Post on 05-Jan-2017
transcript
YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 1
- Flora Pidoux
Since its creation, NATO has tremendously changed. Starting from an
Alliance that connected Western Europe with North America to deter threats coming from the USSR, NATO has come to
encompass more and more members over the years. Beyond the expansion of the membership, the Allies also aimed at
spreading their security ideal further, forced to acknowledge that their safety was vulnerable to the stability of other regions. With threats arising in its direct proximity,
NATO thus set up the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue to enhance cooperation on tackling threats arising in the
broad European and North African regions. However, NATO has become
increasingly vulnerable to attacks coming
from farther, as illustrated by the 9/11 attacks. In light of this, handpicked countries, referred to as ‘Partners across the
Globe’, have been given preferential terms to cooperate on key security issues with NATO.
The first article discusses the partnership with Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan; the second focuses on Japan’s and South Korea’s bond with the Alliance; and the third dwells
on the cooperation between the Allies, Australia and New Zealand.
Partners Across the Globe: Stretching the Transatlantic Bond
Volume 6 - Issue 10 October 2016
Contents:
Shifting the Sands of the Transatlantic Bond
Mr. Roger Hilton analyzes the partnerships that tie NATO with Afghanistan,
Iraq and Pakistan and which aims at tackling terrorism at the source.
Extending the Bond Eastward
Mrs. Floor Doppen studies the partnership between NATO, Japan and
South Korea, which emerged in reaction to North Korea’s nuclear threats.
Mr. Matt Bowers discusses the bond that Australia and New Zealand share
with the Allies, which is based on governance similarities as well as comparable
security threats and a commitment to global security.
In orange, NATO Partners across the Globe (Image: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 2
Early Global Outreach
As experience has confirmed, combating terrorism
has been a global operation that has required efforts
from across the world. Since 9/11, the Alliance has thus
pluralised its partnerships, expanding its geographic
scope of operations through a network of international
military installations and political dialogue that has
enabled them to project power and contribute to global
stability. This has been expressed with NATO
formalizing partnership relations with Afghanistan in
2010, Pakistan in 2011, and Iraq in 2012. NATO’s
engagement in the region is, however, not a nascent
experience. With the Cold War being fought on all
peripheries, the three states played a role in proxy
battles. Unsurprisingly, due to their geo-strategic value
NATO embarked to monopolize their utility once again.
Pakistan, in particular, has been central to NATO’s
matrix of Middle Eastern and Asian policy. Islamabad’s
integration with NATO took form through two
mirroring organizations; the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO). SEATO was a product of US
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who imagined it in
1954 as a bulwark against regional Communist
movements. Due primarily to internal conflict, SEATO
never reached its potential and collapsed in 1977.
Mimicking this was CETNO or the “Baghdad Pact”,
which shared a similar role as a Western bastion against
Communism within the Middle East. Conceived in
1955, Iraq’s participation in the Organization lasted
until 1958 when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by
Shifting the Sands of the Transatlantic Bond
By Roger Hilton
n the devastating aftermath of 9/11, NATO
was forced to confront a threat it had limited
familiarity with: Islamic terrorism within the
Euro-Atlantic boarders. After grappling with the
Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, the Alliance
has needed to seek out expertise beyond its normal
sphere of competencies to tackle fundamentalism. To
increase security in this new era, NATO’s tactical
reconfiguration extend into the deserts of Iraq as well
as the mountainous Khyber Pass of Pakistan and
Afghanistan, subsequently stretching the transatlantic
bond. Unfortunately, terrorism has proven to be a
stubborn enemy, as potent attacks from the so-called
“Islamic State” (IS), have hit Belgium, France, and
Germany. With this persistent threat lingering, NATO
has had to leverage its “Partners Across the Globe”
concept, recasting the utility of Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan to disband Islamic networks and reduce their
public appeal. The diverse roles of these states have
risen with the ascension of IS, which claims (marginal)
ideological support in all three and publicly declares
their intent to attack NATO states. As the spectre of
radicalism is showing no signs of exhaustion
throughout the Middle East and South Asia,
reinforcing the transatlantic bond as a catalyst for
stability is urgently needed. If NATO is to avoid
violence spilling over to the member states, it would
do well to continue to collaborate with this troika of
states, and provide them with material and
professional support to eradicate the potential of
terrorism to strike and grow.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 3
General Abdul Qasim who withdrew Iraq from CETNO
in 1958 and opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. Similarly, CETNO’s impact was minimal and
dissolved after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Despite the
loosening of ties between the Alliance and Pakistan, the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was put in
the epicenter of Western operations. After the
withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the Taliban
assumed power starting in 1994., The ascension of
Saddam Hussein as Iraqi President and the subsequent
Iran-Iraq War complicated matters for NATO in the
region. Consequently, the litany of these factors
indefinitely suspended the cultivation of transatlantic
values in all three states until 9/11.
21st Century Outreach
Where the past objective of NATO with Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan centered on containing the
spread of communism, the role of these states today has
been to eliminate sanctuaries for terrorism and facilitate
regional stability, as illustrated by the subsequent NATO
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and the American-
led intervention in Iraq two years later. Although some
terrorist havens were destroyed and Saddam Hussein
removed from power, these interventions inadvertently
contributed to a power vacuum that destabilized Iraq
and Afghanistan and injected uncertainty into Pakistan.
