Operationalizing social safeguards in REDD+: actors,interests and ideas
Constance L. McDermott a,*, Lauren Coad a, Ariella Helfgott a, Heike Schroeder b
aEnvironmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, 5 South Parks Rd, Oxford OX1 3QY, UKb School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 2
a r t i c l e i n f o
Published on line 18 May 2012
Keywords:
REDD+
Safeguards
Social safeguards
UN-REDD
FCPF
Certification
Forest carbon certification
a b s t r a c t
‘‘REDD+’’ is a mechanism created under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) for Reducing {carbon} Emissions from Deforestation and Degra-
dation and forest enhancement. In addition, REDD+ ‘‘safeguards’’ are intended to protect
non-carbon forest values. While REDD+ countries are formally requested to provide infor-
mation on safeguards, there is as yet no agreement on the relative priority of carbon versus
non-carbon values, and the appropriate level of safeguard standardization.
This, we argue, has allowed REDD+ to function as a ‘‘boundary object’’ spanning disparate
priorities. Meanwhile, the contestation of these priorities has been displaced from intergov-
ernmental processes to the various organizations involved in operationalizing REDD+ activi-
ties. This article applies a set of organizational, substantive and conceptual typologies to
compare differences in the balance of actors, interests and ideas across these organizations. It
finds that multi-lateral funding programs have drawn heavily on existing safeguards for
international aid, while private certification schemes have specialized in different niche
priorities at the project level. In regards to the substance of safeguard requirements, the
involvement of donors and investors appears correlated with a stronger emphasis on carbon
and risk mitigation while greater NGO involvement and the decoupling of safeguards design
from REDD+ funding appear correlated with greater emphasis on social rights and benefits.
These findings have several critical implications for future REDD+ activities. Firstly, the
choice of organizations involved in defining, funding and verifying safeguard activities, and
the balance of actors in their governing structures, are likely to influence the relative
emphasis on non-carbon values. Secondly, a diversity of approaches to disbursing REDD+
incentives may be necessary to maintain widespread support for REDD+. Thirdly, it remains
to be seen whether REDD+ will remain a boundary object if it transitions to a national-level,
performance based system where the design and enforcement of safeguards competes
directly with financial compensation for measurable emissions reductions.
# 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The acceleration of tropical forest loss since the 1950s—
peaking at 16 million hectares per year between 1990 and 2000
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 01865 275870; fax: +44 01865 275850.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C.L. McDe
[email protected] (A. Helfgott), [email protected] (H
1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserveddoi:10.1016/j.envsci.2012.02.007
(FAO, 2010: xiii)—has been a source of global environmental
concern for decades. Until recently, however, it was an issue
negotiated within a relatively narrow sphere of actors
variously concerned with forest sector production, conserva-
tion and/or the welfare of forest-dependent communities
rmott), [email protected] (L. Coad),. Schroeder).
.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 264
(Humphreys, 2006b). The many barriers to a global forest
agreement include the sovereign right of governments to
determine priorities for forests within their borders, the lack of
financial incentives for conservation, and disagreement on the
relative priority of economic, environmental and social values.
The result has been a proliferation of different forest-related
agreements covering an increasingly comprehensive range of
environmental, social and economic issues related to forest
management and conservation, but largely without binding
commitments or consensus as to their relative priority
(Humphreys, 2006a; McDermott et al., 2007).
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
(REDD), in contrast, emerged from within the climate sector
via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). First brought to the table by Papua New
Guinea and Costa Rica, and backed by a coalition of other
developing countries (UNFCCC, 2005), REDD was proposed as a
mechanism for developed countries to pay developing
countries to reduce emissions from forest loss. Lending
support to this proposal, climate scientists estimated that
forest loss was generating 17–20% of global anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2007), while economists
argued that slowing forest loss offered a relatively low cost
option for reducing global emissions (Eliasch, 2008). This
apparent alignment of political interests and scientific find-
ings fueled the interest of the global climate policy communi-
ty, including governments and private investors engaged in a
global carbon market generating over $140 billion USD per year
(Linacre et al., 2011), and thereby vastly expanded the range of
actors, interests and ideas driving debates over global forest
governance (Thompson et al., 2011).
The ideational anchor of REDD, as defined in the UNFCCC,
is that developing countries will be paid for measurable
reductions in forest carbon beyond what would have occurred
in the absence of REDD (UNFCCC, 2011) and that public and
private investors will fund REDD because it costs less than
other forms of emissions mitigation. Furthermore, REDD will
respect sovereign authority by channeling payments through
national governments. REDD thus pivots on low-cost pay-
ments for carbon.
Yet the widespread popularity of REDD (now ‘‘REDD+’’
reflecting an expanded focus to include forest enhancement
and low deforestation and/or low forest cover countries)
arguably lies in its ability to simultaneously promote non-
carbon values associated with forest conservation and sustain-
able development (McDermott et al., 2011b). Indeed the
emerging REDD+ text expressly states that REDD+ must be
‘‘implemented in the context of sustainable development and
reducing poverty (UNFCCC, 2011: Annex I 1(g)).’’ Furthermore,
the text calls on REDD+ countries to provide information on
‘‘safeguards’’ to address a range of environmental and social
issues including respect for indigenous and local communities,
public participation and the protection of biodiversity (UNFCCC,
2011: Annex I).
