption, pressures, storage levels, pipes, valves, hydrants, and of the operations of the supply works and distribution system, including valve and hydrant inspections and repairs should be maintained.

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REQUIRED DURATION OF FIRE FLOW Fire Flow Required Duration (litres per minute) (hours)

2,000 or less 1.0 3,000 1.25 4, 000 1.5 5,000 1.75 6,000 2.0 8000

10,000 2.0 2.0

12,000 2.5 14,000 3.0 16,000 3.5 18,000 4.0 20000 22,000

4.5 5.0

24,000 5.5 26,000 6.0 28,000 6.5 30,000 7.0 32000 34,000

7.5 8.0

36,000 8.5 38,000 9.0

40,000 and over 9.5

TABLES

STANDARD HYDRANT DISTRIBUTION Fire Flow Required Average Area

(litres per minute) per Hydrant ( m2) 2,000 16,000 4,000 15,000 6,000 14,000 8,000 13,000

10,000 12,000

12,000

11,000 14,000 10,000 16,000 9,500 18,000 9,000 20,000 8,500

22,000

8,000

24,000 7,500 26,000 7,000 28,000 6,500 30,000 6,000

32,000

5,500

34,000 5,250 36,000 5,000 38,000 4,750 40,000 4,500

42,000

4,250

44,000 4,000 46,000 3,750 48,000 3,500

Interpolate for intermediate figures

Area refers to surface area of blocks and bounding streets. For a street without adjacent streets, a depth of one-half block is used.

A water supply system is considered to be adequate for fire protection when it can supply water as indicated above with consumption at the maximum daily rate. Certain types of emergency supplies may be included where reasonable conditions for their immediate use exist. Storage on the system is credited on the basis of the normal daily minimum maintained insofar as pressure permits its delivery at the rate considered.

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PART II

GUIDE FOR DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED FIRE FLOW COPYRIGHT I.S.O.

N.B. It should be recognized that this is a "guide" in the true sense of the word, and requires a certain amount of knowledge and experience in fire protection engineering for its effective application. Its primary purpose is for the use of surveyors experienced in this field, but it is made available to municipal officials, consulting engineers and others interested as an aid in estimating fire flow requirements for municipal fire protection.

Required Fire Flow may be described as the amount and rate of water application required in firefighting to confine and control the fires possible in a building or group of buildings which comprise essentially the same fire area by virtue of immediate exposure. This may include as much as a city block.

1. An estimate of the fire flow required for a given area may be determined by the formula:

where

F = 220C A F = the required fire flow in litres per minute. C = coefficient related to the type of construction.

= 1.5 for wood frame construction (structure essentially all combustible). = 1.0 for ordinary construction (brick or other masonry walls, combustible floor and

interior). = 0.8 for non-combustible construction (unprotected metal structural components, masonry or metal walls). = 0.6 for fire-resistive construction (fully protected frame, floors, roof).

Note: For types of construction that do not fall within the categories given, coefficients shall not be

greater than 1.5 nor less than 0.6 and may be determined by interpolation between consecutive construction types as listed above. Construction types are defined in the Appendix.

A = The total floor area in square metres (including all storeys, but excluding basements at least

50 percent below grade) in the building being considered.

For fire-resistive buildings, consider the two largest adjoining floors plus 50 percent of each of any floors immediately above them up to eight, when the vertical openings are inadequately protected. If the vertical openings and exterior vertical communications are properly protected (one hour rating), consider only the area of the largest floor plus 25 percent of each of the two immediately adjoining floors.

For one family and two family dwellings not exceeding two storeys in height, see Note J.