To stem the groundswell of violence, the Alliance has
taken a tailored approach to each state composed of a
combination of methods and providing hard security,
professional training, and resource management.
Pakistan-NATO
In October of 2001, when NATO intervened in
Afghanistan as part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), Pakistan immediately became
the Alliance’s preeminent partner. Specifically,
Islamabad proved their utility to the operations through
military cooperation as well as logistics support. The
institutionalization of cooperation through the Tripartite
Commission, a joint military and security forum that
includes representatives from the NATO-led ISAF
operation, Afghanistan and Pakistan, concentrates on
four areas: intelligence sharing, border security,
countering improvised explosive devices, and initiatives
relating to information operations. Additionally,
Pakistan has been playing a crucial role in supporting
NATO’s logistics operations. Although multiple routes
to delivery lethal and non-lethal equipment to
landlocked Afghanistan exist, the two available Pakistani
routes are significantly faster than through Russia and
Central Asia. In 2004, Pakistan earned the title of
“Major Non-NATO ally”, and in 2011 was officially
included in NATO’s flexible partnership policy
programme allowing them access to NATO’s
Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) and the
possibility to develop a bilateral programme. At the
2012 Chicago Summit, the Alliance reaffirmed
Pakistan’s pivotal role in combatting terrorism.
Outside of the security realm, NATO has cooperated
on issues related to international peacekeeping and
emergency humanitarian assistance. During the Bosnian
War in 1994, Pakistan participated in the United
Nations Protection Forces in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) to
compliment NATO's operations. In 2005, NATO came
to the aid of Pakistan after a devastating earthquake
resulted in nearly three million people being displaced
and starved of food and shelter. In response, NATO
airlifted almost 3,500 tons of supplies and provided
engineers, medical units and equipment for relief
operations.
Despite these joint achievements, the relationship is
not without shortcomings. In November of 2011,
relations regressed drastically when US-led NATO
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 4
forces opened fire on two Pakistani border outposts
near the Afghan border killing 28 soldiers. The hostile
reception by the general public to the events led to a
major breakdown of relations that resulted in
Islamabad expulsing the US from the Shamsi Airfield
and the immediate closure of all NATO supply lines
to Afghanistan. It took an intensive diplomatic effort
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to secure the
reopening of the supply lines in July 2012.
Complicating matters for the Alliance are the
persistent rumours that Pakistan is knowingly
harbouring, arming Taliban fighters in Waziristan, to
secure their geo-political interests in Afghanistan.
Pakistan and NATO do not share a uniform definition
of terrorism which has been the main source of
disaccord. This diverging view on terrorism carried
over to the Warsaw Summit, where Afghan President
Ghani accused Islamabad of distinguishing between
“good and bad terrorists”, echoing NATO’s position.
Afghanistan-NATO
NATO’s cultivation of Afghanistan as a Global
Partner was an accelerated process. Initially, the
mandate of the ISAF mission was to secure Kabul and
neighbouring areas from the Taliban and al-Qaeda in
order to facilitate the establishment of the Afghan
Transitional Administration. The Western-backed
government was not without resistance as fugitive
Taliban leader Mullah Omar orchestrated an
insurgency campaign to deter its installment. In
response to this guerilla warfare, NATO increased its
counterinsurgency operations, peaking at more than
130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner nations.
ISAF assisted in the training of the Afghan National
Security Forces to enhance their competencies for the
future. Complementing this hard security was
NATO’s public outreach through nation building
projects to secure the “hearts and minds” of the Afghans.
Under the auspices of its updated Strategic Concept,
the Alliance and Afghanistan signed the Declaration on
an Enduring Partnership at the 2010 NATO Summit in
Lisbon. This Declaration was designed to provide long-
term political support to Kabul and complement ISAF’s
combat training and military advising, all in anticipation
of when Afghan forces would assume the reigns for
national security management. In December 2014, ISAF
ceased combat operations in the country and shifted to a
strictly advising capacity. Since January 2015, the
Afghan National Defence and Security Forces have
maintained full responsibility for security nationwide.
Currently, NATO’s involvement is defined by three
inter-related mandates: a NATO-led Resolute Support
mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security
forces and institutions; a contribution to the broad effort
of financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces;
and the enhanced NATO-Afghanistan Enduring
Partnership, developed jointly with the Government of
Afghanistan. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO
assured the continuation of the partnership with
Afghanistan as they confirmed that they would
collectively fund Afghan security forces by providing
roughly $1 billion annually over the next three years. At
the upcoming Brussels Conference on Afghanistan that
will take place in October, NATO will focus on
contributing to a wider international effort to advance
the country’s self-reliance.
Iraq-NATO
In 2003 as the Iraqi Interim Government gingerly
entered the post-Saddam era, the future prospects of
national security were uncertain. Upon Baghdad call for
assistance, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I)
was established in 2004. Its non-combat mandate, was
designed to offer guidance to the Iraqi security forces by
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 5
providing training and building the institutions to
create a national security service. Specifically, the NTM
-I concentrated on three main lines of training: support
the Iraqi Command and Control Structure,
professionalize the Iraqi Armed Forces in tandem with
institutional education to develop Iraq military
doctrine, as well as professionalize the Iraqi Police
through Carabinieri-led training. Since the inception of
the NTM-I, 23 NATO members as well as Ukraine,
have facilitated this by contributing either personnel,
financial resources, or equipment. Through the
Training, Education and Doctrine Advisory Division
(TEDAD), transferable training skills have been
installed to help them prepare the next generation of
trainers as well as develop their training methods. In
total, 5,000 military and 10,000 police personnel have
profited from this instruction. The Officer Education
Training & Advisory Branch has created the National
Defence College, the lead cross departmental Institute
on grand strategic and military strategic issues, as well
as the Defence Language Institute that is responsible for
teaching foreign languages, principally English, to
personnel in the Iraqi Armed Forces and government
administration. Despite the high educational impact
delivered by the NTM-I, it would cease to operate in
2011 due to a lack of legal status for NATO troops.