‘‘Safeguards’’ is a term that can be traced to financial
institutions such as the World Bank, where it refers to measures
to prevent and mitigate undue harm from investment or
development activities (World Bank, 2005). There are many
such risks for REDD+. Many REDD+ countries score high on
indices of corruption (World Bank, 2011) and lack capacity to
regulate commercial activity in their forest frontiers, particu-
larly in areas where land tenure and resource rights are
unresolved and/or disputed. A large infusion of REDD+ money
could exacerbate these governance challenges. Furthermore, if
economic efficiency were the driving concern, REDD+ investors
may prefer to engage with commercial producers rather than
poor rural farmers and forest dependent communities, leading
to the further displacement and marginalization of the rural
poor (Peskett et al., 2008; Pistorius et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2009).
Due to such risks, the UNFCCC text calls on REDD+
countries to provide information on the safeguards they have
in place, including those addressing social issues of forest
governance, respect for the rights of indigenous and local
communities, stakeholder participation and enhancement of
social benefits (UNFCCC, 2011: Annex I). The language of this
UNFCCC text is very general, however, and—consistent with
respect for state sovereignty—reiterates goals common to
other international agreements (McDermott et al., 2011a). It
does not define, in the context of REDD+, what constitutes an
adequate safeguard, nor how to prioritize different values (e.g.
carbon versus biodiversity versus social benefit), nor how
countries will be held to account should they fail to safeguard.
The UNFCCC has created additional time and space to resolve
issues around governance and safeguards by institutionalizing a
three-phase approach to REDD+, beginning with the develop-
ment of national strategies and capacities, followed by the
implementation of policies and measures including capacity-
building and demonstration activities, and evolving into
‘‘results-based actions that should be fully measured, reported
and verified’’ (UNFCCC, 2011: Dec 73). No decision has been
reached, however, as to how safeguards will be factored into
payments for emissions reductions in the ‘‘results-based’’ phase
of REDD+. In other words, there is no agreement as yet on what
trade-offs will be required among various stakeholder aspira-
tions for safeguarding and the receipt of financial payments for
reducing carbon emissions. Equally importantly, it is unclear
how much net benefit will be available to distribute once all of
the costs of policies and measures to reduce emissions and
safeguard other values have been considered (Peskett, 2011).
We argue that it is this very ambiguity, taken together with
REDD+’s stated commitments to resolve a wide range of forest
governance challenges, that allows REDD+ to serve as a
‘‘boundary object’’: plastic, open to interpretation by different
actors and valuable to each for different reasons. The term
boundary object describes concepts that are weakly structured
in common use, only obtain meaning in a particular context,
yet retain enough immutable content to still be recognizable
(Star and Griesemer, 1989). While they allow coordination of
different groups without consensus about interests or values
(Bechky, 2003), the danger is that their flexible nature allows
for existing agendas to be rebranded then ethically legitimated
against a socially acceptable goal (Ott, 2003). They may thus
hide conflicts and power relations when different persons
agree on the need for safeguards in REDD+ when in fact they
mean different things by it. This raises the question of
whether REDD+ will survive as a boundary object, retaining
support but leaving forest priorities unresolved, or if its
survival depends on a broader consensus regarding the
appropriate levels of priority and trade offs among carbon
and non-carbon values.
1 The other global multi-lateral fund, the Forest InvestmentProgramme (FIP), is a multi-donor trust fund channeled throughthe World Bank Group and five regional development banks. Weselected the FCPF rather than FIP because the former has the morefully articulated safeguards requirements. However, more fundsin total have been pledged and disbursed for FIP than the FCPF,highlighting the ambiguities around safeguarding under a frag-mented REDD+ funding structure (Climate Funds Update, 2011.Climate Funds Update > Climate fund profiles > Forest Invest-ment Program. Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBF) and the OverseasDevelopment Institute (ODI). http://www.climatefundsupda-te.org/listing/forest-investment-program).
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 2 65
This paper tackles this question by examining how various
actors, interests and ideas are influencing the prioritization of
carbon and non-carbon values in REDD+. In particular, it
focuses on the social dimensions of REDD+ safeguards. It
builds upon a growing body of academic literature on social
safeguards that, to date, has focused on assessing what
requirements and guidelines are needed to ensure adequate
safeguarding. For example, some authors have emphasized
the importance of procedural and tenure rights for local
communities and indigenous peoples (Kelly, 2010; Lawlor
et al., 2010; Sikor et al., 2010). Others have considered the
potential of particular verification mechanisms, e.g. carbon
certification, to ensure comprehensive coverage of carbon and
non-carbon values (Merger et al., 2011).
