City on the edge: the transformation of Miami

transcript

title: CityOntheEdge:TheTransformationofMiami

author: Portes,Alejandro.;Stepick,Alex.publisher: UniversityofCaliforniaPress

isbn10|asin: 0520089324printisbn13: 9780520089327ebookisbn13: 9780585249841

language: English

subjectMiami(Fla.)--Racerelations,Miami(Fla.)--Ethnicrelations,Miami(Fla.)--Socialconditions,Minorities--Florida--Miami.

publicationdate: 1994lcc: F319.M6P681994ebddc: 305.8/009759/381

subject:Miami(Fla.)--Racerelations,Miami(Fla.)--Ethnicrelations,Miami(Fla.)--Social

conditions,Minorities--Florida--Miami.

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CityontheEdgeTheTransformationofMiami

AlejandroPortesand

AlexStepick

UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyLosAngelesLondon

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UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyandLosAngeles,California

UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd.London,England

FirstPaperbackPrinting1994

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataPortes,Alejandro,1944Cityontheedge:thetransformationofMiami/AlejandroPortesandAlexStepick.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN0-520-08932-4(alk.paper)1.Miami(Fla.)Racerelations.2.Miami(Fla.)Ethnicrelations.3.Miami(Fla.)Socialconditions.4.MinoritiesFloridaMiami.I.Stepick,Alex.II.Title.F319.M6P681993305.8´009759´381dc2092-39417 7CIP

PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

98765432

ThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciences-PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials,ANSIZ39.48-1984.

ForMariaPatriciaandCarol,withthanks

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Contents

ListofIllustrations viii

ListofTables x

Preface xi

Acknowledgments xv

1.ChangewithoutaBlueprint 1

2.AYeartoRemember:Mariel 18

3.AYeartoRemember:TheRiotandtheHaitians 38

4.TheEarlyYears 61

5.EntertheCubans 89

6.HowtheEnclaveWasBuilt 123

7.ARepeatPerformance?TheNicaraguanExodus 150

8.LostintheFray:Miami'sBlackMinorities 176

9.Reprise 203

Postscript:IntheEyeoftheStorm 223

Notes 229

Bibliography 259

Index 275

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Illustrations

Photographs

Followingpage107

1.TheMiamiskyline

2.SigninMiami

3.ChapelofOurLadyofCharity,BiscayneBay

4.BayofPigsMemorial,WoodlawnCemetery

5.FlagsinWoodlawnCemetery

6.DominoplayersinLittleHavana

7.FuneralhomeinMiami

8.Streetscene,LittleHavana

9.BillboardinMiami

10.DowntownLittleHaiti,Miam i

12.Streetscene,LittleHaiti

13.Haitianboatandcaptain,MiamiRiver

14.Haitiandockworker,MiamiRiver

15.Haitianagriculturalworkers,southwestofMiami

16.Haitianbeanpicker,southwestDadeCount

17.HaitianshoppersinaCuban-ownedmarket

18.ReligiouscollegeinMiamiBeach

19.StudentsatTalmudicUniversity,MiamiBeach

20.HasidicJews,MiamiBeach

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21.MonumenttoCarlFisher,founderofMiamiBeach

22.MuralinnorthwestMiami

23.CubansprotestingNelsonMandela'svisittoMiami,1990

24.Anti-Mandelaprotester,1990

25.ProtesterarguingwithMandelasupporter,1990

26.TentcityforpeoplemadehomelessbyHurricaneAndrew

27.Storedestroyedbyhurricane

28.Homedestroyedbyhurricane

Figures

1.Extentofsubordinationandspeedofassimilation 7

2.PopulationoftheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980 20

3.WeeklyMarielarrivalsandnegativeMiamiHeraldarticlesontheinflow,1980

4.Professionals,executives,andlaborers,DadeCounty,1970and1980

5.Income,affluence,andpoverty,DadeCounty,1980 44

6.Unemploymentratesbyraceandorigin,DadeCounty,1980-90

7.BlackprofessionalsandadministratorsworkingforDadeCountygovernment,1982-90

1.TheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980 19

2.Blackpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990 186

3.Spanish-originpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990

Tables

1.AttitudesTowardAmericanEthnicGroupsHeldbytheAmericanPublic,1982

2.PerceptionsandExperiencesofDiscriminationofMarielRefugees,1983and1986

3.EthnicGroups'EmploymentbySector,DadeCounty,1960-80

4.CharacteristicsofHaitianEntrantsinSouthFlorida,1983

5.GrowthofMiami'sBlackBusinesses,1977-87 180

6.Black-andCuban-ownedFirms,1987 182

7.EmploymentandBusinessEstablishmentsintheMiamiMetropolitanArea,1950-87

8.EthnicCompositionofMetropolitanMiami,1950-90 211

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PrefaceMiamiisnotamicrocosmoftheAmericancity.Itneverwas.Fromitsverybeginningsacenturyago,theBiscayneBaymetropolispossessedanairofunreality,aplaygrounddivorcedfromitsnaturalhabitatbythedeedsofYankeedevelopers.Forawhileitseemedthatnofantasy,nomatterhowfarfetched,couldnotbeenactedhere.ThethinstripoflandbetweenjungleandreefhencebecamelessanAmericanRivierathanacompendiumofthenation'sfoibles.DuringthelastthreedecadesorsoMiamihasevolved,sheddingitslight-heartedpasttobecomeaserious,somesaytragic,place.TheCubanRevolutionmarkedthebeginningofthischange,whichwaspushedalongbynewinfluxesofCaribbeanmigrantsandbynativereactionstothepresenceofsomanyoutsiders.Cubans,ofcourse,playedapivotalroleinthetransformation,fortheiractionsanddreams,whileinspiringtheCubancommunity,alsoaffectedthecharacterandidentityofothergroups.Andtherebytheentirecommunitychanged.

Ourinterestinthiscitydatesbacktotheearlyseventieswhenwebeganstudyingthearrivalandresettlementofnewimmigrantgroupsinthearea.Associologists,ourprincipalfocuswastheadaptationofforeign-bornminoritiestotheirnewenvironment.Astimepassed,however,itbecameclearthattheenvironmentitselfwaschanginginwaysthatwecouldnothaveanticipated.Theimmigrantsweretransformingnotonlythemselves,butalsothecityaroundthem.Unwittingly,Miamihadbecomethenation'sfirstfull-fledgedexperimentinbiculturallivinginthecontemporaryera.

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OtherU.S.cities,suchasNewYorkandLosAngeles,alsohavelargeSpanish-speakingandimmigrantpopulations,butnowherehasthesocialandeconomicweightofthenewcomersortheirpoliticalsignificancebeengreaterthaninSouthFlorida.InNewYork,newarrivalsarepromptlyabsorbedintotheimmensefabricofthecity;theverydiversityofnationalitiesinNewYorkconspiresagainstanysinglegroupbecomingtooprominent.InMiami,theregroupedCubanbourgeoisienotonlyredefinedthecharacterofthecity,butalsopromptedotherethniccommunitiesnativeBlacksandwhitesincludedtocasttheirownidentitiesinsharperrelief.

Otherbilingualandbiculturalcitiesandregionshaveofcourseexistedinthehistoryofthenation.MilwaukeeandSt.LouisattheturnofthetwentiethcenturywereGermantowns;northernWisconsinandMichiganwereheavilyScandinavian;inhabitantsofparishesintheLouisianalowlandsspokeAcadianFrench;andSanAntonio,SantaFe,andothertownsinthevastterritoriestakenfromMexicoretainedSpanishforalongwhile.ButthepassageoftimeandthegrowinghegemonyofAmericanculturedilutedtheseexperiencesandaccustomedustothespectacleofimmigrantswhohadbeenAmericanizedbeforereachingU.S.shoresorwhopromptlyshedtheirculturaltrappingsinquestofassimilation.Arisingfromauniquesetofhistoricalcircumstances,theMiamiexperimentisuniqueandunlikelytoberepeated.YetthepassionsthatitawokeandthesocialenergiesthatitreleasedmaycarrysignificantlessonsasAmericabecomesagain,undertheinfluenceofgrowingimmigration,amultiethnicsociety.

Theimmediatepredecessorofthisbookwasasix-yearpanelstudyoftheadaptationprocessofCubanandHaitianimmigrantsinSouthFlorida.Thatstudywaspromptedbythe1980Marielexodus,accompaniedbyarisingnumberofHaitian"boatpeople"arrivinginFloridaataboutthesametime.Ouroriginalintentionwastolearn

howtheseimmigrantsunwelcomebyalmosteverysectorofAmericansocietymanagedtocopeintheirnewsocialenvironment.ThesocialreceptionandeconomicsituationofMarielCubansandHaitianswaschronicledinaseriesofarticles,citedinthefollowingchapters.YettopursuethebroadergoalofanalyzingthetransformationofMiamiundertheinfluenceoftheseandearlierimmigrantwaves,wehadtoshiftmethodologicalgears.

Tolearnmoreaboutthecity,wesupplementedtheoriginal

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panelstudywithaseriesofinterviewswithleadersofthecommunitiesthatformitsethnicmosaic.First,leadersoftheoriginalrefugeegroupstargetedforstudyCubansandHaitianswerecontactedandinterviewedin1983.ThiswasfollowedbysystematiccanvassingofBlack,Jewish,Anglo(asnativewhitesarecalledtoday),Cuban,andNicaraguanleadersin1987-88andbysupplementaryinterviewswiththesameornewinformantsin1990-91.

Simultaneously,wehadtodelvedeeperintothehistoryoftheareaandgatherdataonpresentdevelopments.RichchroniclesoftheFloridapeninsulaandtheislandofCubawrittenbyhistorianssuchasMarjoryStonemanDouglas,AlvaMooreParks,HughThomas,andHerminioPortellVilahelpedusunderstandthelong-termtrendsthatgaverisetomodernMiami.Yetmostofthesehistoriesendedjustasthecity'suniquetransformationwasgettingunderway.Asweturnedtothepresent,thedata-gatheringroutinebecamelessroutine:scarcelyadaypassedwithoutsomenewdevelopmenttakingplaceinthecity.Thiswaschangenotonlywithoutablueprint,butatbreakneckspeed.

Bythemid-eighties,othershavebeguntonoticethesamething.LiteraryfigurestraveledfromNewYorkandothernortherncitiestorecordtheirimpressionsoftheplace.Theresultingbookswereusefultous,notmerelyfortheirinsights,butbecausetheyobviatedtheneedtojustifyaseriousstudyofwhat,untilthen,hadbeenregardedasafadingtouristresort.Forsomeoftheseauthors,likeT.D.Allman,eventsinSouthFloridaevenprefiguredthefutureofotherAmericancities.

Inwhatfollows,thestoryofMiamiistoldinasomewhatunconventionalwaythatdeservesexplanation.Thefirstchapterillustratestheoverlapofdiverseandcontradictorydiscoursesaboutthecitythataresomuchpartofitsevolutioninrecentyears.Welookthenattheproximatecausesoftheriseofthesecompetingdiscourses

intheeventsthattookplaceinthepivotalyearof1980theMarielexodus,thearrivaloftheHaitian''boatpeople,"andtheviolentriotintheBlacksectionsofthecity(chapters2and3).Nextweexplorethemoredistantoriginsofcontemporaryevents,bothinthehistoryofFlorida,fromcolonialdaystotheeveoftheCubanRevolution(chapter4),andinthepeculiarrelationshipbetweenCubaandthepeninsuladuringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury(chapter5).ThisrelationshipledtotheoverwhelmingpreferenceforMiamishownbyCubansdisplacedfromtheir

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homelandandtothesubsequentconstructionofanethnicenclaveeconomyinthecity(chapter6).

FinallyweexaminehowthelatestimmigrantgrouptheNicaraguansaswellastheHaitiansandnativeBlackshavefaredinthisnewMiamiandtheirlikelyprospectsforthefuture(chapters7and8).Chapter9thenassessesthewholeintermsofbothpasttheoriesofurbanizationandethnicrelationsandpracticallessonsinurbanpolicy.

Miami'sstorydoesnotendwiththeclosureofthisnarrative.Evenaswebroughtittoatentativeconclusion,anunexpectedeventgavethisremarkabletransformationanewandtragicturn.HurricanesarenothingnewinSouthFlorida,butthefuryofHurricaneAndrewinAugust1992andthemagnitudeofthedestructionleftinitswakeamounttoanewhiatusinthehistoryofthearea.Wevisitedthecityagaininthestorm'saftermath,wenttothemostaffectedareas,andtalkedtobothvictimsofthedebacleandexpertsonnaturaldisasters.

Thissadinquiryinthemonthafterthedisasterofferedpersuasiveevidencethattheextentofthedamagewasnofleetingnewsitem,butwouldmarktheevolutionandcollectiveidentityoftheareaforyearstocome.ThePostscriptsummarizeswhatwelearnedinthepartiallydestroyedcityandthelikelyeffectstheeventwillhaveonitssocialanddemographicmakeup.Theirruptionofanaturalcataclysmintowhatalreadywasacomplexsituationmayleadtounexpectedoutcomes,butouroverallsenseisthatitsprimaryeffectwillbetoacceleratetheprocessofchangealreadyunderway,outlinedinthefollowingchapters.

Afinalwordonthetitle.Itwasdifficulttoarriveatadesignationthatwasneitherominousnorcelebratorybutthatcapturedtheobvioustensionintheunprecedentedeventsexperiencedbythiscity.Inourview,sucheventssignaltransformationandchallenge,notnecessarilydecline.Miamiisnot"intheabyss,"butonathreshold.Thecityis

severalthingsatonce:atthesouthernendofthelandandastridetwoculturalworlds;abouttocompleteitsfirstcenturyofexistence;and,aboveall,ontheedgeofafuturemarkedbyuncertainty,butalsobythepromiseofpathbreakinginnovationsinurbanlife.Themultilingual,multiculturalexperimentthatisMiamiholdsimportantlessonsforwhattheAmericancitywillbeaboutinachangedworld.

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AcknowledgmentsTheoriginallongitudinalstudyofMarielCubanandHaitianrefugeesinSouthFloridaonwhichthisbookispartiallybasedwassupportedbygrantsfromtheNationalScienceFoundation(SES8215567)andtheNationalInstituteofMentalHealth(MH41502).AdditionalsupportforfieldinterviewsanddatagatheringinMiamicamefromagrantfromtheFordFoundation.Wearegratefultoofficialsinallthreeinstitutions,andinparticulartoDr.WilliamA.DiazoftheFordFoundationforhistimelyassistanceandencouragement.

Theoriginalandthetwofollow-upsurveysofMarielrefugeesinMiamiwereconductedbyDr.JuanM.ClarkofMiami-DadeCommunityCollege.WeoweanimmensedebttoJuanforhisexpertiseanddedicationtotheproject.AsimilarstellarperformancewasdeliveredbyCarolStepick,fielddirectorofthethirdHaitianrefugeefollow-up,whichfocusedonissuesofmentalhealthandhelp-seekingamongthisgroup.

Thenationalityoftheauthors(Cubanand"Anglo"inlocalparlance)precludedthemfromconductingunbiasedfirst-personinterviewswithseveralkeyinformantsinthepolarizedMiamienvironment.ThebulkofthistaskfelltoDr.PatriciaFernandez-Kelly,asocialanthropologistbytraining,whosefieldskillsandrelatively"neutral"originsdidwonderstoopendoorsthatotherwisewouldhavebeenclosedtous.Withoutherhelpandthematerialsthatsheaccumulated,thisbookcouldnothavebeenwritten.

Wearegratefulaswelltoallourinformants,busypeoplewho

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gavegenerouslyoftheirtime,oftenonmorethanoneoccasion.Inkeepingwithourcovenantatthetimeoftheinterviews,theirnamesmustremainanonymous.Anumberofourcolleaguesweresimilarlygenerousinreadingearlyversionsofvariouschaptersandprovidingencouragementforwhat,forus,wasa"first"anattempttocombinetheanalysisofsurveydatawithfirst-persontestimoniesandanecdotalmaterial.OurNewYork-basedcolleaguesRichardSennett,AristideZolberg,andJanetAbu-Lughodmustbementionedinthisregard.Withouttheirsupportandinspiration,weprobablywouldhaverevertedtostandardmodesofdataanalysis.

WeacknowledgewithgratitudetheassistanceofDr.CharlesW.BlowersandMr.OliverKerroftheResearchDivision,Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,whomadeavailabletousvaluabledataandgraphicsontheMiamiarea.WewouldalsoliketothankSteveDoigoftheMiamiHerald,SandraDibbleofNationalGeographicandformerlytheMiamiHerald,MikeClaryoftheLosAngelesTimes,andRolandFischofFloridaKeysCommunityCollege,allofwhomprovideddatathatwefounduseful.

AttheUniversityofCaliforniaPress,oureditorNaomiSchneiderandthereviewersassignedtothemanuscriptgaveuswelcomeencouragementaswellaswell-targetedcriticisms.Wecanonlyhopethatthefinalversionreflects,atleastinpart,theireffortstoimprovethebook.AtJohnsHopkins,webenefitedfromthecommentsandadviceofMelvinL.Kohn,ChristopherChase-Dunn,andDavidKyle;atFloridaInternationalUniversity,fromthoseofLisandroPerez,A.DouglasKincaid,MaxCastro,GuillermoGrenier,andMarkRosenberg.ToMark,inparticular,weowetheideaofthetitle.Butnoneofthemandnoneoftheotherpersonsnamedabovebearsanyresponsibilityforthecontent,whichisexclusivelyours.

Lastbutnotleast,weoweagreatdebtofgratitudetoCristiana

CamardellaandDianeBerger,whotranscribedeachchapter,struggledwithillegiblelonghands,andproducedintheendahandsomemanuscript.Wecommendtheireffortsandhopethattheyarepleasedwiththefinalproduct.

ChapterOneChangewithoutaBlueprintJ.MichaelQuinlan,federaldirectorofprisons,wasaworriedman.Eightdaysintoamajorriot,therewerenosignsthatthesituationwasabouttoeaseorthatmorethanonehundredhostageswouldbereleasedunharmed.Theprisoners'cause,meanwhile,wasgainingground.Theyhadriggedapublicaddresssystemontopoftheprisonwallstobroadcasttheirdemandsandtalktorelatives.Prisoners'wivesandmothershuddledintentsjustoutsidethepenitentiary,notfarfromthefamiliesofthehostages.Neithergroupwantedviolence.Abusloadofprisoners'relativeshadjustarrivedinWashington,D.C.,tointercedewiththeattorneygeneralonbehalfofthoseinside.

Morevexingtofederalofficialsweretherioters'demands.Everyoneagreedthatconditionsinsidetheprisonwereintolerableandthatmanyhadbeendetainedforyearswithoutdueprocess.Neitherofthesefacts,however,sparkedtherebellion.Rather,theprisonersrevoltedwhentheyheardtheywouldbereleased,inordertobesentoutofthecountry.Thereceivingnation'sgovernmenthadassuredU.S.authoritiesthatnoreprisalswouldbetakenagainstthedeportees,whichmadethelatter'sattitudeevenmoreextraordinary.

Quinlanhadatrumpcardinhisfavorshouldtheimpasseturntoarmedviolence,andthatwasthesolidsupportshownbythepublicforthegovernmentandagainsttherebelliousforeigners.Thatsupportwasapparenteverywhereeverywhere,thatis,butinonecity.Theretherioters'demandsnottobedeportedstruckaresponsivechord.Previouslydismissedas"scum,"theprisoners,

withtheirsorrylivingconditionsandtheirendlesssentences,hadelicitedlittleconcerninthepast,butwhentheydeclaredthattheywouldratherdiethangohome,theircompatriotsinMiamiclaimedthemastheirown.Whiletherestofthecountryprayedforthesafetyofthehostages,inthisonecitythemassesandtherosarieswereperformedforthesakeofthecaptorsandtheirplight.

ForQuinlanandhismen,timewasrunningout.Publicpatiencewaswearingthinasdayafterfruitlessdayofnegotiationspassed,makingtheauthoritieslookevermoreimpotent.Thentheriotersvoicedanewdemand:theywantedtoseesomeonewhowouldvouchfortheirsafetyaftertheysurrendered.TheydidnotaskfortheattorneygeneraloftheUnitedStatesoranyotherimportantWashingtonofficial;rather,theyrequestedanobscurepriestfromtheplacewherethemasseswerebeingsaidintheirbehalf.

MonsignorAgustinRomán,auxiliarybishopofMiami,isanunpretentiouslittleman.White-haired,withaslightframe,hewasanincongruousfigurenexttotheburlyprisonofficials.Hispresence,however,accomplishedwhatthefederalauthoritieshadbeenunableto.Román'smessagetotherebellingMarielprisonersinOakdaleandinAtlantabegan"Dearbrothers,"andendedwithapleathattheydemonstratetotheworld"Christiangoodwill."Behindthepiousrhetoric,themessagesaidthis:Youbelongtousandwewillnotabandonyou.Afewhourslater,the1987Marielprisonriotswerehistory.

Appealsbythedowntroddentofellowethnicsarenotuncommon-ethnicgroupsympathies,afterall,oftenflowindirectionscontrarytothoseofthemainstream.Yeteventsafter1987demonstratedthatMiamiwasindeeduniqueintheextenttowhichcontrasting

worldviewsexistedandweresuperimposedoneachother.

OnJanuary24,1990,formerpolicemanWilliamLozanostoodbeforeapackedMiamicourtroomawaitingsentenceontwocountsofmanslaughter.Amonthearlier,hehadbeenconvictedofshootingandkillingBlackmotorcyclistClementLloydandhispassengerinadesolatestreetoftheOvertownghetto.Lloydhaddisobeyedanordertostopandracedinthedirectionoftheofficer,whofelledhimwithasingleshot.Theeventtriggeredtwonightsofarsonandlooting,putdownonlybymassivepoliceforceandthemayor'spromisethatjusticewouldbedone.WhenLozanoreceiveda

seven-yearsentenceformanslaughter,thecommunitybreathedasighofreliefnoriotingthistime.BlackMiamiwasreassuredthatpolicekillingswouldnolongeroccurwithimpunity.ClementLloyd'srelativescomplainedaboutthelightsentencebutpronouncedthemselvessatisfiedabouttheverdict.Asoneofthemputit,"AtleastLozanoisaknowncriminalnow."

ToprotecthimselffromthevindictivemoodofBlackMiami,Lozanohiredoneofthecity'sbestcriminalattorneys.Ashislegaldebtsmounted,thenowunemployedpolicemanappearedtohavereachedtheendoftherope.Hehadoneadvantage,though.AmonghisfellowColombiansandmuchoftheLatinpopulationLozanowasseen,ifnotexactlyasahero,atleastasavictimandscapegoat.HisfirstpublicbroadcastoverMiamiCubanradionetted$150,000incontributions;subsequentappealsproducedsubstantialamountsaswell.ThefactthatLozanowas"aknowncriminal"didnotseemtolessenhimintheeyesofhisfellowLatins.Thankstotheircontributions,hewasabletoretainahighpowereddefenseteam.

OnJune25,1991,twoandahalfyearsaftertheshooting,theThirdFloridaDistrictCourtofAppealsthrewoutLozano'ssentenceandorderedanewtrial.Theoriginaljudgehaddismissedallmotionsforachangeofvenuewiththeargumentthatinthismetropolitanareaoftwomillionpeopleanimpartialjurycouldbefound.Theappellatecourtdisagreed.ThepeopleofMiamiwereinfacttoosharplydividedoverLozano'sfatesomereadytolynchhim,othersprovidingfinancialsupportforhiscausetoleavespaceforafairtrial.

Sinceitsbeginningsatthestartofthecentury,Americanurbansociologyhasfocusedonafewthemesthatrepeatthemselveswithuncannyregularity.Strippedoftheiracademicgarb,thesethemes

reflecttheperennialpreoccupationsoftheurbancitizenry:Whoreallyrules?Howcanlocalelitesbemademoreaccountabletotheirfellowcitizens?Whatexplainstheplightofethnicminorities?Howcanconflictberesolved?Studentsofurbanlifehaveattemptedtoprovideanswerstotheseandotherquestionsand,intheprocess,havecreatedarichimageryofwhattheAmericancityisallabout.Itisusefultoreviewsomeoftheseimages,fortheyformthebackdropagainstwhichtheaboveeventsandthosede-

scribedinthefollowingpagescanbeunderstood.TheirsignificanceisnotthattheyhelpaccountforthecourseofeventsinMiami,butpreciselythattheyfitthestorysoawkwardly.

CommunityPower

Thequestion"Whorulesthecity.?"hasledtoanelaborateliteratureandtothedevelopmentofcomplexmethodsforunderstandingthetruecharacterofurbanpower.Spearheadedinthe1940sandintothe1960sbysuchscholarsasFloydHunter,RobertDahl,andC.WrightMills,thebasiccontroversycenteredonwhetherthe"businessclass"wasthesolearbiteroflocaldecision-makingorwhetherothergroupsalsohadasayinurbanaffairs.Crucialamongthelatterwerepublicofficials,oftenelectedonthevotingstrengthofethnicminority,blocks.Weresuchelectedofficialspartofthe"real"powerstructure,orweretheymerelywindowdressingtocovertheactionsofthetruemoversandshakers?"Pluralism"and"elitism''becametheacceptedlabelsinthislong-runningcontroversy.

Morerecently,theelitistpositionhasexpandedtoembraceanalysisoftheurban"growthmachine."Proponentsofthisview,notablyHarveyMolotchandJohnLogan,portraythegrowthmachineasaconfabulationofpropertycapitalistsbentonprofitingfromtheircontrolofurbanamenitiesandscarceurbanspace.Techniquesincludemanipulationofzoningordinancesandothertrickstorendereruptylandvaluableortoredefinetheuseofbuiltspaces.Henceitisnot"business"ingeneral,butthebusinessofcreatingprofitsoutoflocationaladvantage,thatdeterminesthepatternofurbangrowth.4

LocalsandCosmopolitans

Ina1946reporttotheU.S.Senate,C.WrightMillsraisedarelatedissue,namelywhethercitiessufferedwhentheireconomiesbecamedominatedbyoutsideinterests.Millsdenouncedfootloosecorporatecapitalismthatextractedresourcesbutprovidedlittletothecommunityinreturn.Inlieuof"branch"capitalism,MillsproposedtotheCongressaprogramtorevitalizelocalbusinessonthetheorythatcommunity-basedenterprisesweremoreegalitar-

ianandmoreresponsivetolocalwelfare.CriticscalledMills'spositionretrograde;thegrowthoftheAmericaneconomy,theysaid,requiredtheemergenceofpowerfulmulticentriccorporations,andtheyproducedanarrayofstudiestodemonstratethatcorporateexecutivescouldbejustascivic-mindedaslocals,andoftenmoreeffectivelyso.

5Withvariations,thisdebatebetweenadvocatesof"cosmopolitan"versus"local"economiccontrolendurestoday.

EthnicityandAssimilation

Itwasethnicity,however,thatemergedasthefundamentalleitmotivofAmericanurbansociology.Indeed,itcouldnothavebeenotherwise,givenacitizenrymoldedbysuccessivewavesofimmigration,eachdifferentinmanywaysfromearlierones.ThethemesofsocialpowerandsocialclassonwhichHunter,Mills,andotherclassicsfocusedbecameincreasinglyintertwinedwiththoseofrace,language,andculture.Thefundamentalcontroversyaboutethnicitywaswhetherracialandculturalmarkersweretiedtoclasspositionandhencedisappearwithupwardmobilityorwhethertheyrepresentaseparateandautonomousdimensionofsocialstructure.ThefirstpositionwaseloquentlyarguedbyW.LloydWarnerandhisassociatesonthebasisoftheirmassivestudyof"YankeeCity"(Newburyport,Massachusetts).Writinginthe1940s,Warnercapturedthedifferencesthatheandhisstudentsobservedinsocialprestigeandsocialrecognitioninasixfoldclassificationof"class."ClassesinYankeeCityrangedfromthewhiteProtestant''upper-upper"eliteandmostlywhite"lower-upper"professionalstothelargelyethnic"upper-lower"strataoffactoryworkersandthe"lower-lower"skidrowpopulation.6

An"ethnic,"inWarner'stheory,wassomeonewhobyreasonofcultureorracewasoutsidethecommunity'smainstreamandconsideredhimselforherselforwasconsideredbyotherstobelongtoadistinctsubsociety.Ethnicsconcentratedinthebottomrungsofthesocialstructurethelowermiddleandlowerclassesdependingontheirworkskillsandlengthoflocalresidence.Climbingthesocialladderrequiredthatonejointheculturalmainstream,butevenfullyacculturatedminoritiesmightnotproveacceptabletothe"upper-upper"brahminswhocontrolledtheprestigehierar-

chy.WarnerandLeoSroleidentifiedskincolor(race),language,andreligionasthefundamentalcriteriaofeliteacceptance:themoresimilarethnicgroupsare,alongthesedimensions,tothoseoccupyingpositionsofprestigeandpowerinthecommunity,thefastertheirassimilation.Racewasthemostimportantfactor,followedbylanguageandthenreligion.

7Thecombinedoperationofthesefactorswithintheurbanpopulationledtoanethnicclasshierarchythatalsopredictedtheexpectedspeedofassimilation.Figure1reproducesWarnerandSrole'shierarchyofethnicityandtheconsequentpeckingorderinYankeeCity.

Inthe1940sand1950s,itseemedreasonabletoassumethatall"ethnics"wishedtoandwouldfollowthepathofassimilation.Bythesixties,thatstoryhadbecomeopentodoubt.Severalauthorspointedtothepresenceof"unmeltableethnics,"forwhomnoamountofacculturationappearedsufficienttogainthemacceptanceintotheurbanmainstream.Othersnotedhowdistinctculturaltraitsenduredthroughthegenerationsthankstostronggroupinstitutionsandtheunwillingnessofcertainminoritiestolosetheiridentity.Oftensuchresilientethnicity,wasdisplayedevenafteragrouphadmovedsignificantlyupwardintheeconomichierarchy.Focusingontheseexceptions,NathanGlazer,DanielP.Moynihan,andAndrewGreeleyquestionedtheearlierassumptionsandsuggestedthattheAmericancitywasnotreallya"meltingpot"whereminoritieswouldsoonerorlaterlosetheiridentitiesandjointhemainstream,butrathera"socialmosaic"whereethnic-basedsolidaritiespersistedacrossgenerations.8

Withthepassageoftime,theintertwinedthemesofpower,class,race,andethnicity.andtheassociatedcontroversiescametodefinehowstudentsofurbanlifethoughtabouttheAmericancity.Althoughtheanswersgivenby"pluralists"and"elitists,""locals"and

"cosmopolitans,"and''meltingpot"versus"socialmosaic"advocatesdiffered,thequestionsremainedconsistent:Whoreallygoverns?Howdoesoutsidebusinesscontrolaffectcivicwelfare?Whyareethnicminoritiesoutsidethesocialmainstream?Whatwouldittaketochangetheirsituation?Thesearchforanswersgaveriseovertimetoamethodologicalrepertoireatoolkitthatresearcherscarriedfromcitytocityandappliedinamoreorlessstandardizedfashion.

Figure1.Extentofsubordinationandspeedofassimilation.AdaptedfromW.LloydWarnerandLeoSrole,

TheSocialSystemsofAmericanEthnicGroups(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1945),288.

BypermissionofYaleUniversityPress.

ResearchersapproachingmodernMiamiwiththesametime-honoredideasandthesamemethodologicaltools,however,wouldbeinforashock.AlthoughthecityisintheUnitedStates,itdoesnotresembleintheslightestthemodelsofYankeeCityandotherurbanclassics.Nordoesitfitverywellmorerecentdescriptionsofa"socialmosaic"composedofestablishedethnicgroupsthatmaintaincertainelementsoftheircultureunderthehegemonicumbrellaofawhiteProtestantelite.InMiami,thefragmentsofthemosaicarelooseanddonotcometogetherinanyfamiliarpattern.Considerthefollowingreversalsvis-à-vistraditionalAmericanurbanlife:

1.Whilethe"businessclass"doesexerciseundisputablecontrolingoverningthecity,itiscomposedincreasinglyofrecentimmigrants,ratherthanexclusivelyof"old"familiesorcorporate"branch"executives.Thisisparticularlytrueinthecaseofthe"growthmachine''createdbyforeign-bornbuildersanddevelopers.

2.Theclashbetweenlocalandoutsidecorporatecontroloccurs,butinMiamitheproliferatinglocalsmallbusinessesareownedmostlybyimmigrants,whilethecorporate"branch"officesareAmerican-owned.Manyofthelatteraretherenottoproducegoodsforthedomesticmarketbuttosellservicestootherforeigners,oftenthroughthemediationofthelocalimmigrant-ownedfirms.

3.Thereisnomainstream.Thehegemonyoftheold"upperuppers"hasgivenwaytoparallelsocialstructures,eachcompletewithitsownstatushierarchy,civicinstitutions,andculturallife.Asaresult,economicmobilityandsocialstandinghaveceasedtodependonfullacculturationoronpleasingtheelitesoftheoldclassorder.

4.Theoverlapofparallelsocialsystemsinthesamephysicalspacehasgivenrisetoacculturationinreverseaprocessbywhichforeigncustoms,institutions,andlanguagearediffusedwithinthenativepopulation.Asaconsequence,biculturalismhasemergedasan

alternativeadaptiveprojecttofullassimilationintoAmericanculture.Opponentsofbiculturalism,immigrantsandnativesalike,musteitherwithdrawintotheirowndiminishedcirclesorexitthecommunity.

TheexistenceoftheseparallelsocialstructuresiswhatunderlaytheMarielprisoners'callforBishopRománratherthanAttorneyGeneralMeesetoactasguarantoroftheirfate.

9TheirmovewouldhavebeeninconceivablehadtheircoethnicsinMiamioccupiedtheroleassignedtothembyWarnerandotherclassicauthorsoncommunitypower.Forthatmatter,theveryfactthatMarielrefugeeswereinAmericanprisonsatallisexplainableonlyintermsoftheunusualprocessofchangethathadovertakenSouthFloridabeforetheirarrival.

CompetingDiscourses

Socialfactsarenotself-intelligible.Theirinterpretationdependsonthecognitiveframesinwhichtheyareplaced,andtheseinturnareproductsofpriorsocialinteractions.Commonmeaningsarearrivedatwhenrelevantaudiencesagreetostresscertainaspectsofagivenphenomenonandinterpretthemonthebasisofsharedpastexperience.Existing"frames"ofwhatAmericanurbanlifeislike,includingthoseelaboratedinthesociologicalresearchliterature,provetobeoflimitedutilityforrenderingeventsinSouthFloridaunderstandable.Theseeventsrepresentsocialchangewithoutablueprint;becausetheyledpreciselytothefragmentationofpreviouslyheldconsensualviews,itisnotsurprisingthatseveralcompetingdiscoursesemergedtoexplainthem,eachwithitsowndistinctshadesofmeaningandmoraltone.OnlyinsuchacontextwoulditbeconceivableforWilliamLozano,convictedfelon,tosolicitandobtainsupportfromawidesegmentoftheverycitywherehisallegedcrimewascommitted.

ToapproachdevelopmentsinMiami,wefirstmakeuseofW.I.Thomas'sconceptof"definitionofthesituation,"atermthat

highlightshowsubjectiveperceptionsofrealitycaninfluencerealityitself.10Inourview,definitionsofthesituationcomprise(a)aframeofreferenceembodyingoneormoregeneralizedideasand(b)an"object"thatisinterpretedintermsofthoseideas.Differentobjectsareinterrelatedbyreferencetothecommonframe,givingrisetoaperspective,or"discourse,"inwhichapparentlydisparateaspectsofrealityareintegratedintoameaningfulinterpretivewhole.ThedifferencebetweenMiamiandmostcommunitiesstudiedbysociologistsinthepastisthatinMiamieveneveryday

eventsnottomentionmoreexplosiveconflictsbetweensocialclassesandinterestgroupsarenotnecessarilyassessedwithinacommonframeofreference,butmaybeinsertedintodifferent,mutuallyunintelligible,interpretiveframeworks.

Atpresent,severalperspectivessufficientlybroadtoprovideacoherentaccountoflifeinthismetropolitanareaareidentifiable.Themostcommononesmaybelabeledthe"Angloculturalreaffirmation,"the"Cubanorpan-Latinsuccessstory,"andthe"Blackdoublemarginality"discourses.Bywayofillustration,thefollowingexcerptsofstatementsmadebycommunityleadersininterviews,addressingfourfrequent"objects"ofdebateinMiami,maybetakenastypicalofeachdiscourse.Thestatementsaredrawnfrominterviews,conductedbetween1983and1988,withapproximatelysixtyofthemostprominentbusiness,political,andreligiousleadersinthecityasacomplementtoalargesurveyoftherecentlyarrivedimmigrantpopulationinthearea.

11Threeofthese''objects"Miami's"majorproblem,"language,andinterethnicrelationswereposedasquestionstoallrespondents;thefourththeMiamiHeraldemergedspontaneouslyinseveralconversations.

Miami'sMajorProblem

Nativewhitebusinessexecutive,formerchairmanofalargelocalcorporation(interviewedin1987):

Youhavetwolevels,oneiswhatisgoingtohappentothenationasawholeoverthenextfiftyyearswhentheHispanicpopulationmaybecomeoverfiftypercentofthepopulation;andtheotherlevelistheshort-termimpactofHispanicsinacitylikethisone.Youdealwithperceptionsbecauseyoudon'treallyknowwhatpercentageofthepopulationismakingthenoise,butyouhearthenoise,themajornoise,thedominant

noise,andyouarebeginningtohearmoreandmorethattheCubansarenotinterestedinintegratingintoAmericansociety,andifthatisthecase,thenthathastobethenumber-oneprobleminMiami.

Thatisaproblembecausethereisn'tagreatdealinCaribbeanandLatinAmericanculturesthat'sgoingtoaddanythingtodemocracyatall.AndIthinkthereisagoodchancethatitwilldetractfromit.Cubansreallyvalueeconomicfreedom,butthereareotherfreedomstheydon'tvalue.

Cubanbusinessman,ownerofalocalfactory,emigratedintheearly1960s(1986):

OurmostseriousprobleminMiamiisthedevaluationofSouthAmericancurrenciesbecauseinthiscitytherehasbeencreatedalargecurrentofbusinesswithCentralandSouthAmerica;manypropertieswerebuilt,manyapartmentsweresold,apartfromtheexports.ThedevaluationsinVenezuela,Mexico,andBrazilparalyzedeconomicactivityinMiami.Atthesametime,constructionofapartmentsforallthoseSouthAmericanswhowantedtoownsomethingherestopped.Thisisourmostseriousproblemtoday.Untilcurrenciesregaintheirvalueandeconomictranquillityreturnstothosecountries,MiamiwhichisthekeylinkbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatinAmericawillcontinuetosuffer.

Blackcommunityactivist,directorofasocialserviceagencyinLibertyCity,themajorBlackareaofSouthFlorida(1987):

Therealproblemin1987isthattheBlackshavenotconcludedthattheymusttakecontroloftheirdestiny.That'stherealproblemnow.Butthatwasnottherealproblemin1964.Then,theproblemwastoremovetheshacklesofsegregation.Youhadtogothroughthatprocessinordertogettowherewearein1987....Now,havinggonethroughthatprocess,thefinallapistoputeverythinginperspective,andtoaskourselveswhatarewegoingtodoaboutit,becausealltheyhavedonesince1619hasnotbeeninourinterest,buttheirs.Inordertotakechargeofitsowndestiny,thiscommunitymustsimply,selfishlybecomeunabatedlypro-Black.

Caseinpoint:thereissomethingspecialaboutBlacksandRevlonbeautycareproducts.WefindoutthatBlacksbuyoverfifty-onepercentofallthebeautycareproductsmadeinthecountry....Ifwearethemainconsumersinthatindustry,thentheappropriateresponseisforustobecomemajorproducersofthatwhichweconsume.

Language

Jewishlawyer,directoroftheregionalbranchofamajornationalJewishorganization(1986):

Thisisacommunitylikeavolcano....AmajorissueconcernsthetensionsbetweennativeAmericansandHispanics.Thefocalpointislanguage.Thereisaverystrong"EnglishOnly"movementorvariationsofit.Intwenty-fiveyears,closetothreehundredthousandCubanshavecomehere,andmanyhavedoneverywell.Thefactisthattheyhavetakenoverthecitybothintermsofnumbersandeconomicpresence.Thishas

createdalotofresentmentandbitternessinsomecircles.Ithinkthepopularizedstatementthattypifiedthetensionwasthebumperstickerthatread,"WhenthelastAmericanleavesMiami,pleasetaketheflag."Thatrepresentsthemiddle-andlower-middle-classfeelingaboutwhathappenedhere.

Nativewhitebusinessexecutive(quotedabovewithregardtoMiami'smajorproblem):

Whathappensisthatinanopenstoretherewillbetwoorthreewomentalkinginanincomprehensiblelanguage,andpeople,Ithink,sometimesjustgettiredofbeingsurroundedbySpanish.Moreimportantly,therearemany,manytimeswhentheCubansknowthatthepeopleintheroomwiththemdon'tunderstand.Likemywifeandherhairdresser:shespeaksSpanishentirelywhilesheisworkingonherhair.Mysonisanabsolutelinguist,hespeaksPortugueseandSpanishfluently.HelearnedwhilehewasinRochester,NewYork,notwhilehelivedinMiami,Florida.Itispopulartheretobebilingual;itisn'tpopularinMiami.

Cubancivicactivist,headofamultiethniccommunityorganization,emigratedintheearly1960s(1986):

LanguagehasgreatimportancebecauseifanindividualownsastorewhoseclientscomefromLatinAmerica,hewillneedbilingualemployees.DuringChristmastime,ninetypercentofthestoresadvertiseforbilingualemployees.Toapersonwhodoesnotknowthelanguage,thissituationrepresentsaneconomicproblembecauseheknowsthat,unlessheknowsSpanish,hewouldnotcompetesuccessfullyinthelabormarket.ThisproblemisespeciallyimportantintheBlackcommunity,whichhasthegreatestnumberofunemployed.TheyoungBlackknowsthatitwouldbemuchmoredifficulttosecureajobifhedoesnotspeakSpanish.

BlackownerofamajorbusinessinLibertyCity,activeinthelocalchamberofcommerce(1987):

ThereisalsoagrowingnumberofCuban-ownedbusinessesinBlackneighborhoodsbuttheydon'thireBlacks.Forexample,IwasinadrugstoreacoupleofweeksagoandtherewasablackCubanladyatone

ofthecashregisters.Iwenttoherandshedidn'tevenwanttotalktome.Ithoughttomyself,"Talktome,ifI'mgoingtoleavemymoneyhere,yououghttolearnhowtospeakEnglish."Theycomeinourareas,theytakeourjobs,theytakeourdollars,anddon'tevenhavethedecencytolearnthelanguage!

InterethnicRelations

Nativewhiteattorney,partnerinalargelocallawfirm(1987):

TheproblemofBlacksinMiamiisveryserious.ButmyfeelingisthattheBlackpopulationissorelativelysmallinnumberthatIamnotsureit'sonanybody'sagenda....ThenumberofHispanicsissooverwhelmingthatthecontestisover.Imeanthereiscompetition,thereistension,thereisconcernintheBlackcommunity.ButCubansaresowellentrenched,solargeinnumbers,thatit'snotanissueanymore.

Now,thereisanotherbigproblemworthinvestigating:theconceptofgivingintheLatincommunity.OneoftheproblemsthatFIU[FloridaInternationalUniversity]hashadisthat[formerpresident]Wolfecouldn'traiseanymoney.Sowhatdidwedo?ThepowerstructureandtheCubanssaid,"Let'sgogetourselvesagoodoldCubanboy."Let'sseewhetheroldMaidique[Cuban-born,U.S.-educatedpresidentofFIU],PresidentMitch,candemonstratethathecanraisedollarsfromtheLatincommunity.Ifhecan'traisedollars,inmybookhe'sfailed.

ThereisalotofworkthatneedstobedoneinteachingtheconceptofphilanthropywithintheLatincommunity.TheCubanshavebeenhereovertwentyyears,theyhavemadegreateconomicstrides,thekidsplayfootballandbaseball,theygototheoperas,theydoallthesethings;whynotgivemoretothecommunity?

Cubanbusinessman(quotedabovewithregardtoMiami'smajorproblem):

RelationsbetweenthedifferentethniccommunitiesinMiamiarenormalasinanydemocraticcountry.Ethnicdifferencesdonotinterfereatallincommercialrelations.Astocommunityactivities,eachoneworksintheplaceheorsheprefers.TherearepersonswholiketoworkintheUnitedWay;andthereistheLigacontraelcancer[LeagueAgainstCancer,acharityfoundedinHavana],whicheveryonejoinstoworkforagoodcause.

Perhaps,themostaffectedrelationscouldbethosebetweenCubansand

Blacks,inthesensethatBlacksarelesstrainedasentrepreneurs,butIdonotbelievethatthereisanextraordinaryfriction.OurchiefaccountantwasBlack,agreatBlack,butrightnowtherearenoAmericanBlacksworkinginourcompany.WhenwearrivedfromCubaandopenedoursmallbusiness,thesituationwaslikethis:whenashipmentarrivedincustoms,wewouldgotoacornerandtherewouldbeten,fifteen,twentyBlacksstandingwaitingforwork.Wepickedthemupsothattheywould

unloadourboxes,paidthem,andreturnedthemtothesameplace.Today,youdon'tseeanythinglikethis.Isincerelybelievethat,inMiami,thepersonwhodoesn'tworkisbecauseheorshedoesnotwantto.Proof:whyaresomanyHaitiansnowsewinginourfactory?

Blackattorney,communityactivist(1987):

Initially,astheCubansbegantobeverycompetitive,asthenewbankstendedtobeCuban,astheCubansbegantocomeintotheinsuranceandtraditionalfinancialmarketswheretheJewshadplayedanimportantrole,theissuewasnolongerJewsagainstAnglosbutoneofthesurvivalofthestatusquo....

Blackswereleftbehind.MiamiistheonlycityI'veeverseenwhereBlacksdon'townaradiostation,oratelevisionstation,oracardealership,orasavingsandloan,oraninsurancecompanyanything!Blacksherehavenotonlybeenmanipulatedoutofthemainstreamofthepowerstructure,but,moreimportantly,theyhavebeenmanipulatedoutoftheeconomicmainstreamofMiami,andwhenyou'reoutoftheeconomicmainstream,you'reoutofthepoliticalarena.

Blackcommunityactivist(quotedabovewithregardtoMiami'smajorproblem):

Inthosedays,IsaidtoCubansinaspeechthattherewasgoingtobeatimewhenwhitefolksaregoingtotrytotreatyoualllikeniggers.They'regoingtoputyouagaininyourplaceastheydowithallminoritygroups.ButunlikeBlackAmericans,Cubanshadnohistoryofbeingkeptintheirplace,andasaresult,theyrespondeddifferently.WeBlackfolksweresayingtowhitefolks,"Letusin."Cubansweresayingtowhitefolks,"Letusinsothatwecantakeover."Now,in1987,youhearwhitestellingusthatweshouldformanalliancewiththemtokeepCubansintheirplace.Isay,"I'vehadmyexperiencewithyouall.Don'ttellmenowthatyouandIcanbuddy-buddybecauseyou'retryingtokeepCubansfromdoingwhatisrightfortheirown."

TheMiamiHerald

NativewhiteexecutiveofKnight-RidderCorporation,parentcompanyoftheMiamiHerald(1987):

Inourbusiness,whichisthepublishingbusiness,wemadeabetduringthe1960sthatthenormalpatternofimmigrationthatthiscountryhadseenovermanyyearswhenethnicminoritiescameininlargenumbers

andsettledindifferentsectionswouldnotbeverydifferenthere;thatwithinareasonablenumberofyears,Englishwouldbecomethedominantlanguage.Sowemadeabetin1960thatthatwouldoccurhereinMiamiasalargenumberofCubanrefugeescameinfollowingCastro'stakeover.Thatdidn'thappenasfastaswethoughtitwould.WebelatedlystartedinourbusinessaSpanisheditioncalledElMiamiHerald.It'saveryexpensivepropositionforus,butithashelpedusgainacceptanceandcirculationintheHispaniccommunity.WethinkthatitisimportanttousandimportanttothemthattheHeraldbeavailableinbothSpanishandEnglish.WecirculatethatSpanishsectioninconjunctionwiththeMiamiHerald,sothatwebelievethat,byvirtueofhavingthetwotogether,we'lleventuallymovebacktowardtheultimateutilizationofEnglishastheprimarylanguage.

Cubanbankdirector,memberoftheCubanAmericanNationalFoundation,emigratedintheearly1960s(1989):

TheconflictbetweentheCubancommunityandtheHeraldreacheditspeakwhen,aftertheresignationofoneofthedirectorsoftheCubanAmericanNationalFoundation,thenewspaperstartedspeculating,withoutbasisoffact,aboutinternaldivisionsintheorganization.Wedecidedtowriteanopenletter.JorgeMasCanosa[presidentofthefoundation]broughtawriterfromWashingtonwhowrotetheletterinanafternoon,anditwaspublished,asapaidannouncement,thefollowingday.TheHeraldneverexpectedthatweCubanswoulddosomethinglikethat!Therewasameetinginwhich,infact,weconsideredorganizingaboycottagainstthenewspaper.RichardCapen,theeditor,calledtocomplain,but,facedwiththethreatofamassiveboycott,thenewspaperrelentedandhaschangedcourseonehundredandeightydegreesinrecentmonths.

We'vetoldCapenthatitdoesnotmatterwhattheNuevoHerald[thenewrevampedSpanisheditionoftheMiamiHeraldcreatedin1988aftertheeditorsoftheearlierversion,ElMiamiHerald,resignedoverdisagreementswiththenewspaper'seditorialline]publishesbecausepraisestothecommunitywhichappearthereareforCubansofCalleOeho[SouthwestEighthStreet,themainthoroughfareofMiami'sLittleHavana

section].MuchmoreimportantiswhatispublishedinEnglish,whichisreadnationwide.TheHeraldsometimesplaysadoublegame,publishingarticlesinEnglishthatdonotappearinSpanishandviceversa.

Blackattorney(quotedabovewithreferencetointerethnicrelations):

TheMiamiHeraldrunsalotofnegativestoriesaboutMiami.Initially,IthinkthatafewpersonalitiesoftheHerald'sseniormanagementsawthejobofthenewspaperastobetruthfulevenifitdestroyedthecity.Theyhavebeenextremelymisguided.Atthesametime,theyhavebeenaverypositiveforceinMiami.Aspositiveastheycanbe,theycanalsobewrong.Traditionally,likealltherestofthedowntownprimarilyoldAngloestablishment,theHeraldassumedthattheCubanswouldgoaway;iftheydidn'tassumeit,theyatleasthopedtheywould,andsotheyignoredthem.Theymusthavethought,"They'rehereandwehavetolivewiththem,butmaybetheCastrogovernmentwillbeoverthrownandwe'llsendthembackthere."Theydidn'tunderstandthatthehistoryofeverygroupthathascometoAmericaisthatnobodyevergoesbackhome.

Differentframes,differentdefinitionsofthesituation.Discoursesthatdonotclashdirectly,butratherslidepasteachotherasifmovingondifferentplanes.Clearly,thearrivalofthe"threehundredthousandCubans"overtwenty-fiveyearswasthekeyeventthatrupturedthetraditionalworldviewinthissouthernAmericancity.Butsuchaninterpretationdoesnotsuffice.TherearemoreLatinsinLosAngelesandNewYorkthaninMiami,yetthosecitiesneverexperiencedasimilartransformation.There,immigrants"knowtheirplace"anddonotchallengetheestablishedsocialhierarchyorthefundamentalshareddefinitions.AsforBlacks,African-Americancommunitiesinothercitiesareneitheraspowerlessnorasmilitantwhentheyrevolt.ItisasiftheparallelsocialstructuresanddefinitionsthatwerecreatedbythearrivaloftheCubanssimultaneouslypushedBlacksintodoublesubordinationandopenedspaceforthemtorevitalizethediscourseaboutcivilandhumanrights.

EverywhereoneturnsinMiami,thisfragmentationoftheoldstandardframeproducesoddities,mostlycomicbutattimespoignantandeventragic:theyoungBlackwaitressintheairportbarservingcafécubanotoCanadiantourists;theCarnivalofMiami,whichisreallytheoldHavanaCarnaval;thecitybracingitselfforthenext,fullyexpected

riotasajurydebatesthefateofapoliceofficer.TheseeverydayfactsoflifehavegainedtheattentionofoutsiderswhohavewritteninsightfullyaboutMiami'sparadoxes.WhileotherlargeLatincommunitiesinEastLosAngelesortheBronxgounsungandunnoticed,Miamihasattractedtheattention

ofseveralprominentAmericanliterati.JoanDidion,forexample,hadthistosayaboutthenativewhiteestablishmentin1987:"Thissetofmind,inwhichthelocalCubancommunitywasseenasacivicchallengetobedeterminedlymet,wasnotuncommonamongAnglostowhomItalkedinMiami,manyofwhompersistedintherelatedillusionsthatthecitywassmall,manageable,prosperousinapredictablebroad-basedway,southerninaprogressivesunbeltway,American,andbelongedtothem."

12AndDavidRieffhighlightedoneofthemanylocalpeculiarities:"AttheedgeofCoralGables,Inoticedasignadvertising,'TheCaballeroFuneralHome,Founded1858.'Miami,ofcourse,didnotexistin1858andIrealizedwithastartthattheownersmeantfoundedinHavanain1858.ItisasifCubanMiamirecapitulatesalltheparticlesofprerevolutionaryHavanawith,ofcourse,theexceptionoftheleft."13

Drugrunning,theperiodicBlackriots,Mariel,thestarkbeautyofthecityallhavebeenextensivelychronicledinbooks,articles,films,and"MiamiVice."Butaftereachcolorfulsnippet,thequestionremains:Howdidithappen?HowcouldalargeAmericancitybetransformedsoquicklythatitsnativesoftenchosetoemigratenorthinsearchofamorefamiliarculturalsetting?Howcouldanimmigrantgroup,especiallyonecomingfromtheThirdWorld,reproduceitsinstitutionssothoroughlythataparallelsocialstructurewasestablished?Atwhatpointdidacculturationinreversebegin?And,perhapsmostimportant,wherewillthisprocessofchangewithoutablueprintlead?

Foranswers,onemustlookback,firstat1980,ayearstillfreshinpeople'sminds,andthenatthedeepandunappreciatedrootsofthecityintheCaribbean.

ChapterTwoAYeartoRemember:MarielNineteeneightywassomeyear.Ifyouwereanoldnative,youprobablystillbelievedthatnothingmuchhadreallychangedinMiami,thatimmigrantswouldeventuallylearnEnglishandlifewouldgoonasusual.Yetaswithallmajorprocessesofchange,theforcesunderlyingthedramaticeventsofthatyearhadlongbeenatwork,unknownandunforeseenbythosewhoselivestheywereabouttotransform.Theyfinallyirruptedin1980.Asthecityreeledfromoneunexpectedeventafteranother,itsinhabitantsconfrontedheadontheprospectofafuturewithoutprecedentinAmericanurbanhistory.Forsome,thisprospectwasachallengetobe"determinedlymet";forothers,itwasaloomingthreattobeescaped.Propertyvaluescollapsedallovertownasthecityabandoned,onceandforall,theimageofasunnytouristdestinationandfacedthatofanuncertainbridgebetweentwoworlds.

TheMarielExodus

OnApril1,1980,JoseAntonioRodriguezGallegos,abusdriver,rammedhisminibusthroughthegatesofthePeruvianembassyinHavanainanefforttogainpoliticalasylum.Duringtheensuingmelee,aCubanguardwaskilled.FidelCastroangrilywithdrewpoliceprotectionfromtheembassy,amovethatbroughtovertenthousandCubansfromallpartsoftheislandtotheembassyinsearchofrefuge.ThispopulardemonstrationofayearningtoleaveCubawasamajorembarrassmenttotheCastroregime;itfeltcompelledtoopentheportofMariel,declaringthatanyonewishingtoleavecoulddoso.CastrothenproceededtoinviteCuban

Map1.TheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980.

Figure2.PopulationoftheMiamimetropolitanarea,1980.

Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,ResearchDivision,DadeCountyFacts(Miami:MetropolitanDadeCountyGovernment,1990),2,6.

exilesintheUnitedStatestocomepickuptheirrelatives.

1OnApril20,twolobsterboatscarryingaboutfortyCubansarrivedinKeyWest.Thefollowingday,RadioHavanareportedthatelevenmoreboatswereleavingMariel;meanwhile,twenty-fiveMiami-basedboatsweresaidtobeenroutetoMariel.The1980''FreedomFlotilla"wasunderway.2

TwoCubanresearcherswiththeCenterfortheStudyoftheAmericasinHavanalaterreportedtheirviewofthecompositionoftheoutflow:

Wecanaffirmwithcertaintythat45.25percentofallpersonsthat

abandonedCubathroughtheportofMarielhaddelinquentbackgroundsasfollows:

1.Crimesagainstproperty(theft,etc.) 40.1%2.Dangerouscondition* 16.43.Fraudandfalsification 4.04.Crimesagainstthepublicadministration 1.75.Possessionandsaleofdrugs 5.56.Forbiddengames 4.37.Crimesagainstphysicalintegrity 4.48.Crimesagainstthenormaldevelopmentofsexualrelations

9.Crimesagainstthesecurityofthestate 5.210.Violationsofpublicorder 4.011.Others 3.7*Dangerousconditionisthespeciallikelihoodthatapersonwillcommitcrimesinthefuture,demonstratedbytheconductthatheorsheobserves(PenalCodeofCuba,Law21,Title11).

Thisaccountofthoseleavingtheislandin1980dressedinacademicgarbthemuchstrongerindictmentbytheSupremeLeaderoftheRevolutionhimself:"ThosethatareleavingfromMarielarethescumofthecountryantisocials,homosexuals,drugaddicts,andgamblers,whoarewelcometoleaveCubaifanycountrywillhavethem"(FidelCastro,MayDayCelebrationSpeech,1980).Foronce,Castro'senemiesinMiamididnotdisagree:"MarieldestroyedtheimageofCubansintheUnitedStatesand,inpassing,destroyedtheimageofMiamiitselffortourism.ThemarielitosaremostlyBlackandmulattoesofacolorthatIneversaworbelievedexistedinCuba.Theydon'thavesocialnetworks;theyroamthestreetsdesperatetoreturntoCuba.Therewillbetwohundredmoreairplanekidnappings"(Cuban-Americanofficial,CityofMiami,August1983).4

MarielwasauniqueepisodeinAmericanimmigrationhistory.Insteadofimmigrantscomingontheirown,theywereactuallybroughtintothecountry,notbygovernmentagencies,butinboatscharteredbyearlierimmigrants.5MarielwashighdramaintheStraitsofFlorida,performedbythetwowarringfactionsofCubansocietybeforetheastonishedeyesoftheUnitedStates.Intheend,noneoftheprincipalsinvolvedweretoachievetheirgoals.Marielturnedouttobealosinggameallaround.

Byreleasing125,000peopleinlessthansixmonths,theCubangovernmenthopedtodemonstratetotheworldhowliberalits

exitpolicywasandsocounteractthebadpublicitycreatedwhententhousandCubansdesiroustoleaveoccupiedthePeruvianembassyinHavana.Thestrategybackfired.Thelargenumberofrefugees,thetestimonyofemigrants,thedeliberateplacementaboardtheboatsofex-convictsandmentalpatientsinordertonailtheimageofexilesas"scum"simplyconfirmedthetotalitariannatureoftheCastrogovernment.

Cubanexilesspentmillionsofdollarscharteringboatstorescuetheirrelativesfromtheisland.Somesucceeded,butmostendedupferryingacargoofunknownsacrosstheStraitsofFlorida.Althoughsubsequentresearchhasshownthathardenedcriminals,mentalpatients,andothertrueundesirablesrepresentedaminority,perhaps10percent,ofthenewarrivals,theirpresencestigmatizedtheentireexodusand,intheviewofmany,adverselyaffectednotonlythereputationofCubansintheUnitedStatesbutalsoMiami'sallureasatouristdestination.

TheCarteradministrationatfirstattemptedtocontroltheexodusbutthenbackeddown,apparentlyfearfulofalienatingCuban-Americanvoters.OnMay5,1980,thepresidentpledgedthattheUnitedStateswouldcontinuetoprovide"anopenheartandopenarms"forthoseleavingCubaandaskedCongressforsupplementalaid.OnMay14,Carteragainreversedhispolicy,proposinganairliftfromCubaandorderingboatscarryingrefugeestobestoppedandseized.Thispresidentialorderwaslargelyignored.Theadministration'sindecisiondidnotplaywellintheNovember1980presidentialelections:amongthosevotingagainstCarterwasasolidmajorityofCuban-Americans.

TheMarielrefugeeswhocametotheUnitedStatesinsearchofpoliticalfreedomandabetterlifefoundtheirpathblockedatevery

turnbygrowingdiscrimination.ThelabelsaffixedtotheexodusbytheCubangovernment"scum"and"lumpen"werepickedupbytheU.S.mediaandbeamednationwide.InNovember1982,afront-pagestoryintheColumbus[Ohio]Dispatchreportedthat''the'Marielistas,'asocietyofCubancriminalswhocametothiscountryonthe'FreedomFlotilla,'mightbeorganizinginColumbus.Thecriminalsyndicatewhosemembersadvertisetheirspecialtiesbytattoosbetweenthumbandforefingerhavebeenseenaroundtownbuyinghandguns."7Aslateas1987,theBostonHeraldreportedthecaptureofthe"South

ShoreStalker,"describedasa"29year-oldMarielito...releasedfromjailtojointheMarielboatlift,alongwiththousandsofotherconvictsandmentallyillpatients."

8Withsuchimagesreachingacrossthecountry,itisnotsurprisingthattheyeventuallyalteredtheattitudesoftheverycommunity,thathadengineeredthenewrefugees'departure,theMiamiCuban-Americans.

TonativewhiteSouthFloridians,thenewwaveofexileswasathreattobedeterminedlyopposed.Theirorgan,theMiamiHerald,spearheadedacampaignthataimed,tobeginwith,atavoidingU.S.involvementpriortotheopeningoftheMarielharbor,andthenathavingtheflowofrefugeesdivertedelsewhere,preferablytootherLatinAmericancountries.TheHeraldrepeatedlycastigatedCuban-AmericansfortheireagernesstorescuerelativesleftinCubaandshrillyechoedCastro'scharacterizationofthenewrefugees.Thiseffort,too,backfired.TheexoduswasnotdivertedfromMiami;moreover,thestigmaofMarielsotarnishedthethusfarpristineimageofanti-Castroexilesthatanew,reactivediscoursearose.

MarielandtheHerald

TheMiamiHeraldcoverageofeventsrelatedtoMarielrevealsbothhowquicklythingsdevelopedandhowdeterminedthenewspaperwastostemthetide.Aday-by-dayaccountoftheseeventswasproducedaspartofourstudyofpost-1980immigrationtoSouthFlorida.9Thefollowingsummaryindicatesclearlythepositionsadoptedbythatnewsorganizationwithrespecttotheunfoldingevents.

April7.

TheMiamiHeraldreportsthatCubansinthePeruvianembassyin

HavanamostlikelywillendupintheUnitedStates.DadeCountyofficialsstatethattheywillbeunabletoaccepttheCubans,citingahousingshortageandadepressedlocaleconomy.MiamimayorMauriceFerreasksthat,ifrefugeesareadmitted,theybesenttootherpartsofthecountry.HialeahmayorDaleBennettpredictsthatrefugeeswillhaveamajorimpactandsaysthatimmediatefederalaidwillbeneeded.

April12.

Initseditorialpage,theHeraldtakesupthethemeof

hemisphericcooperationandcallsfora"multinationalsenseofresponsibility,"regardingtheresettlementofthetenthousandembassyrefugees.ProposalsaremadetotransportrefugeestoatemporarysiteonthewaytoPeru.

April24.

AMiamiHeraldeditorialcondemnstheboatlift,begunthreedaysearlier,callingithumiliatinganddangerousandassertingthatthe"would-berescuersfromFloridaarepawnsinCastro'sopendiplomaticwar."ThearticlepredictsthatCastrowillpermitonlyatrickleofrefugeestoleavefromMarielandcontinuetodenypermissionfortheairliftthatwouldtaketheentiretenthousandtowelcomingCostaRica.MayorFerreechoestheHeraldandcallsforashiptotakealltheasylumseekerstoCostaRica.

April29.

Inaforcefuleditorial,theHeraldstatesthat"CarteradministrationofficialsseemtobeafraidtoangerCuban-Americanvotersbydemandinganendtotheinflux,buttheydon'twanttolegitimizeitbymobilizingFederalassistance."Thepaperreportsthat3,200Cubanshavearrived,and1,500boatsarewaitinginMarieltobringmore."Localresourcesparticularlyhousingalreadyareexhausted,andapotentiallyuglybacklashisbuildingamongnon-Hispanics."

FloridagovernorBobGrahamauthorizes$100,000forbasicassistanceandopenstheNationalGuardArmoryinHomesteadasashelterbecauseofthegrowingprocessingbacklog.ThefirstarticleonpsychologicalproblemsamongMarielrefugeesappearsintheHerald;itreportsthatsomeoftherefugeeshaveapriorhistoryofseverepsychopathologyandquestionswhethertheyhadbeenpartofthePeruvianembassycrowd.Asecond,verynegativearticlereportsthat

5,000Cubanshadarrivedinover100boatsthepreviousday,and"thestridentexilecommunityintheUnitedStatesshowslittleinclinationofwindingthingsdown."Inwhatisdescribedasamoresinisterassessmentoftherefugees,theHeraldcommentsthatahigh-rankingU.S.officialsurveying"thesullen,seedylookingcontingentthatarrivedaboardtheOceanQueensaidprivately:'justlookatthatbunch.Awfullyfunnythattherearenowomenandchildreninthegroup.Somethingtellsmewemayhaveabunchofcriminalshere.'"

PresidentCarterdeclaresastateofemergencyinFlorida.U.S.marshalsandmarinesaresenttoSouthFloridato

managetheinflow.TheCoastGuardcounts374boatsheadedforFloridaand74headedforMariel.Over3,500Cubansarriveonthisdayalone,bringingthetotaltoover16,000infifteendays.

TheprocessingcenteratFortChaffeeinArkansasisreadied.U.S.ImmigrationandNaturalizationServiceofficersinKeyWestclaim,accordingtotheHerald,that"asmanyasfouroutoffiveofthemostrecentarrivalshavecomefromCubanprisons,"butalsothatonly209refugeeslessthan1percentofarrivalstodatehadbeendetainedinDadeCountyaftertheirpreliminaryscreeningsuggestedacriminalrecord.

May11.

InextensivecoverageofthecrisisthisSunday,theMiamiHeraldreportsresultsofaninformalpollofMiamiresidents.Undertheheadline"DadeFearsRefugeeWave,"alongarticlereportssignificantnegativereactiontotheinflowbybothnativewhitesandBlacks,incontrasttogeneralacceptancebyDade'sHispanics,andconcludesthatthis"revealspotentiallydangerousdisagreementsamongDade'snon-Latinwhite,Latin,andblackpopulations."

May18.

TheprocessingcenteratFortIndiantownGapinPennsylvaniaopenstotaketheoverflowfromChaffee.

May31.

Duringtheprecedingfiveweeks,theboatliftisestimatedtohavebroughtoverninetythousandCubansintothecountry.AHeraldeditorialcallsforacoordinatedprogramtosettlethenewrefugeesandcontraststhe"new"Cubanswiththeold:"Thisisnottheentrepreneurialclassthatmovedin15yearsago....ACubanghetto

mightdevelop."

June4,5.

TheMiamiHeraldrunsaneditorialreviewingthenegativeimpactofMarielonDadeCountyandtheneedtosafeguardagainstsuch"floods."Acoupleofarticlesclaimthat,astheboatliftwanes,CastroissendinghundredsofcriminalstotheUnitedStates.

June17.

PresidentCarterrequeststhatCongressappropriate$385millionforCubanrefugeeprograms.

June20.

Apresidentialordergrantsaspecialsix-month"entrant"statustoHaitiansandCubanswhoarrivedbeforeJune20,allowingthemtoworkandqualifyforAidforFamilieswithDependentChildren(AFDC),SupplementalSecurityIncome(SSI),Medicaid,andotherassistanceprograms.

June26,27.

LegalactionistakentoblockrefugeechildrenfromDadepublicschools.AMiamiHeraldeditorialstronglycriticizesPresidentCarterforyieldingtofearsofCubanexileviolenceiftheUnitedStatespreventedexilesfromgoingtoMariel:"ThePresidentconsciouslyletthethreatofmobreactionintimidatehimintoignoringthelawandallowinghisownpoliciestobetrampled.WhenthePresidentfinallyorderedtheboatlifthaltedonMay15,hedidsobecausetheCuban-AmericancommunityitselfhadbecomeunhappyoverthementalpatientsandcriminalsthatFidelCastrohadincludedamongtheMarielrefugees."

June30.

Over114,000Marielrefugeeshavearrived.

July7,8.

TheMiamiHeraldclaimsthatovertwentythousandhomosexualCubanrefugeesawaitsponsors;thenumberisdeniedthenextdaybygovernmentofficials.

July24,25.

AseriesofarticlesintheHeraldfocusesonthecrimeattributedtoMarielrefugees.Ajudgereportsacrimewavefromboatliftjuveniles;MiamiBeachreportsacrimeincreaseof34percentsincetherefugeesarrived;teenviolenceisalsoreportedtothriveinrefugeebarracks.

August16.

ThreepassengerjetsarehijackedtoCubabyMarielentrants,makingsixsuchhijackingsinoneweek.

August30.

CubanexilesinMiamirallydemandingthatPeruvianembassyrefugeesnowsettledinLimabeallowedtoentertheUnitedStates.

September5-8.

TheMiamiHeraldreportstwodeathsinagunbattleandprovidesdetailedaccountsofMarielrefugeesinvolvedincrimes.Storiesofcrimesbyrefugeesruneachdayforfourconsecutivedays.

September14.

TheHeraldreportsthathomesickrefugeesaretryingtostarta"reverseflotilla."

September18.

WhiteHouseofficialsannounceinMiamiaplantoalleviatethecrisiscausedbytheinfluxofimmigrants.AMiamiHeraldfront-pagearticlereportsacrimewaveinLittleHavana,theperpetratorsbeingMarielcriminals:775percentmorerobberiesthanin1979;284percentmorecarthefts;191percentmoreburglaries;110percentmoreassaults.

September26.

CubaofficiallyclosesMarielharbortoU.S.-boundemigrantsafter159daysandatotalof124,769newrefugees.

