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What has happened to Arabs?Identity and face management online

NAJMA AL ZIDJALY

Abstract

In this article, I draw on contemporary theorizing on the concept of face(e.g., Ting-Toomey 1994, 2004; Tracy 2008) and research on Islamic andArabic cultures and linguistic strategies (e.g., Beeman 1986; Hegland1998; Wilce 2005; Al Zidjaly 2006) to explore the role that the Internetplays in enabling Muslim Arabs to manage or save their collective faceonline. I do so by examining the responses that Muslim Arabs from variousnationalities and backgrounds post to the website of Al Jazeera, the notedArabian political news agency, with regard to articles that attack theiridentity as Muslims. I identify three strategies that enable Muslim Arabswho post to the Al Jazeera website to productively engage in discussionand save collective face 2 self-praise, West-attack, and self-attack. In thisstudy, I focus on the most widely-used strategy 2 self attack and demon-strate how self-attack is best understood as a form of ‘reasonable hostility’(Tracy 2008) in this particular online discussion forum because it savescollective face in a culturally 2 and contextually 2 appropriate way. Thepaper contributes toward developing a grounded practical theory of face(Craig 1989; Craig & Tracy 1995, 2008), to conceptualizing facework onlineas identity work, and to investigating identity construction at the group level.

Keywords: Muslim Arabs; internet; identity; facework; self-attack; Al Ja-zeera

What is Muslim Arab identity?

Who Arabs are, what it means to be Arabic, and what constitutes anArab identity are issues that have perplexed scholars and politicians alikefor many years (Said 1979; Lewis 2001; Patai 2010). The term Arab origi-nally referred to the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula and the SyrianDesert. With the expansion of Islam, the term acquired a new meaning,

Multilingua 31 (2012), 4132439 01678507/2012/03120413DOI 10.1515/multi-2012-0019 F Walter de Gruyter

414 Najma Al Zidjaly

referring to anyone who speaks or adopts the Arabic language and ‘feels’Arab, regardless of regional, political, or social diversity (Patai 2010).While there are Christian and Jewish Arabs, the major ethnic group inthe Middle East is Muslim Arabs, who are defined as Arabs who followthe religion of Islam (Haggett 2001). Because Islam originated in theArabian Peninsula, Muslim Arabs, whose discourse is the focus of thisarticle, believe they are the true protectors of their religion, Islam.Hence, to many Muslim Arabs, the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Arab’ are usedsynonymously. Additionally, that Arabs, who currently span NorthAfrica and part of South-West Asia, are multifarious is a recognized fact;however, Arabs see themselves as a homogenous group 2 an imaginedArab nation divided by colonialism (Nydell 2005). It is this variance thathas long bewildered outsiders. As stated by the sociologist Lewis (2001:5), Arabs (meaning Arab Muslims) ‘belong to a culture in which notnationality, not citizenship, not descent, but religion, or more precisely,membership of a religious [and a linguistic, I add, community, is theultimate determinant of identity.’ Despite Western dominance, whichcontinues till this day, the old communal solidarities among the multipleidentities of the Middle East 2 a Western term invented at the beginningof this century (Nydell 2005) 2 have remained and are as powerful asever. That is why it is difficult, Lewis postulates, to understand Arabs 2Muslims or otherwise. Two questions beg to be answered: Has it becomeeasier to understand the complex identity of Arabs, especially MuslimArabs, as a result of the Internet? And more importantly, how can oneexamine and, consequently, understand Muslim Arab identities online?

I address these questions by drawing upon research on Arabic andIslamic cultures and linguistic strategies (e.g., Beeman 1986; Hegland1998; Wilce 2005; Al Zidjaly 2006). Of particular interest are the ideasof getting the lower hand and self-flagellation or lamenting and currenttheories of face that take a dynamic view of face 2 a concept introducedin 1967 by Goffman, conceptualizing it as simultaneously social, interac-tional, emergent, multifaceted, contextual, individual, and cultural (seeTing-Toomey 1994, 2004; Tracy 2008). The notion of face and its inher-ent associations with saving or losing face is particularly relevant to theanalysis in this article because face is a key component in being an Arab(Patai 2010), especially in recent years. Ever since the tragic events ofSeptember 11, 2001, Muslim Arabs, who are best described as a collectiv-ist, communitarian, or, more precisely, tribal group (Hofstede 1990),have been bombarded with criticism and cynicism about their identity,history, and character. In this article, I investigate how Muslim Arabsfrom diverse backgrounds and nationalities attempt to manage and/orsave their face in the context of such ‘personal’ attacks by examining

What has happened to Arabs? Identity and face management online 415

responses that Muslim Arabs leave on the website of Al Jazeera, thehighly-regarded Arabic political news agency.

The data I analyze are drawn from a larger sociolinguistic project onIslamic Arab identities online conducted over a period of six monthsduring 2009. Thus, the analysis proposed in the paper provides a generalscan of the mood that was prevalent online on the Al Jazeera websiteprior to ‘the Arab Spring’ or ‘the Arab Youthquake’ that started onDecember 18, 2010. I identify three strategies that enable Muslim Arabswho post to the Al Jazeera’s website to productively engage in discussionand save collective face. These are self-praise through the evocation of aglorious Muslim past, West-attack, and self-ridicule or self-attack. Myanalysis focuses on the most widely-used strategy 2 self-attack (self-ridicule) 2 and demonstrates how self-attack is best understood as aform of ‘reasonable hostility’ (Tracy 2008) in this particular online dis-cussion forum, because it saves collective face in ways appropriate bothculturally (within the context of the lower hand and Islamic self-flagella-tion) and contextually (within the context of online discussion that aimsto be democratic and open to questioning). I thus suggest that face-attacks appropriated by Muslim Arabs online promote democratic dis-cussions (ability to see failures of self and not only failures of other) andreaffirm shared Muslim Arab identity.

The study contributes to understanding the Internet as a voice-givingmedium, to conceptualizing facework online as identity work, and toinvestigating identity construction at the group level. Specifically, thearticle presents counter-evidence to research that suggests that the In-ternet is creating diversity among Arabs (Eickelman & Anderson 2003)by arguing that the unified strategies that the various users on Al Jazeeradraw upon to manage their attacked face actually work to create a uni-fied front and, thus, a shared national identity that reaches across bor-ders and nationalities. It additionally contributes to developing a‘grounded practical theory’ (Craig 1989; Craig & Tracy 1995; Tracy2008) of face by examining how collective identities and face are createdand managed by a cultural group at the ‘restorative stage’ (Ting-Toomey1994, 2004) online. It moreover demonstrates why face as a theoreticalconcept is best suited for confrontational or hostile interactions, as sug-gested by Tracy (2008).

