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Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols
By Donald F Dreisbach
IN HIS TREATMENT of religious symbols Paul Tillich claims that
Cod or being itself can be known through beings through those beings
which are religious symbols1 Tillich supports this claim by arguing that
there is an ontological relationship between all beings and being itself and
that beings ie objects of perception thought or imagination can become
transparent to being so that it can be known through them This doctrine
is theologically interesting in that Tillich is attempting to provide an onto-
logical foundation for the claim that Cod is manifested in the world and that
man can know and relate himself to Cod through these manifestations It is
also philosophically interesting in that Tillichs claim that we can attain
some grasp of being by means of a relationship to things myths ideas and
so forth is not unlike the claims of Heidegger in his later work and of Karl
Jaspers with his ciphers of transcendence
1 Tillich says at several places that God is being itself See for instance Paul TillichSystematic Theology Vol 1 (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1951) p 238 Hereafter citedas ST I
Unfortunately Tillichs exposition and defense of this theory of sym-
bols is diffused throughout his work and is never neatly gathered together or
summarized in any one place Hence it is easy to misunderstand or to fail
to grasp the strength and coherence of Tillichs position Indeed one critic
Lewis S Ford has written
Though Tillich recognizes the necessity for a theory of symbols and
has sought diligently to formulate one it takes a subordinate position with
in the total systematic framework of his thought From the systematic
standpoint the exact nature of the religious symbol is less important than
the various functions it must perform Thus Tillich has permitted himself
considerable liberty in developing alternative and competing theories con
cerning the nature of the symbol We discern at least three a dialectic
of affirmation and negation an extended use of the metaphor of the trans
parency of the symbolic medium and a theory of participation relevant
to symbolic predication These theories appear singly and in various
combinations with one another Tillichs sole requirement for these
Donald F Dreisbach (P h D Northwestern University) is Associate Pro-fessor in the Philosophy Department of Northern Michigan University
(326)
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 327
theories is that they adequately describe symbols capable of fulfilling thenecessary metaphysical and religious functions required of them2
Ford is quite correct in discerning the three major movements or steps
in the development of the doctrine of symbols what he fails to perceive is
that these are three elements of one doctrine and that they do come together
to form a coherent whole This unity emerges when the various parts of
Tillichs treatment of symbols are gathered together and when necessary
clarified and restated For one difficult problem in the theory of symbols
the explanation of what constitutes the difference between an ordinary ob-
ject and a symbol Tillich does offer more than one answer In the second
part of this paper I will argue that one of these explanations is far better
than the others and does produce a plausible account of how being itself
can be known through finite beings
The easiest way to enter Tillichs discussion of symbols is through the
list of six characteristics of symbols or really three pairs of characteristics
which he provides in Dynamics of Faith
1 Symbols are similar to signs in that both point beyond themselves
to something else However signs can be replaced for reasons of ex-
pediency or convention while symbols cannot
2 The reason why symbols cannot be replaced in the same way in
which signs can is that the symbol participates in that to which it points
the sign does not
3 A symbol opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed
for us
4 A symbol also unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which
correspond to the [above mentioned] dimensions and elements of reality
5 Symbols cannot be produced intentionally They grow out of
the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being
accepted by the unconscious dimensions of our being
6 Symbols grow and die3
The first important characteristic of a symbol is that it is different from
a sign Signs and symbols both point beyond themselves but signs can be
replaced by convention while symbols cannot The reason for this is that
symbols participate in that which they symbolize Participation then ap-
pears to be the key to this important difference between sign and symbol
2 Lewis S Ford The Three Strands of Tillichs Theory of Religious Symbols The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966) p 106
3 Paul Tillich Dynamics of Faith (New York Harper and Row 1957) p 41-43 Hereaftercited as DF
328 Encounter
However as William Rowe points out what Tillich means by participation
is not at all clear
Participation is a fine old Platonic word never very clearly defined
in Platos work and it is even more obscure in Tillichs This is most un-
fortunate since as Rowe says until the meaning of participation is clarified
Tillichs fundamental distinction between sign and symbol is quite un-
informative4 And Tillichs use of the word participation is so varied
and general that it seems to have for him only the vaguest of meaning Con-
sider for example the following
A symbol participates in the reality it symbolizes the knower participatesin the known the lover participates in the beloved the existent partici-pates in the essences which make it what it is under the condition ofexistence the individual participates in the destiny of separation andguilt the Christian participates in the New Being as it is manifested inJesus the Christ In polarity with individualization participation under-lies the category of relation as a basic ontological element Withoutparticipation the category of relation would have no basis in realityEvery relation includes a kind of participation
6
From this it appears that participation although it is the basis of relation
really has no meaning beyond relation But this cannot be correct if par-
ticipation is to mark the difference between sign and symbol since even the
sign is related to that for which it stands if only in the sense of being
a sign for
But Tillichs position can be restated so that the meaning of the partici-
pation of the religious symbol in the symbolizandum being itself becomes
clearer First let us forget about all other kinds of participation since we
are not here interested in the relationship of lover and beloved or Christian
and the Christ and it is by no means obvious that these kinds of partcipation
are the same as or even similar to the participation of the symbol in the sym-
bolizandum We should also forget about kinds of symbols other than the
religious Tillich does give a few examples of non-religious symbols such
as symbols within the arts or a flag which participates in the power of king
or country but none of these examples helps to clarify the nature and mean-
ing of the participation of the religious symbol in being itself8
The relation of symbols to being itself is a metaphysical one and so we
might expect to find an answer to the question of participation within the
context of Tillichs metaphysics But although he does construct an ontology
4 William L Rowe Religious Symbols and God A Philosophical Study of Tillichs Theory(Chicago University of Chicago Press 1968) p 119
5 ST I p 1776 DF p 42 Rowe discusses some of the difficulties associated with the flag as a symbol
Rowe p 121
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 329
of sorts as is evidenced by his discussion of ontological elements polarities
of being and so forth a detailed and coherent original metaphysical system
is not the major focus of Tillichs efforts and at no point in his discussion
of metaphysics does a clear definition of participation emerge Also al-
though Tillichs ontology is the basis for his soteriology and for his method
of interpreting religious symbols it has no direct bearing on his explanation
of what a symbol is or how it functions
But in a more general way Tillich does make use of and even pre-
suppose a Platonic or perhaps more accurately a neo-Platonic view of
the relation of entities to being itself
Ever since the time of Plato it has been known that the concept of be-
ing as being or being itself points to the power inherent in everything
the power of resisting non-being7
Tillich thinks of being as the power to resist non-being a power present in
all that is Participation is simply a word which points to the relation of all
beings to and their dependence on being itself Participation of the religious
symbol in its symbolizandum simply means that there is some sort of onto-
logical relationship between a being and being itself a relation of depend-
ency A being is or is real it therefore shares in manifests is grounded by
or participates in being or reality itself Without this relationship there
would be no ground or reason for the being to be In that it exists that it is
not non-being an entity manifests its relation to being itself or shows that the
power of being itself is present in it The precise description of this rela-
tionship Tillich does not give but for the purposes of formulating the doc-
trine of symbols it really need not be given Indeed we might say that