TheAngloPerspective

ThepositionadoptedbytheMiamiHeraldwasunderstandable.AsthevoiceoftheAngloestablishment,itconsideredtheMarielexodusaseriousdoublethreat:first,asaneconomiccataclysm,giventhedepressedstateoflocalindustryandthenegativeimpactoftheinflowonMiami'sstatusasatouristdestination;andsecond,asadirectthreattotheestablishmentpowerstructure,giventheadditionofmanythousandstoanalreadyuncomfortablylargeCubanpopulation.Hence,througheditorials,letterstotheeditor,andthe"spin"itputonnewsstories,theHeraldsoughtinitiallytopreventthenewwaveofCubanimmigrationfromtakingplaceand,whenthatfailed,todiscreditthefresharrivals.

Thedevelopmentofthisdiscourseisquiterevealing.YohelCamayd-FreixasconductedasystematiccontentanalysisofstoriesaboutMarielprintedbytheMiamiHeraldduringthefirstfourteenweeksofthecrisis,beginningonSunday,April6,1980.AllarticlesthatdepictedtheMarielexodusincriticaltermsandMarielrefugeesasproblematicwereratedas"negative";thosethatweredescriptive,positive,neutral,orindifferentweregroupedas"positive."

10Figure3showsthat,astheexodustookshape,negativecoveragebytheHeraldincreasedfollowing,withashortlag,theupwardswingoftheinflow.Despitetheconservativebiasofthegraph,whichcountsas''positive"allneutralorpurelydescriptivearticles,negativecoveragereached90percentofallprinteditemspertainingtoMarielintheHeraldintheweekofMay26,andremainedatbetween40and60percentthereafter.

Inseekingtoadvanceitspolicygoals,Camayd-Freixasnotes,theMiamiHeraldidentifiedtheCubanexilecommunityasitsmajor

sourceofoppositionandactedaggressivelytocounterthisgroup'seffortstobringtheirrelativesandtheoriginalPeruvianembassyoccupantstotheUnitedStates.11Inthecourseofarticulatingthesegoals,theHeraldactedwithbothgreatenergyandnotableineffectiveness.

Until1980,Cubanexilepoliticshadfocusedontheideaofreturningtotheisland.OccasionalsalliesintolocalpoliticswerecriticizedbythecommunityitselfasdetractingfromthegoalofliberatingCubafromCastro'sregime.Despitethevauntedpower

Figure3.WeeklyMarielarrivalsandnegativeMiamiHeraldarticlesontheinflow,1980.YohelCamayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami(Boston:BostonUrbanResearchand

DevelopmentGroup,1988),III-42;JuanM.Clark,JoséI.Lasaga,andRoseS.

Reque,The1980MarielExodus:AnAssessmentandProspect(Washington,D.C.:CouncilforInter-AmericanSecurity,1981),5.

ofCuban-Americanvoters,onlyahandfulofCubansheldelectiveofficein1980,andthosewhodidgenerallydownplayedtheirnationality.AfewsuccessfulCubanentrepreneursjoinedthelocalChamberofCommerceandotherAmericanbusinessorganizationsandtriedtomelt,asfaraspossible,intotheAnglomainstream.

AstheHeraldlauncheditscampaignagainstapossiblenewwaveofCubans,then,theexilecommunitywasdefenselesstoconfrontit.Sofar,exileorganizationshadbeenconcernedwitheventsintheisland,notlocalpoliticsinMiami.TherewasnoalternativeCuban"discourse"aboutthecity,andnoorgantoadvanceit.TheHeraldthushadthefieldtoitselfandcouldpresentthenewarrivalsinanylightitchosetointhisinstance,consistentlynegative.Yetthenewspaper'sarticulatepleas,directedmostlytothefederalgovernment,fellondeafears.WhatmostdisturbedtheHerald'seditorsandthenativewhiteestablishmentwashowanAmericanpresidentcouldsacrificethemtoaccommodatethewishesofaforeignminority.Asacolumnistbitterlycomplainedyearslater,"Castroalwaysseemstocalltheshotshere."13ThemostscathingeditorialsduringtheMarielcrisis,infact,werereservednotfortheCubans,butforPresidentCarter,whointhenewspaper'sviewhadallowedhimselfto''beintimidatedbymobreaction"andhisownpolicies"tobetrampled."

TheSouthFloridanativewhitecommunitywasconcernedlargelywithpreservingitsownlife-style;ithadlittleinclinationtogopokingintothecomplexitiesofforeignpolicyandthesingularlinkbetweenCubanexilesandthefederalgovernment.Yetfortwentyyears,theexilecommunityhadbeentheU.S.government'smostresolutepartnerinthestruggleagainstCastrocommunismandthatdictator's

attemptsatexpansioninLatinAmerica.ForWashington,theMiamiexileswerenotan"ethnic"group,butanimportantallyinthefightforCubaandLatinAmerica.Forcefullystoppingthesesupportersinthehighseasastheyattemptedto"liberate"theirkinwouldnotplaywellabroad,especiallyamongfriendsoftheUnitedStateselsewhereinthehemisphere.Hence,thebiggergoalofpreservingAmericanglobalhegemonyclashedwiththelocalgoalofpreservingAnglohegemonyinMiami.Thelatterhadtogiveway.Itwasthisalternativedefinitionofexilesascitizensofaninvadedneighboringnation,ratherthanasadomes-

ticethnicminority,thatenabledthemtoactwithoutmuchconcernforlocalmatters,tothedismayoftheHeraldanditsallies.

InMiamiin1980,thetwomajorsegmentsofthelocalpopulationeachfeltbetrayedbythefederalgovernment,butfordifferentreasons.TheexileshadlongdeploredthefailureoftheKennedyadministrationtofollowthroughwiththeBayofPigsinvasion,andsubsequentU.S.administrationswerecondemnedfortheireffortstopreventexileraidsonCuba.LocalAnglos,inturn,feltabandonedwhenWashingtonfailedtobacktheirstruggletosaveMiamifromtheCubans.TheHerald'sarticlesandeditorialsduringtheMarielcrisisfaithfullyreflectedthelatterposition.

ReactiveEthnicity

Theperspectivearticulatedin1980bytheMiamiAngloestablishment,thoughultimatelyunfruitfulregardingitsgoals,didhaveseveralunintendedeffects.Twooftheseshapedthesubsequentevolutionofthatgroup'sprincipalcontenderduringtheMarielepisode,theCubans;athirdunintendedeffectchangedthe"mood"ofthecity,inparticularinthethirdmajorsegmentofitspopulation,theBlacks(seechapter3).ThefirstsucheffectwastostigmatizetheMarielrefugees,notonlynationwidebutwithintheCubancommunityitself.TheHeraldwasnotsolelyresponsibleforthereversaloftheexiles'originalsupportforMarielrefugees;thepresenceofmany"undesirables"deliberatelyplacedaboardtheboatsbytheCubangovernmentplayedasignificantroleaswell.Yetthenewspaper'sinsistenceonstoriesofcriminalsandmentalpatients,totheneglectofthemajorityofMarielrefugeeswhowerenotmisfits,advancedthehighprofileofthenewcomersasanundesirableadditiontoMiami'spopulation.

Uptothatpoint,theself-imageofCubanexileshadbeenahappy

mix:theywerenotonlyAmerica'salliesintheglobalanti-communiststrugglebutalsoa"model"minority.Severalarticlesinthenationalpressduringthe1960sand1970sdescribedtheCuban"successstory"inMiamiaswellasthecontributionsexileshadmadetotheeconomicrenaissanceofthecity.

14WithMariel,thispositiveimagefadedquickly;Cuban-Americansnowfoundthemselvesclassedwiththemostdowntroddenanddiscriminated-againstminorities.AnationalGalluppollconductedshortlyafter

theexodusdescribedvividlytheextentoftheCubans'unpopularity:afterMariel,Cubansrankeddeadlastinthepublic'sviewofcontributionsmadebydifferentethnicgroupstothenationalwelfare(table1).Foraminoritylongaccustomedtopublicpraise,suchopinionscameasarudeawakening.

ThereactionofmanyolderCubanswastoblametheMarielarrivalsforthenewsituationandtocreatesocialdistancefromthem.BythetimeweinitiatedourstudyofimmigrantsinSouthFloridain1983,ahighlynegativestereotypeofthe"Mariels"hadcrystallizedintheestablishedCubancommunity.Thefollowingcommentsexemplifytheviewsheardin1983andrepeated,withnotableconsistency,insubsequentyears:

Cubanbusinessman,employeroftenMarielrefugeesinhisrestaurantandliquorstore(1983):

Table1.AttitudesTowardAmericanEthnicGroupsHeldbytheAmericanPublic,1982

HasBeenGoodfortheCountry

HasBeenBadfortheCountry

MixedFeelings/Don'tKnow

English 66% 6% 28%Irish 62 7 31Jews 59 9 32Germans 57 11 32Italians 56 10 34Poles 53 12 35Japanese 47 18 35Blacks 46 16 38Chinese 44 19 37Mexicans 25 34 41Koreans 24 30 46

Vietnamese 20 38 42PuertoRicans

17 43 40

Haitians 10 39 51Cubans 9 59 32Source:RoperOrganization,RoperReports(1982),84-4,2-27.

ThemainproblemI'vehadwithMarielitosistheirinclinationtopettytheft.Theydon'tstealoutofneed,theyearnenoughforaliving.It'sahabitlearnedundercommunism.Thesepeopledon'tbehavelikeCubans.Idon'tbelievethattheywillbeabletomoveupeconomicallyliketheoldCubansbecausetheylackmannersandeducation.Alsotheyareviolent,theyareaccustomedtosolveeverythingwithshoutsandblows.SeveraltimesI'vehadtopackaguntodealwithdrunkenMarielemployees.

Cubansocialworker,headofaCityofMiamisocialserviceagency(1983):

ThequalityofCubanrefugeeswhoarrivedintheseventiesisverydifferentfromthosewhocamein1980.Aboutone-thirdofthe125,000Marielitosaretrash-delinquents,homosexuals.TheireffectsonMiamihavebeenterrible.Inouroffice,wetrytofindemploymentforthemandprovidethemwithtransportationtotheirnewjobs.However,manyemployersdon'twantMarielrefugees.ThereasonwhytheMarielitosaredifferentisthatmanycamealone,ratherthanaspartoffamilygroups.Eightypercentofthosewhocomehereaskingforjobsareloneindividuals....Andtheyhavehighexpectations:theydon'tacceptminimumwages.Theysay,"It'stoolittle,"andprefertocontinuelivingonwelfareandfoodstamps.

Marielrefugeesalsolearnedquicklyaboutthechangedviewsoftheircompatriots.In1983,wecompletedasurveyoftheMarielpopulationlivingintheprincipalareasofCubanconcentrationintheMiamimetropolitanarea(DadeCounty).Thesampleof520wasreinterviewedthreevearslater.Onbothoccasions,respondentswereaskediftheyperceiveddiscriminationagainsttheirowngroup(Marielrefugees)bynativewhites(Anglos)andby"old"Cubans;wealsoaskedthemiftheyhadpersonallyexperienceddiscriminationbyeithergroup(table2).

15In1983,afterthreeyearsofU.S.residence,onlyaminorityofMarielrefugees25percentreportedthatAnglo-Americans

discriminatedagainstthem,withroughlythesameproportionstatingthattheyhadsufferedsuchexperiencespersonally.Threetimesasmany,howeveralmost75percentreportedthatolderCubansdiscriminatedagainstthem,andover50percenthadbeendirectlyaffected.Threeyearslater,personalexperiencesofdiscriminationhaddeclinedsomewhat,buttheperceptionthatsuchdiscrimina-

Table2.PerceptionsandExperiencesofDiscriminationofMarielRefugees,1983and1986

ThreeYearsafterArrival(1983)

SixYearsafterArrival(1986-87)

BelievethatMarielCubansarediscriminatedagainstbyAnglos

26% 32%

BelievethatMarielCubansarediscriminatedagainstbyolder-establishedCubans

HavepersonallyexperienceddiscriminationbyAnglos

Havepersonallyexperienceddiscriminationbyolder-establishedCubans

Source:AlejandroPortesandJuanM.Clark,"MarielRefugees:SixYearsAfter,"MigrationWorld15(1987):14-18.Note:Samplesizein1983was520drawnatrandomfromatwo-stageclusterdesignintheprincipalareasofCubanconcentrationinDadeCounty.Thesampledecreasedto400in1986becauseofrespondentattrition,butitwasstatisticallyunbiasedwithrespecttotheoriginal.

tionexistedhadincreased:nowclosetoone-thirdoftherefugeesfeltdiscriminatedagainstbyAnglos.Still,thisfigurewasbutafractionofthealmost80percentwhoreporteddiscriminationbyotherCubans.

Thesenumbers,impressiveastheyare,donotfullycapturethedepthofthefrustrationexpressedbymanyofourMarielrespondentsatbeingtreatedassecond-classcitizensbytheircompatriots.Aslateas

1987,aMarielinformantreported:"TheseolderCubansareverydifficult.Ifyouobjecttotheirverynarrowandreactionaryviewofthings,theymakeasceneandaccuseyouofbeingwithFidel.Theyareverydogmatic.Iamaneducatedpersonandhavearighttomyownideas.

TheaccusationsoftheCastrogovernment,echoedbytheNorthAmericanmedia,didsucceedinstigmatizingtheMarielinflowandcreatingadeepriftwithintheexilecommunity.Butasecondeffectarosealmostsimultaneously.Facedwitharapidlyspreadingreputationas"undesirables,"Cuban-Americanswereforcedtoturntheirattentioninwardandconfronttheirconditionasadomesticethnicminority.Likeotherethnicgroupsbeforethem,theexiles

respondedtostrongoutsideprejudicebyundergoingaprocessofreactiveformation:theyworkedtoredefinethesituationintermsmorefavorabletotheirownself-imageandtheirroleinthecommunity.

17ThekeyfactorseparatingCubansfrommostotherethnicgroupsinthiseffortwasthearrayofresourcestheywereabletomuster.

Meanwhile,asadirectoutgrowthofMariel,agrass-rootsmovementofnativewhiteswasorganizedinMiami.ItsoverallgoalsparalleledthosepromotedbytheHerald,buttheimmediateobjectivewassomewhatdifferent:"MyparentswereimmigrantsandtheyhadtolearnEnglishpromptly;Cubansshoulddolikewise,"announcedoneoftheleaders.ThemovementgatheredenoughstrengthtoputthelanguageissuebeforethevotersintheelectionofNovember1980.TheCubancommunitywasstillunorganizedinlocalaffairs,andthe"antibilingual"referendumpassedoverwhelmingly.Fromthenon,DadeCounty,officialswereprohibitedfromfundingprogramsoractivities"otherthan[those]intheEnglishlanguage."18ThereferendumvictorymarkedthehighpointoftheAnglo-centeredefforttohangontohegemony.DavidRieffexplainsthefeelingsofMiami'snativewhites,manyofthemchildrenofimmigrants,thus:"Withinlivingmemory,theyhadgivenuplanguagesandhabitsofbeinginordertofeelthemselvesmoreAmerican.Moreover,theywerenotgivenachoice....ButtheItalians(andtheJewsandtherest)hadnotexpectedAmericatoadapttothem,sowhyweretheCubanssointransigent?"19

The1980electionmarkedthebeginningsoftheprocessofreactiveformationonthepartofCuban-Americansaswell.Thefollowingstatementsaretypicalofexilecommunityleaders'reactionsintheyearsfollowingMarielandthepassageofthe"antibilingual"

referendum:

Cuban-AmericanexecutiveofKnight-RidderCorporation,parentcompanyoftheMiamiHerald(1983):

TherewerethreereactionstoMariel.Thefirstreactionwaspositive:tohelpallthosewhocame.Thesecondreactionwasnegative,evenbyCubanexileleaders.Therewereobviousdifferencesofvalues,ofappearance,ofambitionbetweentheoldandthenewrefugees.Therewasgreatfearofthecriminalelement.Thethirdreactionwasthatofthepress.Itwasnot"FreedomFlotilla,"butboatlift;thenewcomerswerenot"escapeesfromcommunism,"buteconomicimmigrants....

Atthattime,weCubansbegantoreceiveblowsfromeverywhere.Negativepressandstereotypesapplytoall,notonlytotheMariels.ThencameScarface,thereeditionofa1930movieaboutAlCapone,butthistimewithaMarielitoasadrugmafiaboss.TheseweretheeventsthatledtothecreationofFACE[FactsaboutCubanExiles].Theorganizationhastwoprograms:onetocounteractalltheanti-Cubanarticlesandstereotypes;asecondtopromotetheCubans'imagethrougharticlesandfilms.FACEstartedwiththirteenpeopleinMiami,butnowhaschaptersthroughoutthecountry.

Cuban-AmericanDadeCountyofficial(1981):

TheAnglopowerstructureisscaredtodeathabouttheCubanriseinthiscommunity.Ithastriedcooprationthroughan"interethnicrelationscommittee"oftheMiamiChamberofCommerce,whichisreallyasham.TherewerefourstagestoMarielanditsaftermath:

Inthefirst,therewasgreatsolidaritybyCuban-AmericanswiththeMarielrefugees.Onemilliondollarswerecontributedafteratelemarathon,andfifteenhundredvolunteersshowedupdailytoassistwiththeprocessing.Metro-DadeCountygovernmentwasinchargeofoperations.ThislastedfromApril21toMay9.

Inthesecond,theFedstookover.ThecampaignagainstMarielinthepressgottougher.Cuban-Americansbegantobelieveitandabandonedthenewarrivals.Therewereriotsinthecamps.Inall,adisasterorchestratedbypeopleatthehighestlevelofgovernment.

Inthethirdstage,therewastheantibilingualreferendum,whichwasaslapinourface.Peoplebegantofeel"moreCubanthananyone."Therewasangerattheinsult,butnoorganizationyet.Inthefourthstage,thereisembryonicorganizationpromotedbythebusinessleaders;theplantodayistotrytoelectaCubanmayorofthecity,andperhapsoneortwostatelegislators.

Followingtheeventsof1980,Cuban-AmericanbusinessmenwhohadbelievedthemselvesintegratedintothemainstreambegantowithdrawfromAngloorganizationsortocombineparticipationinthemwiththe

creationofparallelethnicassociations.FactsaboutCubanExiles(FACE)andtheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundation(CANF)werefoundedatthistime.Plansweremadetoruncandidatesforlocaloffice.Moreimportant,anewperspectivebegantoemerge,aresponsetothatadvancedbytheantibilingualmovement.Inthisalternativeperspective,theexilecommunityitselfrepresentedthesolutiontoMiami'sproblemsand

thebuilderofitsfuture.LuisBotifoll,aleadingCuban-Americanbanker,becameoneoftheprincipalexponentsofthisview:

Beforethe"GreatChange,"Miamiwasatypicalsoutherncity,withanimportantpopulationofretireesandveterans,whoseonlyactivityconsistedintheexploitationoftourismduringthesunnywinters.NoonethoughtoftransformingMiamiintowhatitistoday.ItisnoexaggerationtosaythatthemotorofthisGreatChangewastheCubanmenandwomenwhoelectedfreedomandcametotheseshorestorebuildtheirhomesandfacewithcourageanuncertainfuture....TheselastdecadesofthetwentiethcenturyhavewitnessedthefoundationofadynamicandmultifacetedMiamioverthepastofaMiamithatwasmerelyprovincialandtourist-oriented.Today,thelevelofprogresshasreachedunanticipatedheights,beyondthelimitsofanyone'simagination.

EvenMarielrefugeesbecameintegratedintothisoptimisticframework,whichrescuedthemfromthegloomypurviewofthemainstreampressandredefinedthemascontributorstothecity'sfuture.TheCuban-Americanassistantcountymanagerdefendedthemasfollows:

Sofar,fromapopulationof120,000,wehave2,750potential"badapples"lessthan2.5percent.Thatleaves117,250immigrantswhoaregood,hardworkingpeopleseekingpoliticalandeconomicfreedom....Let'stalkaboutthesepeople.Let'stalkaboutthebenefitswewillderivefromthem....Cubanshave,forthepasttwodecades,madeatremendouscontributiontoDadeCounty.WeallknowthesuccessstoriesofCubanlawyersandbankers.Indeed,commercialliaisonswithLatinAmericanclientsandlanddevelopmentventureshaveestablishedCubansaseconomicleaders.Withthepassingoftime,upwardmobilityhascreatedopeningsatthesemiskilledlevels.Nowthelaborforceissuddenlyheretofillthegap.Ofcourse,thenewarrivalswillneedtimetoretrain,toadjusttolifeinanenvironmentofabundanceandfreedom....Sothey,and

thereforeweinthiscommunityarenowinastateofflux.Historyshowsusthatthistoowillpassandthatweareonourwaytogreaterprosperity.21

TheCuban-American"successstory"isalreadyevidentinthesestatements.Whatisoftenneglectedisitsreactivecharacter.TheAngloattempttoreasserthegemonywasinessenceanoffensiveagainsttwocentralgoalsoftheexilecommunity:familyreunificationthroughtheopeningprovidedbyMariel,andthepreservationoftheSpanishlanguage.Theestablishmentcampaigndidnot,

however,yieldtheexpectedresults;indeed,itledtonovelconsequences,mostlytheoppositeofthoseintended.InsteadofsubduingtheCubans,thehegemonicdiscourseoftheHeraldanditsalliestransformedtheexilecommunityintoaself-consciousethnicgroupthatorganizedeffectivelyforlocalpoliticalcompetition.

Bymid-decade,themayorsofMiami,Hialeah,WestMiami,andseveralsmallermunicipalitiesinDadeCountywereCubanborn,andthereweretenCuban-Americansinthestatelegislaturequiteastepupfromtheoneortwoenvisionedinthe"embryonicorganization"planoutlinedbytheCuban-AmericanDadeCountyofficialin1981.Andsignificantly,thesechangestookplaceinthecontextofanaggressivealternativediscourse,onethatportrayednotoldMiamians,butformerrefugees,astheprimarybuildersofthecity'sfuture.LocalAngloeliteswerethereaftercompelledtobargaininatransformedenvironment,wheretheirviewhadceasedtobehegemonicandwheredefactopluralismbecamethenorm.

ChapterThreeAYeartoRemember:TheRiotandtheHaitians

BlacksandRefugees

Thethirdconsequenceoftheanti-MarielcampaignspearheadedbytheMiamiHeraldwasanincreaseinthemoodoftensioninthecity.NotonlyMarielCubansbutalsoHaitianswerecoming(sometimeswashing)ashore,andthesenseofbeingunderinvasionbytheThirdWorldfusedwiththeunresolvedracialtensionsofthissoutherncity.EvenasthelocalestablishmentbattledtheCubansinitsefforttofendoffnewwavesofimmigrants,itpersistedinitsoldwayswithregardtothenativeethnicproletariattheBlacks.ThesewaysinvolvedrelegatingBlackstoapermanentlysubservientstatusandthen,whencivilrightslegislationmadethisimpossible,simplyignoringthem.

WhenthefirstCubanexilesbeganarrivingintheearlysixties,theyconfrontedtheunfamiliarspectacleofBlacksqueuinguptoseekandberefusedadmittanceintowhites-onlymovietheaters.Thiswasjustthetipoftheiceberg.Blackscouldnoteatatwhiterestaurants,theypaidtheirtaxesataseparatewindowintheDadeCounty,courthouse,andtheydidnotevenhaveaccesstoMiami'sfamousbeaches.BlackshadtotravelbyboattoVirginiaKeyorgoallthewaytoBrowardCounty"toswiminsaltwater."

Theearlymiddle-classexilesmayhavedeploredthesceneofNAACPactivistsbeingturnedawayatthemovieboxoffice,butwhenitcametojobsthey,too,brushedtheBlacksaside,taking

overpostionsthatmighthavebeenthetickettoeconomicadvancementforthenativeminority.AsCubansbegantoconsolidatetheirholdincertainareasofMiamiandHialeah,theyforgotabouttheBlackcommunityaswell.LittleHavanaandLibertyCid,thelargestBlackareaofMiami,arescarcelytwomilesapart;sociallytheycouldbeindifferentcountries.

ForBlackMiami,the1960sand1970sweretoughyearsinwhichtheyhadtocontendnotonlywithaDeepSouthlegacy,butalsowiththeCuban-inspiredtransformationoftheircity.Duringthesixty-oddyearspriortothearrivalofthefirstCubans,BlackshadbeenthetraditionalsourceofmanuallaborinMiami,simultaneouslyneededandrejectedbythecitythattheywerebuilding.Asuccessionofwhitesheriffshadmadeittheirbusinesstokeepthe''Negroes"intheirplace,bothsociallyandphysically.TheirzealwasreinforcedbytheKuKluxKlan,whichtarredandfeathered,beatandbombed,anyuppityNegrowhotriedtoleavehiscrowdedghetto.AlthoughBlacksfoughtbackasbesttheycould,itwasonlyinthe1960swiththeupsurgeofthecivilrightsmovementthattheybegantomakesignificantheadwaytowardracialequality.ThesixtieswerealsotheyearsinwhichthefirstCubanexilesarrived.

In1966,MartinLutherKing,Jr.,notedMiami'semergingracialtriangleandwarnedagainstthepittingofrefugeesagainstBlacksincompetitionforjobs.3Bythemid-seventies,theCubanpresencehadbecometoolargeforanyonetoignore.IftheAngloestablishmentfounditdifficulttofathomwhatwashappeningtotheircity,forBlackstheCubanpresenceanditsconsequenceswasasocialcataclysm.

Thusfar,thestoryoftheeffecttheCubaninfluxhadonthenative

minorityhasbeentoldwithanemphasisontwothemes:first,competitionforjobsbetweenthetwogroups,andsecond,theconsequentdeteriorationofthelivingstandardsoftheBlackpopulation.OneBlackleaderbluntlyasserted:"ItisafactthatCubansdisplacedBlacks."4BrucePorterandMarvinDunn,comparingfiguresforBlackemploymentfortheperiod1968-78,observedthatitwaslikeeconomicprogresssuddenlythrownintoreversegear.5

Neitherassertionisentirelyaccurate.Althoughmiddle-classCubansinthe1960stookwhateverjobswereavailableandinthissense"displacedBlacks,"theirstayinthosejobswasrelatively

brief.Subjectively,theexilesdidnotseethemselvescompetingwiththenativeminority;theyweresimplymakingdountiltheycouldreturntoCuba.Asthoseprospectsbecameprogressivelydimmer,manymovedrapidlyintoself-employmentinsuchareasasgarmentsubcontracting,landscaping,andresidentialconstruction.ThisevolutiondidnotsomuchdisplaceBlacksastransformthelocaleconomy.Indeed,figuresonethnicemploymentbyindustryindicatethattherisingrepresentationofLatins(overwhelminglyCuban)wasprimarilyattheexpenseofnativewhitesratherthanBlacks.

Table3illustratesthistrendwithCensusfiguresforthegarment,construction,hotel,andrestaurantindustries.AlthoughthesefiguresmustbeinterpretedwithcautionbecauseofchangingCensusdefinitions,theyindicatethatnativewhitesweretheprimarylosers,atleastinthesesectors.Thegarmentindustry,forexample,evolvedfrom94percentnativewhitein1960toonly10percentin1980,whenSpanish-originworkersrepresented83percentofthegarmentlaborforce.Blacksdidnotreducetheirrepresentationinthissector,butheldsteadyat5-7percent.Moretellingistheevolutionofthehotelindustry,commonlycitedasthecorelocusof"displacement."TheCubansdidmorethandoubletheirpresencebetween1970and1980from18to40percentbutagainthegainwasentirelyattheexpenseofnativewhiteworkers.Blacks,infact,increasedtheirrepresentationinthisindustryfrom14to23percentoverthesameperiod.

Avariantofthesamestoryistoldinfigure4,whichportraysemploymentinprofessional,executive,andlaborpositionsbyethniccategoryfor1970and1980.Ofthenewjobsgeneratedduringthedecade,Blacksgarneredabout20percent,afigurecommensuratewiththeirproportionoftheMiamipopulation.Asfigure4shows,Blacksincreasedtheirrepresentationacrosstheboard.TheproportionofBlacksintheprofessionsalonealmostdoubled,from7to13

percent.ItistruethattheCubanpresencegrewfaster,butonceagain,thisoccurredattheexpenseofAngloworkers.Between1970and1980,theSpanish-origingroupsecured65percentofallnewjobs,afigurewellabovetheirapproximate40percentrepresentationinthearea'spopulation.

Blackeconomicadvancementduringthedecadeisevidentinotherareasaswell.Forexample,themedianincomeoftheBlack

TABLE3.EthnicGroups'EmploymentbySector,DadeCounty,1960-80

1960 1970 1980White Black White Black Spanishorigin White Black Spanishorigin

Garment(textiles) 94.4% 5.6%17.8% 3.7% 78.5%10.4% 7.0% 82.6%Construction 80.1 19.9 60.1 19.4 20.5 43.8 16.6 39.6Hotels 83.8 16.2 77.5 14.1 18.4 37.3 22.9 39.8Restaurants 90.7 9.3 61.7 12.9 25.4 60.5 9.3 30.2Source:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,Florida(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1960,1970,and1980).Note:The1960CensusdidnothaveacategoryforpersonsofSpanishorigin.Inthe1970and1980censuses,Spanish-originoverlapswiththeothercategories.However,in1970and1980DadeCountyhadrelativelyfewblackCubansorblackLatinAmericans,sothecategories"Black"and"Spanishorigin"maybetakenasmutuallyexclusive.Thefiguresforwhitesarethendeterminedbysubtraction.

Figure4Professionals,executives,andlaborers,DadeCounty,1970and1980.

ProfileoftheBlackPopulation(Miami:Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,1984),tables25and26.

populationofDadeCountyrose7percentbetween1970and1980;bythelatteryear,moreover,Blackmedianincomewas68percentofthenationalaverage,comparedto60percentforBlacksnationwide.AffluenceamongBlackfamiliesalsogrewrapidly;by1980,7percentofthearea'sBlackfamilieswereearning$50,000ormore.Indeed,fullyone-thirdofallBlackfamiliesinthisincomecategoryinthestateresidedintheMiamimetropolitanarea.

Therewasnoone-to-onesubstitutionofBlacksbyCubansinthelabormarket,norwastheredirectexploitationofoneminoritybytheother.Therewas,however,anewurbaneconomyinwhichtheimmigrantsracedpastothergroups,leavingthenativeminoritybehind.Hence,afterdecadesofstrivingforameasureofequalitywithwhites,MiamiBlacksfoundthatthegamehaddrasticallychanged.Angloswereleaving,andotherwhiteswhospokeaforeignlanguagewereoccupyingtheirpositions.Asaresult,mostBlackswereinasimilarpositionasbefore.Nowhereisthispartofthestoryclearerthanintheevolutionofincome,poverty,andunemployment.Figure5comparesrelativeincomesandpovertylevelsforthethreemajorethnicgroupsinMiamiin1980;figure6graphsunemploymentbetween1980and1990.Inbothdatasets,thereisawidegapbetweenBlacksandnativewhitesinfavorofthelatter.Thereisalso,however,asignificantgapbetweenBlacksandtheintermediateSpanish-origingroup.

Theseaggregatefiguresdonotconveythefullstorybecausetheypertaintoeveryone,employersandemployeesalike.Itwas,rather,inthedevelopmentofsmallenterprisesthatthedifferencesbecamemostvisible.PerhapsmostdevastatingtotheBlackcommunitywastheapparenteasewithwhichtheCubansensconcedthemselvesinthelocaleconomy,allthewhileclaimingthattheirstaywastemporaryfor

theywouldsoonreturntotheirisland.In1977,onlyeighteenyearsaftertheCubanRevolution,Cuban-ownedfirmsinDadeCountyexceededeightthousandinnumber,orfourtimesasmanyaswereownedbyBlacks;averagegrossreceiptsofCubanfirmsamountedtoalmost$84,000,ortwiceasmuchasthetypicalBlackenterprise.7By1980,approximatelyhalfofthelargestbanksandenterprisesownedbySpanish-origingroupsintheUnitedStateswereinMiami,eventhoughtheareaclaimedamere5percentofthecountry'sSpanish-originpopulation.Bycontrast,onlyoneMiamiBlackbusinessmadethelistofthethreehundredtopBlackenterprisesinthenation.8

Figure5Income,affluence,andpoverty,DadeCounty,1980.

ProfileoftheBlackPopulation(Miami:Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,1984),tables29,32,and33.

Figure6Unemploymentratesbyraceandorigin,DadeCounty,1980-90.

FloridaStatisticalAbstracts(Gainesville:UniversityofFloridaPress,1973-90),tablesonunemploymentbycounty.(Datafor1987notavailable.)

TherapidentrepreneurialadvanceoftheCubanswasnotdueentirelytotheirbusinessacumenorcommunitysolidarity.U.S.governmentagenciesalsolookedwithsympathyontheexiles'fledglingbusinessesandfavoredthemdisproportionately.In1968,forexample,thefederalSmallBusinessAdministration(SBA)distributed$1,078,950inloanstoCuban-ownedsmallfirmsinDadeCountyand$82,600toBlackenterprises.Between1968and1980,46percent($47.7million)ofSBADadeCountyloanswenttoCubanandotherSpanish-originbusinesses,versusonly6percent($6.5million)toBlackfirms.Bythesametoken,theconstructionofMiami'srapidrailtransit(Metrorail)duringthelate1970semployedonly12percentBlackcontractors,comparedtoover50percentCuban.

SuchpatentinequalitiessharpenedthesenseofdoublesubordinationfeltbyMiamiBlacksastheseventiesprogressed.Afterall,itwastheywhohadfoughtthecivilrightsbattlestogainaccesstopublicandprivatefacilities.AffirmativeActionandotherprogramshadbeendesignedtorectifytheyearsofabusethattheyhadsuffered,nottohelparecentlyarrivedgroupofwhiteimmigrants.AsfarastheCubanswereconcerned,however,America'sraceproblemwasnottheirsandtheywerecertainlynotabouttomakeitso.Theirhistoryandconcernsweredifferent;hence,theytooknoresponsibilityfortheracialinequalitiesthattheyencounteredinMiami.

Duringthe1970s,thetwominoritiesneverclasheddirectly;eachremainedabsorbedinitsownsituationandproblems.Yettheimmigrants'presenceincreasinglyalteredthecharacterofthecity,addinganewtwisttotheperennialsubordinationofBlacksandtotheirrisingdiscontent.

TheRiot

Foroutsiders,Ithink,itwouldbeimpossibletoappreciatetheshockthatwentthroughtheBlackcommunity.Ithinkitissafetosaythatyou'dalmosthavetobeBlacktounderstand.Alltheirgrievances,alltheirdistrustofthesystem....Suddenly,itallturnedouttobetrue.

MajorClarenceDickson,highest-rankingBlackofficer,MiamiPoliceDepartment10

By1980,thissituationofdoublemarginalizationhadnotyetbeenarticulatedintoacoherentBlackdiscourse,althoughtherealityofpowerlessnesswasthereforalltosee.Atthestreetlevel,powerlessnesswasreflectedinthetraditionalpolicepracticeoftreatingBlackswithrelativeimpunity.Seenbyrespectablewhitecitizensasthevice-ridden"bad"partsoftown,LibertyCityandotherBlackghettoareaswereplaceswherethepoliceweregivenafreerhand.Peoplelivingintheseareashadtofearnotonlyviolencefromcrime,butalsoviolencefromtheirwould-beprotectors.ThisadversarialculturebetweentheBlackcitizenryandthelocalpolicedepartmentsthenbecameexacerbatedinthewakeofthecivilrightsmovement,justasanincreasingnumberofofficerscametobearSpanishnames.

"McDuffie,"asthecasewasknownlocally,representedtheculminationofthishostiletrend.InMarch1980,athirty-three-year-oldBlackinsuranceagentnamedArthurMcDuffiediedinMiami'sJacksonMemorialHospitalfrominjuriessustainedafterbeingchasedbycityandcountypoliceunits.Thecauseofthechasewasarollingstopataredlightplusanobscenegesturetowardanearbyofficer.PoliceclaimedthatMcDuffiehaddiedastheresultofaccidentalinjuriesduringthechase.BlackMiamiknewbetter.OnMarch31,fourwhiteDadeCountyPublicSafetyDepartmentofficerswerechargedwithplayingsomeroleinthebeatingofMcDuffieandsubsequentattemptstocoverupthecauseofhisdeath.Sensingthemoodoftensioninthecity,alocaljudgegrantedachangeofvenuetoTampa.Asheputit,thecasewas"atimebomb."

MarielhadnotyetstartedatthetimeoftheMarchindictment,butbymid-May,whenthejury'sverdictcamein,somefiftythousandnew

refugeeswerecampedintheOrangeBowlandinpubliclandunder1-95,thecity'smainnorth-souththoroughfare.Theirvisibilitywascompoundedbydireforebodingsinthepressabouttheirpresence.Justaweekbefore,theMiamiHeraldhadpublisheditssurveyofsignificantnegativereactionstothenewrefugeesandthe"potentiallydangerousdisagreements"amongnativewhites,Blacks,andLatins.12Theanti-Marielcampaignonlyaddedtotherisingtensioninthecity.Hence,asCubanexilesandnativewhitesfocusedtheirattentiononthecomingsandgoingsintheStraitsofFlorida,BlackMiamiremainedfixedonthatTampa

courtroom.ForMiaminativewhites,thecitywasundersiegefromtheoutside;asBlackssawthings,theircityhadlongbeenundersiegebytheforcesofthelocalestablishment.

Theverdict,reachedinlessthanthreehoursofdeliberationbyanall-whitejury,wasbroadcastbytheMiamimediaonaclearSaturdayafternoon.Allfourwhiteofficerswereacquittedofallcharges.IttooktheBlackcommunityaboutasmuchtimetoreacttothisverdictasithadtakenthewhitejurytoarriveatit.ThenewswasknowninMiamiat2:42P.M.;lessthanthreehourslaterthefirstrocksandbottleswereflyinginLibertyCity.

The1980Miamiriotwasdifferentfromsimilarurbanuprisingsinthreeways:first,itwasisolatedratherthanpartofanationaltrend;second,itwasunusuallyviolent;third,ittookplacewithatleastthetacitapprovalofmanyBlackleaders,whounderothercircumstancescouldhavebeentrustedtoopposeit.

IthadbeentwelveyearssincetheothergreatBlackMiamiuprising.Butunlikethe1968riot,whichwastimedtocoincidewiththeNationalDemocraticConventioninMiamiBeach,the1980civildisorderswerenotmatchedbysimilareventsinothercities.BlackMiamirosealone.Itsactionstoodasyetanothermanifestationofthesingularityofthecity,andasareflectionoftheuncommonlyharshconditionsenduredbyitsnonwhitecitizenry.

Theriotwasalsodifferentinitsviciousness.PorterandDunnestimatethattotalpropertylossreachedabout$80million.Allkindsofbusinesseswerehit,includingmanufacturingplantswherenoconsumergoodsweretobefound.White-,Cuban-,andBlack-ownedbusinessesweretorchedindiscriminately.Bytheendofthedisorders,commerciallifeinmanypartsofLibertyCityhadvirtually,ceasedtoexist.

13Nevertheless,thepent-upangerreflectedintherioters'drivenotjusttostealbuttodestroywasnothingincomparisonwiththewaytheywentafterrandomwhites,AngloandLatinalike.Therewasaneye-for-an-eyemoodwhichledhithertopowerlessBlackstoattackanyunfortunaterepresentativesoftheirperceivedoppressorswhohappenedby.Drivingdownthewrongstreetduringthosedayscouldleadtoanightmarishexperience,ifnotdeath.Whitesweredousedwithgasolineandsetafireintheirears;othersweredraggedoutandbeatenrepeatedly,withchunksofconcreteandbricks,runoverbyears,stabbedwithscrewdrivers,andshot.Onewasleftdyinginthestreet,ared

roseinhismouth.Eightwhitesdiedinsuchterribleways,mostonthefirstdayoftheriot.

SimilaruprisingsinothercitieshavebroughtBlackleadersintothestreetstocalmdownthemasses,andolderBlackcitizenshavegenerallytriedtoreininghettoyouth.ThereweresuchattemptsinLibertyCityandotherBlackareasofMiami,buttheywerecountermandedbytheoppositetrend.ApeacefulrallycalledbythelocalbranchoftheNAACPthedaytheverdictwasannouncedturnedintoafull-scaleriotinvolvingbothghettoteenagersandBlackprofessionals.Duringtheincident,theseatofDadeCounty'sjusticesystem,thecourthouseitself,wasbrokenintoandtorched.Adultsonghettostreetcornerswereobservedeggingonyouthsastheystoppedandattackedcarsdrivenbywhites.15''Duringtheriot,wehiteverybody,Anglo,Cuban,itdidn'tmatter,"aBlackcommunityleadertoldusin1985thepronoun"we"speakingvolumes;"itwastheonlywayleftforthiscommunitytoshowitsire."16ThelocalheadoftheUrbanLeaguerefusedtogointothestreetsandcalmthecrowds,notingthat"anyonewhohadanyunderstandingsoftheramificationsofdehumanizationandsocialisolationcouldunderstandtheriots....Whitesthoughtitwasirresponsible...becausetheyassumedthatblackleadersweretheretoprotectthemandnottoleadblackfolks."17

The1980riotexpressedinactionswhatwordshadnotbeenableto.AmericanBlackshavealwaysdefinedtheirrealityinreactiontothesubordinationanddiscriminationlaidonthembywhites;indeed,thisisthecoreofanationwideBlackdiscourse.IntheirstudyofAmericanraceriots,forexample,StanleyLiebersonandArnoldSilvermannotedthatcitieswhereriotsoccurredasarulehad:(1)too

fewBlackpoliceofficersrelativetotheBlackpopulation;(2)toofewBlackentrepreneursandstoreowners;and(3)anelectoralsystemthatledtotoofewBlackrepresentativesinlocalgovernment.18Miamifulfilledallthreeconditionsamply,butinadditionthenativeminorityconfrontedtherealityofachangedcity,whereanewimmigrantgroupwaselbowingthemaside."McDuffie"was,withoutdoubt,thetriggerfortheriots,buttheresentmentofbeingalwaysleftout,ofremaininginvisibleandforgottenasothergroupsmarchedforward,wasthebackgroundagainstwhichtheextremelyviolentactionsofMaytookplace.

MarielandtheBlackriothadthisincommon:theygalvanized

thetwoethniccommunitiesandprovidedthebasisforavigorouseffortatreinterpretion.ThestigmaofMarielcompelledtheCubanstoinventa"newMiami"inwhichtheirownrolewasbothcentralandpositive.Similarly,thedeathsanddeliberatedestructionduringtheMayuprisingforcedBlackleaderstorethinkthecityintermsnotboundedbythestandardurban-minorityframe.Themilitantdouble-subordinationperspectivethattookshapeduringthenextdecadewasbornoutoftheseevents.

TheBoatPeople

MynameisJeanandIcametotheUnitedStatesin1978.Well,whathappenedtomewasthataMacoute20cametorentabicyclefrommeforadollar.WhenIaskedforitback,hetoldme,"Don'tyouknowthatIboughtthisbicyclefromyouforadollar?"Iheldthebicycleandtookitawayfromhim.Rightawayhehitmewithaclub.AsIwastryingtogetaway,fourmorecameandstartedbeatingonme.Iranandhidinthewoods.

Acousincametotellmethattheyhadtakenoneofmybrothers.Whenhecouldn'ttellthemwhereIwastheytookhimtoaparkinfrontofeverybodyandkilledhim.Ispenttwoorthreemonthshiding,andthenIwenttotheNorthwesttofindaboat.Thatwasn'thard,butIhadtogetthe$1,500forthepassage.Isoldoneofmysmallplots.Anyway,Ithoughtthat,onceinMiami,Icouldearnenoughtobuyitbackandprobablymore.Otherfamiliesinthetownreceivedasmuchas$200amonthfromrelativesinMiami....That'smorethanmostcouldearninthreeyears.21

BetweenPort-de-PaixandCap-HaïtienonthenorthcoastoftheRepublicofHaiti,therewereatthestartofthe1980ssomesixtyboatscapableofcarryingpeopleonalongseavoyage.Chargingtwoorthreetimesthecommercialairfareandpackingdozensofpeopleineverytrip,thecaptainsofthoseboatscreatedoneofthemostlucrative

businessesinthecountry.ThedestinationwasMiami.

Peoplesoldeverythingtheyhad,includinglandthathadbeenintheirfamilysincetheHaitianRevolutionin1804,tobuypassageaboardthoseboats.Theirdesperationwasunderstandable.InMay1980,themilitarycommanderofHaiti'sNorthwestProvincecalledtogetherallthearea'spastorstoinformthemthatthegovernmentwantedtostoptheexodus.Heaskedthereligiouscommunityfor

itsassistance.Infact,theflowdidstopforaboutaweek.Butafterthebriefembargo,thefirstboattoleavedepartedfromdirectlybelowthemilitarycommander'sheadquarters.Allalong,hisintenthadbeennottocontroloutmigrationbuttoobtainamonopolyonkickbacks.

Totrytoleavethepoorestcountrywithoneofthemostcorruptregimesinthehemisphereisarationalcourseofaction.Indeed,forseveraldecadesHaitiansofallclasseshadbeenstreamingout.Duringthe1960sand1970stheirmaindestinationwasNewYorkCity.Aswithotherimmigrants,NewYorksimplyabsorbedthenewcomers.Middle-classprofessionalsescapingtheDuvaliers'oppressionwerefollowedbyartisansandworkers,whosimplyoverstayedtheirtemporaryvisas.Nomatter:NewYorktookthemin,addingthemtoitsglobalmix.

Miami,however,wasdifferent.Between1977and1981,approximatelysixtythousandHaitiansarrivedbyboatinSouthFlorida.Thenumberwasonlyaboutone-fifththesizeofNewYork'sHaitianpopulation,buttheimpactthatthese"boatpeople"hadinthereceivingcitywasimmeasurablygreater.23

Morethannumbers,itwasthemanneroftheirarrivalthatgarneredattention,bothlocallyandnationwide.PhotographsofshirtlessblackrefugeeshuddledaboardbarelyseaworthycraftevokedimagesburieddeepintheAmericancollectivemind.Liketheslaveshipsofyore,theseboatsalsobroughtacargoofblacklaborers,exceptthatthistimetheycameontheirowninitiative,andthistimenobodywantedthem.StillmorepatheticwerethoseblackbodieswashingashoreFlorida'spristinebeacheswhentheircraftdidnotmakeit.Fornativewhites,thisnewimmigrantwavereinforcedthestate-of-siegementalitycreatedbyMariel.

In1980,theThirdWorldlaidclaimtoMiami.TheHaitianboatflowpeakedrightatthetimeoftheCubanflotilla,thetwobecomingoneinthepublicmind.Yetdespitethisconflation,thetworefugeestreamswereverydifferent.24Marielhadbeen,afterall,sponsoredfromMiami,thecreationofnostalgicCuban-Americans.ThemajorityofMarielentrantshadrelativesawaitingthemandastrongcommunitythatunderstoodtheirlanguageandculture.Cubans,moreover,hadbeenafamiliarpresenceinSouthFloridafortwodecades.

HaitianswerenotsponsoredbyMiami,nordidtheyhaveany

solidethnicnetworksonwhichtorely.FewpeopleinSouthFloridaunderstoodeitherHaitianCreoleortheabysmalconditionsthatthewould-berefugeeswereleavingbehind.Notsurprisingly,thereactionofnativewhiteswastorejectthenewarrivalsandtotrytostoptheirentry.UnlikeMariel,thiseffortmetwithgreatersuccess.

InresponsetorepresentationsmadebyMiamileadersandlocalstaffoftheINS,federalofficialsinWashingtoninitiateda"HaitianProgram"in1979.ThecoreoftheprograminvolvedacceleratingdeportationproceedingsandmakingaconcertedefforttodiscourageHaitianboatpeoplefromapplyingforpoliticalasylum.Thosewhodidapplydidnothavemuchluck:"Fiveminuteanswerstosuchquestionsas'WhatdoyouthinkwouldhappentoyouifyoureturntoHaiti?'werereducedtoasinglesentenceintranslation.'WhydidyoucometotheUnitedStates?'wasvirtuallyalwaysansweredontheofficialformas'Icameheretofindwork,'asifeachoftheHaitianshadusedpreciselythesamewords."

25TheINSwouldeitherfailtoadviseHaitiansoftheirrighttoalawyerorelsetellthemthatalawyerwouldonlygetthemintotrouble.Afavoritetacticwastoschedulemultiplehearingssimultaneously.Attorneysforthewould-berefugeeswereexpectedtoarguefifteendifferentcasesinfivedifferentlocationsatthesametime.

Theculminationofthiscampaigncamenotingovernmentoffices,butonthehighseas.SoonaftertheinstallationoftheReaganadministration,CoastGuardcutterswereorderedtopatrolHaitianwatersaroundtheclocksothatMiami-boundboatscouldbeinterceptedatseabeforereachingU.S.jurisdiction.26Facedwithsuchdeterminedeffortstopreventtheirarrival,itisremarkablethatsomanyHaitiansmanagedtoslipthroughandremaininSouthFlorida.

Ironically,thereasonthe"HaitianProgram"didnotthoroughlysucceedwasitsvictims'owndefenselessness.Theirplightelicitedpubliccompassionandtheconcernofchurchesandphilanthropicorganizations.TheNationalCouncilofChurchessponsoredtheHaitianRefugeeCenter(HRC),ledbyanactivistHaitianpriestnamed,mostappropriately,GerardJean-Juste.Thethreeorfouryoungattorneyswhoworkedprobonoatthecenter,withsupportfromnationallawfirms,probablydidasmuchtosustainthefledglingHaitiancommunityastherefugeesthemselves.Theselawyers

ineffectinterposedtheAmericanlegalsystembetweenthepowerlessnewcomersandthegovernment'seffortstoberidofthem.TheireffortsculminatedinaclassactionsuitheardinMiami'sFederalDistrictCourtthesameweekthatthefirstboatsfromMarielcamestreamingin.

Cuban-AmericansalsoprovidedunwittingsupportfortheHaitianrefugeesthroughtheireffortstobringtheirownkinfromMariel.Thecoincidenceofthetwoflowsonlyunderscoredtheglaringdisparitiesinthereceptionsaccordedtoeachgroup.NogovernmentofficialeverattemptedtosummarilydeportaMarielrefugee;U.S.CoastGuardcutterstowedandescortedboatscarryingCubanstoKeyWest,notbacktoCuba.NomatterhowdisparagedMarielentrantswerebythemedia,theywerestillCubanandthuseffectivelyinsulatedfromthefateawaitingtheboatsfromCap-HaïtienandPort-de-Paix.

TheU.S.government'sjustificationforthedifferentialtreatmenthingedonthedistinctionbetween"political"refugeesand"economic"migrants.Theargumentdidnotwash.ClearlymanyMarielrefugeeshadleftinsearchofbetteropportunities,whilemanyHaitianshadexperiencedgenuinepersecution.TheMiamiDistrictCourtrepeatedlyheardtestimonylikethatofMr.SoliveceRomet:

HeldbytheTontonMacoutesforfourdaysduringwhichhewasforcedtostandina2by3footcell.Beatenrepeatedlyasaconsequenceofwhichheshoweddeepscarsinhisskullanddevelopedaspeechimpediment.AfterescapingtoFloridainasailboat,hewasdetainedbytheImmigrationandNaturalizationService.INSwastryingtodeporthimonthegroundsthathewasaneconomicimmigrant.28

Infact,thedifferencebetweentheCubansandHaitiansstreamingintoMiamihadlesstodowithindividualmotivationsthanwiththe

countrytheyleftbehind,thecommunitythatreceivedthem,andtheircolor.ThislastrealizationmobilizedtheBlackpoliticalestablishmentindefenseoftheHaitians."Ifwecantakeintherefugeesofothercountries,wecantakeintherefugeesofHaiti,"declaredAndrewYounginaMarchvisittoMiami.29OnApril19,1980,JesseJacksonledamarchofonethousandpeopletoahotelinMiamiwherethegovernmentwasholdingsixtyHaitianwomenandchildrenwhohadarrivedbyboattheprecedingweek.In

Washington,theCongressionalBlackCaucusledthepoliticalbattle.U.S.representativesShirleyChisholm,WalterFauntroy,andMickeyLelandallarguedontheHaitians'behalfinpersonalmeetingswiththeattorneygeneral,thesecretaryofstate,andthepresidenthimself.Shortlythereafter,SenatorEdwardKennedyattackedU.S.policyasraciallybiasedanddemandedtoknowifHaitianswouldbetreatedthesameasCubans.

Facedwiththiscombinedoffensive,thegovernmentrelented.ProcessingofthetwoflowswasassignedtoanewadministrativeentitytheCuban-HaitianTaskForce,housedintheStateDepartment.Thecreationofthistaskforceandtheappointmentofanew"Cuban-Haitianrefugeecoordinator"bytheCarteradministrationfurtherstigmatizedtheMarielarrivals,butprovedinvaluabletoHaitiansseekingstaysfromdeportation.Fromthenon,anygovernmentactiontowardthe"entrants"(asbothMarielCubansandHaitianswerenowofficiallylabeled)wouldhavetobeonanequalbasis.31

Haitiansgraduallywonenoughclassactionsuits,andsufficientnumbersgainedpermanentortemporaryreprievefromdeportation,toconsolidateasmallethniccommunity.TheFordFoundationandotherphilanthropicorganizationssteppedinwithsupportfortheHaitianRefugeeCenterandthenewlyfoundedHaitianTaskForce,createdtostimulatesmallbusinessesinthemodelofnearbyLittleHavana.Middle-classHaitianscamefromNewYorktojointheentrantsreleasedfromINScustodyandthosewhomanagedtoslipinundetected.TogethertheyforgedanewneighborhoodLittleHaitioccupyingaboutninecensustractsinMiami'snorthwest.Asmallstripofbrightlypaintedshopsemergedinthissection,"gypsy"cabsbegantomaketherounds,andtheslowcadencesofCreolecametobe

heardoverlocalradio.Cityandcountygovernmentseventuallythrewtheirsupportbehindaneworganization,theHaitianAmericanCommunityAgencyofDade(HACAD),establishedtoprovidesocialservicestothenewimmigrantneighborhood.32

HaitiansandMiamians

IfthecreationofLittleHaitiwasavictoryforthenationalBlackpoliticalestablishmentandfortherefugeesthemselves,itwasseen

inaverydifferentlightbythelocalpopulation.EmbattledMiamiAnglos,seekingtopreservewhatremainedoftheirlife-style,vieweditasyetanotherharshblow.Itseemedthattheycouldnotwin,nomatterhowhardtheytried.TheirefforttostopMarielhadfizzledinthefaceoftheCubanexiles'cloutwithconservativeforcesinWashington;attemptstostoptheHaitianboatshadbeensimilarlyshort-circuited,thistimebyliberalactivists.Miami'soldresortwayoflifewasbeingrelentlesslyundercutbytheintrusionofnationalandinternationalforces.Notsurprisingly,therhetoricof"Paradiselost"andthepopularbumperstickerreading"WillthelastAmericanleavingMiamipleasetaketheflag"madetheirappearanceaboutthistime.

TheBlackcommunityalsohadreasontolookupontheHaitianswithambivalence.True,prominentBlackfigureshaddefendedthenewcomersagainstgovernmentdeportation,buttheyhaddonesointheinterestofracialequalitybecausetheywereblack,notbecausetheywereimmigrants.Oncesettled,however,thenewcomersproceededtocompetedirectlywithBlackAmericansformanuallaborjobs,acceptingalmostanywagesandworkconditions.ForLibertyCity,Overtown,andotherBlackghettoareasreelingundertheimpactofdoublemarginalization,theappearanceonthelaborsceneofyetanothercompetitorwasnotwelcome.BlackleadersneverpubliclyattackedtheHaitians,butconfrontationbetweenthetwogroupsmountednevertheless.TheCreole-speakingnewcomersweretoodocile,toosubservienttowhiteemployers,and,aboveall,tooforeigntotherealitiesofBlackAmerica.

DiscriminationonthepartofnativeBlacksdidnotgounreciprocated;Haitiansdidnotseethecommoncircumstanceofraceassufficient

reasontojoinasubjugatedminority.Insteadtheysettheirsightshigher,seekingtobecomeanentrepreneurialgroup.Theself-consciousattempttopatternLittleHaitiafterthebusinesscommunityofLittleHavanawaspartofthiseffort.TheHaitianquarterabutsLibertyCityontheeast,butcontactsbetweenthefledglingimmigrantneighborhoodandtheBlackghettowerescarceanduneasy.AHaitian-Americancommunityleaderdescribedthesituationintheearlyeightiesthus:"Haitiansrarelycross7thAvenueorI-95[thelocallyagreed-uponlimitsofLibertyCity].Theycallthearea'BlackPower'anddonotwanttolive

closetoit.HaitianswillnotmeltintothelargerBlackcommunity.Thereisjusttoomuchanimositybetweenbothgroupsbothinschoolandatwork.Thecompetitionforjobsistremendous."

Thedifficultcircumstancesofarrivalandtheindifference,ifnothostility,ofthelocalpopulationcombinedtomaketheinitialyearsintheUnitedStatesatryingexperiencefortheboatpeople.In1983,aspartofourstudyofimmigrantsinSouthFlorida,weinterviewedfivehundredHaitianentrantswhohadsettledinMiami'sLittleHaitiand,insmallernumbers,inFortLauderdaleandthenearbytownofBelleGlade.35Theresultsofthissurveyofferaprofileofthebackgroundoftheseimmigrantsandtheirsituationduringthefirstseveralyearsofsettlement(table4).Predictably,most1980-81Haitianarrivalswereyoung,aprerequisiteifonewastowithstandthegruelingseajourney.AbouthalfcamebyboatdirectlytoSouthFlorida,butathirdmadeastopineitherCubaortheBahamas.Mostoftheseyoungimmigrantstraveledalone.

ThestoryoftheirreceptionintheUnitedStatesistoldinthebodyofthetable.ThetypicalHaitianhadfewornorelativesawaitingherorhiminthiscountry,theaveragebeing1.5.(Bycontrast,Marielrefugeesinterviewedinthesameyearhadthreetimesasmanyrelativesalreadylivinghere.)One-thirdofallHaitiansand42percentofthemaleswereinternedinINSdetentioncampsuponarrival.Whenfinallyreleased,theyandotherswenttoliveinareaswheretheirimmediateneighborswereeitherAmericanBlacksorotherHaitians.Theconcentrationofthenewcomersinthepoorestghettoareasisnotsurprising,giventheunwelcomeofficialreceptionandtheirownmodestbackgrounds.AlthoughHaitianentrantsweresomewhatbettereducated,morehighlyskilled,andmoreurbanthantheircompatriots

stillinHaiti,theyneverthelesscomparedpoorlywithAmericanBlacksorMarielCubans.Onaverage,nonehadadvancedbeyondthefifthorsixthgrade,andaboutfour-fifthsspokelittleornoEnglish.InHaiti,aboutathirdhadbeenjobless(unemployedornotlookingforwork)beforetheydecidedtoleave.

By1983,theHaitians'tribulationshadnotyetbeguntopayoff.True,overhalfwereenrolledinEnglishandothercoursesinordertoimprovetheirlabormarketchances,butfullytwo-thirds(and80percentofthewomen)werejobless.Bywayofcomparison,that

Table4.CharacteristicsofHaitianEntrantsinSouthFlorida,1983

Males(N=205)

Females(N=294)

WholeGroup(N=499)

Medianage 30 29 29Percentsingle 53.6 48.5 49.8PercenttravelingalonetoU.S. 81.3 70.7 74.9Meansoftravel(percentage)Airplane 15.7 12.7 14.0Boat,directtoU.S. 46.1 52.8 50.3Boat,stopinCuba 21.2 16.2 18.2Boat,stopinBahamas 17.0 18.3 17.6Averagenumberofrelativespresentatarrival

1.6 1.5 1.5

PercentjailedbYINSuponarrival 41.8 33.1 34.6Ethnicityofneighbors(percentage)Haitian 61.2 67.2 64.8AmericanBlack 20.5 20.6 20.6Anglo/Latin/other 18.3 12.2 14.6Averageyearsofeducation 5.9 3.7 4.6PercentfluentinEnglish 30.1 11.9 19.2PercentpursuingEnglishorothercoursesintheU.S.

54.6 56.6 55.8

PercentjoblessInHaiti 28.2 33.0 31.0InU.S. 35.7 81.4 63.0Percentprofessionals/managersInHaiti 9.0 2.5 5.2InU.S. 1.0 0.0 0.4Sourceofhelpinsecuringfirstjob(percentage)Kinandfriends 75.2 66.4 70.7Self 23.0 27.9 25.5

Governmentagencies/other 1.8 5.7 3.8Currentindividualincome(dollarspermonth)

600 440 563

Currenthouseholdincome(dollarspermonth)

712 508 600

Percentinpovertya 46 71 59Percentreceivingwelfareaidb 12.7 40.3 29.2Source:AlexStepickandAlejandroPortes,"FlightintoDespair:AProfileofRecentHaitianRefugeesinSouthFlorida."InternationalMigrationReview20(1985):329-50.aPercentofhouseholdsbelowthefederalpovertylevelforahouseholdofthreein1982($7,963).bIncludescash,food,andallotherformsofaid,exceptmedical,fromprivateorpublicagencies.

figureisabouttwicethejoblessrateamongMarielrefugeesand,formales,threetimesthejoblessratereportedbytheCensusforallpre-1980Haitianresidentsnationwide.

36Asaresult,theaveragehouseholdincomeforHaitianentrantswaslessthanhalfthatreportedforthepre-1980U.S.Haitianpopulation;indeed,closeto60percentofthenewhouseholdswerebelowthepovertyline.Despitetheirdiresituation,only29percentoftheimmigrantsreceivedanyformofpublicorprivateassistanceduringtheirinitialyearsintheUnitedStatesaclearindicatorofthesocialenvironmenttheyconfrontedhere.Ofthoseluckyenoughtohavefoundjobs,theoverwhelmingmajorityhaddonesowiththeaidofkinandfriendsorbythemselves;fewerthan4percenthadbeenhelpedbyanypublicorprivateagency.

ThepariahstatusofHaitianboatpeoplewasaconsequenceofboththeirraceandthehighlyvisiblemanneroftheirarrival,whichcontrastedwiththelowprofilethattheirco-nationalshadbeenkeepinginNewYorkforyears.Thetwofactorscombinedtoinsureanegativereceptionbyboththefederalgovernmentandthelocalpopulation.Forthelatter,thepatheticimageofthearrivingHaitianboatssuggestedthatnotonlyCuba,buttheentireCaribbean,wasabouttoemptyitselfinMiami.TheassociationinthepublicmindofincomingCubansandHaitiansbecameoneofthefewluckythingsgoingforthelatter.Yetdespitethiscoincidenceandthehelpofchurchesandprivatecharities,thesituationthreeyearsafterarrivalwasanythingbutenviable.

Haitianswerenotsomuchatthebottomofthelabormarketasoutsideit;theywereneglectedbypublicwelfareagenciesandlookeddownonbyallothersegmentsofthelocalcommunity,includingnativeBlacks.Reflectingthissituation,53percentofour1983Haitian

entrantrespondentsreportedthattheywerediscriminatedagainstbyBlackAmericans;65percentindicatedthatAnglo-Americansconsideredtheminferior;and86percenthadhadfewornocontactswithasinglenativewhite.

TheCityatMid-Year

Nowpicturethesituationbythelatesummerof1980:MarielhadaddedsomeninetythousandtoDadeCounty'sCubanpopulation.Theexilecommunityhadgottenawaywiththeboatlift,butFidel

Castrohadsucceededinstigmatizingtherescueeffort.AlthoughmostMarielrefugeeshadintegratedthemselvesquietlyintothecommunity,avisibleminoritywascausingenoughtroubletogarnernationalattention.SeriouslydisturbedmentalpatientsroamedthestreetsofLittleHavana,overwhelmingthelocalmentalhealthsystem;

37formerconvictssurvivedbypreyingonJewishretireesinSouthMiamiBeach;Marieldruggangspepperedeachotherwithgunfireinanyneighborhoodshoppingcenter.

Meanwhile,muchoftheBlacknorthwestsectionofMiamilayinshamblesfollowingthelatestassaultbyitsowncitizens,arebellionagainstthecitythatimmigrantnewcomerswereovercomingallobstaclestoreach.TheMayriothadmadeabundantlyclearjusthowtallthebarrierswereseparatingnativewhites,Latins,andBlacks.NexttothewastedBlackghetto,immigrantsofthesamecolorbutadifferentmind-sethadstartedbuildingacommunityoftheirown.Forold-timeMiamians,thisactivitywasaharbingerofthingstocome.FrenchCreolewasnowaddedtoSpanishinwhatwasquicklybecomingapolyglotboardinghouse.

MonolingualAnglos,meanwhile,respondedbyvotingsolidlyfortheprimacyofEnglish.Cubanspaidnoattention.HaitiansenrolledinEnglishclasses,buttheylearnedSpanishonthejobtoo.Bynow,MiamiHeraldcolumnistshadrunoutofexpressionstodescribethenewevents,eachoneablowtothecityastheyhadknownit.Theircriesofanguishalsowentunheeded.Miamiwasaverydifferentplaceeightmonthsintotheyearbecausetheremarkablehappeningsbeforehandhadfundamentallyaltereditsethnicmakeupand,intheprocess,subvertedanentiresocialorder.

Thecity,hadneverbeenaplaceconducivetoself-reflection.Forits

once-dominantAnglomajority,itwasessentiallyavacationspotturnedpermanentresidence.Whatwastheretocontemplateinacitybarelyeightyyearsofage?Transplantedwhitespaidmoreattentiontotheweather,especiallyincontrasttothefrigidnorththattheyhadleftbehindthantopoliticalrevolutionsintheCaribbean.MiamiBlackswerenotmuchforintrospectiveanalysiseither.Thecity'sracerelationsweresolidlycastinaDeepSouthmold,onethatwasbothfamiliarandoppressive.ThelocalBlacks'situationwasnottoodifferentfromthatoftheirbrethreninGeorgiaorAlabama,anditscauseshadalreadybeenwrittenabout

atgreatlength.AsforthegrowingLatinpopulation,Cubansreservedtheircapacityforself-reflectiontopondereventsintheislandandtheirprospectsforreturn.Thecitywheretheyresided''temporarily"wastakenlargelyforgranted.

Nineteeneightychangedallthat,forcingeachgrouptolookinwardanddeviseanoveldefinitionofthemselvesandtheircity.AttackedbyAnglosanddenouncedbyBlacks,CubansreactedtothethreatofapariahstatuswithanoveldiscoursethatplacedtheirroleinandtheircontributiontoMiamiinastronglypositivelight.Thisreactiveframedidnotstopatself-defense;itwentallthewaytolayingclaimtothecity.Andtheconsiderableresourcesoftheexilecommunitymadethisaimaseriouschallenge.

Blacksdidnotgothatroute;rather,pressuredfromallsides,theyexpressedtheirsentimentsinthedesperateviolenceofMay.Theseactionshadtobeexplained,however,andinsodoingBlackleaderspiecedtogetheranoveldiscoursenotheardanywhereelseintheSouth.Inconfrontationwithnativewhites,Cubans,andHaitians,BlackMiamiansfoundtheirvoice.Fromthatpointon,itwastobeheardenergetically,stakingouttheclaimsofthenativeminority.

EvensucharecentimmigrantgroupastheHaitiansfoundthatlifeinMiamimeantmorethanhardworkandsendingmoneyhome.Theprocessofrapidchangethattheythemselveshadhelpedtocreatealsocompelledtheirfledglingcommunitytoreinventitself,astheysoughtalegitimacythatotherswereonlytooquicktodeny.

ForMiamiAnglos,thissuddenethnicconflagrationwastoomuch,andmanyjustflednorth.Thosewhoremainedalsohadtorethinktheircity,nolongerasatouristdestinationbutasaninternationalcrossroads.Itbecamealessrelaxed,butmorecomplexandinterestingplace.Injockeyingwitheachotherandbringingdowntheoldorder,Miami'sethnicgroupsproducedauniqueurbanexperiment.

Althoughtheeventsof1980weretheimmediatedeterminantsofthecurrentprofileofMiami,theythemselveshadmoreprofoundroots.Thesearetobefoundinthehistoryoftheareaandinitslong-neglectedCaribbeannexus.ThosegroupsthatcrossedtheStraitsofFloridainthatyearandthosethatresistedtheirarrivalwereunwittinglyreenactingandbringingfullcircleahistoricalsagabegunfourandahalfcenturiesearlier.

ChapterFourTheEarlyYearsCivicspiritmaybesaidtoexistinacitywherethereiswidespreadparticipationincivicaffairsonthepartofthoseabletobenefitthecommunitybyvoluntarymanagementofitscivicenterprises.

C.WrightMillsandMelvilleJ.Ulmer,"SmallBusinessandCivicWelfare"

SippingadrinkonaterracedownbythemouthoftheMiamiRiver,thevisitormayfancythattheHyattandDupontPlazahotelstherearethefirstcivilizedtenantsofthisarea,itexudessuchanauraofnewness.Yettheimpressionisdeceiving.WhilethecityofMiamiislessthanacenturyold,thesitewheretheriveremptiesintoBiscayneBayhashostedsuccessivevisitorsforoverfourhundredyears.AstrandedBasquesailorgavethebayitsnameintheearlysixteenthcentury.ItwasherethatSpanishmissionaries,complainingbitterlyaboutthemosquitoes,settledin1568.Almostthreehundredyearslater,in1836,AmericansoldierserectedFortDallasonthesamesiteasthatfirstmissionduringtheSeminoleWar.Andsixtyyearsorsolater,Henry,MorrisonFlaglerbuilttheRoyalPalm,thefirstgrandhotelofMiami,wheretheDupontPlazastandstoday.

Throughoutthesefourhundredyears,thesuccessiveoccupantsoftheplaceIndians,Spanishfriars,Americansoldiers,southerncolonists,andblackslavesleftsuchtenuousimprintsthatbytheendofthenineteenthcenturytheareawasthoughttobeaswildandemptyasithadbeeninthesixteenth.ThefirstwhitemendidnotsettleonthereefislandeventuallyknownasMiamiBeachuntil1870,whenanadventurernamedHenryB.Lumconceivedtheideaofputtingthesandtouseasacoconutplantation.Theenterprisefailed,butMr.Lum'scoconuttreesstillgracethebeach.Onthemainland,afew

scatteredplantationssurvivedbyshipping

theirproductstoKeyWest,wheretheyweretransshippedtoplacesnorth.

1Aslateas1890therewasnocityatall,butonlyasmallagriculturalcommunityintheareaknownasCocoanutGrove.