The paper is structured as follows. I first introduce the theoreticalbackground upon which the analysis rests. This includes (i) a review ofthe current theories of face and the concept’s relationship to identity andcultural variance as it has been conceptualized in politeness theory and(ii) a synopsis of recent research on the Internet, politeness, and Arabicand Islamic identities. The data are introduced next. The analysis exam-ines and theoretically conceptualizes three strategies (with a focus on


self-attack) that Muslim Arabs draw upon online to save face when con-fronted with attacks. The concluding remarks point to the necessity offurther examining the identity of Muslim Arabs, especially as it pertainsto new media technology. I also discuss the theoretical and practicalcontributions of the study.

Face as an approach to hostile (inter)actions

That politeness, face, and identity are intertwined is a truism in polite-ness theory. The nature of this interconnectedness and, more impor-tantly, what constitutes face, however, merit further exploration. In addi-tion, the Internet as a site for developing politeness theory and politenesstheory as a tool to inform research on identity construction online are,at present, somewhat widely accepted proposals. But they, too, still meritfurther theorization. One thing is clear, though: while foregroundingslightly different aspects of face, its place in politeness theory and itsrelationship to identity, the recent approaches to politeness collectivelyendorse Goffman’s (1967: 5) original definition of face 2 ‘the positivesocial value a person effectively claims for himself [or herself] by the lineothers assume he [or she] has taken during a particular contact.’ Accord-ing to this definition, which remains a touchstone for contemporary re-search on the face concept, face is a social, relational, and emergentconstruct that is claimed and negotiated in (inter)actions. Recent re-search in politeness similarly concurs that Brown & Levinson’s (1987)conceptualization of face, which instigated a tremendous amount of re-search in the field of politeness, is no longer valid given what we knowabout the nature of human communication being discursive, relational,and interactional (e.g., Spencer-Oatey 2007; Locher 2008). Brown &Levinson formulated a dichotomous, Western-geared, face-saving theoryof politeness, where the goal of the speaker is to minimize face threatsto both self and others. Further, they conceptualized face as a morepsychological (rather than a social) construct, consisting of two needsevery person has: positive face (the desire to be liked and approved of)and negative face (the desire to be respected and not to be imposedupon). The model’s inadequacy to capture the complexity of humancommunication has also led to a surge of research in recent years thattakes a new approach to politeness theory 2 an approach that addscomplexity to the notion of politeness and its relationship to face andidentity.

Prominent among these new dynamic approaches to politeness is thediscursive approach pioneered by Locher and Watts (Watts 2003;Locher & Watts 2005), which suggests moving beyond the old schoolimpolite2polite dichotomy instigated by Brown & Levinson’s (1987)


conceptualization of face and politeness, to viewing politeness as rela-tional work along a continuum of polite, politic (or appropriate), andimpolite behavior. The theoretical concept underlying this framework isthat of face as conceptualized by Goffman (1967), which, unlikeBrown & Levinson’s (1987) conceptualization of it, is discursively negoti-ated rather than predefined. In this approach, Locher (2006: 251) states,the notion of face is ‘socially attributed anew in every social interactionand depends crucially on the uptake of the addressees. It is, in fact, onlyon loan to us by society.’ The notion of face thus refers to

[a]n unstable, external construct that is continually renegotiated inidentity construction. In addition, an individual may want to presentmany different faces, or masks, in the course of interactions, and isnot tied to just one single role. I follow Scollon and Scollon (2000: 48)here who claim that there is ‘no faceless communication.’

(Locher 2006: 251)

To explore the hostile side of communication, however, Tracy (2008)argues that instead of using politeness, the framework under which mostresearch on miscommunication is grouped, one should use Goffman’s(1967) concept of face which is more suitable for studying ‘the ethicalstruggle of everyday life’ (Tracy 2008: 170) because many situations can-not be explained simply by a polite or impolite dichotomy. Specifically,Tracy argues that a better theoretical concept for dealing with publicinteractions involving conflict is that of ‘reasonable hostility,’ which in-volves ‘emotionally marked criticism of the past or future actions ofpublic persons that even though they are rude are acceptable and expectedin public discourses’ (2008: 184). That is, a reasonable amount of hostil-ity is at times required in certain interactions, as when democracy is anissue, because it encourages freedom of speech. Instead of reformulatingpoliteness theory to examine the hostile side of interaction, however,Tracy proposes combining the notion of reasonable hostility with Goff-man’s face concept, which is more befitting to contentious interactionsbecause Goffman recognizes that while people seek cooperation in manycases, there also exist face-attacks, ‘communicative acts that are inten-tionally rude and mean for which “impolite” is too tame a word’ (Tracy2008: 173). This argument (that face lends greater insight into hostile orconfrontational interactions) is further demonstrated in this article.

Because face-attacks require facework, Tracy (2008) proposes theoriz-ing face separately from politeness. The first step in theorizing face ap-propriately, Tracy suggests, is contextualizing the analysis of face byexamining how it functions in various situations and possibly cultures.This call builds on Eelen’s (2001) argument that politeness and face, in


turn, should be contextualized and studied as practice, which Tracydraws upon to develop a grounded practical theory of communicativeproblems (Craig 1989; Craig & Tracy 1995). In such a theory, the focusis not so much on theorizing the study of politeness, but rather on pro-viding useful ideas that would be helpful in actual practices. That is,instead of theorizing politeness theory, a grounded practical theory isinterested in advancing the field by studying specific situations 2 espe-cially those involving miscommunication or hostile interactions 2 tocome up with ideas that participants might find useful in dealing with‘the ethical struggle of daily life’ (Tracy 2008: 170). Detaching the con-cepts of facework and face-attacks from politeness theory might makethe current location of face in theory sketchy. However, according toTracy, detaching these concepts is a benefit rather than a hindrance.1

To theorize face properly, its relationship to identity and the questionof intercultural variation need to be addressed. That face and identityare interrelated is a given in research on face (e.g., Ting-Toomey 1994;Scollon & Scollon 2000); however, the exact relationship between thetwo is not yet fully understood. Spencer-Oatey (2007) argues that this isso because face is a complex phenomenon that needs to be studied frommultiple perspectives. It is a multifaceted yet unitary concept; it is par-tially cognitive, yet socially constituted; and, finally, it is simultaneouslyindividual, collective, and interpersonal. Thus, to arrive at the core ofthe relationship between face and identity, Spencer-Oatey draws upontheories of identity that lead her to suggest that both face and identityare interactional, emergent, individual, social and collective, althoughsome major differences between the two concepts remain. She explains,2

I propose that in cognitive terms, face and identity are similar in thatboth relate to the notion of ‘self’-image (including individual, rela-tional and collective construals of self), and both comprise multipleself-aspects or attributes. However, face is only associated with attri-butes that are affectively sensitive to the claimant. It is associated withpositively evaluated attributes that the claimant wants others toacknowledge (explicitly or implicitly), and with negatively evaluatedattributes that the claimant wants others NOT to ascribe to him/her.

(Spencer-Oatey 2007: 644)

Additionally, Spencer-Oatey agrees that face entails evaluations; there-fore, it needs to be studied relationally and interactionally. However, sheargues that interaction needs to be defined broadly so that it includesnot just face-to-face interactions but also asynchronic interactions be-cause, as research on online interactions have shown (e.g., Graham2007), face is an issue even on the Internet.