Tillichs metaphysical need here can be met by any ontology be it Platonic
Thomistic Scotistic Spinozistic or what have you in which being itself is
treated as real ie as not just a bare abstraction or intellectual concept and
in which a real relationship is seen as existing between all entities or beings
and being itself
The word participation is then not so much a definition or account
of this ontological relationship between beings and being itself as it is a meta-
phor which points to it a metaphor which is occasionally replaced or clari-
fied by another At one point it is replaced by belonging to
Certainly we belong to beingmdashits power is in usmdashotherwise we would
not be8
At another point participation is compared to representation
7 ST I p 236
8 Paul Tillich Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago University
of Chicago Press 1955) p 11
raquo
330 Encounter
The representative of a person or an institution participates in the honorof those whom he is asked to represent but it is not he who is honoredit is that which or whom he represents In this sense we can state gen-erally that the symbol participates in the reality of what it symbolizesIt radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands
9
The meaning of participation is indeed vague and will remain so since
it is more of a metaphor than an explanation But it is now clear enough to
begin to make sense of the difference between sign and symbol A sign
merely stands for or indicates something else There has to be some reason
or ground for this signification some sort of connection between sign and
signified With a sign this connection is only a relation of cause and effect
as with the clouds indicating rain resemblance as with the curved arrow on
the roadsign indicating a curve in the road or convention as red indicating
danger These examples I borrow from Rowe As he points out natural
signs such as nimbus clouds indicating rain or smoke indicating fire are not
the product of convention and cannot be changed at will Hence Tillich is
wrong when he says that all signs are the product of convention and hence
being changeable at will and determined by convention cannot be a mark
which differentiates signs from symbols10 But this is no large problem
Tillichs discussion of signs only needs to be expanded to include natural
signs as well as conventionally determined ones After all Tillichs main
interest is in symbols and he mentions signs only in passing The connec-
tion between sign and signified is either one of convention in which case it
can be changed at will or one of resemblance or causation or temporal order
as with the rain coming shortly after the arrival of the clouds But the rela-
tion of sign to signified usually is not difficult to undtrstand
There must also be some sort of connection between the religious sym-
bol and the symbolizandum being itself But this connection must be of a
different kind from that between sign and signified It cannot be a relation
of resemblance since no finite entity resembles being itself Nor can it be
one of natural causation at least not in the same sense of cause as when
fire is the cause of smoke or clouds of rain Nor finally can the relation
be one of convention Although we have an immediate awareness of the
power of being itself at least insofar as we are aware of the existence ie
the not being nothing of entities and especially of ourselves this is so to
speak a nonconceptual awareness11 Although it discloses the reality of be983085
9 Paul Tillich The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols Religious Experienceand Truth ed Sidney Hook (New York NYU Press 1961) p 4
10 Rowe pp 1080911 For a further discussion of Tillichs view of η s awareness of being itself see my
artice Paul Tillichs Hermeneutic forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy ofReligion
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 331
ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12
Hence there is no
ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-
sents being itself
Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the
context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-
ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only
can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones
ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation
performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and
transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol
The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity
13
Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that
the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present
However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient
to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything
every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in
being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is
an identity of every thing with being itself
No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where
14
We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a
symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself
The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-
ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further
account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one
Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn
that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up
corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and
elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-
12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something
13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188
14 ST I p 118
332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 327
theories is that they adequately describe symbols capable of fulfilling thenecessary metaphysical and religious functions required of them2
Ford is quite correct in discerning the three major movements or steps
in the development of the doctrine of symbols what he fails to perceive is
that these are three elements of one doctrine and that they do come together
to form a coherent whole This unity emerges when the various parts of
Tillichs treatment of symbols are gathered together and when necessary
clarified and restated For one difficult problem in the theory of symbols
the explanation of what constitutes the difference between an ordinary ob-
ject and a symbol Tillich does offer more than one answer In the second
part of this paper I will argue that one of these explanations is far better
than the others and does produce a plausible account of how being itself
can be known through finite beings
The easiest way to enter Tillichs discussion of symbols is through the
list of six characteristics of symbols or really three pairs of characteristics
which he provides in Dynamics of Faith
1 Symbols are similar to signs in that both point beyond themselves
to something else However signs can be replaced for reasons of ex-
pediency or convention while symbols cannot
2 The reason why symbols cannot be replaced in the same way in
which signs can is that the symbol participates in that to which it points
the sign does not
3 A symbol opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed
for us
4 A symbol also unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which
correspond to the [above mentioned] dimensions and elements of reality
5 Symbols cannot be produced intentionally They grow out of
the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being
accepted by the unconscious dimensions of our being
6 Symbols grow and die3
The first important characteristic of a symbol is that it is different from
a sign Signs and symbols both point beyond themselves but signs can be
replaced by convention while symbols cannot The reason for this is that
symbols participate in that which they symbolize Participation then ap-
pears to be the key to this important difference between sign and symbol
2 Lewis S Ford The Three Strands of Tillichs Theory of Religious Symbols The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966) p 106
3 Paul Tillich Dynamics of Faith (New York Harper and Row 1957) p 41-43 Hereaftercited as DF
328 Encounter
However as William Rowe points out what Tillich means by participation
is not at all clear
Participation is a fine old Platonic word never very clearly defined
in Platos work and it is even more obscure in Tillichs This is most un-
fortunate since as Rowe says until the meaning of participation is clarified
Tillichs fundamental distinction between sign and symbol is quite un-
informative4 And Tillichs use of the word participation is so varied
and general that it seems to have for him only the vaguest of meaning Con-
sider for example the following
A symbol participates in the reality it symbolizes the knower participatesin the known the lover participates in the beloved the existent partici-pates in the essences which make it what it is under the condition ofexistence the individual participates in the destiny of separation andguilt the Christian participates in the New Being as it is manifested inJesus the Christ In polarity with individualization participation under-lies the category of relation as a basic ontological element Withoutparticipation the category of relation would have no basis in realityEvery relation includes a kind of participation
6
From this it appears that participation although it is the basis of relation
really has no meaning beyond relation But this cannot be correct if par-
ticipation is to mark the difference between sign and symbol since even the