Our approach in this article is somewhat different, in that
we are not developing or applying a normative framework to
evaluate REDD+ safeguarding, but rather assessing how
different actors and interests are currently influencing its
design and what this tells us about their different ideas and
priorities for an appropriate REDD+. We have observed how
the ability of REDD+ to function as a boundary object, where
widespread support masks disagreement around its priorities,
has simultaneously slowed agreement within intergovern-
mental processes while encouraging a wide range of actors to
design their own rules for engaging with REDD+ on the ground.
REDD+ safeguards are currently being developed by various
organizations with different organizational mandates operat-
ing in different capacities.
This observation leads to our examination of the operatio-
nalization of REDD+ social safeguards and benefits, i.e. the ways
in which the definition and prioritization of social policies are
developing in the context of applying them to specific REDD+
activities, subject to the particular demands and constraints of
implementing organizations. In so doing, we share with
Corbera and Schroeder (2011) and Thompson et al. (2011) a
focus on how REDD+ is functioning as a dynamic and
contested instrument of governance, where rules are designed
and interpreted at multiple scales involving state, private
sector and civil society actors who interact within a yet
broader network of actors and interests concerned with forest
conservation, development and trade.
Specifically, this article develops and applies three com-
parative typologies to assess the operationalization of REDD+:
(1) an organizational typology (comparing the balance of
actors, scale of focus and enforcement or verification mecha-
nisms of REDD+ organizations); (2) a substantive typology
(comparing the content of safeguards); and (3) a conceptual
typology (comparing the conceptual paradigms behind differ-
ent approaches to REDD+). This allows us to then consider how
the interaction of actors, interests and ideas in different
organizations may be influencing the content of safeguards.
2. Methods
There are a large number of organizations currently involved
in both designing and applying REDD+ safeguards, ranging
from World Bank and UN funding programs, to regional and
bi-lateral initiatives, to certification schemes or ‘‘verifiers’’
operating in voluntary forest carbon markets (HuMa, 2010;
Merger et al., 2011; Moss and Nussbaum, 2011). This paper
selects case studies from among these organizations. The goal
is not to be comprehensive, but rather to assess how differing
assemblages of actors, interests and ideas are shaping REDD+
social safeguards. In particular, we focus on global-scale
initiatives engaged in developing international REDD+ related
policies and standards as the organizations most directly
engaged in seeking global consensus.
Specifically our selection includes two of the three largest
funding programs for REDD+ that involve multi-lateral
institutions and are active in multiple world regions. These
are the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)
and the UN-REDD Programme.1
In addition to these global, multi-lateral funding initiatives,
we then select two certification schemes focused on project-
level REDD+ activities that have verified the largest numbers of
projects selling credits into forest carbon markets (Diaz et al.,
2011). These are the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS, formerly
the Voluntary Carbon Standard) and the Climate, Community
and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA).
Finally, our analysis includes a ‘‘hybrid’’ (public/private)
initiative, the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards
(REDD+ SES). REDD+ SES involves CCBA, Care International,
and select REDD+ governments.
Having selected the case study organizations, we then
compare them according to a four-dimensional organizational
typology. The first dimension addresses organizational type,
i.e. whether the organization is a global, multi-lateral funding
program; private certification scheme; or ‘‘hybrid’’ (public/
private) organization. The second addresses the governance
structure, comparing the relative level of participation of
REDD+ countries, donors and non-donors, including NGOs.
The third addresses the scale of focus on national- or project-
level REDD+ activities, and the fourth the scope of focus on
carbon accounting and/or safeguarding.
We then apply our substantive typology to analyze the
content of the safeguards across the different selected
organizations. As with the organizational typology, this
substantive typology was developed iteratively. Specifically,
we start with the five safeguards listed in the UNFCCC REDD+
text that explicitly address social issues (UNFCCC, 2011: Annex
I a–e). We then add the concepts of ‘‘additionality’’ and
‘‘equity’’ which emerge as important points for discussions in
our analysis of the evolving organizational safeguards. As
discussed in our results section below, ‘‘additionality’’
addresses the requirement to demonstrate measurable net
social benefit. ‘‘Equity’’ refers to the distribution of benefits
Box 1. Substantive typology
1. Consistency with international agreements (UNFCCC/
COP16/Annex I, 2a)
2. Transparent and effective governance (UNFCCC/
COP16/Annex I, 2b)
3. Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous
peoples and local communities, noting the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples (UNDRIP) (UNFCCC/COP16/Annex I, 2 c)
4. Stakeholder participation (UNFCCC/COP16/Annex I, 2
d)
5. Enhancement of social benefits (UNFCCC/COP16 An-
nex I, 2 e)
6. Additionality (implied by ‘‘enhance. . .social benefits’’
but not required in UNFCCC/COP16 Annex I, 2 e)
7. Equity (UNFCCC/COP16 1.4)
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 266
and costs across stakeholders, including the poor and
vulnerable. Box 1 summarizes this typology.
After comparing differences in the substantive content of
safeguards, we then develop a conceptual typology that charts
the range of different ideas or positions on safeguards. We
consider how variables in the organizational typology (balance
of actors and scale of focus) as well as other factors may
influence the ideas of REDD+ as articulated in the substantive
content of various safeguard texts. We then conclude by
considering the implications of this analysis for the future
evolution of REDD+ safeguards and international forest
governance more generally.
