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A Report on the Patrol Special Police and Community Safety in San Francisco
EDWARD STRINGHAM, Ph.D.Research Fellow, The Independent Institute,
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, San Jose State Universityand
Shelby Cullom Davis Visiting Associate Professor of American Business and Economic Enterprise, Trinity College
Independent Institute Working Paper Number 74
December 21, 2009
100 Swan Way, Oakland, CA 94621-1428 • 510-632-1366 • Fax: 510-568-6040 • Email: info@independent.org • http://www.independent.org
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Private Policing in San Francisco
Abstract:ThispaperprovidesananalysisofoneofthelongestestablishedprivatepolicegroupsinAmerica,theSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP).DatingbacktothedaysoftheGoldRush,thePSPareacollectionofindependentcompaniesthatthecitycharterauthorizestopatroldifferentneighborhoodsattherequestofprivateclients.AsurveywasconductedtoinvestigatewhyprivatepartiespaythePSPratherthansimplyrelyingongovernmentpolice.TheresultsindicatethatthePSPplayanimportantroleinprovidingsafetythatcitizenscannotobtainiftheyrelysolelyontheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment’ssafetyservices.However,despitetheseevidentbenefits,thePSPfacesomechallengingpoliticalandregulatoryobstacles.ThisarticlefindsevidencethatmembersoftheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment(SFPD)havebeenusingregulationstorestrictcompetitionandeffectivelytakeoverbusinessusingtheforceoflaw.Thisreportdocumentssomeoftheexpensesthesepracticescosttaxpayersandofferssomesuggestionsforregulatoryreform.Ifit’snotacorefunction,perhapsweshouldnolongerdoit.—KenBukowski,chieffinancialofficer,SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment1Mypersonalopinionisthereisaplaceforthem[thePatrolSpecialPolice]inSanFranciscopolicing....They’reanassetthat’sessentiallycost‐freefortheCity.—TheresaSparks,formerpresident,SanFranciscoPoliceCommission2Letusbringbackaveryeffectivetool[thePatrolSpecialPolice]tomakethestreetsofSanFranciscosafer.—EarlSanders,formerpolicechief,SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment3TableofContents
1. Introduction 2
2. SurveyingtheRoleoftheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice 7
3. RegulationstoPromoteSafetyorRestrictCompetition 12
4. EstimatingSomeoftheCostsofRegulationandMonopolization 19
5. ConclusionandRecommendations 24
Appendix.SurveyResponses 27
1RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/S.F.P.D.‐struggling‐to‐make‐budget‐cuts38585652.html.2RetrievedSeptember1,2009fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Extra_force_may_be_on_its_way_out.html.3RetrievedSeptember1,2009fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1997/05/15/MN73142.DTL#ixzz0POif0y9S.
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1. Introduction
SanFrancisco,likemostotherCaliforniacities,isfacinglargebudgetdeficits,andquestionsexist
astowhethercontinuing(andincreasing)policedepartmentbudgetlevelscomparedtopreviousyears
isactuallysustainableinthelongrun.4Budgetcutshaveyettobemade,butsomepeopleworrythat
possiblefuturelayoffsorattritionmayincludeupto325officersintheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment
(SFPD),leadingmanytoaskwhowillkeepSanFranciscosafe.5Althoughmanypeoplebelievethatsafety
issolelythedomainofagovernment‐fundedpoliceforce,thefamousurbantheoristJaneJacobsand
manyothershavepointedoutthatcommunitysafetyisprovidedbynumerousfactors.Jacobs
highlightedthathavingmany“eyesonthestreet”(multiplepeopleobservingtheactivitiesina
community)canhaveamoreimportantimpactonsafetythanattemptingtojustrelyonone
government‐fundedagency.Asafactualmatter,policingcomesfrommanysources,notjustfrom
government‐fundedpolice.FromthewidespreadprivatefootpatrolwatchesinearlymodernEnglandto
theincreasinglycommonself‐helpneighborhoodgroupsinmanycommunitiestoday,various
nongovernmentalorganizationsandprivatepolicegroupshaveplayedandareplayinganincreasingly
importantroleinprovidingsafety.6
Thispaperprovidesananalysisofoneofthelongestestablishedprivatepolicegroupsin
America,theSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP).ThePSPareacollectionofindependent
companiesthatthecitycharterauthorizestopatroldifferentneighborhoodsor“beats”inSanFrancisco
attherequestofprivateclients.ThePSPdatebacktothedaysoftheGoldRushandwereincorporated
4AJanuary2009KCBSheadlinereported,“S.F.P.D.[SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment]ForcedtoTakeaHacksawtoItsBudget,”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.kcbs.com/pages/3751731.php?.AJune2009SanFranciscoExaminerheadlinereported,“Citybudgetcutsposerisktopublicsafety.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/City‐budget‐cuts‐pose‐risk‐to‐public‐safety‐‐47888112.html.5RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/City‐budget‐cuts‐pose‐risk‐to‐public‐safety‐‐47888112.htmlandhttp://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2009/06/heads_of_fire_police_departmen.php.6Jenkins,Morris.2006.GullahIslandDisputeResolution:AnExampleofAfrocentricRestorativeJustice.JournalofBlackStudies,37(2):299–319.ForaliteraturereviewofthesetrendsseeBenson,Bruce(1998)ToServeandProtect:PrivatizationandCommunityinCriminalJustice.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.
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intheSanFranciscoCityCharterin1856.7TodaythePSPhavehundredsofaccounts,includingsmallto
largebusinesses,merchantandresidentialassociations,churches,streetfairorspecialeventorganizers,
residentialcommunities,andindividualhomeowners.ThePSPprovideawidevarietyofsecurityservices
andactivities,includingpatrollingstreets;standingguardatorpatrollingnearprivatepropertysuchas
businessesandhomes;providingsecuritychecksinsideandoutsideshopsandoffices;speakingwith
residents,businessownersandtheiremployeesandpatrons,andpassersbyonthestreetsandadvising
aboutsafety;discouragingloiteringandvagrancy;interveningintopotentiallydisruptivesituations;
respondingtocomplaintsofshopliftingandnoise;andgenerallymaintainingorderandpeaceonthe
streets.ItistobenotedthatthePSParenotjuststationarypropertyguardsatonelocation;by
municipalcodetheyaretheonlyprivatepatrolpermittedtopatrolthestreetsastheywalkfrom
accounttoaccountaswellasrespondtosafetyemergenciesintheirneighborhood.Inadditionitisto
benotedthatwhetherornotaprivateclientisinvolved,sometimesPSPofficersaffirmativelyassist
anyoneinneed,andtheycanbecalledupontobackupthepublicpoliceandassistwithcrimescene
control.Thustheyprovideapolicepresencetomanymoreindividualsthanjusttheirclients.ManyPSP
officershaveworkedcontinuously,servingaspecificclientorservingintheirneighborhood,foryears,
thusmakingthemaknowncommodityinthecommunity.
TheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolicepresentaninterestingcasetostudybecauseelementsof
theirstructureandnatureofservicerenderthemuniqueintheUnitedStates,includingtheparticular
effectivenessoftheirmodelofdeliveringpolicingservices.ProfessorJamesPastorwritesthatthePSP
have“whatmaybethemostuniqueprivatepolicingarrangementinAmerica.”8However,manypeople
areunawareofhowthePSParefundedandhowmanyandwhomtheyserve.Ineconomicterms,the
7Theprecisedateoftheirformationisuncertainbut“SpecialPolice”arementionedinTheDailyAltaCaliforniaonApril1,1851.IowethispointtoHeatherCassel,whoiswritingahistoryofthePatrolSpecialPolice.8Pastor,James.2009.TerrorismandPublicSafetyPolicing:ImplicationsfortheObamaPresidency.CRCPress,p251.[[AU:Pleaseprovidepublisher’slocation.]]
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PSPprovideaservicethatwouldbeclassifiedasapublicgood.Theirservices,whichprivateclientspay
for,providespilloverbenefitstoanyonewhodesirestokeepSanFranciscosafe.Inthisway,private
clientswhosemaininterestmaybeimprovingtheirpersonalorbusinesssafetyareintentionallyor
inadvertentlyprovidingbenefitstotheirentireblockorneighborhood.Anotherimportantand
interestingfeatureofthePSPisthattheydonotdrainmunicipalbudgets,butarefundedbyprivate
clientswhowanttokeeptheirneighborhoods,placesofbusiness,andpropertiessafe.PSPservicesare
consumerdefinedandconsumerdriven,andofficersprovideservicestothosewhomtheSanFrancisco
PoliceDepartment(SFPD)doesnotalwayshavethetimeorresourcestoserve.ThePSPbecome
profitableandremaininbusinesssolelybyvirtueoftheirsuccessinservingandsatisfyingtheirclientsin
makingthecommunitysafer.
Yetdespitetheseevidentbenefits,thePSPfacesomechallengingpoliticalandregulatory
obstacles.Intheearly1990scertainmembersoftheSanFranciscoPoliceUnionnoticedthatthePSP
hadproductive,andhenceprofitable,contractswithmanybusinessessuchasmajorshoppingcenters,
ornot‐for‐profitgroupssuchaslargehousingprojectmanagementorganizations.Theunionconceived
ofanewmarketingfrontierthatmightbenefitmembershipandprovideanewsourceofincome.