StandingsomethreemilestothesouthofthefirstSpanishmission,anearlyYankeepioneerrecordedhisimpressionsoftheplace:"Fancyyourselfonabroadpiazzafacingsoutheast.Thewind,almostconstantlyfromthatdirection,bringswithittherefreshingsmellofsaltwater,whichisasclearasthatoftheMediterranean,beddedasitiswithapurewhitesandandcoralrock."2Yetsuchimpressionsofunspoilednaturalbeauty,concealedaturbulentpast,fortheareahadbeencrisscrossedandfoughtoverbyIndiansandEuropeansforoverthreehundredyears.Withinviewofourcharmedobserver,notthreemilesaway,wasthelighthouseofCapeFlorida,sackedandburnedbyadesperateSeminolepartysomesixtyyearsearlier.Inretribution,LieutenantColonelHarveyoftheU.S.ArmyhuntedandhangedtheSeminolechiefandforcedtheotherstoscatterintotheEverglades.TheemptinessthatwasSouthFlorida,readyforthewhitecolonist'shand,wasmoldedbyahistoryofstruggle.3

ThecityofMiamiwasfoundednotbyaEuropeanempire,anarmy,oragroupofplanters,butbyahandfulofbrashmillionairesbentonturningtheMediterraneandreamsofearlyBiscayneBaysettlersintoreality.AnenterprisingClevelandwidow,JuliaTuttle,whoownedlandbythemouthoftheriver,madeuphermindtoturnthewildernessintoanorderlymetropolis.Accordingtolocallore,thehighpointofthisventurecameduringthehardfreezeof1894-95when,withcitrusdyingsouthofOrlando,Mrs.TuttledispatchedabouquetoforangeblossomstorailroadmagnateHenryM.Flagler,provingthatSouthFloridaremainedfrostfree.Whetherthestoryis

trueorapocryphal,thefactisthatMr.Flaglerwasintheareashortlythereafter,withaspurofhisFloridaEastCoastRailwayfollowingfromWestPalmBeach.Thefirsttrainarrivedin1896,andwithitMiamicameintobeing.4"Commodore"RalphMunroe,aCocoanutGroveplanterandyachtsmanthussaidhisnostalgicfarewelltothepast:"TherearemanyadvantagesinthenewlifewhichhasflowedsoirresistiblysincetherailroadcametotheBay,butletnoonethinkthatthisgreatchangedidnotbringdisadvantageas

well.Thecharmofwidespacesandthesimplelifearegoneandtheyareblessingsnottobedespised."

FloridaandCuba

Foralmostfivehundredyears,thehistoryoftheFloridapeninsulahasbeenmarkedbyaseriesofsuddenjoltsthattieditscoursenowtomenandplacesofthesouth,nowtothoseofthenorth.Early-sixteenth-centurynavigationalchartsportrayedFloridaandCubaasasinglelandmass.Althoughtheerrorwassooncorrected,theSpanishCrownlostnotimeinclaimingthenewterritoryasitsown.Forthenextthreecenturies,thedestinyofthepeninsulawastobeintertwinedwiththatoftheislandtothesouth,andespeciallytoitscapital,Havana,fromwhichFloridawasgoverned.

JuanPoncedeLeónhadsailedwithColumbusonhissecondvoyageandwaslatersenttopacifytheislandofPuertoRico.Hesucceededinthistask,butfailedinhiscourtbattleagainstDiegoColumbus,whoclaimedthegovernorshipashisown.Poncewasfifty-threewhen,asadelantadooftheunknownnorthernpeninsula,hesailedthreeshallow-draftshipsfromPuertoRicoinearly1513.Theexpeditionmadelandfallatlatitude29°32'northonEasterSundayorPascuaFlorida,whichgavethelanditsname.Contrarytolocallore,theFountainofEternalYouthdidnotrankhighintheoldsailor'spriorities,forheneverwroteaboutit.Instead,PonceandhismensoughtwhatSpaniardseverywhereinthenewcontinentthirstedfor:goldandnativeempirestosubdue.Nothingofthatsortmetthemalongtheinterminablelowcoast.TheFountainofYouthendured,however,asthefirstofFlorida'smanymyths.6

Sailingsouth,theexpeditionroundedtheislandofSantaMarta,today

KeyBiscayne,andcameintosightofthegreatemeraldbay.TheIndiansbythemouthoftheMiamiRiverwerefriendlyenough;PoncenamedthemChequescha,ashethoughttheycalledthemselves.Theadelantadowentontoexplorethewestcoastofthepeninsula,enduredahurricane,andeventuallyreturnedhome.7Eightyearspassedbeforeheventuredagainintothesedomains.SpurredbytheincredibleachievementsofHernánCortésinMexico,PoncefinallyboardedfivehundredmenintwoshipsandsailedagainforthewestcoastofFlorida.Againneither

goldnoreternalyouthmettheSpaniards.Indeed,thistimetheyweregreetedbyhostileIndiansandahailoffire-hardenedarrows.Mortallywounded,PoncewastakenbacktoCubawherehedied.Heleftlittlebehind,exceptanunshakablemythandthemysteryofaforbiddingland.

ThenextSpanishattempttoclaimthelandwasmadein1528whenPánfilodeNarváez,humiliatedbyamisfiredattempttosubdueCortésinthenameofCuba'sgovernor,triedtoredressthatfailurewithaconquestofhisown.Bannersflying,heagaintookpossessionofFloridainthenameoftheking.Butthelandwasunyielding:itjustswallowedNarváezandhisexpedition,allofwhosefourhundredmenperishedexceptfour.Oneofthesesurvivors,CabezadeVaca,returnedtoSpaintowarnfuturewould-beconquerorsagainstthefutilityoftheenterprise.9

Buthiseffortwasinvain.HernandodeSotohadbeenwithFranciscoPizarroduringtheconquestofPeru,whereheacquiredgreatwealthandareputationforbravery.AppointedgovernorofCubaandadelantadoofFloridabyEmperorCharlesI,DeSotoorganizedandfinancedtheexpeditionfromSpainhimselfinhopesofreplicatingPizarro'sgreatfeat.In1538,afleetoftenshipswithathousandmenand350horsesarrivedinCuba.Afterayear'spreparation,DeSotoappointedhiswifetemporarygovernoroftheislandandsailedtotheGulfCoastofFlorida.ThattearfulfarewellintheHavanaharborwasthelastseenofhim.TheexpeditionhopedtoencounteranadvancedcivilizationliketheAztecsortheIncasthatwouldguideittogreatwealth.Insteaditencounteredprimitivevillagesandaforbiddingswampland.AftermarchingalongtheGulfCoast,DeSotoestablishedhiswinterquartersinthenorthofthepeninsula,nearpresent-day

Tallahassee.FromtheretheSpaniardshackedtheirwayintoGeorgia,venturingasfarnorthasthemountainsofTennessee.Thentheyturnedwest,discoveringtheMississippiRiverandreachingtheArkansas.10

DeSotoalternativelymadetreatieswithlocalchieftainsandfoughtfiercebattleswiththem.Exhaustedbythestrugglesandthemarch,hediedoffeveratthemouthoftheArkansasRiver.ThefewsurvivorsfromthedoomedexpeditionbuiltbrigantinesandsaileddowntheMississippi,arrivinginTampico,Mexico,threeyearsaftertheiroriginaldeparture.11ForthenextquarterofacenturyFloridawasleftalone,theSpanishCrownnowbeing

convincedthatnothingwastobegainedfromsettlingthisbarrenandhostileland.

Butalthoughthepeninsulaitselfhadnothingtooffer,itdidsitontherouteoftheFlotadelaPlata,afleetofshipstakingthesilverandgoldoftheNewWorldtotheking'scoffers.Piratesandhurricanesmadeinnumerablevictimsoftheslowandoverloadedcargoships.ParticularlyfearedwerethemanyFrench,English,andDutchpirateswhobasedthemselvesinthesmallislandsoftheCaribbeanandtheBahamas;andnow,tomakemattersworsefortheSpanish,aFrenchHuguenotexpeditionwasdispatchedtotakepossessionofFloridainthenameoftheirking.TocombattheseevilsKingPhilipIIturnedtohisbestcaptain,DonPedroMenéndezdeAvilés,whomheappointedthethirdadelantadoofFlorida.

12DonPedropromptlymountedafive-galleonexpeditiontothepeninsula'seastcoastinordertodestroytheFrenchsettlementofFortCaroline,atthemouthoftheSt.JohnsRiver.OnAugust28,1565,SaintAugustine'sDay,heenteredthedeep,easilydefendedbaythatwastoharborSpain'sfirstsettlementinFlorida.TheinletatthesoutherntipofthebaybecameknownasMatanzas(lit.,Slaughters),anamewellearnedduringthefollowingdays.13

Afterseveralindecisiveencounters,theSpaniardssucceededincapturingFortCaroline,andindefeatingtheHuguenotfleetthatcametoitsrescue."AreyouCatholicorLutheran?"eachprisonerwasasked.UpondeclaringtheirProtestantfaith,thecaptivesweretakeningroupsoftenbehindasandduneandputtotheknife.SeventyFrenchmenwerethusexecutedatMatanzas,includingtheircommander,JeanRibault.WiththeHuguenotperiloutoftheway,Menéndezconcentratedonconsolidatinghisholdonthisslipperyland.Hetraveledupanddownthecoastestablishingfortsandsigning

peacetreatieswithlocalchieftains,suchasthepowerfulCarlos,headoftheCalusas.Butwherevertheadelantadowasnotpresent,thingsrevertedtotheiroriginalstate.Soldiersmutiniedandlefttheirgarrisons;tribescapturedshipwreckedsailorsandburnedtheminhonoroftheirgods.Thewildlandresistedineverypossiblewaytheholdoftheempire.14

Andsoitwouldcontinuefor250years.Everyattemptatcolonizingtheinteriorofthepeninsulawithfortsandmissionswaseventuallyrepelled,firstbytheIndiansandtheelements,andlateronbymaraudersfromtherivalcoloniestothenorth.OnlyinSt.

AugustinedidSpanishFloridamaintainanenduringexistence,andthisthanksonlytoitsenviablenaturaldefensesandtoacontinuousstreamofsettlersandsuppliesfromCuba.Capturedandburnedonseveraloccasions,thesettlementwaseachtimerebuilt.FrancisDrakestrodecontemptuouslyintothepunylittlefortbeforeputtingittothetorchin1586,butonhisdepartureastrongeronewaserected.

Finally,thediscoveryofthewhiteshellrock"coquina"andthearrivalofSpanishengineersfromCubamadepossiblethecompletionofthecastleofSanMarcosintheearlyeighteenthcentury.

15Surroundedbyadeepmoat,thehighwallsofSanMarcosprovedunassailable.Severaltimesduringthenextdecades,thepopulationofthetowntookrefugeinSanMarcosaspiratesandEnglishtroopsfromGeorgiaandtheCarolinascamecalling,onlytobebeatenback.Thecastleandthetownwerefinallysurrenderedin1763,notbecauseofmilitarydefeat,butastheoutcomeofthevagariesofEuropeanpolitics.Onthatoccasion,HavanaandFlorida,bothoutpostsofempire,weretradedforeachother.LordAlbemarlehadtakenHavanafromSpainin1762duringtheSevenYears'War(theFrenchandIndianWarinNorthAmerica).Thenextyear,theTreatyofParissealedBritain'scompletevictoryoverbothFranceandSpain.

ForSpain,thelossofHavana,thekeytohercolonialempire,wasirreparable.Inexchangeforthecity,theBourbonkingagreedtosurrenderallofFlorida.Hewascompensatedinturn,byhiscousinandallytheKingofFrance,withthevastbutunsettledterritoryofLouisiana.ASpanishgovernortookoverinNewOrleansatthesametimethatthedejectedtownspeopleofSt.AugustineembarkedforHavana.TheEnglishwerefinallyabletoentertheunconquerablecastle,whichtheyrenamedFortSt.Marks.16

Floridawasnowdividedintotwocolonies,EastandWestFlorida,withcapitalsinSt.AugustineandPensacola.TheEnglishmovedquicklytoconsolidatetheirholdontheregion,establishingplantations,addingincongruouschimneystoopenSpanishcourtyards,andotherwiseanglicizingthelandscape.Thiseffortprovedshort-lived,however.TherevoltofAmericancolonists,eagerlysupportedbyFranceandSpain,deprivedEnglandnotonlyofitsoriginalthirteencolonies,butofitsfourteenthandfifteenthaswell.MarchingfromNewOrleans,GovernorBernardodeGálvez

retookPensacolafortheSpanishCrownin1781.InHavana,societyladiesgaveuptheirjewelsinsupportoftheAmericantroopsduringthatbitterwinter.

BytheTreatyofVersaillesin1783,theAmericancoloniesgainedtheirindependenceandSpainregainedFlorida.BritishroyalistswhohadtakenrefugefromtherebelliousAmericansinSt.Augustinelearnedthattheywouldhavetomoveyetagain.18AlthoughthereturningexilesfromHavanafoundtheirdwellingsstrangelychangedbyEnglishadditions,otherwisethetownwasthesame.FloridaoncemorefounditselfSpanishanddependentontheCaptaincyGeneralofCuba.Thedestiniesoftheislandandthepeninsulawereprovinginextricablyboundtogether.

TheEmptyLand

IftheloyalsubjectsofGeorgeIIIhadbeenforcedintoasecondexilebythereturnoftheSpaniardstoSt.Augustine,othersfoundinFloridaarefugefromoppressioninthenewlyliberatedcolonies.SlavesrunningawayfromtheirmastersinGeorgiaandAlabamacouldgaintheirfreedombysimplydisappearingintothepeninsula'swilderness.Theretheyjoinedapopulationofhalf-HispanicizedIndiantribes,half-breeds,andevenafewdescendantsofwhitesettlers.ThisoddmixthatformedFlorida'snativepopulationatthebeginningofthenineteenthcenturywascalledtheSeminoles.TheworddidnotcorrespondtothenameofanyIndiantribe;rather,itapparentlyevolvedfromtheSpanishwordforrunawayslaves,cimarrones,pronouncednowas"seminolies."19Seminole"Indians"werethusfarmorefamiliarwiththewaysofwhitemenandfarmoreincontactwiththeirculturesthantheimagesofscalpingsavagesdiffusedby

booksandfilmsacenturylater.

AndrewJacksonsawanopportunity.American"property"wasescapingbythedrovesintoFlorida,arepugnantstateofaffairstothemindoftheplanterclass,ofwhichtheTennesseangeneralwasaprominentmember.Life,liberty,andthepursuitofhappinesswerefineforwhitecitizens,buttheydidnotapplytoothers.ThedisorderlystatesouthoftheGeorgiaborderwhereformerslaveswerebeginningtoenjoyjustsuchfreedomsarousedconcernandalarminthesouthernstatesreasonenoughtoannexthepenin-

sula.Floridawas"apistolpointedattheheadofLouisiana,"remarkedPresidentMonroe,thoughthishardlyseemedasignificantthreat.

20RecoveringfromtheNapoleonicinvasionofherownterritory,Spainwasinnopositiontobebelligerent,ortoresistanAmericaninvasionofFlorida.

JacksonenteredFloridaandroamedatwill,despiterepeatedprotestsbytheSpanishministerinWashington.Ononeoccasion,hekidnappedthehaplessSpanishgovernorandstoletheroyalarchives;onanother,hehad250Blacksmassacredwiththejustificationthattheywereafterall"Americanproperty."IntheSuwanneeRiver,hetookprisoneranoldBritishtradersaidtobefriendlywiththeIndiansandhadhimshotfor"conspiringwiththeenemy."21Publicly,PresidentMonroedisclaimedanyresponsibilityforthesedeeds;hisgovernment,however,secretlyencouragedthem.TheundeclaredwarinFloridaputmuchpressureontheSpanishCrowntocedethepeninsula,astheAmericansrepeatedlyrequested.Unabletoresistbyforceofarms,theSpanishgovernmentstalled,hopingthatdiplomaticeffortwouldsaveitFlorida.InternationallawwasfullyonSpain'sside,butJacksonheldtheground.

InFebruary1821,afterthreeyearsofhaggling,thekingfinallyratifiedthetreatyofcession.MosthistoriesreportthatSpainreceived$5millionincompensation.Infact,theU.S.governmentagreedonlytosettleclaimsofAmericancitizensagainstSpainuptothatamount.Spainneversawapenny.AtabrilliantceremonyonJuly15,1821,JacksonandhismenstoodatattentioninthemainplazaofPensacolaastheSpanishflagcamedown,markingtheendofthreecenturiesofdomination.22Somuchsuffering,andonlytoendinthisignominioussurrenderinalittlePanhandletown.Nolongerwouldmen,weapons,andideascomeupfromtheislandofCuba.Nowtheywouldcome

fromthenorth,andquickly,inthewakeofJackson'svictory.

Beforethenewconquerorscouldimposetheirownbrandofcolonialism,though,thelandhadtoberidofitsold-timeoccupants.Theremnantsofcenturies-longIberianrulewererapidlyclearedoutasthefewSpanishsettlersreturnedtoCubaandasBlackrunawayswerecapturedandsoldbackintoslavery.NativeSeminoleswereinformed,innouncertainterms,thattheyhadtovacatetheland.In1830,theU.S.CongresspassedtheRemoval

Act,thepurposeofwhichwasnothinglessthantheforceddisplacementofFlorida'sentirenativepopulationintothebarrenlandswestoftheMississippi.Today,aswevisittheelegantbeachresortsandthemanicuredthemeparksofDisneyWorld,itisdifficulttoimaginethatforallthistocomeabout,weepingIndianmen,women,andchildrenweremarchedatriflepointdowntheTrailofTears.Manymen,BlackandIndianalike,committedsuicideratherthanbesoldbackintoslaveryorremovedfromtheirland.

TheSeminoles,beingpushedeverdeeperintotheEverglades,resisted.TwoarmycompaniesunderMajorFrancisDadewerewipedoutastheymarchedeastfromTampa.ChiefsAlligatorandOsceolamettheremainingtroopsshortlyafterattheWithlacoocheeRiver,inflictingmanycasualties.LikeotherSeminoles,OsceolawasnotafullnativebutthesonofawhitefatherandaCreekIndianmother.InMarjoryStonemanDouglas'swords,"Hefoughtsavagely,yetherefusedtomakewaronwomenandchildrenorpermittorture.HewasunquestionablythegreatestFloridianofhisday."24Unabletodefeathiminbattle,GeneralThomasS.JesuptrickedtheSeminolechiefbysendinghimaflagoftruce.AsOsceolaandhisretinueenteredSt.Augustinefortheparley,theywerepromptlyenchainedandremittedtoCharleston,where,in1838,thechiefdiedofillnessandgrief.Hisheadwasthencutoffandexhibitedforawhileincircusshows.25

Thusthewhitesmovedrelentlesslyforwardwiththeiroccupationofthelongterritory.TheattackonthelighthouseatCapeFloridabythelastofthe"SpanishIndians"intheMiamiRiverwasafinaldesperateactofresistance.By1843,however,itwasallover.The"RedPeril"hadbeenputtoanendandthelandmadesafeforwhitesettlementandcottonplanting.Toachievethisend,theU.S.Armyhad

conductedascorched-earthpolicythatledtoFlorida'sdemographiccollapse.BytheendoftheSeminoleWar,thetotalpopulationhadfallentoanestimatedthirty-fivethousand,andthepeninsulaacquiredthatemptylookthatwastoendurewellintothetwentiethcentury.26

Inthemiddleyearsofthenineteenthcentury,Floridawaslargelyvacant,havingbeenmadesobythelogicofAmerica'simperialistexpansion.Beforetherewerebeachresorts,FortMyers,FortPierce,andFortLauderdaleweremilitary,outpostsof

thatempire;MiamiatthetimewasknownasFortDallas.

27Visitingthepresent-dayMiccosukeereservationtwenty-fivemileswestofMiami,onewonderswhethertheseimpoverisheddescendantsofthefightingtribesareawareoftheirhistoricallinkwiththedescendantsofSpanishcolonistswhonowinhabitthecity.ForitwasunderthetenuousruleofSpainthattheSeminolesemergedasapeopleandprospered,havinglittletofearfromtheindifferentcolonialismoftheirneighborstothesouth.Thesuddenendofthatrulemarkedthenatives'nearextinctionunderafarmorelethalformofempire-making.

ShallowDixie

NowFloridacameundertheinfluenceofitsnorthernneighborsasitwasdiscoveredthatcottoncouldbegrowninthenewlyclearedlands.Demandforthefiber,andexhaustedsoilsonolderplantations,ledtoawaveofmigrationandinvestmentfromGeorgia,Virginia,andtheCarolinas.Anewplanterclassemerged,securingafirmgripontheterritorialgovernmentinPensacolaandlaterinTallahassee.ThenortherncountiesLeon,Jackson,Gadsden,Jefferson-acquiredthatpeculiarOldSouthcolorationasgracefulmansionswithclassicalGreekporticoesroseinthecountrysideandassocietycametorelyonslavesforallmanuallabor.Ownershipofslavesandlandwasthekeytowealthintheterritory,andthosewhohadthemweredeterminedthatthingsstaythatway.In1845,FloridaenteredtheUnionasaslavestate;in1861itseceded,brieflybecominganindependentrepublic.Americandomination,whichkilledoffsomanynativeFloridians,hadlastedjustfiftyyears.28

ThenewlyindependentrepublicthenjoinedandfoughtalongwiththerestoftheOldSouth,andwasdefeatedwithit.ButunlikeinGeorgia

orAlabama,plantationsocietydidnotreturntothepeninsula.ForFlorida,theendoftheCivilWaralsospelledtheendofthatpeculiarorder.BecauseithadbeenmerelyanoutpostoftheSpanishempire,FloridahadescapedthedestinyofaCaribbeansugarcolony.AndbecauseithadremainedinSpanishhandswellintothenineteenthcentury,italsomanagedtoescapethe''curseofcotton."29Despitedominanceinstategovernmentoftheyoungplanterclass,thatcoterieneversucceededinconsolidating

itsholdontheterritoryasawhole.ThesparselysettledlandsleftinthewakeoftheSeminoleWarsencouragedamoredemocraticfrontierstyleoflife.Southandeastofthecotton-growingcounties,whereslaveswerefew,sentimentfortheUnionremainedstrongthroughoutthewar.

UnlikeitsDixieneighbors,then,Floridaescapedtheunenviablefateofaone-cropeconomy,tenancyandsharecropping,anddemagogicruralbosses.Instead,avastsocialvacuumemerged.Lackingadominantplanterclass,statepoliticsbecamefundamentallyatomized.NeitherSpanishnorsouthern,notyetfirmlyunderYankeerule,thestatedevelopedanamorphouspoliticalsystem.Thissystempersistedwellintothetwentiethcentury,whenthepoliticalscientistV.O.Keydescribedthesituationthus:"Floridaisnotonlyunbossed,itisalsounled....FactionallinesintheTennesseefashionsimplydonotexist.Nordoesthereseemtobeanyclear-cutfundamentalcleavagewithinthestatethatrevealsitselfstarklyintimesofpoliticaltensionasinAlabama."31

Centuriesofmarginalcolonizationfollowedbyawarofexterminationandanotherofsecessionhadfailedtoproduceasocialorderworthyofthename.ThetwoconflictssuccessivelyloppedoffthebottomandtopofFloridasocietysothat,bythelastquarterofthenineteenthcentury,thestatehadrevertedtoavacantlandawaitingresettlement.SouthofLakeOkeechobee,inparticular,thelandscapewasmuchasithadbeenatthetimeofPonce'svisitatangleofswampandmangrovewherethesaltwatercrocodilesandalligatorsvastlyoutnumberedthefewhumanresidents.

LikeJuanPoncedeLeón,HenryM.Flaglerwasfifty-threewhenhelandedinSt.Augustinein1883.ClosetowheretheSpaniardhad

plantedhisflag370yearsearlier,claimingtheterritoryforEmperorCharlesI,Flaglererecteda$1.25millionresorthotel.Withafinehistoricalsense,henameditafterPonce.Flaglerhadnodoubtwhothenewconquerorswouldbe.32

AnAmericanRiviera

BythetimeJuliaTuttlesentherbouquetoforangeblossomstwelveyearslater,thefutureofFlorida'snorthernAtlanticcoastwascertain.Flagler'selaboratechainofhotelsnowextendedallthewaydowntoLakeWorthfromthePoncedeLeonandthe

AlcazarinSt.AugustinetotheBreakersinnewlyfashionablePalmBeach.Theywereimpressivestructures,capableofattractingtheNewEnglandandNewYorkgentrywhoarrivedaboardtheirprivaterailroadearsonFlagler'sJacksonville,St.Augustine,andIndianRiverRailway.Thelatenineteenthcenturywasnotthetimeofthecommonman,norwasMr.Flaglerabouttomakeitso.Hisestablishmentswerestrictlyfortherich;aftertheballseasonendedaroundmid-Marchandthemagnatesreturnedhome,theyclosedfortheyear.

YettherewassomedoubtaboutthelandwestofBiscayneBay.Itsfamewasdue,afterall,tothefactthatorangesdidnotfreezethereinwinter.TheweatherplusthefewgrovesaroundCocoanutGroveauguredfortheareaatranquilruralfutureasacitrusshipper.Buttherailroadthatwassupposedtotransportthefruitnorthbroughtinsteadamixedbagofhuckstersandvisionarieswho,innotime,changedforgoodthefortunesoftheplace.Miamiwasliterallybuiltupfromswampandmangrovetobecomeanassortmentofthemeparksfeaturing"sunandsand,bathingbeauties,glamoroushotels,palatialhomes,nightclubs,racetracks,andacertaindashofsin."34

FirstoffthetrainwasMr.Flaglerhimself,whoseRoyalPalmHotel,builtoveraTequestaburialgroundbytheMiamiRiver,continuedthetraditionofextendingawinterwelcometothewell-bornandpowerful.Flagler'sbaronialstyleisperhapsbestcapturedintheveryfoundingofthecityinJuly1896.Miamiwasincorporatedatameetingattendedby368persons,162ofthemBlacklaborersfromFlagler'srailroad.This"blackartillery,"broughttotheassemblybyJohnSewellonFlagler'sorders,votedasitwastoldto,thusinsuringthattheinterestsoftheFloridaEastCoastRailwayhadpriority.Aftertheelection,theBlackswerepromptlysentbackoverthetracksand

forgotten.EvenMrs.Tuttleandherdreamsofaliquor-free,genteelcitywerepushedasideasmoredaringadventurerspouredfromFlagler'straincars.Theygavethecity,fromitsbeginnings,amoreextravagant,unruly,anddemocraticflavorthanthesecondPalmBeachcontemplatedbytheladypioneerandthebaron.35

Oftheseearlyentrepreneurs,nonewasmoreimportanttothenewcity'sfuturethanaQuakerhorticulturistfromNewJerseynamedJohnS.Collins.HecametoMiamiwhentheideaoftropical

fruitproductiontherestillhadcurrency,andimmediatelyboughtthebarrierislandbetweentheAtlanticOceanandBiscayneBaywiththenotionofturningitintoanavocadoplantation.Thelandresistedthiscrop,asithadresistedLum'scoconutstwodecadesearlier.Astheavocadofarmwentbust,oldCollinsyieldedtohischildren'sentreatiestoselltheplaceinlotstotourists.Butinordertogetthefruitoutandthepeoplein,communicationtothemainlandwasnecessary.CollinsstrainedhiscreditinNewJerseyandMiamitobuildawoodenbridgeacrossBiscayneBayonlytoseeconstructionstop,forlackofmoney,halfamileshort.

Sinkingonehundredthousand1912dollarsintoabridgeleadingnowherewasheartbreaking,especiallysincedemandforoceanfrontlotswasontherise.ReliefcameintheformofanIndianahucksterandself-mademillionairebythenameofCarlJ.Fisher,builderoftheIndianapolisSpeedway,inventorofPrest-o-lite,andpromoterofthefirstcross-countryhighway.Withthesameirrepressibleenergy,FishersetouttofinishwhatFlaglerandCollinshadstarted.Hecompletedthebridgeandclearedtheland,actuallymakingmoreofitbythesimpleexpedientofdredgingsandfromtheshallowbay.Ontopofthisnewlandheputgolfcourses,baroque-stylehotels,andgrandmansions.37

AshisvisionofMiamiBeachtookshape,oneofFisher'sfewconcernssharedbymostofhisfellowdeveloperswastopreventtheplacefrombeingturnedintoanotherAtlanticCity,bythenvirtuallyaJewishcolony.Signsspecifying"GentilesOnly"blossomedasFisherandCollinsmovedtokeepmoneyedJewishshopkeepersoutoftheirnewresort.Lotsintheirdevelopmentsweredeededwithprovisosthatread:"Saidproperty,shallnotbesold,leasedorrentedinanyformor

manner,byanytitleeitherlegalorequitable,toanypersonorpersonsotherthanoftheCaucasianrace."38AtthesoutherntipofMiamiBeach,meanwhile,theLummusbrothersdeveloperswithlesscapitalandfewerprejudiceswerenotabouttoletgoodmoneypassthemby.ItwasontheirlandthattheoriginalMiamiJewishcommunitygainedafoothold.

Backonthemainland,SalomonMerrick'scitrusplantationhadalsogonebust,leavingtheformerNewYorkpastorwithalotofidleland.LikethesonsoffarmerCollins,thoseofMerrickquicklysawthelightand,withsomeoutsidebacking,begantoimprovethe

area.TheexclusiveresidentialcityofCoralGablesnetteditsdevelopersaprofitestimatedatmorethan$20millionduringitsfirstfiveyearsalone.

Thetycoons,hucksters,andvisionarieswhoweremininggoldoutofthesandsofMiamihadsomethingincommonmorepeculiarthanasimpleloveofmoney.Northernersall,itmighthaveseemedreasonableforthemtoconceiveofaseasideresortonthemodelofNewportorCapeMay.Yetthisdidnothappenbecause,almosttoaman,theseYankeedeveloperswereobsessedwiththeMediterranean,andinparticularwithSpain.HenryFlaglersetthetonewithhotelsthatreproduced,inminutedetail,thehuesandarabesquesofAndalusianarchitecture.St.Augustinetoourdayisacounterpointbetweenthemajesticfake-baroquestructuresofthePoncedeLeonandtheAlcazarandtheunpretentiousremnantsoftheoriginalsettlement.The"nation'soldestcity"becamefarmoreSpanishundertheYankeetycoonthanithadeverbeenduringthreecenturiesofSpanishdomination.40

Nottobeoutdone,HenryM.Plantspentthreemillion1890dollarsonhisTampaBayHotel,whosethirteenMoorishtowersandminarets,itsshiningcrescentsandpiazzas,madeit,inthemindofitsowner,"thegreatesthotelintheworld."PlantevenbuiltarailroadfromcentralFloridatotransportvisitorstohishotel.41Downsouth,BiscayneBaydrewaswarmofvisitorswhosawinitsmagnificentvistasthebeginningsofanAmericanRiviera.OneofthesewasJamesDeering,ofInternationalHarvesterfortune,whodecidedtobuildhimselfawintervillasouthoftheMiamiRiver.Completedin1916,thismagnificentstructurefeaturesacoralrockpierintheshapeofaVenetiangondola,abroadpiazzaoverlookingthebay,andavast

collectionofobjetsd'artimportedfromEurope.DespiteitsVenetianstyle,thevillawasnamedVizcayaconfirmingDavidRieff'sobservationthatinSouthFlorida,SpainandItalywerealwaysgettingconfused.42

HispanophiliawastakentoanextremebytheyoungerMerricks,whoconceivedCoralGablesonascaleandatanexpensethatbogglesthemind.Itwastobenotmerelyapleasantresidentialarea,butthebestresortintheworld;itwouldboast,amongotherthings,thegrandesthotelandthemostprestigiousuniversityinthecountrytoday'sBiltmoreHotelandtheUniversity,ofMiami.

MetropolitanMiami,indeed,isprobablytheonlycityintheworldwithtwocopiesofSeville'sGiraldaTower.OneistheBiltmore;theother,builtatthebayfront,washomeoftheMiamiNewsuntilitcametohousetheCubanRefugeeCenterandwasrebaptizedFreedomTower.

TheleitmotivoftheMerricks'grandioseprojectwas,astheBiltmorearchitecturesymbolizes,Andalusian.Eventoday,oneentersCoralGablesthroughfakeSpanishfortgatestofaceshadedstreetsnamedGranada,Giralda,Galiano,Oviedo,andPoncedeLeon.UnliketheplaceandstreetnamesofsouthernCalifornia,oftenincomicallyanglicizedSpanish,thoseinsouthernFloridaarealwayscorrect.TheMerrickskepttheirdictionarycloseby.TheirAndalusianthemeparkcamecompletewithMoorishminarets,abaroquefrontispiecefortheCongregationalchurch,"Spanish"mosseverywhere,andacoralrockswimmingplacenamed(perhapsinanswerto"VillaVizcaya")the"Venetian"pool.44

Theleadofthesepioneerswasfollowedbymyriadothersduringtheboomofthetwenties.EveryonewantedaSpanishvillabythewater.PlacescalledMar-a-Lago,Miramar,andBuenRetirohousedtheluckyentouragesoftheFishersandtheFirestones.Aself-appointedarchitectnamedAddisonMiznerdottedtheFloridacoastwithastylethatmixed,inastonishingproportions,everythingMediterraneanthatmoneycouldbuy.45SouthFlorida'sdemandforSpanishgrillwork,Italianterraces,andMoorishtilebecamesogreatthatartisansfromalloverEuropecametoMiamitohelpturnthismixoffadandobsessionintoreality:"By1930...MiamiBeach'soceanfrontwascoveredwithCasasdePlayawhoseredtiledroofsandstuccoedwallslookedasifPoncedeLeonhadreallycolonizedFloridaafterall."46

ForthefirstthreehundredyearsofitshistoryFloridawassettledfromthesouth;forthelasthundred,theprocessshifteddirectiontocomefromthenorth.Evenso,thepeninsulacouldnotshakeoffSpain.HerdistantinfluencecamefirstinthegalleonsofvisionaryconquerorsandsoldiersfromCubaandtheninthebriefcasesanddreamsofYankeeentrepreneurs.Thenotionthathistoryrepeatsitself,thesecondtimebeingaparodyofthefirst,couldfindnobetterevidencethanintheornateminarets,baroquehotels,andSpanish-stylevillasbuiltbytheMerricksandMizners.47Al-

thoughfewresidentsofCoralGablescouldpronouncethenamesoftheirstreetscorrectly,itdidnotmatter:theplacestoodasapeculiarlinktoFlorida'spastandapremonitionofthingstocome.

TheBlacks

Beneaththedreamlandsbuiltbynortherndevelopers,arealcitywastakingshape,anditwassubstantiallyBlack.By1910,fully42percentofMiami'sfivethousand-oddinhabitantswereBlack.Yetfewtouristsormoneyedresidentshadcontactwiththispopulation,exceptinthelatter'scapacityasservantsandmanualworkers;thecityfatherstookgoodcaretokeepthemisolatedinremotequarters.Thelandwithincityboundaries,originallyownedbyJuliaTuttleandMaryBrickell,anotherearlysettler,wasdeededinsuchafashionthatwhitesreceivedallthebayfrontpropertyandthatonbothsidesoftheMiamiRiver.Blackswereconfinedtoanorthwestquarteracrosstherailroadtracks,whichbecameknownas"ColoredTown,"laterOvertown.

TheMiamiBlackpopulationwasuniqueinthatitcontained,inadditiontomigrantsfromGeorgiaandtheCarolinas,asizablenumberofBahamians,whohadbeenbroughttoworkonagriculturalplantationsandsubsequentlyinrailroadandhotelconstruction.ManysettledinCocoanutGrove,givingtheareaadistinct"island"atmospherethatlaststoourday.UnlikeBlacksfromtheDeepSouthaccustomedtoservilestatusandheavydiscrimination,theBahamiansarrivedwithoutastrongsenseofstigma.In1908,JudgeJohnGramblingoftheMiamiMunicipalCourtnotedthat,untiltheyweretaughtalessoninmannersbytheMiamipolice,"ThegreatnumberofNassauNegroes...upontheirarrivalhereconsideredthemselvesthesocialequalofwhitepeople."49

PuttingBahamiansintheirplacewasimportant,butbynomeanswasitthewhiteestablishment'sonlyworryvis-à-vistheBlacks.Asthetouristboomtookoff,largenumbersofreliablemanuallaborerswereneeded,andthoseworkerswereoverwhelminglyBlack.Theybuilttherailroad,thevillas,andthehotelsandlaterstaffedthemwithporters,maids,waiters,andgardeners.YetevenasBlackworkersbuiltMiami,theirgrowingnumbersposedaproblemtohoteliersanddeveloperswhohadtomakesurethattheirpresencedidnotsullytheimageofanunspoiledMedi-

terraneanparadise.ThesolutionwastoconfineBlackstorestrictedresidentialquartersandtocontrolthemwithvariousformsofintimidation,mostlyentrustedtothepolice.

In1898,soldiersofCampMiami,builtbytheU.S.ArmyduringtheSpanish-AmericanWar,amusedthemselvesbyharassingthehaplessresidentsofColoredTown.Ononeoccasion,theykilledaBlackandinjuredseveralothersfornoapparentreason.Onanother,theyinvadedinforcewhenarumorspreadthataBlackhadkilledasoldier,forcingtheresidentstofleeinterror.Notasinglesoldierwaseverarrestedforthesedeeds.Regular"necktieparties"werevisiteduponBlacksaccusedofattackingwhites,especiallyiftheallegeddeedinvolvedrape.ThefirstcitynewspaperoptimisticallynamedtheMetropolismadeaspecialtyofarousinganti-Blackfeelingsonsuchoccasions,suggestingmeasuresforthewholesaledisposalofthe"blackfiends."Epithetssuchas"darky"and"coon"appearedregularlyinthepagesofboththeMetropolisanditsrisingcompetitor,theMiamiHerald.

ThecampaignofintimidationagainsttheBlackminoritywasnotaimless;indeed,ithadtwoverycleargoals.ThefirstwastopreventBlackexpansionintoadjacentneighborhoods.Thesecondwastopreventtheminority'senfranchisementthroughtheelectoralsystem.Untilthe1930s,everyattemptbyBlackfamiliestomoveoutofthecrowdedandunhealthylivingconditionsinColoredTownwasmetwithviolence.A1911MiamiHeraldarticledeclaredthat"theadvanceoftheNegropopulationislikeaplagueandcarriesdevastationwithittoallsurroundingproperty."51ThefewBlackswhohadmanagedtoleaveColoredTownby1915hadtoabandontheirhomesinahurry,afterbeingvisitedbymaskedmenwho

threatenedtheirlives.Thispatternofintimidationpersistedformorethanfiftyyears.Aslateas1951,BlackfamiliesattemptingtomoveintoanapartmentbuildingoutsideOvertownweregreetedbyaseriesofdynamiteexplosions.InthatsecondyearofrenewedAmericaninvolvementinAsia,theseblastswerelargeandfrequentenoughtoearnfortheareathenickname"LittleKorea."52

ForcefulattemptstoexcludeBlacksfromthepollswerelessfrequent,thoughnolessviolent.TheydatedbacktothedaysofworkonFlagler'srailroad,butbeganinearnestwiththearrivaloftheKuKluxKlaninMiamiin1921.TheKlan,foundedinGeorgia

in1915onthemodelofitsReconstructionerapredecessor,madeaspecialtyofrunningoutoftownministersandleadersoftheBlackcommunitywhoadvocatedracialequalityorgreaterBlackparticipationinthepoliticalprocess.In1939,theKlanattemptedtopreventBlackvotinginaprimaryelectionbyholdingaparadethroughColoredTownwithhoodedmenaboarddozensofcars.Klansmenburnedcrossesatone-blockintervals.Adummyhangingbyanoosefromapowerpoleboreared-letteredsign:"Thisniggervoted."

Upto1960,BlackMiamicloselyresembledsimilarareasinotherSoutherncities,despitethecity'sprojectedimageofacosmopolitanworld-classplayground.Aslateas1982,theEconomistobservedthat"MiamiisnotagoodcityinwhichtobeBlack."54Fromthestart,avastriftdevelopedbetweenthewhitefantasylandminglingItalianandAndalusiandreamsandthestarkrealityoftheBlackproletariat.ForBlackswereMiami'strueworkingclass,eventhoughtheireconomicsubordinationwasbothconcealedandcompoundedbyraciallinesandofficiallysponsoreddiscrimination.Theywere,morethanwhiteworkerswouldhavebeen,cutofffromthebenefitsofthecitytheywerebuildingtosuchanextentthat,to"swiminsaltwater,"theyhadtoleaveDadeCounty.55

Despitepovertyandmeagerresources,theBlackpopulationfoughtback.Churches,businessorganizations,andpublishingconcernsemerged,providingleadershipforthecommunity'sdevelopmentandforthestruggleagainstoppression.By1905,abusinessdistricthaddevelopedonahalf-milestripalongAvenueGinColoredTown.Black-ownedbusinessesinthedistrictincludedgrocerystores,anicecreamparlor,apharmacy,afuneralhome,andanewspaper.Later,and

farthernorth,aseriesofjazzandbluesnightclubsemergedinthesamestreet(nowrenamedNorthwestSecondAvenue),earningitthesobriquet"LittleBroadway."MarianAnderson,NatKingCole,andmanyotherBlackstarsofthethirtiesandfortiesperformedthere.56

AsincoloredsectionsofotherAmericancities,theconfinementoftheentireBlackpopulationintotightquartersledtosocialdifferentiationandtheemergenceofasmallbutactivemiddleclass.DavidA.Dorsey,ColoredTown'sfirstandonlymillionaireinthe1910s,builtthearea'sfirstpark,library,andschool.Henry

ReevespublishedtheMiamiTimes,thelargestBlacknewspaper,whichprovidedaminorityalternativetotheviewsairedintheMetropolis.TheseleadersandotherprominentcitizensfoundedtheCivicLeagueofColoredTown,theNegroUpliftAssociationofDadeCounty,andtheColoredBoardofTrade,organizationsthattooktheleadinfightingdiscriminationandtheKlan.

Althoughfailureswerecommoninthefaceofwhatamountedtoofficialsupportforracism,thereweresomescatteredsuccesses.LibertyCity,forexample,todayMiami'smainBlackneighborhood,wasbornoutofonesucheffortspearheadedbyaBlackEpiscopalministerandtheGreaterMiamiNegroCivicLeagueintheearly1930s.TheypersuadedtheMiamiHerald'seditortorunaseriesofexposésonthedeplorablelivingconditionsinOvertownandtheconsequentproliferationofcontagiousdiseases.Atthattime,theinfantmortalityrateintheareawastwicethatofwhiteMiami,andthereweresporadicoutbreaksofinfluenza,yellowfever,andsmallpox.ThenewsreachedWashingtonandcontributedtothedecisionofRoosevelt'sPublicWorksAdministration(PWA)tobuildthefirsthousingprojectinthesoutheasternstates.LocatedbetweenN.W.62dand67thstreets,theprojectconsistedinitiallyofthirty-fourapartmentunitsandwasbaptized"LibertySquare."58

Thereisevidence,however,thattheBlackleaders'petitionstotheNewDealersweresuccessfulonlybecausetheycoincidedwiththeinterestsoftheMiamiestablishment.TheformalapplicationforLibertySquaretothePWA'shousingdivisionwassubmittedbytheSouthernHousingCorporation,organizedbyleadingmembersofthewhitebusinesselite.TheirpointmanwasJohnGrambling,thesameformerjudgewhohadpraisedtheMiamipoliceforputtingBahamian

immigrantsintheirplace.Hiseffortsin1933togetthePWAtoeradicateColoredTown's"slum"stemmedlessfromachangeofheartthanfromthedesiretopushBlacksevenfartherawayfromanexpandingcentralbusinessdistrict.59Norwasthechoiceoftheproject'slocationentirelycasual.GramblingwasatthetimethepersonalattorneyofFloydW.Davis,adeveloperwhoownedmuchoftheemptylandaroundLibertySquareandwhostoodtoprofitenormouslyfromtheexplodingBlackdemandforhousing.Inshort,ashistorianR.Mohl,putsit,"The

availabilityoffederalhousingfundsmobilizedthecivicelite,whosawinslumclearanceagoldenopportunitytopushtheBlacksoutofthedowntownarea.''

Hence,eventhesmallvictoriesofBlackleadersdidnotoccurwithoutthesupportofthedowntownestablishment.Betterhousingandpoliticalrepresentationwerethelong-termgoalsoftheBlackcommunitythatorganizationsliketheKKKattemptedtothwart.However,themainconfrontations,thoseinwhichtheminoritypopulationpouredoutintothestreets,hadlesstodowithlong-termimprovementeffortsthanwithproximateincidentsofviolence.Soldiers,Klansmen,andpolicefeltfreetoattackindividualBlackswithcompleteimpunity.TheabsenceoflegalredressinsuchcaseswastheprincipalmotiveformostspontaneousmobilizationsandnearriotsinOvertownandtheninLibertyCity.Notuntil1928,afteraseeminglyendlessseriesofviolentattacksonColoredTown'scitizens,werethefirstwhitepoliceofficersindictedforbeatingaBlackmantodeath.Butthen,afterdeliberatingforthreehours,theall-whitejuryacquittedtheofficers.61

Similareventstookplacewithalmostmonotonousregularityduringthenextfortyyears.Morethanhousingorpoliticalrepresentation,whatdroveBlacksintothestreetswastheneedtodefendthemostbasicrightofall,lifeitself.Thispatternofconfrontation,firmlyimplantedintheBlackcollectiveconsciousnessafterdecadesofoppression,createdthebackdropagainstwhichthe"McDuffie"riotandotherviolentuprisingsduringthe1980smustbeunderstood.

TheCities

Before1949,thelawsofthestateofFloridaallowedtwenty-fiveor

morepersonsofanyhamlet,village,ortownwhowerefreeholdersandregisteredvoterstoestablishamunicipalcorporation.If,afterlegalpublicnotice,two-thirdsoftheinhabitants,butnofewerthantwenty-fivepersons,metandagreedtoformamunicipality,theycoulddoso,earningforthemselvesallthepowersoftaxationandregulationgrantedbythestatetomunicipalcorporations.

ThedeveloperswhoinventedMiamifounditconvenienttogivetheircreationslegalstandingsoastogainforthemselvesallthepowersgrantedbythestate.Undertheeasyincorporationlaws,

theyquicklymovedtoturntheirorangegrovesandfailedplantationsintofull-fledgedcities.Miamimadeitsdebutin1896,followedinDadeCountybyHomestead,incorporatedin1913,andFloridaCityin1914.AllthreeplaceswerestationsalongthenewbranchofHenryFlagler'sFloridaEastCoastRailway.Subsequently,CollinsandhisfollowersincorporatedMiamiBeach(1915),andtheMerricksdidthesamewithCoralGables(1925).Opa-LockadeveloperGlenCurtiss'sdreamofthe"BaghdadofAmerica,"withstreetsnamedSheherazadeandAliBababecameacityin1926.MiamiSprings,SouthMiami,andNorthMiamifollowedduringthenexttwoyears.

TheproliferationoflocalgovernmentunitsslowedsomewhatintheaftermathoftheGreatDepression,thoughfivemorecitieswerecreatedduringthe1930s:MiamiShores(1931),BiscaynePark(1931),andElPortal(1937)onthemainland,andtwotinybarrierislandsacrossBiscayneBay,Surfside(1935)andIndianCreekVillage(1939).Thepaceacceleratedinthe1940swiththeincorporationofSweetwater(1941),BalHarbour(1946),BayHarborIslands(1947),VirginiaGardens(1947),HialeahGardens(1948),Medley(1949),andPennsuco(1949).In1949,thestatelegislaturefinallypassedameasurethatpreventedfurthermunicipalincorporations.Thelawwasreinforcedbyaninformallegislativeagreementin1953prohibitingthecreationofnewcitiesbyspecialacts.63

Butthedamagewasdone.Laxregulationhadledtoahodgepodgeoftwenty-six"cities"that,in1990,rangedinsizefrom358,548(Miami)to13(Islandia).Areasthatinothercitieswouldbesmallormidsizeneighborhoods,inDadearefull-fledgedmunicipalities.Theproliferationoflocalauthorities,pettyrivalries,andoverlappingjurisdictionsresultedininefficientprovisionofbasicservicestothe

true"city"thatencompassedalmosttheentirecounty.Inaddition,after1949manyresidentsmovedtothe"unincorporated"areaofDadeCounty,servicedbycountyagenciesbutuntaxedbyanymunicipalauthority.Theobviousneedtoprovidecountywideservicesandtheequallyobviousinequityofservicecostsforcityversuscountyresidentswastoshapethelocalpoliticalagendaforyearstocome.Thestruggletocreateabadlyneededmetropolitanformofgovernmentinthefaceofdeterminedmunicipalresistanceandtheparadoxofan"unincorporated"areatwo

andahalftimeslargerthanthelargestcity(1,036,925vs.358,548,in1990)wasthelegacyofthedevelopers'chaoticdreams.

FloridaPolitics

Politicsinpre-1960Miamiwasnotsomuchastrugglebetweenwell-definedpartyforcesasabeautycontestamongmembersofasingleparty.TheDemocratsreignedsupreme.TheRepublicanparty,turnedbytheReconstructioneraintoapermanentminorityforce,wasriddledwithfactionalism.TounderstandthecharacterofMiamipoliticsinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,onemustfirstlookatthesingularstatecontextinwhichitwasembedded.

Florida,thatlong-vacantland,wasbeingresettled.TheOldSouth,tooweaktodominatethenewterritory,becameapassagewayforthosecomingfromfarthernorth.FarmersvictimizedbybollweevilanddroughtintheirhomestatessettledbytheIndianRiver;hordesofretireesdiscoveredSt.PetersburgandTampa;andwell-heeledeasternfamilieswereseducedbythemanicuredplaygroundsthatFlaglerplantedalonghisrailroad.Bythemidtwentiethcentury,48percentofFlorida'spopulationhadbeenbornelsewhere,comparedto11percentinGeorgiaand10percentintheCarolinas.65

Thesettlementprofileofthepeninsulaalsocontrastedinmultiplewayswiththeneighboringstates.By1940,only16percentofFlorida'spopulationlivedinruralareas,comparedto48percentinSouthCarolina,57percentinArkansas,and64percentinMississippi.Floridaagriculturebecameincreasinglydiversifiedandtechnology-driven.Itsweightinthestate'seconomywasbalanced,however,bylumberingandfishinginterests,construction,and,aboveall,tourism.Thisdiversificationgavethestatethehighestincomepercapitainthe

South,withtheexceptionofoil-richTexas,andaparadoxicalpoliticalsystemdominatedbyasinglepartyyetfreeofthehegemonyofanyinterestblock.66

InFlorida,candidatesforCongressandforthestatelegislatureoftenranasindividuals,ratherthanaspartofa"ticket"asintherestoftheSouth;localofficialsfrequentlyrefusedtoendorsecandidatesforstateoffice,lesttheyantagonizelocalopponentsofthosecandidates;andformergovernorsseldomhadenoughclouttogetthemselveselectedtotheU.S.Senateoreventootherstateoffices.

Theoutcomeofelectionsdependedonshiftingcoalitionsinwhichthefarmers,thedevelopers,theinsuranceindustry,andotherspecial-interestgroupsparticipatedbutwhichnoonedominated.ThisgavetoFloridapoliticsthatatomized,amorphousqualityuniqueintheSouth.

ThesystemisbestreflectedbythepeculiarcharacteroftheFloridaexecutivebranch,establishedbytheconstitutionof1885.Thisdocumentprovidedforacollegialexecutiveinwhichnotonlythegovernor,butalsothesecretaryofstate,attorneygeneral,comptroller,superintendentofpublicinstruction,statetreasurer,andagriculturecommissionerwereelectedstatewide.Thegovernorcouldnotserveinasecondfour-yearterm,butcabinetofficialscouldbereelectedindefinitely.Manyactuallydiedinoffice.Duringtheirtenure,theyservedexofficioandwiththerighttovoteinallkeystateboardsandcommissions.Thisanachronistic"cabinetsystem,"whichseverelyrestrictedthepowerofthechiefexecutiveanddilutedresponsibilityforgovernmentdecisions,wasactuallydefendedbymanyasprovidingtheonlymeasureofstabilityinashiftingpoliticalorder.InV.O.Key'sopinion,"Itmaynotbemerecoincidencethatsuchaninstitutiondevelopedinthesouthernstatewiththemostdisintegratedstructureofpoliticalorganization."68

Ittakestimetoputdownrootsinaplace,tocultivatestableloyalties,andtoidentifyreliableenemies.Factionsconsolidatedelsewhereoverthecourseofgenerationshadbutafeeblebaseinapopulationofsun-seekingretirees,part-timetourists,andnewlyarrivedfarmers.TheradicalindividualismdisplayedinFloridaelectionswasbutthepoliticalreflectionofastill-unsettledsocialorder.Bythemid-twentiethcentury,Florida,thoughnolongeravacantfrontierland,wasstillinsearchofanidentityandfarmorepermeabletooutside

influencesthantheoldersocietiesofitserstwhileConfederatepartners.

TheFightforMetropolis

Whatwastrueofthestateasawholewasmoresoatitssoutherntip.DadeCounty'spopulationwasevennewerandmoreunsettledthanthatoftherestofthestate.CrispBostonianaccentsmixedwiththenasaltwangofmidwesterners,theslowcadencesofGeorgians,andtheharshNewYorkintonations.Thispopulationhad

littleconnectionwiththearea'spastandlittleincommonamongthemselves,exceptperhapstheloveofsunandsandandofthemoneythatcouldbemadefromthem.WiththeexceptionofBlacks,whoseconditiondidnotdiffermuchfromthatoftheirbrethreninothersoutherncities,Dade'spopulacecouldhavebeenfoundanywhereinthecountry.Developerstookfulladvantageofthisfragmentationtoquicklyandeasilytransformnewlydrainedswampsintopoliticaljurisdictions.

TheloyaltiesthateventuallyemergedinDadeCountydidnotencompasstheentiremetropolitanarea,butwentonlyasfarasthemunicipalborders.ResidentsofCoralGables,thebest-laid-outresortinthearea,developedanimageasaprivilegedenclave,jealousofitsmunicipalprerogativesandwearyofanycloseintercoursewiththelessfortunatecitizensofothersubdivisions.Incontrast,Hialeahdeterioratedfromthestylishneighborhood-bythe-racetrackadvertisedbyGlenCurtissintoajumbleofcheapbungalowsandtrailerparks,becomingprogressivelypoorandfallingundertheinfluenceofaseriesofnotoriouspoliticalbosses.Tothenorth,Curtiss'sArabianstyleOpaLockacityhallpeeledandfadedasfastastheinhabitants'socialstanding;thecitybecameincreasinglyBlackandpoor,housingrefugeesfromLibertyCityandOvertown.

InthatavocadoplantationcumtropicalresortcalledMiamiBeach,themostinterestingdevelopmentoccurredastheoneethnicgroupexplicitlybarredbyFisherandCollinssettledenmasse,displacingtheoriginalgentileproprietors.NewYorkJewishtouristshadstartedcomingforshortvacations,settlinginthemodesthotelsandhousesoftheLummusbrothers'subdivisionsouthofFifthStreet.Astheboomofthe1920scametoanendandwealthyvacationersstarted

bypassingMiamiBeachformoreexoticdestinations,localrealtorsquicklybecamelesssqueamishabouttheethnicbackgroundoftheircustomers.Whenitcamerightdowntoit,aJewishmillionairewasbetterthannomillionaireatall.70

ThedepressionyearswerehardonMiamiBeach,butwealthyJewsarrivedtopickuptheslackbothascustomersandasbuyersofproperty.WiththemcameYiddishandsynagogues,delicatessens,andevenHebrewprivateacademiesanduniversities,transformingtheresortintoanextensionoftheirJewishNewYorkenclave.WhereCarlFisherhaddreamedofanexclusiveplay

groundforwealthyAngloSaxons,thehithertodiscriminatedagainstminorityerectedacityinitsownimagethatobliteratedtheresort'searlysocialambiance.Jewswerecitypeople,andtheyconceivedoftheirplaygroundinurbanterms-aWarsawbythesea.TheirinfluencewasmostmarkedsouthofLincolnRoad,wherethequaintlittlehotelsandnumeroussmallshopsexudedanunmistakableethnicflavor.Thehumandimensionsoftheplace,infact,weretosaveMiamiBeachfromruinhalfacenturylater,whenthis"ArtDeco"districtwasrediscovered.

NostablepoliticalcoalitiongainedhegemonyoverMiamiitself,however.Duringthe1930s,DanielJ.Mahoney,publisheroftheMiamiNews,andFloridasenatorErnestG.Grahamforgedapoliticalcoalitionthattookcontrolofpoliticalpatronage,functioningforawhileasa"LittleTammany."Afteritsdissolutionanduntilthe1950s,thefamiliarpoliticalvacuumreemerged,filledonlyinpartbythegrowinginflueneeoftheMiamiHeraldanditsassociateeditorJohnPennekamp.Intheabsenceofawellarticulatedpowerelite,thenewspaperassumedthisrolebydefault,becomingapowerbrokerinitsownright.72

Lackofatruebipartisansystemandofaconsolidatedelitewasnowheremoreevidentthaninthefighttoestablishametropolitansystemofgovernment.Thecomplexitiesofmanagingagrowingcitysqueezedintoanarrowstripbetweenoceanandswamplandhadbecomepainfullyobvious.Apatchworkofadhocsolutionshademerged,suchasthearrangementsbywhichthecityofMiamisoldwatertoHialeah,MiamiSprings,andMiamiBeachandprovidedtheuseoftheMiamipolicecommunicationssystemtosmallermunicipalities.Areawideagencieshadbeencreatedbythestate

legislaturetoattendtothemosturgentneeds.In1945,forexample,anactofthelegislaturedidawaywiththeGreaterMiamiPortAuthorityandreplaceditwiththeDadeCountyPortAuthority.undercontroloftheCountyCommissionandwithjurisdictionover"allharborsandairports,tunnels,causeways,andbridges."73

Buttheseshort-termsolutionswerenotenough.Thetruecity,growinginalldirections,requiredunifiedgovernance.Themyriadincorporated"cities,"ledbyCoralGables,however,orchestratedafierceoppositiontoallproposalsformetropolitangovernment.Thefightpitteddowntownbusinessandcivicleaders,whosawapressingneedforcoordinatedauthority,againstlocalresidents

bentonprotectingtheirownparticularlife-styles.Theindependent"cities"werebackedbytheirownemployeeunionsandtheirsuppliers;opposingthemwasaloosecoalitionledbytheMiamiHeraldandincludingtheDadeCountylegislativedelegation,theDadeCountyResearchFoundation,andtheMiami-DadeChamberofCommerce.

Despitetheirimpressiveroster,thepro-Metroforcessufferedaseriesofdefeatsatthehandsofthemunicipalities.MiamiBeachcomplainedtirelesslythatitcontributedfarmoreinsalestaxesfromtourismthanitreceivedfromthecountyinservices.Otherlocalitieshadgripesoftheirown.Beneaththeseprotestsandtheeffectiveresistancetheyarticulatedwasthefactthatsocialstructureandcommunitysolidaritybarelytranscendedlocalboundaries.Residentsidentifiedwiththeirimmediatesurroundings,betheyinCoralGables,MiamiBeach,orHialeah.Inthiscontext,thevoicescallingforacitywidediscoursefacedanuphillbattle,despitethepressingneedsonwhichtheygroundedtheirposition.

MetropolitangovernmentultimatelycametoMiamiinatwostageprocessthatrequiredapprovalofaHomeRuleAmendmentforDadeCountybytheFloridaelectorateandthenpassageofametropolitancharterbycountyvoters.Homerulegarneredafull70percentofthestatevoteintheelectionsofNovember1956.Passageofthemetropolitancharterwouldseemaneasylaststep.Themunicipalities,however,hadotherideasandbitterlycontestedthereform.TheMetroCharterpassedinthespecialelectionofMay1957byamere1,784votes44,404forversus42,620against.NotasingleprecinctinMiamiBeachandHialeahvotedinfavor,andmostsmallercitiesalsoturnedthereformdown.Onlyamassivevoteinthecentralcityenabled

Metrotobecomelaw.75

TheclashbetweenthecityofMiamiandthesurroundingmunicipalitieswasnottheclassicalconfrontationbetweenalowincomecentralcityanditsaffluentsuburbs,for,withtheexceptionofLibertyCityandOvertown,mostofthemetropolitanareawasinfact"agiantsuburb."76Theconflicthadtodoinsteadwiththepettyloyaltiesbuiltovertheshortspanofthearea'sexistenceasacityandwiththevestedinterestscreatedduringtheearlyfeverofincorporation.ForalargepartofthispopulationofNewYorkretirees,transplantedNewEnglanders,andChicagobusinessmen,theideaof"metropolitanMiami"wasstillanabstraction.Downtownleaderswhohadbeguntothinkinthesetermsscoredtheir

firsttangiblevictorywiththepassageoftheMetroCharter.Itpavedthewayforacceptanceofthecityasarealplaceandfortheexpansionofacivicspiritconfinedthusfartonarrowlocalboundaries.Thisvictory,however,occurredin1957,justtwoyearsbeforethetriumphoftherevolutionariesledbyFidelCastroinCuba.

OntheThresholdoftheSixties

ThemostprominentpoliticalfigureinFloridaintheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcenturywasNapoleonBonaparteBroward.Acommittedpopulist,BrowardwastheantithesisofHenryFlagler,whosebaronialstyleheopposed.Asgovernor,hebeganthedrainingoftheEverglades,aprojecthebelievedtobeinthepublicinterest,whilesimultaneouslyfightingthe"wildcapitalism"hesawgrowingeverywherearoundhim.HisroughbrandofpopulismcameasclosetodividingFloridapoliticsintoentrenchedfactionsasanythingbeforeorafter.

77BrowardhadmadeanameforhimselfsmugglingarmstotheCubaninsurrectionaryarmyfightingSpaininthe1890s.Hisinterestintheislandahundredmilestothesouthwas,likehispolitics,exceptionalforthetime.MostFloridapoliticiansdirectedtheirsightsexclusivelynorthward,totheplacesfromwhichpeopleandmoneywereflowinginaseeminglyendlessstream.Inthismentallandscape,Havana,andforthatmattertheentireCaribbean,were,atbest,aremotepresence.

Thisviewofthingswaswidelysharedinthefast-growingcitybythebay.Miami's"Spanishness"didnotcomefromCuba,butfromNewYork.Duringitsfirsthalf-centuryofexistence,Miamihadevolvedintoatouristresort,aplayground,evenaJewishenclaveanythingbutthe"CapitaloftheCaribbean."Thatdesignationwhichtodayisoneof

thecity'sclaimstofamewouldhavebeenincomprehensibletoapopulationarrivedrecentlyfromthenorthwhohadbutthefaintestideaofFlorida'sSpanishpast.Onthethresholdofthesixties,Miamireveledinitsnewlygainedmetropolitanstatusandtookthefirsthesitantstepstowardanurbanidentitythatwouldtranscenditspunysubdivisions.Thepoliticalconcernsofitscitizenrycontinuedtofocus,however,ontheendlessbickeringbetweenMetroandthe"cities,"andonthethreatposedbythecontinuousinflowofnorthernmigrantsseekingthesamelife-stylethatthelocalsalreadyenjoyed.78

Thosewhoinveighedatthetimeaboutthedireconsequencesof

thisinfluxofnorthernerscouldnothavedreamedthatthebulkofthecity'spopulationinthenextdecadeswouldcomefromtheoppositedirection.Onceagain,thedestiniesoftheislandandthepeninsulaweretobeintertwined,thistimeinamostunexpectedway.TherisingflowofexilesfromCuba'ssocialistrevolutiondidnotgotoTampaandKeyWest,placesofCubansettlementatthetimeoftheisland'searlierwarofindependence.Rather,andoverwhelmingly,theychosetheglitteringBiscayneBaymetropolis,thengropingforsomesenseofurbanidentity.Thefirstexilesencounteredasocialandpoliticalorderthat,ifnotentirelyamorphous,wasafarcryfromtheconsolidatedpowerstructuresinplacefarthernorth,andthereforefarmorepermeable.AstheMiamiHeraldanditsalliesstruggledtobuildaseriouscityoutofanassemblageofthemeparks,theentireCubanbourgeoisiearrivedonthedoorstep.TheAndalusiansettingssoprescientlybuiltbyGeorgeMerrickhalfacenturyearliernowbecamepopulatedbypeoplewhoknewtheiroriginsandcouldpronouncethestreetnamescorrectly.Afterfourhundredyears,historyhadcomefullcircle.

ChapterFiveEntertheCubansTuckedamongtheroyalpalmsandfrangipaniofSouthStreetinKeyWest,thesouthernmosturbanwayintheUnitedStates,istheJohnDeweyHouse.ThebungalowwasthewinterhomeofthefamousAmericanphilosopher,whofoundinthiscommunityanditsweatherabalmyrespitefromtherigorsofthenorth.ItisawhitewoodenstructurebuiltinastylefamiliarthroughouttheCaribbean;itlookssouthtowardCuba.

Lessthantwoblocksaway,asoneturnsnorthontoDuvalStreet,ElBalcóndeMartí,thesecond-storybalconyfromwhichtheCubanrevolutionaryJoséMartíaddressedthrongsofexiledcigarworkerscommandsthesidewalk.Thehumblemonetarycontributionsofthoseworkers,plussimilarcollectionsinTampaandJacksonville,armedaseriesofexpeditionsagainsttheSpanishcolonialregimeintheislandduringthe1890s.TodaythebuildinggracedbyElBalcónhousesaninnandafancyrestaurant.

OneblocknorthalongDuvalistheSanCarlosClub,astructurereminiscentofthearchitectureofoldHavanabutactuallybuiltinthe1920storeplaceanineteenth-centurygatheringplaceofCubanrevolutionaries.ThenewSanCarloswasdedicatedonOctober10,1924,theanniversaryofthebeginningofthefirstCubanwarofindependence.Thebuilding'sfoundingstonewasbroughtfromLaDemajagua,thesugarmillwherethatrebellionstarted.

BeforetherewasaMiami,thecityofKeyWestwasawell-

establishedandthrivingcenterofCaribbeancommerce.ThesuppliesandmenwhocarvedHenryLum'scoconutplantationoutofthejunglethatwasthenMiamiBeachcamefromthere.Mailalso

camefromtheKeyaboardtheschoonerFlora,whichsailedregularlytotheBrickelltradingpostbytheMiamiRiverandtothetinysettlementofCocoanutGrove.

2InKeyWest,thetwooddlymixedcurrentsthatweretoshapeMiami'shistoryinthetwentiethcenturywerealreadypresentinthefinaldecadesofthenineteenth.

TheDeweyHouseistodayalingeringsymbolofwhatnorthernersofallstripescamesouthfor:theseabreezes,thesunlight,theoceaninmultiplehuesofemerald.TheSanCarlosandElBalcóndeMartístandfortheother,earlierSouthFlorida,inhabitedbypeopletowhomsandandseameantlittle,sincetheywerebornwiththem.Thislastgroupdedicateditsenergiestootherpursuits,usuallyofapoliticalnature.InKeyWestattheendofthe1800s,paleYankeetouristsintermingledwitholive-skinnedexiledworkersandveteransofpastinsurrectionarywars.Heavilyarmedexpeditionssetsailrightnexttobeachresortspackedwithnorthernvacationers.

TheTwoFloridas

Thiscounterpointwasnotjustacolorfulhistoricaloddity;itpreparedthewayfortheforcesthatweretotransformSouthFloridaandMiamiaftertheCubanRevolution.ThecommonhistoryoftheislandandthepeninsulaunderSpanishruleconstitutedthebackdropagainstwhichtheeventsofthe1970sand1980sweretounfold.Themoreimmediatesocialexplanationforthoseevents,however,layinthatpeculiarjuxtapositionoftourist-orienteddevelopmentandrevolutionaryexpeditions,theconstructionofbeachresortsandthearmingofmen,thatmarkedthelatenineteenthcentury.Floridameantverydifferentthingstopeoplecomingfromthenorthandthosecomingfromthesouth,andthecombinationtookanumberof

dramaticturns.

Inlate1894theCubanRevolutionaryparty,foundedbyMartí,readiedtorekindletheinsurrectionintheisland,organizingawell-armedexpeditionofthreeshipstosetsailfromFernandinaBeachnearSt.Augustine.Owingtothecarelessnessortreacheryofitscommander,however,theexpeditionwasdiscoveredandthevesselsseizedbyU.S.authoritiesonJanuary14,1895.Itwasamajorblow.ThemoniesaccumulatedafterendlessralliesandspeechesinTampaandtheKeywerelostwiththeships.3

Meanwhile,theheartbreakofthearrestedrevolutionarieswas

echoedacrossCentralFlorida,butforverydifferentreasons.ArecordfrostthatwinterhadruinedcountlesscitrusgrowersandcompromisedthefinancesofFlagler'sEastFloridaRailroad.Theyearwaschillingallaround.Insurrectionists,growers,andrailroadworkersstruggledmightilythatwinterinclosephysicalproximity,eveniftheirworrieswerenotatallthesame.

OnFebruary24,1895,MartífinallysucceededintakingthewartoCuba,wherehehimselflandedattheheadofanewexpedition.TheconfiscationsofJanuaryhadinfactenergizedtheCubancausebyprovingtherevolutionaries'seriousnessofpurpose.

4Thatsamemonth,thefrostpeakedinFlorida,triggeringasimilarlyenergeticresponse.Flagler'srailroadorganizedthedistributionoffreebagsoffertilizerandcheaploansforthegrowers,whereasinMiami,JuliaTuttlesawhergoldenopportunity.5

ThefollowingyearsweremarkedbyfeverishactivitybothinSouthFloridaandacrosstheFloridaStraits,asonegroupofnewcomerssunktheirenergiesintobuildingnewresortsandanotherintoachievingnationalindependence.Yetacuriousmutualindifferencewasapparentthroughoutthisentireperiod.ItseemedasifthereweretwoFloridasonebeingbuiltoutoftheswampwiththedreamsandambitionsofYankeeentrepreneurs;theotherlookingevertoCubaandtoSpainthankstocenturiesoftradeandpoliticaltradition.In1896,MiamibecameacityandconstructionofFlagler'sluxuriousRoyalPalmHotelwasproceedingatfullsteam.Inthesameyear,expeditionaryboatsplayedcat-and-mousewithU.S.revenuecuttersupanddowntheFloridacoast,takingvitalsuppliestotherebelsinCuba.6

Oftheseexpeditions,noneweremorecolorfulthanthoseorganized

byNapoleonBonaparteBrowardandtheCubanRevolutionaryCouncilofJacksonville.Broward'spowerful,fasttugboattheThreeFriendswasidealforoutrunningtheU.S.cuttersandtheSpanishgunboatsthatblockadedtheisland.Aftersomevacillation,Browardsignedasecretagreementwiththecouncilandhimselfcaptainedthefirstexpedition.OnMarch15,1896,theThreeFriendsdeliveredtothenorthcoastofMatanzasProvincesomesixtyCubansoldiersandacargoconsistingoftwofieldcannons,fivehundredRemingtonrifles,threehundredWinchesterrifles,fivehundredmachetes,fivehundredpoundsofdynamite,andthreehundredthousandroundsofammunition.7

Althoughthetripwassuccessful,thetugboatwasdiscoveredby

theSpaniards,whonearlycapturedit.Onlyitssuperiorspeedallowedittoescape.ButtheSpanishministerinWashingtonprotested,and,aftertheadventurebecameknown,theThreeFriendscameunderclosescrutinybyU.S.TreasuryofficialsandSpanishgovernmentspies.Browardandhismenwerequiteadroitateludingthisvigilance.Morethanonceheexplainedhisboat'sactivitiesbysayingthathewastowingFlagler'sbargesordoingotherworkfortheresortdevelopersinSouthFlorida.TotheSpanishconsulinJacksonville,SeñordeMariátegui,heretortedononeoccasion,''I'vegotonehundredtwentytonsofcoalandawholeboatloadofarmsandammunitionforKeyWest."