As for intercultural variation, there is an underlying proposition in allcurrent theories of face that the study of face and facework cannot beundertaken without consideration of cultural context. But how wouldone go about examining this? To answer this question, I turn to Ting-Toomey (2004: 1), who defines face as entailing ‘the presentation of acivilized front to another individual within the webs of interconnectedrelationships in a particular culture’ (see also Ting-Toomey 1994). HerFace Negotiation Theory explains how members of different culturescommunicate and manage conflict. The theory suggests that the root ofconflict is based on identity management on an individual and culturallevel. This means that face entails different things in different cultures,and for different people. For example, Ting-Toomey explains that incollectivist cultures, such as Asian (and Arabic I might add) cultures, theface of the group outweighs the face of any individual in that group(this dynamic is reversed in individualistic cultures). Effectively, when aperson’s or a group’s face is threatened, various facework behaviors aretriggered, depending on how important the issue is to the face of thethreatened party being attacked, the context, and so on. Face Negotia-tion Theory thus highlights that facework occurs at individual and cul-tural levels and through various linguistic strategies. This idea meritsfurther research consideration in the Arab world, which has received farless research attention than Asian and Western cultural contexts in termsof face and identity.

Internet, face, and Muslim Arab identity

The Internet provides a new site for negotiating face and accomplishingidentity work. Anderson (1999) and Eickelman & Anderson (2003), forinstance, state that the Internet has caused changes in what it means tobe an Arab. They explain that, in particular, the Internet has given itsusers (a) an unaccustomed measure of agency and self-authorization and(b) the freedom to sample alternative authoritative role models. Thisnewfound freedom resulted in loosening boundaries between Arab youthand authoritative figures 2 especially religious figures, who traditionallycontrol access to and interpretation of religious texts. New media tech-nology also has accentuated diversity within the Arab nation, especiallyreligious and political diversity, causing distribution of (religious) knowl-edge and the questioning of authority (Eickelman & Anderson 2003;Eltahawy 2010). Moreover, the Internet has arguably helped transformmany Islamic authoritative discourses (Bakhtin 1981) that were unques-tioned and taken for granted into internally persuasive discourses (Bakh-tin 1981) that are open for debate and discussion. In turn, this has ledto the creation of new religious identities, such as enlighteners whose


mission is to explain true Islam to Muslims (Al Zidjaly 2010). In short,research on new media technology and Islamic Arab identities claim thatNew Media Technology has in fact created a virtual public sphere (Eick-elman & Anderson 2003) that is causing havoc among Arab youth, espe-cially where their identity as Muslims is concerned. Two questions are inorder: What is the nature of these transformations 2 religious or other-wise 2 that are instigated by the Internet? How do we go about investi-gating them?

The question of face and identity are prevalent in online interactionsinvolving conflict. This is evident in research by Graham (2007), whoexamines how conflict and expectations of (im)politeness are negotiatedwithin an online Christian religious email group, and by Upadhyay(2010), who explores computer-mediated reader responses to ideas andviews expressed by professional journalists. Both of these works, whichdelve into the nature of the interrelationship between identity and (im)-politeness online, indicate that speaker identity plays an important rolein impoliteness behavior. This leads Graham to argue that the resultingonline conflicts among the members of the religious community underscrutiny reflect both group identity formation and the demands of themedium of online communication itself, and leads Upadhyay to argue,following Haugh (2010), that interpreting something as impolite is re-lated to constructing certain types of identities. This suggests that impo-liteness and identity are connected, because by positioning themselves asin-group or out-group, readers in Upadhyay’s study revealed their iden-tities through the responses they left online. Unlike the aforementionedtwo studies that draw upon politeness theory to study online conflicts,in this paper, I propose that integrating and exploring Tracy’s (2008)work on reasonable hostility, Ting-Toomey’s (1994, 2004) culturally-sen-sitive understanding of face, and Goffman’s (1967) original idea of faceare more useful tools for studying identities 2 Arabic and otherwise,especially in hostile interactions concerning attacked cultural faces on-line.

By extending the notion of reasonable hostility online, I not only testthe validity of this concept through empirical research in a different un-der-examined context, but I also demonstrate Tracy’s (2008) argumentthat face is a more appropriate theoretical concept than politeness forinteractions involving conflict because, as this paper demonstrates, whatis at stake in the Al Jazeera posts analyzed here is the question of MuslimArab face rather than polite or impolite behavior. My analysis fills in asecond gap 2 the lack of research on face and identity in the Arab andIslamic contexts. Most research on Muslim and/or Arabic politeness todate just blindly applies Brown & Levinson’s (1987) face-saving modelwithout taking into account current theories of face and politeness. Ex-


amples of such work that focuses on formulas used to indicate politenessin various Arabic contexts include El-Shafey (1990) on politeness inEgyptian Arabic, Atawneh (1991) on directives by Palestinian bilinguals,Stevens (1993) on refusals in Egyptian Arabic, Nelson, El-Bakary & Al-Batal (1996) on compliments in Egyptian Arabic, Methias (2003) on po-liteness strategies in Naguib Mahfouz’s novels, and Mazid (2006) on Em-irati Arabic politeness formulas. As for studying face and/or politenessonline in the context of the Arabic world, this has not been done yet tothe best of my knowledge, which makes this article all the more impor-tant because it fills in a current gap in the discussion of Arabic face on-line.

Introduction to the data

The Al Jazeera network, based in Qatar, was created in 1996. Immedi-ately, it caused a revolution in the Middle East, especially in the ArabianGulf, which up until then had no freedom of press, with the media beinggoverned by local governments. There are many studies of the immenseimpact that Al Jazeera has had on introducing Arabs to a democraticform of media (e.g., Miles 2006; Rushing & Elder 2007; Seib 2008;Zweiri & Murphy 2011). These days, it is no secret that it is a power-house in both English and Arabic and that both terrorists and Westerngovernments alike turn to it to deliver their messages. Al Jazeera is alsovery well respected by Arab people. This is so because, contrary to whatWestern governments sometimes claim, Al Jazeera presents news storiesobjectively. It allows viewers to make up their own minds by presentingvarious points of view. One feature of its Arabic website that many Arabsappreciate is that it allows its readers to anonymously respond to thevarious editorials, cartoons, and articles it posts in an effort to representthe voice of the Arab street instead of Arab authorities. It should benoted that Al Jazeera represents mainly the Muslim view or the voice ofMuslim Arabs 2 the main inhabitants of Arab countries (which are allMuslim countries). Being able to respond is a novel practice around theworld that is gaining momentum, especially in the Muslim Arab worldand among the Arab Diaspora as a tool to voice dissent that is other-wise unheard.