3. Results
3.1. An organizational typology of REDD+ case studyorganizations
3.1.1. Global multi-lateral funding programsThe FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme are two key multi-
lateral organizations designed expressly to fund REDD+ activi-
ties. The FCPF is administered by the World Bank, a multi-lateral
financial institution, and the UN-REDD was established by three
UN development agencies: the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN
Development Programme (UNDP).
The governing boards of both organizations include repre-
sentatives of REDD+ recipient countries and donors, but vary in
their inclusion of other actors. The FCPF Participant’s Committee
grants ‘‘observer’’ status to non-donor stakeholders, including
the private sector, NGOs and ‘‘forest-dependent indigenous
peoples and other forest dwellers’’ (FCPF, 2011a). The UN-REDD’s
Policy Board, in contrast, grants decision-making authority to
non-donor stakeholders under the categories of ‘‘civil society’’,
the Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and
its founding UN agencies (UN-REDD, 2009). The FCPF and UN-
REDD also differ in their approach to policy enforcement. FCPF
activities are subject to investigation under the World Bank’s
Inspection Panel, while it is yet unclear how disputes over the
application of UN-REDD policies will be addressed.
The primary scale and scope of focus of both FCPF and UN-
REDD activities is on national-level REDD+ readiness, includ-
ing carbon mitigation and safeguarding. FCPF is currently
working on such activities with 37 partner countries and UN-
REDD 14 partner countries (UN-REDD, 2011a). UN-REDD also
helps coordinate international REDD interventions among UN
Organizations and other partners, ‘‘particularly the World
Bank’’ (UN-REDD, 2008: 1).
3.1.2. Private certification schemesOur case study private certification schemes focus on verifying
the performance of project-level activities and are more
narrowly specialized in their purpose and governance struc-
tures. The mission of the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) is ‘‘to
provide a robust quality assurance standard that projects
could use to quantify greenhouse gas emissions and issue
credits in voluntary markets’’ (VCS, 2011d). The VCS Governing
Board consists of ‘‘carbon market leaders’’ including industry
associations and investors (VCS, 2011c).
The Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)
is governed by NGOs (CCBA, 2011b). The goal of CCBA is to,
‘‘Develop standards that evaluate climate, community and
biodiversity impacts of land-based climate change mitigation
projects (CCBA, 2011a). The CCBA addresses carbon mitigation
as well as non-carbon values, but unlike the VCS does not
engage in carbon accounting for the purpose of selling verified
carbon credits. Many projects have pursued joint certification
under CCBA and VCS to demonstrate achievement of both
carbon and non-carbon goals (Diaz et al., 2011).
3.1.3. Hybrid approachesThe hybrid public/private REDD+ Social and Environmental
Standards (REDD+ SES) initiative aims to ‘‘define and build
support for a higher level of social and environmental
performance from REDD+ programs (REDD+ SES, 2011b).’’
REDD+ SES was initiated under the impetus of CCBA and CARE
International to help REDD+ countries develop standards to
guide national-level REDD-readiness activities. There are
currently five REDD+ countries engaged with REDD+ SES at
state, provincial or national levels, including Brazil (State of
Acre), Ecuador, Indonesia (Central Kalimantan), Nepal and
Tanzania. The REDD+ SES Steering Committee includes
participating REDD+ Governments, Indigenous Peoples orga-
nizations, Community associations, Social NGOs, Environ-
mental NGOs, the Private Sector, and the REDD+ SES
Secretariat (consisting of CCBA and CARE representatives)
(REDD+ SES, 2010a). In addition, there are National Interpre-
tation Committees in each participating REDD+ country
tasked with producing national indicators (REDD+ SES,
2011a).
In notable contrast to our other case study organizations,
REDD+ SES safeguards are currently not formally linked to
public or private funding, certification, or other enforcement
or verification mechanisms. Rather the REDD+ SES represent
voluntary commitments by REDD+ governments decoupled
from REDD+ finance.
Table 1 summarizes all of the above findings according to
our organizational typology. Significant variation is apparent
across these organizations in terms of their organizational
type, governance structure, scale and scope of focus.
Table 1 – A typology of case study organizations operationalizing REDD+.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 2 67
3.2. A substantive typology of REDD+ social safeguards
3.2.1. Global multi-lateral funding programsFCPF, as a program of the World Bank, draws on a decades-long
institutional legacy of formal safeguard policies. These policies
had been articulated in detail by the early 1990s after intense
lobbying from NGOs critical of the environmental and social
impacts of Bank projects, and the subsequent withholding of US
funds until steps were taken to improve the Bank’s account-
ability and transparency (Bridgeman, 2001). Subsequently Bank
funding of all projects, including those channeled through FCPF,
has been contingent on demonstrating compliance with an
evolving set of safeguards ‘‘. . .designed to avoid, mitigate, or
minimize adverse environmental and social impacts of projects
supported by the Bank (World Bank, 2005: OP 4.00, p1).’’ In light
of this history, safeguarding of the Bank’s environmental and
social impacts can also be viewed as safeguarding Bank funding
and investment.