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2. The value obtained in No. 1 may be reduced by as much as 25% for occupancies having a low contents fire hazard or may be increased by up to 25% surcharge for occupancies having a high fire hazard. Those may be classified as to contents as follows:

Non-Combustible -25% Free Burning +15% Limited Combustible -15% Rapid Burning +25% Combustible No Charge

As guide for determining low or high fire hazard occupancies, see the list in the Appendix. The fire flow determined shall not be less than 2,000 L/min,

3. The value obtained in No.2 above may be reduced by up to 50% for complete automatic

sprinkler protection depending upon adequacy of the system. The credit for the system will be a maximum of 30% for an adequately designed system conforming to NFPA 13 and other NFPA sprinkler standards. Additional credit of up to 10% may be granted if the water supply is standard for both the system and fire department hose lines required. The percentage reduction made for an automatic sprinkler system will depend upon the extent to which the system is judged to reduce the possibility of fires spreading within and beyond the fire area. Normally this reduction will not be the maximum allowed without proper system supervision including water flow and control valve alarm service. Additional credit may be given of up to 10% for a fully supervised system.

4. To the value obtained in No. 2 above a percentage should be added for structures exposed

within 45 metres by the fire area under consideration. This percentage shall depend upon the height, area, and construction of the building(s) being exposed, the separation, openings in the exposed building(s), the length and height of exposure, the provision of automatic sprinklers and/or outside sprinklers in the building(s) exposed, the occupancy of the exposed building(s), and the effect of hillside locations on the possible spread of fire.

The charge for any one side generally should not exceed the following limits for the separation:

Separation Charge Separation Charge 0 to 3m 25% 3.1 to 10m 20% 10.1 to 20m 15%

20.1 to 30 m 10% 30.1 to 45m 5%

The total percentage shall be the sum of the percentage for all sides, but shall not exceed 75%.

The fire flow shall not exceed 45,000 L/min nor be less than 2,000 L/min.

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Notes to Calculation

Note A: The guide is not expected to necessarily provide an adequate value for lumber yards,

petroleum storage, refineries, grain elevators, and large chemical plants, but may indicate a minimum value for these hazards.

Note B: Judgment must be used for business, industrial, and other occupancies not specifically

mentioned.

Note C: Consideration should be given to the configuration of the building(s) being considered and

accessibility by the fire department.

Note D: Wood frame structures separated by less than 3 metres shall be considered as one fire

area.

Note E: Fire Walls: - In determining floor areas, a fire wall that meets or exceeds the requirements of

the current edition of the National Building Code of Canada (provided this necessitates a fire resistance rating of 2 or more hours) may be deemed to subdivide the building into more than one area or may, as a party wall, separate the building from an adjoining building.

Normally any unpierced party wall considered to form a boundary when determining floor areas may warrant up to a 10% exposure charge.

Note F: High one storey buildings: When a building is stated as 1=2, or more storeys, the number of

storeys to be used in the formula depends upon the use being made of the building. For example, consider a 1=3 storey building. If the building is being used for high piled stock, or for rack storage, the building would probably be considered as 3 storeys and, in addition, an occupancy percentage increase may be warranted.

However, if the building is being used for steel fabrication and the extra height is provided only to facilitate movement of objects by a crane, the building would probably be considered as a one storey building and an occupancy credit percentage may be warranted.

Note G: If a building is exposed within 45 metres, normally some surcharge for exposure will be

made.

Note H: Where wood shingle or shake roofs could contribute to spreading fires, add 2,000 L/min to

4,000 L/min in accordance with extent and condition.

Note I: Any non-combustible building is considered to warrant a 0.8 coefficient.

Note J: Dwellings: For groupings of detached one family and small two family dwellings not

exceeding 2 stories in height, the following short method may be used. (For other residential buildings, the regular method should be used.)

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Exposure distances Suggested required fire flow

Wood Frame

Masonry or Brick

Less than 3m 3 to 10m 10.1 to 30m Over 30m

See Note "D" 4,000 L/min 3,000 L/min 2,000 L/min

6,000 L/min 4,000 L/min 3,000 L/min 2,000 L/min

If the buildings are contiguous, use a minimum of 8,000 L/min. Also consider Note H.

OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE

A. Determine the type of construction.

B. Determine the ground floor area.

C. Determine the height in storeys.

D. Using the fire flow formula, determine the required fire flow to the nearest 1,000 L/min.

E. Determine the increase or decrease for occupancy and apply to the value obtained in D

above. Do not round off the answer.

F. Determine the decrease, if any, for automatic sprinkler protection. Do not round off the value.

G. Determine the total increase for exposures, Do not round off the value.

H. To the answer obtained in E, subtract the value obtained in F and add the value obtained in G.

The final figure is customarily rounded off to the nearest 1,000 L/min.

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Apartments Hotels Prisons Asylums Institutions Public Bu Churches Libraries, except Large Rooming Clubs Stack Room Areas Schools Colleges & Universities Museums Tenemen Dormitories Nursing, Convalescent Dwellings and Care Homes Hospitals Office Buildings

APPENDIX

TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION

For the specific purpose of using the Guide, the following definitions may be used:

Fire-Resistive Construction - Any structure that is considered fully protected, having at least 3-hour rated structural members and floors. For example, reinforced concrete or protected steel.

Non-combustible Construction - Any structures having all structural members including walls, columns, piers, beams, girders, trusses, floors, and roofs of non-combustible material and not qualifying as fire-resistive construction. For example, unprotected metal buildings.

Ordinary Construction - Any structure having exterior walls of masonry or such non-combustible material, in which the other structural members, including but not limited to columns, floors, roofs, beams, girders, and joists, are wholly or partly of wood or other combustible material.

Wood Frame Construction - Any structure in which the structural members are wholly or partly of wood or other combustible material and the construction does not qualify as ordinary construction.

OCCUPANCIES Examples of Low Hazard Occupancies:

ildings Houses

ts

Generally, occupancies falling in National Building Code Groups A, B, C and D are of this class.

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Aircraft Hangars Linseed Oil Mills Cereal, Feed, Flour and Grist Mills Match Manufacturi Chemical Works - High Hazard Oil Refineries Cotton Picker and Opening Operations Paint Shops Explosives & Pyrotechnics Manufacturing Pyroxylin Plastic M Shade Cloth Manufacturing Solvent Extracting Foamed Plastics, Storage or Varnish and Paint W

use in Manufacturing Woodworking with High Piled Combustibles Storage in Linoleum and Oilcl

excess of 6.5 metres high

Examples of High Hazard Occupancies:

ng

anufacturing & Processing

orks Flammable Finishing oth Manufacturing

Other occupancies involving processing, mixing storage and dispensing flammable and/or combustible liquids. Generally, occupancies falling in National Building Code Group F, Divisions 1 and 2 would be in this class.

For other occupancies, good judgment should be used, and the percentage increase will not necessarily be the same for all buildings that are in the same general category - for example "Colleges and Universities": this could range from a 25% decrease for buildings used only as dormitories to an increase for a chemical laboratory. Even when considering high schools, the decrease should be less if they have extensive shops.

It is expected that in commercial buildings no percentage increase or decrease for occupancy will be applied in most of the fire flow determinations. In general, percentage increase or decrease will not be at the limits of plus or minus 25%.

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EXPOSURES

When determining exposures it is necessary to understand that the exposure percentage increase for a fire in a building (x) exposing another building (y) does not necessarily equal the percentage increase when the fire is in building (y) exposing building (x). The Guide gives the maximum possible percentage for exposure at specified distances. However, these maximum possible percentages should not be used for all exposures at those distances. In each case the percentage applied should reflect the actual conditions but should not exceed the percentage listed.

The maximum percentage for the separations listed generally should be used if the exposed building meets all of the following conditions:

a. Same type or a poorer type of construction than the fire building. b. Same or greater height than the fire building. c. Contains unprotected exposed openings. d. Unsprinklered.