In September of 2012 the Alliance agreed to an
Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme
with Baghdad that institutionalized political dialogue
and allowed for more tailored cooperation. This
followed up with Iraq being included in the Defence
and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative
that was launched at the 2014 Wales Summit to
provide support to nations requesting defence capacity
assistance. Despite NATO’s investment in Iraq, it is
hard to reconcile how the supposed professionalized
Iraqi army collapsed immediately in the face of IS
aggression. A continuing deteriorating of security
throughout the region led NATO in July of 2015 to
agree to a package of defense capacity building measures
and pledged to continue to build institutions capable of
restoring national stability for Baghdad.
Intensifying Transatlantic Bonds
For the foreseeable future, it appears that terrorism
will remain a permanent feature of the international
system. Consequently, NATO’s cooperation with Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan constitutes the advantage it
needs to dismantle radical Islam’s operational
infrastructure and ability to conduct foreign attacks. As
front line states against terrorism, these three countries
must be supported through expertise training and long
term financial aid, as failure to do so would jeopardize
Euro-Atlantic security. NATO must remain steadfast in
stretching the transatlantic bond to have any chance of
returning a modicum of security to these troubled
regions and at home.
Roger Hilton is an international affairs professional.
Roger has previous experience at the Office of the State
Minister of Georgia for European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration as well as with the delegation of Belgium at
the OSCE. He is a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy
of Vienna where he holds a Masters in Advanced
International Studies.
“Relations with Pakistan” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 3, 2016
“Chicago Summit Declaration” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 20,2012
“Afghanistan and NATO’s Enduring Partnership” NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2012
“NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I)” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, September 30, 2014
About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 6
bilateral relations with Japan and the Republic of Korea.
As NATO’s largest contributor, US foreign policy
affects the Alliance’s focus and it seems like no
coincidence that Japan and South Korea have been
building stronger ties with both Washington and the
Alliance over the past decade. The Obama
administration officially announced in 2012 its
unsurprising pivot to Asia after years of security
rapprochement with the region since the turn of the
century. The institutionalisation of security partnerships
between the two Asian countries and the Alliance thus
seems like the natural next step. Japan’s and South
Korea’s continuous support must, however, also be
acknowledged: both countries have often displayed less
reluctance to act than NATO members themselves.
Japan and South Korea’s involvement in NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan is the perfect example of that.
It was within this context that the 2010 New
Strategic Concept was conceived. It enhanced the role of
what the Alliance now calls ‘Partners across the Globe’.
Cooperative security was added in the New Strategic
Concept as a core task of NATO in the current security
environment. This core task specifically targets NATO’s
relations with its various partners on the following three
broad ideas: : strengthening partnerships; arms control,
non-proliferation and disarmament; and increasing its
assistance to new member states.
The biggest change that the New Strategic Concept
brought was the opening of NATO’s full range of
activities in the Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM).
Comprising approximately 1,400 activities, this forum
allows all partners with which NATO has individual
programs of cooperation to pick and choose the activities
Extending the Bond Eastward
By Floor Doppen
J apan and the Republic of Korea (also referred
to as South Korea) are both major non NATO
member states that have continuously
contributed to the Alliance’s missions. Given the
geographical distance between the Euro-Atlantic
region and its Global Partners in the Asia-Pacific,
cooperation is not self-evident. Consequently, until
the beginning of the 21st century both political and
operational cooperation were limited, infrequent and
not institutionalised. The relations between these two
states and NATO have, however, developed steadily
over the past years. One of the main reasons for this
development is the concern NATO, Japan and South
Korea have over the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) nuclear threat.
When the Cold War ended, NATO’s partnership
policy was mainly used as an instrumental tool to
reintegrate and democratise a divided Europe.
Following the 9/11 terror attacks against the United
States, the Alliance started to focus on global
challenges that could pose a threat to its members.
The Allies realised that future security threats could
originate anywhere in the world, and that these threats
needed to be tackled before their reached the Euro-
Atlantic, which increased the importance of
cooperating with what they at the time called ‘contact
countries’. ‘Global Partner’ replaced this appellation
after the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, indicating the
increasing intensity of the cooperation between the
Alliance and non-member states like Japan and South
Korea.
Strengthening Global Partnerships
The increased focus on strengthening partnerships
in the Asia-Pacific region is partially due to the US’s
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 7
they want to participate in. Relations with all Global
Partners are hereby streamlined, and the Individual
Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) is
regarded as the only generic partnership document for
all Global Partners. Some states advocated to fully
institutionalise NATO’s relations with the Global
Partners, in the same format as the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) or the Mediterranean Dialogue. This
institutionalisation did not happen, mainly because of a
reluctance from some European member states (France
and Germany in particular). These European member
states feared that institutionalisation could antagonise
countries like China, which might interpret closer ties
with Japan and the Republic of Korea as provocation.