Yet the Bank’s safeguards impose their own costs and
financial risks. The Bank has addressed such risks by adopting
a ‘‘risk-based approach’’ to safeguarding. Risk-based
approaches, now common among financial institutions,
involve pricing and prioritizing risks according to a logic of
economically efficient ‘‘risk management’’ (Greenberg et al.,
2011). Along these lines, the FCPF is developing a risk
management process to insure against the risk of REDD+
activities triggering its safeguard accountability mechanisms
(FCPF, 2011b). Risk-based economic calculations thus provide
a backdrop for prioritizing FCPF safeguard activities.
In regards to the substantive content of World Bank
safeguards, they overlap considerably with the REDD+ safe-
guards articulated under the UNFCCC. Specifically Bank
safeguards of direct relevance include Environmental Assess-
ment (OP 4.01) which considers social and environmental
impacts of Bank funded projects; Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10)
which requires a process of free, prior and informed
consultation to ensure respect of indigenous rights; Involun-
tary Resettlement (OP 4.12) which calls for avoiding such
resettlement and mitigating its impacts; and Forests (OP 4.36)
which addresses forest management for poverty reduction
and sustainable development. These safeguards together
address dimensions 3–5 in our substantive typology (see Box
1 above). All of these safeguards also address aspects of
‘‘equity’’, the seventh dimension of our substantive typology.
For example, they all include measures to protect vulnerable
populations. Furthermore, OP 4.36 on forests states a prefer-
ence for ‘‘small-scale, community-level management
approaches’’ (OP 4.36: 5).
These Bank safeguards were designed for project level
implementation. The FCPF, however, is engaged in broader
sector reforms where it is more difficult to assess and manage
the risks of its interventions. The Bank has developed another
policy tool for such broad-based activities, known as ‘‘Social
and Environmental Strategic Assessment’’ (SESA). FCPF
funded countries must develop SESAs which include a
procedure for developing an Environmental and Social
Management Framework (ESMF) that will ensure that REDD+
implementation will comply with Bank safeguard policies
(FCPF UN-REDD, 2010b). The SESA also provides an overarch-
ing frame to address dimensions 1–2 of our substantive
typology, i.e. compliance with international agreements and
good governance.
The FCPF safeguards and SESA requirements together
reinforce a strong Bank tradition where international aid and
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 268
loans are contingent on prescribed risk management proce-
dures. However the FCPF has also been working with UN-REDD
to develop additional policies expressly designed for REDD+
readiness. These include a detailed guidance document on
stakeholder engagement (FCPF UN-REDD, 2010a).
The sum of FCPF requirements covers almost all of the
social issues outlined in our substantive typology (see Box 1)
with two important exceptions. The first is that the World
Bank’s requirement for ‘‘free, prior and informed consulta-
tion’’ with indigenous peoples is not consistent with the
‘‘consent’’ required by the United Nations Declaration on
Indigenous Rights (UNDRIP). The second is that there are no
standardized requirements to demonstrate measurable and
additional social benefits. Both of these exceptions are
consistent with a greater emphasis on the mitigation of risks
than on the promotion of recipient rights and benefits.
The UN-REDD’s approach to safeguarding echoes the
FCPF’s emphasis on mitigating risks, reflecting similarities
in its role as a multi-lateral funding mechanism. However UN-
REDD is also influenced by the mission of the UN to promote
peace, security, democracy and human rights. In keeping with
these goals, UN agencies including those engaged in UN-REDD,
have committed themselves to a ‘‘rights-based approach’’ to
development (UNDG, 2010). A rights-based approach, in
contrast to a risk-based approach, prioritizes the protection
of the individual rights of those affected (Ibid), without
reference to cost.
Elements of both risk- and rights-based approaches are
evident in UN-REDD’s guidance documents on safeguards.
These include the ‘‘Social Principles Risk-Assessment Tool’’
(UN-REDD, 2010) and the ‘‘UN REDD Programme Social and
Environmental Principles and Criteria’’ (UN-REDD, 2011b). The
Risk-Assessment Tool provides detailed decision-trees for
identifying risks in relationship to three Principles (and
associated seven criteria) of ‘‘Good governance’’, ‘‘Stakeholder
livelihoods’’, and ‘‘Policy coherence’’, the latter referring to
coherence with other sustainable development strategies and
priorities. Where risks are identified, the Tool specifies ‘‘risk
mitigation actions’’ such as preparing an ‘‘anti-corruption
strategy’’ or identifying ‘‘national and/or local anti-corruption
bodies’’ (UN-REDD, 2010).
The aim of the second UN-REDD safeguards document, the
‘‘Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria’’, is to
‘‘enhance the multiple benefits of, and reduce risks from
REDD+’’. This document outlines seven principles and 25
criteria covering democratic governance, respect for stake-
holder rights, sustainable livelihoods, sustainable develop-
ment consistent with international agreements, protection of
natural forests from conversion, enhancement of ecosystem
services, and minimizing harm to ecosystem services. ‘‘Equi-
ty’’ is mentioned in regards to the recognition of carbon rights
and benefit sharing (UN-REDD, 2011b).
