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transcript
By Coraline Goron
July 2011
Building an ASEAN Community
by 2015
New Concepts for a Revival of the ‘ASEAN Way’
towards Regional Integration ?
EIAS
Briefing Paper
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 1
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015 New Concepts for a Revival of the ‘ASEAN Way towards
Regional Integration?
By Coraline Goron1
Since the Asian crisis and with renewed impetus since the adoption of the ASEAN
Charter in 2008, ASEAN has proved to be a formidable source of conceptual
creativity pertaining to regional integration. While clinging to ASEAN‟s defining
principle of non-interference, as expressed in the treaty of Amity and Cooperation
and while maintaining a persisting aversion for any “Europe-like” transfer of
national sovereignty to supranational entities, a new language, symbol of a
renewed political rhetoric of integration, has emerged. Formulas such as “visions”,
“roadmaps”, “blueprints”, “connectivity”, “scorecards” and “soft regionalism” have
served to keep a consensual narrative of a voluntary-based integration, while
bringing a qualitative change to the initial „ASEAN way‟ doctrine. Whereas neo-
realists dismiss them as mere artifacts, aimed at maintaining the “delusion” of an
Asian integration process, these new concepts and mechanisms, perhaps,
encapsulate the dynamics necessary to fulfill the political commitments put forward
by ASEAN leaders in the ASEAN Economic Blueprint, to turn ASEAN into a „single
market and production base‟ and a „competitive region‟ but also the longer-term
objective of promoting its centrality as a hub for regional integration in East Asia.
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof David Camroux for his supportive comments and
corrections. This paper would definitely not have been achieved without his contribution. I
would also like to thank Mr Dick Gupwell, Vice-Chairman of EIAS, and the EIAS team for their
numerous and useful inputs and feedbacks.
1 Ms. Coraline Goron is a Junior Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies. She holds a Master's Degree in European Studies of Institute for European Studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and a double Bachelor in French and Common Law from the University of Cergy Pontoise (France)
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
2 European Institute for Asian Studies
Index
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 3
Building an ASEAN Economic Community – a challenging path to regionalism ....................... 5
From market-driven to institution-driven economic integration: the post Asian crisis
shift in the discourse on economic integration ................................................................ 5
Critical assessment of the ‗ASEAN way‘ to economic integration ....................................... 8
East Asian Economic development patterns ................................................................ 9
The Asian Crisis and its consequences for regional integration in East Asia ................... 11
New concepts striving to maintain the momentum of economic integration- added value
and shortcomings ........................................................................................................ 14
Presenting the new instruments aimed at implementing the economic blueprint: ASEAN
‗connectivity‘ and the ‗scorecard‘ mechanism ............................................................... 15
Connectivity – a bold concept ................................................................................. 15
The Scorecard – ASEAN‟s Open Method of Coordination? ............................................ 19
Maintaining the process and retaining centrality - political objectives superseding
economic realities ..................................................................................................... 22
FTAs versus Community or FTA + Community? ......................................................... 22
Deeper regional institutionalisation or inefficient superposition? .................................. 24
ASEAN striving for leadership in the region ............................................................... 25
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 27
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 29
Official documents: ................................................................................................... 29
Books: .................................................................................................................... 29
Articles: .................................................................................................................. 29
News articles: .......................................................................................................... 31
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 3
Introduction
2011 began with a bleak outlook for ASEAN, with the worrying escalation of the Thai-Cambodia
border dispute in February, which, according to Prof. Bilveer Singh from the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, endangers the very raison d‟être of
ASEAN as a regional ‗security complex‘2. Despite this dramatic event, which seemed to have
fallen outside the diplomatic control of ASEAN, 2010 had seen very encouraging signs in
ASEAN‘s march towards realizing its 2015 Vision of an ―ASEAN Community‖3. Important
achievements were made. In particular, the public release of the ASEAN Economic
Community‘s ―scorecards‖ in March 2010 and the adoption of a ―Master Plan on ASEAN
Connectivity‖ in Hanoi, on 28 October 2010, marked important innovations on the way towards
promoting ASEAN as the engine of regional integration in East and South-East Asia.