This is an important consideration, especially for those
European states that
have few stakes in the
Asia-Pacific region and
do not wish to offend
Beijing. Consequently,
the IPCP is currently
open to all non-
member states who
share NATO’s
strategic goals and
fundamental values. In
practice, this non-
exclusivity implies that
no country is excluded
from potential cooperation with NATO, including
China.
NATO-Japan Relations
Japan signed its latest IPCP with NATO on the 6th of
May 2014. In addition to promoting political dialogue
and defence exchanges, practical cooperation focusses
on a wide array of areas identified in the PCM. Among
others, they agreed to cooperate on cyber defence,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter
terrorism, disarmament, maritime security (counter
piracy), conflict management, and defence science and
technology.
Amongst NATO’s Global Partners, Japan has the
largest population, economy, military budget, and the
most active overseas development programs. Tokyo also
shares a long history with the US following World War
II. Between 1945 and 1952, the US occupying forces,
led by General Douglas A. MacArthur, enacted
widespread military, political, economic, and social
reforms in the country. This resulted in strong bilateral
ties between Tokyo and Washington. However, Japan’s
primary motive for its involvement with NATO was
more of a political motive than an operational one.
Tokyo sees NATO as a useful mechanism through
which it can raise awareness in Western countries about
pressing strategic
developments in North
East Asia. During
Foreign Minister Taro
Aso’s term (2005-2007),
his strategy was to
expand Japan’s
diplomatic horizons
beyond its traditional
allies. In this sense,
Europe is considered by
Japan as a potential
partner that shares the
same fundamental values as they do. Through NATO,
both Taro Aso and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wanted
to educate their European counterparts on Asia’s
security environment. Especially after the European
Union’s (EU) move towards lifting the arms embargo on
China between 2003 and 2005, Japan felt that the Union
did not understand the extent of the threat that China
posed to the region, notably through the several
territorial disputes that oppose several East-Asian states,
including Japan with Beijing.
Libyans celebrating the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe (L) address a joint news conference at the Alliance headquarters in Brus-
sels May 6, 2014 (Photo: Reuters/Francois Lenoir)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 8
When it comes to operational cooperation Japan is
a rather unique case. Japan’s constitution, in
particular Article 9, constrains Japan’s contributions
to NATO operations seen how it poses different
restrictions on the use of its army. In short, Article 9
prohibits Japan from ever gaining war potential, and
the Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF) has
subsequently only focussed on its defence capabilities.
Largely because of these restrictions in operational
military power, Japan’s contributions to ISAF and
other NATO operations were different in nature from
the efforts of other Global Partners. They did not
contribute any troops to NATO’s mission in
Afghanistan, but proved to be an active political and
financial contributor to the operation and to many
more. The country has provided operational funds to
support activities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) and deployed experts to the Lituanian-led
PRT in the Ghor province. In addition, they were also
a financial contributor to the PfP Trust Fund project
on munitions safety and stockpile management in
Afghanistan, as well as to the Helicopter Trust Fund
and the NATO-Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
Finally, Japan was also part of NATO’s counter piracy
efforts off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.
Japan is also one of the front runners on Ballistic
Missile Defence (BMD), which is a tool that NATO
considers crucial in pursuing one of its other core
tasks of collective defence.
NATO-Republic of Korea Relations
The Republic of Korea signed its first IPCP with
the Alliance in September 2012. Joint priority areas
focus on, among others, cyber-defence, response to
terrorism, multinational peace support operations,
interoperability and Science for Peace and Security
(SPS). To date, the collaborative activities of NATO
with the Republic of Korea under the SPS Programme
primarily focused on the development of advanced
technology and cyber defence. Common projects
include the development of a compact sensor system for
unmanned aerial systems and the defining of solutions
for preserving confidentiality and integrity for big data
processing.
The Republic of Korea’s relations with NATO are
more recent than Japan’s. Their relations started in 2005
when Ban Ki-moon, then Foreign Minister, addressed
the North Atlantic Council in an informal meeting
during a visit to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.
The foreign minister expressed Seoul’s hopes for
exploring possibilities of cooperation between his
country and the Alliance. By 2010, this political move
towards more cooperation was translated into
operational cooperation with the Alliance. In April 2010
a contingency of around 350 staff was sent to the Parwan
province to pursue economic and social development
within NATO’s operation in Afghanistan. Seoul also
donated around $75 million to the Afghan National
Army Trust Fund between 2011 and 2012. South Korea
also contributed to Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf
of Aden on anti-piracy operations.
The Threat of North Korea
Both Japan and South Korea share the same core
security concerns: North Korea and its nuclear and
ballistic missiles ambitions. Regardless of other
perceived security threats in the region, North Korea is
the one imminent and explicit threat that binds both
Global Partners and NATO. The threat of North Korea
is explicitly mentioned in the IPCP’s NATO has with
both Global Partners. The Alliance has frequently
condemned Pyongyang’s repeated acts of aggression, in
particular its nuclear ambitions and ballistic missile
program. The latest statement came after recent reports
about a possible fifth nuclear test conducted by North
Korea. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a
statement on September 9th declaring his strong
condemnation of North Korea’s consistent provocations
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 9
and violations of international regulations. The fact that
NATO takes a clear stance on the North Korean issue
does imply that NATO realises the global nature of
those threats. It also demonstrates that NATO is aware
of the political weight the Allies carry within the
security arena. NATO has positioning itself as a
significant player in global security which matches with
the political authority accompanying the fact that it
speaks on behalf of its 28 independent member
countries. Japan and the Republic of Korea have been
using this political authority to their advantage to build
their case against North Korea.