sign is related to that for which it stands if only in the sense of being
a sign for
But Tillichs position can be restated so that the meaning of the partici-
pation of the religious symbol in the symbolizandum being itself becomes
clearer First let us forget about all other kinds of participation since we
are not here interested in the relationship of lover and beloved or Christian
and the Christ and it is by no means obvious that these kinds of partcipation
are the same as or even similar to the participation of the symbol in the sym-
bolizandum We should also forget about kinds of symbols other than the
religious Tillich does give a few examples of non-religious symbols such
as symbols within the arts or a flag which participates in the power of king
or country but none of these examples helps to clarify the nature and mean-
ing of the participation of the religious symbol in being itself8
The relation of symbols to being itself is a metaphysical one and so we
might expect to find an answer to the question of participation within the
context of Tillichs metaphysics But although he does construct an ontology
4 William L Rowe Religious Symbols and God A Philosophical Study of Tillichs Theory(Chicago University of Chicago Press 1968) p 119
5 ST I p 1776 DF p 42 Rowe discusses some of the difficulties associated with the flag as a symbol
Rowe p 121
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 329
of sorts as is evidenced by his discussion of ontological elements polarities
of being and so forth a detailed and coherent original metaphysical system
is not the major focus of Tillichs efforts and at no point in his discussion
of metaphysics does a clear definition of participation emerge Also al-
though Tillichs ontology is the basis for his soteriology and for his method
of interpreting religious symbols it has no direct bearing on his explanation
of what a symbol is or how it functions
But in a more general way Tillich does make use of and even pre-
suppose a Platonic or perhaps more accurately a neo-Platonic view of
the relation of entities to being itself
Ever since the time of Plato it has been known that the concept of be-
ing as being or being itself points to the power inherent in everything
the power of resisting non-being7
Tillich thinks of being as the power to resist non-being a power present in
all that is Participation is simply a word which points to the relation of all
beings to and their dependence on being itself Participation of the religious
symbol in its symbolizandum simply means that there is some sort of onto-
logical relationship between a being and being itself a relation of depend-
ency A being is or is real it therefore shares in manifests is grounded by
or participates in being or reality itself Without this relationship there
would be no ground or reason for the being to be In that it exists that it is
not non-being an entity manifests its relation to being itself or shows that the
power of being itself is present in it The precise description of this rela-
tionship Tillich does not give but for the purposes of formulating the doc-
trine of symbols it really need not be given Indeed we might say that
Tillichs metaphysical need here can be met by any ontology be it Platonic
Thomistic Scotistic Spinozistic or what have you in which being itself is
treated as real ie as not just a bare abstraction or intellectual concept and
in which a real relationship is seen as existing between all entities or beings
and being itself
The word participation is then not so much a definition or account
of this ontological relationship between beings and being itself as it is a meta-
phor which points to it a metaphor which is occasionally replaced or clari-
fied by another At one point it is replaced by belonging to
Certainly we belong to beingmdashits power is in usmdashotherwise we would
not be8
At another point participation is compared to representation
7 ST I p 236
8 Paul Tillich Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago University
of Chicago Press 1955) p 11
raquo
330 Encounter
The representative of a person or an institution participates in the honorof those whom he is asked to represent but it is not he who is honoredit is that which or whom he represents In this sense we can state gen-erally that the symbol participates in the reality of what it symbolizesIt radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands
9
The meaning of participation is indeed vague and will remain so since
it is more of a metaphor than an explanation But it is now clear enough to
begin to make sense of the difference between sign and symbol A sign
merely stands for or indicates something else There has to be some reason
or ground for this signification some sort of connection between sign and
signified With a sign this connection is only a relation of cause and effect
as with the clouds indicating rain resemblance as with the curved arrow on
the roadsign indicating a curve in the road or convention as red indicating
danger These examples I borrow from Rowe As he points out natural
signs such as nimbus clouds indicating rain or smoke indicating fire are not
the product of convention and cannot be changed at will Hence Tillich is
wrong when he says that all signs are the product of convention and hence
being changeable at will and determined by convention cannot be a mark
which differentiates signs from symbols10 But this is no large problem
Tillichs discussion of signs only needs to be expanded to include natural
signs as well as conventionally determined ones After all Tillichs main
interest is in symbols and he mentions signs only in passing The connec-
tion between sign and signified is either one of convention in which case it
can be changed at will or one of resemblance or causation or temporal order
as with the rain coming shortly after the arrival of the clouds But the rela-
tion of sign to signified usually is not difficult to undtrstand
There must also be some sort of connection between the religious sym-
bol and the symbolizandum being itself But this connection must be of a
different kind from that between sign and signified It cannot be a relation
of resemblance since no finite entity resembles being itself Nor can it be
one of natural causation at least not in the same sense of cause as when
fire is the cause of smoke or clouds of rain Nor finally can the relation
be one of convention Although we have an immediate awareness of the
power of being itself at least insofar as we are aware of the existence ie
the not being nothing of entities and especially of ourselves this is so to
speak a nonconceptual awareness11 Although it discloses the reality of be983085
9 Paul Tillich The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols Religious Experienceand Truth ed Sidney Hook (New York NYU Press 1961) p 4
10 Rowe pp 1080911 For a further discussion of Tillichs view of η s awareness of being itself see my
artice Paul Tillichs Hermeneutic forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy ofReligion
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 331
ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12
Hence there is no
ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-
sents being itself
Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the
context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-
ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only
can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones
ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation
performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and
transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol
The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity
13
Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that
the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present
However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient
to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything
every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in
being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is
an identity of every thing with being itself
No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where
14
We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a
symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself
The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-
ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further
account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one
Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn
that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up
corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and
elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-
12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something
13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188
14 ST I p 118
332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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328 Encounter
However as William Rowe points out what Tillich means by participation
is not at all clear
Participation is a fine old Platonic word never very clearly defined
in Platos work and it is even more obscure in Tillichs This is most un-
fortunate since as Rowe says until the meaning of participation is clarified
Tillichs fundamental distinction between sign and symbol is quite un-
informative4 And Tillichs use of the word participation is so varied
and general that it seems to have for him only the vaguest of meaning Con-
sider for example the following