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CONVERSION FACTORS

Multiply By To Obtain Centimetre Cubic Foot Cubic Metre Cubic Metre Cubic Metre Foot Horsepower Imperial Gallon Inch Kilogram Kilogram of Water Kilopascal Kilowatt Litre Litre of Water Metre Metre of Water Pound Pound per sq. inch U.S. Gallons Imperial Gallons

0.3937 0.0283 35.3145 219.97 1.000 0.3048 0.7457 4.546 2.54 2.2046 1 0.1450 1.341 0.21997 1 3.281 10 0.4536 6.89476 0.8327 1.201

Inches Cubic Metres Cubic Feet Imperial Gallons Litres Metres Kilowatt Litres Centimetres Pounds Litres Pounds per sq. inch Horsepower Imperial Gallons Kilograms Feet Kilopascals Kilograms Kilopascals Imperial Gallons U.S.Gallons

St. John’s Regional Fire Department

DECISION/DIRECTION NOTE

Title:

Analysis of future fire station location for North Eastern St. John’s

Date Prepared:

March 28th, 2016

Report to:

Regional Fire Services Committee, Councils of City of St. John’s, City of Mt. Pearl Town of Paradise.

Ward:

Ward One

Decision/Direction Required:

To seek direction in determining the appropriate design, location and commencement date of constructing a fire station to provide better protection/fire coverage for the Hyde Park/Torbay Rd./Stavanger Drive region.

Discussion – Background and Current Status:

SJRFD is currently challenged to meet the response time standards for first and second arriving fire apparatus due to geographic location, traffic patterns and occupancy type.

SJRFD’s present response protocols to this area within CSJ leaves the downtown core vulnerable.

There has been, and continues to be residential and commercial development in the region requiring more resources to meet the need of expansioni.

There is interest in the Town of Logy Bay-Middle Cove- Outer Cove to discuss potential grant of land for a station within its borders.ii

There is no interest in the Town of Torbay to enhance the services agreement currently held between us.

There are several locations which can meet the location criterion for better coverage.iii

Key Considerations/Implications:

1. Budget/Financial Implications

Cost of procuring land (aprx One acre lot) Cost of initial construction of a satellite station (aprx $ 3.8

million) Cost of fire equipment, protective clothing and equipment

and fire engine (aprx $ 900,000.) Cost of maintenance and operational (aprx $60,000/

annum) Cost of staffing, including payroll and leave replacement

(aprx $2 million/annum)


2. Partners or Other

Stakeholders

Partners of Regional Fire Services Board Town of LB-MC-OC

3. Alignment with Strategic Directions/Adopted Plans

A Culture of Cooperation Develop improved inter-regional municipal relations Explore regional emergency and continuity management strategy

Fiscally Responsible Explore cost-sharing programs/foundations/models

Neighborhoods Build our City Promote a safe and secure city

4. Legal or Policy Implications

National Fire Protection Association Standard 1710 Fire Underwriters Survey SJRFD Audit 2012 National Institute of Science and Technology Land acquisition

5. Engagement and

Communications Considerations

N/A

6. Human Resource Implications

Assistance in recruitment and hiring of sixteen firefighters. On- going HR support for same.

7. Procurement Implications

Secure funding for: Design of station Construction of station Construction of fire apparatus Tools, equipment, living support items

Legal regarding land acquisition.


8. Information Technology Implications

Hardware and software for station communications, operational computer and other communications linkages and dispatching hardware.

9. Other Implications

Recommendation:

The Regional Fire Services Committee and the City of St. John’s reevaluate the projected date of building a fire station in the north eastern corner of the city and negotiate with the Town of LB-MC- OC regarding negotiate a possible land acquisition agreement for station placement on Snows Lane.

Prepared by/Signature:

J. F. Peach Fire Chief, Director of Regional Fire and Emergency Services

Approved by/Date/Signature:

J. F. Peach Fire Chief, Director of Regional Fire and Emergency Services

Attachments:

Fire Station Analysis for the City of St. John’s

i Development data from the City of St. John’s; Development proposals from the City of St. John’s ii See attached report. iii LIS data from City of St. John’s; Coverage mapping data from Fire Underwriters Survey report, attached.