Experience internationally has demonstrated that regional integration requires permanent
innovation, with no ―key-in-hand‖ readily applicable formula. In particular, it has long been
recognized that the European model of integration cannot be replicated entirely elsewhere in
the world; thus each region must find its own ‗path to regionalism‘.
ASEAN was created in 1967, mainly as a regional peace-building political project in the
immediate aftermath of decolonization4, amid fears of the ‗balkanisation‘ of South East Asia.
Comprising ten countries since 1999, it has a population of 575 million and a combined GDP of
$1,282 billion5. From its inception in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was envisaged as
an inclusive process ultimately aiming at gathering all South-East Asian countries under a
single framework of cooperation. Already at that time, economic cooperation was deemed
essential, in order to bring stability and prosperity to the region. Yet, neither definite aims nor
elaborate plans and instruments were elaborated then. What has been subsequently described
as the ‗ASEAN way‘ of regional cooperation was based on ―the avoidance of institutional grand
designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach6‖, paying more than mere lip
service to the independence and sovereignty of the member states. Economic integration,
therefore, was essentially informal and ‗private sector-led‘. Hence, the initiative to put forward
an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 was more a practical response to the needs of the
nascent ―East Asian integrated circuit‖ of production7 than a genuine integration project.
2 Singh, Bilveer, Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby, ―Thai-Cambodian skirmishes: Endangering ASEAN‘s ‗raison d‗être‘‖, School
of International Studies, Singapore , in The Jakarta Post , 21 February 2011 3 The ASEAN Vision Statement Vision 2020, adopted at the ASEAN Summit of Kuala Lumpur in 1997, envisaged ASEAN
economic integration to be achieved by 2020. This time frame was then shortened to 2015 in the ASEAN Economic
Community Blueprint, adopted in 2007. 4 Crozier, Andrew J, ―Festina Lente: An Introductory Sketch of the History of ASEAN‖, In Welfens, Paul J.J, ―Integration
in Asia and Europe: historical dynamics, political issues, and economic perspectives‖, 2006, Springer Science &
Business, pp 13-29. According to Andrew J. Crozier, the Thai foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who played a
formidable role in the creation of ASEAN, envisaged it as a remedy to the ―power vacuum‖ left behind by the colonial
powers, which could have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains. 5 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, “A Bumpy Road Towards ASEAN Economic Community 2015” , in The Global
Economic Crisis, Implications for ASEAN, Singapore, ISEA, 2010, pp 125-143 6 Acharya, Amitav, ―Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: from the ‗ASEAN Way‘ to the ‗Asia-Pacific Way‘?‖, The
Pacific Review, Vol 10 n°3, 1997, pp 319-346 7 Nicolas, Françoise "The Political Economy of Regional Integration in East Asia, Economic Change and Restructuring,,
Springer, Vol 41, n°4, 2008, pp 345-367. Françoise Nicolas argues that intra-regional trade in East Asia has been
largely driven by the growing ‗vertical trade‘ in parts and components. The rise of China as a major platform for
processing and assembling parts and components produced at lower costs in the South East Asian countries and re-
exporting final products to the western markets has played a critical role in this process.
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
4 European Institute for Asian Studies
However, the Asian Economic crisis, which hit most East Asian countries in 1997-98, revealed
that the regional structural and normative weaknesses had played their part in accelerating the
propagation of the plague throughout the region. Arguably, as a result of this, a change of
mindset occurred regarding further regional integration and more particularly the economic
integration process. At the ASEAN summit of Bali, in 2003, ASEAN ministers adopted the
landmark ―Bali Concord II declaration‖, within which they committed themselves to
establishing an ASEAN Community comprising of three pillars, namely the ―ASEAN Political and
Security Community‖ (APSC), the ―ASEAN Economic Community‖ (AEC) and the ―ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community‖ (ASCC). However, to date, only the AEC has been subject to a
comprehensive implementation scheme with definite objectives and a schedule for
implementation, put forward in the ―ASEAN Economic Blueprint‖, which was adopted, at the
12th ASEAN Summit, in November 2007.
