Post on 25-Aug-2020
transcript
AUSTRALIA’SSOUTHCHINASEADILEMMA:MULTIFACEDINTERESTS,SHIFTINGPOLICIES,AND‘ATALEOFTWOCITIES’(BEIJING&WASHINGTON)DrChristopherRobertsDirector,NationalAsianStudiesCenter(NASC),AdjunctAssociateProfessor,InstituteforGovernanceandPolicyAnalysis(IGPA),UniversityofCanberra.TaiwanFellow(MOFA),InstituteforInternationalRelations,NCCU.
AUSTRALIA’S‘INTERESTS’INTHESOUTHCHINASEA
• FreedomofNavigation• Commercialgoods?• Military
• Political-Legal• Apoliticalinterestinthesalienceofa‘rules-basedorder’
underpinnedbyadherencetotreatybasedinternationallaw• The2016AustralianDefenceWhitePaper& the2017ForeignPolicy
WhitePaperhighlightthe‘SouthChinaSea’asakeyconcern.• Military:
• FivePowerDefenceArrangements(1971)andOperationGatewaySurveillanceFlights(1980,ButterworthAirbase,Malaysia)
• TheAustralia-USalliance
BEIJING:ACTIVEMILITARYINVOLVEMENT/INTERESTS(RED)ANDINFLUENCE(YELLOW)
AustralianAntarcticTerritory
3(4?)Chinesebasesand2FieldCamps
IndiaandBhutan’sTerritorialDisputeswithChina
Beijing’semergingstrategicencirclementofIndia
TheEastChinaSeadisputes
TheSouthChinaSeaDisputes
MountingInfluencebyChinaacrossSoutheastAsia
TheKoreanPeninsula
ENTIREIndo-PacificTrumpadministrationgeneratinguncertainty
MountingInfluenceacrossthePacificIslands
MountingInfluencebyChinawithinAustralia
BEIJING’SGRANDSTRATEGY:SECURINGITSMARITIMEPERIPHERY
3.NeutralisetheKoreanPeninsula
1.ControltheSouthChinaSea
2.ControltheEastChinaSea
4.ReunifyTaiwan(byanymeans)
2017:STRATEGICALARMANDACALLFORCOLLECTIVEACTION
• StrategicAlarm:Legality, Proportionality,andCoercion• TheJuly2016ArbitralAwardlargelyignoredbyBeijing• Dangerousprecedent:theEastChinaSea,SouthAsiaandAntarctica?
• July2017PMTurnbull’sShangri-LaDialogueKeynoteaddress:• ReferredtoChinathirteentimesandstated‘wemustpreservethe
rules-basedstructure…Thismeanscooperation,notunilateralactionstoseizeorcreateterritoryormilitarizedisputedareas.Thismeans…notwinningthroughcorruption,interferenceorcoercion’.
• JulieBishop’s2nd NewDelhiOration• SupporttorestarttheQuadrilateralSecurityDialogue2.0
• 6VesselNavalTaskGroupthroughtheSouthChinaSeaandbeyond• GlobalTimes:Australiawas‘encirclingChina’
2017-2018:CONTINUED(LIMITED)MILITARYBALANCING/CONTINGENCIES
• AU$195billiondefence procurementprogram(5th largestarmsimporter)• Recentcontractsinclude:
• 9BAEanti-submarinefrigates(Britain,AU$35billion)• 12offshorepatrolsvesselsand211BoxerCRVarmoredcombat
vehicles(Germany,AU$9.2billion)• 6AdvancedTritonDrones(US,AU$6billion)
• Earliersignificantcontracts/acquisitionsinclude:• 2LandingHelicopterDockShips(AU$3billion)• 72F-35B(AU$17billion).• 12FrenchShortfinBarracudaBlock1Asubmarines(AU$50billion)
• Overallassessment:LimitedDeterrenceandForceProjectionCapabilities• Professionalandrelativelypotentforcegovernedbypopulationlimits
2016-2018:BEIJING’SRELATIVELYMEASUREDRESPONSESANDPRESSURE
• EscalatingrhetoricagainstAustralia(CCP&state-controlledmedia):• GlobalTimes:‘Economic&militaryconsequenceslieinstorefora“papercat”suchas
AustraliathatdarestochallengeChina’ssovereigntyclaims’• GlobalTimes:Beijingwill“adoptstrongcountermeasureswhichwillseriouslyimpact
Australianeconomicdevelopment”unlesswestop“kissinguptotheUnitedStates.”• Tangible(adverse)DevelopmentsintheChina-AustraliaRelationship
• From2017:ChinadeferredaSeniorAustralianOfficialsmeeting• Stalledministerialvisitsandlowerlevelexchanges• ChinablockedprogressontheMarch2017pledgetocreatean
Australia-Chinaministerialenergydialogue• WineindustryreportsofChinesecustomsdelayingAustralianexports• Nonetheless,clearsignal:BeijingwillnottolerateAustralian