AlthoughthelawpreventsmembersoftheSFPDfromworkingmorethantwentyhoursofvoluntary
overtimeperweek,officersfoundorinventedaworkaroundinwhatisknownasthe10(b)program.9
9SanFranciscoWeeklyreports,“Unlikeovertimeincurredduringthecourseofordinaryduty,whichispaidbytaxpayersaspartofthePoliceDepartment’s$406millionbudget,the10(b)program—bytappingbusinessesandinstitutionswillingtopayfortheextraservices—hitsthePatrolSpecialPolicewhereithurts.TheS.F.P.D.doesn’tadvertisehowmuchtheprogramrakesin.ButdocumentsthedepartmentprovidedtoSFWeeklyinresponsetoapublicrecordsrequestshowthat10(b)garnered$9.5millionduringthe2006–2007fiscalyearalone,upfrom$6.6millionfiveyearsago.
“Forrank‐and‐filecops,whoearntimeandahalfforsuchwork,theprogramcanbelucrative.Uptohalfofthe2,300‐memberpoliceforceparticipatesinthe10(b)programinagivenyear,recordsshow.Rulesrestrictofficersfromworkingmorethan20hoursofvoluntaryovertimewithinsevendays,butsomecopsstillmanagetorackuphugesums.Forexample,inasexdiscriminationlawsuitagainsttheS.F.P.D.,oneofficer,SusanRolovich,whoclaimsthedepartmentunfairlypunishedherinpartbytakingawayher10(b)work,earnedmorethan$185,000—$100,000ofitovertime—inasingleyear,recordsshow.
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SFPDofficersmayexceedovertimelimitsbyacceptingandworkingassignmentsfromthe10(b)
“overtimeprogramwhichallowstheuseofuniformedpoliceofficersassecuritypersonnelatspecial
events,sportsmatches,constructionsites,filmingsites,danceclubs,departmentstores.”10Ifthe
administeringSFPDcouldconvinceexistingPSPclientstohireSFPDofficersinsteadthroughtheir10(b)
overtimeprogram,thentheseSFPDofficerscouldboosttheirsalariesandalsothebaserateuponwhich
theirpensionswouldbecalculated.
HourlyratestheSFPDbilledunderthe10(b)programarenearlydoublethePSP’srates.Today
anoff‐dutySFPDofficerbillsroughly$87perhour,withanupcharge(extrafee)ifamotorcycleorpatrol
carisrequested,andontopofthata22percentadministrativefeeisinvoiced.Thebaseratetherefore
approaches$106perhour,whileaPSPofficer,includinghisorherpatrolcar,canbehiredforroughly
$48perhour.AlthoughhiringanSFPDofficerthrough10(b)istypicallyuneconomicalforthosepaying
thebillswhencomparedtothePSPrate,itprovidestremendousbenefitstotheofficersbeinghired,so
membersoftheSFPDhaveusedvariousmeanstomakesurethattheygethired.Thesetacticshaveled
tovariouslawsuitsallegingthattheSFPDisviolatingantitrustlawsforactingmonopolistically.For
example,thepolicecommissionerhasdelegatedbroadandvirtuallyuncircumscribedauthoritytothe
SFPDtoadministerthePSPprogram,includingscreeningapplicants.Withoutanytimelimitssetbyrule
orregulation,theSFPDhasexercisedthisauthoritytodelayformonthsoryearsonend,orinsome
casesevenlose,applications.TheSFPDhasalsocrosssubsidizedthe10(b)programwithgeneralfunds
sothatSFPDofficerscanofferratesthatappeartobecompetitivewiththosechargedbythePSP.Not
onlymustthehourlyratebecomparedtodeterminecost,butalsotheeffectivenessofthe10(b)officer
workingafteralreadyputtinginanine‐to‐fiveregularpolicingassignment,versusaPSPofficerwho
‘The10(b)programhaskilledus,’saysSamReyes,whohasbeenapatrolspecialbeatownersincethe1960s.HeinsiststhattheS.F.P.D.’santipathytowardthespecialsisowingto‘the10(b)pie.’”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/2.Seealsohttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/3.10RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3731.
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neverworksovertime,butalwaysservesfreshonregularassignment.Theseandotherallegationswill
bediscussedinmoredetaillater,butonefactthatremainsindisputableisthatsincethenumberand
extentofregulationsgoverningthePSPstartedincreasinginthe1990s,thenumberofPSPofficershas
decreasedfrommorethan200toabout40orsotoday.11
Severalpotentialhypothesesexistaboutwhyincreasednumbersofregulationsarebeing
promulgatedtorestrictthePSPconcerninganincreasedrangeofbehaviorsortopics.Onehypothesisis
thatmembersoftheSFPDareactinginitscapacitytomaximizethepublicgood.Asecondhypothesisis
thatmembersoftheSFPDhavebeenusingregulationstorestrictcompetitionandeffectivelytakeover
businessusingtheforceoflaw.Ifthissecondhypothesisistrue,thenregulationsareactuallyharming
residentsandmakingSanFranciscolesssafe.
Toevaluatethesetwohypotheses,anin‐depthinvestigationwasconductedexaminingevidence
fromvarioussources.Evidencewasgatheredfromgovernmentdocuments,lawjournals,newsmedia,
andpolicecommissionmeetings.TolearnmoreabouttheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice,I
conductedasurveyoftheirclientstogatherdataabouthowtheyareperceived.Theresultsarequite
informative.
EvidenceindicatesthatthePSPplayanimportantroleinprovidingsafetythatcitizenscannot
obtainiftheyhavetorelyonthesafetyservicesoftheSFPD.Thisreportprovidesananalysisofthe
PSP’sroleinprovidingcommunitysafetyinSanFrancisco.Itthenprovidesananalysisofsomeofthe
regulatoryobstaclesthattheyfaceandconcludesbyofferingspecificpolicyrecommendations.
11RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐03‐05/news/san‐francisco‐patrol‐special‐police‐rent‐a‐cops‐with‐guns/.
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2. SurveyingtheRoleoftheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice
TheaveragepersonmaynothavemuchspecificknowledgeabouttheSanFranciscoPatrol
SpecialPolice(PSP),iftheyevenknowabouttheexistenceofthispoliceforceatall.However,anyone
whohasgonetoornearhundredsofindividualbusinessesandmerchantassociations,not‐for‐profit
andhomeowners’organizations,orindividualresidentswhohirethePSPhashadanindirect
relationshipwiththeseofficers.TohelpcollectbaselineclientopinionsaboutthePSP,aprintedsurvey
wasdelivered,primarilybyhand,toatotalof146clients.12Theclientswereaskedtocompletethe
anonymoustwo‐pagesurveyandmailitbackintheincludedstampedaddressedenvelope.The
responseratewasverygood,withsixty‐threesurveys(43percent)completed,givingalargeenough
samplesizetoanalyzeandfromwhichtodrawreasonableconclusions.Thesurveyincludedsome
questionsthataskedrespondentstocheckboxes(suchaswith“Yes”or“No”questions)andother
questionsthataskedrespondentstowritereplies.Thequestionsweredesignedtobenon‐leadingand
toenablecomparisonofthePSP’sperformancewiththatofthepublicpolice.Thecompletesurveyis
includedinAppendixA,andasummaryoftheresultsisprovidedinAppendixB.
AnswerstoquestionsaboutwhyclientspaytohirethePSPratherthansimplyrelyontaxpayer‐
financed“free”publicpolicewereparticularlyinformative,thusallresponsesareincludedinthe
appendix.Manyacademicstheorizethatpublicpoliceprovideallnecessaryservicesandlaw
enforcementthatareneededtoaddressproblemsofcrimeanddisorder.However,answerstothe
surveyclearlyrevealedthatthePSPfillneedsthatarenotmetbytheSFPD.ThePSPofferservicesand
protectionthatclientsstatetheycouldnotobtainotherwise.Completeresponsestosomeoftheopen‐
endedsurveyquestionsareincludedintheappendix.
12Thesurveywasgiveninprintedformandhandedoutinperson(orinsomecasesdroppedinthemail)alongwitha$2bill,whichisacommonwayofinducingahigherresponserate.SeeRizzo,Louis,InhoPark,BradfordHesse,andGordonWillis.“EffectofIncentivesonSurveyResponseandSurveyQuality:ADesignedExperimentWithintheHINTSIRDDSample.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009.fromhttp://www.allacademic.com/meta/p116055_index.html.
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Theresultscanbesummarizedas:
1. ThePSPprovideservicesthatmembersoftheSFPDdonotprovide.2. TheSFPDdoesnotrespondquicklytomanytypesofcallswhereasthePSPdoes.3. Crimeisviewedasaproblem,andthePSPareseenasaproactiveratherthanareactive
solutiontothatproblem.4. MostresponsesindicatethattheSFPDisnotresponsivetotheirneeds.