Taken together, the draft UN-REDD policies address almost
all of the issues in our substantive typology. Furthermore they
are more explicit than World Bank safeguard and SESA
requirements in referring to the ‘‘rights’’ of local communities
and indigenous peoples. In particular, they require ‘‘free, prior
and informed consent’’ (FPIC) of indigenous peoples, and then
build upon this by requiring FPIC for ‘‘other forest dependent
communities’’ as well. The one dimension of our typology not
covered by UN-REDD policies is a requirement for measurable
social additionality.
For both the FCPF and UN-REDD, funding for REDD+
countries is ultimately contingent on serving the central
aim of REDD+, that is reducing forest carbon emissions.
However it is no easy matter to assess their relative
prioritization of carbon versus non-carbon values given that
neither organization has explicit policies or accounting
procedures that address this. It is notable, however, that
international NGOs have conducted assessments of various
countries’ national readiness proposals for the FCPF, in some
cases prepared jointly for UN-REDD, and found that the
proposals for carbon accounting are ‘‘well-developed and
well-budgeted. . . at the expense of detailed analysis of
governance failures, the drivers of deforestation, and partici-
patory and rights-based planning and approaches’’ (Dooley
et al., 2011). While these findings may be debated, they
highlight ongoing conflicts over the prioritization of measur-
ing carbon versus addressing the drivers of forest loss and
safeguarding non-carbon values.
3.2.2. Private certification schemesVCS approved its first REDD methodology in 2010 (VCS,
2011a,b) and has approved several REDD-related methodolo-
gies since then (Point Carbon, 2010). VCS-approved REDD
methodologies do not address environmental or social safe-
guards.
The CCB standards are divided into five thematic sections.
Issues of direct relevance to social safeguarding are covered
within the ‘‘General Section’’, the ‘‘Community Section’’ and
the ‘‘Gold Level Section’’ (CCBA, 2008). The General Section
includes a subsection on ‘‘Legal Status and Property Rights’’
with six indicators documenting evidence of good governance
including compliance with international agreements, clear
legal rights to carbon and obtaining ‘‘free prior and informed
consent’’ from all rights holders, including explicit reference
to UNDRIP. The ‘‘Community Section’’ includes the subsec-
tions Net Positive Community Impacts, Offsite Stakeholder
Impacts, and Community Impact Monitoring. There are eight
indicators in total in this section that cover requirements for
the identification of relevant stakeholders and the develop-
ment of plans and methodologies to address impacts and
benefit-sharing.
A particularly notable feature of the CCBA approach is its
application of the logic of ‘‘additionality’’ to social benefits.
The concept can be traced to carbon accounting standards
such as the VCS that focus on verifiable and quantifiable
reduction of carbon emissions that is additional to what would
have occurred without the management intervention. It is this
carbon ‘‘additionality’’ that is then saleable in quantified units.
CCBA requirements for social ‘‘additionality’’ require that
projects generate measurable and verifiable additional net
social benefits that are ‘‘equitably shared among community
members and constituent groups’’ (CCBA, 2008: 25).’’ However
CCBA’s social additionality is not translated into saleable
units. Rather it signals to investors, including buyers of carbon
credits, that the project is socially beneficial. Furthermore,
under the ‘‘Gold Level Section’’ of the CCB Standards, is a
subsection for ‘‘Exceptional Community Benefits’’ with five
indicators for how projects that excel in the generation of
Table 2 – Social safeguards: substantive content of international standards and policies.
1.Consistency
with internationalagreements
2.Transparent and
effectivegovernance
3.Indigenous peoples
& local communities
4.Stakeholderparticipation
5.Social
benefits
6.Additionalitya
7.Equity
FCPFbU U U
cU U U
UN-REDDdU U U U U U
REDD + SES U U U U U U U
VCSe
CCBA U U U U U U U
Other sources: REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (REDD+ SES) v. 1 June 2010; CCB Standards, 2nd edition, December 2008.a ‘‘Additionality’’ refers to requirements to produce additional, measurable social benefits for particular actors, as distinct from less
prescriptive guidelines to ‘‘enhance’’ or ‘‘contribute to’’ social benefits.b The FCPF documents assessed include the World Bank Safeguards (World Bank, 2005); the SESA requirements as outlined in FCPF UN-REDD
(2010b) and the FCPF/UN-REDD guidelines for stakeholder engagement (FCPF UN-REDD, 2010a).c The World Bank safeguards recognize Free, Prior and Informed Consultation in all of its investments but not Consent.d The UN-REDD documents assessed include the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria the Risk Assessment Tool (UN-REDD, 2010),
and the FCPF/UN-REDD guidelines for stakeholder engagement (FCPF UN-REDD, 2010a).e The primary VCS document assessed is the VCS REDD Methodology Framework v. 1.1 September 2011 which outlines the essential
components of REDD methodologies under the VCS (VCS and ADP.org, 2011).