8HetheninvitedtheSpaniardtobeaguestonhisnexttrip.

TheCubanRevolutionaryCouncilinJacksonvillecouldneverhavegottenawaywiththistraffickingofmenandarmswereitnotfortheopensympathyofmanyAmericanstotherebelcause.FreightcarsloadedwithgunsandammunitionfortheCubanarmyarrivedinJacksonville'syardsfromthenorth,whilerecruitscamefromTampabythedozensandneitherMariáteguinortheU.S.authoritiescoulddoanythingaboutit.TheThreeFriendstookthreemoreexpeditionstoCuba,thethird,whichdeliveredseventy-fivemenandathousandrifles,landingonlyafewhundredyardsfromGeneralMaceo'srebelarmyinPinardelRíoProvince.9Duringitsfourthincursion,theThreeFriendswasdiscoveredandchasedbyaSpanishgunboatsouthofPinardelRíoProvince.Answeringitsfire,thetug'srapid-firecannonscoredadirecthitthatcrippledtheSpaniard.Another,largergunboatgavechase,butthetugmanagedtoescapeinthefog.Theepisodebecameknownas"Cuba'sfirstnavalbattle."10IttookplaceinDecember1896,ataboutthesametimethattheRoyalPalmHotelwasbeingreadiedforitsNewYeargalaopeningandthesteamerCity

ofKeyWestdelivereditsfirstboatloadofwintertouriststoCocoanutGrove.11

In1897,aSupremeCourtdecisionreaffirmedU.S.neutralityintheCubanwarandorderedallfilibusteringboatstobeimpounded.FortunatelyforBrowardandotherpro-Cubanowners,theU.S.battleshipMainewassenttoHavanaharbor,whereitmysteriouslyexploded,leadingPresidentMcKinleytodeclarewaronSpain.TheSupremeCourtrulingonFlorida'sCubansupporterswasneverimplemented.12

FloridaasaStage

Miamiinthelate1890swasasyettooinsignificanttoserveasabaseforconspiraciesandwasthussparedtherevolutionaryfever.Miami'sconfrontationwasnotbetweenCubanrebels,theirAmericansympathizers,andacorneredSpanishgovernment,butbetweenFlagler'srailroadandthoseold-timerswho,liketheMunroesandtheBrickells,weretryingtopreservewhattheycouldofthebay'soldcharm.Justahundredmilestothesouth,meanwhile,CaptainGeneralValerianoWeylerofSpainwasstarvingtheCubanpeasantrybyrelocatingpeopleawayfromtheland;atnight,theskieswerelitbythebrightlyburningcanefields.

TheSpanish-AmericanWarwasthefirstmajoreventtounitethedestiniesoftheyoungFloridacityandtheislandcolony.Shortlyafterthehostilitiesbegan,theU.S.ArmymovedtroopstoCampMiamiinpreparationforinvadingtheisland.Asitturnedout,noinvasiontookplacebecausetheSpanishresistancecrumbledquickly;insteadtheidletroopsamusedthemselvesbyharassingtheinhabitantsofColoredTown.14ItwouldnotbethelasttimethataffairsinCubawouldendupwiththevictimizationofBlacksinMiami.

ThedefeatofSpainwasabittersweetvictoryfortheCubans.AstheexilecoloniesofTampaandKeyWestbegantoemptyout,thereturningrevolutionariescarriedtotheislandambivalentfeelingstowardthecountrythathadgiventhemrefuge.True,theAmericaninterventionhadbroughtabloodywartoaswiftend,butthefavorhadcomeatacost:Cubawasnowapoliticalprotectorate.Americangeneralsgovernedtheislandfrom1898to1902,andwhentheyfinallyleft,thenewrepublicfoundthatitwasanythingbutfully

independent.SenatorOrvilleH.Plattproposed,andtheU.S.Congressapproved,anamendmenttotheCubanconstitutiongivingWashingtontherighttointerveneintheeountrv'sinternalaffairs.15UnderthePlattAmendment,theAmericanambassadorbecameinpointoffactthecolonialoverseerofCuba.

Withsuchpoliticalassurancesinplace,U.S.capitalstartedpouringintotheisland.ThepatternofinvestmentwasnottoodifferentfromthattakingplaceinFloridaatthesametime:moneywentintoagriculture,primarilysugarcane,andtouristventures.In1902,themostplausiblefutureforthenascentrepublicwasasa

southernextensionofFlorida,formallyindependentbutsubjecttotheeconomicandculturalhegemonyofthenorth.Hadthisoccurred,theremarkablecounterpointofYankeedevelopersandCubanrevolutionariesthatwassoapparentinSouthFloridaduringthe1890swouldnothaverepeateditself.Insteadthehomogenizinglogicofcapital,bentonextractingprofitfromwarmerweatherandfertilelandonbothsidesoftheStraitsofFlorida,wouldhaveprevailed.

ThatthingsdidnotturnoutthatwayisaconsequenceprimarilyofthekindofcountryCubawas.Weakeconomically,itneverthelesspossessedastrongnationalidentity.TheanthropologistSidneyW.Mintz,inattemptingtoexplainCubannationalcharacter,contrastedthecolonialhistoryoftheislandwiththatofherCaribbeanneighbors.Theplantationsystem,soinimicaltonationhoodasitfilledonecolonyafteranotherwithmassesofslavelaborersruledbyafewoverseers,madeitsappearancelateinthehistoryofCuba.ForthefirsttwocenturiesofSpanishrule,theislandhadbeenleftalonetodevelopanindependentsocietyofCreolecommercialfarmersandsmallsubsistencecultivators.Therewerefewslaves;evenafterthelarge-scaleintroductionofsugarcaneinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury,theproportionofslavestothetotalpopulationremainedmuchlowerthanintheotherAntilles:

BythetimetheplantationsystembegantoexpandinCuba,thatsocietyhadapeopleandacultureofitsown....Cubansocietygraduallytookaspecialquality:ruralinemphasis,anti-Spanishbutpro-Hispanic,folkCatholic,Creole....ItwasCuba'ssubsequentstruggleforpoliticalandculturalautonomyfromSpainthatgaveherthefocussheneededtobecomeacohesivenation.CubaasaSpanishcolonyhadmorenationhoodthanthecoloniesofotherEuropeanpowersintheAntillesmighthavehadassovereignstates.

ThispeculiarityofthesubordinatenewrepublicnowcameintoplayasacounterweighttoAmericaneconomicandpoliticalinfluence.ThesuccessorsofFlaglerandFishercouldnotsimplypushsouthintomore"openspace,"astheyhadatBiscayneBay.Althoughweakereconomically,Cubawasaverydifferentplacefromthesemivacantpeninsula.Insteadofbecomingitsappendage,CubagraduallyconvertedFloridaintoherownpoliticalbackstage,

wherethedramas,andsometimescomedies,ofexilewereregularlyenacted.Thecounterpointofthelate1890swashencerepeated,buteachtimewithadifferentcastofcharactersandaslightalterationofplace.Now,asMiamicontinuedtodevelopalongthelinesenvisionedbyitsfounders,theupheavalsofCubanpoliticsregularlydepositedanewwaveofexilesonitsshores.

Formanyyears,theresort-boundvacationersandpoliticalconspiratorscoexistedinthecitywiththesamemutualindifferencetheyhadexhibitedinKeyWestduringtheSpanish-AmericanWar.PollyRedford'shistorvofMiami,whichendsbeforetheCubanRevolution,containsonlytworeferencestoCubans,bothashiredhelpinMiamiBeachhotels.

17Inturn,HughThomas'svoluminoushistoryofCubadoesnothaveasingleindexentryforMiami,eventhoughmuchpoliticalmaneuveringwentonthereinthetwentiethcentury.18ForMiamihotelownersanddevelopers,Cubansrepresentedlittlemorethananoccasionalsourceoflow-wagelabor.Fortheexiles,thecitywasbutarearbasefororganizingoffensivesagainstthegovernmentinHavana.

SeveralfactorscontributedtothiscasualattitudeofCubanstowardacitythatwas,afterall,inadifferentcountry.Weatherandgeographyplayedapart,nodoubt,butsodidthebuiltenvironment.OldKeyWesthadbeenbuiltbyCubans,anditsarchitecturenaturallyreflectedstylesfamiliarintheisland.MiamiwasbuiltbyYankeedevelopers,buttheirblueprintswerealsodominatedbyAndalusianandMediterraneanthemes.Upanddownthebeach,wroughtiron,redtile,andvillaswithSpanishnamesabounded.Anarchitecturedesignedtoattracttouristscametoprovide,unwittingly,areceptivesettingforformerSpanishcolonials.

WhenGeneralGerardoMaehado,democraticallyelectedpresidentofCuba,decidedtochangetheconstitutioninthelate1920ssothathecouldstayindefinitelyinpower,hetriggeredanewflowofexilesgoingtobothMiamiandNewYork.19ThePlattAmendment,stillinforce,enabledtheU.S.ambassadorstoCubatoplayakeyroleintheensuingstruggle.Americaneconomicinterestsintheisland,moreover,supportedthedictator,justastheyhadsupportedthecolonialregimeduringthewarofindependence.20"Indeed,"Thomasobserves,"itwasalltooeasyforbothgovernmentandoppositiontoslipintotherolesofSpaniardsandNationalists

withtheU.S.playingasimilarifmoreambiguousrolethaninthe1890s:itshometerritoryactingasabaseforrebels,itscitizensinCubabeingasupportfortheCubangovernment,bothhelpingtoprovidespecificfinancialassistance."

TheAmericanambassador,SumnerWelles,wasatfirstfriendlytowardMachado,butsoontheincreasingviolenceandpoliticalinstabilityinCubapersuadedhimthatthegeneralhadtogo.Thus,throughWelles'sefforts,thefirstCubandictatorshipcametoanend:onAugust12,1933,MachadoflewtoNassauwithafewfriendssomestillintheirpajamasandsevenbagsofgold.22ManyofhisclosestsupportersendedupinMiami,whereMachadowaseventuallyburied.HistombisintheWoodlawnCemetery,todayintheheartofLittleHavana.

TheintenseparticipationoftheAmericanambassadorintheeventsof1933,aswellasthecomingsandgoingsbetweenWashingtonandHavanaunderthePlattAmendment,gaveCubansanobjectlessoninthepoliticsofempire.Theunfortunatestatusofbeingasemicolonyhadtheunintendedeffectofgivingtheislandersathoroughapprenticeshipinthepoliticalwaysofthenorth.TheCubanupperclasslearnedhenceforthtomonitorthegovernmentinWashingtonascarefullyastheydidtheirowninHavana.

InMiami,thoseAugustdaysof1933hadwitnessedthedepartureofexultantrevolutionaries,theirplacestakenbycrestfallenincomingmachadistas.Thecity,however,wasinnomoodtopaymuchattentiontothischangeoftheguard:itwasinbigtrouble.Thelandboomofthenineteentwentieshadturnedintoacompletebust,andthepopulationhaddeclinedbymorethanhalfinlessthantenyears.TheRoyalPalmHotelwasboardedup,andmanyotherbusinesses

hadclosed.Withnopayingjobsanywhere,localsrediscoveredthenaturalbountyofthetropics,nearlyforgottensincethearrivalofFlagler'srailroad.Avocadoes,mangoes,andguavaswerestillplentifulinMiamibackyards,andfishstillswamingreatnumbersinthebay;thesubsistencethattheyprovidedcametosubstituteforstore-boughtprovisions.23AsthedespondentMachadoexilesmadetheirappearance,theyfoundacitywhereagoodpartoftheeconomyhadrevertedtowhatithadbeenhalfacenturyearlier,replacingthatrunontouristdollarsandrampantlandspeculation.

TheLeaderCometh

Onasunnydaytwenty-threeyearslater,theauthoritiesofDaytonaBeachgatheredtohonorafamouslocalresident.Themaninquestion,GeneralFulgencioBatistayZaldívar,hadleftDaytonaafewyearsearliertoorganizeoppositiontothedemocraticallyelectedpresidentofCuba,CarlosPríoySocarrás.OnMarch10,1952,BatistaengineeredamilitarycoupthatsentPríopackingtoMexicoandeventuallytoMiami.ThenewregimewasveryfavorablydisposedtoAmericans,betheylegitimatebusinessmenorgamblingracketeers,andthesugar-ledprosperity,oftheislandinsuredhappyreturnstoall.Accordingly,theDaytonacityfatherssawnothingwronginproclaimingMarch24,1956,"BatistaDay"inhonorofthenewCubandictator,inaceremonyheldonlyafewhundredmilesawayfromMiami,wherethedeposedlegitimatepresidentsulkedinimpotence.

Príowasdownbutnotout.HenowdedicatedallhisenergiesandhisconsiderablepersonalfortunetotheoverthrowofBatista.AndalthoughPríowasnotuptoleadinganexpeditionhimself,hesupportedalmostanyonewhodid.FirsttheLuzerneHotelinMiamiBeachandthenPrío'sownCasaReposadainSouthMiamibecamehubsofconspiracywherepoliticiansandadventurersofallstripescametoavailthemselvesoftheformerpresident'slargesse.MiamionceagainbecamethecenterofoppositiontotheregimeinHavana.25

ItwasthustoMiamithat,inlate1955,ayoungexilecamewhocouldboastofhavingledtheonlymajorarmedattackonBatista'sdictatorship.Theattackfailed,andmanyoftheparticipantswere

killed,butFidelCastrosurvivedandwasamnestiedtwoyearslater.AlthoughCastrohadbeenanactivepoliticalopponentofformerPresidentPrío,allwasforgottennowinthetwomen'scommonstruggleagainsttheBatistadictatorship.FromMiami,therefore,FidelwasabletotakebacktohisheadquartersinMexicoaheftyfinancialcontributionandthepromiseofmoretocome.26Oneyearlater,Fidelandhisbandofrevolutionariesembarkedonthefifty-eight-footyachtGranma,boughtwith$15,000ofPrío'smoney,andlandedinOrienteProvince,Cuba,onDecember2,1956.27

FromthatdayuntiltheoverthrowofBatistain1959,thecenterofrevolutionaryactionshiftedtotheSierraMaestraMountains,wheretherebelshadestablishedtheirheadquarters.Miamibecameasupportbase.ThenceforthatacitstrugglebrokeoutbetweenCastrosupporters,whosemissionwastosendarmsandsuppliestotherebels.andtherestoftheanti-Batistafactions,whofeltincreasinglyupstaged.Prío'splanhadsucceededonlytoowellincreatinganarmedchallengetothedictatorship,butintheprocessthedeposedpresidenthadlostcontrolofthesituation.

AnattempttobringtherevolutionbackintothehandsofthosewhowerepayingforitwasmadeinMiamiintheearlywinterof1957.AtameetingattendedbyrepresentativesofCastro'sTwenty-sixthofJulyMovement,Prío'sAutenticoparty,andotherexilefactions,aCouncilofNationalLiberationwasestablished,withPrío'sformerprimeminister,ManuelAntoniodeVarona,namedhead.ThecouncilimmediatelyissuedamanifestodesignedtoreassurebothWashingtonandtheCubaneliteabouttherevolution'sprocapitalistleanings.Prío,whohelpedorganizethemeetingandwhofinancedmostofthegroupspresent,emergedastheclearwinner.

Therewasonehitch,however,andthatwasthatFidelCastrohadneverbeenconsulted.Helearnedaboutthe"MiamiPact"intheNewYorkTimesandimmediatelydenouncedit.Hisprotestlettertothecouncilexemplifiesthelanguagehewouldusetosilencealloppositionafterhisarrivalinpower:"Forthosewhoarefightingagainstanarmyincomparablygreaterinnumberandarms,withnosupportforawholeyearapartfromthedignitywithwhichwearefighting...bitterlyforgottenbyfellowcountrymenwho,inspiteofbeingwellprovidedfor,havesvstematically...deniedustheirhelp,

theMiamiPactwasanoutrage."29

WiththewithdrawalofCastro'sTwenty-sixthofJulyMovementandlaterofotherforces,thecouncildisintegrated.TheexilecommunityinMiamiwasthereaftertorninadoublestruggle:againstBatistaandbetweentheincreasinglydominantfidelistasandotherrevolutionarygroups,Príohelpedorganizeandfinanceseveralsubsequentexpeditions,aimedatbalancingtheincreasinghegemonyoftheSierraMaestrarebels.30Butitwastoolate.FidelCastrohadcapturedboththeimaginationofCubansandthefancyoftheU.S.press,andwhenBatistafinallyfledonDecember31,1958,

powerfellrightintothehandsoftheSierraMaestraleader.Otherrevolutionarygroupswerecompelledtofallintolineorwereeliminated.

InthewakeofFidel'striumph,manyMiamiCubansreturnedtotheirhomeland.Likethereturningexilesof1895,theyharboreddecidedlymixedfeelingsaboutthecountryleftbehind.True,theUnitedStateshadgiventhemrefuge,andinfluentialAmericanvoiceshadsupportedtheircause,buttheU.S.governmenthadalsowaiteduntilthelastminutetoreverseitsactivesupportofBatista.LiketheDaytonaBeachcitycouncil,StateDepartmentofficialsputNorthAmericaneconomicconcernsfirstandhumanrightsanddemocracyinCubaadefinitivesecond.AfamousremarkbytheCubandeskofficerattheStateDepartment,WilliamWieland,waskeptwellinmindbythereturningexiles:"IknowBatistaisconsideredbymanyasasonofabitch...butAmericaninterestscomefirst....Atleastheisoursonofabitch,heisnotplayingballwiththeCommunists....Ontheotherhand,FidelCastroissurroundedbycommies."

Asforex-presidentPrío,theearlypatronofCastro'srebelmovement,hewascourtedatfirstbythenewregime,whichsenthimonaseriesofdiplomaticsortiesabroad.Deprivedofanyrealpowerandconfrontedwitharadicalizingrevolution,though,hesoughtasylumduringonesuchtriptoBrazil.Afewdayslater,hewasbackinMiami.Yearslater,hisfortuneandinfluencegone,hecommittedsuicideathishomeinCoralGables.LikeGerardoMachado,heisburiedintheWoodlawnCemetery,inthemiddleofLittleHavana.

Off-SeasonTourists

AnotherfacetoftherelationshipbetweenCubaandFloridabecame

apparentduringthePrío/Batistadecade(1948-58).Miamiinthe1950swasnotjustaplacewherepoliticalmanifestoswereissuedandrevolutionarypactssigned;forthegrowingCubanmiddleclass,itwasalsoapopularvacationspot.Theislandsoldsugar,nickel,andtobaccoandimportedalmosteverythingelse,mostlyfromtheUnitedStates.Itmadesense,then,togoshoppingforthelatestfashionsandconsumergoodsonthemainlandand,intheprocess,partakeoftheglitterofMiamiBeach's"GoldCoast"

alongLincolnRoadandCollinsAvenue.PanAmericanAirlineswasbornwhenitbeganservicetoCuba,andtheMiami-basedhydroplanesthattookthrill-seekingtouriststoHavanaalsobroughtbackloadsofCubanshoppers.CubanaAirlines,originallyaPanAmsubsidiary,addedseveraldailyflights,turningtheMiamirunintoaroutineevent.

Formanymiddle-classCubans,aSouthFloridavacationwasayearlyritual;forthewealthy,itcouldbeadailyexcursion.Businessmenandwell-heeledgovernmentofficialscouldflytoMiamiinthemorning,shoponLincolnRoadandhavelunchattheFontainebleauHotel,andbebackinHavanabyevening.Forthosewithaccesstogovernmentorprivateplanes,itwasapopulartripindeed.

32Miamihoteliers,whohadignoredtherevolutionariesexceptperhapsasasourceofcasuallabor,welcomedtheCubantourists,fornowtheycouldkeeptheirestablishmentsopenyearround.Northernerscamefleeingthecoldandsnowinwinter,atimewhennoself-respectingCuban,orSouthFloridianforthatmatter,woulddreamofgoingnearthewater.Cubans,however,cameinthesummer,the"off-season";afterall,itwasnotweatherthatattractedthemtoMiami.TheysimplyenjoyedpartakingofAmericancultureinafamiliarenvironment.Thetemperature,thefaunaandflora,eventhearchitecturewerecommon;thethrillconsistedmainlyinseeingthemlabeledinadifferentlanguageandarrangedsomewhatdifferentlyintheflatFloridalandscape.

Bythemid-1950s,theMiamitouristindustryandthesemipermanentcolonyofCubanvisitorshadsettledintoacomfortablerelationship.ExpelledpoliticianscametoMiamitoliveinleisure,iftheyhadtheeconomicmeans,ortoworkforlowhotelwagesiftheydidnot.Touristaccommodationswerediscountedinthesummermonths,andtheCubanmiddleclasstookadvantageofthecheapratesforits

pilgrimagesnorth.Noneofthesetouristsimaginedthattheywouldwalkthesamestreetsaspennilessrefugeesonlyafewmonthslater.

CubanpoliticalmilitantsremainednearlyinvisibleinMiamiatleastuntiltheearly1960s;atthatpoint,though,theerstwhilesummervacationersbegantojointheirranksinincreasinglylargenumbers.WhentheCubanmiddleclassdidstarttoexittheisland,itwenttoasocialenvironmentmadeutterlyfamiliarbyyearsofpriortravel.Nocultureshockhere.Unlikelaterrefugeesfrom

othercommunistregimesVietnamese,Cambodians,EthiopiansCuba'sexilesdidnotreallymovetoaforeignland.

33SouthernFloridawasknownterritory.Thisperceptualframeallowedearlyescapeesfromtherevolutionmembersoftheoldelitewhocametoawaitthe"inevitable"downfallofCastrotodefinetheirsojourntoSouthFloridasimplyasanextendedvacation.

TheExodus

InJuly1960,ayoungstudentleaderrecentlyescapedfromCubawascollectedathisMiamihotelandtakentoasecretmeetingoftheCubanMovementforRevolutionaryRecuperation(MRR).Thepurposeofthemeetingwastoexpelthreeofthefourfoundersofthemovementsoastoputitunderthesolecontrolofthefourth,aCIA-backedformerlieutenantinCastro'srebelarmy,ManuelArtime.Thoseatthemeetingweremadetosignaformaldocumentof"expulsion";subsequentlytheyoungexilewasescortedtoahousewherehewouldresidewithothermembersofthemovementuntilhisdeparturefortheclandestinetrainingcampssetupbytheCIA.ThehotelwheretheyouthwaslivingwasinMiamiBeach,thehousewherethesecretmeetingtookplacewasinCoralGables,andthewould-befreedomfighters'dormitorywasinSouthMiami.34

Evenatthisearlydateintheexodus,therewereCubansalloverthecity.MeetingslikethisoneinCoralGablesproliferatedasself-proclaimedleadersofpost-CastroCubajockeyedforpower;attheairports,trafficwasheavyasplaneloadsofnewrefugeesarrivedfromtheislandandsecretCIAflightsdepartedfortrainingcampsinCentralAmerica.Allthewhile,Miami'swhiteestablishmentignoredalltheactivity,confidentthat,asintimespast,itwouldeventuallygoaway.

OnJanuary1,1959,theforcesthathadbeenbuildingforsolongoneithersideoftheStraitsofFloridahadbeguntoconverge.ThisfirstdayoftheyearmarkedthebeginningoftherevolutionaryregimeinCuba,aswellasthebirthofanewsocialorderinMiami.Assooftenhappensinhistory,theoldorderlookedontheeventthatmarkeditsdemisewithindifference.ThestruggleinCubadidnotevenmakethefrontpageoftheMiamiHeraldonthatfatefulNewYear'sDay.Insteadthenewspaperinformeditsreaders

abouttheKingOrangeparadeandtheendoftheEasternAirlinesstrike.WhileCubanexilesinMiamitooktothestreetstocelebrate,nativeMiamianspaidscantattentiontothenewsthatGeneralFulgencioBatistahadfledtheisland.

Thefirstwaveofthepost-CastroexodusconsistedofofficialsfromthedeposedBatistaregime.Thefamiliarchangingoftheguardtookplace,withexultantfidelistasleaving,tobereplacedbydefeatedbatistianos.ScufflesbrokeoutintheMiamiairportbetweenpassengersarrivingfromanddepartingforHavana,causinglocalpolicereinforcementstobesentin.Otherwise,thingswerenormal.Asexpected,thenewexilescreatedtheirownorganizationsandnewspapersandsetabouttheimprobabletaskofwrestlingpowerawayfromtherevolutionariestheyhadbeenunabletodefeatwhiletheystillcontrolledthegovernmentinHavana.

Thisfirstbatchofexileswasnumericallyinsignificant,andgiventhemassreturntotheislandfollowingBatista'sdownfall,theCubanpopulationofMiamiprobablydiminishedforawhile.Hadtherevolutionaryregimecarriedoutthepromisedreturntoelectedgovernment,thesituationmighthavestabilizedatthatpoint.Instead,Castrooptedto''deepen"therevolution,movingitsteadilyleftward.Inreaction,aslowbutgrowingtrickleofbusinesspeopleandformerlandowners,whohadatfirsttriedtonegotiatewiththenewauthoritiesonlytoseetheirpropertiesandlandconfiscated,begantoleavetheislandaswell.InMiami,theBatistafollowersawaitedthemwithan"Itoldyouso"smirk.ThefirsttwoyearsoftheCubanRevolutionthussawthegradualreturntoMiamiintheguiseofpoliticalexilesoftheverygroupswhohadknownthecityasaplayground:first,theprivilegedforwhomMiamiwasadaytrip,andthenthosewhocould

affordtocomeeverysummer.Approximately135,000CubansarrivedduringthisearlyperiodbetweenJanuary1959andApril1961.36

Implausibleasitmayseem,regularHavana-MiamiflightscontinuedaftertheBayofPigsinvasionof1961,ferryingagrowingnumberofescapees.Thenewcomerscameincreasinglyfromthelowermiddleclassandweremuchlesslikelythantheirpredecessorstoholdtheillusionofexileasan"extendedvacation."CommercialflightstoMiamiceasedduringtheMissileCrisisofNovember1962.Fromthattimeon,escapefromCubabecamepossibleonlybysecuringavisatoathirdcountry,adifficultprocessatbest,

orbycrossingtheFloridaStraitonaclandestineboatorraft.By1965,annualCubanrefugeemigrationtotheUnitedStateshaddwindledtoonly16,447;thecumulativetotalsincetherevolutionstoodat210,000.

ThesuperpowerconfrontationovertheRussianmissilesinCubain1962wasresolvedattheeleventhhourwhentheSovietUnionagreedtoremoveitsweapons;inturn,theKennedyadministrationagreedthattherewouldbenonewarmedactionsagainstCastro'sgovernmentincludinganyinitiatedbyCubansinMiami.WiththeSovietUnionbackingFidelandWashingtonpreventingraidsontheisland,theMiamiCubancommunitywaseffectivelyreducedtoimpotence.Thisstateofaffairswasnotlostonthecity'scivicleaders,whodidnotrelishtheprospectofapermanentpopulationoftwohundredthousandimpoverishedrefugees.By1965,thepresenceoftheCubanswasnolongeramatterofpublicindifferenceinMiami.ElectedSouthFloridaofficialsnowpetitionedWashingtonforfederalhelpinsolvingthe"refugeecrisis."

Inresponse,theU.S.governmentorganizedalarge-scaleinitiativetoresettleanti-CastroexilesawayfromMiami.ThenewCubanRefugeeProgram,createdbytheKennedyadministrationtoaidtheexilesduringtheir"temporary"stay,focusedalmostimmediatelyonresettlingthemacrossthecountry.Cubanprofessionalswereretrainedashighschoolteachersanddispatchedtoremotenorthernlocations;governmentaidtoindividualsandfamilies,infact,wasmadecontingentonacceptanceofresettlement.By1967,theprogram'shead,JohnThomas,couldproudlyproclaimthattheresettlementofCubanrefugeesintheUnitedStateshadbeenacompletesuccess.38Withimmigrationfromtheislandreducedtoatrickleandavigorous

resettlementprograminplace,Miamiofficialsbreathedfreelyagain.Miamiwouldcontinuetobewhatithadalwaysbeenapurveyorofsunandsandtonortherntourists,itspoliticsdominatedbytheperennialstrugglebetweenMetroandthemunicipalities.

Alas,itwasnottobe.InSeptember1965,theCubangovernmentopenedthefishingportofCamariocatoallexileswantingtotaketheirrelativesfromtheisland.InarehearsalofMarielfifteenyearslater,fivethousandCubanswereferriedacrosstoMiami.Inresponsetothisincident,theJohnsonadministrationsigneda"MemorandumofUnderstanding"withHavanaallowingtwo

dailyflightsofrefugeesfromVaraderoBeachtoMiami.BetweenDecember1965andApril1973,whentheywereunilaterallyterminatedbyCastro,these"freedomflights"broughtapproximately340,000newrefugees.

ItisunclearwhyWashingtonagreedtosuchamassiveairliftperhapstoavoidanotherCamarioca,butthenagain,thedailyspectacleoftheserefugeeshadpoliticalvalue:whatbetterindictmentofCaribbean-stylecommunism?Cuba'sescapeesmayalsohavebeenregardedasanassetbecauseoftheireducationalandoccupationalcredentials,particularlyduringthisperiodofsustainedeconomicgrowthintheUnitedStates.Inreality,however,therefugees'educationalqualificationswerecontinuouslyfallingastheeliteexodusgavewaytoamorerepresentativecross-sectionoftheCubanpopulation.Before1970,theproportionofprofessionalsamongtheexileshoveredaround15percent;butinarepresentativesampleof1973arrivals,professionalsrepresentedonly4.8percent.Evenso,averageeducationalattainmentofthenewrefugeeswasstillabovetheaverageofthepopulationontheisland.Theexileswerealsodisproportionatelyurbaninorigin,andtheproportionofblacksandmulattoesremainedmuchlowerthaninCuba.40

AllthetimethatthefreedomflightswerecomingintoMiami,resettlementflightswereleavingitinanattempttodistributemoreevenlytheburdenofrefugeeresettlement.By1978,469,435CubanshadbeensettledawayfromMiami.Tofederalandlocalbureaucrats,thiswasampleevidencethatthe"problem"ofrefugeeconcentrationinSouthFloridahadbeenresolved.41Inthelate1960s,however,adiscreetcountertrendstartedthatsawresettledCubanfamiliestrekbacktoMiamiontheirown.In1973,asurveyestimatedthat27

percentoftheCubansresidingintheMiamimetropolitanareahadreturnedtherefromotherU.S.locations.AsurveyconductedbytheMiamiHeraldin1978raisedthatvaluationtoabout40percent.42Asaconsequenceofthisacceleratingreturnmigration,by1979,ontheeveofMariel,closeto80percentofCubansintheUnitedStateswerelivinginMiami,makingit,ineffect,Cuba'ssecond-largestcityandtherefugeesthemostconcentratedforeign-bornminorityinthecountry.43

ThereisevidencethatreturningCubanexilefamiliesregardedtheirsojourninthenorthmuchasimmigrantsoftenviewtheir

staysabroad,namelyasanopportunity.toaccumulatesavingswithwhichtostartabusinessathome.

44Oncetheyhadaccumulatedasubstantialsum,theyheadedbacktoFlorida.Butnottojustanyplace.JacksonvilleandTallahasseewereasalientotherefugeesasthefrigidcitiestheyhadleftbehind.Miami,ontheotherhand,waswarmandfamiliar.Itwasrelativelyeasytolearntheropesofbusinessthere;Cubansknewthecity,andmosthadkintherewhohadremaineddespitetheentreatiesoftheCubanRefugeeCenter.Thetiesbuiltoverhalfacenturynowworkedtopromoteamassreturnmigrationtothissinglecity.AsasubstituteforlostHavana,onlyMiamiwoulddo.

BythetimethecharteredboatsbegantocrosstheStraitsofFloridaforMariel,alargeanddiversifiedexilecommunityhademergedinSouthFlorida,actingasamagnetforallCubanselsewhere.Anestimated80percentofthe125,000-oddMarielentrantssettledthere,45atonceexpandingthecommunityinsizeandpromptingitstransformationfromapoliticalexilegroupintoaself-consciousethnicminority.

UneasyNeighbors

TheflightfromVaraderoBeachhadalreadyarrived.Mostpassengershadbeengreetedwiththeusualtearsandembracesandwhiskedawaytothehomesoftheirkin.Sittingaloneinthereceptionareawasamiddle-agedmanreflectivelypuffingonhiscigar.TheinterviewerapproachedhimandaconversationinSpanishbegan:

Whyareyoustillhere?

I'mawaitingaflighttoNewJersey.

Doyouhaverelativesthere?

Yes,afew.

Andtheywillsurelyhelpyou.

Idon'texpectso.

DoyouspeakEnglish?

Notaword.

Butlook,NewJerseyisnotMiami.Ifyou'regoingtherewithoutknowingEnglishandwithnoonetohelpyou,howdoyouexpecttosurvive?

Acondescendingsmile."That'swhat'they'alwaystoldme.The

fidelistaswhereIworkedwerealwayssayingthatIcouldnevergetasgoodajob,couldprobablygetnojobatallhere.AndIreplied:Chico,inNorthAmerica,howdothedeaf-mutessurvive?Becausethat'swhatI'mgoingtobetheredeafandmute.Andiftheycansurvive,sowillI."

ItwasMarch1973.Evenatthislatedate,withthefreedomflightsabouttoendandalargeexilecommunityresidentinMiami,newarrivalswerestillwillingtotrytheirluckinnortherncities.Itwasdifficult,however,toremaindeafandmuteandataculturaldisadvantagewhenabetteroptionexisted.Sixyearsaftertheaboveexchangetookplace,ourconfidentrespondentcamebacktoMiami.Manyothershadprecededhim.

Afterthe1962MissileCrisis,theCubanexilecommunityresigneditselftoalongperiodofwaitingbeforeareturntoCubawouldbepossible.Bytheendofthedecade,manyhadbecomeconvincedthattheir"temporary"movehadturnedpermanent.Forthosearrivingaboardthefreedomflights,comingfromprogressivelylowerstrataofCubansociety,therewasnodoubtingthatfact.Theyhadlefttoescapecommunism,nottoengineeritsdemise.AstheyjoinedolderCubansinSouthFlorida,theywereconfrontedwithanovelproblem:howtocoexistwiththeirAngloneighbors.

JustasithadinfluencedtheselectionofMiamiasthechoiceplaceofexilesettlement,thehistoryofCubaU.S.relationsalsoaffectedtherefugees'approachtocommunity.ResistancetoYankeehegemony,soprevalentamongtherevolutionaryleadersinHavana,wasnotentirelyabsentinMiami.Asagroup,therefugeesregardedthenationthathadreceivedthemwithamixofgratitudeandsuspicion.HadnotNorthAmericans,afterall,alwaysputtheirowninterestsfirst?Hadtheynot,afterhelpingtoliberateCubafromSpain,thenimposedthePlatt

Amendment?Hadtheynotsupportedvariousdictators,evenwhiletheyhostedsuccessivegroupsofexilesworkingtooverthrowthosesamedictators?Hadtheynot,tenyearsearlier,armedtheexpeditionaryforceagainstCastroandthenabandonedthemenintheBayofPigs?Finally,hadnotWashingtontradedawaytheexiles'abilitytoconfrontCastrodirectlyinexchangeforitsownsecurity?Allinall,averyspottyrecord.

Hence,whenMiaminativewhitesabandonedtheirtraditional

indifferencetowardtherefugeestospeakinincreasinglyurgenttermsabouttheneedforassimilation,theCubansbalked.TheAngloelitediscourse,whichurgedthenewcomerstogiveuptheirculture,learnEnglish,andtaketheirturnintheethnicqueue,inspiredlittleenthusiasm.Instead,despiteitsownmyriadsocialandpoliticalcleavages,theexilecommunitysetaboutpursuinganalternativeproject.Tacitly,almostunconsciously,itattemptedtorecreateasfaraspossiblethecountryleftbehind.Thiswastobenomereimmigrantneighborhood,buta"moralcommunity"standingforthevaluesofoldCubansocietyandagainsttheneworderimposedbyCastroism.

47Throughouttheseventies,thistacitprojectcontinuedatarapidpace.Therhetoricwasthatofreturn,buttherealitywasoneofconsolidation.Theloudprotestsofthenativeeliteswentunheededas,gradually,Miami,tookonthehuesofa"secondHavana"48givingtotheAndalusianplaygroundsandtheSpanish-namedboulevardsanewmeaning.

1.TheMiamiskyline,1992.PhotobySueChaffee.

2.SignatS.W.8thStreetand27thAvenue,Miami.

PhotobySueChaffee.

3.ChapelofOurLadyofCharity,patronsaintofCuba,builtonBiscayne

Bay.ItfacessouthtowardCuba.PhotobySueChaffee.

4.BayofPigsMemorial,WoodlawnCemetery,Miami.Theinscriptionunderthe

mapofCubareads:"Inmemoriam,mayGodgranteternalresttothosewho,fortheirloveofGod,Cuba,andfamily,precededusinsacrificeanddenyittousuntilwe

winvictoryforCuba."

PhotobyPeggyNolan.

5.CubanandU.S.flagsinWoodlawnCemetery.TwoCubanandone

Nicaraguanpresidentareburiedthere.PhotobyPeggyNolan.

6.DominoplayersinLittleHavana.

PhotobySueChaffee.

7.FuneralhomeinMiami.Thecitydidnotexistin1857;thesign

referstothehome'sfoundinginHavana.PhotobyPeggyNolan.

8.Streetscene,LittleHavana.

PhotobySueChaffee.

9.BillboardpaidforbytheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationaspartofitscontroversywiththelocalnewspaperinearly1992.Thesignreads,''Idonot

believeintheHerald."PhotobySueChaffee.

10.DowntownLittleHaiti,Miami.

PhotobySueChaffee.

11.Haitianstreetvendors,LittleHaiti.

PhotobySueChaffee.

12.Streetscene,LittleHaiti.PhotobySueChaffee.

13.HaitianboatandcaptainintheMiamiRiver.Theboat'sname,in

Creolemeans"GodIsNotLikeUs."PhotobySueChaffee.

14.Haitiandockworker,MiamiRiver.

PhotobySueChaffee.

15.Haitianwomenatworkinagriculture,southwestofMiami.

PhotobyPeggyNolan.

16.Haitianbeanpicker,southwestDadeCounty.

PhotobyPeggyNolan.

17.HaitianwomenshoppinginaCuban-ownedmarket.

PhotobySueChaffee.

18.ReligiouscollegeinMiamiBeach.

PhotobySueChaffee.

19.StudentsatTalmudicUniversity,MiamiBeach.

PhotobySueChaffee.

20.HasidicJewsunderthepalmtrees,MiamiBeach.

PhotobyPeggyNolan.

21.MonumenttoCarlFisher,founderofMiamiBeach.Itssmallsizemaybedueto

hisanti-SemiticviewsinwhatbecameapredominantlyJewishcity.

PhotobySueChaffee.

22.MuralinnorthwestMiami.Itmarksthedividinglinebetween

LittleHaitiandLibertyCity.PhotobySueChaffee.

23.CubansprotestingNelsonMandela'svisittoMiami,1990.

PhotobyDezsoSzusi,MiamiHerald.Reproducedbypermission.

24.Anti-Mandelaprotester,1990.PhotobyJonKral,MiamiHerald.

Reproducedbypermission.

25.CubanprotesterarguingwithMandelasupporter,1990.

PhotobyDezsoSzusi,MiamiHerald.Reproducedbypermission.

26.Tentcityprovidingtemporaryshelterforpeoplemade

homelessbyHurricaneAndrew.PhotobySueChaffee.

27.StoredestroyedbyHurricaneAndrew.

PhotobySueChaffee.

28.HomedestroyedbyHurricaneAndrew.

PhotobySueChaffee.

ChapterSixHowtheEnclaveWasBuilt

TheRecareyCase

Themaninthesoberdarksuitappearedquiteconfident.''Letthemcomplain,"hesaid."Ourprofitsarelegitimateandtheycomefrombulkbuyingofgenericdrugsandfrompreventivemedicine."Themanhadreasontobeself-assured.InlessthanfiveyearshehadparlayedatinyhospitalinMiamiintoachainofhealthmaintenanceorganization(HMO)clinicsgrossing$30millionamonth.Thechain,InternationalMedicalCenters(IMC),hadrisenfromnowheretobecomethesecondlargestHispanicbusinessinthecountry,rightafterBacardi.Theowner,MiguelRecarey,wascatapultedintoprominenceasaleaderoftheLatinbusinesscommunityandastheultimateexampleoftheself-mademan.Headoptedalife-styleinaccordwithhissuccess:a$1.2millionoceanfronthouseinCoralGablesEstates,aMaseratiatthedoor,tripstoaprivateislandintheBahamasaboardhisforty-seven-footyacht.BillboardsinLittleHavanaproclaimedIMCasthelargestCubanfirminthenationandencouragedelderlyCubanstoenroll.

ThesplendidsuccessofIMCwastheproduct,however,notofcompetitiveservicesandcustomersatisfaction,butofbehind-thesceneslobbying.The$30milliondidnotcomefromindividualpayments,butfromthefederalgovernment,mailedtoRecareyeverymonthinasinglecheck.ThroughpoliticalcontactsinMiami,rangingfromCongressmanClaudePeppertothethenvicepresident'ssonJebBush,RecareyhadsecuredforIMCanexclusivecontractforapilot

programunderthesponsorshipoftheDepart-

mentofHealthandHumanServices(HHS).TheprogramwasdesignedtoreduceMedicarecostsbypayingHMOs95percentofaverageMedicarepaymentsforelderlypatients,regardlessofthepatient'shealth.IftheHMOcouldmaintainthepatient'shealthforlessthanthisfigure,itwouldpocketthedifference;ifnot,itwouldabsorbtheloss.

RecareystartedbyenrollingenmassetheelderlyCubansofMiami,butsoonmovedbeyondthiscoregrouptoeyethelargepopulationsofAmericanretireesinBrowardCounty,PalmBeach,andTampaBay.Therewasacatch,however.Toinsurequalityhealthcare,HHShadstipulatedthatatleasthalfofIMC'spatientsbefromoutsideofthepilotprogram,thetheorybeingthatmarketcompetitionwouldmaketheorganizationmoreefficientandguaranteeitsabilitytodeliverthebestpossibleservices.ForthefirstthreeyearsoftheprogramRecareyhadbeenexemptedfromthisrequirement,butas1984rolledaroundhebegantoworry.TheproblemwasthattheIMC'srollswereheavilytiltedtowardprogramparticipantsanditwasdifficulttoattractoutsidepatients.Butinsteadofgoingafternewclients,Recareywentafterthepoliticians.AloyalaidetoPepperpromisedthecongressman'ssupport.OntheRepublicanside,RecareyhiredtwoformerReaganaidesLynNofzigerandJohnSearsaslobbyistsforastronomicalfees(reportedly$400,000and$300,000,respectively).

Theeffortpaidoff.JebBushtelephonedkeyHHSofficialswithassurancesthatRecareywas"solid"andwouldnotproveanembarrassment.HHSsecretaryMargaretHecklerfoundtheserepresentations"persuasive."AletterdenyingthecontinuationoftheexemptiontoIMCwasreplacedbyoneextendingitforanotherthreeyears.Recareywasinthemoney.Withinayear,twohundredthousandnewpatientswereenrolledinhisclinics,almost80percentofthemelderlyMedicarepatients.HHSofficialswhohadplayedaroleinextendingtheexemptionquitthedepartmenttocomeworkfor

IMCatmuchhighersalaries.JuandelReal,thegovernment'sattorneyduringthenegotiations,tradedhis$70,000a-yeargovernmentjobfora$325,000annualsalaryatIMC.C.McClainHaddow,theHHSofficialwhoactuallysignedtheexemption,waspaid$38,000in1986asa''consultant"toIMC.

Soon,however,complaintsandlawsuitsstartedpouringin.WhileRecareypaidhimself,hisfamily,andhisbusinessassociates

fabuloussalaries,hewassqueezingtheactualhealthproviders.Theaimwasnothinglessthantoreducecostsperpatientwellbelowthe95percentofaveragecostsbudgetedbythegovernment.EarlyattemptstoinvestigateRecareylednowhere.A1984-85investigationbytheStateofFlorida'sInsuranceCommissionconcludedthatIMCwasfinanciallyhealthyandfoundnoevidenceofwrongdoing.AfederaldistrictattorneyinMiamiwhoopenedaninquirywasadvisedtoabandonit:Recareywasjusttoopowerful.

Buttheavalancheofcomplaintsandlawsuitscontinued.ThescandalofelderlycareinIMCclinicswasjusttoobigtocoverup.InApril1987,Recareyandthreeassociateswereindictedbythefederalgovernmentforbribery,andtheIMCcontractwasrevoked.InOctoberRecarey,afterquietlysecuringpassportsforhisyoungchildren,leftthecountry.Heisstillafugitive.TheremnantsofIMCwereacquiredbytheHumanaCorporationofKentucky,andwiththemerger,the"largestCubanfirm"intheUnitedStatesceasedtoexist.

AlthoughnotrepresentativeofthebulkofexilefirmsinMiami,theRecareystoryillustrateswellseveralaspectsoftheCubanenclave.First,IMCwasnotthetypicalsmallethnicbusinessportrayedinthesociologicaloreconomicliterature.Thiswasnocornergrocerystoreorloftgarmentshop,butamultimillion-dollarbusinesswithconnectionsatthehighestlevelsofgovernment.AlthoughIMCwasthelargestandfastest-growingexileenterprise,otherCubanfirmsreached,withlessalacritybutbetterpractices,acomparablesize.Second,Recareywastheprototypicalambitiousimmigrantentrepreneurwhogoestoofartoofast,payinglittleattentiontotherules.Hecarriedbrashnesstoanextreme;nevertheless,thesameorientationisfoundamongotherfirst-generationbusinessmenandpoliticianswhobelievethattosucceed,onemustnotbetooboundbylegalnicetiesandformalprocedures.Asthesepeople'sdeedsareregularlyuncoveredandtheyarehauledbeforethecourts,they

provideeffectiveammunitionforthoseintheAngloestablishmentwhochargethattheseLatinnewcomerscannotbetrustedwiththemanagementofAmericaninstitutions.Notsurprisingly,Recarey'sstorywasextensivelyreportedonthefrontpageoftheMiamiHerald.

Third,thescandalrockedbutinnowaycompromisedtheeco-

nomicstrengthortherapidgrowthoftheCubanbusinessenclave.OtherunscrupulousentrepreneurslikeRecareyjustshruggedtheirshoulders:hewascaught,perhapstheywouldescape.ThemajorityofCubanfirmsandbusinessmen,thosewhoplayedbytherules,lamentedtheincidentasanotherepisodegivingthecommunityabadname.Theymadeeveryefforttoputtheincidentbehindthem,althoughtheHeraldwouldnoteasilyletthemforget.Intheend,however,thenumberofentrepreneurialventuresandthesheerdensityofbusinessnetworksweresuchthattheRecareyscouldcomeandgowithoutmakingadentinthelocaleconomy.BythetimeIMCenteredthescene,theCubanbusinessenclavehadlefttheconfinesofLittleHavanabehind;itnowencompassedtheentireMiamimetropolitanarea.Howthisphenomenondevelopedasifoutoftheblue,liftingpennilessrefugeestonationalprominence,isthestoryofthischapter.ThisprogressionsetthestagefortheprocessofreactiveformationthatwastofollowMarielandthe1980antibilingualreferendum.

TheBeginnings

Backin1962,therewerefewifanyCubanbusinessesinMiami.Thescatteredrestaurantsweremostlyfromtheprevious,anti-Batistaexile.Byforceofhabit,theyhadmadeofnostalgiaaspecialty.EveryoneexpectedtobebackinHavanasoon.DespitetheBayofPigsfiascotheprecedingyear,theCIAcontinuedtobeveryactiveinMiami.Itslocalstation,locatedattheUniversityofMiamiandknownasJM-Wave,wastheagency'ssecondlargestnexttoheadquartersinLangley,Virginia.Exileswhohadbeenunabletobringenoughfundstobeself-supportinginFloridamilitatedinanti-CastroorganizationssupportedbytheCIA.Theagency,indeed,hadbecomeoneofMiami'slargestemployers.TheofficesoftheCubanRevolutionaryCouncil,theexileumbrellaorganizationinBiscayneBoulevard,wereknownas"theMinistry"becauseofthemanyapplicantsbothfor

currentpositionsandforfutureonesinCuba.

TheU.S.-SovietdealthatresolvedtheCubanMissileCrisisin1962putanendtothemilitantperiodofexilepolitics,buttheCIAdidnotabandonSouthFloridaimmediately.OnlygraduallydiditdawnontheCubanactiviststhattheagency'sgoalhadchanged:

fromoverthrowingCastrotoeasingtheexilesoutofMiami."Don'tforgetthatwehaveadisposalproblem,"AllenDulleswassaidtohavetoldKennedyontheeveoftheBayofPigsbywayofwarningabouttheconsequencesofabortingtheinvasion.

4TheproblembecameurgentaftertheMissileCrisisconcluded.Tosolvethe"disposalproblem,"wordwaspasseddownfromJM-Wavethatthenextstepintheanti-CastrostruggleconsistedinjoiningtheU.S.Army,which,induecourse,wouldinvadeCuba.ScoresofyoungexilesenrolledandwerepromptlytakenawayfromMiami.Onthecivilianside,thenewfederalCubanRefugeeCenterstrengthenedthedispersaleffortbymakingresettlementawayfromSouthFloridaacommonrequisiteforassistance.

Thedevelopmentofanethniceconomyofanysubstantialscalehasthreeprerequisites:first,astablemarketthatsmallfirmscancontrolbyofferingtotheimmigrantcommunityculturallydefinedgoodsandservicesnotavailableontheoutside;second,privilegedaccesstoapoolofcheaplaborthroughnetworkswithinthecommunity;andthird,accesstocapital.Theavailabilityofaprotectedmarketandofcheaplaborgivesincipientethnicenterprisesan"edge"overfirmsinthemainstreameconomy.Accesstocapital,however,isthebiggeststumblingblock,sincenativebankersseldomlendtounknownnewcomers.5InMiamiintheearly1960s,prospectsfortheriseofaCubanethniceconomylookeddimastheprotectedmarketandlaborpoolwereconstantlyerodedbytheresettlementflightsoutofthecityandasmajorlocalbanksprovedunwillingtoadvancemoneyforexilebusinessstart-ups.

Nonetheless,severalcountertrendswereinevidenceaswell.JewishgarmentmanufacturersinNewYorksoondiscoveredthatthemiddle-classCubanwomenofMiamimadeexcellentworkers.Desperateto

maintainthelivingstandardoftheirfamiliesduringthe"temporary"exile,thesewomenwouldacceptlowwagesandhardworkingconditionswithoutprotest.Thus,confrontedwithuniontroubleinNewYork,manufacturersmovedtheiroperationsdowntoMiamiandHialeahindroves.Thelocalgarmentindustrythrived.AformerpresidentoftheFloridaNeedletradeAssociationdescribedthemovethisway:

YouhavetounderstandthatCubanworkerswerewillingtodoanythingtosurvive....Atthesametime,NewYorkwasexperiencingaresurgence

ofunionfervor.ManufacturersfromNewYorkwhohadhomesinMiamiBeachsawtheadvantagesofopeningnewbusinessesandhavingthelargenumberoffreshimmigrantscomingfromCuba.AsaresulttheSouthFloridaneedletradeindustrywentfromaboutseventhousandworkersin1964totwenty-fourthousandin1973.

Atypicalmid-sixtiesCubanhouseholdinMiamifeaturedahusbandwhohadbeenamemberofananti-CastroorganizationandnowstrainedtofindemploymentandawifewhohadneverworkedoutsidethehomebeforebutnowsewedfulltimeinaHialeahfactory.Thelarge-scaleemploymentofCubanwomenintheneedletradehadtwoimportantconsequences.First,itallowedfamiliestostayinMiamiandboughttimeforhusbandstolearnEnglishandfindsomelocalbusinessniche.Andsecond,ititselfcreatedsomeofthesenichesthroughindependentsubcontracting.ManyCubans,seeingwhattheJewishjobbersweredoing,decidedtoimitatethem.ThesameNeedletradeAssociationofficialreports:"Inthebeginning,allthefactorieswereJewish-owned,butbythemid-seventiestherewasadivisionoflabor.ThemanufacturerswerestillJewish,butmostcontractorswereCuban.Cubangarment'factories'usuallystartedintheowner'sgarage,withthewife,themother,andotherwomeninthefamilyastheoperators."7

Othermarketforceswerealsoatplay.ThelargenumberofformerCubanprofessionalsandwhite-collarworkers,whoofcoursespokefluentSpanish,begantoattracttheattentionofcompaniesoperatinginLatinAmerica.ExecutivesofNorthAmericancompaniesthathadhadbranchesinCubapointedouttotheiremployerstheadvantagesofestablishingtheirLatinheadquartersinMiami.OneenterprisingemployeeofCoralGableswentsofarasprintingbrochureshighlightingtheopportunitiesofferedbythecity,distributingthemto

allcompanieswithLatinAmericanoperations.Theresult,inthewordsofaCuban-Americanbanker,wasthat"CoralGablestookonanunexpecteddimensionandsoonconsolidatedintoaworldcenterofactivityforthelargestfirms....Cubanswerethenemployedbythesesamemultinationalcompaniestotravelanddobusinessforthemoverseas."8

CapitaliststhroughoutSouthAmericaalsobecameawareofthenewlabormarketcreatedinMiamibytheCubanRevolution.

Alongwiththedrugtradethatwastogiverisetothe"MiamiVice"image,manylegitimateVenezuelan,Ecuadorean,andotherLatincompaniessoughtinthecityarefugefromtheeconomicvagariesandpoliticalinstabilityoftheirowncountries.SouthAmericanflightcapitalplusCubanmanagementthusbecameaformulaforthecreationandgrowthofmanybanksandconstructioncompanies.

9TheirpresencewastohaveadecisiveimpactonthesubsequentdevelopmentoftheCubanbusinessenclave,aswewillseebelow.

AstheCIAabandonedMiami,itsmissionunfulfilled,itleftbehindalargenumberofformermilitantsreluctanttoresettleinthenorthandreadytoavailthemselvesoftheemergingbusinessopportunities.Contrarytosomescholarlyaccounts,therewasapparentlynodirectconnectionbetweenCIAinvolvementwiththeexilecommunityandtheriseofCubanentrepreneurship.10Fewoftheagency's"front"operationsprosperedaslegitimateenterprises,andthereislittleevidencethatCIAsalariesandsecretaccountsfunctionedasamajorsourceofcapitalforexilefirms.Instead,themainaccomplishmentoftheagency'smassiveinterventioninMiamiwastosupportasubstantialnumberofmiddle-classCubansatareasonablestandardofliving,allowingthemtimetomonitoropportunitiesofferedbythelocaleconomyandtofindasuitablebusinessniche.Painfulasitwasfromapoliticalpointofview,thetransitionfrommilitantexodustoentrepreneurialcommunitywasremarkablysmooth.FewimmigrantgroupshavecommencedtheireconomicadaptationtoAmericanlifefromapositionofsuchrelativeadvantage.

ThreeStories

In1966,SantiagoAlvarezhadhadenoughoftheclandestinewaranddecidedtosettledown.Hewastwenty-fiveand,forthelastfewyears,

hadworkedasaboatcaptainfortheCIAinfiltratingmenandarmsintoCuba.AsidefromanintimateknowledgeoftheCubancoast,hehadfewskills."Ididn'thavemuchofaneducation...Ihadtofightsinceaveryyoungage,"hesaid.InMiami,Santiagoworkedasawaiter,truckdriver,andconcretesalesman.Finally,in1971,heopenedhisownconstructionfirm,beginningwithjusthimself,hispickup,andhisconnections.Such"back-of-

the-truck"enterprisesproliferatedduringtheearlyseventies,butdidnotyetchallengethedominanceofestablishedAnglo-ownedcompanies.Alvarez'soperation,however,neverceasedgrowing.By1985hewasoneofSouthFlorida'smostactiverealestatedevelopers,havingtakenoverfromoldercompaniesthebuildingofshoppingcentersanddepartmentcomplexesinHialeah.

Afterspendingelevendaysinjailforantigovernmentactivities,RemediosDiaz-Oliverandherhusband,Fausto,leftCubain1961.AgraduateoftwoHavanabusinessschools,shewenttoworkasabookkeeperforRichfordIndustries,acontainerdistributor.FaustofoundworkatBertramYacht,locatednearby;thatmeantthecouplecouldmanagewithasingleoldcar.Withinayear,RemedioshadbeenmovedtoRichford'sinternationaldivision.Faustotookhistwoweeks'vacation,andthecoupletraveledtoCentralAmericawithabagofRichford'ssamples.Theyreturnedwith$300,000inordersfrompharmaceuticalcompaniesinHondurasandCostaRica.By1965,Diaz-OliverhadbeenappointedRichford'svicepresidentofdomesticsales,inadditiontoherdutiesaspresidentoftheLatinAmericandivision.

Theseweretheyearsinwhichformermilitantexileswerelookingforpermanentemployment.FromherHavanadays,Remediosknewmanypeoplewiththeskillstomakeabusinesssucceed.In1966,shepersuadedRichfordtoadvance$30,000incredittoonesuchperson,withthepromisethatifhedefaultedshewouldcoverthedebtwithherownsalary.Themanpaid,theaccountgrew,andsodidhercommission.Followingthisexperienceandatherprodding,Richfordagreedtoadvancecredittonumerousexileclients.Asthesefirmsdeveloped,thecompany'sownbusinessgrewrapidly.

In1976,however,RichfordwassoldtoadivisionofAlcoStandardCorp.ofOmaha,Nebraska.ThenewemployerrequiredRemediostosignacontractguaranteeingthatshewouldnotcompetewithAlcoStandardifsheleftthecompany.Insteadofsigning,Diaz-Oliverdecidedtoquitandformherowncompany.TheconstructiontrailerinwhichAmericanInternationalContaineropeneddidnotlooklikemuch,exceptthatitsownerhadfarmoresolidconnectionsinthelocalmarketthanthebuttondownmid-westerncompanydid.By1978,AmericanInternationalhadtaken

overtheinventoryofAlcoStandardafterdrivingitoutofMiami.Diaz-OliverbecameexclusiveFloridadistributorforsomeofthebiggestnamesinpackaging,includingOwens-IllinoisandStandardContainer.HercompanyhadwarehousesinMiami,Orlando,andTampaandannualsalesofover$60million.

RemedioshasbeenpresidentofDadeCounty'sAmericanCancerSociety,theHispanicdivisionoftheRedCross,andthesocialcommitteeoftheBigFivetheprivateclubcreatedinMiamiinnostalgicremembranceoftheHavanaYachtClubanditsfourextinctpeersinCuba.

AllthatDiegoR.Suarezhasdoneinhislifeisdesignandmanufactureagriculturalequipment,especiallyforthesugarcaneindustry.AgraduateoftheVocationalSchoolofHavanaandoftheCivic-MilitaryInstituteofCeibadelAgua,SuarezfoundedandoperatedacompanycalledVanguardNationalEquipmentpriortotherevolution.AfterFidelCastrocametopower,SuarezstartedmovinghiscapitaloutofCuba,andhehimselfleftin1961.WiththemoniessmuggledoutandaloanfromasmallPuertoRicanbank,heestablishedinMiamitheInter-AmericanTransportEquipmentCompany,amanufacturerandsupplierofharvest,transport,andfieldmachineryforthesugarindustry.ThecompanybeganbyexportinglightequipmenttoPuertoRico,thenexpandedtoallLatinAmericancountriesexceptBrazil.Atpresent,over90percentoftheequipmentmanufacturedisexportedtomorethanfortycountriesworldwide.InSuarez'sestimate,thelargemajorityoffieldequipmentusedtodayinFlorida'ssugarindustrycomesfromhisfactories.

Thecompany'sheadquartersandmainfactoryarelocatedinthevicinityofHialeah,whereitemploysbetweenthreehundredandfour

hundredworkers.TradenamesincludeVanguardandThomson(tractors,transportequipment,andothermachinery)andClaas(harvesters).By1986,mostofthisequipmentwasdesignedandmanufacturedatthesefacilities,excepttheharvesters,whichweremadeinWestGermany.Inter-American'sengineersareCuban,Mexican,American,andBritish.Throughouttheyears,Suarezhasmaintainedgoodrelationswithhisworkersandissatisfiedwiththestrongbondsthatexistwithhisclosecollaborators.

In1980,SuarezinitiatedtheInter-AmericanSugarCaneSemi-

nars,whichbringengineers,technologists,andsugarmillownersfromallovertheworldtoMiamitodiscussscientificandtechnicalissuesrangingfromsugarcanediseasestocomputerautomationofsugarmills.TheseminarsarefinancedbyInter-AmericanTransportincooperationwiththecityofMiami.SixU.S.universities,theuniversitiesofPuertoRicoandtheWestIndies,andtheU.S.DepartmentofAgriculturearethecosponsoringinstitutions.SuarezalsopresidesovercompaniesaffiliatedwithInter-AmericanTransportandisoneofthefoundersanddirectorsoftheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundation.

CharacterLoans

DiegoSuarezwasfortunatetohavebroughtmoneyandcontactsfromCuba.Ingeneral,thelargestandbest-capitalizedfirmsoftheemergingenclavewerecreatedbyexilesexperiencedinbusinessandhavingaccesstotheseresources.Manywould-beentrepreneursseekinganicheinMiami'seconomyduringtheearlysixtieswerenotsofortunate,however.UnlikeAsianimmigrantcommunitiesthatmakeextensiveuseoftherotatingcreditassociationasaninstrumentforpoolingsavings,Cubansdidnothavethisculturalpractice.14Initsabsence,itseemedthatbusinessstartswouldhavetorelyonpaltryfamilyloansorsmallsavingsfromwagelabor.

Therewasanotherway.WhatRemediosDiaz-OliverwasdoingatRichfordextendingcreditonthebasisofpersonalreputationbecameinstitutionalizedasCubanmanagersgraduallytookovertheloanportfoliosoflocalbanks.Tobesure,thesewerenotthedominantAnglo-ownedbanksforwhomtheexileswerejustanotherdowntroddenminority,butsmallbankscreatedwithLatinAmerican

capital.SouthAmericanownershaddeemeditwisetoputthemanagementoftheirfirmsinthehandsofexperienced,butthenunemployed,Cubanbankers.Oncetheirownpositionsbecamesecure,theseofficersinitiatedaprogramoflending$10,000to$30,000tootherCubansforbusinessstart-ups.

Accesstothiscreditwasnotbasedontheapplicant'sbalancesheetorcollateral,butonhisorherbusinessreputationinCuba.Thisuniquepracticebecameknownas"character"lendingandallowednumerousexileswhospokelittleEnglishandhadnostandingintheAmericanbankingworldtogetafootholdinthelocal

economy.AleadingCuban-Americanbankerwhotookpartinthisoperationdescribeditasfollows:

Atthestart,mostCubanenterprisesweregasstations;thencamegroceryshopsandrestaurants.NoAmericanbankwouldlendtothem.Bythemid-sixties,westartedapolicyatourbankofmakingsmallloanstoCubanswhowantedtostarttheirownbusinessesbutdidnothaveanycapital.Theseloansoftenorfifteenthousanddollarsweremadebecausethepersonwasknowntousbyhisreputationandintegrity.Allofthempaidback;therewerezerolosses.Withsomeexceptions,theyhavecontinuedbeingclientsofthebank.Peoplewhousedtoborrowfifteenthousanddollarsonaone-timebasisnowtakeoutfiftythousandinaweek.In1973,thepolicywasdiscontinued.Thereasonwasthatthenewexilescomingatthattimewereunknowntous.

Anearlyclient,nowalargefactoryowner,describeshisimpressionsofdifferingbankingstyles:

TheAmericanbankerlooksonlyatthestatement,thebalancesheetofthecompany.Ifhedoesn'tlikeit,hedoesn'tgiveyoutheloan.TheCubanbankerhasadifferenttechnique:helooksforsignsofyourcharacter.Ifheknowsyou,knowsthatyoumeetyourobligations,helendsyouwithoutlookingatthebalancesheet.Heknowsyouarenotgoingtofailhim.Americanbankshavethehabitofchangingcreditmanagersveryoften.TheyhirefreshcollegegraduateswhocomeheretoMiami,knownoone,andhavetobeginanalyzingstatements.TheretheCubanbankshavetheadvantage.Theirloanofficersknowtheirclientele,theyoftenevenknewtheirfamiliesinCubatwenty,thirtyyears.It'sasmalltechnicaldetail,butimportant.16

Meanwhile,intheconstructionindustry,Cubanswithexperienceandwhosoughtjobsascarpenters,plumbers,andbricklayerswerebeingblackballedbylocalunionsdominatedbynativewhites.Undeterred,theCubanscreatedtheirownhomerepairbusinessesbybuyinga

truckandgoingdoor-to-doorseekingwork.Eventually,someofthemgainedaccesstocharacterloans,SmallBusinessAdministrationloans,orpooledfamilysavingstoestablishmoresubstantialfirms.By1979,about50percentofmajorconstructioncompaniesinDadewereCuban-owned,andtheyaccountedforover90percentofresidentialandcommercialconstructioninthesouthwestzoneofthecounty.

DeveloperslikeSantiagoAlvarezgraduallydisplacedolderun-

ionizedcompanies.By1985,sixofthetenlargesthomebuildersinDadewereCuban-owned,includingWestMillerHeights(P.Adrian),AtriumHomes(A.Sotolongo),H.G.Enterprises(H.Garcia),andInteramBuilders(E.Pereira).Thesecompaniesareuniformlynonunion.Astheygraduallyexpanded,unionizednewconstructioninMiamiplummetedfromover90percentin1960tolessthan10percentin1980.ACarpenter'sUnionorganizergloomilysummarizedthesituationin1984:''WepaiddearlyfornotlettingtheCubansin.Theycametoseeusastheenemy,andworkersintheircompanieswouldnottouchus.NowevenAnglofirmsare'double-breasting':theykeeptheirunionizeddivisionsasafaçade,butalltheworkgoestonewnonuniondivisions."

GroupedintheLatinBuildersAssociation,theCubancompaniescametoexertgrowinginfluencenotonlyintheconstructionindustry,butinlocalpoliticsaswell.Predictably,oneofthegoalsoftheassociationistoinsurethattheinfluenceoftheconstructiontradesinDaderemainsataminimum.

Therewereothermeansofcapitalizingnewfirms,bothorthodoxandunconventional.EstablishedCubanJewishcompaniesinHavanasimplymovedtoMiamiandcontinuedtheirlong-standingrelationshipwithsuppliersandcreditors.ThisisthecaseoftheSuaveShoeCompany,afootwearmanufacturerandoneofthelargestfirmsoftheMiamienclave.Suaveandsimilarmanufacturerswereabletosecurecreditfrom"factors"bankerswhospecializeinadvancingcapitalonthebasisofworkorders,bypassingtheusual90-to-120-daysrepaymentperiod.Factorbankingisnotavailabletojustanybusinessnewcomer,however;itisbasedonestablishednetworksandasolidcommercialreputation.Thankstothisdecidedadvantage,

SuavebecamesosuccessfulthatitwentpublicandqualifiedtobelistedontheNewYorkStockExchange.18

Verysmallbusinesseswithoutaccesstobusinessnetworksorcharacterloanshadtofallbackonfamilysavings.AsurprisinglycommonwayofcapitalizingsuchfirmswastocollectthecashvalueofinsurancepoliciesboughtfromanAmericancompanyinCubabytheentrepreneurorhisorherparents.Manysmallbusinesses,fromgasstationstobookstores,wereestablishedinLittleHavanabycashingintheseoldandnearlyforgottenpolicies.19

ButitwascapitaladvancedbyCubanofficialsatthesmallSouthAmerican-ownedbanksthatplayedthedecisiveroleduringthe

sixties,fuelingthedevelopmentofathickmidlevellayerofenterprisesbetweentransplantedlargefirmsandthesmallfamilybusinesses.By1977,theCensusofMinority-OwnedEnterprisescounted30,366Cuban-ownedfirmsintheUnitedStates,mostoftheminMiami.TheareawashometohalfofthefortylargestHispanicfirmsinthenationandtothelargestbank.Therewasonefirmforeverytwenty-sevenCuban-bornpersons.

NetworksandSocialCapital

Clearly,socialnetworkswereessentialineffectingtherapidtransformationofpoliticalmilitantsintoethnicentrepreneurs.Yetitisimportanttodelvedeeperintothesocialcontextinwhichtheseeventstookplace.LanguageandacommoncultureprovidedCubanswithabasisforsolidaritybutbythemselveswerenotenoughtocreatealevelofmutualsupportstrongerthanthattypicalofmanyotherimmigrantcommunities.Rather,thecommoncircumstanceofexileandthecommonexperienceofsuccessivepoliticaldefeatshadcementedastrongsenseof"we-ness"amongtheserefugees.Expelledanddespisedbythegovernmentoftheircountry,abandonedattheBayofPigsbyasupposedlyfriendlygovernment,tradedoffduringtheMissileCrisis,ridiculedbyLatinAmericanintellectualswhoconfinedthemtothedustbinofhistory,theexileshadlittletofallbackonbutthemselves.Boundedsolidarity,wastheoutcome,amechanismthatledtheCubansdespitediverseclassoriginsandviewstopatronizeotherCuban-ownedbusinessesandtopreferco-nationalsasbusinessassociates.

Sharingacommonpoliticalfate,andanunenviableoneatthat,hadtheunexpectedconsequenceofpromotingeconomicprogressby

cementingtiesbuiltoriginallyonacommonculture.The"discrimination"thatCubanssufferedwasnottheusualtypeinvolvinglabormarketopportunitiesorsocialacceptance.Instead,itconcernedthefailureoftheiroverallpoliticalprojectandtheirinabilitytopersuadeothersofitsmerit.LatinaswellasNorthAmericanintellectualsderidedCubanexilesasjustabunchofpoliticallosersstrandedbetweentwonations.Thisisolationdefinedthecommunitvandstrengtheneditsinternalsolidarityinawaythatevenlanguageorawell-definednationalculturecouldnot.