Inadditiontoopen‐endedquestions,manywere“Yes”or“No”questions,andtheanswerswerealso
quitetelling.Ninety‐sevenpercentofrespondentsanswered“Yes”whenasked,“DoesyourPSP[Patrol
SpecialPolice]officermakeyourneighborhoodamorefriendlyandsafeplace?”(seeFigure1).Eighty‐
ninepercentofrespondentsanswered“Yes”whenasked,“Doyoufeelyouropinionmakesadifference
inwhatyourPSP[PatrolSpecialPolice]officerdoes?”(seeFigure3).Thiscontrastsstarklywiththe
perceptionoftheSFPD,whereonly47percentofrespondentsanswered“Yes”whenasked,“Doyou
feelyouropinionmakesadifferenceinwhattheSFPDdoes?”(seeFigure2).Theseresponsesindicate
thatpeoplefeelthatthePSParemoreresponsivetotheirneedsthanaretheSFPD.
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Figure1.DoesyourPatrolSpecialPoliceofficermakeyourneighborhoodamorefriendlyandsafeplace?
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Figure3.DoyoufeelyouropinionmakesadifferenceinwhatyourPatrolSpecialOfficerdoes?
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Figure4.DoyouthinkthePatrolSpecialPolicewouldbeaseffectiveiftheywerewearinglightblue?
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Otherquestionsaskedaboutvariousregulations,suchas“Doyouthinktheywouldbeas
effectiveiftheywerewearinglightblue?”;77percentofrespondentsanswered“No”(seeFigure4).
Clientsperceivethisregulationaslessconcernedwithsafetyandmoreconcernedwithhandicapping
thePSP.Inansweringthisquestion,manyclientsexpressedorindicatedthatforcingPSPofficerstowear
lightbluewouldmakethemlooklessseriousandhencelesseffective.
Anotherquestionasked,“OneoftherequirementsforyourPSPofficeristhathe/sheturnover
allspecificdetailsofyourcontract,name,andfeesforservicestothepolicecommission.Doesthat
mattertoyou?”Anumberofpeopleexpressedconcernwhileonlytwosawitasagoodthing.For
example,clientsreplied:“Seemslikeaninvasionofprivacythatisn’tnecessaryformysecurityorthe
policecommission’sabilitytodotheirjob”(respondentnumber26),“Iwouldlikeanonymity”(number
34),“PersonalinformationIchoosetorelease”(number40),“MycontractiswiththePSP.The
commissionhasneverapproachedmeforopinionorhelp;Idoubtitevenknowsourproblems”
(number6),“Idonotunderstandthereasonorpurposeforit”(number23),“Becausemyfinancial
recordsarenoone’sbusiness!Iknowofnoreasontheyneedthisinfosinceanofficer’sillegalbehavior
ifanycanbeprosecutedunderexistingcriminallaws”(number19).
Inaddition,thequestionwasasked,“SomepeoplebelievethatthePSPofficersoperateasif
theyareabovethelaw.Doyouhaveanyevidenceofthat?”Forthisquestionthenearuniversalanswer
was“No.”13Onerespondent(number41)wrote,“Youarekidding,right!”Thereisnoevidenceforthe
claimreportedinthemediathattheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolicebehaveunlawfullyorare
“freewheeling.”14Inaddition,inallmyreadingofnewsarticles,Ifoundnofactualevidencebyany
13Everysinglerespondentanswered“No”tothatquestionwiththeoneexceptionofrespondent#31whohappenedtoanswer“Yes”oneverysinglequestiononthesurveyregardlessofwhatthequestionasked,indicatingtherespondentwasnotreadingthequestions.14RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,945720,00.html.
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reporteroranycitationofclientcomplaintsregardingunlawfulbehaviorbythePSP.Infact,allevidence
indicatesthatthePSPareprovidingservicestomakethecommunitysafer.
3. RegulationstoPromoteSafetyorRestrictCompetition
Manyacademicwritersbelievethatgovernmentalregulationsareonlyimplementedtoprotect
thepublic.Nobelprize‐winningeconomistGeorgeStigler,however,pointedoutthatmany
governmentalregulationsareactuallyimplementedtoadvancespecialinterestsattheexpenseofthe
public.Manyoftheseregulationsarepromotedinthenameofthepublicgood,butinrealityareused
torestrictcompetition.FamousexamplesincludethemonopolyprivilegesgiventotheformerAT&T
(theBellSystem)orcablecompaniesinthe1980s(andinmanyplacestoday)whereregulations
effectivelypreventedwould‐becompetitorsfromenteringthetelecommunicationsmarket.AT&Thada
clearvestedinterestininfluencingregulatorstopreventwould‐becompetitorssuchasMCIandSprint
fromenteringthemarketplacesinceAT&Tknewcompetitionwouldleadtolowerpricesforthepublic
andlowerprofitsforthemonopolist.
InSanFrancisco,thePatrolSpecialPolice(PSP)andtheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment(SFPD)
havecoexistedforthepast160years.Overtime,however,theSFPDhasgraduallyexpandedits
publicizedorintendedroleintoareashistoricallyprovidedbythePSP.TheSFPD’sroleoriginallyfocused
onlawenforcementregardingseriouscrimesagainstpropertyorperson,includingviolenceand
predationbygangsorresultingfromgangwarfare,undercoverinvestigations,criminalarrest,
subsequentinvestigation,andprosecutionassistance.Todaytheyhavemovedintowhatisknownas
“communitypolicing,”amodelofpolicingdevelopedintheearly1970sandonewhosegoalistoadopt
aserviceorientation—providedoriginallyasanintegralpartoftheverynatureofPSPservice.
AccompanyingtheSFPD’sexpandedroleandreachhasbeenanincreasingnumberofregulationson
newareasofbehaviorandrequirementsforthePSP.Onemustinvestigatewhethertheseregulations
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areconsistentwiththehypothesisthat“regulationsarealwaysbenevolent,”orwhethertheyare
consistentwiththehypothesisthatregulationscanbeusedtorestrictcompetition.
CloseinspectionofthecurrentsetofInterimRegulationsofthePatrolSpecialPolice,adoptedin
December2008,indicatesthattheSFPDareinterpretingandadministeringseveralregulationsto
restrictcompetition.LawssuchastheShermanAntitrustActof1890(15U.S.C.§§1–7)andtheClayton
Act(15U.S.C.§§12–27)preventprivatebusinessesfromusingunfairbusinesspracticestomonopolizea
market.15AlthoughtheLocalGovernmentAntitrustAct(15U.S.C.§§34–36)providesthat“local
governmentsandtheirofficialsandemployeesactinginofficialcapacitieshaveantitrustimmunitywith
respecttoactionsbroughtunder15U.S.C.§15fordamages,fees,orcosts,”notallactivitiesare
permitted.16KinsellaandRubinsexplain:
As States became increasingly involved in commercial activities during the late nineteenth century, they began to question the expediency of such an unbending doctrine of absolute immunity. . . . This gave rise to the "commercial activity" exception—so if and to the extent a state engages in “commercial activity,” it will not be entitled to sovereign immunity. The FSIA defines “commercial activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.” U.S. courts have interpreted commercial activity to be any activity in which a private person could engage. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, more specifically, that commercial activity is “the type of actions by which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’” [See on this Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc (US S. Ct. 1992); SEDCO, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Company, 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).]17
The California Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et. seq.) prohibits
unfair competition not only by corporations and firms but also “by other organizations of persons” (which
would include the SFPD if they are classified as an organization or persons).18 InthecaseRusso&Reyes
v.WillisCaseyetal.,15F.3d1089(9thCir.1993),twoPSPofficers(RussoandReyes)allegedthatthe
SanFranciscopolicechief(Casey)hadconspiredtorestrictcompetition.Thecasewentallthewaytothe
U.S.SupremeCourtbutonlyonapretrialMotiontoDismiss;themeritsofthecasewerenever
15RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter2.pdf.16RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter2.pdf.17Rubins,Noah,andN.StephanKinsella.2005.InternationalInvestment,PoliticalRiskandDisputeResolution:APractitioner’sGuide.DobbsFerry,NewYork:OceanaPublications,pp.141,145.18RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/BPC/1/d7/2/5/s17200andhttp://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/BPC/1/d7/2/5/s17201.
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reached.19The“U.S.SupremeCourt...declinedtohearit:Thesuitwas‘time‐barred,’meaningthatthe
relevanteventsinthesuittookplacetoolongagotomeritjudicialattention.”20
Duringoraboutthetimethiscasewaswendingitswaythroughthefederalcourtsystem,a
sweepingsetofregulationswasintroducedandeventuallypassedin1994.Insignificantpart,these
regulationsremovedmanyofthePSP’slong‐heldpowers,specificallytakingawaytheirpeaceofficer
powersofarrestandreducingthatpowertoacitizen’spowertoarrestonly,andremovingthePSPfrom
civilserviceemploymentstatus.Atthesametime,membersoftheSFPDbeganencouragingbusinesses
tohireoff‐dutypoliceofficers(andalsoprivatepatroloperatorcompaniesallegedlyownedbysome
SFPDfamilymembers).21IthasbeenreportedthatmembersoftheSFPDhavethreatenedbusinesses,
sayingtheirbusinesswillreceivenoprotectioniftheyhirePSPofficersratherthanoff‐dutymembersof
theSFPD.22AsrecentlyasSeptember2009,similarinformationcametolightwhenownersofseveral
entertainmentbusinesseslocatedintheCastrodistrictreportedlyfearedretaliationbycitylicensing
agenciesiftheyfailedtofollowtheleadoftheCommunityBusinessDistrict,wheretheexecutive
leadershiphadbeenpressingforadditionalsecuritytobeprovidedsolelybythe10(b)program.