However, the biggest question for NATO’s future
involvement in Asia-Pacific is the willingness of
European member states to get more involved in that
region. While the US is a major ally of both Japan and
the Republic of Korea, this does not imply that
European states will come to their rescue just as
willingly. Granted, the UK, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Greece and Turkey sent forces to the
Korean War (1950-1953) to fight alongside their US
allies. It is unclear whether they would do the same
again in this day and age. As the treat of North Korea
grows, so will Japan and the Republic of Korea’s
incentives to find reliable defence partners that share
their same concerns. Using NATO as a tool to reach
out to both Europe and the US would be a very
effective method to do just that.
Both Japan and South Korea agree that their
relation with the Alliance is still developing and both
express a desire to further it, both politically and
operationally. Aside from the imminent threat of North
Korea, latest tensions in the South China Sea over
contested islands also increase the need for a reliable
security partnership. NATO benefits from the
relationship as well in its efforts to secure the world
and their members from threats that could destabilize
the security environment. It remains to be seen how
the partnerships with Japan and South Korea will
develop further, but there is definitely reason to believe
that they will deepen rather than the opposite.
Floor Doppen is a student of International Relations
and Diplomacy at the University of Antwerp, Belgium.
Bagbaslioglu, A. (2010), “Relations With ‘Global Partners’ in the Framework of NATO’s New Partnership Policy”, Security Strategies, Volume: 20, pp 49-78.
Cooperative Security as NATO’s Core task, Building security through military cooperation across the globe (7 Sep. 2011), retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77718.htm
Frühling, S., Schreer, B. (2009), “NATO’s New Strategic Concept and US Commitments in the Asia-Pacific”. The Rusi Journal, Vol. 154, No. 5, pp. 98-103.
Green, M. (2016), “The Legacy of Obama’s “Pivot” to Asia”, Foreign Policy (September 3, 2016), retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/
Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme Between Japan and NATO (6 May 2014), retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_05/20140507_140507-IPCP_Japan.pdf
NATO intensifies scientific cooperation with the Republic of Korea (26 Nov. 2015), as retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_127384.htm?selectedLocale=en
NATO Secretary General Statement on North Korea (9 Sep. 2016), retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_135008.htm
Schreer, B. (2012), “Beyond Afghanistan. NATO’s Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific”. Research Division, NATO Defense College, No. 75.
Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (19-20 Nov. 2010), retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf
The Law Library of Congress (2015), “Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution”. Global Legal Research Center, Sept. 2015.
Tsuruoka, M. (2010), “The Future of NATO: Cooperation and its Limits”. Stiftung Wissenschaft un Politik, Session IV, Discussion paper.
Tsuruoka, M. (2013), “NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners”, Research Division, NATO Defense College, No. 91.
About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 10
By Matt Bowers
S ince its inception, NATO has operated as a
network of partnership and mutualism
among its members to provide security,
stability, and peace to the Atlantic community. At its
naissance, the single greatest threat to global security
was the Soviet Union, the shadow of which loomed
large over Europe in the aftermath of World War II.
Fears of Soviet influence in Europe spurred the
foundation and subsequent expansion of the Alliance
eastward, a process which still continues today,
notably through the Partnership for Peace program.
Simultaneously, NATO has sought to engage
countries further afield in strategic partnerships,
augmenting the collective defense apparatus between
Europe and North America with individualized
agreements beyond the immediate Euro-Atlantic
sphere. Never have these partnerships been more
valuable than today. In a globalizing world of evolving
transnational threats, broadening the scope of
partnerships is essential to strengthening the security
of Alliance members and, indeed, the global
community. Propaganda emanating from Raqqa, for
example, can incite an extremist in Sydney to
violence, leading to policy change not only in
Canberra, but also Brussels and Washington. As
emerging threats metastasize and grow globally,
maintaining partnerships in all corners of the globe has
become a key NATO priority.
Two of NATO’s most vital partnerships are with
Australia and New Zealand – countries half a world
and oceans away from the Atlantic periphery that are,
in fact, closer to the heart of the Euro-Atlantic
community than any other partnership in NATO’s
history. Middle powers with robust economic and
defense structures, the two countries punch above their
weight on the global stage and face similar transnational
threats to the NATO alliance. Both also occupy a unique
space in the modern global security regime as vehement
Pacific adherents to the North Atlantic Charter’s tenet of
“safeguard[ing] the freedom, common heritage and
civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Their
partnerships serve to complement and further NATO’s
work toward achieving this goal in the Euro-Atlantic
community and beyond.
Natural Partners in Peace and Security
The closeness of the relationship between NATO,
Australia, and New Zealand is based on a foundation of
values and historical ties that defy geographic distance
while also maximizing on the partners’ geostrategic
locations and interests.
Geographic isolation largely left Australia and New
Zealand adrift in the global order emerging from the
ashes of World War II. As remnants of the British
Empire in the South Pacific, they were simultaneously
European and yet as far removed from Europe as can be.
To this day, they have retained political attributes of
Atlantic-minded countries despite their remoteness. Both
are open democracies with industrialized economies that
share the values and global security interests of the
Atlantic community. It is not difficult to imagine them as
natural full members of the transatlantic Alliance but for
geography.