ThephysicalboundariesoftheMiamienclavearenotclearly

demarcatedbecauseCubanbusinessesmaybefoundthroughoutthemetropolitanarea.Thesocialboundariesare,however,extremelyclear;theydefinetheoperationandthelimitsofboundedsolidarity,aswellasofasecondmechanismthatcontributeddecisivelytobusinessdevelopment.UnderlyingtheeasewithwhichCubanbankofficialsmadecharacterloanswasthecertaintythattheirclientswouldpay.Anyonedefaultingorotherwiseviolatingtheimplicittrustbuiltintosuchdealscouldkissgood-byehisorherchancesforbusinesssuccess;theentireCubancommunitywouldknow,andtherewaspreciouslittleopportunityoutsideofit.Hence,bankerswerenotsimplybeingloyaltotheirfriends,butdisplayinggoodbusinessacumen.Morethanbyawrittenpromise,theirloanswerebackedbyakindofenforceabletrustinherentinthesocialnetworksoftheenclave.The"zerolosses"reportedbyourCubanbanksourceswereentirelypredictable.

Normsofsolidaritywithinanethniccommunityraisethereverseproblemofsocialsupportexpectationsthatareincompatiblewiththelogicofcapitalaccumulation.InhisstudyofcommercialenterprisesinBali,CliffordGeertzobservedhowsuccessfulentrepreneurswereassaultedbyjob-andloan-seekingkinsmen.Thepetitioners'claimswerebuttressedbystrongnormsenjoiningmutualassistancewithintheextendedfamilyandamongallcommunitymembers.Theresultwastoturnpromisingbusinessesintorelieforganizationslanguishingatthemarginsofsolvency.22

FamilyandethnicobligationssurelyexistedamongMiamiCubans,buttheydidnotgosofarastocompromisetheviabilityofmostbusinessventures.Onthecontrary,suchtiesworkedintheentrepreneurs'favor,assourcesoflow-costfamilylaborandstart-up

capital.Thereareseveralreasonsforthissituation.FirstisthefactthatprerevolutionaryCubansocietyneverenjoinedthewealthytosupporttheirlessfortunatecompatriots.Boundedsolidarityemergedinexileoutofthecontingentcircumstancesdescribedabove,butithadclearlimitsintermsofmutualassistance.

Second,theprecariousbeginningsofmanyCubanenterprisesandtheobviousfactthat,tosurvive,theyneededtomaximizeefficiencyrestrictedtheirroleassourcesofemployment.Earlyexileentrepreneurs,engagedinwhatamountedtoeconomicguerrillawarfareagainstmuchlargerfirms,wereinnopositiontohonorotherCubans'welfareclaims.Onlykinandworkerswilling

toworklonghoursforminimalremunerationcouldbeemployedbythesefledglingbusinesses.

Third,largerenclaveenterprisesfrequentlyshiftedtomoremodernmanagementpracticesthatprecludedparticularisticobligations.Astheethniceconomygrewandfirmsbecamebettercapitalized,theyadoptedmoreconventionalformsoflabormanagement.Tobesure,Cubanswerestillpreferredasworkersandsupervisors,andCuban-ownedcompaniesdidmuchoftheirbusinesswitheachother,butthetransactionsacquiredamoreuniversalisticcharacterthatprecludedexclusivelyethniccriteriaforhiringandcontractingdecisions.

Mostenclavefirmscouldthusprosperwithoutbeingturnedintowelfarehotels.Thesocialmechanismsofboundedsolidarityandenforceabletrustproducedentrepreneurialsuccessthatwascelebratedbytheentirecommunityandpresentedasamodeltofollow.Inpoliticaldefeat,successinbusinessgraduallyemergedasasourceofcollectiveself-esteemandasproofofthecorrectnessoftherefugees'ideologicalstance:whileCubawentdowneconomicallyandregimesfriendlytoCastroalsofoundered,theMiamienclaveflourishedontheenergiesofexileentrepreneursandthesocialcapitalcreatedbytheirsolidarity.

TheMoralCommunity

"Miami:TheWorldinBlackandWhite,"readthetitleofaneditorialbyafamousCubanpoetafterspendingafewmonthsinthecity.Hesummarizedhisimpressionsinafewpoignantwords:"YouhavetoliveinMiami,sleepiniteachday,toreallyknowhowitisandhowithasforged[the]profile[ithas].Itisn'teasywithoutalonghistoricalrecountingtounderstandtherootsofsomuchincomprehension."24

HislastwordreferredtothepeculiarpoliticalintolerancethataccompaniedtherapideconomicgrowthoftheCubanenclave.InMiami,anappearancebyJaneFondahadledtoaboycottandaseriesofthreateningcallstoBurdines,thesponsorofhervisitandtheregion'slargestdepartmentstore.LatinAmericanartistswhohadvisitedCubaatsomepointoranotherwerebarredfromperformingattheannualCalleOchoCarnival.AndtheMiamiCityCommissionpermittedtheHaitiancommunitytocelebratethe

investitureofHaitianpresidentFatherJean-BertrandAristideonlyprovidedFidelCastrowasnotinvitedtothehome-countryceremonyinPort-au-Prince.

AstheCubancommunitygainedpoliticalpoweritimposedamonolithicoutlookonthecity,oftenwithlittleregardfortheconcernsandinterestsofothersegmentsofthepopulation.

25AplaybyaNewYork-basedCubanwritersuspectedofbeingsympathetictotheregimeintheislandhadtoberemovedfromtheprogramoftheMiamiTheaterFestivalaftertheorganizersreceivednumerouslocalthreats.ACubanbusinessmandefendedtheprotesters'pointofview:

Whensomanypersonshavebeenaffectedbycommunism,whensomanyhadtoabandonthelandinwhichtheywereborn,whenpeoplecouldnotvisitthecemeterieswheretheirlovedonesrest,wedohavetoprotestthiskindofthing.Whynot?Whydotheyhavetoimposeonussuchapainfulthing?Apersonwhohasnotsuffered,whohasnothadrelativeskilled,cansaycoollythattheremustbefreedomofexpression.Weknowbetter.Itistoohardthattheycomehere,toourcenter,totellusthesethings.26

TheplayinquestiondidnothavemuchtodowithconditionsinCuba,nordiditdefendtheregime.Theexiles'objectionswereexclusivelytotheassumedpoliticalsympathiesoftheauthor.Theexpression"ourcenter"intheabovetestimonyencapsulatedthebeliefthatMiamiwas,aboveall,thecapitaloftheOtherCuba.Butothersegmentsofthecityresentedtheexiles'politicalintolerance.TheMiamiHerald,inparticular,wagedarelentlesscampaignagainstwhatitsawastherisingpoweroftheCubansandthethreatthattheyposedtocivicfreedoms.EvenbeforetheMarielconfrontation,thepapercastigatedonnumerousoccasionstheexilecommunity'sextremism.

Duringthe1970s,suchattackscouldbemadewithimpunity,butafter

theexilecommunitybecameorganizedfordomesticpoliticalactionintheaftermathofMarielthestorychanged.ThisiswhattheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationhadtosayabouttheHerald'scampaigninafull-pagepaidadvertisement,publishedintheHeraldin1987:

Allourachievementshavebeenaccomplishedwithanationalpresscoveragethathasoftenportrayedusasextremists.ThishasbeenthemostunfairandprejudicedperceptionwehaveexperiencedinAmerica....

TheMiamiHeraldbearstremendousresponsibility.forthisinjustice....TheMiamiHeraldisaggressiveinitsignoranceofourpeople.ItrefusestounderstandthatCubanAmericansseethestrugglebetweentotalitarianismanddemocracyasapersonal,ever-presentstruggle.WelivethestruggledailybecauseourfriendsandfamiliesenslavedinCommunistCubahiveitdaily.

Astheenclaveeconomygrew,sodidthereachofthisdistinctpoliticalperspective,onethatsettherefugeessharplyapartfromthefairlyliberalviewsofAmericanjournalism.TheCubanssawthemselvesasmoremilitantintheirdefenseofAmericanvalues,moreawareoftheperilssurroundingthem,thanthelaid-backnatives.ThepopularradiostationWQBA,LaCubanisima(The"Cubanest"),forexample,greetsitslistenerseverydaywiththisrefrain:"It'snoontime.LetusgivethankstoGodforlivinginacountryoffulllibertyanddemocracy."28

AngloMiamianswhocaredtolistenreactedtosuchfervorwithalarm,ifnotscorn.Theeffectwastosharpenthecontoursoftherefugeecommunityandincreaseitsinternalsolidarity.LittleHavanaisnomereimmigrantneighborhood,notevenalivelybusinesshub,butamoralcommunitywithitsowndistinctoutlookontheworld.Iffromtheoutsidetheexiles'politicaldiscourseappearedasravingintolerance,fromtheinsideithelpeddefinewhowasandwasnotatruememberofthecommunity.TobeaMiamiCuban,itdoesnotsufficetohaveescapedfromtheisland;onemustalsoespousepointsofviewrepeatedceaselesslybyeditorialistsinMiami'sSpanishradioandpressthesamevoicesthattakecareofdenouncinganymemberofthecommunitywhostraystoofarfromthefold.29

Thepoliticalfalloutofthisferociousright-wingframehasbeen

generallynegativewithregardtotheexiles'outsideimage,butitseconomicconsequencesareenviable.Theconsolidationofamoralcommunitypermeatedimperceptiblytherelationshipsbetweenbuyerandseller,lenderandborrower,employerandworkerintheethnicenclave.Aheightenedsenseof"we-ness"clarifiedthelimitstowhichboundedsolidaritywouldapply,whileintensifyingitshold.Cubanrefugeesboughtfromeachotherandsponsoredeachother'sbusinessestoanextentseldomseenamongLatinimmigrantgroups.Membershipinthiscommunitydefined,toalargeextent,

whowaseligibleforbusinessloansandwhowasnot."Cubanness"byitselfdidnotsuffice.

UnionorganizerssimilarlyreportedthatwhereasCubanworkersinmainstreamfirmswouldjoinunions,thesameworkersinCuban-ownedfirmswouldbenexttoimpossibletoorganize.Theadversarialunion-managementrelationshipappearedinimicaltothebondbetweenworkersandownerscreatedbyacommonpastandcommonpoliticaloutlook.Forthisreason,firmslikeDiegoSuarez'sInter-AmericanTransportcouldremainindefinitelyunion-free.

Iftheexiles'politicaldiscoursehadbeenmoretolerantandlessmilitant,itprobablywouldnothavebeenaseffectiveinreinforcingthesocialcapitalonwhichtheircollectivebusinessadvancementwascemented.Thesenseofhavingthetruthbutfewallieswithwhomtoshareitstrengthenedconsiderablythemoralbondsandself-relianceofthiscommunity:CubanswereinAmerica,butnotreallyofit,evenafterbecomingU.S.citizens.Manyfearedthattheirsituationandcurrentwell-beingwouldbejeopardizedbythemorallaxitywithwhichthenation'sleaderswereconductingthefightagainstcommunism.ThefollowingexcerptfromaquerybyaHialeahresidentwaspublishedinElNuevoHerald,theMiamiHerald'sSpanish-languageedition,in1988:

HundredsofCubansliveinfearafterthechangesintheImmigrationLawfollowingthePactbetweenMikhailGorbachevandthegovernmentoftheUnitedStateswithregardtoFidelCastro.

IhavebeenintheU.S.for25years.Iammarriedandhavechildren.MywifeandIhavebeenAmericancitizensfor15years.Myquestionisthis:IfweweredeportedtoCubaasaconsequenceofthisPact,wouldwestillhavearighttooursocialsecuritypensions?Ourchildrenwereborninthis

country,couldwestillhavesomerightsasretireeswiththeirconsent?31

IthadneveroccurredtothisoldCubanthatU.S.citizenshipwouldprotecthimfromdeportation,eveniftheU.S.governmentcametoanunderstandingwithCastroandtheSoviets.

OriginsoftheMoralCommunity

ThereisaBlack-CubanelementinthisdisputeandtherehasbeensinceJune26.That'sthedaythatMayorsGildaOliverosofHialeahGardens,

JoséRiveroofSweetwater,PedroReboredoofWestMiami,JulioMartinezofHialeah,andXavierSuárezofMiamisignedaletterunwelcomingNelsonMandela."We,Cuban-Americans..."itsaid.Withthesewords,thefivemayorsmadethisinpartaCubanissue.

Theepisodeinquestionoccurredinthesummerof1990,afewdaysbeforeNelsonMandela'sarrivalinMiami.Thehero'swelcomeplannedfortheSouthAfricanleaderquicklyturnedintoindifferenceandthenoppositionfollowingacknowledgmentofhisfriendshipwithFidelCastroduringanABCtelevisioninterview.OverthestrenuousobjectionsofBlackcommunityleaders,theCuban-Americanmayors"uninvited"Mandela.AlthoughtheSouthAfricancametoMiamionlyforabriefspeechataunionconventionandneveracceptedanylocalinvitation,themayors'actionprofoundlyhurtthesensitivitiesofMiami'sBlackcommunity.Blackleadersrespondedbydeclaringaboycottoftheirowncity,askingoutsideconventioneersnottocometoMiamiuntilthemayorsformallyapologizedtoMandela.33

Noneofthemdid.Tohavedonesowouldhavebeentantamounttolosingthenextelection.PoliticalpowerinthesecitiesrestedwithCuban,notBlackvoters,andtheexilecommunitywasmonolithicinitsrepudiationofanyonehavinganythingtodowithFidelCastro.AlthoughtheBlackboycottcouldeasilyhavebeenpreventedwithaminorgestureofconciliation,electedCuban-Americanpoliticianswereunabletotakethatstep.AnysignofanapologywouldhavebeenimmediatelydenouncedbytheSpanishradiostationsasun-Cubanandasignofweaknessinthefaceoftheenemy.

Wheredidthisfiercerightismcomefrom?ItwasnotaforegoneconclusionthatescapeesfromCastro'sleftistregimewouldmovetotheoppositeendofthepoliticalspectrum.Indeed,thedominant

politicalviewpointamongexilesduringthedaysofactivemilitarystruggleintheearlysixtieswasverydifferent:therevolution,embodyingthelegitimateaspirationsoftheCubanpeople,hadbeenbetrayedbyCastroandhishenchmen;thefight,therefore,wastogetthemoutinordertorestorethecountry'sconstitution,organizefreeelections,andpromoteeconomicgrowthwithsocialequalityinall,asocialdemocraticoratleastmildlycentriststance.34

Threesuccessiveeventsunderminedthispositionandopenedthewayforthehegemonyofextremeright-wingpolitics.First,theexiles'AssaultBrigade2506wastrainedandfinancedbytheCIAonlytobeabandonedtoitsfateattheBayofPigs.Thedecisiontoleavethemenstranded,whichdirectlycontradictedearlierguaranteesmadebytheU.S.government,wastakenbytheliberalKennedyadministration.Theexiledleadersdupedbythesepromiseswerealso,byandlarge,membersoftheoldliberalandcentristwingofCubanpolitics.

EvenaftertheBayofPigs,theseleadersstillheededthepromisesoftheWhiteHouse;oneyearlater,however,theKennedy-KhrushchevaccordduringtheMissileCrisisputanendtoallhopes.ThemilitarydeactivationoftheCubancommunitywasaliberalDemocraticfeat,andtheexileleaderswhohadtolerateditwereofasimilarpoliticalpersuasion.ShortlyaftertheMissileCrisis,theheadoftheCubanRevolutionaryCouncil,JoséMiroCardona,resignedinprotest,andthecouncil,theexiles'umbrellaorganization,wasdisbanded.

TherewasonemorechanceforCubanprogressivestoprevailasthemoralwatchdogsoftheexilecommunity.Ittooktheformofanorganizationbuiltbyformerrevolutionaryleadersandmilitantsandledbyanex-ministerofoneofCastro'sfirstcabinets,ManuelRayRivero.TheycalledthemselvesthePeople'sRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoRevolucionariodelPueblo,orMRP)andforalongtimemaintainedtheirdistancefromtheCIA-supportedCubanRevolutionaryCouncil,whichtheysawasexcessivelycentristandpro-American.TheMRPreaffirmedthethemeofthe"revolutionbetrayed"andsoughttheoverthrowoftheregimethroughinternalmobilizationandthesupportoffriendlyLatinAmericangovernments.Intheend,however,financialneedforcedRayandhisfollowersto

acceptcovertU.S.supportfortheirplanstolaunchanewinvasionoftheisland.AswiththeBayofPigsthreeyearsbefore,politicalexpediencyagainprevailedandthecivilwingofLyndonJohnson'sDemocraticadministrationbetrayeditsnewclients.Britishauthoritieswerenotifiedastothelocationofthewould-beinvadersinaBahamiankey,andRayandhisgroupwereeasilyapprehended.36

TheignominiousendoftheMRPandtherepeatedbetrayalsofexileaspirationsbyDemocraticpartyleadersinWashingtonpaved

thewayforextreme-rightelementstooccupycenterstageinMiami.FormerlydiscreditedBatistasupportersreemergedfromtheshadowswithaclaimtopoliticalforesight."Wetoldyouso,"theyproclaimed;"Fidelhasalwaysbeenacommunist,andhiscomradesofyesterdaylikeRayarenotmuchbetter."Alongwithotherconservatives,theyforgedacoherentinterpretationoftheexiles'plight.Forthem,therevolutionarytriumphintheislandhadnotbeentheresultofsocialinequality.orpoliticaloppression,becauseCubabeforeCastrowasalreadyaquasi-developedcountrywithenviablestandardsoflivingandeconomicopportunitiesforall.Rather,Castro'striumphwastheresultofaninternationalcommunistconspiracy.TheCubanpeoplehadbeendeceivedbyCastroandhiscliqueandthenbetrayedagainbyfellowtravelerswhohadinfiltratedtheliberalDemocraticestablishmentintheUnitedStates.

Liberalism,accordingtothisview,wasnothingmorethanaconvenientdisguise,afrontforcommunistobjectives.Accordingly,leftistsofallstripeshadtoberesolutelyopposed;intransigentanticommunismwastheonlyvalidpositionfortheexilecommunity.Thisdiscoursehadtwosignificantadvantages.First,itabsolvedearlierCubangovernments,includingBatista's,ofallresponsibilityfortheascentofFidelCastrotopower.Second,itprovidedacoherentinterpretationfortheimmenselydepressingfactthattheU.S.governmenthadrepeatedlyabandoneditsferventCaribbeanalliesatkeymomentsintheirstruggle.Communistinfluencewaseverywhere,evenatthehighestlevelsoftheAmericangovernment.Cubans,whohadsufferedintheirownfleshtheconsequencesofsuchdeceit,hadthemissionofopposingiteverywhereandalertingothersastoitsterribleconsequences.

TheCubanliberaldiscourse,labeledbytheconservatives"FidelismwithoutFidel,"simplydisappearedfromview.38IthadalwayshadadifficulttimereconcilingitsprogressiveclaimswithmilitantoppositiontotheCubanRevolution.Forleft-leaningintellectualsandpoliticiansinLatinAmericaandforliberalacademicsintheUnitedStates,FidelCastrosymbolizedtheanti-imperialiststruggle.HisdefianceinthefaceofYankeehostilitygainedhimmuchsympathy,whichexiledliberalswerehardputtocounteract.Incontrast,theconservativediscoursewasexceedinglycoherent:sincealltheseliberalacademicsandpoliticianswerecommunist

sympathizersanyway,therewasnopointintryingtopersuadethemontheappallingfactsofthematter.Instead,Cubansshouldlineupwithmilitantanticommunistforcesandseektheirsupporttoliberatetheisland.

Thehegemonyofextremeconservatismdidnotemergeallofasuddenbutevolvedgradually,growingintandemwiththebusinessenclave.Thetwodevelopmentsthusbecameintertwined,withmilitantrightismcomingtodefinethevocabularyinwhichexileentrepreneursexpressedtheirviewsandwithwhichtheysignaledmembershipintheboundedCubancommunity.Eventhosewhotookexceptiontotheextremistviewsairedceaselesslyonlocalradiohadtokeeptheirdoubtstothemselvesforfearoftheconsequences.Themoralcommunityhadtakenfirmhold,anditsideologicaltrappingswereunmistakablythoseofthefarright,adirectoutgrowthofthefailedliberalpromisesoftheearlysixties.

BuildingonaFeebleBase

MonsignorBryanD.Walsh,alongtimeMiamicivicleaderwhohadwitnessedthearrivalofthefirstCubanrefugees,describedtheeconomicsituationofMiamiinthe1960sasfollows:

TwothingshappenedinthenextyearsthatcausedallmoneyfordevelopmentoftourisminSouthFloridatodryup.One,DisneyWorldstartedoperating,andeverybodywithbigmoneyinNewYorkknewit,theyknewthat80percentofthetouristswhocametoFloridacamebycarandDisneyWorldwouldbelikeaChineseWallnobodywoulddrivefurthersouth.ThestateofFloridaputalow'priorityonbuildingmajorhighwaysintoSouthFlorida.Thesecondfactorwasthejetplane.ItbecamejustascheaptoflytoJamaicaorPuertoRico,whereyoucangettwoweeksofsunshineguaranteed,thantoflytoMiami,whereyoumaygettwoweeksofrainifyou'reunlucky.

HaditnotbeenfortheCubans,Miamiwouldhavebeenadeadduck.We

hadaneconomicdepressionin1959;1960wasatotaldisaster.TheUnitedWayfailed,itdidnotraiseone-thirdofitsgoal....TheCubansmovedintoavacuum;theplacewasfullofemptystores.SouthwestEighthStreetwasboardedupfromoneendtotheother.Verysoontheywentintotheexport-importbusiness,theywentintobanksandeverythingelse;theybecametheliaisonbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatinAmerica.

Fromminimalcharacterloanstobecoming''theliaisonbetweentheU.S.andLatinAmerica"wasalongroad.Ittooktwodecadesforenclavefirmstomovefrombeingameremeansofpersonalsurvivaltoachievingapositionofinfluenceinthelocaleconomy.Asidefromthecohesivenessgeneratedbyacommonpoliticaldestinyandamonolithicideology,theconsolidationoftheenclavebenefitedfromthewaytheexodusfromCubawaspaced.Aswehaveseen,thearrivalofCubansinMiamididnotoccurallatonce,norwasitasteadytrickle;rather,Cubanscameinaseriesofwavescreatedbysuccessivepoliticalcrises.Eachwavebroughtamassofrefugeeswithanaverageeducationandoccupationalstatusbelowthoseoftheprecedingwave.

Forearlyenclaveenterprises,accesstocapitalwasacrucialbutbynomeanssufficientconditionforsurvival.Tomaintainthemselvesandexpand,theyneededgrowingmarketsandareadysupplyofcheap,hard-workinglabor.Thesuccessiverefugeewavesalongadecliningsocialgradientfulfilledbothneedsadmirably.Asconsumers,newrefugeescreatedagrowingdemandforculturallydefinedgoodsandSpanish-languageservicesthatonlyenclavefirmscouldprovide.Asworkers,theyreadilyacceptedthemodestjobsprovidedbyCuban-ownedfirmsasamodeofentryintotheAmericaneconomy.

Themoralcommunitythatdevelopedamongtherefugeesintroducedanewelementintowhatotherwisewouldhavebeenpuremarketrelations.Earlyenclaveownerswereexpectedtohirefellowexilesinpreferencetoothers,whileworkerswereexpectedtolabordiligentlyattheavailablejobswithoutmakingexcessivedemands.LowwageswereacceptedinexchangeforpreferentialaccesstoemploymentevenintheabsenceofEnglishorformalcertification.Modestenclavejobsalsoprovidedaninformalapprenticeshipinhowtoestablishandrunanindependentbusinesslateron.

EvidenceregardingthesedevelopmentscomesfromsuccessivesurveysofCubanrefugeesinSouthFloridathatweconductedduringthe1970s.In1979,forexample,63percentofasampleof450refugeeswhohadarrivedsixyearsearlierreportedbuyingeverydaygoodsfromCubanstores.Evenpurchasesofmajoritemssuchascarsandapplianceswereoftenmadeinthesameway(32percentofthesample),despitethescarcity,ofCubanretailersof

majorappliancesatthetime.Bycontrast,inthesameyearacomparablesampleofMexicanimmigrantsthathadalsoarrivedintheUnitedStatesin1973reportedproportionsofcoethnicpurchasesthatwereapproximatelyhalfthosedetectedamongCubans32percentforeverydayitemsand19percentfordurables.

In1976,39percentoftherefugeesinoursamplewereemployedinCuban-ownedfirms(includingtheself-employed).By1979,thefigurehadincreasedto49percent,almosthalfofthetotal,whereasthefigureamongtheMexicanimmigrantswasonly15percent.Indirectevidenceofhowemploymentintheethniceconomyencouragedsmallentrepreneurshipcomesfromfiguresonself-employment.SixyearsafterarrivalanddespitelowaveragelevelsofeducationandknowledgeofEnglish,21.2percentoftheCubansampleinMiamihadbecomeself-employed,ascontrastedwith5.5percentoftheMexicangroup.Self-employedCubansearnedmuchmorethantherestofrespondentsinbothsamples.Thiswasespeciallytrueofthosewhosefirmshadgrownenoughtohiresalariedworkers.Averagemonthlyearningsfortheseentrepreneurswere$1,924in1979dollars,comparedto$974forCubanswhoremainedasemployeesand$914forallMexicans.41

Furtherevidenceoftheroleofenclaveapprenticeshipinbusinesscreationamongnewarrivalscomesfromananalysisofthedeterminantsofself-employmentinourMiamiCubansample.Itwasfoundthatthesinglemostsignificantpredictorofself-employmentin1979wasemploymentinaCuban-ownedfirmthreeyearsearlier.42Asanoutgrowthofalltheseprocesses,Cubanexileenterprisesexpandedfromanestimated919in1967,toabout36,000nationwidein1982,andto61,500in1987.FirmsintheMiamienclavegrewnot

onlyinnumber,butalsoinsize.AggregatereceiptsofHispanicfirmsinMiamiwere$3.8billionin1987,afigurethatexceededbyover$400millionthatofsecond-rankingLosAngelesandwasthreetimesthatofNewYork,despitethesecitieshavingmuchlargerHispanicpopulations.Cuban-ownedfirmsaveragedannualsalesof$89,181,afigurethat,thoughmodestbynationalstandards,exceededbyover$30,000theaverageforallminority-ownedfirmsnationwide.43

OntheeveofMariel,then,theexilecommunityfeaturedamonolithicpoliticaloutlook,sustainedbothbyconvictionandthe

silencingofdissidentsandbyarapidlyimprovingeconomicsituation.ThestaggeredpatternofrefugeemigrationhadcontributedtothelatterstatebyfurnishingCubanfirmswithgrowingmarketsandreliablelaborpoolsatopportunemoments.Unwittingly,thesuccessivewavesofrefugeemigrationreproducedinMiamithesocialpeckingorderofprerevolutionaryCuba:early-arriving,higher-statusrefugeescreatedthefirstenterprisesandtookovercommandpositionsintheethniceconomy;subsequentarrivalscamefrommoremodestclassoriginsandwereemployedbythesefirmsinvarioussubordinateroles.Thegrowthoftheenclaveofferedtotheselaterarrivalsthechancebothtoremainwithintheirowncommunityandtolearntheropesofatradeforlatersalliesintoself-employment.

Conclusion

InMay1981,afewmonthsafterMariel,aleadingexileeducatorinMiamicomplainedinthesetermsabouttherecentevents:

Themostimportantthingwastheanti-Spanishreferendum.ThisshowedtoCubanshowtheirAngloneighborsinDadereallyfelt.ItmadeCubansseethemselvesforthefirsttime,asadiscriminatedminority.Thelocalpowerstructuretookanambiguousstance:theydidn'tpromotethereferendum,butdidn'topposeiteither.Deepdown,theysharedthefundamentalhostilityoftheAnglocitizenrytowardtherefugees.ThereactionoftheCubancommunitywaspitiful.Therewasbarelyoppositionormobilization.Everyonewastoobusywithhisownaffairs.Cubanscametorealizewhatwashappeningthedayofthevote.

Theoverwhelmingvoteinfavoroftheantibilingualordinanceinlate1980conveyedtheimpressionthattherefugeeswouldbeeasilyputbackintheirplace,withcontrolofthecitythusrevertingtoitsold-timeelite.Cubansweremadetofeelatthistimethefullweightof

Anglodiscrimination.Notsurprisingly,severallocalorganizations,suchastheSpanish-AmericanLeagueAgainstDiscrimination(SALAD),startedrehearsingthevocabularycommontoalldowntroddenminorities:complaintsaboutdiscrimination,demandstobeincludedandnotmarginalizedfromlocaldecisionmaking,supportofaffirmativeactionprograms.45

Appearancesweredeceiving,forbehindtheapparentvulnera-

bilityoftherefugeeswasanethniceconomythathadnotceasedgrowingfortwentyyears.Obsessedwiththedreamofreturn,Cubanssofarhadhadlittletimeforlocalpolitics.WhentheunexpectedandfiercehostilityofMiaminativewhitesburstforth,theexileswereinitiallydisoriented.Ittooktimetofashionaresponsecongruentwiththeirpastideologicalstance.Thatresponse,whenitfinallycame,stunnedopponentsbothbyitsnoveltyandbyitsrevolutionaryimplications.

TheMiamiHeraldanditssupportershadonlywantedtorestorenormalcytothecitywhentheyinformedCubansabouthowthepoliticalgamewasplayedinAmericaandoftheirtruepositionintheethnicqueue.Theexilesrespondedbylayingclaimtothecity.Theyputoldelitesintheirplacebyportrayingthemasrepresentativesofaprovincialpast.Oneofthemostrespectedexileleadersarticulatedhiscommunity'sresponsethus:

TheCubans'presenceinMiamihasanextraordinaryimportance.Therapiddevelopmentachievedbythecityisafeatthathasnoprecedentinthehistoryofthecountryandhasbeencalled,inmultipleoccasions,"theGreatCubanMiracle."Forthisreason,theexileswhocamefromtheislandafter1959andotherswhoarrivedlaterwiththesamefaithandhopemustbeproudofwhattheyhaveachievedforthemselvesandforthecommunityingeneral.

InordertoappreciatetheCubans'contributiontoMiami'sdevelopment,itisconvenienttogobacktowhatthecitywasin1959.MiamicouldbedefinedasatypicalSoutherntownwithapopulationofveteransandretirees.Thesoleactivitywastheexploitationoftourisminthesunnywinters.Commercialactivitieswerelimitedandindustrialdevelopmentincipient....ItwasanunderdevelopedareawithintheAmericaneconomy,withoutanygreatperspective.

Themoralandmaterialresourcesoftheexilecommunity,longpreventedfromconfrontingFidelCastrodirectly,werenowredeployedtochecktheloominglocalchallengewithintheframeworkofAmericanpolitics.ThetermCubanAmericanseldomusedbefore1980becamethestandardself-designation.TheCubanAmericanNationalFoundation(CANF)wasfounded,eachofitsmanydirectorscontributingfreetimeforpoliticallobbyingplus$10,000peryear.Unlikeotherminorityorganizations,CANFdidnotaskpoliticiansformoney,butactuallygaveittothemthroughitspoliticalactionbranch,theFreeCubaCommittee.47Theexiles

naturalizedenmasseandlinedupatthepollstovotefortheirowncandidates.Iftherewasameasureofexaggerationintherefugees'claimtohavingengineeredMiami'seconomic"miracle,"therewaspreciouslittlehyperboleinthepoliticalconsequencesofthisclaim.Asonemayoraltyandlegislativeseatafteranothercameintothehandsoftheformerexiles,theirmessageaboutwhatMiamiwasandcouldbecomegainedincreasingcredibility.

Theextreme-rightideologyoftheexilecommunityhadgreatdifficultyreconcilingitselfwiththevocabularyinwhichdowntroddenminoritiescustomarilyexpresstheirgrievances.Forthisreason,the"minority"perspectiveneverprosperedinCubanMiamiaftertheearlyeighties.Insteadthe"successstory"discoursegainedprecedence.Giventheissuesconfrontingthecommunity,ithadtwosignificantadvantages.First,itofferedconcreteproofofthesuperiorityofthesystemadvocatedbytheexilesoverCaribbean-stylecommunism.Theimplicitpromisewasthat,afterCastro'sregimeended,theentrepreneurialsuccessesachievedinMiamiwouldbereproducedinCuba.Second,the"successstory"discourseconveyedamoreoptimisticmessageaboutthepresentandfutureofthecitythanthatputforthbythenatives.WhereaslocalwhitesdeploredwhatMiamihadbecome,theCubansextolleditandpromisedastillbettertomorrow.Thispositiveframeofminddisplacedbothassimilationistand"minority''discoursesamongMiami'sLatinpopulation.Theoldhegemonicorderwasrupturedandthewaypavedforanovelsetofdefinitionsaboutwhatthecitywasandshouldbecome.

ChapterSevenARepeatPerformance?:TheNicaraguanExodusForthoseresidentsofSouthFloridawhostillthoughtoftheareaasaresort,1989beganbadly,verybadly.Theworstseemedtobehappeningalloveragain.Immigrants,moreSpanish-speakingones,wererollingintothearea.Attheendof1988,theU.S.supportedContrawarwaswindingdown,andthousandsofNicaraguansbeganflowingupthroughGuatemalaandMexicotoTexasandontoMiami.Thestreamofnewimmigrantsswelledthroughthelastmonthsof1988until,atthebeginningof1989,itbecameaflood.U.S.ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)officialsestimatedthatasmanyasthreehundredrefugeesaweekhadbeensettlinginDadeCountysincethesummerof1988.

1Atthebeginningof1989,GreyhoundassignedspecialbusestoruncontinuouslybetweentheTexas-MexicoborderandSouthFlorida.InthesecondweekofJanuary1989,tenbusesarrivedinMiamiononedayalone.2

WhilethebusloadsmaynothavebeenasdramaticorasnumerousastheboatloadsarrivinginKeyWestduringthe1980Marielinflux,theNicaraguanrefugeesbecameaconcretepartofthepublicconsciousnessafterINSattemptedtointerceptanddetainthemattheTexas-Mexicoborder.ThenewlyincarceratedNicaraguans,whohadbeendriftingalmostinvisiblyintoMiamifortenyears,nowappearedonnationaltelevision,standingbehindfencesandlookingmuchlikethedetainedMarielrefugeesof1980.Theywerealsosaying,againliketheMarielentrants,thattheywould

headforSouthFloridaassoonastheycould.ThenafederaljudgeruledINS'sdetentionpolicyunconstitutional;therefugeeswerereleased,andnearlyeveryoneinMiamibracedfor"anotherMariel."

TheNicaraguanflowdidindeedappearsimilartothatfromCuba.Nicaraguans,likeCubans,werefleeingaradical,left-wingregime.TheNicaraguanexodus,liketheCuban,convergedinsuccessivestagesonMiami,beginningwiththeelites,thenincorporatingtheprofessionalandmiddleclasses,andlastlytheworkingclass.

ButtherewerealsoimportantdifferencesfromtheearlierCubanexodus.Mostnotably,WashingtondidnotwelcometheNicaraguansasithadtheCubans.CubanshadtheirpassagefromCubapaidfor,wereautomaticallygrantedpermanentresidenceintheUnitedStates,andreceivednumerousotherbenefits.ThefederalgovernmentclassifiedmostNicaraguansinsteadasillegalaliensandactivelytriedtokeepthemout.Thenewrefugeesdidhavethebenefit,however,ofcomingaftertheCubanenclavehadbeenconsolidated,andsohadinitapowerfulally."Latin-ness"alonewasnotthereasonfortheCubans'supportoftheNicaraguans.Rather,politicalideologycementedthealliancethecommoncircumstancesofmilitantoppositiontoanextreme-leftregime.

PhasesofNicaraguanMigration

ThegrowthandconsolidationofMiami'sNicaraguancommunityroughlyfollowedthepatternestablishedbytheCubans.Bothbeganinresponsetoamajorrevolutionaryupheaval.Bothcameinsuccessivewaves,eachdistinctintermsoftimeofarrival,socialcomposition,andgeographicalconcentrationinMiami.Inbothcases,thefirsttoarriveweretheonesmostimmediatelyanddirectlyaffectedbythe

revolutionarygovernmentlargelandholders,industrialists,andmanagersofNorthAmericanenterprises.ManyoftheNicaraguanupper-classexilesalsohadeconomicrootsintheUnitedStatesandMiamibeforetheupheaval.Inbothmigrations,asecondwaveofprofessionalsandwhite-collarworkersfollowedthedepartureoftheupperclass.ForNicaraguans,thissecondwavecommencedduringtheearly1980s.The

finalwave,consistingprimarilyofurbanblue-collarworkers,peakedforNicaraguansinthedramaticexodusofearly1989,theequivalentoftheCubans'Mariel.

TheWealthy

In1978,NicaraguandictatorAnastasioSomozaDebaylesecretlyboughtabaysideestateinMiamiBeach,paying$575,000throughaVirginIslandscorporationtotheowner,Miami'sRomanCatholicarchdiocese.In1979,twodaysbeforeManaguafell,SomozasteppedoffaplaneatHomesteadAirForceBasejustsouthofMiamiandwaswhiskedtohissprawlingnewseven-bedroomhouse.

4Evenafterhis1980death,hisrelativescontinuedtheiropulentlife-style.HopeSomoza,wifeoftheousteddictator,andMatildaDebayle,Somoza'sauntbymarriage,wereamongtherichestpeopleinFlorida.Buttheymaintainedalowprofile,notattendingpoliticalralliesandmakingprivatevisitstothegraveofAnastasioSomozawho,likeCubanpresidentsCarlosPríoandGerardoMachado,isburiedinWoodlawnCemetery.5

TheSomozafamilyisthemostfamousNicaraguanclanlivinginMiami,butapproximatelyfifteenthousandotherrichexilestransferredtheirassetstoMiamibanksinthelate1970s,movedtheirfurnitureintofashionableresidencesinKeyBiscayneandBrickellAvenue,andinvestedoncondominiumsinthesuburbanwesternedgeofthecity.6

TheMiddleClass

Theearly-arrivingelitewassoonabletorentandsellthosecondominiumstootherNicaraguanstheprofessionalsandbusinesspeoplewhomadeupthesecondwaveoftheexodus.TheserefugeesestablishedforthefirsttimeavisibleNicaraguanpresenceinMiami,

clusteringinthewesternsuburbofSweetwater,rightnexttotheEverglades.Manyofthesemiddle-classNicaraguansarrivedontouristvisas,andsometimestheymovedbackandforthbetweenManaguaandMiami,eventuallysettlinginthelatter.Likeothereducatedrefugees,theyinitiallyexperienceddownwardmobilityastheyretooledfortheirnewenvironment.Asurveyconductedintheearlyeightiesestimatedthat70percentofskilled

Nicaraguanswereworkingbelowtheirtraininglevel.

7Anotherstudyfoundthat,ofonethousandrefugeessurveyed,34percentwereprofessionalsinNicaragua,butintheiradoptivecountry"manyareworkingoutsidetheirfieldsaslaborersbecausetheyaresouncertainoftheirfuture."8

Thoseprofessionalswhoendedupstayingdidnotusuallyremainlaborersforlong.Beforetherevolution,JorgeSavanyheldacabinet-levelpostastheexecutivesecretaryoftheNationalCottonCommission.HefledManaguaforMiamiinJuly1979,justastheSandinistasoustedSomoza.Withayoungerbrotherhestartedsellinghotdogsfromacartandeventuallypurchasedeightsuchstands.Afewyearslater,however,hewasworkingasasalesmanandassistantmanagerforaCuban-ownedfurniturestoreonLittleHavana'sCalleOcho,whilehisbrotherwentontobecomearealestatebroker.9

SomeoftheserefugeesalreadyhadsomeworkexperienceinNorthAmerica,whichtheynowputtouse.ThefirstpresidentoftheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociationofMiami,RobertoArguello,wasaNotreDamegraduatewhobecamevicepresidentofaMiamibankwithinafewyearsofhisarrivalinMiami.10ThefirstNicaraguaneardealershipinMiamiwassimilarlystartedbyanindividualwhohadattendedtheUniversityofMiamiinthe1970s.Toobtainfinancing,hemobilizedthefriendshipsdevelopedinschool,especiallywithCuban-Americanstudents.11StillothersbenefitedfromtheheavyNorthAmericanpresenceinNicaraguabeforetheSandinistarevolution.AnotherpresidentoftheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation,RobertoZamora,wasaformertraineeattheCitibankofficeinManaguawhoquicklymadeafortunebrokeringLatinAmericanloansindebt-equityswaps.AndLeoSolorzanohadattendedtheHarvard-affiliatedCentralAmericanInstitutefor

BusinessManagement;in1989,heheadedthelendingdivisionofMiami'sCapitalBank.12

TheWorkers

Thethirdwave,comprisingNicaragua'sworkersandpeasants,beganinthemid-1980s,whentheU.S.-sponsoredContrawardisruptedthecountry'seconomy.13Asearlyas1984,nearly20percentofNicaraguanmigrantscamefromthesemodestback-

grounds;

14bythelate1980s,anestimated50percentofallNicaraguansinMiamiworkedaslaborers.15MuchlikeMarielCubansin1980,thenewlyarrivedrefugeescouldnotaffordtoliveinmiddle-classsuburbs.InsteadtheyoccupiedthepoorestsectionsofLittleHavanawheremanyMarielCubanshadpreviouslysettledcreatingasecondNicaraguanneighborhood.16UnlikeSweetwater,EastLittleHavanaispooranddeteriorated.Despiteitsname,itisnowmostlyanareawhereNicaraguansandotherCentralAmericanslive.17

Thesenewrefugeeshadmoredifficultyfindingjobsthantheirpredecessors.Miami'sinformaleconomyofoddjobsandoff-the-booksemploymentforminimalpaybecametheNicaraguanworkers'mainmeansofsurvival.Flowervendors,acommonsightafterMariel,reappearedineverybusyintersection.Otherstookjobsashousepainters,unskilledfactoryhands,andseamstresses.LidiaCano,asinglemotherwhofledNicaraguawithtwoyounggrandchildrenandadraft-dodgingson,workedasaseamstress.InNicaraguasheownedasmallgarmentfactory.InMiami,shestartedsewingathomeonamachineloanedbyaCubansubcontractor.Withhersavings,sheboughtausedSingerandlatertwootherspecializedsewingmachines.ThroughexpandedhomeworkforCubancontractors,shewasabletoearnenoughtosupportherfamily.18

OtherNicaraguanwomenwenttoworkdirectlyforMiami'snumerousapparelfactories,replacingtheshrinkingCubanlaborsupply.ForJewishandCubanfactoryowners,thearrivaloftheNicaraguanswasablessing,astherapidwithdrawalofCubanwomenfromthegarmentlaborforcehadalreadyforcedtheclosureofseveralfactories.Ethnicsuccessioninthegarmentindustryneatlyreflectedthesuccessiveimmigrantwavesshapingthearea'seconomy:frommiddle-class

Cubanwomeninthesixtiesandearlyseventies,toMarielandHaitianentrantsintheearlyeighties,topoorCentralAmericans,primarilyNicaraguans,bytheendofthedecade.19

NicaraguanmenhadasimilarroleinMiami'sconstructionindustry.TheLatinBuildersAssociationCuban-ownedfirmsfoundedinthelatesixtiesandseventiesandgroupedinastrongguildconfrontedaseriouslaborproblembythemid-eighties.CubanimmigrationhadvirtuallystoppedafterMariel,andthe

builderswerereluctanttoemployunion-pronenativelabor.Again,afewMarielitosandHaitiansprovidedarespite,butitwasreallytheCentralAmericanswhofilledthegap.TheNicaraguans'urgentneedforworkwasobvious,aswastheirideologicalaffinitywiththeirCubanemployers.Increasingly,NicaraguansbecamethepreferredworkersintheMiamibuildingtrades.

Othersreliedoncasualwork.Between6:00and7:30a.m.everyweekdayfromthemid-1980son,aboutahundredmenwouldgatheroutsideacoffeeshoponCalleOcho,downingCubancoffee,waitingandhopingforaday'sworkfrompassingcarsandpick-uptrucks.Sometimesnearlyeveryonewashired,butatothertimessomethirtymenwerestillwaitingat11:00.Joboffersrangedfromgardeningtowashingdishes.Thenormalday'swagewas$40,paidincashattheendofthedaywhentheemployerdroppedthembackatthecoffeeshop.21Asoneworkerstated,"Sometimestheemployerisconscientiousandpaysadecentwage,butsometimesyouworkeighthoursandtheypayyou$20."22InDecember1988,thecityofMiamiemploymentofficebeganreceivingcallsfrompeoplelookingforlive-inmaids.Payhoveredaround$100amonthplusroomandboard.AlthoughcityemployeeswhowerehelpingtheNicaraguanslabeledthesejobs"slavery,"manyNicaraguanswillinglyacceptedtheoffers.23

NicaraguansalsofollowedtheHaitiansonthetrailtowardstooplaborinFloridaagriculture.AnaSolishadworkedasacookinalittleeaterynearManagua'sairport,butsheleftin1983whenshewassummonedtotrainforthelocalmilitia.Marriedwithfourchildren,SolislefthercrampedLittleHavanaapartmentat3:00a.m.everydayforathree-hourbusridetoImmokalee,wheresheworkedfora

producepackerfor$4anhour.HerthoughtsonsurvivingintheUnitedStateswerelimitedtotheimmediateconcernsofearninganincome."Ithurtmetoseethetomatoesend,becausetherewasnomorework.Thelemonsarecoming,butthecontractorcan'ttakemorepeople."24

ThearrivaloftheNicaraguanworkingclasshencehadasignificanteffectonMiami'seconomy.Allemployersofunskilledlaborbenefited,especiallygarmentcontractors,homebuilders,farmers,andmiddle-classfamiliesinsearchofdomestichelp.Morespecifically,thenewimmigrantshelpedtheCubanenclaveavertaseriousproblem.Somelocaleconomistshadworriedthattherapid

increaseofLatinfirmswouldsoonsaturatetheethnicmarkettowhichtheycatered.TheNicaraguans,togetherwithotherLatinimmigrants,expandedthatmarketaswellasthelaborpoolforethnicfirms.

Thesecontributionswentunappreciated,however,byothersegmentsofthelocalpopulation.TheNicaraguansswelledthelocalinformaleconomyinbothlow-payingjobsandpettyentrepreneurship.TheproliferationofstreetvendorsgavetopartsofthecityaThirdWorldflavorthatmanynativesfounddistasteful.Toovercomethisandotherconsequencesoftheinflux,nativistgroupslaboredmightilytogetridofthenewrefugees.LikeHaitiansafewyearsbefore,theNicaraguansfoundthemselvesthetargetofmilitanthostilitybymuchofthelocalpopulation.Theirweaklegalstatusmadethemdependentonafewkeyalliestobalancebothgovernmenthostilityandwidespreadlocalrejection.

FederalPolicy:NicaraguansBelonginNicaragua

InJune1983,PresidentReaganassertedthatiftheUnitedStatesfailedtoprevailinCentralAmericaitwouldbeinvadedbyrefugees."Theresult,"Reagansaid,"couldbeatidalwaveofrefugeesandthistimethey'llbefeetpeopleandnotboatpeopleswarmingintoourcountryseekingasafehavenfromCommunistrepression."

25Inmanyrespects,Reaganwascorrect.ThefederalgovernmentatthetimewasprimarilypreoccupiedwiththeContrawaragainsttheSandinistas.BecauseContraleadersresidedinMiami,high-levelU.S.policymakersfrequentedthecity.Thispresence,however,didnothelptheresettlementofordinaryNicaraguans.Rather,federalofficialsappearedtoencouragetheserefugeestogobacktoNicaraguatobattletheSandinistas.TheReaganandsubsequentlytheBushadministrationsthusfocusedexclusivelyontheContrawar,ignoringtheconcernsoftherefugeecommunity.

NowhereisthecontrastbetweenCubanandNicaraguanexilesmorestarkthanintheU.S.government'sdifferingresponsestoeach.AllarrivingCubans,untilthe1980Marielflow,wereautomaticallyextendedtherighttoremaininthecountry.Asagroup,

theyreceivedoneofthemostgenerousbenefitspackageseverofferedtoarrivingforeigners.SecureintheUnitedStates,theycouldplananddebatetheirdesignsforoverthrowingtheCastroregime.ButwithrespecttotheContrawar,adifferentlogicwasfollowedasWashingtonvirtuallydemandedthattheNicaraguansaccepttheopportunitytoconfronttheSandinistasontheirownterrain.Therebels'baseofoperationswastobeascloseaspossibletotheSandinistasinneighboringHonduras,notinMiami.IntheeyesoftheReaganadministration,NicaraguansintheUnitedStatesweretoofarfromtheactionandwerenotputtingenoughpressureontheSandinistas.FederalofficialsthusdidalltheycouldtodeterthearrivalandsettlementofnewNicaraguanrefugees.

Through1985,onlyabout10percentofNicaraguanapplicantsweregrantedpoliticalasylumafiguresignificantlyhigherthantheapproximately3percentforSalvadoransandHaitians,butfarlessthantheaveragesforCubans(almost100percent)orforothernationalitiessuchasIranians(60percent).

26Nicaraguansnotgrantedpoliticalasylumweredeclaredillegalaliens,andsonotentitledtorefugeeassistance,resettlementaid,welfare,orgovernmentloans.In1981,theywereevenkickedoutoffreeEnglishclassesforMarielandHaitianentrants.27

Untillate1983,whenprofessionalsandothermiddle-classrefugeeswerearriving,Nicaraguanasylumapplicantswereatleastgrantedworkpermitsthatremainedvaliduntiltheircasesweredecided.Butthenthisbenefit,too,waswithdrawn.28Atthatpoint,would-berefugeeswereaddedtothefederalgovernment'sOperationSave,whichattemptedtocheektheimmigrationstatusofeveryalienwhoappliedforstate-administeredbenefits.29Ifanalienwasnotproperlydocumented,INSwastoinitiatedeportationproceedings.

UnlikeSalvadoransalsounsuccessfulasylum-seekerstheNicaraguansfoundthatsomeaspectsoftheirplighteventuallyplayedintheirfavor.Inthemid-1980s,astheContrawarbegantoprovemoreintractablethanfirstimagined,StateDepartmentofficialstouredthecountrytodrumupsupport.OneoftheirmostfrequentstopswasMiami,wheretheycouldbeassuredofasupportivereception.Bythistime,theinitialwavesofNicaraguanbusinesseliteandprofessionalshadbecomeestablishedandhadcementedtheirtieswiththeCuban-Americancommunity.When

ElliotAbrams,thetopLatinAmericanaffairsofficialintheReaganadministration,journeyedtoMiamiforacelebrationofthe165thanniversaryofNicaragua'sindependencefromSpain,healsometwiththeNicaraguanBusinessCouncilandattendedadinnerforonethousandpeoplesponsoredbytheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation.

WhenagroupofCuban-Americanbusinessmenorganizeda$35-a-platefund-raisertolobbyformoreU.S.supporttotheContrarebels,guestspeakersincludedRobertReilly,thespecialassistanttoPresidentReagan,whosejobitwastotravelaroundthecountryexplainingtheadministration'spoliciesinCentralAmerica.AsidefromthemoneycontributedtotheContracause,Washingtonhadgoodpoliticalreasonstopayattentiontosuchevents.ThefocalpointofthedinnerwasatestimonialtoMiami'sINSdistrictdirector,PerryRivkind,whojustbeforethe1984presidentialelectionhadorganizedaceremonyinwhichoverninethousandCubansreceivedU.S.citizenshipandsimultaneouslyregisteredasRepublicans.31

MiamiundertheCuban-AmericanshadbecomeaRepublicanbastion,andadministrationofficialsdidnotwanttoalienateit.ThestrongWashingtonvoiceoftheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationandsimilarorganizationswasnowheardinsupportoftheNicaraguans'cause.ThisefforthelpedproducetheonlysignificantturninfederalpolicyduringtheentireNicaraguanexodus.InApril1986Rivkind,stillINSdistrictdirector,announcedthathehadstoppeddeportingNicaraguanaliensfromMiami.Instatinghisreasonshesaid,"I'vealwayshaddifficultyviscerallywithsendingbackpeopletoacowardlyCommunistgovernment.TheSandinistasareexactlythat."32

BackinWashington,thingsmovedmoreslowly.TheadministrationappearedtoagreeimplicitlywithRivkind;inanycase,hisrulingwasneithercondemnednorreversed.NicaraguansinMiamiwereallowedtostay.ButneitherdidtheadministrationwelcomeallNicaraguans.Federalpolicybecameutterlyambivalent,allowingNicaraguansinMiamitoremainbutdeportingotherslivingelsewhereinthecountry.OnlyaftermorethanayeardidtheDepartmentofJusticeofficiallyendorseMiami'snewpolicy.InJuly1987,AttorneyGeneralMeesedeclared:"NoNicaraguanwhohasawell-foundedfearofpersecutionwillbedeportedintheabsenceofafindingbytheJusticeDepartmentthattheindividual

haseitherengagedinseriouscriminalactivityorposesadangertothenationalsecurity.''HefurtherruledthateveryqualifiedNicaraguanwouldbeentitledtoaworkpermitandencouragedthosewhohadbeendeniedasylumstatustoreapply.

ThismajorpolicyshiftwasreminiscentofPresidentJimmyCarter'sinvitationtoCubanstoseekfreedominAmericaduringtheMarielepisode.TheMeesememorandumrepresentedavictoryfortheNicaraguanrefugeecommunityanditsCuban-AmericanalliesevenasitdirectlycontradictedthelogicoftheContrawar.Theruling,afterall,encouragedNicaraguanstofleetheircountry,whereasContraaidtacitlyreliedonNicaraguansstayingputtoincreasepopularpressureontheSandinistas.Notsurprisingly,Meese'sinvitationprovokedanunprecedentedrushthatswampedtheMiamiINSoffice,promptingittoestablishspecialweekendhours,outreachcenters,andrulesthatdictatedwhenpeoplecouldapplyonthebasisoftheirbirthmonth.Inthecourseofsixweekendsmorethanthirty,thousandNicaraguansappliedforasyluminMiami.Atapproximatelythesametime,theapprovalrateforNicaraguanasylumrequestsclimbedfromaround10percenttoover50percent.34

NicaraguanswerestillnottreatedasfavorablyasCubanshadbeen.TheUnitedStates,initspursuitoftheContrawar,stillneededsomeNicaraguanstoremaininCentralAmericatofighttheSandinistas.Moreover,growingsectorsoftheSouthFloridacommunityincludingsomeCuban-AmericanshadbecomealarmedattherapidlygrowingNicaraguaninflow.Finally,afederalgovernmentseekingtoreduceagapingdeficitwasinnomoodtoassumethecostfornewforeignclients.ThefirstresponsetothesecontradictoryforceswastoprocesstheNicaraguans'asylumapplicationsbutdenythemaccesstoany

specialassistanceprogram,suchasthatorganizedforCubansintheearlysixtiesoreventhattowhichMarielandHaitianentrantseventuallybecameentitled.ThesameMiamiINSofficialwhohadclaimedhehad"visceral"difficultysendingpeoplebacktoNicaraguanowassertedthatMiami'sNicaraguanstudentsdidnotdeservescholarshipsbecause"theymaybelookingforsomethingthey'renotentitledto.Whyshouldthepublicfootthebill?"35Offtherecord,otherofficialsadmittedthattheyfearedthatprovidingbenefitstoNicaraguanswouldattractevenmore.

Federalpolicyfinallyshiftedagaintowardrepressioninthe

summerof1988.InthewakeofthecongressionalfreezeonmilitarysupportfortheContrasearlythatyear,theflowofNicaraguansacrosstheTexas-Mexicoborderincreasednotably.ToomanywerecomingnearlythirtythousandappliedforasylumbetweenJulyandDecember1988aloneandtheJusticeDepartmentwentbacktotreatingNicaraguansasharshlyasotherillegalaliens.Inthefall,NicaraguanswerestrippedoftheirrighttoworkpermitsandlumpedwithSalvadoranasylum-seekers.Washington'sINSspokesman,VerneJervis,claimedthat"peoplewhomakefrivolousapplicationsshouldnotwintherighttoworkhere."

36ThestrategyadoptedbytheINSatthispointwasremarkablysimilartoitsvariousattemptstoexpelHaitiansduringtheearlyeighties.Asthe1988-89Nicaraguanrefugeecrisisunfolded,immigrationauthoritiesspeededupthereviewofasylumapplicants,therebyacceleratingtheprocessbywhichtheycouldbedeported.37

TheJusticeDepartmentdiverted$28milliontowardborderenforcementinadetain-and-deportpolicyforCentralAmericansthatincludedaveritablesouthTexasblockadeofpatrols,detentioncamps,andimmigrationcourtsinstalledattheborder.Thepolicyworked.Fromapeakof2,400CentralAmericansaweekcrossingintosouthTexasinJuly-December1988,thenumberdroppedtoabout150inJanuary1989.38Afewmonthslater,aftertheSandinistasscheduledopenelections,PresidentBushcalledforContradirectorsandotherNicaraguansinMiamitogohomeandtestthedemocraticopeningintheircountry.TheStateDepartmentfollowedwithaprodinthepocketbook:itannouncedthatitwouldcuttheContras'monthly$400,000administrationbudgetbyhalf,whichinturnforcedadrasticcutbackinstaffsinMiami.39

FederalpolicythusrevertedtothelogicofReagan'sstatementatthe

beginningofthedecade.TheContrawarhadachieveditsgoals.TheSandinistaswereforcedintoelectionsthattheylost,andhenceallNicaraguansshouldreturntoNicaragua.Astheadministrationsawthings,thosewhohadbeenlivingandworkinginMiamiforseveralyearswerestillnotapermanentpartofanyAmericancommunity.InsteadofaresettlementprogramlikethatextendedtoCubansandotherofficiallyrecognizedrefugeegroups,theNicaraguansgotakickinthepants.Thisofficial"unwelcoming"was,ofcourse,heartilyapprovedbythosesectorsof

Miami'spopulationthathadsoughtfromthestarttherefugees'removal.

TheNativeResponse

TheAnglos

In1980,CitizensofDadeUnited,agrass-rootsAngloorganization,placedontheballotanordinancethatprohibited"theexpenditureofanycountyfundsforthepurposeofutilizinganylanguageotherthanEnglishoranycultureotherthanthatoftheUnitedStates."

40PassageofthisordinancesimultaneouslygalvanizedtheCubancommunity,andinauguratedtheU.S.Englishmovementnationwide.In1988,themovementreturnedtoMiamiwhenCitizensofDadeUnitedpushedanEnglishOnlyamendmenttotheFloridaStateconstitution.Eighty-fourpercentofFloridavotersapprovedtheamendmentintheNovemberelection.SupportforEnglishOnlywasnotlimitedtoAnglos,butalsoincludedmuchofDadeCounty'ssubstantialandgenerallypoliticallyliberalJewishpopulation.Inthe1989DemocraticprimarytoreplaceClaudePepperintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,theJewishcandidatefirmlysupportedEnglishOnly,advocatinglanguagetestsforU.S.citizenship.

Bythetimeofthe1988-89Nicaraguanrefugeecrisis,old-timeliberalandconservativepoliticalpositionsinMiamiseemedtodissolveintoeithernon-Latinanti-immigrantorLatinpro-immigrantviews.ThefirstpositionisillustratedbyalettertotheMiamiHerald:

Mostgreatcivilizationsinhistorywerebroughtdownbythe"barbarians"oftheirdays,whosemilitaryconquestoftheirwealthyneighborswasprecededbyinsidiousinvasioninsuchnumbersthatitdestroyedthefiberofsocietyoftheirhosts.ThisnewestwaveofimmigrantstoMiamiisjustthebeginning;thereare400millionLatinAmericanswhoarejustas

desperateastheNicaraguans.41

Formostlocalpublicofficials,theescalatingcostsofprogramsforarapidlyincreasingpopulationwastheconcreteissuebehindanti-immigrantsentiment.Inthemid-1980s,afterthelarge-scaleimmigrationofworking-classNicaraguanshadcommenced,publicofficialsbegantonotetheextrastrainandcostinpublicservices,

especiallyinhealthandeducation,createdbythenewrefugees.In1987,attheDowntownClinicrunbyDade'sPublicHealthUnit,Niearaguansbecamethesinglelargestgroupofpatients,accountingfor60percentofeases.

42Inthesameyear,NicaraguanchildrenovertookCubanchildrenasthelargestforeignminority,inDadeCountypublicschools,andarticlesaddressingtheproblemoflackofresourcestomeetthenewdemandbeganappearingwithincreasingfrequencyintheHerald.43

Duringthe1989Nicaraguanexodus,ameetingofDadeCounty'sadvisorygrouponthehomelessbecameanangryforumontheimpactofMiami-boundimmigrants."ThiscountryshouldopenitsdoorstoreceiveanybodyandeverybodywhowantstocomeherefromacountryunderCommunistruleordictatorship,"saidMetrocommissionerShermanWinn,amemberofDade'sImmigrationAdvisoryCommittee."Recall,recall,"shoutedahalfdozenmembersofCitizensofDadeUnited.44Sportingabuttonthatstated,"DeportIllegals,''PatKeller,amemberofCitizensofDade,assertedthat"illegalaliensareencouragedtocomehere."Anotherdeclaredthat"wecannotaffordtotakeintheThirdWorldexcesspopulation."45Subsequently,theheadoftheImmigrationAdvisoryCommittee,CommissionerBarbaraCarey,urgedDadeCountytoabandonplanstobuildatrailer-parkshelterforNicaraguanrefugeesonthegroundsthatitwouldonlyenticemoretocome.

MostlocallyelectedfederalrepresentativesviewedthearrivingNicaraguansinasimilarlight.SenatorBobGraham,aMiaminativewhohadbeengovernorduringtheMarielcrisis,sentalettertoU.S.AttorneyGeneralRichardThornburghonbehalfofthelocalgovernments.HeassertedthatAmericamust"regaincontrolofitsborders.Thosewhodon'tdeserveasylumshouldnotbeallowedto

violateourborders."Florida'sothersenator,ConnieMack,declared:"Weneedchangesinthelawthatwon'tsendamessagethatyoucanjustcrosstheborder,applyforasylumandcometoworkhere."46

CongressmanDanteFascell,chairoftheHouseForeignAffairsCommitteeandakeyfigureinobtainingfederalfundingduringtheMarielcrisis,stated:"Whatarewegoingtodo?MarchsixabreastwithagunandshoottheINScommissioner?You'relookingatmorefrustrationthancanbehandled."47Intheend,theyneither

hadtoshootthecommissionernoropenanewtrailerparkforarrivingrefugees.TheINS'senergeticpolicyattheTexasborderdeterrednewarrivals,andtheNicaraguansalreadyinMiamifendedforthemselvesaswelltheycouldasanewsourceofcheaplaborforthelocaleconomy.

TheBlacks

BlackAmericansdidnotleadthefightagainstNicaraguanmigration,buttheydidrepeatedlyexpresstheirfrustration.Whenthe1988NicaraguanrefugeecrisishitMiami,FrankWilliams,aMiami-bornBlackworkerwhohadalreadyspentoverayearshiftingfromoneday-laborjobtoanother,claimed:"I'lltakeanything,anyjobatall.Fivedollarsanhour?Somepeoplesaythat'slow,butI'lltakeit."HedirectlyblamedthenewlyarrivedNicaraguans,usuallyhiredat$5anhour,forhisnotbeingabletofindasteadyjob."Thebossesshouldbelookingoutforthepeoplewhohavelivedhereforyears.Theyshouldn'tallowtheseforeignerstocomehereandtakeourwork,"hesaid.

MostBlackAmericans,however,didnotblametheNicaraguansfortheriotsthatagainconvulsedOvertownjustbeforetheMiamiSuperBowlofJanuary1989.Insteadtheypointedtothesameissuesthathadalwaystormentedtheircommunity:policebrutality,acriminaljusticesystemthatrepeatedlyfailedthem,andapoliticalsysteminwhichnobodylistenedtothem.49Nicaraguansdidnotcauseallofthis;theyweremerelythelatestmanifestationsandremindersofwhereBlackAmericansstood.Miami'sBlackleaderscompareddespairinglytheirowncommunity'ssituationwiththatoftheNicaraguans.Fordespiteallthenewrefugees'sufferingandalltheforcesarrayedagainstthem,theyhadasignificantadvantagethat

allowedthemtosurviveandevenprosperinMiami,whileBlackAmericanscontinuedtostruggle.

Comrades-in-Arms:TheEnclaveatWork

WhentheNicaraguanrefugeecrisissurfacedinlate1988,CubanborncityofMiamimanagerCesarOdiocriticized"inhuman"con-

ditionsataprivateshelterforhomelessNicaraguans,ordereditshutdown,andbusedmorethan150refugeestoBobbyMaduroStadiumafacilitybuiltbywealthyCubansinthe1950sandthespringtrainingsitefortheBaltimoreOrioles.OdioassuredtherefugeesthattheywouldreceivethesameconsiderationgivenCubanMarielrefugeesin1980andtoldreporters:"Nowtheyunderstandtheyhavethefullsupportofthecity."

Theactionmobilizedsquadsofcityrescueworkers,busdrivers,andsanitationemployees.Weldersfencedoffentrancestothebaseballfield,carpentersbuiltpartitions.Cotswereplacedunderthestands,rowafterrowofthemalongtherampsandthecorridors.Outsideincenterfield,theU.S.flagfluttered.Inthevisitors'on-deckcircle,theNicaraguanflagwavedtoo,fromapoleplantedbytherefugees.51

Miami'sauxiliarybishopAgustinRomán,thesamemanwhohadbeensodecisiveduringthe1987Marielprisonriots,droppedbytotalkwiththenewrefugees.DoctorsfromMiami'sPasteurClinicrunandstaffedmostlybyCuban-Americandoctorssetupanexaminationroomunderastairway.City,aidesHiramGomezandEdgarSoporacedfromatelephonetotheparkinglotcallingnamesinrapidSpanish:"CentroVaseo,CentroAsturiano,IslasCanarias."Theywerefieldingpledgesfromrestaurants,nearlyallCuban-American,todonatefood.IgnacioMartinez,aCubanexileandretiredgrocer,showedupwithacigarinhismouthandasackofclothesinhishand."Wehadourtimeofneed,andnowit'stheirturn,"heexplained.Cuban-AmericanWQBAAMnewsdirectorTomasGarciaFusteraised$9,000inonedaybycallinguplocalbusinessesandaskingeachfora$1,000donation.52

Underneaththestadiumseats,twoformerCubanpoliticalprisoners,

AlfredoMenocalandAntonioCandales,mannedagreentelephonethatrangincessantly.AscityofMiamiemployees,theyassumedthetaskoftryingtofindjobsfortheNicaraguanrefugees.AhotelrepresentativeinquiredabouttheavailabilityofNicaraguanmaids.Aconstructionforemanaskedaboutrefugeedaylaborers.Somecallers,apparentlyignorantofthestadium'snewestresidents,wantedtoknowwhentheBaltimoreOrioleswouldbehavingbattingpractice.53

TwodaysafterOdiopromisedMiami's"fullsupport"forthehomelessNicaraguans,theCuban-AmericanmanagerofDade

County,JoaquinAviño,unveiledtheplantobuildatemporarytrailercamptohouse350to400newarrivals.Althoughtheplanwaseventuallyshelved,Aviñopersistedindemonstratingunwaveringsupportfortherefugees:"We'repullingoutallthestops.TherearealotofpeopleinthiscommunitywhoareclosetothePresident.Ithinkit'simportantforthosepeopletobemessengersforus."

Those"closetothePresident"werenotthetraditionalAngloestablishmentofMiami,butCubancommunityleaders.Withinaweek,OdiohadflowntoWashingtontomeetwithINScommissionerAlanNelson.OdiorequestedthatINStemporarilyreverseitspolicyofdenyingworkpermitstothenewNicaraguans.DespitethepleasofFloridasenatorsto"regaincontroloftheborders,"NelsonaccededtoOdio'srequest,promisingtoprocesstheasylumapplicationsofallNicaraguansinthebaseballstadiuminthreetofivedays.Thoseapprovedweretobeissuedpermanentworkpermits,andeventhoserejectedweretogettemporaryworkpermitswhiletheyappealedtheircases.UponreturningfromWashington,Odiowentdirectlytothestadiumtoaddresstheescapees,wherehewascheeredandhadbestoweduponhimthetitle''FatheroftheNicaraguanRefugees."55

Thisattitudeofthecityandcountygovernmentsdidnotgounresisted.Asidefromtheusualnativistcriesofanguish,themosteffectivechallengetolocalrefugeepolicycamefromanunexpectedquarter.Advocatesofthehomelesspointedtotheobviousparadoxthatwhilethecitywasstretchingitselftoprovidesheltertonewlyarrivedforeigners,nativeAmericanslivinginthestreetsofMiamicontinuedtobewoefullyneglected.Thelogicoftheargumentwasunimpeachable,andOdioandhisaideshadtoconcede.Thecity'sresponsewasremarkablysimilartothepolicyadoptedbytheCarter

administrationtenyearsearlierafterbeingchallengedfordiscriminatinginfavorofMarielCubansandagainstHaitians.Inbothcases,theSolomonicofficialanswerwastotreatbothgroupsalike,atleastonthesurface.

BobbyMaduroStadiumbecamepartitioned:theNicaraguansoccupiedrightfieldand,quiteappropriately,thevisitors'dugout;thehomelesswerehousedinthehome-teamdugout.UponarrivinginMiamiandseeinghowtheirspringtrainingcamphadbeentransformed,theOriolespromptlymadearrangementstomoveto

Sarasota.

56OnefirmbuildingprefabricatedhousesforrecenthurricanevictimsinJamaicahiredfromthestadiumsomehundredNicaraguansandanotherhundredhomelessAmericans.Amonthlater,abouteightyoftheNicaraguanswerestillworkingforthecompany,butfewofthehomelessremained.57Cityofficialsusedthisandsimilarpiecesofevidencetocementtheirobviousbiasinfavoroftherefugees.

Inamatterofweeks,NicaraguanrefugeessettlinginMiamiaspartofanapparentlyuncontrollableflowhadsecuredspaceontheagendasoflocalgovernmentsthathadlongarguedthattherefugeeswereafederalconcern.Therefugeesachievedthisrecognitionnotsimplybecauseofthemagnitudeofthemigrationproblem,butbecausetheCubanAmericancommunityhadorganizedagenerouswelcome.Miamiattheendof1988wasnotthesamecityithadbeenjusteightyearsearlierduringMariel.CubanAmericans,nowinpositionsofpoliticalpower,sawtheNicaraguansasfellowvictimsofcommunism.Theyextendedtothenewarrivalswhatisprobablythemostuniquereceptionforanyimmigrantgroupinrecenthistory:notwelcomedbythegovernmentandthesocietyatlarge,thenewentrantswerestillgrantedaccesstolocalresourcesbydintofpoliticalkinshipwithanestablishedrefugeecommunity.