A symbol participates in the reality it symbolizes the knower participatesin the known the lover participates in the beloved the existent partici-pates in the essences which make it what it is under the condition ofexistence the individual participates in the destiny of separation andguilt the Christian participates in the New Being as it is manifested inJesus the Christ In polarity with individualization participation under-lies the category of relation as a basic ontological element Withoutparticipation the category of relation would have no basis in realityEvery relation includes a kind of participation
6
From this it appears that participation although it is the basis of relation
really has no meaning beyond relation But this cannot be correct if par-
ticipation is to mark the difference between sign and symbol since even the
sign is related to that for which it stands if only in the sense of being
a sign for
But Tillichs position can be restated so that the meaning of the partici-
pation of the religious symbol in the symbolizandum being itself becomes
clearer First let us forget about all other kinds of participation since we
are not here interested in the relationship of lover and beloved or Christian
and the Christ and it is by no means obvious that these kinds of partcipation
are the same as or even similar to the participation of the symbol in the sym-
bolizandum We should also forget about kinds of symbols other than the
religious Tillich does give a few examples of non-religious symbols such
as symbols within the arts or a flag which participates in the power of king
or country but none of these examples helps to clarify the nature and mean-
ing of the participation of the religious symbol in being itself8
The relation of symbols to being itself is a metaphysical one and so we
might expect to find an answer to the question of participation within the
context of Tillichs metaphysics But although he does construct an ontology
4 William L Rowe Religious Symbols and God A Philosophical Study of Tillichs Theory(Chicago University of Chicago Press 1968) p 119
5 ST I p 1776 DF p 42 Rowe discusses some of the difficulties associated with the flag as a symbol
Rowe p 121
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 329
of sorts as is evidenced by his discussion of ontological elements polarities
of being and so forth a detailed and coherent original metaphysical system
is not the major focus of Tillichs efforts and at no point in his discussion
of metaphysics does a clear definition of participation emerge Also al-
though Tillichs ontology is the basis for his soteriology and for his method
of interpreting religious symbols it has no direct bearing on his explanation
of what a symbol is or how it functions
But in a more general way Tillich does make use of and even pre-
suppose a Platonic or perhaps more accurately a neo-Platonic view of
the relation of entities to being itself
Ever since the time of Plato it has been known that the concept of be-
ing as being or being itself points to the power inherent in everything
the power of resisting non-being7
Tillich thinks of being as the power to resist non-being a power present in
all that is Participation is simply a word which points to the relation of all
beings to and their dependence on being itself Participation of the religious
symbol in its symbolizandum simply means that there is some sort of onto-
logical relationship between a being and being itself a relation of depend-
ency A being is or is real it therefore shares in manifests is grounded by
or participates in being or reality itself Without this relationship there
would be no ground or reason for the being to be In that it exists that it is
not non-being an entity manifests its relation to being itself or shows that the
power of being itself is present in it The precise description of this rela-
tionship Tillich does not give but for the purposes of formulating the doc-
trine of symbols it really need not be given Indeed we might say that
Tillichs metaphysical need here can be met by any ontology be it Platonic
Thomistic Scotistic Spinozistic or what have you in which being itself is
treated as real ie as not just a bare abstraction or intellectual concept and
in which a real relationship is seen as existing between all entities or beings
and being itself
The word participation is then not so much a definition or account
of this ontological relationship between beings and being itself as it is a meta-
phor which points to it a metaphor which is occasionally replaced or clari-
fied by another At one point it is replaced by belonging to
Certainly we belong to beingmdashits power is in usmdashotherwise we would
not be8
At another point participation is compared to representation
7 ST I p 236
8 Paul Tillich Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago University
of Chicago Press 1955) p 11
raquo
330 Encounter
The representative of a person or an institution participates in the honorof those whom he is asked to represent but it is not he who is honoredit is that which or whom he represents In this sense we can state gen-erally that the symbol participates in the reality of what it symbolizesIt radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands
9
The meaning of participation is indeed vague and will remain so since
it is more of a metaphor than an explanation But it is now clear enough to
begin to make sense of the difference between sign and symbol A sign
merely stands for or indicates something else There has to be some reason
or ground for this signification some sort of connection between sign and
signified With a sign this connection is only a relation of cause and effect
as with the clouds indicating rain resemblance as with the curved arrow on
the roadsign indicating a curve in the road or convention as red indicating
danger These examples I borrow from Rowe As he points out natural
signs such as nimbus clouds indicating rain or smoke indicating fire are not
the product of convention and cannot be changed at will Hence Tillich is
wrong when he says that all signs are the product of convention and hence
being changeable at will and determined by convention cannot be a mark
which differentiates signs from symbols10 But this is no large problem
Tillichs discussion of signs only needs to be expanded to include natural
signs as well as conventionally determined ones After all Tillichs main
interest is in symbols and he mentions signs only in passing The connec-
tion between sign and signified is either one of convention in which case it
can be changed at will or one of resemblance or causation or temporal order
as with the rain coming shortly after the arrival of the clouds But the rela-
tion of sign to signified usually is not difficult to undtrstand
There must also be some sort of connection between the religious sym-
bol and the symbolizandum being itself But this connection must be of a
different kind from that between sign and signified It cannot be a relation
of resemblance since no finite entity resembles being itself Nor can it be
one of natural causation at least not in the same sense of cause as when
fire is the cause of smoke or clouds of rain Nor finally can the relation
be one of convention Although we have an immediate awareness of the
power of being itself at least insofar as we are aware of the existence ie
the not being nothing of entities and especially of ourselves this is so to
speak a nonconceptual awareness11 Although it discloses the reality of be983085
9 Paul Tillich The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols Religious Experienceand Truth ed Sidney Hook (New York NYU Press 1961) p 4
10 Rowe pp 1080911 For a further discussion of Tillichs view of η s awareness of being itself see my
artice Paul Tillichs Hermeneutic forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy ofReligion
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 331
ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12
Hence there is no
ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-
sents being itself
Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the
context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-
ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only
can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones
ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation
performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and
transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol
The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity
13
Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that
the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present
However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient
to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything
every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in
being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is
an identity of every thing with being itself
No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where
14
We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a
symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself
The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-
ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further
account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one
Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn
that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up
corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and
elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-
12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something