Parallel to these evolutions, since the Asian crisis and with renewed impetus since the adoption
of the ASEAN Charter in 2008, ASEAN has proved to be a formidable source of conceptual
creativity pertaining to regional integration. This article argues that the theoretical emulation
among ASEAN epistemic communities stems from the perceived need to manage two diverging
aspirations. While clinging to ASEAN‘s defining principle of non-interference, as expressed in
the treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and while keeping a persisting aversion for any ―Europe-
like‖ transfer of national sovereignty to supranational entities, a new language, symbol of a
renewed political rhetoric of integration, has emerged. Formulas, such as ―visions‖,
―roadmaps‖, ―blueprints‖, ―connectivity‖, ―scorecards‖ and ―soft regionalism‖, have served to
keep a consensual narrative of a voluntary-based integration, while bringing a qualitative
change to the initial ‗ASEAN way‘ doctrine.
Whereas neo-realists dismiss them as mere artefacts, aimed at maintaining the ―delusion‖ of
an Asian integration process8, these new concepts and mechanisms, perhaps, encapsulate the
dynamics necessary to fulfil the political commitments put forward by ASEAN leaders in the
ASEAN Economic Blueprint.
This article, focusing on the political economy of ASEAN, as it involves probably the most
advanced area of the region‘s integration process, explores the possible added-value, beyond
rhetoric, of two concepts recently endorsed by ASEAN ministers. The first of these concepts is
that of ―connectivity‖, put forward in the ―ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity‖, adopted in
November 2010. Encompassing ―physical connectivity‖, ―institutional connectivity‖ and
―people-to-people‖ connectivity, it seems to address several challenges pointed out earlier as
impediments to the economic integration process. Notably, it offers a comprehensive approach
to tackling challenges of pan-regional infrastructure building, as well as non-tariff barriers to
trade. This analysis assesses how effective this approach can be in the context of ASEAN. The
second concept deserving of attention is that of a ―scorecard‖. Referring to a kind of ―peer
review‖ mechanism entrusted to the ASEAN Secretariat in the 2007 Economic Blueprint, it
serves as a basis for monitoring its implementation by the member states. In response to
critics, who have dismissed the ASEAN Economic Community idea as mere ―paper words‖, this
author argues that this mechanism is intriguing for various reasons: firstly, it mirrors the
―ASEAN Way‖ preference for ‗non-judicial‘ implementation mechanisms; secondly, it provides
8 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion,
Northhampton, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006, 269 pages
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 5
for a new instance against which the merits of a non-binding political mechanism, as opposed
to a classical judicial review mechanism, can be tested.
One of the purposes of this article is to present and contextualise the emergence of these new
concepts. In particular, it seeks to situate them in the theoretical debate between the
constructivist, the realist and the European approaches to regional integration, in the field of
political economy. Then, it proposes to assess their potential as instruments capable of
realizing ASEAN‘s goals. These goals include the medium-term goal of creating an ―economic
community‖ by 2015, turning ASEAN into a ‗single market and production base‘ and a
‗competitive region‘ 9 but also the longer-term aim of promoting its centrality as a hub for
regional integration in East Asia.
Building an ASEAN Economic Community – a challenging path to
regionalism
Economic cooperation has always been a cornerstone in the project to create an integrated
East Asian or South-East Asian region. In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976), the
founding members of ASEAN already committed themselves to ―promote active cooperation in
the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields10‖. Yet, these aspirations did
not materialise in the first twenty years of ASEAN‘s existence. Subsequent developments since
the 1990s gave momentum to ASEAN‘s economic integration. However, the East and South-
East Asian patterns of economic development and regionalism have been viewed from very
different perspectives according to the theoretical framework used by the authors. Whereas a
theoretical orthodoxy in Asian studies has developed, arguing for an ―Asian Way‖ towards
regional economic integration, scholars drawn from the realist school of international relations
have rejected their findings. Both schools of international relations have interpreted treaty
commitments and empirical data in opposite ways. While on the European continent the
development of an Asian regional integration rhetoric since the late 1990s has been followed
with interest and has received strong political support, ASEAN endeavours and methods of
integration, however, have raised doubts seen from the standpoint of the EU‘s own experience.