It is these responses to articles, editorials, and cartoons that attack theidentity and character of Muslims that I turn to in this study. The datawere collected over the course of six months in 2009 as part of a largersociolinguistic project on Islamic Arabic identities online. In particular,I analyze responses to one specific article posted on the Al Jazeera web-site on July 16, 2009. This article, titled ‘The roots of Western stereotypi-cal characterization of Muslims: Fear and mutual animosity,’ attacks


Muslims and, as a consequence, Arabs’ character and identity since, asI stated at the outset, Arabs believe they are the protectors of Islam,which originated in their land. The article suggests that the stereotypicalcharacterization of Muslims is that they are violent, undemocratic, andwarmongers who hate freedom. It also delves into various theories con-cerning the catalysts for such unfavorable and violent characterization 2is it Western imperialism and colonization? Historical, strategic, andideological differences? Geographical closeness? Or has the tragic inci-dent of September 11, 2001, caused long-buried dissents to surface?Thus, the article not only threatens Muslims’ collective face, but alsoopens up a forum for discussion and creates dialogue about the reasonsbehind their unfavorable current image. The author is unnamed, but thesource of the article is listed as the Al Jazeera Research Center. Since itspublication date, the article has generated 38 responses.3 Most of theresponses are posted by Muslim Arab men from various backgroundsand nationalities, indicated by their posted names and respective loca-tions.4 It should be of notice that Al Jazeera claims no responsibility forthe views expressed on its website.

Analysis

The analysis takes into account the following two factors. First, com-munication on the Al Jazeera website is in modern standard Arabic, avariant of classical Arabic, the language of the holy book of Islam, usedby educated Arabs only and Arab media (Cuvalay-Haak 1997). Second,the responses are addressed to other Arabs, despite the fact that thearticles and caricatures are criticisms of Muslim (Arabs) from a Westernpoint of view. This is evident because the responses are posted on theArabic version of Al Jazeera, in Arabic (i.e., it is an insider strategy). Iidentify three linguistic strategies that Muslim Arabs from various na-tionalities draw upon to collectively deal with personal attacks on theircharacter as Muslims. These are in order of frequency (from least fre-quent to more frequent): self-praise by evocation of a glorious Muslimpast; West-attack (United States of America, Europe, and Israel); andself-attack. Specifically, out of the 38 combined posted responses, 21 areself-attacks, 9 are West-attacks, 2 are self-praise, 2 are West-attacks andself-attacks simultaneously, 2 are West-attacks combined with self-praise, one strategy consists of a mixture of self-attack and self-praise,and the remaining response just poses a rhetorical question. I first giveexamples of each one of these strategies starting from the least frequentto the most frequent. I then provide a theoretical conceptualization ofthe main type of responses (self-attack) and address its communicativeeffect. The strategies used in these responses are representative of those


found in the whole data set. The posts respond both to the article andto other readers’ posts. The responses were translated as closely as pos-sible to express the sentiments voiced online. The implications of thestudy to Muslim Arab identity, face research and new media studies arediscussed in the concluding remarks.

Strategy 1: Self-praise

Examples (1) through (3) are representative of a strategy I refer to asself-praise. Out of the 38 total responses, five are cases of self-praise 2twice combined with West-attack and once with self-attack. The exam-ples listed did not occur sequentially on the website. These postings byMuslim Arab readers of Al Jazeera attempt to save threatened Muslimface through evoking the glorious past of Islam, reveling in the religionof Islam, and drawing comparisons between the Islamic nation and theWest as past colonizing powers. This strategy collectively honors MuslimArab face.

Example (1)

Don’t forget that Western civilization is built upon Arabic inventions. But wars,colonization and the current humiliation we Arabs live in are the reasons (for thestereotypical characterization of Arabs in Western media) in addition to not liftingthe Arabian banner under the one true religion of God: Islam.

Example (2)

No war for no reason … and the war on Islam is the result of the West’s realizationof the power that Islam holds due first to its attraction to people from differentbackgrounds and second because of the scientific discoveries indicated in the bookof Allah (The Qur’an) and in the Prophet’s Sunnah (the teachings of Prophet Mo-hammed). So no one has distorted or can distort Islam in its essence and in itsmeaning.

Example (3)

Don’t historians know about us? Who brought justice to the poor and weak? An-swer: Muslims. When the Muslims arrived in Andalusia (the so-called country Spaintoday), didn’t they elevate themselves and Spain religiously, humanly,’ and civiliza-tion wise or did they become stupid? Please go there and ask them. Then go to thenations that the West have colonized and savagely destroyed. And don’t say thatthe comparison is not legitimate. In any case, those were the good old days.

Self-praise is the least frequent tactic that Muslim Arabs on Al Jazeeradraw upon to manage their attacked face in response to the aforemen-tioned article about the roots of the stereotypical characterization ofMuslims in the Western media. The strategy is used only 5 times (twiceit is intertwined with attacking the West, especially Europe, for the impe-


rialistic role it has played in the current unflattering image of Muslimsworldwide and once with self-attack). The communicative action of‘tooting one’s own horn’ is accomplished through mainly evoking theglorious past of Islam but also through reveling in the religion of Islam.It additionally draws comparisons between the Islamic nation as a pastcolonizing power that has used its power for good, as history testifies,and the West as an imperialistic colonizing power using its power fordestruction, according to historical records. Thus, for instance, example(1) mentions inventions of Arabs, example (2) praises Islam as a religion,and example (3) speaks of Muslims as ‘bringers of justice’ in comparisonto the West, which ‘savagely destroyed’ areas it colonized. Overall, self-praise as a communicative strategy to manage attacked face functionsby: (1) reminding readers of Muslim civilization, inventions, and achieve-ments during the 11th and 12th centuries 2 the epitome of Islamic civili-zation 2 that contributed vastly to Western and human civilization and(2) reminding readers of the power of the holy book of Islam (theQur’an) in attracting converts because of its teachings (example [2]). Inother words, this strategy relies on self-praise in terms of the history andteachings of Islam. Readers using this strategy concur that Muslims andthe West itself know the status and power of Muslim Arabs 2 civilizedpeople with a beautiful religion who shine in comparison to their West-ern counterparts. This strategy of self-praise thus honors Muslim Arabs’collective positive face through constructing an identity of a nation wor-thy of envy because of its past and because of its religion.

Strategy 2: West-attack (USA, Europe, and Israel)

Examples (4) through (7) are representative of a strategy I refer to asWest-attack. These postings by Muslim Arab readers of Al Jazeera at-tempt to save threatened face by counter-attacking the West via a con-ceptualization of it in highly negative terms. These West-attack postings,at times, draw upon multiple strategies (see example [7] in this sectionand example [3] in the previous section). The West-attack strategy asillustrated in the examples below collectively dishonors the faces ofEurope and the United States.

Example (4)

We sin against humanity if we look at the West as hostile to Islam rather than tosee the holistic picture which is that the West is hostile to all humanity, despite ourright to see things just from our point of view. When we talk about the West, weshould think not of people but rather style and approach. The West was its ownenemy through the ages, stretching before and after what they refer to as the darkages, indicating low morals and societies, including the eras of feudalism and the


Inquisition. As for what they proclaim to be the Age of Enlightenment, it is nothingbut an enhancement of their oppression and darkness to spread to peoples of theearth ….