Fig. 1 – REDD+ conceptual typology.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 2 69
community benefits may be awarded a ‘‘gold level’’ certifica-
tion. Gold level performance addresses equity issues by
recognizing projects that are ‘‘explicitly pro-poor in terms of
targeting benefits to globally poorer communities and {original
emphasis} the poorer, more vulnerable households and
individuals within them (CCBA, 2008: 34).’’
If we apply our substantive typology to the two case study
certification schemes, the VCS does not cover any of the social
issues while the CCBA covers all of them.
3.2.3. Hybrid approachesThe REDD+ SES include the strongest and most detailed
language addressing social safeguards of any of the case study
organizations. They include seven principles and over 80
criteria focused on social issues that cover all of the issues in
our substantive typology. The word ‘‘right’’ is mentioned 123
times including footnotes (REDD+ SES, 2010b) indicating
decisive adherence to a rights-based approach. By way of
comparison, the word ‘‘right’’ appears five times in the UN-
REDD draft Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria
and does not appear in the UN-REDD Risk Assessment
Principles and Criteria.
The REDD+ SES focus in particular on how indigenous, local
communities and vulnerable groups will be empowered in
REDD+ decision-making and benefit from its outputs. This
includes specific requirements to generate resources addi-
tional to a reference scenario of no-REDD+ intervention. For
example, Criterion 3.1 calls for ‘‘additional positive impacts on
the long-term livelihood security and well-being of Indigenous
Peoples and local communities’’. This additionality, further-
more, must be measurable at the national scale, as articulated
in framework indicator 4.1.3, ‘‘national livelihood, poverty and
other millennium development goal monitoring shows
improvements in areas where REDD+ program activities are
implemented’’ (REDD+ SES, 2010b).
3.2.4. Summary matrixTable 2 provides a very generalized summary of the different
case study organizations, noting the range of issues they
addressed. At this coarse level of analysis, the similarities are
perhaps more striking than the differences, with the exception
of the VCS. Among the organizations that focus on social
issues, the FCPF are relatively less stringent in addressing
FPIC, while the concept of measurable additionality is present
only in CCBA and the hybrid REDD+ SES. Beyond these coarse
filter differences, our above analyses reveal significant
variability in the level of detail and prescription with which
the different substantive issues are addressed.
3.2.5. A conceptual typology of REDD+The debate around safeguards in REDD+ relates fundamen-
tally to the priority and focus given to carbon versus other
values. Based on the above analysis of the case study
organizations, it is possible to sketch a continuum of
safeguard prioritization, from a pure focus on carbon to an
overriding emphasis on human rights (see Fig. 1).
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 270
The ‘‘carbon pure’’ frame has been adopted by VCS. FCPF
and UN-REDD focus on both carbon and non-carbon values
and have been criticized by international NGOs for placing
disproportionate attention to carbon. In regards to safe-
guarding, FCPF has initially emphasized a ‘‘risk-based’’
approach that draws heavily on pre-existing Bank safe-
guarding requirements for international grants and loans.
From this perspective, emissions reductions may remain a
primary objective, but funding is contingent on doing no harm.
UN-REDD policies also emphasize risk, but place relatively
greater emphasis on human rights consistent with various UN
conventions.
CCBA requires ‘‘additionality’’ of both carbon and social
benefits. From this perspective, REDD+, if appropriately
designed, can achieve ‘‘win-win’’ gains to carbon and non-
carbon values alike. REDD+ SES includes the most detailed
elaboration of a ‘‘rights-based’’ approach. From this perspec-
tive, the rights of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent
communities (and other species) come first and foremost and
must be safeguarded at all cost.
Finally, at the ‘‘no-REDD’’ end of the spectrum are those
actors who focus solely on non-carbon values and oppose the
idea of carbon-focused payments altogether. Since all of the
organizations addressed in this paper are actively engaged in
REDD+, none of them fall at this end of the spectrum.
4. Discussion and conclusion
If we consider the results of applying all three of our typologies
together, i.e. the organizational, substantive and conceptual,
several hypotheses emerge. Firstly, the involvement of
investor and/or donor government actors in decision-making
is correlated with an idea of REDD+ as primarily focused on
carbon, while the involvement of NGO actors is correlated with
the idea of REDD+ as serving non-carbon values. This indicates
that investors and donor government interests are aligned
with stringent carbon accounting, and safeguards serve as
means to manage risks to carbon investments. The involve-
ment of UN agencies increases the focus on international
agreements. The degree to which funding is contingent on
compliance with safeguards and/or subject to formal enforce-
ment or verification mechanisms may also influence safe-
guards design. FCPF is explicit in its requirements and
enforcement of safeguards and places less emphasis on rights
than UN-REDD. Likewise, the case of REDD+ SES indicates that
government actors may support stringent social safeguards in
a context where their financial interests are not directly at
stake and/or where they are able to control the trade offs
between safeguarding and maximizing carbon payments.