In order to assess the pertinence of the most recent conceptual innovations of ASEAN
leaderships, it appears necessary to take into account these diverging approaches.
From market-driven to institution-driven economic integration: the post Asian crisis shift in
the discourse on economic integration
It seems to have been the belief from the inception of ASEAN that the objective of ensuring
Asian countries‘ path to development and security independent of interference from the great
powers would be best pursued through regional cooperation, in particular in the economic
area. Hence, the Philippines foreign minister at the time of the Bangkok Declaration (1967),
Narciso Ramos, was quoted as saying:
9 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (DAC II), Section B, Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 2003 10 Article 4, Chapter 3, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
6 European Institute for Asian Studies
“The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia [with] each country pursuing its
own limited objectives and dissipating its meagre resources in the overlapping or
even conflicting endeavours of sister states carry the seeds of weakness in their
capacity for growth and the self-perpetuating dependence on the advanced,
industrial nations. ASEAN, therefore, could marshal the still untapped potentials
of this rich region through more substantial united action11”.
Notwithstanding these early aspirations, efforts towards cross-border economic cooperation
hardly materialized until the 1990s. The first attempts towards transnational cooperation took
mainly the form of patchy and voluntary preferential trade agreements from the mid-1970s
onward; then, eventually, the establishment of sub-regional growth zones amongst ASEAN‘s
most developed economies (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia)12 started a sub-regional
dynamic of economic integration. These projects were aimed at joint-industrial development.
The first pan-ASEAN-six trade liberalization project came through the Australian initiative for
an Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC), in 1989, which included also the
industrialized economies from North-East Asia and North America. ASEAN itself embarked on a
formal economic cooperation framework only in 199213 with the signing of the ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement (AFTA) trade liberalisation project (to be implemented over 15 years).
Therefore, early trans-regional economic and trade patterns in East Asia were arguably a
―spontaneous process‖, fuelled by the private sector and by the quest for efficiency on the part
of multinational companies, initially mostly Japanese, but later from the so-called ―New
Industrialized Economies‖ (NIE) of Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, seeking to build up
marketing and supply chain networks to exploit economies of scale from the division of labour
and specialisation14. Subsequently, the rise of China as an ―outward processing region for
goods developed elsewhere in Asia‖ and its integration in the regional production network
further encouraged the development of East Asian intra-trade, from 35 to 57% of overall trade
over the period 1980-200515. However, it must be noted that this rise was primarily due to the
increase in trade between individual ASEAN countries (with sharp differences among them)
and the rest of East Asia. Intra-ASEAN trade, on the other hand, grew only from 18% to
25.5% of total ASEAN trade over the period 1990-200516. We shall see in the next section how
these trends have been interpreted in terms of evidence of regional economic integration.
The Asian financial crisis that broke out in Thailand in the summer 1997 diminished some of
the enthusiasm about the ―Asian miracle17‖. While the actual causes of the crisis, regional or
systemic, continue to be debated, one of its side effects has been to strengthen the political
commitments of ASEAN countries to deepen economic integration among them and with the
wider East Asian region. This ambition was officially stated in the ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted,
11 Flores, J.M, Abad, J, cited in Crozier, Andew J, Loc Cit., p 19 12 Jones David, Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Op. Cit. 13 Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28
January 1992 14 Nicolas, Françoise ―East Asia and Western Europe: Between Regionalisation and Globalisation”, in Boisseau du
Rocher, Sophie and Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to Regionalisation – Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe,
Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Asia-Europe Research Series, 2005, p 3-7 15 Nicolas, Françoise, Loc. Cit. ―The Political Economy of Regional Integration in East Asia‖ 16 Austria, Myrna S, ―Tackling Non-Tariff Barriers in ASEAN‖, in ASEAN Economic Blueprint Report N°4, ASEAN Studies
Centre, ISEAS, Singapore, 2009 17 World Bank, ―The East Asian miracle : economic growth and public policy‖ 1993/09/30 , Report n° 12351 (Vol. 2 of
2), 1993
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 7
at the height of the crisis, by ASEAN Heads of State and Governments at the Summit of Kuala
Lumpur, on 15 December 1997:
―We resolve to chart a new direction towards the year 2020 called, ASEAN 2020:
Partnership in Dynamic Development which will forge closer economic integration
within ASEAN‖.