Example (5) (continued from example [4])

For they (the West) have brought destruction to the peoples of the Americas andall of Africa. Their barbarism even extended to reach India, China, Japan, thePhilippines and let us not forget Australia. And finally they stretched their clawsand teeth to the Middle East after they tried to chew what they swallowed in theIslamic Maghreb, from Egypt to Morocco and Mauritania … Is it hostility to Islamalone? Of course not for it is hostility to humanity … However, their hostility toIslam takes a special character because Islamic people continued with their courageto put a strain on their occupation and domination, from which they submissivelyescaped …


As a result, they hated Islam more than ever, for they have been stripped fromappearing panoramic, unbeatable forces since Sudan and Afghanistan expelled theBritish, Algeria the French, and you know the length of the list that runs fromLibya to Yemen … As for Japan, it gave up, and Vietnam became difficult. Regard-ing our Muslim countries, from Afghanistan to Lebanon, they are still teaching theWest lessons with their heroism as in Palestine, and here is Iraq making history asit is defeating the might of America with all its aggression.

Example (7)

The causes of the conflict are ideological. Islam is the last castle to stand up to thegreedy Western capitalism, which worships the dollar for which it is willing to paywith capital, people, soul, honor and dignity. Islam on the other hand gives awayeverything precious it owns for justice and liberation of its land and rights. Islam’smission in its essence resists and stands up to the greed of the West, which revolvesmainly around the fortunes of the Muslims who stand up to the lure of the dollarand the horror of weapons because of their ideology. This ideology does not fearthe terror of weapons and is not lured by the dollar because it fears somethingmore deep and aspires to something more deep. It seeks to win the greatest.

West-attack (United States of America, Europe, and Israel), the secondmost frequent face-saving strategy, occurs 13 times (twice in conjunctionwith self-praise and twice in conjunction with self-attack). Those re-sponses are aimed at managing Muslim Arabs’ threatened face bycounter-attacking through a conceptualization of the West, as indicatedin the examples provided, as an imperialistic, capitalist, barbarian, andgreedy society. The readers who strike back through criticizing the Westalso point out the strength and perseverance of Muslims in the face ofoccupation (e.g., in Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan), which, accordingto readers, adds to the West’s envy. Constructing Muslims (here usedsynonymously with Arabs) as a strong nation that stands up againstimperialism honors readers’ attacked face by setting up a positive Mus-


lim (Arab and non-Arab) identity vis-a-vis a negative Western identity.This is accomplished by criticizing the West’s present character and his-tory as being full of imperialistic agendas. West-attack postings also sug-gest that the West is not just an enemy to Arabs or Muslims, whosewealth the West seeks, but an enemy to humanity in general. This hostil-ity started from the dark ages of feudalism and continued through theInquisition and the Age of Enlightenment, which according to Al Jazeerareaders, is nothing but an expansion of their greed and hostility. How-ever, the West’s hostility to Islam takes on a special character becauseIslamic people have continued over the years with their courage to puta strain on the West’s occupation and domination. This, in turn, hasfurther fueled the West’s hatred toward Muslims. West-attack thus func-tions by boosting Muslim identities while simultaneously criticizing theWest.

Strategy 3: Self-attack

Examples (8) through (13) are representative of a strategy I refer to asself-attack. These postings by Muslim Arab readers of Al Jazeera attemptto save threatened face by insulting the current situation of Muslim Ar-abs, assaulting their character by portraying them as spineless, and ridi-culing Muslims’ past 2 especially advances in science that have contrib-uted greatly to the advance of humanity. These responses collectivelydishonor Muslim Arab face. I will first present examples of this strategyand then discuss how and why it functions in Muslim Arabic facework.

Example (8)

We Arabs live in fear of not only America and Israel but also, during the day, ofour own shadows, and at night, of our own darkness. So how on earth can weclaim we are not afraid …?

Example (9)

Before we blame the West, let’s ask ourselves first: What is one useful thing thatwe as a nation have presented to the world which we are affiliated with? If it weren’tfor the West, we would continue to this day living in the outdoors with no medicineor treatment. All the technologies at hand are their inventions and so without themwe are nothing at all; even the oil that we are so proud of, if it weren’t for them,it would still remain until the day of resurrection in the ground. And if it came outby itself, what we would have done with it without their knowledge? Because welack the courage to confess that we are dependent people, we blame them.

Example (10)

How our competitors in civilization, America and Europe, see us is the result ofwhat we have done to our selves. Would Americans respect people governed by


morons? The dumb govern while the educated are busy bringing food home becausethe cost of bread is high. Would you respect people who for more than two centurieshad nothing to do with human civilization and scientific progress? There is a lot oftalk but God can only change those who are determined to change from the inside.

Example (11)

I am astonished by some of the brothers who state that we are the source of Westernindustries. Tell me for the love of God: What are these industries? Is it the aircraftindustry, or motor industry, or submarines, or satellites, or possibly modern medi-cine, or nuclear generators; or perhaps it is broadcast stations, televisions, andmobile phone industries, and so on. Enough of lying to self. Enough of the storyof colonialism. All countries and peoples were colonized including America itself,which was a colony of Britain, and France was a colony of Germany, and Germanytill recently was under the control of Russia.


And Spain was under the authority of the Arabs and the Arabs were under theTurks, China and Korea under Japan, and so on … but we are the only peoplewho could not pull themselves up and get rid of their weakness and illness becausewe have learned to lie to ourselves and accuse others. And so we have becomecontent with that lie that we grew up with and that which we teach to our children.Our situation is not going to change if we do not admit that we are nothing, andseriously decide to learn from others and stay away from the lies and hatred to allthose who are better than us. Today everybody is better than us.

Example (13)

God does not change people unless they change themselves first. Muslims are toblame for the stereotypical image Islam bears worldwide, for had we followed ourbeautiful religion’s teachings properly and its values of tolerance, we would havebeen empowered. How could we not and we are the nation that has been chosenby God to bear witness on other nations because our religion is the final messagefrom God.

Example (14)

In my opinion, before we get caught up by the West’s view of us, we have toconsider how we look at ourselves as a Muslim nation. If we want others to respectus, we must work to change our pitiful situation, to restore our confidence and ourrespect for ourselves. Only then will the world respect us. God says (in the Qur’an):God can only change those who can change themselves first.

Self-attack is the most frequent strategy that Muslim Arabs on Al Ja-zeera draw upon in the context of personal attacks against their charac-ter as Arab Muslims. This strategy occurs 24 times in the responses tothe article on ‘The roots of the stereotypical characterization of Muslimsin the West’ (twice in conjunction with West-attacks and once with self-praise). Collectively, the responses insult the current situation of MuslimArabs and their character by portraying them as fearful, spineless people.