ThelawcurrentlyprohibitsmembersoftheSFPDfromaccruingmorethan20hoursofovertime
perweek,23butofficerscansubvertthisprohibitionbyparticipatinginthe10(b)program.Thismakes
the10(b)assignmentsmuchsoughtaftersincethemorethatregularSFPDofficerscanworkafterhours
andoffdutyinthe10(b)program,thehighertheirtake‐homepay.Furthermore,SFPDofficers’pensions
arecalculatedbasedonthesalaryoftheirhighestyearofsalary,addingon10(b)spikestothebasefrom
19RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1998/06/25/MN76911.DTL.20RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/4.21AccordingtoSteveRusso,“Theissueshereare[that]manyoftheseofficerswhoworkintheS.F.P.D.orareaffiliatedwiththeS.F.P.D.ownsecuritycompanies,andtheyinfacthaveassistedincampaigningwithofficersoftheFieldOperationsbureautosolicitthisparticularPoliceCommissionto,onceandforall,removethe[specials’]peace‐officerstatus,thereforerenderingourservicesworthlesstothecitizensoftheCityandCountyofSanFrancisco.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/5.22RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/5.23RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/2.
Page15
whichlifelongpensionsarecalculated.Forthesereasons,anyareainthemarketplacewhereSFPD
officerscansolicitprivateclientsand“compete”withthePSPprovidesanarearipeforgreatcontention.
IfSFPDofficerscannotcompetewiththePSPonalevelplayingfield,thenitbecomesadvantageousfor
themtohandicapcompetitorsviaregulatingthePSPprogram’sadhocadministrativerulesand
practices.Regulationsandtacticsthatappeartoberestrictingcompetitioninclude:
a. TheSFPDhasauthoritytodelayandpreventthePSPfromhiringpersonnel.AlthoughthePSPareprivatebusinesseshiredaccordingtoconsumerdemand,currentregulationsenabletheSFPDtorestrictthesupply.ThePSPandthemediacontinuallybringthisproblemtotheattentionofthepolicecommissionandthepublic;however,noreliefhasbeenforthcoming.Justtobecomeapatrolspecialassistant,oneneedstocompletenumerousforms,andapplicationsareroutinelydelayedformorethanayear.24In2008theSFPDadmittedthatPoliceChiefHeatherFonghadonlyapprovedfiveofthetwenty‐sevenapplicantsinthepastthreeyears.EffectiverestrictionofcompetitionalsoarisesfromtheSFPDprogramadministratorfailingtostayontopofhowmanyapplicationsareinprocess.Inonetellingexchangebetweenthepolicecommissionpresidentandtheprogramadministratoratafall2008policecommissionmeeting,theprogramadministratorcouldonlyestimatethatsixorsevenpendingapplicationswereonhisdesk.Afterseveralmorequestionsfromthepresidentremainedunanswered,thepresidentthenstatedthatsheknewthatseventeensuchapplicationswerepending.Suchtacticsandlackoffollow‐upameliorationfromthepolicecommissionorpolicechiefobviouslydiscouragepotentialapplicantsandpreventthePSPfromstaffingtheiroperations.Inaddition,whensupplyofofficersinthemarketplaceisrestricted,thereislittlehopethatclientdemandcanbemetorthatmarketingeffortswillberewardedbecausethePSPsimplycan’tprovidethenumberofofficerstoservicedemands.ThishasbeenthecaseeveryyearatthefallCastroStreetFestivalaswellasattheCastroStreetHalloweenFestival.ThispracticeofplacinghiringapprovalinthehandsoftheSFPDwithoutanyapparentlimitsistheequivalentofgivingGeneralMotorstheauthoritytodecidewhomToyotagetstohire.
24AccordingtotheSanFranciscoWeekly,“[PatrolSpecialPoliceOfficer]Whitesayshecouldputfivemoretoworkimmediatelyifhehadthem,whichistosayifS.F.P.D.didn’tthrowupbarriers.’Youcan’tgetthemapproved,’grumblesthe65‐year‐oldWhite,tickingoffthenamesof‘quality’peoplehehassponsoredandwhoseapplicationswereeitherrejectedor—moreoften—allowedtolanguishuntilthepersonfinallygaveup.‘They[S.F.P.D.]findsomelittleproblem[intheapplication].Theydelay.Andthentheyfindsomeotherproblemanddelaysomemore.It’sapredictablecycle.’“Noneoftheapplicants,includingsomewhoserésuméshadbeeninthehopperformorethanayear,hadbeenapproved.Innearlyeveryinstance,the‘problems’Shinnidentifiedwerepaperworkdeficienciessuchasincompletebackgroundinformationoramissingpersonalhistorystatement,thekindsofthingscriticssaycouldberesolvedindaysratherthanweeksormonths.Onlyoneapplicant’s‘problemhold’relatedtoinadequatetraining,somethingthatdidn’tescapeWarner’snotice.‘It’sapaperchase,’shesays.‘It’saninstitutionalgamethattheyplaytochokeusoff.’“TheS.F.P.D.concedesthatChiefFonghasapprovedonlyfiveof27patrolspecialassistantcandidatesinthethreeyearssinceTomtookoverday‐to‐dayadministrationoftheprogram.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.policeone.com/patrol‐issues/articles/1701993‐Controversial‐SF‐Patrol‐Special‐Police‐poised‐for‐
comeback/.
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b. ThereareallegationsthattheSFPDcreatesahostileenvironmentformanymembersofthe
PSP.25Forexample,certaindistrictcaptainscallPSPofficersofftheirbeatwhiletheyareonduty,requestingthattheygotodistrictstationsforvariousinspections.StartingafterthepresentsetofinterimregulationswasadoptedinDecember2008,variousdistrictcaptainshavecalledofficersoutofthefieldsothecaptaincouldconducta“uniformcheck”toensurethatthenewlyrequiredbluestripewasinplacedownthesideoftheofficer’spantsandanepauletteacrossthejacketshoulder.Fromallegedlybeingcalled“fakecop”26onaregularbasistohavingtofaceformaldisciplinarychargesissuedagainstthemforapparentlyminorinfractionsonlytangentiallyrelatedorevenunrelatedtopublicsafety,theatmosphereseemshostile.EvidenceofthiscomesfromvarioussourcesincludingformerSFPDPoliceCommissionPresidentTheresaSparks,whostated,“Forthemostpart,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmentwouldjustassoonthePatrolSpecialPolicegoaway.”27
c. TheSFPDhastakentoregulatingeverythingforthePSP,includingthecoloroftheiruniforms
andspecificuseofstripingonit.Onereportercallsthecolor“decidedlyun‐coppishlight‐blueoutfits.”28OneformerPSPofficerstated,“You’remakingusbettertargets."Seventy‐sevenpercentofPSPclientswhoweresurveyedbelievedthatthePSPwouldbelesseffectiveiftheywereforcedtowearlightblue.
d. TheregulatoryenvironmentunderwhichthePSPareoperatingisconstantlychanging,yetthe
PSPareoftennotfullyadvisedabouttheexistenceormeaningofvagueorambiguousandadhocinconsistentinterpretationsofregulations.Thisleadstoconfusion,unnecessaryquestionsfromtheSFPDliaisonstaff,andwasteoffoot‐patroltimeforPSPofficers.Thereareallegationsthatadhocorquestionablybaseddisciplinaryactionsareoftenpursuedagainstoneofficeratatimeinanapparentlyselectiveenforcement,whenotherofficersoperateinexactlythesamefashion.
e. AccordingtoanewregulationpassedinDecember2008,theSFPDisdemandingthatthePSP
turnovernotonlythenamesofclientsontheirbeatsbutalsothefinancialdetailsofcontractswithallclientsindicatingthevalueofeachcontract.FormerSanFranciscoPoliceCommissionPresidentTheresaSparksstated,“Weintendtoforcethemtocomply,andiftheydon’twewilluseanyreprimandnecessary,includingrevokingtheiroperatinglicenses.”29Onecouldinterpretthisregulationasbeingimplementedinthenameofsafety.ConverselyonecouldviewthisasanattemptbytheSFPDtoseewhatclientsaremostlucrativesotheycaneasilysinglethemoutaspotentialclientstobesolicitedbyoff‐dutyofficersinthe10(b)program.Someclientswhoweresurveyedexpressedseriousconcernsaboutthisnewregulationpossiblybeingenforced.
25RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/e/a/1997/05/20/NEWS7595.dtl.26Formoreonthissee,“ToServeandCollect.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/.27RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/San_Francisco_Patrol_Specials_on_the_firing_line.html.28RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/andhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Police‐lay‐down‐the‐law‐for‐private‐patrols‐47271962.html.29RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Police‐lay‐down‐the‐law‐for‐private‐patrols‐47271962.html.