Ashadhappenednumeroustimesinthepast,eventsinMiamiwerethemirrorimageofthosetakingplaceinHavana.FidelCastrohadhailedthearrivaltopoweroftheSandinistasin1979andwelcomedthemascomradesandallies.Inreaction,CubanAmericanpoliticiansbeganreferringtothenewrefugeesas"ourNicaraguanbrothers."58ThemoretheCubangovernmentcametotheaidofthebeleagueredSandinistas,themoretheCubanexilecommunitypumpedresourcesintotheContrastruggle.In1983,Cubansand

NicaraguansinMiamicreatedtheCentralAmericaPro-RefugeeCommission,whosegoalwastoassistbothNicaraguanrefugeesandtheContrasfightinginCentralAmerica.Withinamonththeyamassed1,000boxesofclothes,475offood,and350ofmedicine,worth$800,000altogether.WhilesixCubanandNicaraguanphysiciansvolunteeredtoclassifythemedicines,airtransportationforthegoodswasarrangedbytheCubanAmericanpresidentoftheHialeahChamberofCommerce.59

Spanish-languageradiostationsinMiami,incooperationwithcommunityorganizations,arrangedmarathonstoraisemoneyfortheContras.Onesuchevent,in1983,mobilizedaboutonethou-

sandCubansandNicaraguanstomantablesthroughoutDadeCounty.TheCuban-managedRepublicNationalBankandGeneralFederalSavingsAssociationopenedtheirdrive-inwindowstoacceptdonations.

60In1985,whentheoutspokencriticoftheSandinistasCardinalMiguelObandoyBravovisitedMiami,CubanAmericanradiostationsbroadcastnewsofthecardinal'svisitforanentireweek,exhortingallopponentsofcommunismtoattendthemasshewoulddeliver.Thedaythecardinalspoke,threestationsannouncedanotherradiomarathontoraisefundsfortheContras.61Speakersonlocalradioandtelevisionrepeatedlyassertedthat"theroadtoHavanarunsthroughManagua."62

Beginninginthemid-1980s,CubanAmericanrepresentativestothestatelegislaturealsolobbiedforsupportfortheContrasaswellaslowertuitionforNicaraguansatstateuniversities.TheyalsosucceededinpassingabilltohelpNicaraguandoctorsquicklygetU.S.licenses.Meanwhile,thecityofWestMiami,ledbyitsCubanAmericanmayor,dissolvedtieswithitssistercity,León,NicaraguathefirsttimeaU.S.cityhadbrokensistercitytiesforanyreason.Miami-DadeCommunityCollege,atthesuggestionofitsCubanAmericanvicepresident,setaside$100,000inprivatedonationstopaythetuitioncostsofsomehundredNicaraguanrefugeeswhowerenotentitledtoU.S.governmentaid.63

TheincorporationofNicaraguansintotheexilemoralcommunityinturnopenedthewayfortheirincorporationintothegrowingbusinessenclave.Inbothcases,thelarger,moreestablishedCubanAmericancommunityextendeditselftoabsorbtheNicaraguans,neutralizingtheeffectsofbothfederalpolicyandnativistreaction.Thepartnershipwasneverthelessone-sided,forCubanswereincompletecontrol.As

theNicaraguancommunitydiversifiedandtheContrawardraggedon,fracturesdevelopedinwhathadsofarbeenamonolithicalliance.Despitetheirprecariousposition,Nicaraguansbegantochafeundertheall-embracingtutelageoftheiroldercousins.Forthenewrefugees,CubanAmericanshadbecomethemainstreaminMiami.

InSearchofVoice

ThefirstvisibleNicaraguanneighborhoodinMiamiemergedduringtheearly1980swhenmiddle-classrefugeesofthesecondwavepurchasedcondominiumsownedbyearlier-arrivingmembersof

theeliteinthesuburbofSweetwater.

64Twenty-fiveyearsbefore,Sweetwaterhadbeenanenclaveofthenativewhiteworkingclass-self-styled"rednecks."Atthattime,onewasmorelikelytohearGreek(fromthefewGreekimmigrants)thanSpanish.TheEvergladesswampsabuttedthetownonthewest,whilehundredsofacresofundevelopedlandtotheeastseparateditfromMiami.Duringthe1970s,however,metropolitangrowthrapidlyenvelopedSweetwaterastheCuban-AmericanpopulationspreadwestalongSouthwestEighthStreet(CalleOcho)fromitsLittleHavanahub.TherednecksabandonedSweetwater,andbythetimemiddle-classNicaraguansbegantoarriveintheearly1980stheareawasalreadyLatin,withtwolargeCubangrocerystores,anumberofCubancafeterias,andassortedotherLatinbusinesses.

AsNicaraguansbegantoconcentrateinSweetwater,someboughtbusinessesfromCuban-Americansandconvertedthemtotheneedsoftheircommunity.AfocalpointbecameLosRanchosRestaurant,modeledonaManaguafavorite.WiththeSandinistarevolution,theownersoftheoriginalhadfledandopenedarestaurantinLittleHavana.AsaNicaraguanneighborhoodbegantoemergeinSweetwater,co-ownerJuanWongmovedtherestaurantthereandreassumedthenameLosRanchos.HegraduallyrecruitedthestaffoftheoldManagua-basedestablishment,andtherestaurantsteadilyassumedthesocialimportanceithadhadbeforetheexodus,becomingthemostvisiblegatheringplaceoftherefugeecommunity.65

Theupper-andmiddle-classNicaraguansinMiamifollowedaneconomicpaththatcloselyresembledthatoftheirCubanbrethren.By1983,whenthefederalgovernmentstoppedgrantingworkpermitstoNicaraguanasylumapplicants,about100to150NicaraguanbusinesseshadsproutedinDadeCounty,includingseveral

restaurants,asprinklingofclothingstores,constructioncompanies,realestatebrokers,andflorists.66Fouryearslater,aftertheinflowofNicaraguanworking-classimmigrantshadcommenced,thenumberofNicaraguan-ownedbusinessessurpassed600.Ashoppingcenter,CentroComercialManagua,hadopenedinSweetwater;therewerealsomarkets,pharmacies,bakeries,clothingstores,restaurants,photostudios,insuranceagencies,doctors,anddentists.WealthyexilesgainedamajorityinterestinthePopularBank.Tractoamerica,adistributoroftractorpartstoLatinAmerica,had

grosssalesestimatedat$7million.LosRanchosRestauranthadsproutedfivebranchesinDadeCounty,employingtwohundredNicaraguansandgrossingover$5millionannually.

LikeCubans,Nicaraguanbusinesspeoplemaintainedhighethnicsolidarity:"WhereverIgo,toafurniturestoreora(car)dealershiporinsurancecompany,Ialwaysask,'Where'stheNicaraguanwhoworkshere?'Iwanttogivethecommissiontoacountryman,"claimedMariaCerna,aNicaraguanwhoworkedasabusinessdevelopmentrepresentativeforamajorMiamisavingsandloanassociation.TheNicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation,withfourhundredmembersin1987,helpedaboutahundredfellowNicaraguansfindworkandvouchedforexileswhosegoodcreditwasbynowonlyamemoryfrombeforetheSandinistarevolution.68

TheNicaraguanrefugeecommunitydidnotconsist,ofcourse,simplyofbusinessesandjobassistancenetworks.Ithadmanyculturalcomponents,includingonesthathadbeendormantbackhomebutassumedanewsymbolicsignificanceinexile.ThesesymbolsservedtodistinguishtheNicaraguansnotonlyfrom"Americans"butalsofromtheCubans.NicaraguanstoresinSweetwatersoldtypicalNicaraguanproductssuchascotonas(cottonshirtsusuallywornonlybyIndians)topeoplewhoneverwouldhaveboughtthembackhome.AsoneNicaraguanstoreownerputit,"ThepeoplewhoalwaysworeAmericanbrandsandEuropeanclothesnowcomeshoppingforacotonatoweartoparties."69

OtherculturaltraditionsnothighlyprizedathomefoundnewdevoteesinMiamiaswell.AuxiliadoraSorianocametoMiamifromManaguain1982.Althoughshehadneverbeenadancerherself,sheimmediatelybeganrecruitingNicaraguansbetweentheagesofsixteen

andtwenty-twotoformafolkloricballettroupe.By1989,whatstartedwithonlyfivedancershadgrownintointothenonprofitBalletFolkóricoNicaragüensewithtwenty-fourmembers.70

AllthesignspointedtoarepeatperformanceoftheCubanexperienceandtheeventualemergenceofastrongNicaraguan-Americanvoiceinlocalaffairs.Thisdidnothappen,however,forotherforcesconspiredagainstthisplausibleoutcome.First,theNicaraguanexodusoccurredoverafarmorecompressedperiodoftimethantheCuban.Thelatterhadtakenplaceinseveralwell-

spacedwavesovertwodecades,allowingtheearlier-arrivingentrepreneursandprofessionalstoconsolidatepositionsintheemergingbusinessenclave.BythetimeofMarieltwentyyearsafterthefirstarrivalstherewasaneconomicallyaffluentandsociallywellestablishedcommunitytoabsorbthenewworking-classrefugees.Bycontrast,theNicaraguaninflowtooklessthantenyears,withthefirstworking-classwavesarrivingbarelyfiveyearsaftertheoriginalelites.In1988-89,whenthemovementacceleratedtoaMariel-likeflood,themiddle-classSweetwaterethniceconomywasstilltoorecentandtoofeebletoabsorballthearrivals.TheimpoverishednewrefugeesthushadtorelyonthecharityoftheMiamiandDadeCountygovernmentsandonthelocalinformaleconomyforsurvival.Withtheinfluxofworking-classimmigrants,theimageofNicaraguan-Americanspromptlyshiftedfromagroupofwell-to-doexpatriatestothatofanotherimpoverishedThirdWorldminorityputtingpressureonlocalresources.

Second,thehostilityofthefederalgovernmenttowardpermanentresettlementofNicaraguansintheUnitedStatesweakenedthegroup'svoiceinlocalaffairs.Federalpolicyrenderedthesituationoftheworking-classarrivalsstillmoreprecarious,forcingthemintominimallypaidandinformaljobs.ThestruggletobeallowedtoremainintheUnitedStatesalsoconsumedmuchoftheenergyofthecommunity,preventingitfromarticulatingadistinctpoliticaldiscourse.TheNicaraguanswerejusttoobusytryingtofendofftheINStodevelopacoherentlocalprofile.

Third,theNicaraguanexoduslackedfinality,withtheoptionofreturnremainingopentomany,evenifthatmeantjoiningtheContras.AftertheSandinistasannouncedtheirwillingnesstoholdelections,theoptionexpandedsignificantly,especiallyundertheproddingofBushadministrationofficials.Nicaraguanrefugeesneverhadthedoorfirmlyandpermanentlyclosedbehindthem;thustheywereineffect

tornbetweengoalstobepursuedeitherintheUnitedStatesorintheirhomecountry.AmythicalNicaraguacouldnotbeconstructedinexile,astheCubanshaddonewiththeirisland,becausetherealNicaraguawastooaccessible.

Despiteallthesedifficulties,Nicaraguanexileorganizationsstruggledgamelytobeheard.In1988,theCasaComunidadorganizedaNicaraguanCommunityDaythatattractedfourthousand

people.SixmonthslaterthesameorganizationsponsoredacelebrationofNicaraguancultureintheDadeCountyAuditorium.StampedonthebackoftheprogramwasComunidad'smotto:"Unityisourgoal."

71InDecember1986,theCentroComercialManaguahelditsfirstexilegritería.Nicaraguansfilledtheparkinglottoprayandsinghymns.Littlebasketsbrimmingwithcandywerepassedaround,andthefaithfulyelledtherefrainsthatgivethereligiouscelebrationitsname"TheShouting."72Bythelate1980s,NicaraguanfanspackedvariouspublicparkseachSundaytowatchtheNicaraguannationalpastime,baseball.Theirleague'steamshadthesamenamesasthosebackhomeBoer,Esteli,Zelayaandthefierceallegiancesremainedthesame."InNicaragua,firstyouhavebreadandthenyouhavebaseball,"saidleagueorganizerCarlosGarcia.''Itpromotespatriotismandunity."73

Bythistime,NicaraguanimmigrationtoMiamiwasdominatedbytheworkingclasses,whoweremuchmorevisiblethantheearlierwaves.Miami'sinformalsectorwasburgeoning,andthestereotypeofNicaraguanshadclearlyshiftedtoadefinitionfocusingonpoorandunemployedworkers.UnitedNicaraguanArtistswasformedin1989specificallytoimprovetheimageofNicaraguansinMiami.Asoneofitsfoundersstated,"Peoplethinkwe'realluneducated,poorpeoplewithwork-permitproblems."74

TheRubénDaríoInstitute,runbyadescendantofNicaragua'smostfamouspoet,concentratedongarneringpublicrecognitionofNicaragua'scontributionstoSouthFlorida.HeconvincedtheCountyCommissiontorenamepartofastreetthatrunsthroughSweetwaterRubénDaríoAvenue.HethenpersuadedtheDadeCountySchoolBoardtonameanewschoolintheneighborhoodtheRubénDarío

MiddleSchool.Toembellishtherecognition,theinstitutecommissionedasculptortoproduceabustofthepoetandaNicaraguanartisttodonatealife-sizeoilpaintingofDarío.ItalsoplannedtodonateacollectionoftheworksofDaríoandotherLatinAmericanwriterstotheschool'slibrary.75

Despitetheseefforts,thelegalandeconomicprecariousnessoftherefugeecommunityanditscontradictorygoalsconspiredagainstmakingalastinglocalimpression.AmongtheNicaraguans,noclearleaderorpositionemergedasmultipleagendasarosethatmixedexileconcernsofoustingtheSandinistasinNicaraguawithimmigrantconcernsofgainingworkpermitsintheUnitedStates.

FromtheMiami-ManaguaLionsClubtoNicaraguanDemocraticYouth,adozenlocalgroupsspokeup,demandingsuchthingsasmedicalsuppliesfortherebelsandlegalimmigrationstatus.

76Politicalissuesdividedthecommunitymoreoftenthanimmigrationproblemscausedittocoalesce.RogerBlandon,whoheadedtheMinistryoftheEconomyduringthelasteighteenmonthsofAnastasioSomoza'sregimeandthenfledtobecomeacarsalesmaninMiami,declared:"Iparticipatedinvariousgroupsthatwerestartedtounifytheexodusbutweneverarriveatanything.Everybodywantstheirownideastopredominate.SomesaytheSomocistasaretoblame.Otherssay,'Noit'stheoneswhosupportedtheSandinistaswhoaretoblameforwhathappenedinNicaragua.'"77

AfewmonthsaftercallingonSenatorConnieMacktoallowNicaraguanrefugeestoremaininthecountry,thenewlyformedElectoralCounciloftheNicaraguanExodusaskedmorethanfiftyexilegroupstonominatecandidatesandparticipateinanelectionscheduledforearly1990,because"itisimportantforMiami'scommunitytogetbehindaleaderwhowilladdressproblemsliketheneedforworkpermits,refugeesdetainedbytheImmigrationService,andthefutureofContraslivinginHonduras."78Inshort,nosinglepoliticalvoicehademerged,norcouldit.ThecontradictorygoalsofremainingintheUnitedStatesanddefeatingtheSandinistaspulledateachotheratthesametimethatdiscorddividedtheanti-Sandinistamilitants.

Asdivisiveaspoliticaldifferences,butmoreinsidious,werethelatentclassdivisionsseparatingearlyandlaterefugees.Thefloodofworking-classarrivalshaderasedtherelativelypositiveimageofeliteexiles,andmanyrespondedbydistancingthemselvesfromthenewcomers:"It'snotjustalanguageproblemanymore,"saidLillian

Rios,anelementaryschoolteacher."Manyofthestudents,liketheirparents,arebarelyliterate."OscarMayorga,aU.S.educatedNicaraguanexilewhoranaplasticsplantinPompanoBeach,describedthecontrastbetweenearlyandlaterarrivalsinblunterterms."FromwhatIunderstand,they'repeoplewhoare20yearsbehindincivilization.It'stheeffectoftheenvironmentandalackofeducationandreligioustraining.WehavebeenabletoidentifywithAnglo-Saxonculture,whereorderanddedicationtoworkhasmadethiscountrygreat."Despiteashortageofworkersathisfactory,Mayorgasaidhewouldbereluctanttohire

refugeesfromhiscountryuntiltheywereschooledinEnglishandhadlearnedAmericanculture.

Caughtupbythesecontradictionsmilitantexilegroupversusstrugglingimmigrantminority,freedomfightersinNicaraguaversusinformalworkersinMiamitheNicaraguanexoduscouldnotarticulateadistinctvoice,muchlesscompetewiththediscourseoftheirCuban-Americanallies.TheCubans'three-decadeplightbroughtaboutbyafirmlyentrenchedregimeintheislandandtheimpossibilityofreturngavetheirpresenceinMiamiafinalitythathelpedconsolidatetheirethniceconomy.TheNicaraguans,incontrast,confrontedafeeblerandlessmonolithicadversary,andtheoptionofreturntotheircountryconfusedtheirlocalpriorities.AseconddistinctLatinvoiceinMiamididnotemergeintheend.

The"New"Herald

Asithaddonethroughoutthe1980Marielcrisis,theMiamiHeraldinitiallyopposedtheNicaraguaninflowandcastigatedthefederalgovernmentforcreatinganotherimmigrationmessforwhichDadeCountyhadtopay.Duringtheearly1980s,thenewspaperadvocatedrigidcontrolovertheU.S.borders,preventingnewrefugeesfromenteringanddeportingthosewhodidnotmeetexactingrequirementsforpoliticalasylum.80Allofthis,however,camebeforetheopenconfrontationbetweenthepaperandCuban-Americanleadersthatculminatedinthefull-pagepaidannouncementbytheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundationinOctober1987proclaiming,"TheHeraldHasFailedUs."81

Followingthisandotherrelatedevents,theHerald'spositionbegantochangerapidly.AngloswereleavingMiami,andCubanswerenot

buyingthenewspaper.Market"penetration"thepercentageofhouseholdsingreaterMiamireceivingtheHeraldwasdecliningcontinuously,aswereadvertisingrevenues.Belatedly,HeraldeditorsrecognizedthattheirtownwasnotjustlikeanyotherintheUnitedStates.ContinuingtospouttheoldAnglohegemonicmessagewasasurewayofgoingoutofbusiness.

NowherewasthechangeoftackmoreevidentthanintheeditorialpositionsadoptedtowardtheNicaraguanexodusinthelate1980s.When,in1987,AttorneyGeneralMeeseannouncedthatNicaraguanswouldnotbedeportedandthattheywouldreceive

workpermits,theHeraldendorsedthemeasure.

82Ayearlater,itadvocatedamorestable,permanentstatusforNicaraguans.83Andbylate1988thenewspaper'seditorialwriters,havingapparentlyforgottenallabouttheirattacksonMariel,contendedthattheacceleratingNicaraguaninflowwouldundoubtedlybenefitthecommunity,ashadearlierCubanimmigration.84

EvenmoreastonishingwastheHerald'sreactionwhenBobbyMaduroStadiumopenedtoshelterthenewrefugees.ThisactionbytheMiamicitymanagerwouldhavetriggeredhowlsofprotestinthenewspaper'seditorialsonlyafewyearsbefore.Inlate1988,however,therecentlyappointedHeraldeditorcongratulatedmanagerCesarOdio,assertingthat"theUnitedStateshasamoralobligationtotaketheserefugeesinandletthemwork."85InaChristmasDayeditorial,theHeralddrewaparallelbetweentheplightofthehomelessNicaraguansinMiamiandthatofMaryandJosephinBethlehem.Itdeclaredthatpolitics,economics,andstingytownspeoplehadcausedbothsituationsandcalledoneveryonebutespeciallythefederalgovernmenttoliveuptothenation'scommitmenttolife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappiness.86

Miamiwasverydifferentin1989fromwhatithadbeentenyearsearlier.The180-degreeturnintheHerald'spositiontowardsupportingtheNicaraguanarrivalssignalednolessthanadecisiveshiftinthewaylocalelitesthoughtabouttheircity.Althoughmiddle-andworking-classAnglogroupscontinuedtoembracetheassimilationistdiscourseandtoopposeLatinimmigrantsasferventlyasever,theyhadlosttheirprimechannelofexpression.Thereafter,CitizensofDadeUnitedandotherpronativistgroupswouldbejustanotherminorityvoiceastheAnglobusinessclassdistanceditselffromthem.Thissingularsplitcameaboutbecausecorporateleaders

realizedthatthecitywasnot"intransition"tosomething,buthadconsolidatedadistinctprofile,uniqueinthecountry.BilingualMiamiwasprofitable,monolingualMiamiwasnot;asalways,thebottomlinewaswhatdefinedcorporatepolicy.

Ironically,theCubancommunitywasabletodofortheNicaraguanswhatithadbeenunabletodoforitsownco-nationalsduringtheMarielepisode.AdecadeofinvestmentsinU.S.-orientedpoliticalorganizingmadeallthedifference.OtherchangesintheMiamiHeraldanditsparentKnight-RidderCorporation,moreover,indicatedthattheNicaraguans'suddenwelcomewasnotanisolated

event.WhentheneweditorofthenewspapercametoMiamiin1990,hetooklessonsinSpanishandwastutoredintheculturalnuancesoftheLatincommunitybyaCuban-Americanprofessor.Similarly,thesameHeraldcolumnistwhohadafewyearsearliercomplainedthatCastroalwayscalledtheshotsinMiamididnotsuggestsendingthenewrefugeesback.Indeed,hedeclaredthatitwas"insane"thattheNicaraguanswerenotbeingtreatedaswellastheCubanshadbeen.

MoreimportantstillwasthechangeintheSpanisheditionofthenewspaper.Theoriginalversion,ElHerald,hadremainedunderthecompleteeditorialcontroloftheEnglish-languageeditorandreliedalmostexclusivelyontranslatedmaterial.Althoughcostly,theeffortdidnotwork;circulationratesamongCuban-Americanhouseholdsonlydeclined.Thenin1988,Knight-Riddertookanunprecedentedstep:itcreatedabrand-newSpanish-languagenewspaperElNuevoHeraldthatwasvirtuallyindependentoftheEnglishedition.Ithaditsownbuilding,itsownreportingstaff,and,mostimportant,itsowneditors,overwhelminglyCuban-Americans.Notsurprisingly,ElNuevoHerald'seditorialstancecametoreflectmorecloselytheconservativediscourseoftheexilecommunitythantheoftenliberaloutlookofitssisterEnglishpublication.Thecoexistenceoftwodifferentversionsofthenewspaper,eachinadifferentlanguageandwithitsowneditoriallinebutsimultaneouslydistributed,wasaclearevocationofhowMiamihadbeentransformed.

TheAngloestablishmentyieldedgroundtotheCubandiscourseaboutthecityinexchangeforsocialpeaceandcontinuingcorporateprofitability.Nomatterwhatthe1980EnglishOnlyordinanceand1988amendmenttothestateconstitutionhadmandated,Miamiwasinfactbilingualandbicultural.Theassimilationistdiscoursereceded

notonlybecausethebusinesselitetoneditdown,butalsobecausemanyofitsmostferventnativewhitesupportersleftthearea.BlackAmericans,ontheotherhand,stoodtheirground,andtheirowninterpretationofeventsbecamemorearticulateandurgent.Theywerewellawarethatthequestionoftheirroleandstatusinthisnewcity,liketheroleandstatusofthesurgingHaitian-Americancommunity,remainedunresolved.

ChapterEightLostintheFray:Miami'sBlackMinoritiesSomethreehundredanticommunists,mostlyCuban-Americans,werebunchedatoneendoftheesplanadeinfrontoftheMiamiBeachConventionCenter.Amidplacardsthatproclaimed,"Arafat,Gadhafi,andCastroareTerrorists"and"Mr.Mandela,doyouknowhowmanypeopleyourfriendCastrohaskilledjustforaskingtherighttospeakasyoudohere?"amiddle-agedCubantilesetterasserted,"I'mherebecauseMandelaisafriendofCastroandnofriendofCastroiswelcomeinMiami."

1OpposingtheanticommunistsonlyfiftyyardsawaywerethreethousandNelsonMandelasupporters,mostlyBlack,whoseplacardsdeclared:"Mandela,WelcometoMiami,HomeofApartheid,"and''MiamiCity,Council=Pretoria."Atallmanwavedacardboardsign:"Anticommunismisnoexcusetosupportracism.WelcomeNelson-WinnieMandela."Amiddle-agedBlackAmericanwomanproclaimed,"I'mherebecausethis[NelsonMandela]isagreatman."2

Bothsideshadbeenthereforaboutfivehoursunderasearingsun.Planescontinuouslycircledafewthousandfeetabove,alternatelydraggingpro-andanti-Mandelabanners.JewsagainstMandelaparadeddownthestreet,followedafewminuteslaterbyJewsforMandela.Afewwhitesupremacistscarriedracistsigns.Themainfocusofattention,though,wastheconfrontationbetweenMiami'stwolargestethnicgroups:Cuban-AmericansandBlackAmericans.3Mandela,inthemidstofhistriumphaltouroftheUnitedStates,wasintowntodeliveraspeechattheMiamiBeachConventionCenterbeforetheinternationalconventionoftheAmericanFederationof

State,County,andMunicipalEmploy-

ees(AFSCME).HehadalreadybeentoNewYorkCity,Washington,D.C.,andAtlanta,wherehehadbeengreetedandwarmlywelcomedbythosecitiesandbythenation'stopelectedofficialsandcelebrities.

ButthingsweredifferentinMiami.ThecityhadpointedlyrefusedtohonorMandelabecauseCubanpoliticiansfearedalienatingright-wingCubanradiotalkshowhostsbywelcomingasupporterofFidelCastro.EventheoneBlackmemberoftheCityCommissionhadclaimedhewouldnotforgothecommissionmeetingtoattendMandela'sspeech.

4NeitherhenortheoneBlackAmericanontheCountyCommissionpubliclydefendedMandela.5

IntothevoidsteppedotherBlackleadersmorewillingtoconfronttheCubans."MiamimaygodownininfamyastheonlycityinAmericathatdenounced,criticized,castigatedandthrewits'welcomemat'inthefaceofNelsonMandela,"H.T.Smith,chairmanoftheMiamiCoalitionforaFreeSouthAfrica,wrotetoMiami'sCubanmayorXavierSuárez.6AndPatriciaDue,oneofthefounders,threedecadesearlier,oftheTallahasseechapteroftheCongressofRacialEquality,complained:"Ifeelsick.Howdaretheydothistous?Mr.Mandelaisasymbol.Heisalinktoourmotherland.Afteralltheblood,sweat,andtearsofBlackAmericans,andpeoplearestilltryingtotelluswhowecanhear."7

InthewakeofMandela'svisit,SmithandtheBlackLawyersAssociationbroughtBlackfrustrationintofocusbyorganizingaboycottoftheirowncity.Overthenextfourmonths,atleastthirteennationalorganizations,includingtheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU)andtheNationalOrganizationofWomen(NOW),canceledtheirconventionsinMiami.

InJuly1990,justaweekafterMandela'sMiamivisit,aHaitiancustomergotintoanargumentwithaclerkinaCuban-ownedclothingstoreintheheartofLittleHaiti.Afistfightensued.ThefollowingdayaHaitianradioannouncerrelatedthestoryandsummonedfellowimmigrantsand"BlacksinOvertown,LibertyCityandOpa-Lockatojoininprotest."Anotherannouncerproclaimed,"WearegoingtomaketheCubanspayforthewaytheytreatedMandela."8Onethousandprotestersblockedaccesstothestoreduringanine-hourconfrontation,punctuatedbystreetdancingtoHaitianmerengue,occasionaleruptionsofrocksandbottlesaimedattheshutteredstore,andscreamedepithetsatradiore-

portersfromaSpanish-languageradiostationwhovisitedthescene.

Whenthemerchantreopenedhisstore,aHaitiancrowdgatheredspontaneouslytoprotest.Themerchantspokepeacefullywithsmallgroupsofprotesters,andaHaitianmusicalgroupentertainedthecrowd.Abouthalfleftthesceneduringanafternoondownpour,butintheearlyeveningahundredhelmetedpolicecarryingshieldssurroundedtheremainingprotestersandbeganclosingin,nightsticksflailing.Withtelevisionstationsbroadcastingthemelee,policeknockedtheprotesterstothegroundandcontinuedtohitmanywhiletheyweredown.Protesterstryingtoescapeweretackled,jabbedwithnightsticks,andhandcuffed.Bylateevening,sixty-threewhohadnoimmediateproofoftheirimmigrationstatushadbeenarrested.

ThestoryofBlacksinMiamihasalwaysbeenoneofpowerlessness,suffering,andfrustratedattemptsatresistance.Experiencesduringthe1980sstiffenedthecommunity'sresolvetoimproveitslot,whileatthesametimeextendingitsnewdouble-subordinationdiscoursetoHaitians.YetracialsolidarityisnotthewholestoryforeitherBlackAmericansorHaitians.Atangleofconflictingandoftencontradictoryperceptions,attitudes,andinteractionsyieldedaconfusingscenewhereracialsolidarityalternatedwithclassandethnicfactionalismaswellaseconomiccompetition.Duringthedecade,BlackAmericansbecameincreasinglydividedbyclass,asdidHaitians;andbothimmigrantandnativeBlacksbecameincreasinglyambivalenttowardeachother.Thesecontradictorytendenciesweakenedtheircommonvoice,makingitalltheeasierforthesegroupstobelostinthefray.

ColorVersusClass

Thecommonrealityofcolorconcealedagrowingprocessof

differentiationintheBlackpopulationofMiami.AsinotherAmericancities,theendofsegregationandadventofthecivilrightseraacceleratedthegrowthofamiddleclassthattranslatedeconomicsuccessintoescapefromtheghetto.10UnlikeinotherAmericancities,thisprocesstookplaceastheminorityasawholewasbeingelbowedasidebyanimmigrantgroup.Whilemiddle-classBlackswaxedindignantaboutthesymbolicslightsmetedouttothemby

theLatins,inner-cityghettosexplodedrepeatedlyformorebasicreasons.Miamiwastheonlycityduringthe1980storegisterthreeurbanriots.EachfollowedthekillingofaBlackbypolice,andeachwasspontaneousandleaderless,adesperateexpressionofanger.

ThesuburbanBlackprofessionalsdidnotleadtheseriots,nordidtheyparticipateinthem,butthelocalestablishmenttreatedthemasiftheyhad,addressingthemasvalidinterlocutorsintheireffortstopreventthenextoutburst.Hence,apeculiardynamicdevelopedinwhichregularexplosionsintheghettofueledprogramsthatmainlybenefitededucatedBlacks,therebyaccentuatingtheriftbetweenthetwosegmentsofthenativeminority.Theprocess,inauguratedafterthe1980riot,wasdescribedexplicitlybyaLibertyCityleader:

Thewhitepowerstructureonceagaintooktheeasywayout....Onceagaintheylistenedtothewrongpeople.Theyinvitedthemiddle-classBlackpeopledowntownwhodidnotparticipateintheriotandaskedthem,"Whydidyouallriot?"Theydidn'tknow,sowhattheydidwasarticulatetheirownfrustrations,whichwere"We'renotinbusiness,soifyouputusinbusinesswewillnotriot."Andsothewhitecommunitywentoutandraisedsevenmilliondollarstoputusinbusiness...buttheriotsdidn'toccurbecauseBlacksarenotinbusinessandthefolkswhoriotedcouldn'tgointobusinesstomorrowiftheywanted.12

Theeffortstopreventnewurbanexplosionsdidproduceresultsthatseemedimpressiveintheaggregate.The$7millionputtogetherbytheGreaterMiamiChamberofCommercespawnedtheBusinessAssistanceCenter,whichhelpedlaunchanumberofBlackenterprises.In1989,thecenterraised$8.3milliononitsown.ThenumberofsmallBlackfirmsinMiamimorethantripledbetween1977and1987,reachingalmostseventhousandinthelatteryear(table5).In1980,DadeCountydidnotawardasingleconstruction

programorpurchaseordertoaBlackfirm;afterestablishinganewset-asideprogram,however,countyprojectsgaveworkto158Blackcontractorsbetween1982and1990.Blackparticipationpeakedin1985-86when$12.7millionworthofcontracts,or6.6percentofthecountytotal,wasawardedtothesefirms.13

Similarly,Blackparticipationinthecityandcountybureaucraciesincreasedsteadily(fig.7).Bytheendofthe1980sBlackofficialsincludedoneDadeCountycommissioner,oneMiamicom-

TABLE5.GrowthofMiami'sBlackBusinesses,1977-87

1977 1987NumberofBlackfirms 2,1846,747NumberofBlackfirmswithpaidemployees 380 961TotalnumberofemployeesinBlackfirms 1,5792,891TotalreceiptsforBlackfirms(millionsofdollars)

95 276

TotalpayrollforBlackfirms(millionsofdollars)

Sources:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1977/Blacks(Washington.D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1980);idem,1987/Blacks(1990).Note:Therewerealterationsintheproceduresusedtoidentifyminorityfirmsbetweenthetwoyears.Thesechangesintroduceanunknownelementoferrorintothecomparison.Fordetails,seetheintroductorysectiontothe1990Survey.

missioner,themayorofonemunicipality,(Opa-Locka),theMiamipolicechief,thechairmanoftheboardofthearea'slargesthospital,andnumerouslesserfunctionaries.

EffortswereevenmadetoimproveconditionsinthepoorerBlackneighborhoods.In1981,communitydevelopersandthecity.governmentsoughttoattractfirmstoanewindustrialparkinLibertyCity.Aspecialtaxincrementdistrictwascreatedtochannelnewpublicfundsintoinner-cityareas,andtheCitybegantopurchaselandforredevelopmentinOvertown.In1984,citygovernmenteffortsfocusedonthecreationofanewOvertownshoppingcenter,andthefollowingyearaBlackcommunity-basedorganizationopenedanothershoppingcenterintheborderbetweenLibertyCityandLittleHaiti.Finally,anenterprisezonewascreatedgrantingnewbusinessesin

Overtown,LibertyCity,andotherBlackneighborhoodstaxholidaysandrebates.

Althoughhelpingtoexpandpublicpayrollsandgivingworktoprivatefirms,theseinitiativesseldomattainedtheirintendedpurposes.Deteriorationofhousingintheinnercityoutpacedconstructionofnewunitsandrehabilitationofexistingdwellings.High-riseapartmentbuildingsbuiltrightnexttothesparklingnewMiamiArenawerenotaffordabletomostOvertownresidents.Despitelegalprovisionsreserving20percentoftheseunitsforlow-incometenants,managersofthepropertiesreadilyadmittedthattheymadelittleefforttorenttolocals.15

Figure7BlackprofessionalsandadministratorsworkingforDadeCounty

government,1982-90.Metro-DadeAffirmativeActionReports,1982-90.

TheLibertyCityIndustrialParkhadnotenantsin1989,andtheOvertownShoppingCenterhadonlytwostoresinninespaces.Thecounty'sset-asideprogramwasentangledindifficultiesstemmingfromtheuseofBlacksas"fronts"forwhiteAngloandLatincontractors.By1989,Blackparticipationinpublicconstructionhadplummetedto1.9percent,andinApril1990,DadeCountydiscontinueditsset-asideprogram.

ThelonesuccesswastheLibertyCity/LittleHaitiShoppingCenter,

whoseBlackdeveloper,OtisPitts,becamesomethingofacelebrityinphilanthropiccircles.17Buteventhissuccesscreated

only130-oddnewjobs.Moreimportant,whateveradvancesBlackentrepreneursandprofessionalsmadeoccurredinthecontextofarapidCubaneconomicandpoliticaladvancethatthreatenedtoconfineBlacksuccessestoamostlysymbolicstatus.In1987,stilllessthan2percentofDadeCounty'sBlackpopulationownedbusinesses,ascomparedtoover10percentfortheCubans.Latinfirmsweremuchbiggerintermsofbothsalesandemployment.Table6comparestherelativebusinesspresenceofthetwoethnicminorities.Thetableunderstatesthedifferencesbecausethedataarelimitedtosmallunincorporatedenterprises,excludingmid-sizeandlargeindustries,banks,andservicesfirms,asectoroverwhelminglyconcentratedintheCubanenclave.

Fueledbythecloutoftheirenterprisesandbytheirsheernumbers,Cuban-Americansmovedintolocalpoliticsandgovernment.Whetherornotbyintention,theseadvanceswereoftenaccomplishedbyelbowingBlacksasidefrompositionsofrealpower.Forexample,theBlackMiamicitymanager,HowardGary,wasfiredin1984andreplacedbyCuban-AmericanCesarOdio.Blackmay-

Table6.Black-andCuban-ownedFirms,1987UnitedStates DadeCounty

andMiamiMetropolitan

AreaCuban Black Cuban Black

Numberoffirms 61,470424,16534,771 6,747Numberoffirmsper1000populationa

76.3 16.2 85.4 24.1

Firmswithpaidemployees 10,768 70,815 5,205 961Numberoffirmswithpaidemployeesper1000populationa

13.3 2.7 12.8 3.4

Averageannualsales(dollars) 89,182 46,59290,50640,934Sources:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-owned

BusinessEnterprises,MB87-1and-2(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1991);idem,1980CensusofPopulation,GeneralSocialandEconomicCharacteristics-U.S.Summary(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1983);Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,DemographicProfileofDadeCounty,1960-1980(Miami:DadeCountyResearchDivision,1985).a1980Population.

oralcandidateswererepeatedlydefeated,firstbyPuertoRican-bornMauriceFerréandthenbyCuban-AmericanXavierSuárez.

18In1990,aCuban-American,OsvaldoVisiedo,againbestedaBlackAmerican,T.S.Greer,forthejobofsuperintendentofDadeCountyschools.Greerhadbeenwiththesystemforthirtyyears,andheservedasinterimsuperintendentduringtheselectionprocess.Manyconsideredhimthenaturalchoiceforthejob.Inreactiontohisdefeat,Blackleaderscalledaone-dayboycottofpublicschools.Overtwothousandattendedarallyinfrontofthesystem'sheadquarterstoprotestthedecision,70percentofschoolbusdriversstayedawaythatday,andattendancedroppedtoaslowas20percentinsomeinner-cityschools.19

Cuban-Americanelectedofficialsmadeanumberofgestures,suchasappointingBlackstothepostofMiamipolicechiefonthreeconsecutiveoccasions.Yetthesegestureswerenotenoughtoappeasethewaryleadersofthenativeminority.TheBlack-orientednewspaperMiamiNewsflatlyassertedthata"CubanMafia"controlledMiami,"bullyingandthreateningallthosewhodonottoetheline."20AdebateensuedamongBlackleadersastowhetherCubanshadalwaysbeenasracistaswhiteAmericansoriftheyhadbecomesoalongtheirwaytosocialprominence.ThelatterviewwasadvancedforcefullybyoneLibertyCityactivist:

CubansareafraidofBlacks.TheirexperienceintheUnitedStateshasmadethemmoreracistthantheywere,andthisgetstranslatedintofear....Astheygoupthetotempoletryingtobecomesuccessful,manyCubansfindoutthatthesewhiteAnglosdon'tlikecoloredfolks,soifI'mgoingtoprogress,ImusttakeonsomeofthesamebehaviorsoftheAnglos.Youdon'tdiscriminate,butasawayofdoingbusinessyoubegintolaughatracistjokes,youtalkaboutthoseniggersoverthereinOvertown...becauseyou'resurroundedbyracistpeopleandbecauseitismore

importantinthismomentofyourlifetopursueyourownagenda.21

ThisdebateranroughlyparallelwithanotherwithintheBlackleadership.BlackleaderswhothoughttheirLatinneighborshadbroughttheirracismtoAmericaweregenerallymoreradicalintheiroppositiontotheexiles'risinghegemony;thosewhoarguedthatCubanracismwasmoreanadaptiveresponseappearedmoreinclinedtocompromise.Hence,thegrowingclassdivisionsamong

MiamiBlackswerecompoundedbyincreasingdisagreementamongtheirleaders.WhenlawyerH.T.SmithandNAACPlocalleaderJohnnieMcMilliancalledforaboycottofMiamiaftertheMandelaincident,UrbanLeaguepresidentT.WillardFaircriticizedthemoveascounterproductive.NoneofMiami'selectedBlackofficialsendorsedeithertheconventionorschoolboycotts,nordidtheoneBlackcountycommissioner,theoneBlackSchoolBoardmember,oranyofthesevenBlacklegislators.

22TheMiamiHerald'sBlackcolumnistcomplainedthat"theboycottisdraggingonpainfullywithlittleindicationthatresolutionisinsight,"andheattackedtheMiamiNewsforits"CubanMafia"comment.23

Inshort,therelativelossofpoliticalinfluenceandthegrowingdesperationintheinnercitydidnotproduceaunifiedstancewithintheBlackleadership.Moreestablishedauthority,figuressawthefutureintermsofnegotiationandcompromise.Newerleaderschoseopenconfrontation,believingthatitbestinterpretedthespontaneousexplosionsofangerinthestreets.Ineithercase,theinfluenceofmiddle-classleaderswasweakenedbythewideninggulfbetweentheirownmaterialsituationandthatoftheirbrethrenleftbehindintheinnercity.

ThisriftisreflectedinthespatialsegmentationofBlackMiami.Asseeninmap2,theBlackinnercityLibertyCityandOvertowniscompletelyseparatefromBlackCoconutGroveandtheBlackmiddle-classareaslocatedmostlyinthesouthofDadeCounty.Itisinfactimpossibletodrivefromoneoftheseareastoanotherwithoutcrossinglargestretchesofnon-Blackpopulation.Bycontrast,acomparablemap(map3)ofLatinMiamidepictsitasavirtuallyseamlessweb.WiththeexceptionofaconcentrationofMexicanrural

workersinHomestead,atthesouthernmosttipofthecounty,therestoftheareaswithover50percentLatinpopulationfromthepoorerneighborhoodsofEastLittleHavanatoworking-classHialeahandthewealthierareasofWestchesterandCoralGablesarespatiallycontiguous.

ColorversusCulture

MynameisHerbandI'mnotpoor...I'mtheHerbiethatyou'relookingfor,

likePepsi,anewgenerationofHaitiandetermination...I'mtheHerbiethatyou'relookingfor.

Abeattappedwithbarehands,afewdancesteps,andtheHaitiankidwasrapping.Hissong,titled"StraightOutofHaiti,"wasbeingperformedatEdisonHigh,aschoolthatsitsastridetheLibertyCity-LittleHaitiborder.Hislyricscapturedwellthedistinctoutlookofhisimmigrantcommunity.ThepanoramaofLittleHaitiindeedcontrastssosharplywiththeBlackinnercitythat,bytheendofthe1980s,atleastoneprominentBlackleaderproclaimedthatHaitianshadalreadysurpassedBlackAmericans.25InMiami'sLittleHaiti,thestorefrontsleapoutatthepasserby.Brightblues,reds,andorangesvibratetoHaitianmerengue,blaringfromsidewalkspeakers.ThemultilingualsignsadvertiseethnicproductsandservicesthelatestHaitianrecords,custom-tailored"French-styled"fashions,culinarydelightslikelambiandgriot,andrapidmoneytransferstoanyvillageinHaiti.UnlikeOver-town,thestreetsarefilledwithpedestrians.26

Fromverymodestbeginningsinthe1970s,theHaitianethniceconomygrewtoabout120firmsin1985,andtonearly300bytheendofthedecade.ItisstillafarcryfromLittleHavana,especiallysincemostenterprisesaresmall,butithasgivenHaitiansadefinitebusinesspresence.Underneaththelayerofvisiblefirmsthereisavastinformaleconomycomposedofmicrobusinessesthatbypassofficialregulation:gipsycabs,homechildcare,informalrestaurants,unlicensedautoandelectricrepairs,no-permitresidentialimprovementsallproliferateinLittleHaitiandbeyondastheblackimmigrantsseekanicheinthelocaleconomy.27

ThenumberofHaitianprofessionalsincreasedsignificantlyafterthe1960s,whenmanywhohadoriginallymigratedtoNewYorkcametoFlorida.Majorhealthandsocialorganizationshiredtheseprofessionalstoservetheexpandingimmigrantcommunity.DadeCommunityCollegeandthepublicadulthighschoolbothcreatedclassesandprofessionalpositionsforHaitians.By1990therewereseventyHaitianteachersandfiveadministratorsintheDadeschoolsystemandfourteenHaitianofficersinMiami'spoliceforce.AnewpublicelementaryschoolinLittleHaitiwas

Map2.Blackpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990.

Map3.Spanish-originpopulation,Miamimetropolitanarea,1990.

renamedinhonorofthecountry'srevolutionaryheroToussaintL'Ouverture.

28Professionalsandbusinesspeopleexhibitedgreatenergyandoptimism,consciouslypatterningtheircommunityonthemodelofLittleHavana.TheysawLittleHaitiasbecomingaculturalandtouristattractionbasedontheirowndriveandonHaiti'suniqueculturalattributesworld-renownedpainting,woodcrafts,French-inspiredcuisine,andnumerousskilledtrades.29

AllthesesignspointedtowardasuccessfulrepeatoftheCuban,oratleasttheNicaraguan,experience.LikeHerbie,manyyoungHaitianssawthemselvesas''anewgeneration,filledwithdetermination."Unfortunately,theirreceptionwasfardifferentfromthatwhichtheLatinrefugeegroupsencountered.UnlikeCubans,Haitianscouldnotcountongovernmentsympathyorsupport;unlikeNicaraguans,theycouldnotcountonalarger,well-establishedethniccommunitytoprotectthem.Insteadtheymethostilityateveryturn.U.S.CoastGuardcuttersinterceptedHaitianboatsonthehighseasandreturnedthemtotheircountry.ThosewhomanagedtomakeitashorewereharassedbytheImmigrationandNaturalizationService.Proportionally,nootherwould-berefugeegrouphashadsomanyclaimsforasylumdeniedasHaitians.Publichealthofficialsrepeatedlyidentifiedthenewrefugeesasahealththreat:inthelate1970s,tuberculosiswasdeclaredendemicamongHaitians;andintheearly1980s,theCentersforDiseaseControl(CDC)inAtlantaidentifiedthemasaprimarygroupatriskforAIDS.30

TheseandotherinstancesofoutsidehostilityledtothegradualriseofreactiveethnicityamongHaitiansduringthe1980s.True,theCDClaterremovedthemfromtheAIDSrisklist,buttheFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA)continuedtorefusetoacceptbloodfrom

Haitiandonors.Inresponse,fivethousandHaitianprotestersralliedinfrontoftheFDAofficesinaMiamisuburb.Shortlythereafter,thecommunityfocusedontheINSKromeDetentioncenteronthefarwestofDadeCounty,wheredetainedHaitianarrivalsareincarceratedandfromwhichmanyhavebeendeported.Thistime,twenty-fivehundredmassedtoprotest.

ThepolicebeatingofHaitiansinfrontoftheCubanclothingstorewasseenbymanyastheculminationofadecadeofgrowingtension.AHaitianaccountantinterpretedthepoliceattackas"the

resultofyearsofbeingdescribedasignorant,asilliterates,ofnotknowinganything,ofnothavinganyskills,ofsmellingbad,andsince1980ofhavingimportedAIDShere."

TherealitiesofraceinAmericagraduallybecamecleartotheHaitians,forcingmanytorevisetheiroptimisticforecasts.Inthissoutherncity,whereEnglish-andSpanish-speakingwhitescontrolledbusinessandpolitics,Creole-speakingblackshadfewalliesandevenfeweravenuesforeconomicmobility.Theirplightbroughtthemmuchclosertothedomesticminority,withwhichtheysharedacommonpastofslaveryandacommonpresentofdiscrimination.The"Mandelaincident"andtheHaitianbeatingsoccurredinquicksuccessionandhelpedcementanalliancebasedoncolor.Atapressconferencecalledsoonaftertheseeventsandthatincludedmembersofbothminorities,aBlackAmericanleaderdenouncedthepoliceattackagainsthis"brothers,"claimingthatitwouldneverhavehappenedagainstCubanimmigrants.Insteadoftheworld-classcityitclaimedtobe,MiamiwasinhisviewmorelikeSelma,Alabama;Jackson,Mississippi;andSouthAfrica.32Haitianssharedhisopinion.Inthewordsofoneoftheirleaders:''Wehaveahistoryofabuse,especiallybypoliceofficers.IthinkBlacksandHaitiansrealizetheyareinthesameboat.Thecolorofourskinalllooksthesame."33

Thisemergentsolidarityledtoaseriesofjointdeclarationsandprotests.HaitiansfeltthatCubansupportforthemerchantwhohadallegedlyattackedhisHaitiancustomerwasakintoCubanrejectionofMandela.BlackAmericansagreedandmadecommoncausewiththeimmigrantsfightingdeportationsfromKromeandsummaryinterdictionsatsea.ForBlackleaders,thefactthatCubansrescuedintheFloridaStraitswerebroughttoMiami,butHaitiansinthesame

situationwerereturnedtoHaiti,wastheclearestevidenceofracism.34Reactiveethnicitypromptedbyoutsidediscriminationhencebroughtthetwogroupstogether,temporarilyreducingthesalienceofculturetohighlighttheircommoncolor.

Still,culturaldifferencesdidnotremainsubmergedforlong.ThevastgapinthehistoryandworldviewsofimmigrantsfromanimpoverishedThirdWorldcountryandlong-termcitizensofaFirstWorldnationcouldnotbeentirelypaperedover.BlackAmericansdidnotgenerallyappreciateHaitians'businesssuccessesorother

manifestationsoftheimmigrantdrivetogetaheadatanycost.Fortheirpart,HaitiansacceptedBlackAmericansupportintheirstrugglesagainstracism,buttheydidnotwishtobeidentifiedwithwhattheysawasthepoorestandmostdowntroddengroupinthehostsociety.Eachgroupfearedandresistedtheprospectoftriplesubordination:thedoublehegemonyofAnglosandLatinsplustheascentofanotherblack-skinnedgroup.BlackAmericansareprofoundlyambivalentaboutHaitiansinMiami,who,though"brothers"incolor,areregardedasacompetitivethreatinthelabormarketandthebusinessworld.Haitians,bythesametoken,resistbeingpulleddowntotheeconomiclevelofnativeBlacksandofhavingtheirdistinctimmigrantidentitysubmergedintothatoftheurbanunderclass.

Theresultinggameofmirrorsischaracterizedbyeachgroupseeingitselfaspartlysolidarybutsomehow"above"theother.Haitiansviewtheirculture,thrift,andambitionsasgivingthemaclearadvantageovertheirimpoverishedneighbors.HaitianbusinessleadersconsciouslyseektofollowthemodeloftheCubanenclaveandtoleavetheinnercitybehind.Butthepoliticalandeconomicweaknessoftheircommunityissuchthatthisprojectisconstantlyblocked,throwingthembackintotheless-than-welcomeembraceofthedomesticminority.

BlackAmericans,fortheirpart,donotextendtheiracceptanceunconditionally.Intheirview,Haitiansarenewcomerswhomustlearnabouttheirnewsocietyandadapttoitsculture.JustaswhiteAnglosrepeatedlypreachedassimilationtowhiteCubans,BlackAmericanspushHaitianrefugeesinthesamedirection.ABlackAmericanstudentinterviewedatEdisonHighputthematterbluntly:"Icanunderstandpeoplecomingoverherefromothercountries...Ijustdon'tunderstandwhytheydon'twanttobeAmerican....Theyhavetheirprivileges.What'sthecountrygonnabecalled?Youhaveamilliondifferentnationalities.RussiaiscalledRussia.Theyare

Russianpeople.JamaicaiscalledJamaica.Hey,ifyoudon'twanttobecalledAmerican...getout."

BlackAmericanleadersincludedwhattheyconsideredtobeHaitianissuesintheconventionboycottwithoutconsultingtheirHaitiancounterparts.AndnoHaitianrepresentativewasincludedonthesteeringcommitteeofeithertheconventionortheschool

boycott.ElectedBlackleaders,infact,tookanotoriouslydistantstancetowardHaitianproblems.OnthedaywhencommunityleaderssoughttoeasetensionsafterthearrestofmorethanfiftyHaitiandemonstratorsbythepolice,Miami'sonlyBlackcommissionercaughtaflighttoJamaica.

Blackderisionoftheimmigrants'cultureisnowheremoreevidentthanintheschools.Intheearly1980s,whenCreole-speakingstudentsstartedtoappearinsignificantnumbersinpredominantlyBlackcityschools,thewordHaitianbecameanepithet,standingforforeign,backward,dirty,unintelligible,andignorant.Onseveraloccasions,schoolofficialshadtoclosedownEdisonHighbecauseofBlackstudentviolenceagainsttheHaitians.37

Inresponse,outnumberedHaitianstudentslearnedapatternofadaptationthatwasbaptized"thecover-up."TheylearnedBlackAmericanslang,dressstyles,andbodylanguage;theypubliclydeniedthattheywerefromHaitiandneverspokeCreoleatschool.This"pressurecooker"assimilation,however,nevererasedtheirownconcealedsenseofidentity.Bythelate1980s,afewacademicallyoutstandingHaitianstudents,''Herbie"amongthem,daredtoreassertprideintheirownheritagebutonlyinAmericanizedterms.RapandsimilarBlackculturalexpressionsthusbecamethechannelsthroughwhichdisparagedimmigrantidentitiescouldresurface.38

ThisevolutionwasclearlyseenatMiami'sEdisonHighSchool.Inthemid-1980s,studentsridiculedHaitianculturalpresentations,suchasHaitiandance.Withinafewyears,however,elementsofHaitianculturehadinfiltratedsomeschoolactivities.Evenso,theywereacceptedonlyonBlackAmericanterms.ThepeprallieswerethusforAmericanfootballandbasketball,notforsoccer,atwhichEdison

excelledbecauseoftheHaitians.Similarly,BlackAmericanstudentsenthusiasticallyreceivedCreolerapsongs,butstilldidnotcarefortraditionalHaitiandance.39

AssimilationpressuresatschoolalsocreatedapainfulgenerationalcleavageintheHaitiancommunity.Adultimmigrants'prideofcultureandhopesformobilityonthebasisofHaitiansolidaritywereshatteredbytherapidtransformationoftheiroffspring.UnlikeCubanparentsacrosstown,whocouldsheltertheirchildreninCatholic,Latin-orientedschools,poorHaitianswerefinanciallyunabletosendtheirchildrentoprivateschools,andinanycase,

therewerenonethattaughtinFrenchorpromotedHaitianculture.

40Theinner-citypublicschoolsweretheonlyoption.Hence,"assimilation"wasnottotheAmericanmainstream,buttoBlacksubculture.ThispressuredlearningofBlackAmericanwaysbroughtyouthfromthetwominoritiestogether,butonlyatthecostofgivinguptheimmigrantdreamofeconomicmobilityandadistinctculturalidentity.ForHaitiankidsinpublicschools,thefuturebecameinextricablytiedwiththatoftheirpeersfromtheimpoverishedBlackinnercity.

ClassVersusCulture

TheunwelcomingreceptionreceivedbyHaitiansinMiamiandtheconsequentpoliticalandeconomicweaknessoftheLittleHaiticommunityalsoledtoapeculiarreproductionamongthisminorityoftheclassfragmentationthatalreadycharacterizedMiamiBlacks.JustasHaitiankidsintheinnercityweretryingto"coverup"theirimmigrantidentity,morefortunatemiddle-classHaitianprofessionalsweredoingthesameinthesuburbs.Manycamefromthelighter-skinnedmulattoeliteofthecountry,anattributethatfacilitated"passing"amongLatinsandevennativewhites.41These"invisible"HaitianslivefarfromLittleHaiti,speakEnglishwell,andgenerallytrytofindjobsoutsidetheinnercity.ThelossofthiseducatedelementfurtherunderminesHaitianattemptstocreateaviableethniceconomy.

Therootsofthissegmentationresideinthecountryoforigin.Haitiisanationofsuchvastclassdifferencesthatithasbeenlikenedtoacastesociety.42Thelighter-skinnedmulattoesspeakFrenchandtrytoliveasphysicallyapartaspossiblefromtheCreole-speakingblackmasses.BothgroupswererepresentedintheU.S.-boundinflowand

arenowpartoftheMiamiHaitiancommunity.Recentlyarrived"boatpeople"tendtocomefromtheimpoverishedpeasantryandlaboringclasses;theyareuniformlyblackandgenerallyhaveverylowaveragelevelsofeducationandoccupationaltraining.Middle-classHaitians,whooriginallywenttoNewYorktoescapetheFrançoisDuvalierregime,startedmigratingtoSouthFloridainthelateseventies.InMiami,theystaffedalltheprofessionalandmanagerialpositionsavailabletoHaitians.Theyarealsoresponsibleforcreatingmostoftheformalbusinessesinthefledglingethniceconomy.

Americanracismmadenodistinctionbetweenpoorandmiddle-classHaitians.Inthissituation,theeducatedsegmentadoptedoneofthreealternativestrategies.Somethetruly"invisibleHaitians"escapedthecommunityaltogether,findingjobsoutsideofitandtryingto"pass"asLatinsorevennativewhites.OthersrunbusinessesorprofessionalservicesinLittleHaitibutreturnatnighttothesuburbs.TheyadmitthattheyareHaitian,buttheyspeakFrenchandcarefullydifferentiatethemselvesfromthedarker,Creole-speaking"boatpeople."Finally,thethirdgrouphaschosentobecomeleadersofthecommunity,andidentifythemselvesmilitantlywithitsgoals.Ministersofreligion,liketheactivistpriestGerardJean-Juste,areinthiscategory,asarebusinessandprofessionalpeoplewhostruggletoconsolidateaviableethnicenclave.

Intheend,however,therearejusttoomany"invisibleHaitians,"toomuchleakagefromthecommunityofvaluablehumanresources,toallowtheethniceconomytotakeoff.TrashandpeelingstorefrontsarecommoninLittleHaiti.Manybusinessesarebarelysurviving,andtheincomestheygenerateindicatethattheyareonlysecond-bestalternativestodestitution.AlloftheHaitianenterprisesaresmall:littlegrocerystores,autorepairshops,andvariouspersonalservicespredominate.In1985,HaitianbusinessesinMiamihadanaverageof1.5employees,mostlyfamilymembers;nearly60percenthadtotalsalesoflessthan$2,000amonth.TherewerenoHaitianmanufacturersorwholesalers.AlthoughsomelargeHaitianimport-exportbusinessesexist,theyarelocatedmostlyoutsideofLittleHaitiandareentirelydivorcedfromthecommunity.44

IncontrasttothethemonolithicpoliticaloutlookunderlyingtheCubanenclave,amongHaitianspoliticalandclassdivisionsoverlap,

Thismeansthatthereisnotight,ideologicallyimbuedcommunitytosustainboundedsolidarityandenforceabletrust.Inthe1990s,HaitianimmigrantpoliticaldivisionshavebecomefocusedonthefigureofJean-BertrandAristide,electedandthendeposedpresidentofthecountry.HisMiamicampaignappearanceralliedsomeseventhousandwildlyenthusiasticHaitians.WhenhereturnedtoMiamiin1991aselectedpresident,thirteenthousandwelcomedhim.Andinthefirsttwomonthsafterhewasdeposed,fivethousandHaitiansmarchedonfourseparateoccasionsdemandinghisreinstatement.45

Manymiddle-classHaitianimmigrants,however,especiallyentrepreneursandbusinessmanagers,justasvehementlyopposedAristide.Onemiddle-classwomaninterviewedshortlyafterthecoupassertedthatAristideintendedto"kill"allthebetter-offHaitians.

46Theownerofamajorimport-exportbusinessclaimedthatAristidehadusedtheshantytownmobstosilencethemiddleclassandanyonewhoopposedhim.Thesegroupsralliedtoo,carryingplacardssupportingthecoupandarguingthatHaiticouldbesavedonlyifAristidewaskeptout.47Althoughmuchsmaller,theseralliesinvolvedthemoreinfluentialandwealthiermembersofthecommunity.

LittleHaitihasitsbusinessclass,but,unlikethatrunningtheCubanenclave,thisright-wingelitehasnotbeenabletopersuadeitsfellowimmigrantsastothemeritsofitsposition.Working-classHaitianscametoMiami,afterall,toescapepovertyandoppression,notacommunistdictatorship.Theabsenceofasolidarymoraloutlookcompoundedpremigrationclasscleavagesandacceleratedtheflightofthebetter-offimmigrantstothesuburbs.Weakenedbythesedivisions,havingonlyanuncertainalliancewithBlackAmericans,andsubjectedtopervasiveracism,HaitiansinMiamilooktoafuturethatisdubiousatbest.Inthiscontext,apartialreproductionoftheBlackpatternofclasssegmentationHaitiankids"coveringup"intheinnercity,Haitianprofessionalsdoinglikewiseinthesuburbsisanunftatteringbutrealisticalternativetothedreamsofavibrantethniceconomy.

DoubleSubordination

Miamiisathree-leggedstool,ifonelegisshorter,itwillnotstand.LibertyCitybusinessman,1987

TheAnglo-BlackRelationship

DespitearapidlygrowingHaitiancomponent,thebulkofMiami'sblackpopulationstillcomprisesthenative-born.Thisgroup,roughly20percentofthemetropolitanpopulation,mostofitdeeplyimpoverished,continuestoposethegreatestchallengetothecity'ssocialstabilityandeconomicfuture.Blackleaderswhoarticulatedthedouble-subordinationperspectiveintheearlyeight-

iescontinuetoblamepervasiveracismonthepartofbothAnglosandCubansfortheplightoftheirpeople.Beneaththismilitantrhetoric,however,somesignsofconvergencehaveappearedbetweentheirviewsandthosevoicedbynativewhites.Native-bornBlacksandwhitesshare,afterall,alonghistorythat,despitenumerousconfrontations,hasgivenrisetocertaincommonoutlooks.Undertheimpactofarapidlychangingsituationinwhichanimmigrantgroupchallengestheestablishedorder,someofthesecommonalitieshavecometothefore.

ThreesuchareasofagreementareapparentintheattitudesofBlackandAngloleadersinMiami:theacknowledgmentofthevastgapseparatingtheeconomicconditionoflocalBlacksfromthatoftherestofthepopulation;theassignmentofresponsibilityforthissituationtotheexperienceofslavery,whichunderminedthebasesforBlacksolidarity;andtherecognitionthatnative-borngroups,regardlessofcolor,shouldresisttheinroadsofaforeigncultureandcompeltheimmigrants'assimilation.Thefollowingexcerptsdrawnfrominterviewsconductedduringthelate1980sillustrateeachoftheseareasofagreement.

OntheBlackConditioninMiami

Blackexecutive,formercityofficial,andleaderofabusinesspromotionassociation(1988):

It'snotsomuchthattheearningsofBlacksaresolowbutthatincomparisontotheopportunitiesforHispanicsandAnglosinthistownthereisagulf....Incomparisonwiththesecommunitiesweareadevelopingnation.IfIsaidthatinpublic,theGovernorwouldwanttoshootmebut,inreality,allIdonowisdevelopmenteconomics.

WhiteCatholicprelateandcommunityleader(1987):

Basically,BlacksinMiamiareanunderdevelopednation.ItisasituationexactlythesameasanislandintheCaribbean,andthereforeweshouldbeapplyingthesameprinciplesofeconomicdevelopmentthatwewouldapplythere.TherelationshipofLibertyCitytoGreaterMiamiisthesameastherelationshipofanoldcolonytothemetropolitanpower.

OntheCausesofBlackDisadvantage

BlackbusinessmanandformerleaderoftheBlack-orientedMiamiChamberofCommerce(1987):

We'veacceptedtheideathatwe'reinferior,wecan'tlearn,wecan'tsucceed.AlotofBlacksbelievethat,theyacceptitandpassitalongtothenextgenerations.Suchisthelegacyofslavery....Imaybebiased,butIthinkthatBahamiansandotherforeignblacksaresmarterandmorehardworking....Theycomefromall-blacknationswheretherewaslesscontrastonthebasisofskincolor.

Blackformercityofficialandbusinesspromoter(quotedabovewithregardtotheBlackcondition):

ThereusedtobeastrongBlackbusinessinthiscountry,butintegrationanddiminishingreinvestmentdestroyedtheBlackentrepreneur....Priortointegrationweweren'tallowedtogooutside.Whenyoutellpeopletheycan'tdosomethingandtheylivewiththat,andthenallofasuddenyoucan,whatdoyouthinktheydo?Theydothatwhichtheycouldn'tdobeforeevenifitcostsmore.Overthecourseofthreegenerationswehavelostthecommonsenseandacumenrequiredforbusinesssuccess.

Whiteformerchairmanofamajorlocalretailcorporation(1988):

Iguessitisprobablylowself-esteemamongBlackAmericans.ABahamiancomesoverhereanddoesgood,theWestIndians,theHaitians.ThereisaverysuccessfulJamaicangirlinouraccountingdepartment,blackascouldbe.

Whiteexecutiveofamajorconstructioncompany(1987):

WeusedtohaveaverygoodBlackbusinessclusterinwhatisnowOvertown,andtheBlackswouldgototheBlackhotel,orstore,orwhateverandtheywouldbepatronstoBlackbusinessfriends.Whenweintegratedoursociety,theBlacksstartedpurchasinginshoppingcenterswheretheyweren'tevenallowedbefore....We'vehadseveralofourBlackleaderssay,"Look,thetruthofthematteristhatourpeopleshouldbebuyingfromBlackbusinesses."Isay,"Absolutely,noquestionaboutit."

OnAmericanismandtheCuban"Problem"

BlackbusinessmanandChamberofCommerceleader(quotedabovewithregardtothecausesofBlackdisadvantage):

There'sthefearthattheyaretakingover;there'sstilltheconcernthatthisisAmericaandthatalotoftheolderCubansdoandsaythingsthat

areoppositetowhatAmericastandsfor.Someofthethingsthosepeoplesayanddoturnmeoff.Itturnsmeofftohavethesesmall-mindedzealotstellmewhattothink.Iresentanyonetryingtotakeawaymyrightoffreespeech.Theyjustgothere!Wewereherebefore.Idon'tthinktheyunderstandthesystem.

Whiteformerchairmanofalargeretailcorporation(quotedabovewithregardtothecausesofBlackdisadvantage):

Wehavetopreserveusasacountry.I'mafraid,I'lltellyou,I'mveryafraidthattheLatininfluenceinthiscountryismorenegativethanpositivebecausetheyarenotreallyfundamentalsupportersofpluralismandtheyarenotfundamentalsupportersofourinstitutions....Theyabsolutelyareaneffectivegroup,actuallywillingtoshutoffthedemocraticsystemanytimeit'sconvenienttothem.PluralismisforeigntoCubansregardlesswhattheysay.

Anti-Cubanaffinity,infact,wassostrongthatoneBlackinformantclaimedthatnativewhites,althoughracist,weremoreacceptablebecauseatleastthey"areracistbytraditionandtheyatleastknowthatwhatthey'redoingisnotquiteright....Cubansdon'teventhinkthereisanythingwrongwithit.Thatisthewaythey'vealwaysrelated,period."

Thisapparentsenseofsolidaritybetweennativesofbothcolorshadoneimportantexception,however.WhereasBlackleadersblamedthecontinuouslydeterioratingconditionoftheinnercityondoublesubordinationandthepaucityofresourcesmadeavailablebytheestablishmenttoovercomedecadesofoppression,whiteleadersstatedbaldlythattheyhaddonealltheycouldtoatoneforpastsins,andnowitwastheBlacks'turntoshoulderalargershareofresponsibility.Inapointedmessage,thepublisheroftheMiamiHeraldremindedreadersthat"aftereachriotinthepast,thiscommunity'sbusinessandcivicleadershipraisedbigdollarsforvariousworthwhileprojectsintheBlackcommunity."

49Oneofourinformants,awhitebusinessexecutive,putthemattermorebluntly:"MostofthesuccessfulBlacksignorethepoorBlacks.YoufindasmanywhitepeoplethattrytohelptheBlackasyouwillseeBlackpeople....Blacksintheeconomicworldarenotcomingbackandhelping."

NowhereistheriftmoreobviousthaninthehistoryoftheBusinessAssistanceCenter(BAC),createdintheaftermathofthe1980riots.ThebrainchildofAlvahChapman,chiefexecutiveofficerofKnight-RidderCorporation,andotherwhitebrahmins,itaimedatencouragingthegrowthofBlackbusinesses,whichinturnwouldprovidejobsforinner-cityresidents.BACdescribeditselfasa"one-stoptechnicalassistancecenterservicingestablishedandnewBlackentrepreneurs."

50Itpromotedtrainingcourses,consultantassistance,andaseedcapitalprojectfundedwith$6.9millionmadeavailablebytheMiamibusinesscommunity.

Tenyearsafterthe1980riot,resultsofthiseffortweremixedatbest.BAChadcertainlyprovidedemploymentforanumberofmiddle-classBlacksandhadstimulatedthecreationofsomebusinesses,buttherecordwasnotoutstanding.Inthewordsofadetractor:"Anautomatedfactorywhichprovidedthreejobsopened,anditwasconsideredsuchasignificanteventthattheGovernorcamedowntoopenit."51Althoughthecriticismisexaggerated,therealityisthatthecenterwascaughtinadoublebind:whiletryingtoadministeritslimitedresourcesina"businesslike"manner,itwasstymiedbytheenormousneedsandlackofbusinessexperienceofthepopulationitwasintendedtoserve.AsaformerBACstaffmemberreported:

Ofthetwomilliondollarswelost,halfofthatshouldn'tbelost.Itwaslosttopoorinvestments,meaningfourhundredthousandofitwaslostinonedeal,anofficesuppliescompany.Iknewitwasabaddeal.Buttheboardwasundersomuchpressureinthiscommunitytomakethatfourhundredthousanddollarloan,theycouldn'trefuse....ItwasaBlack-ownedbusiness,butitisnowdefunct.52

FormostBACcritics,however,thekeyproblemwasthemeager

resourcesinvestedinthisventurerelativetoitsmomentoustask.Whiteleadersdisagreed.Theynotedthatnowhereelseinthecountryhadalocalchamberofcommerceraisedsuchalargesumforminorityeconomicdevelopment.Theyhadwalkedtheextramileandhadneithernewideasnornewresourcestocommittothecause.Blacksmuststarthelpingthemselves.53ItwasuptothatelusivemiddleclasscreatedbyAffirmativeActiontostarttakingtheinitiativeintheinnercity.IfBACbyitselfcouldnotmakelocal

entrepreneurshipflourish,perhapssomecollege-educatedBlackscouldbepersuadedtoleavethesuburbsandprovidethehands-onleadershiprequiredforentrepreneurialgrowthinLibertyCity,andOvertown.

TheBlack-CubanRelationship

By1989,theCubanaveragefamilyincomehadreached$38,497,closetoparitywiththewhitenon-Hispanicpopulation.TheadvanceduringthatdecadewasfueledbyanentrepreneurialdrivethatledoneoutofeverysixteenCubanstobeself-employedandthatbroughtinover$5.4billioninannualsalesbysmallbusinessesalone.