Interestingly, the one variable that does not by itself appear
to affect the stringency of safeguards is the level of focus on
projects or national-level readiness activities. This is evident if
one compares, for example, the relatively less stringent
approach to indigenous rights in FCPF with that of REDD+
SES, even though both organizations focus on national-level
activities.
If we consider all of these findings as a whole, several
overarching points emerge. Firstly, our consideration of
REDD+ as a boundary object has helped to unpack how
particular organizational actors and interests may apply
similar legitimating ideas in distinct ways. Secondly, the
iterative application of typologies comparing the governance
and scale of REDD+ safeguarding organizations with their
safeguards content provides important clues as to how REDD+
is likely to be continually shaped in practice. This helps, in turn
to uncover important power dynamics within REDD+ and the
ways in which these might shift depending on the types of
organizations involved in REDD+ design, funding and the
certification or verification of REDD+ activities.
The importance of understanding the power dynamics
involved in operationalizing REDD+ safeguards will become
increasingly critical if REDD+ activities continue to expand in
scale and scope. While thus far there is evidence of many
conceptual similarities, as well as differences, in organiza-
tional definitions of REDD+ safeguards it cannot be assumed
that the practice of safeguarding will continue to converge.
This is because the first phases of REDD+ have exerted
relatively little pressure on organizations to prioritize carbon
versus non-carbon values. Essentially, governmental donors
can follow upon a long tradition of providing aid to countries
conditional on achieving development goals, while various
private sector and NGO actors can engage in certification or
public/private partnerships promoting the values they most
support.
The third phase of REDD+, however, involves payments
based on verified emissions reductions. As explained in the
introduction, safeguarding has thus far developed without
any commitments as to whether or not performance-based
payments will be conditional upon meeting those safe-
guards, nor how their achievement will be determined and
enforced. It is at the point of performance-based payment
that the trade offs between carbon and non-carbon values
begin to be solidified in monetary terms. It remains in
question, given the range of actors, interests and ideas
behind REDD+, whether a Phase III REDD+ will be able to
retain its identity as a boundary object, meaning different
things to different actors. During Phase III, the delivery of
national-level payments for performance will imply that a
country has adequately safeguarded environmental and
social values. This would be a problematic claim for any
country to assert, and require the solidification of bound-
aries around the meaning of REDD+. Furthermore, it would
draw into sharp relief the tensions between ‘‘country-
driven’’ safeguards, and safeguards and SESA requirements
designed to address the liabilities of international donors.
While there are many arguments for some degree of global
standardization on safeguards, there are as many arguments
for a diversity of approaches. Our coarse filter examination of
existing safeguards suggests convergence around broad
substantive issue areas, but this masks significant differences
in the prioritization that is ultimately necessary to implement
REDD+. If we look past this apparent aspirational consensus
and understand REDD+ as a boundary object that has gained
widespread support precisely because of its combination of
simplicity (pay to keep forest standing, agree on broad
principles of good behavior) and unresolved issues (whom
should we empower to do exactly what, how and why), then
we may expect its survival to depend on allowing a diversity of
actors, ideas and approaches to co-exist.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 3 – 7 2 71
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Constance McDermott is a James Martin Senior Fellow and Chairof the Forest Governance Group at the Oxford Centre for Tropical
Forests, University of Oxford. Over the past twenty years she hasconducted research and applied work on local, state and market-based approaches to forest governance. This includes fieldwork inNorth America, Asia and Latin America as well as comparativeresearch covering tropical, temperate and boreal forests in over 65countries. Recent publications include a book comparing environ-mental forest policy in twenty countries and an overview ofinternational forest governance prepared for the multi-agencyCollaborative Partnership on Forests.
Lauren Coad is a James Martin Fellow at the Oxford Centre forTropical Forests, University of Oxford. She is also a research fellowat the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC)in Cambridge, and a member of the IUCN World Commission onProtected Areas. Her work investigates the effectiveness of pro-tected areas in reducing deforestation, and the governance andsustainability of bushmeat hunting in Central Africa.
Ariella Helfgott is a Senior Research Fellow in the EnvironmentalChange Institute, University of Oxford. She is responsible fordeveloping and implementing a program of research on resil-ience and adaptability of human and natural systems to envi-ronmental change. Her research spans conceptual andmathematical modeling of system resilience and practicalapproaches to building resilience on-the-ground particularlythrough participatory processes. She is currently conductingparticipatory action research projects aimed at building resil-ience and adaptive capacity in Australia, the South Pacific,Nepal and Pakistan. All of these projects involve participatoryprocesses for multi-accountable, multi-stakeholder decision-making.
Heike Schroeder is a James Martin Senior Fellow at the OxfordCentre for Tropical Forests, University of Oxford. She is alsocoordinator of the governance theme in the Tyndall Centre forClimate Change Research and a member of the Scientific SteeringCommittee of the Earth System Governance Project (ESGP) underthe International Human Dimensions Programme on Global En-vironmental Change (IHDP). Her research interests include multi-level governance and institutions, the international climatechange negotiations, forest governance and urban climate gover-nance.