Indeed, the modern security challenges facing
Australia and New Zealand: Pacific Countries, Atlantic Partners
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 11
Australia and New Zealand largely mirror those of the
transatlantic community. Transnational terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration
flows, climate change, energy security, maritime issues,
cyber threats, and regional power dynamics all transcend
geographic distance, creating shared interests with the
Atlantic community in tackling these issues at the global
level.
Bolstering Cooperation through Joint
Operations
The two countries have been active partners in
NATO missions for decades, deploying military
personnel, pooling and sharing resources, and enhancing
interoperability in engagements around the world. Both
countries have been active in Kosovo and contributed
troops to the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia
during its mandate from
1996-2004. Currently,
they remain deeply
committed partners in
two of NATO’s largest
missions: Resolute
Support Mission (RSM)
in Afghanistan and
combating piracy around
the Horn of Africa in Operation Ocean Shield.
Australia and New Zealand have been integral non-
NATO partners in Afghanistan, the lengthiest and most
complex mission NATO has undertaken to date
following the American invocation of Article V in
response to the September 11 attacks in 2001. Both have
steadfastly supported the coalition, contributing to both
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
now RSM to advise and train Afghanistan’s developing
security apparatus. Of the 39 countries comprising the
forces of RSM, Australia, as of July 2016, ranks eighth
for troop contributions – two percent of the total
coalition. Of non-NATO countries, only Georgia, which
harbors active ambitions for Euro-Atlantic integration,
has more troops currently active in RSM. Along with
other non-NATO partners, New Zealand also maintains
forces as part of RSM. As emphasized in particular in the
2012 Individual Partnership and Cooperation
Programme between New Zealand and NATO,
cooperation in Afghanistan, as in Bosnia before, has
established a “genuine security partnership aimed at
enhancing interoperability in support of NATO-led
operations, contributing to security, peace and stability,
particularly in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific
regions, promoting democratic values and norms and
improving our joint ability to tackle emerging security
challenges.” The same can be said of the Australian
partnership.
Furthermore, both
Australia and New
Zealand have joined
Operation Ocean
Shield, NATO’s
counterpiracy mission in
the western Indian
Ocean aimed at
protecting maritime
commercial routes and
securing humanitarian
aid corridors to
Somalia. In January of 2014, New Zealand became just
the second non-NATO ally to join the mission after
Ukraine (like Georgia, a country with active Euro-
Atlantic ambitions); Australia has since partaken in
Ocean Shield as well. Upon joining the Operation, New
Zealand Defense Minister Dr. Jonathan Coleman
declared that the deployment of personnel and
resources to the Gulf of Aden demonstrated once again
the country’s “commitment to playing our part in
supporting NATO in areas of common interest.” While
Ocean Shield is slated to conclude in December of this
year, NATO has committed to continuing to support
The Royal New Zealand Navy’s HMNZS Te Mana, deployed as part of Operation Ocean Shield (Photo: Royal New Zealand Navy)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 12
anti-piracy initiatives off the Horn of Africa by
“maintaining maritime situational awareness and
continuing close links with other international counter-
piracy actors.” It would be in NATO’s and the partners’
interest to continue to collaborate in this new phase of
NATO’s anti-piracy work, furthering the maritime
partnerships developed during Ocean Shield.
With each mission that partners engage in, their ties to
the Alliance strengthen, as do their technical capacities to
operate closely with NATO partners. Former Secretary-
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen highlighted this in
welcoming New Zealand to Operation Ocean Shield in
2014, noting that “[b]y working together, we not only
make a real difference in dealing with today’s security
threats, we also improve our ability to operate together.”
This existing framework of interoperability serves not
only to bolster cooperation in ongoing missions, but also
to prepare both sides of the partnership for future joint
endeavors.
Transnational Threats Call for Closer Partnership
The greatest threats to global security today are not
solely conventional and confined to state borders; they
now encompass asymmetric, non-geographic challenges
that have the capacity to grow and expand transnationally.
Cyber threats, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and maritime security have emerged
quickly as critical threats to mutual NATO and Australia-
New Zealand interests. All of these were deemed priority
areas for cooperation in both the 2012 Individual
Partnership and Cooperation Programme between New
Zealand and NATO or the 2013 Individual Partnership
and Cooperation Programme between Australia and
NATO.
These threats and others such as migration flows,
energy security, and climate change cannot be addressed
from an Atlantic or Pacific perspective exclusively; they
require cooperation at a broader global level. The
increased interoperability, intelligence sharing, and
dialogue developed between the Alliance and its South
Pacific partners through Afghanistan and Ocean Shield in
particular have set the stage for further integrated
cooperation in addressing such challenges going forward.
Indeed, in 2011, then-Australian Foreign Minister Kevin
Rudd wrote in an op-ed in The Australian that his country
supported the Alliance’s strategic partnerships, and that
he “look[ed] forward to flexible and substance-driven co-
operation with NATO, one that meets Australia's
requirement and one that will strengthen our bonds with
our allies and partners in NATO.”