The responses additionally ridicule Muslims’ past achievements thatother readers, who draw upon self-praise, referred to in managing theirthreatened face. This third strategy thus intertextually references andrepeats the justifications provided by other readers by (1) breaking downand refuting the presented arguments that glorify the past of Islam and(2) claiming that Muslims have not contributed to human civilization atall. If it had not been for the West, readers of Al Jazeera argue, Muslimsand Arabs would have continued living in the past. Other responses ridi-cule Muslim Arabs because they are the only culture that did not recoverafter being colonized by the West, thereby comparing the Muslim nationto other nations who managed to rise after Western subjugation (e.g.,Japan). Muslim Arabs are thus constructed as weak people who careonly about food and worshiping their oppressive leaders whom they aretoo scared to question. These responses, therefore, dishonor MuslimArab face by holding Muslim Arabs responsible for their current pitifulsituation.

Additionally, rather than blaming the West or glorifying Islamic pastachievements and inventions, those who draw upon self-attack providethree new rationales behind Muslim Arabs’ current humiliating situation:their dictatorial leaders; their own passivity that stems from being con-trolled by tyrannical leaders and living in poverty; and, finally, theirreligious leaders, who happen to practice and advocate a violent andfearful version of Islam. It should be noted, however, that while thisthird type of response ridicules the character of Muslim Arabs in its core,self-attacks often make a distinction between Muslims and Islam. Thatis, while responders using this strategy hold Muslim Arabs responsiblefor the unfavorable characterization of Muslims in the West, they doacknowledge that Islam is a great religion with beautiful messages forhumanity. Thus, they suggest it is contemporary Muslim Arabs who havenot done justice to the religion and have marred its name with theiractions, thereby contributing to contemporary negative characterizationsof Islam and Muslims. Interestingly enough, those self-attacks includenot just a request to accept responsibility for one’s self, but also a callto stand up to Muslim political and religious leaders. Thus, these self-attacks function as a call for action to change Muslims’ unfavorablecharacterizations in the Western media. This call is evident because manyof the self-attack responses (see examples [10], [13], and [14]) include avery poignant verse from the Qur’an (Chapter 13: Verse 11) aboutchange: God can only change those people who work on changing theirinner selves or those who change themselves first. This ‘call to action’ isabsent in the self-praise and West-attack strategies. In short, self-attacksinclude responses that ridicule Muslim Arabs and hold them responsiblefor their powerless position in the world. This strategy also suggests


going back to Islam’s true teachings and taking action to change thecurrent course of events, rather than reminiscing about the past andusing the West as an excuse for unfavorable stereotypical images in theworld.

How do we conceptualize such responses?

I collectively conceptualize the examples in the above three sections asexamples of facework, in which the speaker (or in this case, onlinewriter) self-praises, attacks other, or face attacks the self. In particular,I argue that these responses are what Ting-Toomey (2004: 73) would callrestorative facework. Facework refers to ‘the specific verbal and non-verbal behaviors that we engage in to maintain or restore face loss andto uphold and honor face again.’ In a conflict, facework is at play before,during, and after a particular situation. Facework conducted before theconflict situation is considered preventive, whereas facework conductedduring or after the situation involving a conflict is considered restorative(2004: 75). Restorative facework thus involves strategies or communica-tive skills used to uphold and manage face in an attempt to repair facethat was lost. Restorative strategies ‘reflect behaviors designed to healthe damaged relationship or to reassert the individual’s capability orstrength after the person feels threatened’ (Brown 1977, as cited in Ting-Toomey 2004: 79). Restorative facework includes excuses, justifications,direct aggression, humor, physical remediation, passive aggressiveness,avoidance, and apologies (Cupach & Metts 1994).

In this article, I suggest that self-praise, West-attack, and self-attackfunction as restorative facework. To understand these strategies in thisway, we need to be attentive to culture: Ting-Toomey (2004) argues thatwhile face and facework are universal concepts, how face is conceptual-ized and how facework is accomplished vary from culture to culture.Generally, individualistic societies focus on self-face (preserving and pro-tecting one’s own image) and ‘I’ identity responses (honoring the individ-ual before the group). In collectivist societies 2 which include Arab cul-tures 2 the focus is more on other-face (preserving and protecting theother party’s face) and ‘we’ identity responses (honoring the group be-fore the individual).

While the responses in examples (1), (2), and (3) containing self-praisehonor Arabs’ collective face by praising the character and past of Arabs,the responses in examples (4) through (7) containing West-attack and (8)through 14 containing self-attack are face threats or attacks because theyare ‘communicative actions that are intentionally rude, disrespectful andinsulting’ (Tracy 2008: 173). Tracy uses these strong terms because, sheargues, impolite is ‘too tame a word’ to describe these kinds of acts.


Face-attacks can be accomplished through various means: content andform of a proposition, illocutionary force of a statement, not fulfillingan adjacency pair, address forms, turn-taking processes, non-linguisticcontextualization cues such as tone and prosody, and certain speech acts(Tracy 2008). Face-attacks can vary in force from actions that displaymild disrespect to severe contempt and are an evaluative judgment of asituated communication. This means that face attacks vary situationallyand culturally, a perspective needed in the context of these data. In theexamples provided, other- and self-attacks include face attacks at variouscommunicative levels. For instance, they include selected direct speechacts that challenge the character of the West and Arabs (e.g., criticisms,assertions, accusations, reprimands, self deprecation, and ridicule); theyalso include acts that refute past arguments in addition to using aggres-sive choice of words (e.g., using adjectives like stupid and moron), sar-casm, and performing stance indicators, which, according to Ochs (1993,cited in Tracy 2008), people use to establish identities for themselves andothers. That is, by displaying certain stances (i.e., attitudes towardsothers conveyed by word and phrase choices) through performing cer-tain speech acts, people create identities. Here, readers collectively takecertain aggressive stances that convey contempt and disrespect towardsthe West and towards self.

Self-attacks as restorative facework?

Whereas self-praise and West-attack as responses to face threats in thegiven context are perhaps expected, self-attacks merit more explorationand investigation, especially given the assumption that we normally tryto uphold our own face. Furthermore, self-attacks are the main strategythat Muslim Arabs on the Al Jazeera website draw upon to managepersonal attacks on their character and identity as Muslims (recall thatto many Muslim Arabs, the terms Muslim and Arab are synonymous). Isuggest that this strategy is related to the fact that those who posted theresponses to the article believe themselves to be in an in-group situation,away from the outsiders who originally leveled the attacks (presumably,only Arabs 2 or at least, only those fluent in the Arabic language 2have access to the responses). As a Muslim Arabic speaker who has livedfor many years in Oman and the United States, I have seen this strategyonline and offline, although I believe that the presence of outsiders limitsArabs’ preference for this strategy.5 The self-attack strategy can beunderstood as self-flagellation or lamenting that accomplishes restor-ative facework. But how can self-attacks (self-flagellation) be a face-managing strategy? How can self-attacks ‘save face’? I suggest there aretwo primary ways in which this can be explained and understood: as a


cultural phenomenon, and as a context-bound phenomenon. I now turnto an explanation of these two understandings.