13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188
14 ST I p 118
332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 329
of sorts as is evidenced by his discussion of ontological elements polarities
of being and so forth a detailed and coherent original metaphysical system
is not the major focus of Tillichs efforts and at no point in his discussion
of metaphysics does a clear definition of participation emerge Also al-
though Tillichs ontology is the basis for his soteriology and for his method
of interpreting religious symbols it has no direct bearing on his explanation
of what a symbol is or how it functions
But in a more general way Tillich does make use of and even pre-
suppose a Platonic or perhaps more accurately a neo-Platonic view of
the relation of entities to being itself
Ever since the time of Plato it has been known that the concept of be-
ing as being or being itself points to the power inherent in everything
the power of resisting non-being7
Tillich thinks of being as the power to resist non-being a power present in
all that is Participation is simply a word which points to the relation of all
beings to and their dependence on being itself Participation of the religious
symbol in its symbolizandum simply means that there is some sort of onto-
logical relationship between a being and being itself a relation of depend-
ency A being is or is real it therefore shares in manifests is grounded by
or participates in being or reality itself Without this relationship there
would be no ground or reason for the being to be In that it exists that it is
not non-being an entity manifests its relation to being itself or shows that the
power of being itself is present in it The precise description of this rela-
tionship Tillich does not give but for the purposes of formulating the doc-
trine of symbols it really need not be given Indeed we might say that
Tillichs metaphysical need here can be met by any ontology be it Platonic
Thomistic Scotistic Spinozistic or what have you in which being itself is
treated as real ie as not just a bare abstraction or intellectual concept and
in which a real relationship is seen as existing between all entities or beings
and being itself
The word participation is then not so much a definition or account
of this ontological relationship between beings and being itself as it is a meta-
phor which points to it a metaphor which is occasionally replaced or clari-
fied by another At one point it is replaced by belonging to
Certainly we belong to beingmdashits power is in usmdashotherwise we would
not be8
At another point participation is compared to representation
7 ST I p 236
8 Paul Tillich Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago University
of Chicago Press 1955) p 11
raquo
330 Encounter
The representative of a person or an institution participates in the honorof those whom he is asked to represent but it is not he who is honoredit is that which or whom he represents In this sense we can state gen-erally that the symbol participates in the reality of what it symbolizesIt radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands
9
The meaning of participation is indeed vague and will remain so since
it is more of a metaphor than an explanation But it is now clear enough to
begin to make sense of the difference between sign and symbol A sign
merely stands for or indicates something else There has to be some reason
or ground for this signification some sort of connection between sign and
signified With a sign this connection is only a relation of cause and effect
as with the clouds indicating rain resemblance as with the curved arrow on
the roadsign indicating a curve in the road or convention as red indicating
danger These examples I borrow from Rowe As he points out natural
signs such as nimbus clouds indicating rain or smoke indicating fire are not
the product of convention and cannot be changed at will Hence Tillich is
wrong when he says that all signs are the product of convention and hence
being changeable at will and determined by convention cannot be a mark
which differentiates signs from symbols10 But this is no large problem
Tillichs discussion of signs only needs to be expanded to include natural
signs as well as conventionally determined ones After all Tillichs main
interest is in symbols and he mentions signs only in passing The connec-
tion between sign and signified is either one of convention in which case it
can be changed at will or one of resemblance or causation or temporal order
as with the rain coming shortly after the arrival of the clouds But the rela-
tion of sign to signified usually is not difficult to undtrstand
There must also be some sort of connection between the religious sym-
bol and the symbolizandum being itself But this connection must be of a
different kind from that between sign and signified It cannot be a relation
of resemblance since no finite entity resembles being itself Nor can it be
one of natural causation at least not in the same sense of cause as when
fire is the cause of smoke or clouds of rain Nor finally can the relation
be one of convention Although we have an immediate awareness of the
power of being itself at least insofar as we are aware of the existence ie
the not being nothing of entities and especially of ourselves this is so to
speak a nonconceptual awareness11 Although it discloses the reality of be983085
9 Paul Tillich The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols Religious Experienceand Truth ed Sidney Hook (New York NYU Press 1961) p 4
10 Rowe pp 1080911 For a further discussion of Tillichs view of η s awareness of being itself see my
artice Paul Tillichs Hermeneutic forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy ofReligion
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 331
ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12
Hence there is no
ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-
sents being itself
Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the
context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-
ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only
can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones
ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation
performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and
transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol
The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity
13
Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that
the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present
However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient
to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything
every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in
being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is
an identity of every thing with being itself
No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where
14
We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a
symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself
The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-
ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further
account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one
Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn
that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up
corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and
elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-
12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something
13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188
14 ST I p 118
332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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raquo
330 Encounter
The representative of a person or an institution participates in the honorof those whom he is asked to represent but it is not he who is honoredit is that which or whom he represents In this sense we can state gen-erally that the symbol participates in the reality of what it symbolizesIt radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands
9
The meaning of participation is indeed vague and will remain so since
it is more of a metaphor than an explanation But it is now clear enough to
begin to make sense of the difference between sign and symbol A sign
merely stands for or indicates something else There has to be some reason
or ground for this signification some sort of connection between sign and
signified With a sign this connection is only a relation of cause and effect
as with the clouds indicating rain resemblance as with the curved arrow on
the roadsign indicating a curve in the road or convention as red indicating
danger These examples I borrow from Rowe As he points out natural
signs such as nimbus clouds indicating rain or smoke indicating fire are not
the product of convention and cannot be changed at will Hence Tillich is
wrong when he says that all signs are the product of convention and hence
being changeable at will and determined by convention cannot be a mark
which differentiates signs from symbols10 But this is no large problem
Tillichs discussion of signs only needs to be expanded to include natural
signs as well as conventionally determined ones After all Tillichs main
interest is in symbols and he mentions signs only in passing The connec-
tion between sign and signified is either one of convention in which case it
can be changed at will or one of resemblance or causation or temporal order
as with the rain coming shortly after the arrival of the clouds But the rela-
tion of sign to signified usually is not difficult to undtrstand