Notably, they chose to endeavour to advance economic integration by ―fully implementing the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and accelerating the liberalization of trade in services (ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services introduced in 1995), realising the ASEAN Investment Area
by 2010 (AIA, initiated in 1998) and the free flow of investments by 2020; intensifying and
expanding sub-regional cooperation in existing and new sub-regional growth areas; further
consolidating and expanding extra-ASEAN regional linkages for mutual benefit, cooperate to
strengthen the multilateral trading system, and reinforcing the role of the business sector as
the engine of growth18‖. Then, in 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, adopted in Bali,
developed the economic integration project into the idea of an Economic Community, which
was to establish ASEAN as ―a single market and production base‖. Although substantially very
different from the European model, the rhetoric surrounding it clearly referred to far-reaching
economic integration goals. In 2007, the ASEAN Economic Blueprint, a legally binding
document that committed the ASEAN-ten to implement the AEC, set up distinct
implementation deadlines and periodical implementation reviews, which could arguably have
been inspired by the ―Delors Plan19‖- the latter outlined the three sequences leading to the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 2000. The Blueprint presents two main
objectives: to transform ASEAN into ―a single market and production base‖ and make it ―a
competitive economic region20‖. One should be aware, however, that despite the bold
language, the ideas put forward in this document remain ―significantly lower than the
economic integration in the EU‖21. Notably, no custom union and no single currency are
envisaged.
In the meantime, the ASEAN Charter, adopted in 2008, granted ASEAN an international legal
personality -quite ironically before the European Union obtained such a status in the Treaty of
Lisbon- and for the first time left room for possible sanctions in case of members‘ ―egregious
violations of their obligations‖, as well as room for non-consensual methods of reaching
agreement by the ASEAN Summit22.
Although weaknesses have been pointed out in all these documents, their multiplication shows
the strong – but perhaps only apparent – political will that lies behind the realisation of
economic integration. However, as mentioned above, these achievements have been
interpreted in very diverging ways across the academic spectrum. While constructivists point
to the progressive build-up of a South-East Asian and eventually pan-East Asian regional
identity, realists accuse them of nurturing an illusion of regional integration that does not live
up to the reality. The European approach to regional integration, if perhaps less entrenched,
18 ASEAN Vision 2020, Section ―A Partnership in Dynamic Development‖ , page 3 19 The ―Delors Plan‖ is the popular name given to the ―Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and
Monetary Union‖, appointed by the European Council and chaired by the then president of the European Commission
Jacques Delors. The report‘s conclusions were presented at the Maastricht Summit and for the most reproduced in the
relevant provisions on EMU in the Treaty on the European Union. 20 ASEAN Economic Blueprint, 2007, paragraph 8, p 6 21 Vandoren, Paul ―Regional Economic Integration in South East Asia”, ASEAN Economic Journal, n° 3, 2005, pp 517-
535 22Hsu, Locknie, “The ASEAN Charter and A Legal Identity for ASEAN‖, in The ASEAN Community – Unblocking the
Roadblocks Report N°1, ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS, Singapore, 2008
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
8 European Institute for Asian Studies
insists a great deal on the role of institutions and legal norms and thus struggles to grasp the
dynamics of East Asian regionalism.