First, through the lens of culture, self-attacks can be conceptualized asa culturally-appropriate form of facework. Beeman (1986), for instance,identified a strategy he called getting the lower hand in the Islamic Re-public of Iran, whereby people achieve power by portraying themselvesin a lower status. By doing this, they actually gain power. That is, byplacing themselves at the mercy of a more powerful person (self-humilia-tion), the powerful person becomes obliged to do what the individual oflower status wants. Tannen (1994) refers to this strategy as the protectorschema. This strategy is used elsewhere in the Middle East, as demon-strated in my previous research (Al Zidjaly 2005, 2006). In analyzinginteractions between speakers of different ability-status, I illustrate howa person with a disability in the Arab Islamic country of Oman imple-ments his agenda and in turn achieves power through telling hypotheti-cal future-oriented stories that portray him as powerless. These hypo-thetical stories put him at the mercy of his immediate caregivers, whofeel obliged to do what he wants them to do. In doing this, he notonly succeeds in getting what he wants, but he also becomes the firstquadriplegic man in Oman to get a permit to hire his own personalfemale assistant. (The permit is reserved for married non-disabled peoplein Oman.) The strategy of getting the lower hand is also similar to astrategy called ‘the aikido approach’ identified by Tannen (2001) inwhich people agree to face-attacks such as criticism to disempower theircriticizer. Although the effect is different here, as the criticizer is not thetarget audience, the strategy could still be viewed as a form of self-attackbecause it entails agreeing with face-attacks. Thus, the self-attacks in mydata could be understood as situated within a wider cultural phenome-non of ‘getting the lower hand’ as evidenced, for instance, by some Irani-ans and Omanis.

I argue further that self-attacks in my data could additionally be readthrough the cultural lens of self-flagellation in Islam. Self-flagellation isan Islamic cultural form of showing mourning by lamenting self. Thispractice is used all over the Middle East, mainly by Shi’a Muslims, whocomprise the second largest sect in Islam after Sun’nis. (It should benoted that because Shi’a people are Muslims, I refer to the practice ofself-flagellation as ‘Islamic,’ even though some non-Shi’a Muslims tendto view it as a Shi’a practice. In addition, because it is a practice that iswidely used by both Arab Shi’a Muslims and non-Arab Shi’a Muslims,I conceptualize it as an Islamic practice, rather than as a Muslim Arabversus a Muslim non-Arab practice). In examining the self-flagellationrituals among Shi’a Muslim women in Peshawar (Pakistan), Hegland(1998) demonstrates the transformative nature of this ancient form of


mourning. While overtly lamenting rituals, which are used by Shi’a Mus-lims all over Middle East to commemorate the martyrdom of ImamHussein in A.D. 680, reinforces traditional gender roles in Pakistan,Hegland argues that these rituals are covertly used by Pakistani Shi’awomen as a tool of self-empowerment. Through performing these ritualsShi’a women in Pakistan develop self-confidence, enhance their perform-ance abilities, acquire agency, and strengthen their social support. Thatis, these rituals not only renew cultural and power structures, they alsogive these women a platform on which to exercise individual creativity,agency, and self-expression that are otherwise unavailable to them. Thatis why Wilce (2005) questions conceptualizing the traditional lamentsexercised in Bangladesh as backward practices and argues for a system-atic analysis to get at the richness, semiotic complexity, intertextuality,multimodality, and interdiscursivity of these cultural forms that are usedall over the Islamic nation as performative practices used to affirmshared identity. By the same token, the written, linguistic group-levelself-attacks in the data could be interpreted as a form of self-flagellationthat could be seen as a way of affirming shared identity.

Second, I suggest the examples of self-attacks provided in this articlecould also be considered a form of what Tracy (2008) calls ‘reasonablehostility’ tied to this particular online discussion context. As Tracy sug-gests, in democratic discourse where people openly discuss their ideasand perspectives, there is a certain amount of hostility and face threatthat is expected and indeed contributes to the productivity of discussionsby enabling freedom of speech. For instance, in examining the communi-cative practices at U.S. school board (local governance) meetings, shedemonstrates the necessity of using certain types of face-attacks as areasonable form of hostility in democratic situations where truth out-weighs politeness. My analysis extends Tracy’s notion of reasonable hos-tility to the context of facework by Muslim Arabs online. I argue that theidentified self-attacks are to be considered as reasonable, both culturally(within the context of getting the lower hand and Islamic self-flagella-tion) and contextually, within the context of online discussions that aimto be democratic and open to questioning. It could be that in this newkind of discourse, the reasonable hostility both promotes democraticdiscussion (ability to see failures of self and not only failures of other)and reaffirms shared Muslim identity (in addition to saving face). Fur-ther, it is widely expected that politeness norms online may be affectedby anonymity factors (Herring 2007). This too could be a contextualfactor: The discussion is not only among insiders (Muslim Arabs) anddemocratic; it is also online where identities and faces are hidden, allow-ing readers freedom of speech, thereby increasing the likelihood offace-attacks.


Through my ethnographic observations and my life as a Muslim Arab,I believe that since September 11, 2001, Arab Muslims have largely re-placed evoking a glorious past (self-praise), which used to be the mostdrawn upon face restorative strategy among Muslim Arabs (to the pointof becoming a cliche among Arabs), with self-attack. In the months be-fore the ‘Arab Spring,’ it is evident online (and offline) that in the faceof personal and cultural attacks, Muslim Arabs have become critical ofthemselves and have resorted to responding (among themselves) by say-ing that they merit maltreatment. This strategy usually leads to two out-comes: the attacked gain sympathy from other Muslim Arabs (the fam-ily) or the self-attack becomes considered as a call for action, as eventu-ally happened when youths in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen (toname a few) toppled or have tried to topple their repressive regimes. Ineither case, the strategy results in tying people together through buildingand reaffirming shared history, beliefs, and face. Thus, this analysis andthe larger study of which it is a part indicate that, contrary to researchthat suggests that the Internet is creating diversity among Arabs andMuslims, the Internet also works to affirm shared identity. Hence, ratherthan seeing the identified self-attacks (self-flagellation or lamenting) aspolite or impolite behavior, they are more productively conceptualized asemotionally marked self-criticism that are situation appropriate. Becausethey are used either to gain sympathy or as a call for action, they helpMuslim Arabs recreate the imagined community (Anderson 1999) of theArab nation and create a united front. In short, this in-group restorativefacework strategy 2 shaped by both culture and context 2 is a replicaof the same self-deprecating strategy that Arabs often resort to in theirdaily lives offline when faced with personal attacks, especially after thetragic events of September 11, 2001. In replicating and recreating anoffline strategy, a recreation of the imagined community that has for solong perplexed the West leads to a strengthening of those invisible tiesthat connect Muslim Arabs all over the globe.