54ThecontrastwiththeconditionofMiami'sBlackcommunitycouldnotbestarker,andthegapbecamethesourceofgrowingtension.Asillustratedbyremarksabove,theCubanpresencewasdoublyoffensivetomanyBlacks,bothbecauseitwassosuccessfulandbecauseitwassoforeign.The"un-Americanness"oftheexilesemergedasarallyingpointfornativeAnglosandBlacksalike.

Fortheirpart,Cubansalwaysdisclaimedanyintentionalracism,andtoacertainextenttheyweresincere.Cubandiscriminationoperatedmorebyneglectthanbydeliberateaction.PreoccupiedwiththeirowneconomicprogressandwiththepoliticalstrugglewithCastro,CubanshadlittletimeforthecomplaintsofBlacks.Formany,thenativeminority'sralliesandriotsweresimplyanuisance.Olderexilessawthemasanuncomfortableintrusionintotheirlife-styleinthe"secondHavana";youngerCuban-AmericansreactedvehementlyatthethoughtthattheyortheirparentshadanythingtodowiththeBlacks'plight.DavidRivera,twentyyearsoldandafirst-yearlawstudent,declaredtotheHerald:"We'vepulledourselvesup,whyshouldwerestrainourselves?Idon'tthinktheCubancommunity,inMiamiowes

anythingpoliticallyoreconomicallytoanyone.TheCubancommunitysucceededbecauseit'sbeenloyaltoitself."55

Suchyouthfuloutburstsgavewayduringthe1980stoamorebalancedunderstandingthatBlackswereapermanentpartofMiamiandthattherewasnoshyingawayfromtheirproblems.CubansalsobecameawareofattemptsbyAngloandsometimes

JewishpoliticianstowintheBlackvoteonananti-Cubanplatform.TheytooknotethatwhileAngloelitescomplainedloudlyabouttheexiles'lackofcivicspiritandtheir"clannishness,"thesameleadersalsokeptthedoorsoftopcorporateofficessecurelylocked.

In1987,onlytwoofthetoptwenty-fiveDadecorporationswererunbyCuban-Americans.Ataboutthesametime,Cuban-Americanmanagersalsobegantoconfrontaserious"glassceiling"toadvanceinsuchlocalgiantsasSouthernBell,FloridaPowerandLight,Knight-Ridder,RyderSystems,andBarnettandSoutheastBanks.AndCubanmembershipinlocalestablishmentcirclessuchastheNon-GroupandtheOrangeBowlCommitteewasminimal.57Hence,farfromhaving"takenover,"theexileswerestillasubordinategroupafactthatcreatedalogicalbasisforalliancewithBlackAmericans.

Cubanleadersinthelateeightieshammeredatthistheme.TheystressedthatCubawas,toalargeextent,ablacknationandthatracismthere,ifitexisted,wasmuchmoreattenuatedthanitsAmericancounterpart.Theyalsonotedthat,despiteitssubordinateposition,theLatincommunitywasalreadydoingproportionallymoreforBlacksthantheAngloelite.AformermemberofDadeCounty'sCommunityRelationsBoardmadethepointforcefully:

TheBlackmustlearnthatheneedstheCuban,andviceversa.Increasingly,Cubansofferjobs,personalloans,commercialloans,mortgages.Studiesshowthat,inthelasttwoyears,therehavebeenmorecommercialandpersonalloanstotheBlackcommunitybyLatinbanksthanbythoseownedbyAnglos.Thatis,theCubanbankshavebeenasourceofeconomicdevelopmentforBlacks....ThereisalsogrowingLatininvestmentinBlackareas,andthereasonisthatCubansdonotobjectatalltolivingorworkingnearBlacks.Inourowncountrywehadthissortofcoexistence,whichneverexistedintheU.S.Racismwasnever

partofournationalcharacter.58

Blackleaders,however,atleastbytheearly1990s,hadnotboughttheargument.TheynotedthatCubansinvestedinBlackareasonlytoexploittheminoritymarket,justasJewishandotherwhitemerchantshaddonebefore.CubanshopswerenotemployingBlacksorprovidinganyspecialbenefitstotheirBlackcustom-

ers.Inthecourseoffieldworkforthisstudy,weencounteredbutonenotableexceptiontothispatternofskepticismanddistrust:RaulMasvidal,formerbankerandmayoralcandidate,wasmentionedrepeatedlyasafriendoftheBlackcommunityandasdeservingofsupport.AloneamongCubanleaders,MasvidalvisitedtheBlackareas,talkedtocommunityrepresentatives,andextendedtheservicesofhisbankonafavorablebasis.Whenheranformayorin1986,Blackvoterslinedupsolidlybehindhim.OneLibertyCityactivistputitthisway:

TheBlackcommunitysupportedMasvidalwhichmayhavebeenaverybigmistakebutinpoliticaltermstheyhadeveryreasontosupporthim.Heisanactivecommunityleader.Therewasasensethat,giventhechoices,hewouldbemuchmoresensitivetothetotalcommunity....Also,MasvidalcampaignedinBlackneighborhoods....RaulmadeaconcentratedefforttospendtimeandmoneyintheBlackcommunity.Heearnedthatsupport.HeearneditattheexpenseofCubansupport.

TheMasvidalcampaignrepresentedasortofCubancounterparttotheBusinessAssistanceCenteraseriousinitiativetoreachacrossethniclinesandhelpthepoor.AsinthecaseoftheBAC,thisinitiativedidnotsucceed.Inbothinstances,supportfromthe''donor"communitywaslacking:notenoughmoneydonatedbyAnglobusinessmentofuelrealentrepreneurialdevelopmentintheinnercity;notenoughvotesamongCubanstopromotetheoneleaderwhohadtakenthehigherroad.Asthefinalstatementfromtheaboveinformantindicates,theLatinvoteoptedforthemore"Cuban"ofthetwocandidates,MayorXavierSuárez.Forthepoliticallyempoweredformerexiles,preservingthe"secondHavana"turnedouttobemoreimportantthanbuildinganewmultiethniccommunity.

Onthethresholdofanewcentury,Miami'sBlackpopulationconfrontsasituationreminiscentofthatahundredyearsearlier.JustasFlagler's"blackartillery"wasmarchedintothatfoundingmeetingin1896todoitsmaster'sbiddingandthenbeshuntedaside,Blackscontinuetobeamajorfactorinthecitybutnotthebuildersoftheirowndestiny.Rivenbycleavagesofclassandculture,placedfirmlyatthebottomofthelocalhierarchy,Blacksstilldependonoutsideinitiativestodeterminethefutureoftheir

community.ColoredTownisstillthere,perhapsmoreforlornthaneverdespiteitsnamechangeandthelegalendofsegregation.Itsperiodicexplosionsofdiscontentsparksufficientoutsideconcerntocreateprogramsthatexpandtheminoritymiddleclass,butthedestitutearealwaysleftinthesameconditionasbefore.Doublesubordinationtakesonincreasinglyominoushuesastheplightofthoselostinthefraybecomesmoreintractable.

ChapterNineRepriseItmaybestatedwithcertainconfidencethat...theprevailinginfluenceindeterminingthelocationofcitiesarefacilitiesfortransportation....Thefactorofchiefimportanceinthelocationofcitiesisabreakintransportation....Thegreatestcenterswillbethosewherethephysicaltransferofgoodsisaccompaniedwithachangeofownership.

AdnaF.Weber,TheGrowthofCitiesintheNineteenthCentury(1899)(emphasisinoriginal)

Sincetheiroriginsinthenineteenthcentury,theoriesaboutthegrowthofcitieshaveemphasizedeconomiccauses.Citiesariseoutoftheimperativesofeconomiclifeanddevelopaccordingtotheirimportanceinthelargereconomy.Theirlocationcanbeanalyzedbymeansofthesamelogic:urbanconcentrationsemergeasmarketplacesforsettledhinterlands,asplaceswheresourcesofenergyconvergewithsourcesoflabor,andas"breaks"intransportationroutesrequiringthephysicaltransferofcommodities.

ThiseconomicemphasisissufficientlybroadtoencompassbothmainstreamandMarxisttheoriesofthecity.TheMarxistschoolfollowsthethemeofeconomicdeterminismandendowsitwithgreaterintentionalitythandomoreconventionaltheoriesinsociologyandeconomics.ForMarxists,itisnotaccidentsofgeographyandpriorpopulationsettlement,butthedeliberatehandofcapitalseekingtoorganizethevariousfactorsofproduction,thataccountsforurbangrowth.Thus,whiletheGermansociologistMaxWeberreferredtothecityasa"marketplace"andtheAmericaneconomistAdnaWeber

portrayeditasatransportationhub,Marxistshaveconsistentlydefineditasthesitewhereindustriallaborpower

issoldandcommoditiesareproducedforprofit.AsFrançoisLamarchestates:

Ifthecityisconsideredtostartwithasamarketwherelabourpower,capital,andproductsareexchanged,itmustequallybeacceptedthatthegeographicalconfigurationofthemarketisnottheresultofchance....Themainhypothesisunderlyingourargumentcanbesummarizedasfollows:theurbanquestionisfirstandforemosttheproductofthecapitalistmodeofproductionwhichrequiresaspatialorganizationwhichfacilitatesthecirculationofcapital,commodities,andinformation.

Giventhevastbodyoftheoreticalliteraturecomingfrombothsidesoftheideologicalspectrum,thestoryofMiamiisremarkableindeed.Itisnotastorythatfits"centralplace"theoryverywell,becauseMiamiatitsbeginningswasnotthecenterofanything;itdidnotserveasa"marketplace"forasettledhinterland,ofwhichtherewasverylittle,anditdidnotsitatthe"break"betweenalternativetransportationroutes,becausethesedidnotexistatthetime.Certainly,thecitywasaproductofnineteenth-centurycapitalism,butinawaythatdeviatedsignificantlyfromclassicorthodoxandMarxisttheoriesontheoriginsofcities.Miamididnotattractindustrialcapitalorindustriallabor,anditdidnotproduceanythingofsignificance.Nordiditserveasacommercialhubforagriculturalproducts,orforanyothergoodexceptone.Itssoleassetsweresunandbeach,soldbythesquarefoot.SincetheFloridapeninsulaboastshundredsofmilesofsimilarlyendowedshoreline,thelocationofthecitywasaccidental.ThemetropolisthatgrewbyBiscayneBaycouldequallywellhavebeenlocatedinPalmBeach,bythemouthoftheNewRiverintoday'sFt.Lauderdale,orevenintheFloridaKeys.

Theoriginsofthecitywerehenceeconomicallyunderdetermined,

moretheresultofchanceandindividualwillsthanofanygeographicorcommercialimperative.Thisaccidentalbirth,addedtothepeculiarassetthatwasthelifebloodofthecity,accountedforMiami'ssenseofsuspensionabovereallifeandthefeeblenessofitscivicorganizations.Theexoticthemeparksdreamedupfortheplacebynorthernentrepreneurspseudo-Arabminarets,mock-Andalusiantowers,"Venetian"palacesdidnothingtoreducethefeelingofseparationfromthesurroundinglandscapeordiminishthecity'spoliticalfragmentation.ComparedtoChicago,

Cincinnati,Cleveland,orPittsburgh"real"citiesgrowingatthebreakpointsofrailroadandwaterroutesandattractingindustrialcapitalMiami'ssocialorganizationandcivicleadershipseemedatbestapoorimitation.Peoplecameheretoretire,enjoytheweather,andplay.Apartfromtherealestatebusiness,fewseriouseconomicandcivicpursuitscouldattracttheirattention.

Thepoorfitwitheconomictheoriesabouttheoriginsofcities,however,isonlythefirsthalfofMiami'sexceptionality.TheflowsofmenandmaterialsthatcrisscrossedtheFloridapeninsulaattheturnofthecenturylefttheirmarkonthecity,butindifferentmannersandatdifferenttimes.TheFlagler-ledfeverishbuildingofrailroadandhotelsgaveMiamiadistinctprofilethat,duringthefirsthalf-centuryofitsexistence,separateditfromcitiesupnorth.TheequallybusyferryingofarmstotherebelliousSpanishcolonyofCubaprefigureditscharacterduringthesecondhalf.Geographyisdestiny,butinMiami'scaseitwasnotsomucheconomicaspoliticalgeographythatplayedthedeterminingrole.

AmericaintheCaribbean:TheOriginsofContemporaryImmigration

Ifthenineteenth-centurycreationofMiamiwasduetochanceandindividualinitiativeratherthaneconomicimperatives,itslate-twentieth-centurytransformationundertheimpactofsuccessivewavesofmigrationwaswithoutquestionpoliticallyoverdetermined.Miamiwasachoicetargetfortworeasons:first,itsgeographicproximityandconnectionstotheCaribbeanbyairandsearoutesmadethecityalogicalentrypointintotheUnitedStates;andsecond,itsclosetiestoCubagaveitamajorroleasbackstageinCubanpolitics.

AmorerefinedunderstandingofwhyCaribbeanmigrationaroseinthefirstplaceandwhyitcametotheUnitedStates,however,requires

abriefexcursusintoanotherbodyoftheory.Explanationsofinternationalmigrationarecommonlybasedona"push-pull"mechanismthatdepictsmigrantsaspeopleencouragedtoleavebyunfavorablecircumstancesintheirowncountriesandattractedbyconditionsinthereceivingones.Althoughplausibleonthesurface,thesetheoriesdonotexplainwhymigrantflows

emergefromsomecountriesandnotfromothersatsimilarlevelsofdisadvantage,orwhytheseflowsaredirectedtowardcertainreceivingcountriesbutnotothers.

3Inshort,thetheoryfailstorecognizethatdecisionstomigratearenotmadeinasocialvacuum.IndividualsdonotsimplysitathomeandponderthecostsandbenefitsofgoingtocountryXversuscountryY.Insteadtheyareguidedbyprecedent,bytheexperienceoffriendsandrelatives,andbythealternativecoursesofactionheldtobeacceptableandrealisticintheirownsocieties.

Thesocialenvironmentofmigrationismolded,inturn,bythehistoryofpriorrelationshipsbetweenthecountryoforiginandthoseofpotentialdestination.Peopleseldommovetocompletelyunfamiliarplaces;rather,theyseekoutthosemadeaccessiblebypastcontacts.ThisiswhyagreatdealofmigrationfromformerThirdWorldcoloniesisdirectedtodaytotheoriginalmétropolesAlgeriansandTunisiansgotoFrance;Indians,Pakistanis,andWestIndiansmovetoBritain;SouthAmericansfrequentlymigratetoSpain;andKoreansgotoJapan.4

NootherregionoftheworldhasexperiencedgreaterAmericaneconomicandpoliticalpenetrationthantheCaribbean.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesdidnotbecomeacolonialpowerinthemoldofolderEuropeannations,theheavyhandofNorthAmericaninterventionhasmadeitselfparticularlyfeltinthesmallercountriesofitssouthernfringe.Duringthelastcentury,U.S.militaryoccupationshavebeenafactoflifethroughouttheregion:Mexico,PuertoRico,Cuba,theDominicanRepublic,Haiti,Nicaragua,Panama,andGrenadahaveallbeen,atonetimeoranother,underdirectU.S.militaryrule.Inaddition,theUnitedStateshasexercisedoverwhelmingeconomicdominanceintheregionandhassaturateditwithitsvalues,diffused

throughthemedia.5ConsequencesofthishistoricalrelationshiphavebeenthemassadoptionofAmericanconsumptionpatternsandthecreationofeconomicelitesthatareprofoundly"Americanized"intheiroutlook.Ofthese,nonewasmoretypicalthantheprerevolutionaryCubanbourgeoisie,moldedbythehegemonyofNorthAmericaninterestsintheisland.

AseriesofgraveeconomicandpoliticalcrisesduringthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyledtoenhancedoutmigrationfromanumberofCaribbeancountries.Migrationtookplacenotonthebasisofdetachedcalculationsofcostsandbenefits,butalongthe

linesofleastresistanceopenedbythepriorhistoryoftheregion.Hence,whenconfrontedwithoverwhelmingthreatstotheirwell-being,CubanandNicaraguanelitesdidnotthinkofgoingtoJapan,Germany,orCanada,butrathertothecountrywhoseinfluencehadshapedtheirownpositionandmentaloutlook.Lesswell-to-dogroupsfollowedsuit.

TherecentwavesofCaribbeanmigrationdemonstratehowpastpenetrationandmoldingofweakperipheralsocietiesbyadominantpowercanturnuponitself.Toalargeextent,CubansandNicaraguans,HaitiansandDominicans,camedirectlytotheUnitedStatesbecausetheyhadbeensocializedinthatdirection.Thesameexplanationcoverstheparticulardestinationsofeachmigrantflow:CaribbeanrefugeesdidnotdistributethemselvesevenlyacrosstheUnitedStates,butconcentratedinafewspots.Theseweretheplacesmostsalientinthenewcomers'mentalmapascentersofNorthAmericaninfluenceandpowerandaslogicalentrypointsintothecountry.ForCaribbeanimmigrants,"America"didnotmeanArkansasorNorthDakota,but,almostexclusively,NewYorkandMiami.

The1959CubanRevolutionwas,ofcourse,thedecisiveeventthatinitiatedMiami'spoliticallyledtransformation.AsentirelayersoftheformerlyprivilegedwereforcedtoleaveCuba,theywenttotheonlycountryandtheonlycitywhere,giventheirhistory,itmadesensetogo.AndoncethedefeatedCubanbourgeoisiereestablisheditselfinMiami,thecitybecamethealmostinevitabledestinationofallmajorrefugeestreamsfleeingpoliticalinstability.NicaraguanscrossingtheMexicanbordercaughtthebusnottonearbyHoustonorNewOrleans,buttoMiami;leavingtheirdesperatelypoorandrepressivecountrybehind,Haitianspointedtheirboatsinthesamedirection;andlessnumerousflowsfromPanama,Colombia,andHondurasfollowedthesamecourse.

PoliticalmigrationsthenproducedanoveleconomicphenomenonastheriseoftheCubanenclaveandtheavailabilityoflargepoolsofbilinguallaborturnedMiamiintoamajortradeentrepôt.Thecitysheditsroleasaseasonalresorttowntobecome,asDavidRieffputit,a"real"place.

6Realinthesensethatitsneweconomicdiversificationoccurrednotbyaccident,butonthebasisofresourcesthatonlythatcityhad.WhileOrlandoandothernorthernlocaleschippedawayatMiami'straditionaltouristtrade,noother

citycouldoutcompeteitintheroleof"CapitaloftheCaribbean."

Table7illustratesthiseconomicchangebyshowingthedeclineintheproportionofDadeCounty'seconomicallyactivepopulationemployedinhotelsandrestaurants,mainstaysofthetouristindustry,andtheriseintheproportionemployedinbankingandFIRE(finance,insurance,andrealestate)sectors,elementsofthecity'sneweconomicprofile.Alsoshownistheparallelsurgeofsmallbusinesses,manystartedbyrecentimmigrants."Verysmall"establishments,definedasthoseemployingfewerthantenpeople,grewmorerapidlyduringthe1970sand1980sthandidbusinessestablishmentsoverall,reversingthetrendobservedintheprecedingtwodecades.

TraversingtheMiamiRiverinthedirectionofBiscayneBayisawayofgainingfirsthandevidenceaboutMiami'sCaribbeannexus.FreightersfromHonduras,Haiti,Colombia,andtheDominicanRepubliccrowdthisworkingriver,loadingdiversecargoesfortheircountries.Attheriver'smouth,onesuddenlyleavesThirdWorldtradebehindtoadmirethegleamingsilhouettesoftheRoyalCaribbeanpleasureboatsanchoredinBiscayneBay.Formerlyatouristdestinationitself,Miamiisnowtheworld'smainportofembarkationforvacationcruises,mostofthemtotheCaribbean.Hence,aninterestingdynamicsetsinaswell-heeledtouristsdepartMiamiforenchantedandromanticCaribbeanislands,whichthenativepeopleareoftendesperatelytryingtoleave...forMiami.ThefreightersintheriveralsodotheirpartastheyhaulfromMiamitheluxuriesandconveniencestowhichtouristsareaccustomedandwhichtheywillconsumeintheir"exotic"Caribbeandestinations.

WhatmakesMiamiauniqueexperimentisitspeculiarreversalofestablishedpatternsofurbangrowth.Here,politicsdetermineseconomicsratherthanviceversa.Almostaloneamongmajor

Americancities,Miamididnotoriginallygrowoutofeconomiclocationaladvantages,butacquiredthemonlyafterwardasanoutgrowthofitsunplannedpoliticalrole.Thelatterdidnotinvolvedomesticforces,butrathertheinternationaldynamicsunleashedbytheUnitedStates'dominationofitsimmediateperiphery.

Thissingularitydoesnot,however,meanthatMiami'sexperiencesarenotreplicable.Inthissense,its"uniqueness"mayholdimportantlessonsforothercities.Theinternationalforcesthat

Table7.EmploymentandBusinessEstablishmentsintheMiamiMetropolitanArea,1950-87

1950 1960 1970 1980 1987Economicallyactivepopulation(EAP) 157,321282,774467,992788,249712,568PercentEAPinservices 21.3 25.9 24.8 27.0PercentEAPinhotelsandrestaurants 17.4 13.6 11.0PercentEAPinbanking 1.4 2.4 2.3 2.9PercentEAPinfinance,insurance,andrealestate

6.2 7.6 8.7 7.5

Totalbusinessestablishments 14,894 23,051 27,140 42,817 58,036Percentgrowthduringprecedingdecade 54.8 17.7 57.8Businessestablishmentswithfewerthan10employees

11,566 17,178 18,840 32,368 45,617

Percentgrowthduringprecedingdecade 48.5 7.6 75.2Banksandfinanceagencies 141 309 398 671Percentgrowthduringprecedingdecade 119.1 28.8 68.6Sources:U.S.BureauoftheCensus,CountyBusinessPatterns(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,indicatedyears);idem,CountyandCityDataBook(WashingtonD.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,indicatedyears).

transformedMiamiarestillatplay,andhave,ifanything,grownstronger:peopleworldwideareincreasinglyboundtogetherbyexpandingtradeandinformationnetworks;consumptionexpectationsdiffusedfromthedevelopedworldtranslateintoimmigrantflowsseekingtosatisfythoseexpectations;thedialecticswherebypastcolonialismbegetsrefugeemovementstotheolddominantpowersisstillverymuchalive.

Foritssize,Miamiiseasilythemost"internationalized"ofAmericancities,butothersmayfollowsuitastheyrespondtoglobalsocialandpoliticaldynamics.Today,BostonplayshosttoarapidlyacceleratingIrishimmigration,whileLosAngeles,SanDiego,andSanFranciscodothesameforthevastMexicaninflow,augmentedbyrefugeesfromtheCentralAmericanconflicts.

7Miami'sexperiencemaynotrevealtoothercitiestheimageoftheirownfuture,buttheforcesthatledtoitstransformationwillsurelymanifestthemselveselsewhere,leadingtosignificantsocialandpoliticaloutcomes.

EthnicDiscourses

Whataresomeoftheseoutcomes?Thearrivalofsizableforeigngroupsnecessarilyproducesaresurgenceofethnicityand,alongwithit,atransformationinthefabricoflocalsociety.Dependingonthestrengthofpreexistingelitesandthecharacterofthemigrantcommunity,newcomersmaytaketheirplaceintheethnicqueue,awaitingtheirturntomoveslowlyupward;theymayremainentirelyoutsidetheplayingfieldasmarginalworkers;ortheymayactuallytransformtherulesofthegame.InMiami,thepoliticallyledtransformationofthesocialstructuregaverisetotheemergenceofalternativediscoursesaboutthecityandtoarapidshiftinlocalpower.

Table8presentstheevolutionofMiami'smetropolitanpopulation,providingthebackgroundagainstwhichthetransformationofitspoliticalstructuremustbeunderstood.Thetableillustratesthedramaticchangesintheethniccompositionofthepopulationthatledtotheshiftinelectedleadership.WhereasHispanic(thatis,Cuban)politicalrepresentationwasnonexistentin1950and1960,in1990itaccountedforfourmayoralpostsinDadeCounty(includingthoseofthetwolargestmunicipalities,MiamiandHialeah)

Table8.EthnicCompositionofMetropolitanMiami,1950-901950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Populationtotal 495,000935,0001,268,0001,626,0001,937,000U.S.ranka 19 17 12Percentincreaseinprecedingdecade 88.9 35.6 28.2White,non-Hispanic 410,000748,000 779,000 776,000 586,000Percentoftotal 82.8 80.0 61.4 47.7Percentincrease/decreaseinprecedingdecade

82.4 4.1 0.4

Hispanicb 20,000 50,000 299,000 581,000 953,000Percentoftotal 4.0 5.3 23.6 35.7Percentincreaseinprecedingdecade 150.0 498.0 94.3Blackc 65,000137,000 190,000 280,000 369,000Percentoftotal 13.1 14.7 15.0 17.2Percentincreaseinprecedingdecade 110.8 38.7 47.4Sources:Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,ResearchDivision,DadeCountyFacts(Miami:MetropolitanDadeCountyGovernment,1990);idem,PersonsofHispanicOriginbyRace,City,andCensusTract(Miami:MetropolitanDadeCountyGovernment,1990).aAmongstandardmetropolitanstatisticalareas.bHispanicscanbeofanyrace.cThereissomeoverlapbetweentheHispanicandBlackcategoriesowingtothepresenceofblackHispanics.In1980,theMetro-DadeResearchDivisionreported11,000blacksofHispanicorigin;in1990,therewere28,372suchpersons.Thetableincludesthemas''Black"forthesakeofcongruencewithearlierfigureswherethisseparationwasnotmade.

themajorityofthecouncilsofthesetwocitiesandseveralsmallerones,theMiamiCityandDadeCountymanagers,sevenstatedelegatesandtwostatesenators(one-thirdoftheentirecounty'sdelegation),andaU.S.congressionalrepresentative.Cubanrepresentationamongelectedofficialswillonlygrowfurtherinthecomingyears.Redistrictingrequiredbythe1990VotingRightActswillincreasethenumberof"Hispanic"seatsinthestateHousetoasmanyaselevenoutofeighteentotal;fourofthesixstatesenatorsarelikelytobeCuban-American,aswellastwooutoffourmembersofDade'scongressionaldelegation."Politically,we'llhardlyrecognizetheplace,"writestheMiamiHerald'spoliticaleditor.

Thistransformationofthepoliticalorderistakingplaceinacontextwheretheruptureoftheoldhegemonicdiscoursehasnotyetgivenrisetoanewone.Indeed,thedistinctethnicframesofreferenceoutlinedinchapter1continuetoholdsway,eachhavingitsowncogentreadingoftheprincipalfeaturesofthecityanditsmainproblems.Thissituationhastwonoteworthyaspects.First,thevariousframesseldomincorporatepointssalienttotheothersbutratherslide,asitwere,ondifferentplanes.Theresultisthatseveralmutuallyunintelligibleperceptual"maps"coexistinthesamephysicalspace.Second,theexistenceoftheseseparate"maps"playsbackoneverydayreality,leadingtomorestereotypedbehaviorbymembersofthedifferentcommunities.Anglos,Blacks,andLatinsleadtheirlivesinseparateworlds,butwhenmeetingeachotherinpublicplacestheytendtoadoptaritualizedstance,influencedbytheirownparticulardiscourse.

"Thismicrophonehasanaccent,"saystheCubanbusinessmanaddressingameetingoftheMiamiChamberofCommerce.Butthis

concessiontotheculturalsensibilitiesofhisAnglohostsisfollowedbyavigoroustellingofthefamiliar"successstory."9Ininterethnicpublicgatherings,MiamiCubansarelikelytobehaveas''upandcoming,in-chargeCubans,"Anglosas"onthedefensive,holding-the-fortAnglos,"andBlacksas"entitledanddoublyaggrievedcitizensofcolor."Thisritualizedballetisguidedlessbythespecificsituationoftheindividualthanbyhisorherperceptionofthegeneralcontext,guidedbytherespectiveframeofreference.

Everylargecitypossessesacoterieofcivicfigureswhoattempttoriseabovecurrentproblemsinordertopresenttheplaceinthe

bestpossiblelight.Theresultmaybecalleda"normalizing"narrativethatlinksthecitywithfamiliarandvaluedfeaturesofthenationalculture.Despiteitsfragmentation,Miamialsohasaversionofthisnarrative;thoughitsauthorshipstillfallstotheeditorsoftheMiamiHeraldandasmallgroupofAnglobusinessleaders,thecontentofthemessagehaschangedsignificantlyoverthelastdecade.Inthe1960sand1970s,Miamiwasportrayedasanall-Americancity,theplaygroundofthenationaffectedbythe"problem"ofimmigrationbutultimatelyverymuchinthemainstream.Thispicturecoincidedwiththethen-hegemonicAnglodiscourse.

Duringtheeighties,however,thenativewhitepopulationplummetedtojustone-thirdofDadeCounty'stotalpopulation.InthecityofMiamiproper,Anglosshrankinnumberfromanabsolutemajorityinthe1960stojust10percentin1990;inthelatteryear,meanwhile,Hialeahwasover88percentLatin.

10Accompanyingthisdemographicrevolutionweremajorchangesinlocalculture.CubanandtoalesserextentotherLatinfestivities,music,andcuisinebecameintegraltothecity'slore.ItwasnowincreasinglycommonforAnglosandBlackstolearnSpanish,justasLatinsweretryingtolearnEnglish.Inresponse,Miami's"normalizing"narrativeshiftedtoencompassaverydifferentmessage.ComparetheremarksoftheKnight-RidderAngloexecutivecitedinchapter1withthoseofthenewCEOofthesamecompany,JamesK.Batten,ontheoccasionoftheOctober1991visitofPresidentGeorgeBushtothecity:

ThoseofuswholiveandworkandraiseourchildreninMiamihavebigaspirationsforthisvibrantyoungcity.Weareonly95yearsold,butthose95yearshavebeenjammedwithendlesschange,especiallyoverthelasttumultuousthreedecades....Atthebeginningof1959,onlyafewthousandpeopleofHispanicdescentlivedinDadeCounty.Todaythe

numberofHispanicsherehasjumpedtoclosetoonemillionorroughlyhalfthepopulationofthiscommunity.TheirpresenceherehastransformedMiami,andenrichedlifehereinprofoundandcountlessways.11

AndconsiderthispredictionbypresidentialsonJebBush,citedbyBatten:"Bytheturnofthecentury,Miamiwillhavecompleteditsevolutionintoamajorworldcityacenterofinternationaltrade,culture,education,healthcare,andrecreation,providingadesirablequalityoflifeforourresidentsandvisitors."12

ThecontentoftheAngloelite'sportraitoftheircitythusevolvedfromoneembodyingmainstreamAmericancustomsandtraditionstooneinwhichMiamiwasnothingshortofaharbingerofthenationalfuture.Immigrantsandtheirforeignlanguagesweretransformedfroma"problem"intoan"enrichment."Inaremarkablearticleentitled"GetontheBall...LearnaLanguage,"MiamiHeraldpublisherDavidLawrence,Jr.,setmulticulturalMiamiasanexampletotheentirenationandatthe''cuttingedge"oftheAmericatocome.HethenurgedhisfellowMiamiansto"geton"andenrollinaforeignlanguageclass.

ThenewerCuban-Americanpoliticalleadershipchimedinwithitsowntentativeattemptata"normalizing"narrative.MayorXavierSuárezregularlyraisedthe"CityoftheFuture"theme,thoughhetempereditwithjabsatthecountyandstategovernmentsfornothelpingMiamifulfillitsdestiny.AttheCityCommissioninaugurationceremonyin1989,forexample,Suárezdeclared:

Ourowngovernmenthasbeendrasticallystreamlinedbyourreform-mindedcitymanager.Ourownpolicedepartmenthasbeendecentralizedunderaforward-thinkingchief.WhenarewegoingtoseethesameefficienciesintheCountywhichnowpaysitsattorney50percentmorethanwepayours?AndwhenarewegoingtoseeStatelegislationtoprovidesubstantialhelptopoverty-strickenareassothatcommercialgrowthisfosteredandpolicepresencelessneeded?Howlongcanweremainahigh-taxedcityinalow-taxedstate?14

Pursuingthesamethemeofnormalization,aCuban-AmericanHeraldcolumnistwentsofarastochidehiscompatriotsfortheirexcessively"Cuban"child-rearingmethods.Inhisview,althoughtheoriginalexilesmightremaincontentedlywithintheirenclave,theirAmerican-

bornoffspringcouldnotaffordtodoso:"NomatterhowLatinizedMiamicontinuestobecome,itisstillandalwayswillbeintheUnitedStates.ThusourchildrenarefirstgenerationAmericans.Thatisanimportantdistinctiontomakeifwearetoavoidburdeningthemwithidentityproblemsinthefuture."15

EthnicityinMiamiisstillparamount,andthefragmentationbroughtaboutbythebreakupoftheoldhegemonicdiscourseremainsthecity'sdominantreality.Anglos,Blacks,andJews,Nicaraguans,Haitians,andCubans,tendtostaywithintheirethnic

circlesandtogreetcallsforinterminglingwithskepticism,ifnothostility.

16Yetattheedgesandinthebetter-educatedsectors,therearevisiblesignsofconvergence.ThistrendfitsathusfarneglectedbutfundamentallessoninthehistoryofpastimmigrationandethnicadaptationinAmericancities.Thestoryisworthreviewing,fornomatterhowdistinctMiamiisatpresent,itislikelyintimetofollowapathsimilartothattakenbeforebyothercommunities.

WhoRules?

InWhoGoverns?(1961),hisclassicbookonAmericanurbanpolitics,politicalscientistRobertA.DahltracedthetransformationofNewHaven,Connecticut,fromacityruledbyitsoldwhiteProtestantelitetooneinwhichimmigrantsinthiscaseIrish,Jews,andItaliansgraduallygainedtheupperhand.HeforcefullyarguedthatpowerhadindeedcometobesharedbetweenoldandnewelitesratherthanbeingretainedbyoldWASPsbehindafaçadeofethnicpoliticians.Notsurprisingly,thebookbecamethestandardreferenceforthepluralistperspectiveonurbancommunitypower.

Thepluralist-elitistcontroversyoverwho"really"rulesobscuredanimportantaspectofthebook,however,namelyitsanalysisofhowtheimmigrantsbecameintegratedintoAmericanculturethroughtheirparticipationinpoliticsandmanagementoflocalinstitutions.NomatterthatthefirstimpulseofnewlyelectedIrishmayorswastodistributepatronageamongtheirown,theimportantlong-termconsequenceofinstitutionalparticipationwastointegrateeachgroupfirmlyintolocalsociety:

HencethepoliticsofNewHavenbecameakindofethnicpolitics;itwasapoliticsofassimilationratherthanapoliticsofreform,apoliticsthat

simultaneouslyemphasizedthedivisiveratherthantheunifyingcharacteristicsofvotersandyetplayedupontheiryearningsofassimilationandacceptance.Theverysuccessofpoliticianswhousetheethnicapproachleadstotheobsolescenceoftheirstrategy.17

ThepointofDahl'sanalysis,inshort,isthatethnicpoliticsprovidesaneffectivevehicleforconvergencebecausetheachievementofpoliticalpowersocializesimmigrantsintothefunctioningofmainstreaminstitutionsandgivesthemthenecessary"voice"to

feelthattheyarepartofthoseinstitutions.Immigrantsdonotfirstlearntobe"Americans,"andonlythenarefreelyadmittedintothemainstream.Rather,theybecomeAmericansbyelbowingtheirwayintocentersoflocalpowerthroughthepoliticalmobilizationofethnicsolidarity.Theverysuccessofthatstrategyinturnleadstoitsgradualdissolution.

Thecommonviewoftheprocessofassimilation,unfortunately,tendstoreversethissequence,withacculturationcomingbeforesocialacceptance.Fromthatperspective,ethnicpoliticsisseenasaloomingthreat,afearonwhichnativistemotionsthrive.InabooktitledTheImmigrationTimeBomb,formerColoradogovernorRichardD.Lammexpressedthethemewithnotableclarity:

ThepoliticalpowerofmorethanfifteenmillionHispanicsisbeingusednottosupportassimilationbuttoadvance"ethnicpride"inbelongingtoadifferentculture.Themultiplicationofoutsidersisnotamodelforaviablesociety....Ifimmigrantsdonotfeelthattheyarefullypartofthissociety,asAmericanaseveryoneelse,thenwearefailing.

First-generationimmigrantshaveseldomfelt"asAmericanasanyoneelse"becausenativeshaverepeatedlyremindedthemoftheirculturalandlinguisticdifferences.TheerrorinLamm'sformulationistobelievethatculturaldiversityandethnicpridemustdisappearbeforeimmigrantscantakepartintheinstitutionsofsociety.AsDahl'sstudysuggests,theoppositehasoftenbeenthecase.TheprocessisexemplifiednotonlyinNewHaven,butinlargecitiesthathavebeenmajorrecipientsofimmigration.TheIrishofBoston,theItaliansandJewsofNewYork,thePolesofChicagofirstmobilizedaroundthesymbolsofacommonethnicitypreciselybecausethatwashowtheyhadbeendefinedandoftenostracizedintheirplacesofsettlement.

Hence"ethnicpride"arisingoutofreactiveformationisthefirstandnaturalrallyingpointforimmigrantgroupsenteringthepoliticalsystem.Throughthedefenseofparticularisticgoals,theyaresocializedintonationalpoliticalvalues.BeforepoliticiansofIrish,Greek,andItalianoriginlearnedhowtointerpretmainstreamsentimentandtorepresentbroadconstituencies,theirpredecessorshadspentconsiderabletimeinwardpoliticsfightingforthenarrowinterestsoftheirgroup.19Inpreviouschaptersweexaminedthereactiveformationpro-

cessofCubanrefugeesintheaftermathofMariel,aprocessthatgaverisebothtoanoveldiscourseandtostrongparticipationinlocalpolitics.TheabovequotesfromtheCuban-AmericanmayorofMiamiandtheCuban-AmericancolumnistoftheHeraldresemblehundredsthatcouldbeusedtoillustratehowfartheprocessofintegrationhasadvancedinadecade.Concernsaboutamoreequitabletaxdistributionforthecityandhowtoavoidtheghettoizationofthenextgenerationarehardlytheworriesofarefractoryminority.Gradualconvergencetowardtheculturalmainstream,however,isattributablemoretotheentryofformerexilesintolocalpoliticalinstitutionsthantotheassimilationistsermonsofthepast.

TheextraordinarydivisionofMiamialongethniclinescontinuestodefineitsreality,butthereareatpresentanumberofAngloandCubanleaderswhoprefertoadvancethe"CapitaloftheCaribbean"and"CityoftheFuture"themesoversegmentedethnicperspectives.Leftoutofthisendeavor,however,areMiami'sblackminorities.Thedouble-subordinationdiscourseforgedbyBlackleadersduringthelastdecaderepresentsbothanoriginalformofreactiveethnicityandanattempttogainentryintothecity'spowerstructure.Sofartheattempthasbeenunsuccessful.

ThecontinuingexclusionofBlacksfromtruepoliticalparticipationvirtuallyguaranteesnewepisodesofethnicstrifeinMiami'sfuture.FromtheperspectiveofDahl'sanalysis,theirpositionisthepreciseoppositeoftheCubans'.Blacksarethoroughlyacculturated,"asAmericanaseveryoneelse"yetthisachievementhasyieldednothingnearpoliticaloreconomicparity.Indeed,thesituationhasbecomesobadinrecentyearsthatmanyBlackleadersrecallalmostwistfullythedaysofsegregation.AprincipalBlackcommunityleader,interviewedin1987andwhoseviewswerereportedinchapter1,hadthistosayaboutBlackMiamifiveyearslater:

Thechangeshavebeenfortheworse,notforthebetter;violenceisrampantanduncontrollable....Whatoppressiondoesisthatitmakestheoppressedgroupalsoaspiretobeliketheoppressor.AndifIamabletobeliketheoppressor,thenthethingsthatIwasforcedtodevelopbyvirtueofmyoppressionarenolongervalued....It'saquestionofemulationhavingtodowithassimilation.Withoutadoubt,BlacksarethemostAmericanpeopleinAmerica....

Whenthingswerecolored,whenthingswerecolored,thenthesamekindofbusinessenclavethatexistsintheCubancommunity,intheJewishcommunity,alsoexistedintheBlackcommunity,becausetheconsumerbasewascontained.

Lackinganethniceconomyandsufficientpoliticalpowerforeffectiverepresentation,BlackMiamiremainsmarginaltotheprocessofintegration-through-participationdescribedbyDahl.Dauntedbutnotbeaten,Haitiansneverthelesscontinuestrivingtobuildtheirenclave,andBlackleadersstillseekavoiceinlocalpowercircles.Iftheireffortsarenotsuccessful,the"CapitaloftheCaribbean"isinforsometoughtimesnomatterhowmuchithasmovedtowardconvergencebetweenitsothermajorgroups.

PoliticsduringtheDeathwatch

InFebruary1990,GovernorBobMartinezappointedatwelve-membercommissiontostudythepotentialeffectsthatachangeingovernmentinCubawouldhaveonthestateofFlorida.TheideaforthecommissioncamefromtheCuban-AmericanNationalFoundation,whosepresident,JorgeMasCanosa,wassubsequentlyappointedchairofthepanel.Meetingforthefirsttimeonthetwenty-ninthfloorontheMiami-Metrobuilding,thecommissiondiscussedsuchthingsaspreventingwidespreadabsenteeismamongCuban-AmericanworkerscelebratingthefallofFidel,controllingthefestivitiesinSouthFlorida,andcopingwiththeinfluxofCubansfromelsewhereintheUnitedStateswhowoulduseMiamiasa"stagingarea"toreachCuba.21

Thegapbetweentheimportant-soundingcommissionandtheshallowtopicsitdiscussedreflectsthefactthatneithertheparticipantsnor

anyoneelsehadtheslightestideaofwhatwouldhappenwereCastro'sregimetofall.Thecreationofthepanelwas,inotherwords,largelysymbolic;itsignaledthecloutthatright-wingexileshadwiththeRepublicangovernorandtheirsensethatthelong-awaiteddownfallwasimminent.ThatsensepermeatedtheCubanenclave,beingreflectedbothinthepublicutterancesofitsleadersandinstreetculture.TheCuban-AmericanFoundation,forexample,announcedwithmuchfanfareaplanfor"thefuturegovernanceofCuba."22Sodidalmosteveryotherexilepoliticalgroup.

SalsasingerWillyChirino'shitsongof1990proclaimed,"Yavienellegando"(It'sjustaroundthecorner);anotherpopularrapsinger,perhapswithakeenerinstinctaboutthefuture,announcedthat"sooninCuba,Englishwillbespoken."

In1990,CubanMiamiembarkedonthedeathwatchforitsenemy.EventsinEuropehadconvertedCubaintothesingleWesterncountrystillgovernedbyorthodoxcommunism.ThefallofEastEuropeanregimesandtheendoftheSovietUnionlefttheislandnationbereftofalliesandprotectors,andthedefeatoftheSandinistaregimeinNicaraguaandtheendoftheSalvadoraninsurgencyentirelyisolatedCubaintheWesternHemisphere.Widespreaddomesticscarcitiesandrisingpopulardiscontentmadeitcleartomanythattheendwasnear.

23Afterthreedecades,therevolutionaryepisodethathadtransformedMiamiappearedtobenearanend,andnotonlyCubans,buttheentirecity,watchedwithbothanticipationandforeboding.Whatnewsurprisesdidtheconvulsedislandholdinstore?Wouldthe"CityoftheFuture"besuddenlyabandonedbyhalfitspopulation,asmilitantexileleaderspromised?Orwouldit,onthecontrary,beinundatedbyastilllargerinflowofpost-Castrorefugees?

Bothscenariosareprobablyoverdrawn.AmassivereturntoCubaisunlikelybecauseoftherootsestablishedduringthreedecadesofsettlementandthegrowingprocessofsocialconvergence.Fewwell-establishedformerexilesarelikelytopackupandleavealltheyhaveaccomplishedbehind.ArecentsurveyonthetopicbyresearchersatFloridaInternationalUniversityshowsthatonlyathirdofadultCubanresidents(38percent)inDadeCountywouldconsiderreturningtotheislandtoliveintheeventofCastro'sdownfall.SuchamoveisevenlessprobableamongU.S.-bornCuban-Americans.Onlythemostrecentrefugees,thosewiththeleastsocialrootsandsmallest

economicassets,arelikelytofindthereturnoptionattractive.24

AndalthoughanewrefugeeinfluxismorelikelybecauseofwidespreadmaterialscarcitiesinCuba,itwouldprobablybecheckedbytheendoftheisland'sspecialstatusasAmerica'smainadversaryintheWesternHemisphere.WiththeconversionofCubaintojustanotherCaribbeancountry,newarrivalswouldnecessarilybelabeledconventionalimmigrantsratherthanpoliticalrefugees.

IfthedownfallofCastroismwouldnotleadtoamajordemographicmovement,itcouldhaveasubtlerbutstillfar-reachingeffect,namely,theendofthemonolithicideologicaloutlookthatundergirdstheCubanethniceconomy.Formorethanthreedecades,ideologicalfervorandtightsocialcontrolshavebeenmaintainedonthestrengthofasingletheme:irreconcilableoppositiontoCastroandcommunism.ThishasbeenthemessagehammeredoutdailybytheCubanexilemedia,andithasfurnishedtheframeaccordingtowhichallotherdomesticandworldeventsareinterpreted.

25Castro'sendwouldremovetheraisond'êtreofthisfiercepreachingandputthebellicoseradiocommentatorsandmilitantactivistsonthespot:eithertheymovebacktoCubaasannouncedforsolong,ortheyaccepttheirroleasregularimmigrantsand,hence,theinevitablerealityofassimilation.

Thesameistrue,infact,fortheentirecommunity.AmongthoseformerexileswhochoosetoremaininMiamieasilythemajoritytheclaimofauniquestatusbasedonprincipledoppositiontoadictatorialregimewoulddissolve.Thesocialmechanismsthatunderliebusinesssuccessintheenclavemayremain,onthestrengthofhabitandpastpractice,butwouldweakenovertimebecauseofthelossofsocialcontrolsrootedinexileideology.Inthesecircumstances,themostlikelyprognosisisthegradualendoftheethniceconomyandtheaccelerationoftheprocessofculturalconvergence,alreadyunderway.

YetMiamiwillneverreturntowhatitwasbeforeitstransformation.Theformerexileswillstillbethere,andnewCaribbeanandSouthAmericaninflowswillreplacetheminnumber,ifnotinideologicalfervor.Eventoday,inthemidstofthedeathwatch,theprocessofacculturation-in-reversecontinues.Everyyear,newpartsofMiami

becomemorelikeHavana,oratleastlikethenostalgicimagethatCubanshaveoftheircapitalcity.Inanarticleentitled"Miami'sCrossroadsoftheVanities,"HeraldcolumnistHowardKleinberglamentedthatthestreetsinthe"Latinquarter"werebeingnamedfor"LatinAmericanmilitaristsandromanticswhoneverhadbeentoMiamiandwhosenamesbarelymadeitintoanyencyclopedia."26HeproposedinsteadthattheCityCommissionnameastreetforJohnReilly,thecity'sfirstmayor,andanotherforFranciscoVillareal,theSpanishfriarwhoin1567establishedthefirstCatholicmissiononthesiteoftoday'sHyattRegency.

Despitehisotherwisekeenobservations,Kleinbergfailedtounderstandthedrivingforcebehindallthisnamechanging.TheintentionwasnottomemorializeMiamiasithadbeenuntil1959,butrathertocelebratepre-CastroHavana.Intheirsymbolicreenactmentofalostpast,CubansandtheirelectedleaderscouldnotbecountedontoknowmuchabouttheMerricks,theReillys,andtheDeerings,thoughthesewereprominentmeninthecity'smodesthistory.Insteadamucholderpastwasimported,sothatthefriars,scholars,andsoldierswhosenamesnowadornedthestreetsofMiamiwerealsothosewhogavetheirnamestostreetsandschoolsinCuba.

WithorwithoutCastro'sdownfall,along-termtrendtowardintegrationandculturalconvergenceappearsinevitable.Intheshorttomediumterm,however,Miamiwillcontinuetobecharacterizedbyethnicfragmentation,strife,lackofahegemonicdiscourse,andthenostalgicreproductionofaforeignpast.ForKarlMarx,greathistoricaldramasareoftenenactedtwice,thesecondtimeasfarce.Thereareindeedtragicomicaspectstotheexiles'single-mindedattempttoreenactpastlivesinSouthFlorida.Thereisnothingfarcical,however,inthedepthsofthetransformationthattheyhavewroughtandintheuniqueurbanexperimentthattheirpresence,alongwiththatofnativesandnewerimmigrants,haveforgedintheiradoptedcity.

PostscriptIntheEyeoftheStormWaitingforapoliticalcataclysm,anddisasterofaverydifferentkindstruck.NottheendofCastroism,butahugestormthatsweptawayeverythinginitspath.Thesamefearfulnaturaleventthathasbeenthecurseoftheselandsforcenturiesmadeitsreappearancetoremindeveryoneofthebanalityofhumanconflictsandthefrailtyoftheiroutcomes.Forcenturies,stormshavewreakedhavoconcivilizationinthetropics.Theyhavedonesowithnotableimpartialitytothecontendersoftheday,scatteringandsinkingSpanishgoldgalleonsandtheirFrenchandEnglishpursuers;tramplingwithequalfuryonthecolonizingventuresofcompetingEuropeanpowers.Thegreatwindof1992behavedinthistime-honoredway,impartiallyspreadingdestructionamongpeoplesofdifferentcolor,language,andpoliticalcreed.

ItisnotthefirsttimeastormhasbroughtMiamitoitsknees.Forty-seventhousandresidentswerelefthomelessbythehurricaneof1926.Itkilled113peopleandflattenedfivethousandMiamidwellings.

1ThatstormblewawaynotonlythepalmtreesplantedwithsomuchcarebyCollinsandhissuccessors,butalsothereputationofthecityasacarefreeplayground.Forthenextfewyears,itwasnotpossibletogiveawaythesamelandthat,untilthen,hadsoldformillions.Buteverytime,ascalmreturnedandanewgenerationcameofage,Miamireneweditsillusionthatdisastersofsuchamagnitudecouldnothappenthere.

ThefirstthingthatstrikestheobserverintheaftermathoftheAugust1992stormishowpsychologicallyunpreparedthecityandits

inhabitantswere.Worriedbyeverydayconcerns,manypeople

couldnotconceivethatacatastropheofanaltogetherdifferentmagnitudewouldhitthem.Boatsandhouseswereleftunattended,utterlyexposedtothewind'sfury.DadeCountydidnotevenhaveanemergencyevacuationplanforthehundredsofsmallcraftinitsdocksandmarinas.Asaresult,agoodnumberendedupinthestreets.TaughtalessonbyHurricaneHugothreeyearsearlier,theCharleston,SouthCarolina,policedepartmentcamebarrelingdownInterstate95hoursbeforethestormandmanagedtobeinplaceintheworst-hitareasaheadofDadeCounty'sowndazedofficers.

Thevastdestructionwasnotmediahype.Itwasreal.Eightythousandhomesdestroyedorrendereduninhabitable;160,000peoplelefthomeless;82,000businessesdestroyedordamaged;$20billioninpropertylosses.Themilesandmilesofwreckedpropertiesandinstantpovertyaddeduptoadefiningmomentinthehistoryofthecity.Thereafter,beingaMiamianwouldmeanhavinglivedthroughthe"worstwind."3Consequenceswillnotbeshort-livedoreasilyforgotten.Yet,aswithnaturaldisasterselsewhere,theywillnotreversebutmostlikelywillacceleratethesocialanddemographictrendsunderway.Disastersofthisorderdonotseemtostopsocialchange;instead,theythrowitintohighgear.4

InthecaseofMiami,severalsuchtrendsareapparentandhavebeennotedintheprecedingchapters.Themostimportantistheincipientprogresstowardaconvergenceofsomesortbetweenthecity'spolarizedethniccommunities.Culturalandlinguisticfragmentationisstilldominant,but,asnotedabove(chapter9),therearesignsofanarrowingdistance.Theaftermathofthestormcanacceleratethisprocess.Twotypesofpoststormconvergencesmustbecarefullydistinguished,however.Thefirstisthewell-publicizedoutburstof

compassion,solidarity,andneighborlinessintheimmediatewakeofthedisaster.ArticlesintheMiamiHeraldhavemademuchofhowclassandracebarrierscametumblingdownintherushtorebuildhalf-destroyedneighborhoodsandhelphundredsofvictims.5

Thenewblue-ribbonlocalcommitteeputtogetherattheinitiativeofPresidentBushhasbeenbaptizedWeWillRebuildandhasalsofocusedonthethemesofunityandcommunitysolidarity.6Thetemporarysuspensionofethnicanimositiesandheightenedcom-

munityspiritisanaturalresponse,giventhemagnitudeofthecalamity.Itwouldberiskytobet,however,thatsuchaltruisticbehaviorwillbelonglived.Asthingsreturntonormal,establishedpatternsinvariablyreassertthemselves,andwiththemthesocialfragmentationandcompetingoutlooksthathavebeendominantinthepast.

Thereis,however,amoreprofoundprocessofconvergence.Itislinkedtothe''defining"characterofthecataclysm,thefactthathereaftertheidentityoftheareawillincorporatethisexperience.AsSanFranciscowasmarkedbyshakingearthandfireinthecentury'sfirstdecade,sohavethewindsimprintedMiamiinitslast.Tolocalidentitiesbuiltonthesuccessiveandcompetingimagesdescribedintheprecedingchaptersmustnowbeaddedthatofalandregularlyravagedbyoneofthemostfearsomenaturalforces.Thepeoplewhoinhabitthelandwillincorporatethiselementintotheiroutlook,whethertheycameoriginallyfromNewYorkorHavana,orwereborninSouthFloridaitself.Asinotherplacessimilarlyafflicted,thesenseofidentityderivedfromdisastercutsacrossethniclines.

Itisthisnaturalintrojectionoftheexperienceintopeople'sself-image,ratherthananydisplayofimmediatesolidarity,thatcanhavethegreatereffectonlong-termcommunitybuilding.Thisisbecausethenewsharedidentityofformerlysegmentedgroupscancreateabasisforforgingamoreunifieddiscourse.Thequestionremains,however,ofwhatdirectionsuchaconvergencewilltake,sincetheprocesscanincorporate,tovaryingdegrees,elementsfromthecompetingdefinitionsofthesituationprevalentinthepast.

Heretheevidenceismixed.InanarticlepublishedintheMiamiHeraldshortlyafterthedisaster,aFloridaInternationalUniversitysociologistarguesthatitsdemographicconsequenceswillbesignificant:

SouthDade(theareahardesthitbyhurricaneAndrew)hasbeenoneofthefewremainingareasofthecountywithan"Anglo"populationmajority.IthasalsobeenoneofthefewareaswithinDadewithaffordablesuburbanhousing.Otherareashaveexperiencedfastsuburbangrowth....ButthosearepredominantlyHispanic....For"Anglos"choosingtoleavethehurricane-strickenzones,theareasthatwillproveattractive,intermsofhousingpricesandethnicity,arenotinDade.

Ifthisanalysisiscorrect,itwouldmeantheaccelerationoftheprocessofLatinizationofthearea,astheoutflowoftheAnglopopulationtoFt.LauderdaleandpointsnorthisaugmentedbytheSouthDadevictimsofAndrew.ThistrendwouldconsolidatethepoliticalpoweroftheCuban-Americancommunity.Atthetimeofthiswriting,somechangesinthisdirection,anticipatedastheoutcomeofelectoralreapportionment,havealreadymaterialized:LincolnDiaz-Balart,aformerstatesenator,hasbecomethesecondCuban-AmericanelectedtoCongress;theexpectedincreasesinCubanrepresentationtothestatelegislaturehavealsooccurred,tothedetrimentofAnglopoliticians.

SuchatrendsuggeststhattheprocessofconvergencewillhaveastrongLatinundertone.Acculturation-in-reversemayspearheadthetransitiontoadiscoursefocusedonthecity'suniqueCaribbeanroots.AlthoughparticipationinthepoliticalsystemwillinevitablysocializeCubansintotheinstitutionsoftheAmericanmainstream,theirlocaldominancecaninfluencedecisivelythepaceandcharacteroftheconvergenceprocess.

HurricaneAndrewalsocreatedapowerfulcountertrend,however.ItisperhapsbestsymbolizedbythoseCharlestonpolicemendirectingtrafficindevastatedSouthDade:theaidpouringintoMiamicamefromtherestofthecountry,notfromtheCaribbean.Baptistsectssetupinstantsoupkitchens,theU.S.RedCrossandtheSalvationArmydistributeddesperatelyneededwaterandclothing,caravansofvolunteerscamefromasfarnorthasPhiladelphiaandNewYork,and,afewdaysafterthestorm,theU.S.Armywassettingupemergencytentsforthousands.

8ThisoutpouringofnationalsolidaritytookMiamiasbyasecondstorm.Itmadeevidentthat,whateveritsquirksandfoibles,itremainedfirmlyanAmericantown."Miami,U.S.A.,"not"Capitalof

theCaribbean,"wasthethemeunderwhichreconstructionwaslaunched.

Reenergized,theoldAngloleadershiptookchargeofdirectingthetask.Thatperenniallocalbrahmin,AlvahChapman,wasappointedchairmanoftheWeWillRebuildCommittee,withotherAngloleadersoccupyingkeyposts.Ethnicfigureswererelegatedtosecondarypositions,afactthatpromptedBlackattorneyH.T.Smith,leaderoftheBlackboycott,toremark,"WemusthavethefaceofMiami,whichisculturallydiverse,makingandexecutingthedecisions."9Tobesure,theCuban-AmericanNationalFoun-

dationlaunchedavigorousreliefeffort,andthousandsofMiamiCubansandotherLatinscontributedfundsandworkedasvolunteersintheaffectedareas.Buttherewasnothinginthe"successstory"discoursethatcouldeffectivelyintegratethetragedyanditsaftermath.Instead,thethemesofvoluntarismandsolidarity-incrisis,soclosetothecoreofAmericancultureandsothoroughlypracticedovermanysimilarexperiences,becamedominant.TheflattenedMiamilandscapewasanAmerican,notapan-Caribbean,reality.

Thestormmadethecityevenmoreunique,ifthatwaspossible,andsimultaneouslybroughtitbackintothenationalmainstream.CubansandLatinswillbecomeincreasinglyinfluential,butinthestorm'saftermath,itseemedevidentthattheirlocalhegemonywouldbesecurelyensconcedinabroaderAmericanframework.Undoubtedly,thecadencesofSpanish,thesightsandsoundsoftheCaribbean,andtheritualdenunciationsofCastroandhishenchmenwillbeheardforalongtimetocome.Butnoneofthiswillpreventaprocessofconvergence,givenrenewedimpulseandastrongnationalfocusbythenaturalcatastrophe.

1ChangewithoutaBlueprint

1.ChristopherMarquisandAndresViglucci,"SomeCubanExilesDecryPlantoDeportDetainees,"MiamiHerald,November21,1987;DougStruck,"HostagesSetFree,OakdaleInmatesYield,"BaltimoreSun,November30,1987;"AgreementSignedAfterCubansHearPleafromBishop,"BaltimoreSun,November30,1987;DiannaSolísandJosédeCórdoba,"MarielFirestorm,''WallStreetJournal,December1,1987.

2.JacobV.Lamar,"ABrightlyColoredTinderbox,"Time,January30,1989;RobertL.Steinback,"ForBlackMiami,aSenseofJustice,"MiamiHerald,December8,1989;SandraDibbleandKarenBranch,"ColombiansAngeredbyConviction,"MiamiHerald,December8,1989;ChristineEvansandPeggyRogers,"LozanoGets7Years,"MiamiHerald,January25,1990;RachelL.Swarns,"LozanoWinsaManslaughterRetrial,"MiamiHerald,June26,1991.

3.FloydHunter,CommunityPowerStructure(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1953);RobertA.Dahl,WhoGoverns?DemocracyandPowerinanAmericanCity(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1961);C.WrightMills,ThePowerElite(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1956);idem,"TheMiddleClassesinMiddle-sizedCities,"AmericanSociologicalReview11(October1946):520-29.ForasuccinctreviewoftheliteratureonAmericancommunitypower,seeCharlesM.BonjeanandDavidM.Olson,"CommunityLeadership:DirectionsofResearch,"AdministrativeScienceQuarterly9(December1964):278-300.

4.HarveyMolotch,"TheCityasaGrowthMachine,"AmericanJournalofSociology82(1976):309-30;JohnLoganandHarveyMolotch

UrbanFortunes:ThePoliticalEconomyofPlace(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1987).

5.C.WrightMillsandMelvilleJ.Ulmer,"SmallBusinessandCivicWelfare,"inU.S.Congress,Senate,ReportoftheSmallerWarPlantsCorporationtotheSpecialCommitteetoStudyProblemsofAmericanSmallBusiness,79thCong.,1946,S.Rept.135.ForacritiqueofMills'sposition,seeIrvinA.Fowler,"LocalIndustrialStructures,EconomicPower,andCommunityWelfare,"SocialProblems6(Summer1958):41-51.

6.W.LloydWarnerandPaulS.Lunt,TheStatusSystemofaModernCommunity(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1942).

7.W.LloydWarnerandLeoSrole,TheSocialSystemsofAmericanEthnicGroups(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1945).

8.NathanGlazerandDanielP.Moynihan,BeyondtheMeltingPot:TheNegroes,PuertoRicans,Jews,Italians,andIrishofNewYorkCity(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1970);AndrewGreeley,WhyCan'tTheyBeLikeUs?America'sWhiteEthnicGroups(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1971).

9.Followingtheprisontakeover,RománledacoalitionofCubanAmericanpoliticalleadersandclergythatlobbiedthefederalgovernmentforleniencyaswellascarefulreviewofindividualappeals.ThesubsequentslowpaceofdeportationstoCubaandthereleaseofanumberofformerprisonerstotheirfamiliesareduetoRomán'sactivism.

10.M.Janowitz,ed.,W.I.ThomasonSocialOrganizationandSocialPersonality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1969);seealsoLeonFestinger,ATheoryofCognitiveDissonance(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1957).

11.Thestatementsaredrawnfrominterviews,conductedbetween1983and1988,withapproximatelysixtyofMiami'smostprominentbusiness,political,andreligiousleadersasacomplementtoalargesurveyoftherecentlyarrivedimmigrantpopulationinthearea.Resultsfromthissurveyhavebeenpublishedinseveralarticles,includingAlejandroPortesandAlexStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants:TheLaborMarketExperiencesof1980(Mariel)CubanandHaitianRefugeesinSouthFlorida,"AmericanSociologicalReview50(August1985):493-514;andAlejandroPortes,JuanM.Clark,andRobertD.Manning,"AfterMariel:ASurveyoftheResettlementExperiencesof1980CubanRefugeesinMiami,"CubanStudies15(Summer1985):35-59.

12.JoanDidion,Miami(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1987),51.

13.DavidRieff,GoingtoMiami:Exiles,Tourists,andRefugeesintheNewAmerica(Boston:Little,Brown,1987),164-65.

2AYeartoRemember:Mariel

1.DiannaSolísandJosédeCórdoba,"CubanPrisonRiotsFollowedSevenYearsofU.S.Ambivalence,"WallStreetJournal,December1,1987.

2.Florida,DepartmentofHealthandRehabilitativeServices(DHRS),RefugeesandEntrantsinFlorida:BackgroundandCurrentIssues(Tallahassee:DHRS,March1982);J.Franklin,CubanForeignRelations:AChronology,1959-1982(NewYork:CenterforCubanStudies,1983).

3.RafaelHernandezandRediGomis,"RetratodelMariel:elángulosocio-económico,"CuadernosdenuestraAmerica3(January-June1986):138-39.

4.ThisandotherstatementspresentedinthischapterareexcerptsfrominterviewswithcommunityleadersconductedduringapanelstudyofMarielandHaitianrefugeesinSouthFloridabetween1983and1988.Sixtyinterviewswithgovernmentofficials,entrepreneurs,andreligiousleaderswerecompletedduringthisperiod.

5.RobertL.Bach,JenniferB.Bach,andTimothyTriplett,"TheFlotilla'Entrants':LatestandMostControversial,"CubanStudies11(1981):29-48;Portes,Clark,andManning,"AfterMariel."

6.AlejandroPortesandRafaelMozo,"ThePoliticalAdaptationProcessofImmigrantsandOtherRefugeeMinoritiesintheUnitedStates:APreliminaryAnalysis,"InternationalMigrationReview19(Spring1985):35-63.

7.CitedinGuillermoMartínez,"MarielMythsFeedVenomAcrossNation,"MiamiHerald,November18,1982,31A.

8.EricFehrnstrom,"ConfessionofaKiller,"BostonHerald,April17,1987,1,20.

9.Aday-by-dayaccountoftheseeventswasproducedaspartofourstudyofpost-1980immigrationtoSouthFlorida;seeYohelCamayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami,ReporttotheProjecton"Help-SeekingandServicesUseAmongRecentLatinAmericanRefugees,"conductedbytheSociologyDepartmentandSchoolofPublicHealth,JohnsHopkinsUniversity(Boston:BostonUrbanResearchandDevelopmentGroup,1988).

10.Ibid.,111-33-48.

11.Ibid.,III-37.

12.Thevastmajorityofthesebusinessmenandelectedofficials,includingmanyoftherichestCubans,wereunknowntoMiami'sAnglos,forwhomCubansgenerallyweresimplyamassofforeigners,speakinganunintelligiblelanguageandobsessedwiththeirhomelandpolitics.SeeAlejandroPortes,"TheRiseofEthnicity:DeterminantsofEthnicPerceptionsAmongCubanExilesinMiami,"AmericanSociologicalReview49(June1984):383-97.

13.CharlesWhited,"CastroAlwaysSeemstoCalltheShotsHere,"MiamiHerald,November24,1987.

14."CubanSuccessStory:IntheUnitedStates,"U.S.News&WorldReport,March20,1967,104-6;"FlightfromCubaCastro'sLossisU.S.Gain,"U.S.News&WorldReport,May31,1971,74.Similarreportswerepublishedinthe1980s,thoughlessfrequentlythanbefore;see,forexample,"Florida'sLatinBoom:HispanicsAretheOnlySparkinaSomnolentEconomy,"Newsweek,November11,1985,55-56;andSoniaL.Nazario,"AfteraLongHoldout,CubansinMiamiTakeaRoleinMiamiPolitics;EconomicSuccessSpursStepstoAssimilate,"WallStreetJournal,June7,1983,1,23.

15.Fordescriptionsofthebroaderstudyanditsresults,seePortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants";Portes,Clark,andManning,"AfterMariel."

16.Camayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami,III-33.

17.NathanGlazer,"EthnicGroupsinAmerica:FromNationalCulturetoIdeology,"inFreedomandControlinModernSociety,ed.M.Berger,T.Abel,andC.Page(NewYork:VanNostrand,1954),158-73;Greeley,WhyCan'tTheyBeLikeUs?;Portes,"RiseofEthnicity."

18.FredericTasker,"Anti-BilingualismMeasureApprovedbyDadeCounty,"MiamiHerald,November5,1980,1A,11A.

19.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,71.

20.LuisJ.Botifoll,IntroducciónalfuturodeMiami(Miami:Laurenty,1988),3,10.

21.SergioPereira(AssistantCountyManager,DadeCounty),PresentationatconferencesponsoredbyStrategyResearch,Miami,May1981.

3AYeartoRemember:TheRiotandtheHaitians

1.CitedinBrucePorterandMarvinDunn,TheMiamiRiotof1980:CrossingtheBounds(Lexington,Mass.:D.C.Heath,1984),193.

2.Communityleaders,bothLatinandBlack,commentedonthistousduringfieldworkinMiamibetween1983and1989.SeealsoPortes,"RiseofEthnicity."

3.J.E.Buchanan,Miami:AChronologicalandDocumentaryHistory,1513-1977(NewYork:Oceana,1977),53-57.

4.FieldInterview,January1987.

5.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,195.

6.Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,ProfileoftheBlackPopulation(Miami:ResearchDivision,Metro-DadeCountyPlanningDepartment,1984),84.

7.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,195-96.AlejandroPortes,"TheSocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomyofMiami,"SociologicalPerspectives30(October1987):340-72.

8.Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy";MarvinDunnandAlexStepick,"BlacksinMiami,"inMiamiNow!Immigration,Ethnicity,andSocialChange,ed.G.J.GrenierandA.Stepick(Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,1992),41-56.

9.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,196-97.Only1.4percentofMiami'sBlackpopulationownedbusinessesin1982.Ofthe3,385Blackbusinessesinthearea,only450hadpaidemployees.SeeMaxCastroandTimothyYeaney,DocumentingDade'sDiversity:AnEthnicAuditofDadeCounty(Miami:GreaterMiamiUnited,January1989).

10.CitedinPorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,48.

11.Didion,Miami,41.

12."DadeFearsRefugeeWave,"MiamiHerald,May11,1980.

13.Ibid.,129-30.

14.Ibid.,47-60;Didion,Miami,45.

15.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,60-68.

16.FieldinterviewwithheadofamajorsocialservicesagencyinLibertyCity,1985.

18.StanleyLiebersonandArnoldR.Silverman,"ThePrecipitantsandUnderlyingConditionsofRaceRiots,"AmericanSociologicalReview30(December1965):887-98.

19.Seefieldinterviewsexcerptedinchapter1.BythetimeoftheOvertownuprisingofJanuary1989,thedistinctpositionsoftheMiamiBlackcommunityhadbecomewellarticulated.See,forexample,DorothyGaiter,"LozanoVerdictBroughtReliefandLong-delayedJustice,"MiamiHerald,December8,1989,31A.

20.TontonmacoutesisthenamegivenbyHaitianstothebandsofthugshiredbythesuccessiveDuvalierregimestointimidatethepopulation.

21.ThisstoryisanamalgamationofaffidavitsofHaitianrefugeeswhotestifiedinHaitianRefugeeCenterv.Civiletti,503F.Supp.442(S.D.Fla1980),modifiedSubnom.HaitianRefugeeCenterv.Smith,676F.2d1023(5thCir.1982),includingespeciallythecaseofOdiliusJean.PartswerealsoderivedfromStevanPetrow,"WhatDidtheHaitiansDo?"St.PetersburgTimes,November11,1979,8ff.;andBruceKeldan,"TalesoftheTontonMacoutesfromHaitiansWhoFled,"PhiladelphiaInquirer,October8,1979,A1,10A.

22.AlexStepick,HaitianRefugeesintheU.S.,MinorityRightsGroup(MRG)no.52(London:MRG,1986),11.

23.AlexStepickandAlejandroPortes,"FlightintoDespair:AProfileofRecentHaitianRefugeesinSouthFlorida,"InternationalMigrationReview20(Summer1986):329-50.

24.ThecombinationwassanctionedofficiallybythecreationofthefederalCuban-HaitianInteragencyTaskForceinmid-1980.Thisagencyisdescribedbelow.

25.Stepick,HaitianRefugees,14.