Critical assessment of the ‘ASEAN way’ to economic integration
The ―ASEAN way‖, claims a distinctive approach to regional cooperation. It ―consists of a code
of conduct for inter-state behaviour, as well as a decision-making process based on
consultations and consensus‖23. While this code of conduct puts forward internationally agreed
norms, such as ‗non-interference‘, ‗non-use of force‘ and ‗pacific settlement of disputes‘,
ASEAN‘s uniqueness, arguably, is to ―operationalise these norms into a framework of regional
integration24‖. In this regard, Amitav Acharya argued in the 1990s for the ―ASEAN way‖ to be
seen as a ‗process‘ rather than ‗substance‘. According to him, this ‗process‘ was characterized
by ‗a preference for informality‘ over ‗structured, formalistic and legalistic procedures‘, the
‗aversion to formal, centralized institutions‘ and the practice of ‗consensus‘, which should not
be mistaken for ‗unanimity‘, since it does not require the express agreement from all the
parties, but still enables a forward movement in the direction which elicits broad support, as
long as core national interests are not disregarded25. In short, the ‗ASEAN way‘ doctrine has
been developed in opposition to the ‗European Union way‘, in which the partial handing over of
sovereignty to supranational institutions was present from the very beginning, in 1951, in the
form of the ‗high authority‘ of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC).
While this peculiar regionalization process in South-East Asia has been advocated by ASEAN
policy makers, its success has been looked at through different lenses by scholars belonging to
the constructivist, realist, and European schools of studies.
Constructivism, in a nutshell, argues that norms emerge from the interaction among actors
who, in turn, develop structures to manage these interactions, so that actors and structures
are co-constructed26. In this approach, regions do not exist naturally but are subjectively
constructed by human agency. Thus, in the process towards regional integration, notably in
the European Union, they emphasize the socialization role of common institutions, which
induces a progressive but irreversible redefinition of the national interest in relation to the
others27. This process, according to constructivist scholars, fosters the creation of a shared
‗identity‘ and facilitates the spreading of commonly agreed norms and rules. Socialization can
occur in different institutional settings and, therefore, constructivism does not have a legalist
approach to regional integration. What matters is not that norms can be judicially enforced by
supranational bodies, such as the European Court of Justice, but rather that they become part
of the mindset of the people to which they apply, through ‗borrowing‘, ‗localization‘ and the
further ―reshaping of both existing beliefs and practices and foreign ideas in their local
context‖28. In this process, constructivists privilege the role of ―transnational moral
entrepreneurs29‖. Therefore, constructivism has easily been able to come to terms with the
idea of the ―ASEAN way‖ to regional integration. Hence, it could be argued that it served to
23 Acharya, Amitav, Loc. Cit. 24 Hsu, Locknie, Loc. Cit. 25 Hsu, Locknie, Loc. Cit. 26 Saurugger, Sabine, Théories et concepts de l‟intégration Européenne , Paris, Presse de Science Po, 2009, 483 pages 27 Chirstiansen, Thomas, Jorgensen, Knud Erik, Wiener, Antje, ―The social Construction of Europe”, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol 6, n°4, 1999, pp 536-543 28 Acharya, Amitav, ―Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism‖,
International Organization, Vol 58, n°2, Spring 2004, pp 239-275 29 Acharya, Amitav, Loc. Cit. ―Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the 'ASEAN way' to the 'Asia-Pacific way'?”
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 9
anchor the concept into a comfortable theoretical framework. Notably, ASEAN‘s claim to a non-
legalistic decision-making process and the emphasis put on the role of ‗track two‘ (epistemic
communities, notably CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS30), in driving the integration process, reflect
some of the main ideas advocated by the constructivists.
Realists refute this analytical framework and its findings. Realist and neo-realist approaches to
international relations define the international system as structurally anarchic and recognize
the sovereign, self-interested States as the only significant international actors. Therefore,
they tend to be extremely suspicious of any regional integration projects. Hence, whereas
some successes of the European Union integration arguably puzzle them, they certainly reject
any weaker form of regionalism as irrelevant. Along this line, David Martin Jones and Michael
L.R Smith argue that the ‗ASEAN way‘ merely mirrors the fact that norms in South-East Asia
―are essentially what states, pursuing their strategic self-interest, make of them‖, which is, in
their view, not much. They emphasize the fact that ASEAN‘s structure, even after the Charter,
remains intergovernmental, while interactions remain state-driven31.