Transatlantic Deterrents in the Asian Periphery
The geographic advantage of Asia-Pacific regional
partnerships with Australia and New Zealand, as well as
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Mongolia, adds a
dimension of geostrategic complementarity to the
Alliance’s focus on missions within or in response to
threats to the Atlantic periphery. Security in the Pacific
Rim has become an increasingly important pillar in the
global order in the past two decades, but cooperative
engagements in the region have repeatedly been
interrupted by crises erupting in Europe and the Middle
East. The United States, holding vested interests in the
Pacific, has typically led in this area, most notably with the
Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” policy to
strengthen economic and security ties among America and
other Pacific Rim countries.
Some experts have argued, given Australia and New
Zealand’s strategic interests in the Pacific and NATO’s
lack of clear policy for the region, that divergent interests
suggest a more limited political partnership driven by
Pacific demands is appropriate. But as American attention
has realigned eastward again with that of the European
Allies in the face of a resurgent Russia, NATO’s
relationships in the Pacific are more essential than ever,
and present an opportunity for symbiosis between the
alliance and its partners. The presence of NATO
partnerships with strong middle powers in the Asia Pacific
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 13
adhering to the principles of democracy and the rule of
law provides an implicit check on global security
interests in the region, such as
territorial disputes and an
unpredictable nuclear North Korea,
and strengthens both sides’ ability
to cooperatively counter less
conventional emerging threats.
Shared Threats, Shared
Commitment, Shared Benefits
In addition to the shared threats
faced by both NATO and its
Australian and New Zealand
partners, it is noteworthy that both
countries, broadly, come closer to
meeting certain requirements of
NATO membership than some
Alliance members themselves.
At a time when the NATO
budget is of particular concern,
Australia and New Zealand have
demonstrated a far greater
commitment to shoring up defense
spending than many of their
European and North American
partners. According to the most
recent World Bank/Stockholm
International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) data for military
spending (2015), calculated to
NATO standards (though with
some minor variance), both outpace
several Alliance members in their
percentage of GDP allocated to
defense, as represented in Figure 1
alongside official 2016 NATO estimates for Alliance
members: while neither country hits the 2% threshold
required of NATO members themselves, they
demonstrate a quantifiable commitment to ensuring
their defense spending is measured but robust in
comparison to the Alliance
writ-large. In a global security
environment in which both the
official NATO numbers and
the independent World Bank/
SIPRI data set show a vast
majority of members are not
meeting their 2% minimums,
partners committed to strong
national defense while being
unbound from this threshold
are essential in supplementing
the Alliance’s capabilities in the
missions it undertakes.
Furthermore, the
benefits of partnership are
mutualistic. For NATO,
partnerships with Australia and
New Zealand advance close
cooperation to jointly address
global threats from both
Atlantic and Pacific angles. For
Australia and New Zealand,
partnership brings them closer
to the Atlantic community and
shores up their security
capacities, including through
military training, disaster
relief, intelligence sharing, and
counterterrorism operations.
The result is an arrangement
very close to membership,
though without the political
power of sitting on the North
Atlantic Council and, chiefly, the obligations that come
with Article V.
NATO Member
/Partner
% GDP for Military (per World Bank/SIPRI, 2015)
NATO estimated % GDP for De-fense for 2016
USA 3.32 3.61
Greece 2.60 2.38
Poland 2.20 2.00
Turkey 2.13 1.56
France 2.10 1.78
Estonia 2.01 2.16
Australia 1.95 N/A
UK 1.95 2.21
Portugal 1.85 1.38
Montenegro* 1.63 N/A
Croatia 1.55 1.23
Norway 1.52 1.54
Romania 1.39 1.48
Bulgaria 1.35 1.35*
Italy 1.31 1.11
New Zealand 1.19 N/A
Netherlands 1.18 1.17
Spain 1.18 0.91
Denmark 1.17 1.17
Germany 1.17 1.19
Albania 1.16 1.21
Lithuania 1.14 1.49
Slovakia 1.12 1.16
Latvia 1.06 1.45
Czech Rep. 0.98 1.04
Canada 0.97 0.99
Slovenia 0.95 0.94
Belgium 0.92 0.85
Hungary 0.85 1.01
Luxembourg 0.52 0.44
Iceland N/A N/A
*Official NATO estimate for Bulgaria does not include pensions
2015 Defense Spending by NATO Members*, Australia, and New Zealand (Data: NATO and SIPRI)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 14
Partnership without Membership – A
Stronger Bond?
Occasionally, the topic of full NATO membership
has been floated for Australia and New Zealand.
Expert commentators, including Ivo Daalder and
James Goldgeier in their 2006 piece “Global NATO”,
and political figures, such as former New York City
mayor Rudy Giuliani during his 2008 presidential run,
have advocated within the past ten years in favor of
expanding the Alliance
membership to partners
beyond the Atlantic such
as Australia and New
Zealand, despite Article X
of the North Atlantic
Charter limiting future
membership to “European”
countries.
Yet, while NATO’s
scope has broadened to
combat threats beyond the
Atlantic, there are
potential drawbacks in fully integrating Australia and
New Zealand into the North Atlantic Charter’s
protocols. The risk of attacks on these countries’
territorial integrity that could prompt an invocation
of Article V is extraordinarily low due to their
geographic isolation, and the close-knit cooperation
they have already fostered with NATO through their
partnership agreements negates the need for them to
be signatories. Additionally, it may not be in Australia
or New Zealand’s geopolitical interest to be obliged
to respond to an Article V invocation by a European
or North American NATO member, although, as
evidenced in Afghanistan, they would likely be ready
and willing to join a NATO coalition due to
precedent, political and cultural ties to the Alliance.