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Somespecificallyvoicedobviousprivacyconcerns,giventhatallinformationturnedovertothegovernmentisaccessibletothepublicunderlocalprovisionssuchasSanFrancisco’sSunshineOrdinanceandotherstatelawssuchastheBrownAct.30
f. Usingmoneyfromthecity’sgeneralfundandothertaxresources,theSFPDsubsidizesofficersworkinginthe10(b)program,sotheycanofferratesthatarecompetitivewiththePSP.JamesR.Williamsonwrites,“Crosssubsidizationistheuseofprofitsobtainedinoneproduct,industry,orgeographiclocationtooffsetlossesincurredinanother,andisbutonetypeofpricediscriminationorpredatorypricing.”31Officersworkinginthe10(b)overtimeprogramcurrentlyandtypicallycharge$87perhour(or$93perhourifamotorcycleisinvolvedand$100perhourifapatrolcarisinvolved)andanadditional22percentadministrativeupchargeonthebasehourlyrate.Thisrateiswellabovetheall‐inclusiverate—includingadministrativecosts,liabilitycoverage,tacticalequipmentandpatrolcars—of$48perhourastypicallychargedbyPSPofficers.Inaddition,the10(b)program’sindirectcosttotheclientgoesupifoneconsidersthatthecityrefusestoreimburseanydamagecausedbya10(b)officer’snegligentactionswhileworkingonanoff‐dutyassignment.Thatmeansthecustomer(nottheofficerortheSFPD)isliableforanywrongdoingonthepartoftheSFPD10(b)officer.32YetwhenSFPDofficersmarkettheir10(b)servicescomparedtothoseofthePSP,theSFPDofficershaveclaimed(wronglyso)thatliabilityinsuranceisprovidedwhenindeeditisnot.33Onnotableoccasion,theSFPDmakestheirratesappearcompetitivetoprospectivecustomersbychargingbusinesseslessthan$87,thenpayingtheofficer$87perhourwiththedifferencecomingfromthecity’sgeneralfund(i.e.,moneyfromtaxpayers).Forexample,insteadofchargingtheSanFrancisco49ersfootballteamforfivehoursofsecurityservices($87x5=$435),theywill“donate”twohourstothecustomersandonlybillforthreehoursofservice($87x3=$261).Thentheywillchargetheremainingtwohours($87x2=184)tothegeneralfund(i.e.,taxpayers).
The$261subsidizedpricefora10(b)officernowappearscompetitivewiththe$240fullprice($48x5=$240)chargedbyaPSPofficer,butthe10(b)officerisbasicallyreceivingataxpayer‐financedsubsidyof$38perhoursothe10(b)officer’ssideandafter‐hoursbusinesscanbe“competitive.”
30SeeCaliforniaGovernmentCodeSections54950–63andhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/sunshine_page.asp?id‐34495&mode=text.RetrievedSeptember1,2009.31RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://books.google.com/books?id=eTmjUS7o9y4C&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=cross+subsidization+antitrust+clayton&source=bl&ots=hpxou5h3NN&sig=qkHyH3XZZJNzQNkzZPqz‐k2eJgY&hl=en&ei=AjGYSrFD5J_xBuvshMYB&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#v=onepage&q=cross%20subsidization%20antitrust%20clayton&f=false.32Inarecentcasewherea10(b)officer’shorsekilledaSanFrancisco49ersfan,thelawsuitwillbeagainstthe49ersratherthanthe10(b)officerortheSFPD.TheSanFranciscoExaminerreports,“Theequestrianofficer—a28‐yearPoliceDepartmentveteranwhohad10years’experiencewiththemountedunit—wascontractedoutbythe49ersunderTheCity’s10Badministrativecode.Thatessentiallymeanshewasworkingsecurityfortheteam.Thefootballfranchisewillfacethelawsuitonitsown,clearingTheCityfromanypotentiallylargepayouts,accordingtoMattDorsey,spokesmanfortheCityAttorney’sOffice.”RetrievedOctober28,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Family‐of‐trampled‐49ers‐fan‐seeking‐millions‐63508722.html.33OneSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPoliceofficerstates,“DuringthelastCAD[CastroAfterDarkcoalition]meetingthatIattended,IspecificallyaskedSgt.ChuckLimbertfromtheS.F.P.D.infrontofothermemberspresentiftheCityindemnifiedthe10Bofficerifhe/shekillsgetssued.Hesaidyes!”PersonalcorrespondencewithOfficerJaneWarner(October10,2009).
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Itappearsthatsuchsweetheartdealsarecommontoday,eventhoughtheywerefirstuncoveredandwelldocumentedinareportfromtheSanFranciscoBoardofSupervisors’budgetanalyst.Forexample,duringtheirperiodofstudyin1995–1996,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmentprovided8,598hoursforfootballgamesandcollected$174,385eventhoughitcost$315,350.34Thebudgetanalyststates,“ThePoliceDepartmenthaswaivedthepaymentofSpecialLawEnforcementServices(SLES)administrativeoverheadforcertainorganizationswithoutproperauthority.Additionally,paymentsreceivedforSLESadministrativeoverheaddonotaccruetotheGeneralFund,asisrequiredundertheAdministrativeCode.”35
Examplessuchasthesearelikelyjustthetipoftheiceberg.Thereisevidenceindicatingthatsomeofficersareabletospendalloftheirworkattime‐and‐a‐halfpayunder10(b)insteadofattendingtotheirregularjobs,whiletheSFPDhastohireofficersatovertimetofilltheoriginalofficers’hoursandduties.
ThisisnottomentionthefactthatmembersoftheSFPDwhoworkin10(b)assignmentsdonotcompensatethetaxpayersforuseofequipmentwhileworkingthesesidejobs.Forexample,if33percentofapatrolcar’stotalusageisduring10(b)assignments,properaccountingwouldmeanthat33percentofthecostsassociatedwiththatpatrolcarwouldbechargedtothe10(b)(sidework)program.CurrentlytheSFPDcompletelyignoresthesecostsitisimposingonthecityandtaxpayers,oftennotcharginganyoftheadministrativeoverheadfeesatall.SanFrancisco’sbudgetanalystadmonishedtheSFPDbecauseit“inappropriately
34TheSanFranciscoOfficeoftheBudgetAnalystpointedthisoutwhentheywrote,“InFY1995–96,theDepartmentcollected$3,112,906inSLES[SpecializedLawEnforcementServicesProgram]payments(includingthe22.6percentforadministrativeoverhead).However,thePoliceDepartmenthaswaivedthepaymentofSLESadministrativeoverheadforseveralorganizations,suchasmovieproductioncompanies,withoutproperauthority.Additionally,noneoftheSLESadministrativeoverheadpaymentsreceivedbythePoliceDepartmenthavebeendepositedintotheGeneralFund,asisrequiredundertheAdministrativeCode.ThesefundshaveinsteadbeenretainedbythePoliceDepartmentintheSLESfund.ThePoliceDepartmentarguesthatbyretainingtheoverheadpaymentsintheSLESfund,cashflowproblemsareaverted.BasedonthetotalamountofSLESpaymentsreceivedbytheS.F.P.D.inFY1995–96,theamountofoverheadretainedintheSLESfundcouldbeasmuchas$703,517,butisprobablylessbecausethePoliceDepartmentinappropriatelywaivedtheoverheadchargestosomeorganizations.Asdescribedbelow,theControllershouldconductanauditoftheSLESfundtodeterminethetotalamountduetothegeneralfundforoverheadpaymentswhichhavebeenretainedbythePoliceDepartment.“Furthermore,eventhoughSLESfundsareintendedtorecovertheentirecostofprovidingpolicecoverageforaparticularevent,theactualcostofprovidingpolicecoverageisinmanycaseshigherthantheamountcollected.Forexample,eachyearthePoliceDepartmentreachesseparateagreementswiththeSanFranciscoGiantsandtheSanFrancisco49ersregardingthelevelofpolicecoveragetobeprovidedateachbaseballandfootballgame,respectively.“UndertheseMemorandumsofUnderstanding(MOU),thesetwoteamsarealsonotrequiredtopayadministrativeoverhead,asisrequiredofotherprivateornon‐profitorganizationswhichutilizeSLESservices.Moreover,eachteamisonlyrequiredtopayforpolicecoveragethatisprovidedinsidethestadium.Thus,thecostofprovidingpolicecoverageongamedaysoutsidethestadium(inparkinglotsandonnearbystreets)isabsorbedbytheGeneralFund.InFY1995–96,thePoliceDepartmentprovided29,788hoursofpolicecoveragefor97sportingeventsat3ComPark,including86baseballgamesand11footballgames.Thetotalcostofprovidingpolicecoverageforthese97gamesbothinsideandoutsidethestadiumwas$1,105,361.Ofthisamount,only$340,069or31percentwaspaidforwithSLESfundsreceivedfromtheGiantsandthe49ers.ThisamountrepresentedthecostofSLESservicesinsidethestadiumduringathleticevents.Theremaining$765,292inexpenditureswerepaidbytheGeneralFund.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,from
http://www.sfgov.org/site/budanalyst_page.asp?id=5192.35RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/budanalyst_page.asp?id=5192.