interference
BROADERISSUESINTHEAUSTRALIA-CHINARELATIONSHIP
• MilitaryConcernsreChina’sGrandStrategy• ThePacificIslandsregion– e.g.mountingCCPinfluence• ‘Debate’abouttheCCP+UnitedFront’sinfluenceinAustralia
• DifferenceswithinandbetweenpoliticalpartiesoveraChinaPolicy• ASIODirector:nowmoreforeignintelligenceofficersthantheColdWar• AnnualReportbytheAustralianSecurityintelligenceOrganization
(ASIO):‘scaleofthreattoAustralia...isunprecedented’• TheSamDastyari Affair(LaborPolitician)
• Australia-ChinaEconomicinterdependence• Chinaabsorbed30%ofAustralianexportsin2017(up21.2%)• Cf:Chineseinvestmentsdeclinedby22.8%(2016-17)• 2017:166,000Chinesestudents(43.3%ofinternationalstudents)
Alan Boyd, ‘China dangles trade threat over Australia’, Asia Times, 3 Jan 2018: http://www.atimes.com/article/china-dangles-trade-threat-australia/
2018:CANBERRADISENGAGINGFROMTHESOUTHCHINASEA?
• SouthChinaSeaFatigue?• LossofconfidenceintheQuadrilateralSecurityDialogue• Early2018:PolicymakersconfidentASEANcannegotiateaCodeof
ConductalbeitonChina’sterms(‘sweepingitunderthecarpet’?)• Distancingfrom2018USNationalDefenceStrategy
• FMBishop:wedon’tsee‘ChinaaposingamilitarythreattoAustralia,…WecontinuetoworkcloselywithChina
• Militaryexercises:incontrasttotheUS,AustraliadidnotdisinvitethePLAfrom‘ExerciseKakadu’orExercisePandaroo (BothSep2018)
• July2018:FMJulieBishopcategoricallyruledouttargetedFONOPs(firsttime)addingAustraliahadnevertargetedaspecificcountryanditwouldbean‘extra-ordinarysteptodoso’
AUSTRALIA,JAPAN&INDIAUNDERTHETRUMPADMINISTRATION’SSHADOW
• June2017:Turnbull’sSLDMessagetotheUS:• ‘Inthisbravenewworldwecannotrelyongreatpowerstosafeguard
ourinterests’• July2018,strongestcriticismbyCanberrayet:
• ‘Ourclosestallyandtheworld'smostpowerfulnationisbeingseenaslesspredictableandlesscommittedtotheinternationalorderthatitpioneered…TheUnitedStatesisnowfavouring amoredisruptive,oftenunilateral,foreignandtradepolicythathasheightenedanxietiesaboutitscommitmenttotherules-basedorderthatitestablished,protectedandguaranteed.’
• JapanandIndia:Similarconcerns,plusUStariffs,mayalsoinformasimultaneoussofteningoftheirapproaches.
THEASEANCODEOFCONDUCTAMIDSTDISUNITY&FRUSTRATION
IMPLICATIONSOFTHEANALYSISFORTHEAUSTRALIANFOREIGNPOLICYTRAJECTORY• Australiawilllikelycontinuewithamore
cautiousapproachtotheSouthChinaSea• Fracturedpoliticalenvironment• 2019:changeofgovernmentcouldresultin
anewapproach• Nonetheless:anynewpoliciesunlikelyto
positivelyaffecttheSouthChinaSeasituationabsentamorecollectiveapproach
• Prospectsforaneffectivecollectiveapproachverylow(beyondtheASEANCodeofConduct)• Cf.SignificantconcernsretheCoC (e.g.Prof
Thayer’sanalysis)
NEWALLIANCESAND/ORCOALITIONBENEFITSPROPORTIONATEMILITARYEXPENDITUREBYCOUNTRY(IISS,2018)
AnnualMilitaryExpenditure(2017,US$)China: $150billionOtherKeyMajorandMiddlePowersIndia: $52billionJapan: $46billionSouthKorea: $36billionAustralia: $25billionSingapore: $10billionTotal: $169billion
Source:2018MilitaryBalance,IISS
CAVEATSTOTHEANALYSIS(PLUSTHEPOSSIBILITYOFABLACKSWANEVENT)
• Analysiscouldrapidlychangeshouldacombinationofthebelowoccur:a) TheTrumpAdministrationisreplacedbyanew
government(unlikelybeforenextPresidentialelection)
b) AmilitaryskirmishbetweenBeijingandanotherclaimantorstakeholderstate
c) Asignificantandadversedevelopmentinanotherarena
d) China’sdebtbubblecrashesorotherdevelopmentscombinetounderminetheCCPregime’ssecurity– i.e.leadingto(b)and/or(c).