Even in the absence of membership, the strength
of the ties NATO and its Pacific partners share should
encourage continued, deeper cooperation and
integration of resources between them. The partners
have proven their commitment to NATO’s mission and
values, and, as US Navy Commander and former
Atlantic Council fellow Chris Musselman has argued,
“should be consulted rather than informed” regarding the
planning of operations. How deep that consultation goes
beyond simply cooperation after the fact to combat
emerging challenges will be critical in defining the
partnerships going forward.
Global Partners
Bolstering NATO
as Guarantor of
Global Security
Australia and
New Zealand’s
intricate ties with the
Alliance are a
testament to the
relevance, import,
and necessity of
NATO and collective
defense in addressing modern security challenges. It is
clear that Australia and New Zealand place a high
premium on their relationship with NATO to bolster
their own security and ties to the Euro-Atlantic
community, demonstrated through their participation in
NATO missions and budgetary commitments to defense.
Moreover, their adherence to the Alliance’s core
principles and its mission to promote peace and stability
in the global security order serves to symbiotically
deepen and strengthen their cooperation with NATO at
a structural level. Unequivocally, they are two of the
Alliance’s most indispensable partners at a time when
security threats are becoming more global, more
asymmetric, and less conventional. Their partnerships
with NATO have been, and will continue to be,
invaluable in addressing these emerging challenges.
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull meets with Australian troops in Afghani-
stan in January 2016 (Photo: REUTERS/Alex Ellinghausen/Pool)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 10 15
Matt Bowers holds a degree in International Studies and
Political Science from American University in
Washington, DC. His areas of interest include emerging
transatlantic and transnational security challenges,
international economic and energy policy, and US and
European politics. He currently works with the War
Crimes Research Office at the American University
Washington College of Law, and previously served as a
Policy Intern with the Atlantic Treaty Association. The
views expressed in this article are his own. You can
follow him on Twitter @MattWBowers.
Australia-NATO Joint Political Declaration, NATO, 18 January 2003. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_94097.htm?selectedLocale=en
Blaxland, John, “Australia joining NATO must be carefully considered.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/comment/australia-joining-nato-must-be-carefully-considered-20140904-10c91n.html
“Counter-piracy operations.” NATO, 12 July 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm
Croft, Adrian, “Giuliani says NATO should admit Israel, Japan.” Reuters, 19 September 2007. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-giuliani-idUSL1992785020070919
Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006.
“Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016),” NATO, 4 July 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf
Frühling, Stephen and Benjamin Schreer, “The ‘Natural Ally’? The ‘Natural Partner’? – Australia and the Atlantic Alliance,” in Hakan Edstrom, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (eds.), NATO: The Power of Partnerships (Basingstoke: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2011), pp. 40-59.
Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Australia and NATO, 21 February 2013. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/Australia-NATO-Individual-Partnership-Cooperation-Program.pdf
Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between New Zealand and NATO, NATO, 27 June 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_88720.htm?selectedLocale=en
Musselman, Chris, “Special Summit Series: Australia and NATO.” Atlantic Council, 26 August 2014. http://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/special-summit-series-australia-and-nato
“New Zealand joins NATO’s counter-piracy mission Ocean Shield.” NATO, 21 January 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_106317.htm?selectedLocale=en
“Relations with Australia.” NATO, 7 April 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48899.htm
“Relations with New Zealand.” NATO, 7 April 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52347.htm
“Resolute Support Mission.” NATO, July 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160707_2016-07-RSM-Placemat.pdf
Rudd, Kevin, “NATO Partners Earn Respect.” The Australian, 23 April 2011. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/nato-partners-earn-respect/story-e6frgd0x-1226043480613
The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO, 21 March 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
“Military expenditure (%GDP).” The World Bank, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
About the author
Bibliography
This publication is co-sponsored by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
researcher, a subject expert or a professional and feel you have a valuable
contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of
importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your
work please see our website at: http://atahq.org/atlantic-voices/
Editor: Flora Pidoux
ATA Programs On November 16th, the Atlantic Treaty Association, in partnership
with MUST & Partners and with the support of NATO Public Diplomacy
Division, will host a conference at the European Parliament in Brussels on
"NATO – EU Cooperation After the Warsaw Summit: Countering
Hybrid Warfare".
With particular reference to the NATO Warsaw Summit and the
recent NATO-EU Joint Declaration along with their standing agreements
on cyber security, this conference will focus on how both organizations
can best use their existing resources to develop a cooperative security
strategy that will effectively counter the ongoing threat of Hybrid
Warfare.
The Rīga Conference has become a unique venue for constructive
dialogue on international security issues between leading global decision
makers. The event is organized jointly by the Latvian Transatlantic
Organisation, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia., and will take place
on October 28-29.
More information her: https://www.rigaconference.lv
On October 27-30, Globsec will host the fifth edition of the Globsec
Tatra Summit, which aims to make a lasting contribution to defining the
future of the economic and political governance of the European Union.
This conference will put the emphasis on Central Europe and its interests
in the matter.
More details here: http://www.tatrasummit.org/tatrasummit2016
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic
Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global net-
works and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security.
By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media
representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set
forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace,
Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from
North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlan-
tic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the succes-
sor generation in our work.
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understan-
ding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security through its inter-
national programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security
Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
security issues.
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for
its members.
the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in
Northern Africa and Asia.
The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy acti-
vism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.
These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of internati-
onal policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.