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waivedtheoverheadchargestosomeorganizations.Asdescribedbelow,theControllershouldconductanauditoftheSLES[SpecialLawEnforcementServices]fundtodeterminethetotalamountduetothegeneralfundforoverheadpayments.”
SinceRusso&Reyesv.WillisCaseyetal.,15F.3d1089(9thCir.1993),itappearsthattheSFPD’s
monopolisticpracticeshaveincreased.Anyoneoftheabovemonopolisticpracticeswouldsubjecta
typicalenterprisetoriskoflitigationandcertainlyregulatoryattentionifnotpunishment.Butbecause
theSFPDisthelaw(andtheydecidehowtoenforceitwithrespecttotheirclosestcompetitor),todate
currentpracticeshavenotbeenlegallychallenged,butthisoversightcanandshouldchange.
4. EstimatingSomeoftheCostsofRegulationandMonopolization
IncreasedgovernmentmonopolizationofpolicingcoststhecitizensofSanFranciscoinatleast
twoways.First,asoptionstohireprivatepolicearereduced,citizenshavelessprotection,andless
protectioncanonlyleadmattersinthedirectionofmorecrime.36Second,aspeoplehavetorelymore
onhigher‐costalternativesforpolicing,peoplehavetopayforthosehigher‐costservicesnowandinthe
future.RestrictingcompetitionfromtheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP)meansSanFranciscans
willhavetospendmoreontheSFPD,whichmeanstheywillbeabletospendlessonotherimportant
areas,suchashousing,food,education,andcharitabledonations.
Manypolicingneedsandsafetycircumstancesdonotrequireapoliceofficerarmedtothehilt;
theysimplyrequirethepresenceofsomeonetocheckthatthingsareundercontroland,ifneeded,
interveneearlyandeffectivelytodiffuseapotentiallargerissue.Forexample,itdoesnotmakesenseto
usechemotherapytodealwithsomeonewiththecommoncold,andintheareaofpolicingitdoesnot
36TheNewYorkTimesreportscrimewasreducedinanareaafterthePSPwerebroughtin,"Therewerelocalmuggings,veryaggressivepanhandlingandaproblemwiththehomeless.Thepresenceofapatrolspecialcleanedupthelocation.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/23/us/dispute‐in‐san‐francisco‐over‐use‐of‐special‐security‐patrols.html.Oncethatoptionforprotectioniseliminated,crimecanonlyincrease.
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makesensetohaveaone‐size‐fits‐allsolutionwhendifferentlevelsofpolicingservices(withdifferent
pricelevels)areappropriatefordifferentsituations.Iftheonlyoptionforpolicingservicesistopayfor
themostexpensivepublicpoliceofficer,thencostsgoupandSanFranciscanswillhavelessmoney
availabletospendoneverythingelse.
PolicebillsalreadycostSanFranciscansmoreperofficerthanmanyothercomparablecities,and
furthermovestowardmonopolizationwillfurtherexacerbatethesecosts.Figure5showstheaverage
expenditureperpolicedepartmentemployeeinSanFranciscoandothercitiesin2000.
Figure5.Annualoperatingexpenditureperpolicedepartmentemployee(2000).
$105,000
$100,000
$95,000
$90,000
$85,000
$80,000
$75,000
$70,000
$65,000
$60,000
$55,000
$50,000
NewYork
City
Honolulu
Sunnyvale
Phoenix
Austin
ChicagoBosto
n
DenverDalla
s
Las Vegas
Los Angeles
San Mateo
Portland
Orange
San Diego
BeverlyHills
Reno
San Francisco
Dataarefromhttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lemas00.pdf.
Althoughthe2000basesalaryforanentry‐levelSFPDofficerwas$47,710,whichisjustoverthe
mediansalaryofpoliceofficersintheUnitedStates,onehastodosomediggingtofindoutwhatthey
areactuallygettingpaidsincetheSFPD(theonlyorganizationknownbythisauthorwithsuchastatus)
Page21
isallowedtoissuetheirannualreportwithoutonesinglementionofcosts.37Throughvariousprograms
administeredbytheSFPD,regularofficersaugmenttheirbasecivilservicesalarybyasubstantial
amount,andthatamountisfarmorethantheaveragepersonmightsuspect.Asof2007theSFPDhad
1,784employeesmakingmorethan$100,000peryear,andofthem396weremakingmorethan
$150,000peryear.Thesefiguresarewellabovethe$47,460mediansalaryofpoliceofficersinthe
UnitedStates,nottomentiontheincomeoftheaveragepersoninSanFrancisco.SeeFigure6.
Figure6:HowmuchdoSFPDmembersmake?
$0
$20,000
$40,000
$60,000
$80,000
$100,000
$120,000
$140,000
$160,000
$180,000
$200,000
AverageincomeofcitizensofSanFrancisco
MediansalaryofPoliceOfficersintheU.S.A.
Medianpayamongallmembersofthe
S.F.P.D.(for2007notincludinganybenefits)
Medianpayamongthe75highestpaidmembersofthe
S.F.P.D.(for2007notincludinganybenefits)
$34,556$47,460
$120,600
$200,388
Dataarefromhttp://www.sfgate.com/webdb/sfpay/andhttp://swz.salary.com/salarywizard/.
Notonlydotaxpayerspayforthehighercostofmonopolizedpolicingtoday,theyarealsotaking
onobligationstopaylifetimepensionsforpublicpoliceafterretirement,andtotheirsurvivorsforthe
37Seetheirannualreport,retrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/police/information/annual_report_2007.pdf.
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indefinitefuture.Lifetimepensionsarefinancedfromcurrentcontributions(i.e.,currenttaxdollars)to
theSanFranciscoEmployees'RetirementSystem(SFERS)andconstituteobligationsthattaxpayerswill
payforyearstocome.Forexample,whenformerPoliceChiefHeatherFongretiredfromtheSFPDin
2009,thefifty‐three‐yearoldwillnow“bepullingdownabout$229,500ayearforlife.”38(Asian
Americanfemalesliveonaverageaboutninetyyears,thusFongwilllikelybereceivingwellover$8
millionfromgovernmentcoffersfortheyearsaftersheretired.)AsofJune2009,146retiredSFPD
officersarereceivingmorethan$100,000eachperyearfromSanFranciscotaxpayersfortherestof
theirortheirsurvivors’lives,39andthenumberofexpectedSFPDretireesincomingyearsisburgeoning.
SomepeopleclaimthattheSFPDispermittingitsofficerstoaugmenttheirsalariesunjustly
throughprogramssuchas10(b),andthustheirconcernwiththecostadvantagesofferedbythePSPand
disadvantagesofferedby10(b).SanFranciscoWeeklyreportsthat:
GaryDelagnes,thepoliceunionhead,vehementlydisagrees.“That'sbullshit,”hesays.“10(b)isa$10millionindustryinthistown.Sothey'vegot,what,30peoplevyingfor10(b)work?Howmuchcan[thePatrolSpecialPolicedo]?It’snotevenanissue.”40
ButanaccurateassessmentofthetruecosttothetaxpayerofpermittingSFPDofficerstoworkoffduty
onthe10(b)programwouldincludenotjustcurrentsalaryearnedbutseveraladditionalfactors,suchas
higherrisktotheirclientsfromfailuretoprovideliabilityinsurance,upchargesforpatrolcarsand
motorcycles,thepossibilityorprobabilityofoverlytiredpoliceofficersservingafteranormalpolicing
day,andadded‐onadministrativecharges,nottomentioncostsinthefuture.Sincepensionsare
calculatedbytakinganofficer’shighestsalaryandthenmultiplyingthatby90percent,41whenofficers
38RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/01/BAN017TOP0.DTL#ixzz0Plqt2TF1.39RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/01/BAN017TOP0.DTL#ixzz0Plqt2TF1.40RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/2.41Officersareableto“retireafter30yearsonthejobandreceiveretirementmoneyequalto90percentoftheirhighestpaycheck.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/01/BAN017TOP0.DTL.
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canboosttheirhighestincomebasethroughworkingin10(b)assignmentstheywillbepaidahigher
pensionfortherestoftheirlives.Forexample,ifanofficerworksjusttwoextrahoursofworkperweek
foroneyearon10(b)assignments,earningathisregularmaximumof$87perhour,henotonlywillearn
anextra$9,048forthetwohoursofworkperweekforthatyear,hispensionwillincreaseby$8,143per
yearfortherestofhisorhissurvivors’lives.WiththeaverageSFPDofficerretiringatagefifty‐five(with
atleasttwenty‐fivemoreexpectedyearsofpensionpayouts),42thosetwohoursofextra10(b)workper
weektranslateintowelloveranadditional$200,000inlifetimeincome.Thustheappropriate
calculationforfiguringoutthetruecostofthatofficerworkingthosehoursisnotthe$9,048for104
hoursofworkatacostof$87perhour,butinstead:$9,048for104hoursofwork+(0.90pensionrate)
x(9,048[theadditionalsalaryboost])x(25[numberofexpectedyearsinretirement])=$212,628.The
truecostforthosehoursisactually$2,044.50perhour(only$87ofwhichgetspaidnow,withthe
remainingbillpaidbyfuturetaxpayers).