POSTSCRIPT:WHAT’SNECESSARYINTHEEVENTOFSTRONGCOLLECTIVERESOLVETORESTOREORDER1) AstrategicdialoguethroughanexpandedQuadorthelinkingofkey
regionalminilaterals2) Subsequentarticulationbythesestatesof‘redlines’reBeijing’sbehavior
(+demonstratedwillingnesstoapplyhardpowerwherenecessary)3) Establishmultinationalcoastguardpatrols,subjecttopermission,to
policeresourceswithinlegallyunambiguousEEZsofclaimantstates;4) AbroadermaritimeCodeofConductinvolvingstakeholdersbeyond
ChinaandASEAN5) Collectiveapproachtostrategiccommunicationstocounterpropaganda
andpsychologicalwarfareactivities6) Anincrementalapproachtowardstheestablishmentofamutualdefence
pactcoveringanymilitarythreattothestatusquoacrosstheIndo-Pacific
ANNEXESFORLATERUSE
2017-2018:MAINTAININGAUSTRALIA’SINFLUENCEINTHEPACIFICISLANDS
• Power/InfluenceBalancing– theCaseofthePacificIslands• AnavalbaseinVanuatu?(US$87millionfromChina’sEximBank)• PMTurnbullexpressed‘alarm’andsoonhostedVanuatu’sPMfor
thepurposeofanewsecuritytreaty.• RapidPacificDiplomacy:PMhostedleadersofPNGandSolomon
Islands;FMundertookvisitstoMarshallIslands,Micronesia,andPalau.
• CanberraunderminedHuawei’stelecommunicationstenderbyproviding2/3fundingforunderseainternetcable(PacifictoAustralia)
• Possible
AUSTRALIA’SDEPENDENCEANDBEIJINGINFLUENCE:DEVELOPMENTSANDREGIONALPERCEPTIONS
• Investments from China rose by 60% in 2015• Mining: 80-83% foreign ownership
• BHP Billiton 60%; Rio Tinto 82% (contrast Norway)• Cf: Norway’s US$873 billion future fund
• Agriculture: >12%• 2015-2016: Chinese ownership increased from 1.5 million hectares to 14.5 million
hectares• Residential Property
• 2015: 45% of total Chinese investment ($6.85 billion)• 95% directed towards NSW: Affordability?• Restraint through two way dependence?
• Mixed Signals with and perceptions by Major Powers: Japan, India and the United States
AUSTRALIA’SUS-CHINADILEMMA:MIXEDSIGNALSAMIDSTAWEAKENINGDOMESTICENVIRONMENT?
• Australia’s history of staunch support for U.S. • FM Alexander’s Downers Statement on Taiwan (2004)• Port of Darwin sale, Freedom of Navigation exercises, and
joint exercise with China• Former FM (Gareth Evans): Australia should demonstrate a
foreign policy more independent of the alliance• A strengthening of Australia’s position?
• PM Turnbull at the 2017 Shangri-La Dialogue• FM Bishop at the 2017 2nd India-Australia Oration
• A long-term strategic, political and economic strategy?
ALANDDIVIDED:DEBATESINCANBERRA’SSOUTHCHINASEAAPPROACH
• DivideswithinPolicyandAcademicCircles• Accommodation/morepassiveapproach• Challengingexcessive/illegalclaimsandactions• WhethertoundertaketargetedFONOPs• Otheractionsincludingcollectiveapproaches(e.g.theQuad)
• EvolvingPartyApproaches• Labor