26.TaskForceonImmigrationandRefugeePolicy,"IssuePaperSubject:WhatPolicyShouldtheUnitedStatesAdoptwithRegardtoForeignPersonsWhoEnterSouthFloridaWithoutVisas?"

(June26,1981),MemorandumtoPresidentReaganfromtaskforceestablishedbyhimMarch6,1981.Subsequently,thepolicybecameformalandlegalviaU.S.DepartmentofState,"Migrants-Interdiction,"AgreementBetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandHaiti,EffectedbyExchangeofNotes,SignedatPort-au-Prince,September23,1981,TreatiesandOtherInternationalActsSeries,10241,pursuanttoPL89-497,approvedJuly8,1966(80Sta.271;1U.S.C.113).

27.Stepick,HaitianRefugees,14-15.

28.JohnSilva,"CourtToldofLivingDeathinHaitianPrison,"MiamiNews,April9,1980,4A.

29.FredGrimmandEllenBartlett,"PoliticalHeavyweightsBringBoutHere,"MiamiHerald,March9,1980,lB,7B.

30.KathySawyer,"RefugeePolicyDrawsFireinHearing,"WashingtonPost,May13,1980,A6.

31.InDecember1980,thetaskforcewasmovedtotheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices.ItsfirstcoordinatorwasAmbassadorVictorPalmieri.SeeWhiteHouse,"NewCuban-HaitianPlan,"FactSheet#114(Washington,D.C.,July1980).

32.TheaboveinformationcomesfromfieldobservationandinterviewsconductedwithHaitiancommunityleadersaspartoftheCuban/Haitianimmigrationproject,June-August1983.InformantsincludedMr.YvesSavain,thenheadoftheHaitianTaskForce;theReverendGerardJean-Juste,directoroftheHaitianRefugeeCenter;andofficialsofHACAD.

33.SeeFredricTasker,"DadeNeighborhoodsStaySegregatedasResidentsSeekAmericanDream,"MiamiHerald,November1,1982,D1;"Miami:America'sCasablanca,"Newsweek,January25,1988.

34.FieldinterviewconductedaspartoftheCuban/Haitianimmigrationproject,August1983.

35.ThissampleisstatisticallyrepresentativeofadultHaitiansarrivingbetween1980and1982andsettlingintheprincipalareasofHaitianconcentrationinSouthFlorida.ThemethodologyandinitialresultsofthesurveyaresummarizedinStepickandPortes,"FlightintoDespair";andinPortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants."

36.StepickandPortes,"FlightintoDespair";PortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants."

37.Camayd-Freixas,CrisisinMiami,chaps.5and6.

4TheEarlyYears

1.PollyRedford,Billion-DollarSandbar:ABiographyofMiamiBeach(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1970),chap.2.

2.CitedinHowardKleinberg,"AWistfulEyeBacktoYoungCoconutGrove,"MiamiHerald,March6,1990.

3.MarjoryS.Douglas,Florida,theLongFrontier(NewYork:Harper&Row,1967),147-49.

4.HelenMuir,Miami,U.S.A.(Miami:PickeringPress,1990),47-53.

5.CitedinKleinberg,"AWistfulEye."

6.Douglas,Florida,47-48;WilliamR.Gillaspie,"PoncedeLeon,"inEncyclopediaofWorldBiography,vol.8(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1973),521-22.

7.HowardKleinberg,"PoncedeLeon'sLandinginChequescha(Miami),Fla.,"MiamiHerald,March22,1990.

8.Douglas,Florida,49-50.

9.Ibid.,51-53.

10.WilliamR.Gillaspic,"DeSoto,"inEncyclopediaofWorldBiography,vol.3(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1973),352-53;"Soto,Hernandode,"NewEncyclopaediaBritannica,15thed.(Chicago:EncyclopaediaBritannica,1989),11:23;EmilLudwig,Biografíadeunaisla(i.e.,Cuba)(MexicoCity:EditorialCentauro,1948),75-78.

11.Gillaspie,"DeSoto."

12.Oneothercolonizingeffortoccurredin1558-61,ledbyDonTristándeLunayArellanowho,withapartyof1,500,establishedasmallsettlementonPensacolaBayintheFloridapanhandle.Itfailed,however,andonSeptember23,1561,PhilipIIissuedacedulabarringfurthercolonizingeffortsinForida.SeeRichardB.Morris,ed.,EncyclopediaofAmericanHistory(NewYork:Harper&Row,1976),59.

13."St.Augustine,"inTheColumbiaLippincottGazetteeroftheWorld,ed.L.E.Seltzer(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1962),1627;Douglas,Florida,69-70.

15.Ibid.,86-90;"St.Augustine."

16."St.Augustine";T.WalterWallbankandAlastairM.Taylor,Civilization,PastandPresent,4thed.,vol.2(Chicago:Scott,Foresman,1961),36-37;A.MaletandJ.Isaac,Lostiemposmodernos(MexicoCity:EditoraNacional,1961),278-79.

17.Douglas,Florida,100-103;LuisJ.Botifoll,TheConspiracyofSilence:Hispanics'VitalRoleintheAmericanRevolution(Miami:Laurenty,1986),4-5.

18.WallbankandTaylor,Civilization,105-11;MaletandIsaac,Lostiemposmodernos,283-86.

19.Douglas,Florida,105.DouglastracesthewordcimarróntoJamaica,althoughitisaSpanishtermimportedoriginallyfromCuba.

20.Ibid.,129.GloriaJahoda,Florida:ABicentennialHistory(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1976),47.

21.T.D.Allman,Miami:CityoftheFuture(NewYork:AtlanticMonthlyPress,1987),148;Jahoda,Florida,54.

23.Allman,Miami,152-53.Jahoda,Florida.

24.Douglas,Florida,146.

25.Ibid.,146-47.

26.Allman,Miami,153;Jahoda,Florida,143,158.

27.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,15.

28.Douglas,Florida,148,165.

29.V.O.Key,SouthernPolitics(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1950),86.

31.Key,SouthernPolitics,82-83.

32.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,27.

33.Ibid.,chap.2;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,55-65.

34.EdwardSofen,TheMiamiMetropolitanExperiment(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1963),11.

35.PaulS.George,"ColoredTown:Miami'sBlackCommunity,1896-1930,"FloridaHistoricalQuarterly16(April1978):432-47;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chaps.4,5,8;Douglas,Florida,251.

36.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chap.4;Rieff,GoingtoMiami,6.

37.Rieff,GoingtoMiami;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chaps.5-8,20.

39.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,10-11;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,13.

40.Allman,Miami,170;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,47-65;Douglas,Florida,244.

42.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,10.

43.Allman,Miami,207-10;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,149-50.

44.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar;Allman,Miami,219-21.

45.Rieff,GoingtoMiami,chap.1;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,131-42.

47.KarlMarx,TheEighteenthBrumaireofNapoleonBonaparte(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1963).

48.PaulS.George,"PolicingMiami'sBlackCommunity,1896-1930,"FloridaHistoricalQuarterly17(April1979):434-50.

49.George,"ColoredTown,"444.

50.Ibid.

51.Quotedinibid.,441

53.Ibid.,10.

54.CitedinAllman,Miami,156.

55.StatementofaBlackEpiscopalpastor,citedinPorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,193.

56.George,"ColoredTown,"440.

57.Ibid.,pp.438-40.

58.PorterandDunn,MiamiRiotof1980,9-13.

59.RaymondA.Mohl,"TroubleinParadise:RaceandHousinginMiamiDuringtheNewDealEra,"Prologue8(Spring1987):7-20.

60.Ibid.,13.

61.George,"PolicingMiami'sBlackCommunity."

62.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chap.14;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,14-15;Allman,Miami,211.

63.Allman,Miami,224-26;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment.

64.Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,16;Metro-DadePlanningDepartment,selectedtabulationsfromthe1990Censusmadeavailabletotheauthors.

65.Key,SouthernPolitics,87.

66.Ibid.,85.

67.Ibid.;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,3-10.

68.Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,99.

69.Allman,Miami,210-15;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,127,218.

71.Ibid.;Rieff,GoingtoMiami,26;MiamiDesignandPreservationLeague,"MiamiBeachArchitecture"(1989).

72.Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,8-10,216-17.

73.Ibid.,23.

74.Ibid.,34-35.

75.Ibid.,chaps.4,7.

76.Ibid.,71;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,chap.1.

77.Key,SouthernPolitics,103-4;SamuelProctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,Florida'sFightingDemocrat(Gainesville:UniversityofFloridaPress,1950).

78.Allman,Miami,223-27;Sofen,MiamiMetropolitanExperiment,216-17.

5EntertheCubans

1.Theforegoinginformationisbasedontheauthors'fieldwork.InformationontheconstructionoftheSanCarloswasobtainedonsite.

2.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,27.

3.HughThomas,Cuba:ThePursuitofFreedom(NewYork:Harper&Row,1971),305.

4.Ibid.

5.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,47-49.

6.Proctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,97-99.

7.Ibid.,103-11.

8.Ibid.,114.

9.Ibid.,124.

10.Ibid.,131-32.

11.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,59-62;Proctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,117.

12.Thomas,Cuba,356-66;Proctor,NapoleonBonaparteBroward,

135-37.

13.Thomas,Cuba,328-37;Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,61;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,30.

14.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,67-69;George,''PolicingMiami'sBlackCommunity,1896-1930,"435.

15.Thomas,Cuba,453-54.

16.SidneyW.Mintz,"TheIndustrializationofSugarProductionandItsRelationshiptoSocialandEconomicChange,"inBackgroundtoRevolution:TheDevelopmentofModernCuba,ed.R.F.Smith(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1966),178.

17.Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,249,269.

18.Thomas,Cuba.

19.JorgeGarciaMontesandAntonioAlansoDávila,HistoriadelPartidoComunistadeCuba(Miami:EdicionesUniversal,1970),chap.6;JustoCarrillo,Cuba1933:estudiantes,yankisysoldados(Miami:InstituteofIbero-AmericanStudies,UniversityofMiami,1985),37-50.

20.Carrillo,Cuba1933,587.

21.Thomas,Cuba,625.

22.Muir,Miami,U.S.A.,173-75;Redford,Billion-DollarSandbar,183-91;Mohl,"TroubleinParadise."

23.FulgencioBatista,Respuesta(MexicoCity:ImpresoraManuelLeonSánchez,1960),43.

24.NotonlyPríobutmanyothermajorCubanpoliticalfiguresaswellresidedinMiamiduringthestruggleagainstBatista.JoseMiróCardona,primeminister-designateofthefirstrevolutionarygovernment,wasawakenedinhisMiamihomeonJanuary1,1959,withthenewsofBatista'sfallandhadtobeflowntoOrienteProvincefortheswear-inceremony.SeeAndrésSuarez,Cuba:CastroismandCommunism,1959-1966(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1967),30.

25.Thomas,Cuba,876.

26.Suarez,Cuba,23;Thomas,Cuba,891.

27.Thomas,Cuba,968-69.

28.Suarez,Cuba,25,31;Thomas,Cuba,978-79.

29.FidelCastro,ManifestooftheSierraMaestra,citedinibid.,969.

30.InJanuary1958,theU.S.yachtCorinthialeftMiamiandlandedrevolutionariesonthenorthcoastofCamagueyProvince;they

eventuallysucceededinestablishinga"secondfront"ofguerrillawarfare.SeeThomas,Cuba,978-79.

31.WilliamWieland,citedinibid.,977.

32.FieldinterviewswithformerCubangovernmentofficialsin1983-84.Theirstatementsagreedindependentlyonthefrequencyandhabitualcharacterofthesetrips.

33.Forcomparisononthedifficultiesofadaptationconfrontedbyotherrecentrefugeegroups,seeAlejandroPortesandRubénG.Rumbaut,"AForeignWorld:Immigration,MentalHealth,andAcculturation,"inImmigrantAmerica:APortrait(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990).

34.Fieldinterviews,Miamiimmigrationproject,1984.

36.AlejandroPortesandRobertL.Bach,LatinJourney:CubanandMexicanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985),84-90.

37.Ibid.

38.JohnF.ThomasandEarlE.Huyck,"ResettlementofCubanRefugeesintheUnitedStates"(PaperpresentedatthemeetingsoftheAmericanSociologicalAssociation,SanFrancisco,August1967).

39.PortesandBach,LatinJourney,86.

40.AlejandroPortes,JuanM.Clark,andRobertL.Bach,"TheNewWave:AStatisticalProfileofRecentCubanExilestotheUnitedStates,"CubanStudies7(January1977):tables4-7.

41.ThomasandHuyck,"ResettlementofCubanRefugees."

42.SergioDiaz-BriquetsandLisandroPerez,"Cuba:TheDemographyofRevolution,"PopulationBulletin36(April1981):2-41.

43.Ibid.

44.SeeMichaelPiore,BirdsofPassage:MigrantLaborandIndustrialSocieties(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979);andPortesandBach,LatinJourney,7-10.

45.JuanM.Clark,JoseI.Lasage,andRoseS.Reque,The1980MarielExodus:AnAssessmentandProspect(Washington,D.C.:CouncilforInter-AmericanSecurity,1981);andPortesandStepick,"UnwelcomeImmigrants."

46.Theepisode,atruestory,tookplaceduringpreliminaryfieldworkforastudyonpost-1970CubanemigrationanditsadaptationtoU.S.

society.FinalresultsofthisstudyarepresentedinPortesandBach,LatinJourney.

47.CarlosForment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave:TheCuban-AmericanCase,1959-1979,"TheoryandSociety18(1989):47-81.

48.TheexpressionwasfirstusedbyDavidRieff;seehisGoingtoMiami.

6HowtheEnclavewasBuilt

1."AscensodeIMCdespertócontroversia,"ElMiamiHerald,March28,1986,9;"Recareypagómillonesacabilderos,"ElNuevoHerald,December20,1987,6A.Thepresentsectionisbasedonthesetwosources.

2.MiamiHerald,December20,1987.

3.Didion,Miami,90-91.

4.Ibid.,83,86-98.

5.IvanLight,"ImmigrantandEthnicEnterpriseinNorthAmerica,"EthnicandRacialStudies7(April1984):195-216;Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy."

6.Fieldinterview,January15,1986.

7.Ibid.

8.LuisJ.Botifoll,"HowMiami'sNewImageWasCreated,"OccasionalPaperno.1985-1,InstituteofInter-AmericanStudies,UniversityofMiami,1985,13.

9.Ibid.;andfieldinterviewwithofficialsoftheLatinBuildersAssociationinMiami,January21,1986.

10.SeeForment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave,"47.ThisarticlemaintainsthatCIAtiesplayedapivotalroleintheriseofthefirstCubanenterprisesinMiami.

11."Florida'sLatinBoom."

12.DoryOwens,"HerFaithinHispanicsPaidOffBig,"MiamiHerald,"Profile"sec.,October1,1988.

13.FieldinterviewwithDiegoR.Suarez,January30,1986;citedwithpermission.

14.IvanLight,"AsianEnterpriseinAmerica:Chinese,Japanese,andKoreansinSmallBusiness,"inSelf-HelpinUrbanAmerica,ed.S.Cummings(NewYork:KennikatPress,1980),33-57.

15.FieldinterviewinMiami,February7,1989.

16.FieldinterviewinMiami,January14,1987.

17.FieldinterviewinHialeah,August15,1984.

19.FieldinterviewsinMiami,January30,1986,andJanuary22,1991;Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy."

20.Portes,"SocialOriginsoftheCubanEnclaveEconomy";U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1977/Hispanic(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1980).

21.FieldinterviewswithCuban-Americanbankers,January2,21,1986;February7,1989;February12,1991;alsoOwens,"HerFaithinHispanicsPaidOff."

22.CliffordGeertz,PeddlersandPrinces(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1963),123.

23.Fieldinterviewswithgarmentmanufacturer,January14,1987;ownerofrestaurantsandliquorshops,January9,1986;executivesofInter-AmericanTransport,January30,1986;andlocalunionorganizer,August15,1984.

24.HebertoPadilla,"Miami:elmundoenblancoynegro,"ElMiamiHerald,January18,1986,5.

25.JoannaWragg,"TheBoycott,Blacks,andCubans,"MiamiHerald,December30,1990,2C;SergioLopez-Miro,"Wherethe'Cuban'Endsandthe'American'Begins,"MiamiHerald,February1,1990.

27."TheCuban-AmericanCommunityandtheMiamiHerald"(paidpoliticalannouncement),MiamiHerald,October19,1987,11A.

28.ThestatementinSpanishisusuallyreadbyWQBAnewsdirectorTomasGarciaFusté;fieldvisits,1989-90.

29.Forment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave."

30.Ibid.AlsofieldinterviewswithCuban-Americanindustrialist,January14,1987;banker,February7,1987;andcommunityorganizer,December22,1987.

31."Deportaraunciudadanonoexiste,"ElNuevoHerald,January10,1988,2A.

32.Wragg,"TheBoycott,Blacks,andCubans."

33."TheQuietRiot,"NewTimes,September26-October2,1990,12-22.

34.SeeRichardF.Fagen,RichardA.Brody,andThomasJ.O'Leary,CubansinExile:DisaffectionandtheRevolution(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1968),chaps.3,7.

35.HerbertMatthews,RevolutioninCuba(NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,1975),195-200;HerminioPortell-Vila,NuevahistoriadelaRepúblicadeCuba(Miami:LaModernaPoesia,1989),793-806.

36.RichardE.Welch,ResponsetoRevolution:TheUnitedStatesandtheCubanRevolution,1959-1961(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1985),81-84;Forment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave."

37.SeeAllman,Miami,chap.14;Didion,Miami,chap.7.

38.Forment,"PoliticalPracticeandtheRiseofanEthnicEnclave,"65.

39.InterviewwithMonsignorWalsh,DirectorofCatholicCommunityServicesoftheArchdioceseofMiami,January,12,1987;citedwithpermission.

40.PortesandBach,LatinJourney,tables61,65.

41.Ibid.,tables59,60,63,64,68.

42.Ibid.,table70.

43.U.S.BureauoftheCensus,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1987/Hispanics(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1991),tablesC,D,and6.

44.FieldinterviewinMiami,May3,1981.

45.FieldinterviewswithSALADleaders,May3andJune16,1981.

46.LuisJ.Botifoll,ChairmanoftheRepublicNationalBank,manuscript,1990.

47.FieldinterviewwithJosé(Pepe)Hernandez,PresidentofCANF,February14,1991;citedwithpermission.

7ARepeatPerformance?TheNicaraguanExodus

1.ChristopherMarquis,"MiamiGrappleswithInfluxofNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,December15,1988,1A.

2.ChristopherMarquisandFrankCerabino,"DadeonEdgeoverNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,January14,1989,1A.

3.DaveVonDrehleandChristopherMarquis,"NicaraguanStreamintoMiami;ManyFindTheyMustFendforThemselves,"MiamiHerald,January13,1989,1A.

4.ChristopherMarquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNew

LifeinS.Florida,"MiamiHerald,July16,1989,1A.

5.ChristopherMarquis,"RefugeesFindExilesThriving,"MiamiHerald,January22,1989,1B.

6.AnaVeciana-SuarezandSandraDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans:RemakingTheirLives"(pt.1of2pts.),MiamiHerald,September13,1987,1G.

7.Marquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNewLife."

8.BarbaraGutierrez,"We're'Invisible'Exiles,NicaraguansSay,"MiamiHerald,February5,1984,1B.

9.Veciana-SuarezandDibble,"Miami'sNicaraguans."

10.Ibid.

11.AnaVeciana-Suarez,"NicaraguanExilesBegintoClimbtheLadder,"MiamiHerald,March28,1983,10BM.

12."ExiledNicaraguansReflect,"MiamiHerald,July16,1989,11A.

13.CarlosBriceno,"NicaraguanPleafor'Sanctuary'DoublesinYear,"MiamiHerald,February5,1985,1D.

14.Gutierrez,"We're'Invisible.'"

15.JaimeSuchlickiandArturoCruz,"TheImpactofNicaraguansinMiami:TheNicaraguanExodustoMiamiUndertheSandinistas,andtheFutureOutlookFollowingTheirElectoralDefeat,"StudyfortheCityManagerofMiamipreparedbytheInstituteofInteramericanStudies,UniversityofMiami,March1990.

16.SandraDibble,"NicaraguanExilesFindHomesinLittleHavana,"MiamiHerald,February10,1986,2B;Gutierrez,"We're'Invisible.'"

17.Gutierrez,"We're'Invisible'";Dibble,"NicaraguanExilesFindHomes";Veciana-SuarezandDibble,''Miami'sNicaraguans";RodrigoLazo,"ThereIsSoLittleMoney,butThereIsPeaceofMind,"MiamiHerald,December25,1989,2D.

19.Increasedinternationalcompetitioninthe1980salsoaffectedtheindustryasitbegantocontractforthefirsttime,lesseningdemandforworkers.

20.InterviewwithCarpenters'Unionorganizer,Miami,June9,1988.

21.KarenBranch,"ImmigrantsJamStreetCorner,HopingforaJob,"MiamiHerald,March15,1989,1B.

22.RodrigoLazo,"WithoutWorkPermit,DayJobsSustainHim,"MiamiHerald,December25,1989,2D.

23.RodrigoLazo,"AYearLater,PanaceaTurnstoStruggleforNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,December25,1989,1D.

24."ExiledNicaraguansReflect."

25.QuotedinAlfonsoChardy,"MuchofBlameforInfluxPutonFailedReaganPolicy,"MiamiHerald,January22,1989,16A.

26.SandiWisenberg,"AnUnlikelyChampion,"MiamiHerald,April26,1985,1C.Atthesametime,barelyoverfiftyNicaraguanswere

deportedandfewerthanfivehundredwhofaceddeportationleftvoluntarily;seeBriceno,"NicaraguanPleaforSanctuary."

27.FabiolaSantiagoandBarbaraGutierrez,"Dade'sLittleManagua:BastionofUncertainty.,"MiamiHerald,July19,1984,16A.

28.SandraDibble,"NicaraguansinMiami:LivinginLimbo,MostRefugeesDeniedWorkPermits,Welfare,"MiamiHerald,December23,1985,1A.

29.YvesColon,"State-INSPlanAimstoTakeawayAliens'IncentivestoStay,"MiamiHerald,December26,1984,1D.

30."U.S.OfficialJoinsCelebrationofNicaragua'sIndependence,"MiamiHerald,September10,1986,2B.

31.FabiolaSantiago,"DinnerforINSChieftoFundContraLobby,"MiamiHerald,June27,1985,1D.

32.SandraDibble,"INSHaltsDeportationofNicaraguanAliens,"MiamiHerald,April11,1986,1A.

33."AtLast,WorkPermits,"MiamiHerald,July10,1987,24A.Meese'sdirectivewasbasedona1986SupremeCourtrulingthatloosenedstandardsforgrantingpoliticalasylum,itselfbasedonaprovisionoftheRefugeeActof1980,whichstatesthatarefugeemustshowa"wellfoundedfearofpersecution"tobegrantedasylum.Administrationofficialshadinterpretedthatclausetomeanthatrefugeesmustprove"aclearprobability"ofpersecutioniftheyreturnedtotheirhomecountry.ButtheSupremeCourtrulingrelaxedthestandardbyrulingthatasylumclaimsarevalidif"persecutionisareasonablepossibility"(INSv.Cardoza-Fonseca).Eventhoughthecourtdecisiononasylumappliedtoallrefugees,MeesespecificallyorderedINStohaltdeportationofNicaraguansfromtheUnitedStates.Hemadenomentionofothergroups,however,suchas

SalvadoransandHaitians.SeeTinaMontalvo,"NicaraguansAreOnlyImmigrantsBenefittingfromNewAsylumAid,''MiamiHerald,September11,1987.6C.

34.R.A.Zaldívar,"VagueLawsSpurRefugeeMovements,"MiamiHerald,January15,1989,1A;RichardWallace,"NicaraguansJamINSOfficesforWorkPapers,"MiamiHerald,August23,1987,1B;TinaMontalvo,"JobPermitsGoingFastatINSOffices;10,200NicaraguansProcessedin4Days,"MiamiHerald,September6,1987,1B.

35.RodrigoLazo,"LackingAid,ImmigrantsWaittoLearn,"MiamiHerald,October12,1988,1B.

36.ChristopherMarquis,"InMiami,ConfusionReignsforApplicants,"MiamiHerald,December17,1988,1A.

37.DavidHancock,"U.S.DeniesPolicyShiftonHandlingNicaraguans,"MiamiHerald,December15,1988,1D.

38.Zaldívar,"VagueLawsSpurRefugeeMovements";Chardy,"MuchofBlameforInfluxPutonFailedReaganPolicy";Marquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNewLife.''

39.ChristopherMarquis,"ManyNicaraguansRejectCalltoGoHome,"MiamiHerald,April3,1989,1B.

40.MichaelBrowning,"AntibilingualBackersCelebrateEarly,"MiamiHerald,November5,1980,1B.

41."NicaraguanRefugees:HowtheCommunityFeels,"MiamiHerald,January20,1989,24A.

42.LuisFeldsteinSoto,"NicaraguanInfluxStrainsSchools,Services,"MiamiHerald,July5,1987,2B.

43.Ibid.;RichardJ.Feinstein,"WhyPublicHospitalsAreAiling,"MiamiHerald,February10,1985,3E;ChristopherMarquis,"DadeUnpreparedforRefugeeInflux,"MiamiHerald,October23,1988,1A;CharlesWhited,"WashingtonIsGuiltyofBig,FatBlunderoverRefugees,"MiamiHerald,January14,1989,1B;Marquis,"NicaraguanExileCommunityForgesNewLife."

44.QuotedinSandraDibble,"ImmigrationDebateErupts,"MiamiHerald,December22,1988,1C.

45.Ibid.Ofcourse,thereweresomewhostillignoredthenewestarrivalsintheircity.Duringthe1988-89NicaraguanrefugeecrisisandjustbeforeMiami'shostingoftheSuperBowl,TomFerguson,presidentoftheBeaconCouncil,agroupofbusinessmendevotedto

promotingMiami'simage,declared:"Ihatetosayit,butbecauseoftheSuperBowl,people'senergiesarefocusedinanotherdirectionnow."

46.Ibid.

47."HowtheCommunityIsResponding,"MiamiHerald,January13,1989,19A.

48.GeoffreyBiddulph,"BlacksFeelLeftOutasRefugeesGetJobs,"MiamiHerald,January20,1989,1D.

49.BeaHines,"OvertownFeelsPain,Frustration,"MiamiHerald,January18,1989,1A.

50.Marquis,"MiamiGrappleswithInflux."

51.Ibid.

52.Ibid.

53.JoeStarita,"NicaraguansStreamintoMiamiStadium,anUnlikelyRefuge,"MiamiHerald,January13,1989,1A.

54."HowtheCommunityIsResponding."

55.RodrigoLazo,"MassOffersRayofHopeforRefugees,"MiamiHerald,December26,1988,1B.

56.RichardCapen,"HandIsOuttotheTempest-tossed,"MiamiHerald,January1,1989,3C;LizBalmaseda,"TheNewNicaragua,"MiamiHerald,February5,1989,1-6G.

57.Biddulph,"BlacksFeelLeftOut."

58.FredStrasser,"NicaraguansShareFightforFreedomatCubans'Rally,"MiamiHerald,May21,1984,1B.

59.BarbaraGutierrez,"SuppliestoBeFerriedtoRefugees,"MiamiHerald,June26,1983,4B.

60.BarbaraGutierrez,"CubansHoldMarathontoRaiseMoneyforNicaraguanGuerrillas,"MiamiHerald,August1,1983,3B.Overfourmonthslatertheaid,however,wasstillundelivered;see"AidforRebelsUndelivered,"MiamiHerald,April29,1984,6B.

61.SandraDibble,"NicaraguanCardinalBringsPeaceMessage,"MiamiHerald,June14,1985,1A;LourdesMeluza,"SpanishRadioMarathontoRaiseNicaraguanAidFunds,"MiamiHerald,June14,1985,2C.TheCubanAmericanradiostationsconductmarathonsforavarietyofcauses,mostrelatedtotheLatincommunityandagoodnumberconcernedspecificallywithanticommunism;seeSandra

Dibble,''LatinListenersOpenHeartstoAirwaveAppeals,"MiamiHerald,December15,1985,1A.

62.Strasser,"NicaraguansShareFightforFreedom."

63.FabiolaSantiago,"$100,000FundtoPayTuitionfor100Exiles,"MiamiHerald,January9,1985,6B.

64.Veciana-Suarez,"NicaraguanExilesBegintoClimbtheLadder";BenBarber,"OpenThree:EnclaveforExiles,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,December29,1983,14.

65.LawrenceJosephs,"RanchosCarriesonTradition,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,July7,1983,31.

66.Veciana-Suarez,"NicaraguanExilesBegintoClimbtheLadder."

68.Ibid.

69.Ibid.

70.KarenBranch,"NicaraguanCulture:AliveandGrowinginDade,"MiamiHerald,"Neighbors"sec.,May25,1989,20.

71.KarenBranch,"NicaraguansTrytoHelpTheirOwn,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsKendall"sec.,June4,1989,10.

73.Ibid.

74.Branch,"NicaraguanCulture."

75.Ibid.

76.SantiagoandGutierrez,"Dade'sLittleManagua,"16A;SandraDibble,"NicaraguansLobbyingtoStayinU.S.Legally,MiamiHerald,August15,1985,2D;JayGayoso,"NicaraguanFlightsforRefugees'Aid,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,January18,1987,16;idem,"BattleUnitesNicaraguanRefugees,''MiamiHerald,"NeighborsS.E."sec.,February8,1987,3;KarenBranch,"NicaraguanExileGroupsUniteinAppealtoMack,"MiamiHerald,July1,1989,3B.

77.SantiagoandGutierrez,"Dade'sLittleManagua."

78."NicaraguanExilesSeekOverallLeader,"MiamiHerald,September12,1989,3B.

79.Marquis,"RefugeesFindExilesThriving."

80."Immigration:HowtoControlIt;ALegalLimbo"(5thofa

series),MiamiHerald,December30,1983,28A.

81."TheCuban-AmericanCommunityandtheMiamiHerald,"MiamiHerald,October19,1987,11A.

82."AtLast,WorkPermits."

83."MercyforRefugees,"MiamiHerald,June26,1988,2C.

84."NicaraguanExodus,"MiamiHerald,October20,1988,24A.

85."ImmoralPolicy,"MiamiHerald,December17,1988,34A.

86."RoomattheInfield,"MiamiHerald,December25,1988,2C.

87.Whited,"WashingtonIsGuiltyofBig,FatBlunder."

8LostintheFray:Miami'sBlackMinorities

1.ScottKraftandBarryBearak,"AfterMiami,MandelaFindsHero'sWelcomeinDetroit,"LosAngelesTimes,June29,1990,A18-19.

2.ElinorBurkettandSharonyAndrews,"RhythmsofAfricanPridePulsateinMiamiStreets,"MiamiHerald,June29,1990,13A.

3.KraftandBearak,"AfterMiami,MandelaFindsHero'sWelcome."

4.KimberlyCrockett,ElinorBurkett,andKarenBranch,"GrassrootsWelcomeCountersOfficialSnub,"MiamiHerald,June29,1990,1A,12A.TheBlackcommissionersubsequentlydidgototheconventiontogreetMandela.Unfortunately,Mandelawaslate,andthecommissionerhadtoleavebeforeMandelaarrived.

5.CarlGoldfarb,"Mandela'sVisitPromptsRerunofOldEthnicBattles,"MiamiHerald,July1,1990,lB,4B.

6.CarlGoldfarb,"MandelaBackers,CriticsBraceforMomentousVisit,"MiamiHerald,June28,1990,4A,4B.

7.MargariaFichtner,"StillFartoGo,SistersWhoLedSit-insinSixtiesStillSeekDignity.'Isn'tThatRidiculous?'"MiamiHerald,July3,1990,1C,2C.

8.CharlesStrouseandDavidHancock,"1,000HaitiansTrapStoreowner,"MiamiHerald,July1,1990,lB,2B.Itisimpossibletoassignresponsibilityinthisincident.TheHaitiancustomerapparentlyhadapolicerecordforviolence,whiletheCubanemployeehadareputationforbeingsurlyandattimesverballyabusiveofcustomers.

9.KimberlyCrockett,DavidHancock,andCarlosHarrison,"PoliceCrushHaitianProtest,"MiamiHerald,July6,1990,1A,12A.

10.WilliamJ.Wilson,"TheUnderclass:Issues,Perspectives,and

PublicPolicy,"AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialSciences516(January1989):182-92;CaroleMarks,"TheUrbanUnderclass,"AnnualReviewofSociology17(1991):445-66.

11.See.MartinM.Marger,RaceandEthnicRelations(Belmont,Calif.:Wadsworth,1991),5.Margerstartshistextbookwiththestoryoftheserepeatedincidents.

13.GailEpstein,"ContractsStillScarceforBlacks,"MiamiHerald,September29,1991,1B,3B.

14.JointCenterforEnvironmentalandUrbanProblems,AnEvaluationofRedevelopmentinOvertown(Miami:FloridaInternationalUniversity,October1991),3and9(table1).

15.InterviewswithProfessorRickTardanicoandKevinYelvingtonofFloridaInternationalUniversity,whoconductedresearchfortheJointCenterforEnvironmentalandUrbanProblems;seeibid.

16.Epstein,"ContractsStillScarce."

17.AndresViglucci,"LibertyCityRiseslikethePhoenix;GroupAccomplishesChangeFewEnvisioned,"MiamiHerald,July22,1990,lB,7B.

18.HeatherDewarandMikeWard,"Teele:JobsWouldHealMiami'sWoes,"MiamiNews,October16,1987,1A,7A.

19.KimberlyCrockettandPatrickMay,"BlackProtestsDrawonPast,LooktoFuture,"MiamiHerald,November12,1990,lB,2B.

20."PageOneComment-MiamiRunbyCubanMafia,"MiamiTimes,December20,1990,1.

22.Goldfarb,"MandelaVisitPromptsRerun."

23.RobertL.Steinback,"TensionsPushMiamitoBrinkofItsOwnWar,"MiamiHerald,December28,1990,lB.

24.TheresearchfromwhichthisquotecomesisreportedinAlexStepick,MaxCastro,MarvinDunn,andGuillermoGrenier,"NewcomersandEstablishedResidents:TheCaseofMiami,"FinalReporttotheFordFoundationfortheChangingRelationsProject(Miami:CenterforLaborResearchandStudy,FloridaInternationalUniversity,1989).

25.Fieldinterview,January1987.

26.SeeAlexStepick,"TheBusinessCommunityofLittleHaiti,"Dialogueno.32,OccasionalPaperSeries,LatinAmericanandCaribbeanCenter(Miami:FloridaInternationalUniversity,February1984),1-45;idem,"LittleHaiti,"inMiami:InsightCityGuides,ed.JoannBiondi(London:APAPublications,1991),209-16;andIntegratedAdvertising,S&RHaitianTelephoneDirectory,1987(Miami:IntegratedManagementGroup,1987).

27.AlexStepick,"TheHaitianInformalSectorinMiami,"CityandSociety5(June1991):10-22;idem,"Miami'sTwoInformalSectors,"inTheInformalEconomy:StudiesinAdvancedandLessDevelopedCoun-

tries,ed.A.Portes,M.Castells,andL.Benton(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1989),111-31.

28.DavidHancock,SandraDibble,andKimberlyCrockett,"Haitians:WeWantRespectinS.Florida,"MiamiHerald,July22,1990,1A,17A;NancySanMartin,"HaitiansStruggleforUnityinNewLand,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsNorth"sec.,September23,1990,16-17.

29.See,forexample,1983-87issuesofPótparól,publishedbytheHaitianTaskForce,Miami.

30.ThomasMonnay,"HaitiansAreStillSmartingfromtheEffectsofBloodBanStigma,"MiamiTimes,January3,1991,1A.

31.KimberlyCrockettandSandraDibble,"NewTensionsSeizingDade:HaitiansVentLongstillAnger,"MiamiHerald,July3,1990,lB,2B.

32.AnaSantiagoandIvanRomán,"Haitianosdenuncianbrutalidadpolicial,"ElNuevoHerald,July7,1990,1A,6A.

33.NancySanMartin,AndresViglucci,andDavidHancock,"PeacefulRallyEndsDaysofDivisiveness,"MiamiHerald,July8,1990,lB,2B.

34.MarjorieValburnandSharonyAndrews,"AristideSawHaitians,U.S.BlacksasOne,"MiamiHerald,September28,1991,lB,4B;BarryBearak,"EthnicRelationsinMiamiUnravel,"LosAngelesTimes,July8,1990,A21.

35.Stepick,Castro,Dunn,andGrenier,"NewcomersandEstablishedResidents."

36.CarlGoldfarb,"DawkinsLeavesTown,TurmoilBehind,"MiamiHerald,July7,1990,lB.

37.MarvinDunn,FloridaInternationalUniversity,personalcommunication.

38.Stepick,Castro,Dunn,andGrenier,"NewcomersandEstablishedResidents."

39.Ibid.

40.ResultsofpreliminaryfieldworkinMiamiforaprojectentitled"ChildrenofImmigrants,theAdaptationProcessoftheSecondGeneration,"supportedbytheSpencerFoundationandNationalScienceFoundation;AlejandroPortesandLisandroPerez,principalinvestigators,1990.

41.NancySanMartinandXoseAlvarez-Alfonso,"HaitianFamiliesAreMovingouttotheSuburbs,"MiamiHerald,"NeighborsNorth-

west"sec.,October14,1990,20,21.ForsimilarprocesseswithHaitiansinothercities,seeTekleWoldemikael,BecomingBlackAmerican:HaitiansandAmericanInstitutionsinEvanston,Illinois(NewYork:AMSPress,1989);SusanBuchanan,"ScatteredSeeds:TheMeaningofMigrationforHaitiansinNewYorkCity"(Ph.D.diss.,NewYorkUniversity,1980);idem,"TheCulturalMeaningofSocialClassforHaitiansinNewYorkCity,"EthnicGroups5(1983):7-30;andLorettaJ.P.Saint-Louis,"MigrationEvolves:ThePoliticalEconomyofNetworkProcessandForminHaiti,theU.S.,andCanada"(Ph.D.diss.,BostonUniversity,1988).

42.AllanalysesofHaitiansocietyemphasizeitsclassandcolordivisions.AmongthemostinsightfulisMichel-RolphTrouillot,Haiti,StateAgainstNation:TheOriginsandLegacyofDuvalierism(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1990).

43.AlexStepick,"TheRefugeesNobodyWants:HaitiansinMiami,"inGrenierandStepick(eds.),MiamiNow!,57-82.

44.Stepick,"BusinessCommunityofLittleHaiti";idem,"LittleHaiti."

45.NancySanMartinandKarenBranch,"MiamiHaitiansMarch,"MiamiHerald,October3,1991,18A;HaroldMaass,"'We'reNotGoingtoStop,'HaitiansCryin6thProtest,"MiamiHerald,October6,1991,lB,2B;DavidHancockandJonO'Neill,"5,000toU.S.:BackAristide,TakeRefugees,"MiamiHerald,November17,1991,lB,2B.

46.Fieldinterviewbyauthors,October1991.

47.NancySanMartin,"Miami'sHaitiansNotAllofOneMindontheAristidePresidency,"MiamiHerald,October5,1991,2B.

48.Inthisandthefollowingcitations,italicsareusedtoindicatecommonthemesexpressedbyBlackandwhiteinformants.

49.DavidLawrence,Jr.,"FindaWaytotheFutureforEveryone,"MiamiHerald,December2,1990,3G.

50.Miami'sBusinessAssistanceCenter,promotionalbrochure,1987;courtesyofN.Daughtrey,BAC'sformerexecutivedirector.

53.FieldinterviewswithwhitebusinessleadersinMiami,January1987andJanuary1992.

54.U.S.BureauoftheCensus,TheHispanicPopulationoftheUnited

States,1989(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,1990);idem,SurveyofMinority-ownedBusinessEnterprises,1987/Hispanics.

55.CitedduringinterviewwithGuillermoMartinez,thenLatinaffairscolumnistoftheMiamiHerald,January13,1987.

56.FieldinterviewswithCubancommunityandbusinessleadersinMiami,JanuaryandDecember1987.

57.Ibid.;dataonCubanbusinessandcivicparticipationwereprovidedbyourinformants.

58.Fieldinterview,December22,1987.

9Reprise

1.AdnaF.Weber,TheGrowthofCitiesintheNineteenthCentury:AStudyinStatistics(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1967),172.SeealsotheclassicessayontheoriginsofEuropeanurbanizationbyHenriPirenne,MedievalCities:TheirOriginsandtheRevivalofTrade(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,[1925]1970);andMaxWeber,TheCity(NewYork:FreePress,[1921]1966),chap.1.

2.FrançoisLamarche,"PropertyDevelopmentandtheEconomicFoundationsoftheUrbanQuestion,"inUrbanSociology:CriticalEssays,ed.C.G.Pickvance(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1976),86.

3.AmoredetailedcritiqueofthisargumentispresentedinAlejandroPortes,"UnauthorizedImmigrationandImmigrationReform:PresentTrendsandProspects,"inDeterminantsofEmigrationfromMexico,CentralAmerica,andtheCaribbean,ed.S.Diaz-BriquetsandS.Weintraub(Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1991),76-97.

4.Ibid.;AristideZolberg,"TheNextWaves:MigrationTheoryforaChangingWorld,"InternationalMigrationReview23(Fall1989):403-30;AbdelmalekSayad,"ImmigrationinFrance:An'Exotic'FormofPoverty"(PaperpresentedattheconferenceonUrbanPoverty,Migration,andMarginality,MaisonSuger,Paris,May1991).

5.J.H.Parry,PhilipSherlock,andAnthonyMaingot,AShortHistoryoftheWestIndies,4thed.(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1987);FranklinW.KnightandColinA.Palmer,TheModernCaribbean(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1989),chaps.1,4,6,7,8,12;SidneyW.MintzandSallyPrice,CaribbeanContours(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1985),chaps.1,7;AndréCorten,CarlosM.Vilas,MercedesAcosta,andIsisDuarte,AzucarypoliticaenlaRepúblicaDominicana(SantoDomingo:Taller,1976).

6.Rieff,GoingtoMiami.

7.ForadescriptionoftheplacesofdestinationofmajorU.S.-boundimmigrantandrefugeeflows,seePortesandRumbaut,ImmigrantAmerica,chap.2.

8.TomFielder,"Politically,We'llHardlyRecognizethePlace,"MiamiHerald,October6,1991,5C.

9.Fieldobservationsbytheauthors,Miami,1989.ThespeakerwentontobecomeaprominentmemberoftheMiamiChamberofCommerce.

10.RichardWallace,"SouthFloridaGrowstoaLatinBeat,"MiamiHerald,March6,1991,1-2Z;CarlGoldfarb,"AlienationKeepsMiami'sAnglosawayfromPolls,"MiamiHerald,November19,1989,1-2B.

11.JamesK.Batten,"Miami'sCan-DoSpiritRemainsStrongEveninToughTimes,"MiamiHerald,October10,1991.

12.Ibid.

13.DavidLawrence,Jr.,"GetontheBall...LearnaLanguage,"MiamiHerald,March24,1991,2C.

14.XavierL.Suárez,"MiamiIsPoisedtoFulfill'CityoftheFuture'Role,"MiamiHerald,December6,1989.

15.Lopez-Miró,"Wherethe'Cuban'Ends."

16.Aseven-year-oldgirlalludedtointheabovecolumnrepliedtoLopez-Mirósaying,"IperfectlyknowwhereIcomefromandwhoIam.Myidentityandmyimageareveryclear:IamfromtheUnitedStatesandIknowit.ButmyCubanheritageIcannotignore."SeeRoxanneValdés,"AmericanWithCubanBlood,"MiamiHerald,February15,1990,26A.

17.Dahl,WhoGoverns?,33-34.

18.RichardD.LammandGaryImhoff,TheImmigrationTime-Bomb:TheFragmentingofAmerica(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1985),123-24.

19.TheclassicstatementabouttheenduringsignificanceofethnicityforurbanpoliticsisNathanGlazerandDanielP.Moynihan,BeyondtheMeltingPot:TheNegroes,PuertoRicans,Jews,Italians,andIrishofNewYorkCity(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1970).SeealsoAndrewGreeley,WhyCan'tTheyBeLikeUs?America'sWhiteEthnicGroups(NewYork:E.P.Dutton,1971);andRichardD.Alba,ItalianAmericans:IntotheTwilightofEthnicity(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall,1985).

20.Fieldinterview.January7and8,1992.

21.SandraDibble,"ThinkTankSeeksWide-rangingPlanforLifeAfterCastro,"MiamiHerald,February23,1990,1-3B.

22.PabloAlfonso,"PanelOffersaPlanforGoverningNewCuba,"MiamiHerald,March3,1990.

23.SeeCarmeloMesa-Lago,"Cuba'sEconomicCounter-Reform:Causes,Policies,andEffects,"JournalofCommunistStudies5(December1989):98-139;andPeterT.White,"CubaataCrossroads,"NationalGeographic,August1991,94-121.Forananalysisoftheinternalcontradictionsunderminingtherevolutionaryregime,seeArielHidalgo,Cuba:elestadomarxistaylanuevaclase(Miami:GeneralPrinting,1988).

24.GuillermoJ.Grenier,HughGladwin,andDouglasMcLaughen,ViewsonPolicyOptionsTowardCubaHeldbyCuban-AmericanResidentsofDadeCounty,Florida:TheResultsoftheSecond1991CubaPoll(Miami:CubanResearchInstitute,FloridaInternationalUniversity,1991).

25.Anillustrationcanbefoundincoverageofthe1991GulfWar.SaddamHusseinwasconsistentlylikenedtoFidelCastrointheCubanexilemedia.Onecommentatorafteranothersuggestedthat,afterHussein'sdefeat,thelogicalthingtodowastotransportthemobilizedtroopstotheCaribbeanandthusdoawaywiththeremainingthreattonationalsecurity.

26.HowardKleinberg,"GreaterMiami'sCrossroadsoftheVanities;CityRenamesHistoryStreetsattheWhimofPoliticians,"MiamiHerald,July31,1990.

Postscript

2.SeanRowe,"Hugo'sHomeboys,"NewTimes,September2-8,1992,13-14.

3."TheWorstWind,"NewTimes,September2-8,1992(specialissue).

4.Thiscommonpatternhasbeennotedbyspecialistsonthefieldinthepast;seeFrederickL.BatesandWalterG.Peacock,"DisastersandSocialChange,"inTheSociologyofDisasters,ed.R.R.DynesandC.Pelanda(Gorizia,It.:FrancoAngeliPress,1987),291-330.

5.Thesearticlesconsistentlyfocusedonthethemethatpeoplewhobarelyspoketoeachotherbeforecametogethertosharewhatlittletheyhadinthedaysafterthehurricane.Onesucharticleannouncedinits

headline:"AtLongLast,Neighbors:TheStormThatToreSouthDadeApartHasBroughtManyofItsPeopleTogether"(byCurtisMorgan,intheMiamiHerald,September5,1992,1-2F).

6.DavidSatterfield,"WeWillRebuildHits$11Million,"MiamiHerald,September19,1992,1A,20A.

7.LisandroPerez,"HurricaneHasSeverelyTiltedCommunityDemographics,"MiamiHerald,September27,1992,4M.

8."WorstWind."

9.Satterfield,"WeWillRebuild,"20A.

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Wisenberg,Sandi."AnUnlikelyChampion."MiamiHerald,April26,1985,1C.

Woldemikael,Tekle.BecomingBlackAmerican:HaitiansandAmericanInstitutionsinEvanston,Illinois.NewYork:AMSPress,1989.

"TheWorstWind."NewTimes,September2-8,1992(specialissue).

Wragg,Joanna."TheBoycott,Blacks,andCubans."MiamiHerald,December30,1990,2C.

Zaldívar,R.A."VagueLawsSpurRefugeeMovements."MiamiHerald,January15,1989,1A.

Zolberg,Aristide."TheNextWaves:MigrationTheoryforaChangingWorld."InternationalMigrationReview23(Fall1989):403-30.

Abrams,Elliot,158

Acculturation-in-reverse,8,17,220,225

African-Americans.SeeBlacks

AIDSamongHaitianimmigrants,188,189

AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU),177

AmericanFederationofState,County,andMunicipalEmployees(AFSCME),176

AmericanInternationalContainer,130-131

Anglos.SeeWhites

AnticommunismamongCubanimmigrants,143,176

Aristide,Jean-Bertrand,138,193-194

Artime,Manuel,101

Assimilation:biculturalismand,8

ethnicityand,5-7

ethnicpoliticsand,215-218

speedof,6,7

Auténticoparty,98

Aviño,Joaquin,165

Bahamians,76

BalletFolklóricoNicaragüense,169

Batista,Fulgencio,97-99,102

Batten,JamesK.,213

BayofPigsinvasion,30,102,106,126,127

Biculturalism,175

andassimilation,8

BigFiveClub,131

Bilingualism:employmentand,12

oppositionto,34,35,147,161

socialrelationsand,12.

SeealsoEnglishOnlymovement;Language

BiscayneBay,74

BlackLawyersAssociation,177

Blacks:Black-ownedbusinessesand,43,78,179-180,182,196,197-199,233n.9

boycottofMiamiand,141,177,184,190

boycottofpublicschoolsand,183,184,190

comparedtoforeignblacks,196

discriminationagainst,77-78

divisionsamongleaders,183-184

doublesubordinationof,10,47,50,194-195,197,202,217

inearlyFlorida,72,76-80

economicdevelopmentand,195

employmentof,39-46,179-181

incomeof,40-42,44

localeconomyand,14

localpoliticsand,182-184,199

Lozanocaseand,2-3

middleclass,40,42,78,178-180,181-184

NewDealand,78

policeviolenceagainst,2-3,47-48,50,178,179,189

relationswithCubanimmigrants,12,13,14,16,38-39,140-141,176-177,182-184,196-197,199-202

relationswithHaitianimmigrants,177-178,185,189-192

relationswithwhites,14,195-199

residencepatternsof,184,186

residentialsegregationof,77,79-80

segregationand,38

self-employmentof,199

violenceagainst,77-78,80

visitofMandelaand,141,176-177

Boatpeople.SeeHaitianimmigrants

BobbyMaduroStadium,164-166

Botifoll,Luis,36

Boundedsolidarity:amongCubanimmigrants,135,136,137,139

amongHaitianimmigrants,193

amongNicaraguanimmigrants,169

Broward,NapoleonBonaparte,87,91

Bush,George,213,224

Bush,Jeb,123,124,213

BusinessAssistanceCenter(BAC),179,198-199,201

Camarioca,Cuba,103-104

Camayd-Freixas,Yohel,27

Carey,Barbara,162

CaribbeanmigrationtoU.S.,206-207

Carter,Jimmy,24,25,26,29,159

Carteradministration:Cuban-Americanvotersand,22,24

policytowardHaitianimmigrants,54

policytowardMarielboatlift,22,24

CasaComunidad,170

Castro,Fidel,18

anticipateddemiseof,218-221

asanti-imperialistsymbol,143

descriptionofMarielrefugees,21

movementagainstBatistaand,97-99

supportforSandinistas,166

visitofMandelaand,141,176

CenterforStudyoftheAmericas,20

CentersforDiseaseControl,188

CentralAmericaPro-RefugeeCommission,166

CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA):Cubanbusinessesand,129,242n.10

JM-Waveand,126,127

supportofanti-Castroexiles,101,126-127,129,142

ChamberofCommerce,GreaterMiami,35,179,212

Chapman,Alvah,198,226

Characterloans,132-135

CharlesI(HolyRomanEmperor),64

Chisholm,Shirley,54

CitizensofDadeUnited,161,162,174

CivicLeagueofColoredTown,79

Class:divisionsamongBlacks,178-184,197

divisionsamongHaitianimmigrants,178,192-194

divisionsamongNicaraguanimmigrants,172-173

in"YankeeCity,"5

CoastGuard,U.S.:Haitianimmigrantsand,52,188

Marielboatliftand,24,53

CocoanutGrove,62,72,76,90

CoconutGrove,184

Collins,JohnS.,72-73

ColoredBoardofTrade,79

"ColoredTown,"76-80,93,202

Communitypower,theoriesof,4

CongressionalBlackCaucus,Haitianimmigrantsand,54

CongressofRacialEquality(CORE),177

Constructionindustry:Cubanimmigrantsin,133-134

ethnicgroupsin,40-41

Nicaraguanimmigrantsin,154

Convergenceofethniccommunities,221,224-225,227

CoralGables,Fla.,74-75,84,128

incorporationof,81

Corporatecontrol:ofcities,4-5

inMiami,8

CouncilofNationalLiberation,98

Creole(language),52,54,59,189,191,193

Cuba:anticipateddemiseofCastroand,218-221

independencemovementin,89-94

Kennedyadministrationpolicytoward,103

nationalidentityof,94

newmigrationfrom,218

relationswithU.S.,93-96,106

Cuban-American:useofterm,148.SeeCubanimmigrants

Cuban-AmericanNationalFoundation(CANF),132

foundingof,35,148

futureofCubaand,218

HurricaneAndrewreliefand,226

influenceinWashington,158

MiamiHeraldand,15,138,173

politicalactionbranchof,148

Cubanethniceconomy:apprenticeshipin,145-146

characterloansand,132-135

creditin,132-135

developmentof,126,144-147

futureof,220

hegemonyofconservatismand,144

originsof,127-129

roleofsocialcapitalin,135-137

self-employmentin,146

socialnetworksin,135-137

Cuban-HaitianInteragencyTaskForce,54,234n.24

Cubanimmigrants:conflictwithMiamiHerald,15-16

Cuban-ownedbusinessesand,43,46,182

discriminationagainst,135,147,200

electoralpowerof,141

involvementinlocalpolitics,29-30,35,37,148-149,182-183,201,210-211,225

Johnsonadministrationpolicytoward,103,142

Kennedyadministrationand,30,142

middleclass,40-42,100

asmoralcommunity,137-144,145

aspoliticalexilesinU.S.,63-67,89-99,101-102

politicalintoleranceof,137-144

prospectofreturningtoCubaand,218-219

publicopiniontoward,31

asrefugeesfromCastroregime,102-105,106-107,126-127

relationswithBlacks,12,13,14,16,38-39,140-141,176-177,182-184,196-197,199-202

relationswithHaitianimmigrants,177-178

relationswithwhites,17

resettlementof,103-105

residencepatternsof,184,187

responsetoMarielrefugees,21,29,30-37

self-employmentof,40

assuccessstory,30-36

upperclass,207

womenworkers,127-128.

SeealsoMarielrefugees

Cubanimmigration:comparedtoHaitianimmigration,51-54,188

comparedtoNicaraguanimmigration,151-152,156-157,159,169-170,173

politicalasylumand,157.

SeealsoMarielboatlift

CubanMissileCrisis,102,106,126,142

CubanRefugeeCenter,75,105,127

CubanRefugeeProgram,103

CubanRevolutionaryCouncil,91-92,126,142

CubanRevolutionaryParty,90

DadeCounty:Blackofficialsin,179-180,181

contractswithBlackfirms,179,181

economicallyactivepopulationof,208-209

electedofficialsin,210-211

hurricanepreparednessof,224

impactofredistrictingon,212

Dahl,RobertA.:ethnicpoliticsand,215-216

pluralisttheoryand,4,215,216,217,218

Dale,Bennett,23

DaytonaBeach,Fla.,97

"Definitionofthesituation":conceptdefined,9

varietiesof,inMiami,10-16

DeSoto,Hernando,64

Diaz-Balart,Lincoln,225

Diaz-Oliver,Remedios,130-131,132

Dickson,Clarence,46

Didion,Joan,17

Discourse:ofAngloculturalreaffirmation,10

ofanticommunism,143

assimilationist,149

ofBlackdoublesubordination,10,47,50,194-195,197,217

ofBlacks,49

ofCubanconservatives,143-144

ofCubanliberals,143

ofCubansuccessstory,10,149,212,226

defined,9

minority,149

newAnglo,213-214

unificationof,225

varietiesof,inMiami,9-17

"Disposalproblem,"127

Dorsey,DavidA.,78

Due,Patricia,177

Dulles,Allen,126

Dunn,Marvin,39,48

EdisonHighSchool,185,189,191

ElectoralCounciloftheNicaraguanExodus,172

Employment:ofBlacks,39-46

ofCubanimmigrants,39-46

ofHaitians,56-58

ofnativewhites,39-46

ofNicaraguans,152-156

Enforceabletrust:amongCubanimmigrants,136,137

amongHaitianimmigrants,193

EnglishOnlymovement:amendmenttoFloridaconstitutionand,161

campaignissuesof,161

inMiami,11

EnterprisezoneinBlackneighborhoods,180

Ethnicity:assimilationand,5-8

inMiami,210-215.

Seealsospecificnationalities

Ethnicpolitics,215-216.Seealsospecificnationalities

Ethnics:defined,5.Seealsospecificnationalities

Factorbanking,134

FactsaboutCubanExiles(FACE),35

Fair,T.willard,184

Fascell,Dante,162

Fauntroy,Walter,54

Ferré,Maurice,23,24,183

Fisher,CarlJ.,73

Flagler,HenryM.,61,62,71-74

Florida:Americanconquestof,67-70

economicdevelopmentof,61-63,71-76

Englishcolonizationof,66

Frenchcolonizationof,65

historicalconnectionstoCuba,63-67,90-101

asindependentrepublic,70

Indiansin,63-64,65,68-69,70

legacyofCivilWarin,70-71

proliferationoflocalgovernmentsin,80-81

settlementpatternof,74,82

slavesin,67,70

Spanishcolonizationof,63-68

statepoliticsin,71,82-83

FloridaEastCoastRailway,62,72,81,91

FloridaInternationalUniversity(FIU),13,219

FloridaNeedletradeAssociation,127,128

Fonda,Jane,137

FoodandDrugAdministration(FDA),Haitianimmigrantsand,188

FordFoundation,54

FortChaffee,Ark.,25

FortIndiantownGap,Pa.,25

FortLauderdale,Fla.,56,69

FortMyers,Fla.,69

FortPierce,Fla.,69

Frames,cognitive:defined,9

inMiami,10-16,212

FreeCubaCommittee,148

"Freedomflights,"104,106

FreedomFlotilla,20,22

Gálvez,Bernardode,66,67

Garmentindustry:Blacksin,40-41

Cubanimmigrantsin,40-41,127-128

Haitianimmigrantsin,154

Jewsin,127-128

whitesin,40-41

Gary,Howard,182

Geertz,Clifford,136

Glazer,Nathan,6

Graham,Bob,24,162

Graham,ErnestG.,85

Grambling,John,79

Granma,97

GreaterMiamiNegroCivicLeague,79

Greeley,Andrew,6

Greer,TeeS.,183

Haitian-AmericanCommunityAgencyofDade(HACAD),54

Haitianethniceconomy,185,192-193

Haitianimmigrants:Blackresponseto,55-56

Carteradministrationpolicytoward,54

characteristicsof,56-58

classdivisionsamong,193-194

discriminationagainst,58

Haitian-ownedbusinessesand,193

middleclass,51,54,192-194

policeviolenceagainst,178,181,188-189

politicaldivisionsamong,193-194

inpublicschools,191-192

relationswithBlacks,177-178,185,189-192

relationswithCubanimmigrants,177-178

residencepatternsof,56

whiteresponseto,51,55

workingclass,51,194

Haitianimmigration:comparedtoCubanimmigration,51-54,188

phasesof,51

politicalasylumand,53-54

Reaganadministrationpolicytoward,52,53

responseofwhitesto,51,55

HaitianRefugeeCenter,52,54

HaitianTaskForce,54

Havana,Cuba,18,23,100

Herald,El,15,175

Herald,ElNuevo,15,140,175

Hialeah,Fla.,37,39,84

Hispanics.Seespecificnationalities

HomeRuleAmendment,86

Hotelindustry:Blacksin,40-41

Cubanimmigrantsin,40-41

Hunter,Floyd,4,5

HurricaneAndrew:destructionby,223-224

impactonsocialchange,224-227

ImmigrationAdvisoryCommittee,162

ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS):Cubanimmigrantsand,158

Haitianimmigrantsand,188

Marielrefugeesand,25

Nicaraguanimmigrantsand,150,157,161,163,246n.33

Informaleconomy:casualworkin,155

Haitianimmigrantsin,185

inMiami,154

Nicaraguansin,154,155,165,171

Inter-AmericanTransportEquipmentCompany,131-132

Interethnicrelations:changesin,59-60

asprobleminMiami,13-14.

Seealsospecificnationalities

InternationalMedicalCenters(IMC),123-126

Internationalmigration,theoriesof,205-206

Jackson,Andrew,67-68

Jackson,Jesse,53

Jacksonville,Fla.,105

Jean-Juste,Gerard,52,193

Jews:communityof,73

Cubanimmigrantsand,14

discriminationagainst,73

EnglishOnlyand,161

ingarmentindustry,127-128

asresidents,84-85

astourists,84

visitofMandelaand,141,176-177

Kennedy,Edward,54

KeyWest,Fla.,89-90,93,95

King,MartinLuther,Jr.,39

Knight-RidderCorporation,14,34,198,200,213.SeealsoHerald,El;Herald,ElNuevo;MiamiHerald

KuKluxKlan,39,77-78,79,80

Laborunions,inconstruction,133-134

Lamarche,François,204

Lamm,RichardD.,216

Language:assimilationand,6-7

asprobleminMiami,11-12,59.SeealsoBilingualism;EnglishOnlymovement

LatinBuildersAssociation,134

Lawrence,David,Jr.,214

Leland,Mickey,54

LibertyCity,Fla.,39,55,84,86,177,184

enterprisezonein,180

industrialparkin,180,181

1980riotand,47,48,49

originsof,79

Lieberson,Stanley,49

LittleHaiti,54,55,177,185-188,193

LittleHavana,39,99

asmodelforLittleHaiti,54,55

Lloyd,Clement,2-3

Logan,John,4

LosRanchosRestaurant,168,169

Lozano,William,2-3,9

Lum,HenryB.,61

MeDuffie,Arthur,47,48

Maceo,Antonio,92

Machado,Gerardo,95-96

Mack,Connie,162,172

McKinley,William,92

McMillian,Johnnie,184

Mahoney,DanielJ.,85

Maine,92

Mandela,Nelson,visittoMiami,141,176-177

Mariátegui,Señorde,92

Marielboatlift:Carteradministrationpolicytoward,22,24,26

Cubangovernmentpolicytoward,18-22,26

originsof,18-20

Marielrefugees:Blackreactionto,25,38

Carteradministrationpolicytoward,24,25

criminalsamong,20-21,22-23,24,25,2630,32,59

Cuban-Americanresponseto,21,29,30-37

homosexualsamong,26,32

immigrationstatusof,25

INSand,25

mentalpatientsamong,22,24,26,30,59

officialCubandescriptionof,20-21

perceptionsofdiscriminationof,32-33

prisonriotsof,1-2,9

publicopinionand,30-31

publicschoolsand,25-26

whiteresponseto,23,27-30,34

Martí,José,89-90,91

Martinez,Bob,218

Martinez,Julio,141

MasCanosa,Jorge,15,218

Masvidal,Raul,201

Meese,Edwin,158,246n.33

MenéndezdeAvilés,DonPedro,65

MetroCharter,82-87

Metropolis,77,79

Metrorail,constructionof,46

Miami,Fla.:airlinkstoHavana,100,102,104

boycottof,141,177,184,190

CalleOcho,15,137,168

ascenterforCubanexiles,63-67,90-101,104,106-107

changesin1980,58-60

incorporationof,72,81

mapof,19

originsof,61-63,70,204-205

originsofmetropolitangovernmentin,85-87

politicalgeographyof,205-210,226

populationof,20,186,187,210-211

socialstructureof,8

astouristcenter,99-101,144,148,207,208

MiamiBeach,Fla.,81,84

MiamiCoalitionforaFreeSouthAfrica,177

Miami-DadeCommunityCollege:

Haitianstudentsand,185

Nicaraguanstudentsand,167

MiamiHerald:Blackviewsof,16

boycottofMiamiand,184

conflictwithCubanimmigrantcommunityand,15,16,27,138,173

creationofnewSpanisheditionof,175

discriminationagainstBlacksand,77

Marielrefugeesand,23-30

asobjectofdiscourse,10,14-16

positiononNicaraguanimmigration,173-175

aspowerbroker,85

Recareycaseand,125-126

Spanisheditionof,15.SeealsoHerald,ElHerald,El;Nuevo;Knight-RidderCorporation

Miami-ManaguaLionsClub,172

MiamiNews,85,183

MiamiPact,98

MiamiTheaterFestival,138

MiamiTimes,79

Mills,C.Wright,4-5

Mintz,SidneyW.,94

MiróCardona,José,142,240n.24

Mohl,Raymond,79

Molotch,Harvey,4

Monroe,James,68

MovementforRevolutionaryRecuperation(MRR),101

Moynihan,DanielP.,6

Munroe,Ralph,62

NAACP(NationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople),38,184

1980riotand,49

Narváez,Pánfilode,64

NationalCouncilofChurches(NCC),Haitianimmigrantsand,52

NationalOrganizationofWomen(NOW),177

NegroUpliftAssociationofDadeCounty,79

Nelson,Alan,165

Nicaragua,Contrawarin.150,153,156,157,159,166

Nicaraguan-AmericanBankersAssociation,153,158,169

NicaraguanBusinessCouncil,158

NicaraguanCommunityDay,170

NicaraguanDemocraticYouth,172

Nicaraguanimmigrants:inagriculture,155

Blackresponseto,163

classdivisionsamong,172-173

culturaltraditionsof,169,171

middleclass,151,152-153,157,168-169

politicaldifferencesamong,171-172

residencepatternsof,167-168

responseofCuban-Americancommunityto,163-167,174-175

upperclass,151,152,157,168

whiteresponseto,161-163

workingclass,152,153-156,170,171

Nicaraguanimmigration:comparedtoCubanimmigration,151-152,156-157,159,169-170,173

phasesof,151-156

politicalasylumand,157,159,160,168

responseofwhitesto,161-163

U.S.governmentpolicytoward,150-151,156,158-161,165,170

Nofziger,Lyn,124

ObandoyBravo,Miguel,167

Odio,Cesar,163-165,182

Oliveros,Gilda,140

Opa-Locka,Fla.,81,84,177

OperationSave,157

Osceola(Seminolechief),69

Overtown,Fla.,2,55,163,184

earlyhistoryof,70,77,70-80,89,93

enterprisezonein,180

redevelopmentin,180,181.

Seealso"ColoredTown"

Pennekamp,John,85

Pensacola,Fla.,66,67,70

People'sRevolutionaryMovement(MovimientoRevolucionariodelPueblo,MRP),142

Pepper,Claude,123,161

PhilipII(KingofSpain),65,236n.12

Pitts,Otis,181

Plant,HenryM.,74

Platt,OrvilleH.,93

PlattAmendment,93,95,96,106

Police:Lozanocaseand,2-3,9

McDuffiecaseand,47-48

violenceagainstBlacks,2-3,80,178,179,189

violenceagainstHaitians,178,181,188-189

PoncedeLeón,Juan,63-64,71

Porter,Bruce,39,48

PríoSocarrás,Carlos,97-99,152

Publicschools,DadeCounty:boycottof,183,184,190

Haitianimmigrantsin,185-186

Nicaraguanchildrenin,162

Quinlan,MichaelJ.,1-2

Race,assimilationand,6-7

Racism:againstBlacks,195

inCuba,200

ofCubanimmigrants,183,195,197,199

againstHaitianimmigrants,189,193

ofwhites,195,197

Radio,MiamiCuban:philantropyof,248n.61

supportforNicaraguanimmigrants,164,166-167

visitofMandelaand,177.

SeealsoWQBALaCubanisima

RayRivero,Manuel,142

Reactiveethnicity:amongBlacks,189,217

amongCubanimmigrants,30-37

amongHaitianimmigrants,188,189

Reboredo,Pedro,Mandelavisitand,141

Recarey,Miguel,123-126

Redford,Polly,95

Reeves,Henry,79

Reilly,Robert,158

Religion,assimilationand,6-7

RemovalAct,68-69

Rieff,David,17,34,74

RiotsinMiami:in1968,48

in1980,48-50,59,179

Rivero,José,141

Rivkind,Perry,158

Román,Agustin,2,9,164

RubénDaríoInstitute,171

SaintAugustine,Fla.,65-66,67,71,74

Sears,John,124

Self-employment:ofBlacks,199

ofCubanimmigrants,40,199

Seminoles:attacksagainstcolonistsby,62

originofname,67

removalfromFloridaof,68-69

riseanddeclineof,70

SeminoleWar,69,71

Silverman,Arnold,49

SmallBusinessAdministration(SBA):loanstoBlacks,46

loanstoCubanimmigrants,46,133

Smith,H.T.,177,184,226

Socialcapital,amongCubanimmigrants,137,140

Socialnetworks,inCubanethniceconomy,135-137

Socialstructure,parallel,8,9,16,17

SomozaDebayle,Anastasio,152

SouthernHousingCorporation,79

SovietUnion,Cubaand,103,140

Spanish-AmericanLeagueAgainstDiscrimination(SALAD),147

Spanish-AmericanWar,93,95

Spanishlanguage,36

Srole,Leo,6-7

Suarez,DiegoR.,131,132

Suárez,Xavier,177,183,201,214

Mandetavisitand,141

SupremeCourt,92

Sweetwater,Fla.,81,152,154,168,169,170

Tallahassee,Fla.,105

Tampa,Fla.,93

Thomas,Hugh,95

Thomas,John,103

Thomas,W.I.,9

Thornburgh,Richard,162

ThreeFriends,91-92

TreatyofParis,66

TreatyofVersailles,67

Tuttle,Julia,62

Twenty-sixthofJulyMovement,98

Unemploymentratesbyraceandorigin,45

UnitedNicaraguanArtists,171

UnitedStates:relationswithCaribbean,206

relationswithCuba,93-96,106

UniversityofMiami,74

UrbanLeague,184

1980riotand,49

Urbansociology,3-4

theoriesofcommunitypower,4-5

theoriesofethnicityandassimilation,5-9

theoriesofurbanization,203-205

U.S.English,161

Varona,ManuelAntoniode,98

Visiedo,Osvaldo,183

VotingRightsActof1990,212

Walsh,BryanD.,144

Warner,W.Lloyd,5-7

Weber,Adna,203

Weber,Max,203

Welles,Sumner,96

WestMiami,Fla.,37

WeWillRebuildCommittee,224,226

Whites:discourseof10,213-214

relationswithBlacks,14,195-199

relationswithCubanimmigrants,17

responsetoHaitianimmigration,51,55

responsetoMarielrefugees,23,27-30,34

responsetoNicaraguanimmigration,161-163

Wieland,William,99

WoodlawnCemetery,96,99,152

WQBA-LaCubanisima,139,164

''YankeeCity"(Newburyport,Mass.),5-8

Young,Andrew,53

City on the edge: the transformation of Miami

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