In2009,theSanFranciscoCivilGrandJuryfoundwidespreadevidenceamongcityemployeesof
whatiscalledpensionspiking,theactofearningmoreinoneyearasameansofretiringwithapension
basedonthesalaryfromthatyear.43CurrentlytheSanFranciscoEmployees’RetirementSystemis
payingmorethan$125millionperyeartoPoliceRetiredMembersandSurvivorContinuationBenefits,a
figurethatisnotcountedintheSFPD’s$400+millionannual2009–2010budget.44Thisnumberislikely
togrowsignificantlyincomingyearsgiventhatamongallSanFranciscopublicemployees“40percentof
theactiveemployeesarecurrentlyeligibleforretirementandanother15percentwillbeeligibleinthe
next5years.”TheSanFranciscoCivilGrandJurystates,“Thiswillingnesstoacceptindebtednessintothe
42RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfers/SFERS%20AR%202008.pdf.43Forthecompletereportontheproblemsofpensionspiking,seehttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/courts/divisions/Civil_Grand_Jury/Pension_Beyond_Our_Ability_To_Pay_Final.pdfandhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3680.RetrievedSeptember1,2009.44RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfers/SFERS%20AR%202008.pdf,p.39.
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futureisproblematic.”Theirreportconcludes,“Thetimetopaybackthepensioncommitmentsmade
overthepast20yearsistoday,andtheCityofSanFranciscomaybeunpreparedtomeetitsobligations,
withoutseverecutsinessentialservicestotheresidentsoftheCityandthebusinessinterestswho
employthousandsofSanFranciscans.”45Thesecostsarerealandshouldnotbeignoredanylonger.
5. ConclusionandRecommendations
TheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP)provideservicesandprotectionthattheSan
FranciscoPoliceDepartment(SFPD)doesnotoffer.ThePSPprovideservicesandprotectionfocusedon
anddeliveredinanentirelydifferentwaythantheSFPD’sservices.PSPservicesareproactiverather
thanreactive.PSPofficersalsofocusonnarrowand,thuseasilyserviced,geographicneighborhoods
wheretheybuildlong‐termrelationshipsandbecometrustedmembersofthecommunity.PSPofficers
areresponsivetotheirclientsandtootherneighborhoodneedsfrominitiationofaservicecontract.
Theyhaveanincentivetolistencarefullytoclientopinionsandpriorities,andthenflexiblychange
servicecomponentsasdesiredandadvisable.Theyonlystayinbusinessiftheirclientsaresatisfied.
ThePSPhaveanincentivetorespondquickly,usuallybeforeanSFPDofficercanrespond,and
theyareknownforhandlingservicecallsbothforqualityoflifeandforserioussafetymatterswhenthe
SFPDchoosesnottorespondatall.PeoplesurveyedaboutthePSPindicatedanoverwhelmingsupport
fortheircontributiontoSanFrancisco,andtheyhadlimitedfaithinrelyingontheSFPDtomeetallof
theirsecurityneeds.Nevertheless,certainmembersoftheSFPDhaveviewedthePSPascompetition
andhaveerectednumerousbarriersattemptingtorestricttheirbusiness.Thereisalmostdefinitelya
conflictofinteresthere.
Immediatereformsshouldincludethefollowing:
45RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3680.
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(1) Anauditshouldbeconductedofthe10(b)program,includingsurveyingtheprecise
effectonpensionspikinganddetermininghowtoeliminatecross‐subsidizationof
10(b)workwithtaxpayerfunds.Taxpayersshouldnothavetopaytosubsidizework
forpolicewhowanttohavesidejobs.
(2) Regulationsthatobviouslyareusedtorestrictcompetitionandregulationswith
dubiouspublicsafetyrationale(suchasregulatinguniformcolorandmakingthePSP
turnoverinformationaboutprivatecontracts)shouldbeeliminated.
(3) Certainprogramadministrationchangesareneeded,includingsettingtimelimitsfor
processingPSPapplications.TheSFPDshouldnothavetheauthoritytoinexplicably
delayapplicationsformonthsoryearsonend,orevenlosethem,thuseffectively
preventingthePSPfromhiringadditionalemployees.Allevidencesuggeststhatthe
SFPDhasbeenactingmonopolisticallyattheexpenseofthegeneralpublictomake
itmoredifficulttogetwillingandablePSPofficersonthestreetstoservetheir
clients’needsandtoaffirmativelymarkettheirservices.
Fortunatelytherearesomepositivesigns.A2008newsarticlereports,“Aftermonthsofquiet
deliberation,amorepatrol‐special‐friendlyPoliceCommission,whichhasshownflashesofimpatience
withtheS.F.P.D.’shandlingofthepatrolprogram,hasannouncedplanstorevamptherules,perhaps
evenyankingtheS.F.P.D.’sgatekeeperroleentirely.”46ShiftingbacktothepolicyregimethatSan
Franciscohadforitsfirstcenturyandahalfwouldbeamoveintherightdirection.
SanFranciscohasanopportunitytorelymoreonaneighborhoodpoliceresource,whichtheir
clientsdesireandappreciate,aresourcethatcomesatnorealcosttotaxpayersandthecity.Inthe
clientsurveyquestionthataskedonascaleof1to10,“HowsatisfiedareyouwithyourPatrolSpecial
Policeofficertoday?”themedianresponsewas9outof10,withthemostpopularresponsebeing10
46RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/.
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outof10.Peoplewantmoresafety,butcurrentregulations,rules,andadministrativepracticesmakeit
excessivelydifficultforthePSPtobeabletohireadditionalpeopleandanswertheneed.ThePSP
provideanopportunitythatisavailablenow,thatisdesirable,accountabletothecitizens,customer‐
serviceoriented,andcommunityoriented.SanFranciscocouldbe“puttingextracopsonthestreetand
costingthecitytreasurynexttonothing.”47ThePSPshouldbesupported,encouraged,andassistedin
publicizingtheirpolicingforceasaviablesafetyoptionthatcanbereliedonnowandinthefutureto
makeSanFranciscoasaferandmoredesirableplacetoliveandwork.
47RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/5.
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Appendix:SurveyResponses48
Respondent WhatdoesyourPatrolSpecialPoliceofficerdoforyou?1 Comesinandasksifalliswellandtocheckforanyincidents.2 Respondstofrontdeskforhelpwithinebriated,raucous,troubleguests.Ejections;
undesirablepersonsnotguestsofproperty.3 Rounds,exteriorandinterior,nightsandweekends.4 Increasesneighborhoodsecurityingeneral.5 Enhancedsecurity.Firstrespondertoanyalarmcalls,quickestresponsewhenneeding
help.6 Patrolstheshoppingdistrict.7 Hepatrolsourneighborhood.8 Answersmycallsandshowsuptocheckonus.9 [Officer]patrols[our]neighborhood.10 Communicates,patrols,diffusesproblems,isaneighborhoodasset.11 Offersassistanceinpotentialdisastroussituations.12 Checksinduringeveninghours;oncallforrowdycustomers.13 Checksdoorsandlocks;evictstransientsonstreet.14 Patrolsmystreets.Helpspreventpettycrime.15 (1)Streetpatrolsfivedays/weekinneighborhood.(2)Safetyadvisetoall.16 Ihavenoidea.17 Visitalazonaapie,nospreguntasitodovavien,secomunicaconnuestrosempleadosde
cualquiereventquesucedainelvecindano.18 19 Helpstorepresentourneighborhoodbymaintainingacongenialpresenceandhopefully
showthatwevaluethesafetyandfriendlinessofourneighborhood.20 Providessafety.21 Patrols.22 Patrolsthebusinessareaofourneighborhood.23 Respondstoallemergencycallsandnon‐emergencycalls.Offersinformationonthe
neighborhoodandprovidessafety.24 Drivesby,stopsin.25 26 Patrolneighborhood,gettoknowwhobelongsandwhodoesn’t,keepaneyeon
troublemakers,preventloitering.27 Theofficerprimarilyworksinthebusinessdistrict,soresidentsfeelsaferwhileshopping,
banking,waitingforpublictransportation.28 Comesintocheckthatthereisnodisorderlyconduct.29 30 Checksbuildingsbetween10p–5atomakesuredoorsarelockedandnovagrants.
48Answersarereprintedinfullexceptwhenindividualpersonsorlocationswerementioned,inwhichcasebrackets,suchas“[Officer],”areincludedtopreserveanonymity.