Concluding remarks

At the onset of the article, I posed two questions, given what researchershave argued about the difficulty in understanding Muslim Arab identityand given the claims about the Internet and Arabs. Has it become easierto understand the complex identity of Arabs (Muslim or otherwise) as aresult of the Internet? And, more importantly, how can one examine andconsequently understand Muslim Arab identities online? To answer thesetwo questions, I integrated and explored work in the areas of face, iden-tities, and online communication in a somewhat ‘hostile’ context whereopen, democratic discussion takes place. I additionally drew upon re-


search on Islamic Arabic culture and linguistic strategies, a dynamic andcultural view of face, and a contextualized understanding of discursivestrategies. My analysis demonstrates how this research can be inter-woven to identify and explain how three strategies do collective identity-work, saving face for Muslim Arabs while also creating bonds amongthem. It also demonstrates that face, as argued by Tracy (2008), is bestsuited to studying hostile interactions, including, I suggest, those thatinvolve self- and other-attacks online because the concept of politenessdoes not even begin to capture what is at stake in such self- and other-attacks. Specifically, the findings suggest that Muslim Arabs who poston Al Jazeera’s website in reference to face attacks collectively drawupon three main strategies to respond to these attacks. These are inorder of frequency (from least to most frequent): (1) self-praise throughevoking the glorious past of Islam, reveling in the religion of Islam, anddrawing comparisons between Islamic and Western nations as imperialis-tic colonizing powers; (2) West-attack via conceptualizing the West as agreedy society; and (3) self-attack by insulting the current situation ofMuslim Arabs and their character, including portraying them as fearfulpeople and ridiculing Muslims’ past achievements. I conceptualize thislast strategy 2 the one most commonly used and most analytically inter-esting in the context of face theory 2 as a facework strategy that MuslimArabs draw upon to manage attacked face in a cultural way (throughthe concepts of getting the lower hand and self-flagellation) and throughthe lens of democratic speech enabled by the Internet.

The paper contributes to conceptualizing facework online as identitywork, and to investigating identity construction at the group levelthrough the lens of face as conceptualized by Goffman (1967). In addi-tion, the paper suggests that the unified strategies the various users onAl Jazeera draw upon to manage their attacked face creates commonal-ity and, thus, a national identity that reaches across borders and nation-alities. The paper additionally adds to Face Negotiation Theory by ex-amining how collective identities and face are created and managed atthe restorative stage online (demonstrating that the notion of a collectiveface holds up online where real identities are disguised). It also adds toCraig & Tracy’s (1995) grounded practical theory of face by showing theidentified strategies to be examples of ‘reasonable hostility’ for thecontext. Further, it takes the idea of ‘practical’ seriously: I not only applya cultural understanding of the concept of reasonable hostility, but I alsoprovide a better understanding of what Muslim Arabs do in managingthreatened face, which can contribute to individuals’ interpretations ofthe identified strategies (for both Arabs and non-Arabs). That is, bystudying specific situations, especially those involving miscommunica-tion or hostile interactions, and formulating explanations and ideas that


participants might find useful in dealing with ‘the ethical struggles ofdaily life’ (Tracy 2008: 170), this article advances the field of face theore-tically and practically by providing tools to help answer a question thathas so long perplexed researchers and non-academic people alike formany centuries: What has happened or is happening to Muslim Arabs?

So has it become easier to understand the complex identity of MuslimArabs as a result of the Internet? I cannot claim that the Internet ismaking it easier to understand the complex identity and character ofArabs 2 more research is needed to fully answer this question. However,this study, which is built on data collected in the period leading to theinfamous ‘Arab Spring,’ illustrates the general depressive and self-depre-cating mood that has swept across Muslim Arabs online during the pastfew years. I have interpreted such a mood or stance as a call for actionthat has indeed resulted in literal actions being taken across the MiddleEast beginning in the December of 2010 in retaliation to oppressive Ara-bic regimes. This points to the necessity of further examining what Mus-lim Arabs do online because there is a clear indication of a connectionbetween the actions taken by Muslim Arabs online and their offline lives.Thus, it is evident that to understand the ever-complex character andidentity of Muslim Arabs, one has to examine their (inter)actions andpractices online. As Eickelmen & Anderson (2003) claim, the Internet iscreating havoc across the Middle East by giving Arabs a forum to notjust experience self-expression, but also a medium to voice their concernsand stand up to religious and political leaders who have long oppressedthem. As I have argued in previous research (Al Zidjaly 2010), the natureof these transformations 2 and the connections between online and off-line realities 2 need to be examined sociolinguistically; these examina-tions should analyze specific practices that Muslim Arabs are usingacross various websites. Only then can we achieve a better understandingof the public sphere (Eickelmen & Anderson 2003) in which MuslimArabs do identity work. Further, such research is important in intercul-tural communication, both on- and offline, as face is a fundamentalelement in communication between members of similar and dissimilarcultural groups.

Sultan Qaboos University (Oman)

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Cynthia Gordon and two anonymous reviewersfor their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


Notes1. Due to the complexity and centrality of face 2 especially in confrontational or

intercultural interactions, and in order to get at the exact relationship it has withidentity, Arundale (2010) also argues that face should be theorized separately frompoliteness theory.

2. Many studies incorporate the exploration of facework as part of identity construc-tion (e.g., Adelswärd & Nilholm 2000; Gordon 2007).

3. Al Jazeera lists the responses as 44 but since some responses are divided into twoor three parts, the actual number of responses is 38.

4. The Al Jazeera article ‘The roots of Western stereotypical characterization ofMuslims: Fear and mutual animosity’ and the reader responses it generated canbe found at: HYPERLINK “http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B7262D83-A743-4AED-9B87-79D9E5479E13.htm”

5. I hypothesize that Arabs will not use self-attack as a restorative facework strategyin face-attack style responses to editorials on Al Jazeera’s English website 2 atleast, not to the degree that was observed in this study. In a previous project (AlZidjaly 2010), I found that Muslim Arabs prefer not to ‘air their dirty laundry.’This finding emerged in investigating the transformations that the Muslim Arabidentity is going through because of the Internet. Specifically, the analysis demon-strates how the newly constructed identity of a Muslim enlightener is created bycreating and juxtaposing two different identities in chatroom discourse: admittingto Muslim diversity and disagreement with insiders (other Muslims) and never ad-mitting to diversity or in-group disagreement when non-Muslims are in the chatgroups. Therefore, I hypothesize that on the English version of the Al Jazeerawebsite, Arabs will use more West-attack. However, there is no such option (i.e.,posting comments) on the Al Jazeera English version website to test this hypoth-esis).

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Najma Al Zidjaly is Associate Professor of Linguistics in the Department of English(College of Arts & Social Sciences) at Sultan Qaboos University, Oman. She is theeditor of Building bridges: Integrating language, linguistics, literature and translation inpedagogy and research (2009). Her other publications include articles in Language inSociety, Visual Communication and Communication & Medicine; and chapters in Hand-book of research on discourse behavior and digital communication: Language structuresand social interaction (2010) and Multimodality in practice: Investigating theory-in-prac-tice-through methodology (2011). Her primary research interests are disability, humanagency, geosemiotics, multimodality, new media technology, and Arab (Omani) iden-tity.Address for correspondence: English Department College of Arts & Social Sciences,Sultan Qaboos University, P.O. Box. 42, Al Khod, 123 Oman.e-mail: [email protected]

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