There must also be some sort of connection between the religious sym-
bol and the symbolizandum being itself But this connection must be of a
different kind from that between sign and signified It cannot be a relation
of resemblance since no finite entity resembles being itself Nor can it be
one of natural causation at least not in the same sense of cause as when
fire is the cause of smoke or clouds of rain Nor finally can the relation
be one of convention Although we have an immediate awareness of the
power of being itself at least insofar as we are aware of the existence ie
the not being nothing of entities and especially of ourselves this is so to
speak a nonconceptual awareness11 Although it discloses the reality of be983085
9 Paul Tillich The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols Religious Experienceand Truth ed Sidney Hook (New York NYU Press 1961) p 4
10 Rowe pp 1080911 For a further discussion of Tillichs view of η s awareness of being itself see my
artice Paul Tillichs Hermeneutic forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy ofReligion
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 331
ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12
Hence there is no
ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-
sents being itself
Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the
context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-
ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only
can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones
ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation
performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and
transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol
The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity
13
Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that
the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present
However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient
to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything
every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in
being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is
an identity of every thing with being itself
No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where
14
We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a
symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself
The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-
ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further
account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one
Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn
that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up
corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and
elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-
12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something
13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188
14 ST I p 118
332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
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Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 331
ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12
Hence there is no
ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-
sents being itself
Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the
context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-
ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only
can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones
ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation
performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and
transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol
The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity
13
Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that
the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present
However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient
to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything
every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in
being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is
an identity of every thing with being itself
No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where
14
We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a
symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself
The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-
ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further
account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one
Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn
that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up
corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and
elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-
12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something
13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188
14 ST I p 118
332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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332 Encounter
lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these
claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-
perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of
things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of
expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest
or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in
the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality
These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can
be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform
this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely
stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known
It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either
about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not
be known except through symbols
While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-
lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol
becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15
In
this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put
aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-
festation of the ground of being
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation
10
The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the
holy17
If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-
cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-
sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol
Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if
15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188
16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9
17 ST I p 215
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 333
their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18
For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and
negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is
not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the
last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-
tionally and that they grow and die
By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life
of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot
be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious
Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious
Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes
19
In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-
cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol
must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-
sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability
to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one
single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself
Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-
cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith
demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a
community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20
Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the
dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes
a community in which one acts21
But these all seem to be consequences of
faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol
and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols
never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely
the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of
the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-
18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117
334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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334 Encounter
lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to
them and not the groups
If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious
dimension of our being22
it would follow that symbols cannot be con-
sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization
or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether
this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group
is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of
their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die
But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark
of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an
actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know
very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-
self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect
or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still
to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much
for the plausibility of the theory
Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what
sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have
nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since
the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol
The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness
23
Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich
claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24
Since objects do
not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-
dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human
life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-
vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-
quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-
adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-
quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability
22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
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Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 335
to move people to demand religious attention to create reply
Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive
The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous
26
Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-
bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-
cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-
pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive
that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to
depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-
sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol
is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that
which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself
without interfering with its unconditionedness
There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-
on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest
But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of
thought or experience becomes a valid symbol
The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol
is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself
whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot
be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought
and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the
symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-
cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it
must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to
let being itself show through27
But obviously the symbol cannot completely
recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the
symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich
describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the
26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all
claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
336 Encounter
symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself
as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol
is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be
at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no
importance in itself)
Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how
symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a
purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has
a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the
same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like
learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a
problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re
ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no
genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something
new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained
and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this
purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just
too complicated and elevated to be plausible
The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols
a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain
how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature
of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in
Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that
turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The
only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which
is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym
bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or
plausibility
In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of
transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one
An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 337
count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes
the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma
tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the
job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-
lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an
object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing
and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-
bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and
negation
A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem
arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented
to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a
religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground
of being for human knowledge28
or the manifestation of what concerns us
ultimately39
If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-
thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-
ing itself
Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it
by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-
nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than
he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one
His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-
ing is little more than common sense
Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union
30
Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object
of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or
imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this
separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from
known remains
The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of
knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the
object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-
28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
338 Encounter
server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being
ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-
mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is
taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-
ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must
be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and
that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-
ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-
scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other
forms of cognition even that of the theologian
There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-
ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the
theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-
surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually
most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive
the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall
call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32
In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-
dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union
with the object the self is ecstatic
Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which
is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-
tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which
reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure
Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the
ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation
without ecstasy83
In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least
temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-
ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but
rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship
which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation
Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-
sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining
always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which
the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-
ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by
insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-
31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339
pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-
vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34
Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on
to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An
idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-
tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern
an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the
world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or
complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject
and object is overcome
Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or
success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains
an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it
with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The
more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between
subject and object85
We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of
thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory
event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate
and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-
object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-
bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-
ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-
tion to it
Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-
ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the
self to this object
Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict
interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-
tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through
which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective
side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-
tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively
the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-
jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86
If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the
ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person
34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256
35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
340 Encounter
it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-
jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the
symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event
whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event
an ecstatic relating of person to symbol
How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-
tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do
not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking
about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or
intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds
for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and
educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately
the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-
gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one
person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he
claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether
of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the
movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the
totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-
tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the
utmost
But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly
and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and
make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably
cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to
Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some
people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of
all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come
together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some
ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways
quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for
two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason
Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly
the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus
or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a
religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman
We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-
scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation
will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-
lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 341
I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by
means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a
sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of
a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the
object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship
just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There
is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot
jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or
negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response
rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an
explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable
account of how an object is transformed into a symbol
But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-
ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself
through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the
truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the
symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself
and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community
its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate
concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-
tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of
ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a
personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding
of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective
its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which
one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings
are immediately given
But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the
object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-
ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open
as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry
The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence
of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a
risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to
something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-
volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is
not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37
But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-
lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time
37 DF pp 33-34
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
342 Encounter
both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to
understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although
it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe
Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers
reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement
(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-
tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is
based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating
aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is
a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position
nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational
demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and
rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative
It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or
positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument
the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-
ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no
desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-
nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of
relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol
must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible
A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all
require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness
to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own
experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability
to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will
almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-
bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-
ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only
basis on which a judgment can be made
One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-
cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the
personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he
does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-
ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential
discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But
perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete
his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-
ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the
One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 343
ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively
rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters
with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place
through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of
nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym
bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success
I
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association
^ s
Copyright and Use
As an ATLAS user you may print download or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by US and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s) express written permission Any use decompiling
reproduction or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permissionfrom the copyright holder(s) The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner who also may own the copyright in each article However
for certain articles the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the articlePlease contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement For information regarding thecopyright holder(s) please refer to the copyright information in the journal if available
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s)
About ATLAS
The ATLA Serials (ATLASreg) collection contains electronic versions of previously
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission The ATLAScollection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the AmericanTheological Library Association