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31 Protection.32 Patrols[neighborhood].33 Insuressafetyofstaff.34 Provideapolicepresenceinthecommunity.35 Patrol[neighborhood].36 Checkspropertyforhomelesssquatters.37 Patrols5pmto9pmmostdaysoftheweekonfoot.38 Muchmoreavailablewhenincidentshappen.39 Additionalsafetyandquickerresponse.40 After‐hourprotection.41 Walksareaduringhighcrimeoccurrence.42 43 Patrolarea.44 (1)Routinesecuritypatrols,7nightsaweek;9pm–5am.(2)Respondstocallsof
disturbances.45 Supportfornightshift9pm–5am.Dealswithnoisecomplaints,trespassers,inebriates,
etc.46 Dailycheck‐in.47 48 Apparentlydoessomecommunitywatching/patrolling.49 Ensureentryislockedatclose,verifynooneisinside,helpwithhomelessorother
businessnuisances.Awatchfuleyesinceweareaself‐servicefacility.50 Dailypatrolandcheck‐in.51 Walksneighborhood.52 Footpatrolofstreets.53 Theycometocheckeverythingisokay.Theyarerighttherewhenrequiredtoanswer
questionorsolveaproblem.54 55 Morefrequentdrive‐bysinneighborhood.56 Provideneighborhoodpolicepresence.57 Drivebysevendaysperweekdusktodawn.58 Heispresentin[neighborhood].59 Patrolmyarea,andwhenIhavecalledthemtheycamewithinminutes.60 Walkarea.Providepresence.61 Givesmeanextrasenseofsafetyandpeaceofmind.62 FortheCommunityBenefitDistrictThanksgivingthroughNewYear’sDay.63 Senseofsecurity;officialpresenceintown.
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Respondent WhydidyouhireaPatrolSpecialPoliceofficer?1 2 Supplementalsecurity.3 Reputation.4 Increasesneighborhoodsecurityingeneral.Nospecificordirectbenefitstomeasa
homeowner.5 SlowresponsetimebySFPD.6 Safety.7 Increasedcrimeinneighborhood.8 Communityandsupportofourneeds.9 Recentviolentcrimeactivityin[neighborhood].Neighborhoodpatrolservice.10 Goodbusinesssense.Protectmycustomersandneighborhood.11 ""12 13 ""14 Surgeofcrimeinneighborhood.15 August08wehadahorrificattackjust6doorsdownonlocalmarketowner,followedby
increaseinattacksandpropertycrimes.TheSFPDdisappearedafterfloodingtheneighborhood,andIdidnotfeelsafewiththeincreaseincrime.IrememberedthePatrolSpecials!IrefusetoletmyneighborhoodgointhedirectionofsameinSanFranciscowhichhaveoutrightgangwarfare.Weneededtostoptheincreaseincrimeearlyandconcentrateonprevention.
16 Tosupportthe[neighborhood].17 Lazonaeraaltamentepeligrosa—ventadeestupefacientes.18 19 Concernedwithcrimesoccurringinourneighborhood.20 Mostofthetimetheyareintheneighborhood.Theyrespondfasterthan911.21 Neighborhoodwasbecominglesssafe.22 Therehadbeenaseriesofviolentcrimesintheneighborhood.Thepoliceresponse
seemedinadequate.23 Ifirmlybelievecommunitypolicingisabsolutelynecessaryinatouristandnightlifearea.
Officersbecomefamiliarwiththebusinessesandpotentialproblems.24 Topromoteneighborhoodsafety.25 26 Increaseinmugginginneighborhoodwasworrisome,andpoliceofficersdon’tspend
enoughtimeinourpartoftheneighborhood.27 Crimehasbeenrisingintheneighborhood.Residentswantedtoprotectthemselves.28 29 30 Forsecurityreasons.31 Security.
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32 Rashofpettycrimeandviolence.33 Problemclients,communitysupport,andsafety.34 Tosupportthe[neighborhood’s]needforsecurityandprotection.35 Safety.36 Washavingaproblemwithhomelessandwastiredofcleaningupafterthem.37 Escalatingcrimeinneighborhood.38 Visibilityiskey.39 Additionalsafetyandquickerresponse.40 Goodprice.41 Highcrimerate.42 Tohopefullymaketheneighborhoodsafer.43 Communitysafety.44 (1)Highqualityofservicesoffered.(2)Responsiveness.(3)Value!45 Helpswithabove,“Dealswithnoisecomplaints,trespassers,inebriates,etc.”46 Violentcrimeincidentinvolvingfellowmerchant.47 48 Didnothiredirectly.Onlycontributetoacommunityefforttobesupportive.Wouldn’t
doitformyself.49 Seeabove“Ensureentryislockedatclose,verifynooneisinside,helpwithhomelessor
otherbusinessnuisances.Awatchfuleyesinceweareaself‐servicefacility.”50 Fasterservice,personaltouch.51 52 53 Security.54 Communitysolidarity.55 Forasaferneighborhood.56 Interestinprovidingasaferneighborhood.57 Wasinplacewhenwegotbuilding.58 Iampartofthe[neighborhood]groupmadeupofseveralbusinessesandindividuals.
Wefeltduetoseveralcrimesinourneighborhoodapatrolofficerwasneeded.59 Becauseoftheareaofmybusiness.60 Attackandrobberyofcornerstoreinneighborhood.61 FrustratedbyincreasedcrimeandlackofS.F.policepresence.62 Protectourclientsandcustomers.63 Thereweresomecrimesasoflate;thetownisalsoathoroughfare(BartandMuni).
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Respondent
WhydidyounotsimplyrelyonthelocalSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmenttomeetyoursafetyneeds?
1 2 PSPmoreresponsive,familiarwithpersonnelandsecurityissuesandsituationshere.3 Needextraservices.4 Insufficientneighborhoodpatrol.5 Slowordelayedresponse,thatitwasnoteffective.6 Policecannotsupplyseven‐day‐a‐weekbeatofficers.7 Becausethereislesspatrolinourneighborhood.Secondarytodemandsinotherareas
ofthecity.8 9 Wedidn’tfeellikewehadaconsistentpolicepresenceinneighborhood.10 Theyscareme;trustissues.11 Theytaketoolongtoarrive.12 PSPoffersfasterserviceandareknowninthecommunity.13 14 Toostretchedthin.15 Theyhavetoservicetoowideanareaanddoundercoverwork.Theywerenever/rarely
inevidenceonstreets.96–98IsawSFPDstrollbymyretailshop2–3timesonly!!16 Moreisbetter.17 18 19 Wasn’tworking;IfeelthatwiththeBARTstationcomingsoon(peopleandgoingto
work),andthefreewayexitsandentrancesmakeourneighborhoodmoreofatarget.20 Ittakethemlongtimetorespond,andweneedsomebodytobeintheneighborhood.21 Notsufficientcoverage.22 Theirbudgetandstaffingconstraintsdidnotallowthemtorespondtoourneedsina
completelysatisfactoryway.23 WhenIfirstboughtmyfirst24‐hourcaféin1972,SFPDwasveryhomophobicand
nonresponsive.Theyarebetternow,butstillthinkPatrolSpecialisahugebenefitforthearea.
24 Crimewasincreasingin[our]neighborhood.25 26 IthinkcanworktogetherwithPSPofficersandthattheirfocusisandshouldbe
different.IthinkofmyPSPofficerasproactivelawenforcement,notreactive.27 TheSFPDhasinstitutionalizedproblems.Theyhavebeenlargelyineffectiveandpermita
cultureofpassivityand“paperworkavoidance.”28 They’retoobusytorespondtominoraltercations.29 30 Becausetheydon’tpatroloftenenoughplustheydon’tcheckdoors/windows.31 32 That’sajokeright?IhavelittleconfidenceinSFPD.
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33 Notlocalorquickenoughforsmallproblems.34 Supportamoredirectcommunityneedforadditionalsecurity.35 Bettertohaverecognizablepersoninneighborhood.36 Notasresponsive.37 [Neighborhood]hashadahorrificincreaseincrime(someofitviolent)—muchofit
literallyoutsidemyfamily’shome,andtheSFPDwasunabletohandlealofit.38 SFPDwillsometimesnotconsidershopliftingveryimportant.39 PatrolSpecialPolicemorevisibleandavailable.40 Tooexpensive;notdependable.41 Thereisnotenoughofficersemployed,andretiredofficersdoublethecost.42 Feelweneedadditionalsafetymeasures.43 Notsufficient.44 ServicesandattentionsimplynotavailablefromSFPD.45 Responsetooslow.46 Iwouldprefertodothisandfeelthe$48Kincitytaxes/feespaidlastyearbymy
businessshouldcoveradequatepoliceprotection.47 48 Apparentlyfunding/staffingissuesforregularpresence.49 Policedon’thavetimetohelpwithnuisancetypeproblems—homeless,loitering,etc.50 Notasfamiliarwithlocalissues.51 52 Concernaboutlimitedresources.53 Ibelievewhenpeopleseeanelectronicdevicetheyhavetothinktwicebeforetheysee
something.54 55 Notenoughresources;Californiaisbroke.56 57 Wanteddaytimesecurity.58 Ifelttherejustweren’tenoughpoliceavailableforourarea.AlsoIfeltweneeded
someoneonfootpatrol.59 Inthepasttheyhavetakenmoretimetogettomybusiness.60 InsufficientpolicepresenceforregularS.F.PoliceDepartmenttodetercrime.61 Toomuchcrime,notenoughS.F.policeaction.62 Wewantmorethanonebeatcopbuttheyhavepulledthem,restoredthem,andpulled
them.It’spolitical.63