The European Union has been a pioneer in the process of regional integration. Especially in the
field of economic integration, ―an assumption remains that the EU is the paradigmatic case of
regionalism against which all other regional projects are judged32‖. As a result, Europeans
particularly (but not only them) have tended to assess the East Asian developments only
through the critical lenses of their own experience and their practice of institutionalized forms
of integration. Indeed, a Eurocentric approach has ―imposed an understanding of regionalism
as bound up with ‗formal institutionalization‖ and the creation of ―supranational politico-
institutional bodies33‖. However, this approach has engendered theoretical blinkers to the
analysis of regionalism and probably also encouraged the rejection of the ‗Brussels model‘ by
Asian leaders. Yet, the most recent institutional developments in East Asia have narrowed the
analytical gap and allowed sensible comparative research to take place.
Three elements of East Asian economic ‗regionalism‘ have been interpreted from completely
antagonistic standpoints. The bones of contention concern, first, the interpretation of the
empirical trends of economic development in East Asia from the 1980s onward. The second
disagreement concerns the causes of the 1997 Asian crisis and its consequences in terms of an
ASEAN commitment to pursue a goal of genuine regional economic integration.
East Asian Economic development patterns
Any analysis of the economic integration trends in ASEAN cannot be made in isolation from the
wider East Asian context within which they are embedded. Given the reality of economic
exchanges in the region, such a study would not only be dubious, it would also contradict the
spirit of the AEC. Hence, the project of the AEC is to exploit the strategic position of ASEAN, at
a crossroad between India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south and China,
Japan and South Korea to the north, to transform itself as a hub for economic exchanges in
the wider region. The objective of ‗inclusiveness‘ in the AEC seems to make also reference to
the earlier idea of creating an ‗East Asian Economic Group‘ (EAEG), which was put forward by
30 ASEAN CSCAP is the abbreviation for ―ASEAN Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific‖, whereas ASEAN
ISIS is the abbreviation for ―ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies‖ 31 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Michael L.R, ―Making Process, not Progress – ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian
Regional Order”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 148–184 32 Higgott, Richard ―Alternative Models of Regional Cooperation? The Limits of Regional Institutionalization in East
Asia‖, in Telo, Mario (Eds), European Union and New Regionalism, Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-
Hegemonic Era, second edition, Oxon, Ashgate Publishing, 2007, pp 75-106 33 Richard Higgott, ibid
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
10 European Institute for Asian Studies
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia in the early 1990s34. Following opposition from the United
States, this became an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and can be seen in another
reincarnation as ASEAN +3. Hence, as proclaimed in the AEC:
“In establishing the AEC, ASEAN shall act in accordance to the principles of an
open, outward-looking, inclusive, and market-driven economy consistent with
multilateral rules as well as adherence to rules-based systems for effective
compliance and implementation of economic commitments”35.
Thus, all studies of ASEAN economic integration expand beyond the ten ASEAN countries to
include at least Japan, China, South Korea (ASEAN +3) and India (ASEAN+4), when they do
not extend to the broader Asia-Pacific Region (APEC). As mentioned earlier, all economic
studies point to the fact that trade expansion in East Asia, in the 1990s, ―can be attributed
mainly to an intensification of trade relations between Northeast and Southeast Asia‖36. This
trend resulted from the use of South-East Asia as a production base by Japan, the NIEs and,
more recently, China. However, these data have been analysed through different lenses.
On the one hand, constructivists have emphasised that progressive economic integration,
though imbalanced and incomplete, was the source of economic development in the region.
According to this view, economic integration took place throughout the 1990s, although
―private sector-led‖ and export-oriented, by conforming to the ASEAN informal, lightly
structured way and thanks to the progressive appropriation, by these countries, of the
international norms of the market economy.
Realists, on the other hand, see East Asian economic performance in the same period of time
only as the result of the replication of the ‗Japanese developmental model‘ by the NIEs, based
on a strong state leadership and export-led growth37. They point to the fact that ―ASEAN, as a
regional grouping, was far from integrated‖ and highlight a situation where the more dynamic
ASEAN economies not only were ‗export-oriented‘, but also ―competed between themselves
both for foreign direct investment and as low-cost manufacturing bases for North-East Asian,
European, or North American multinational corporations38‖. This combination of low intra-
ASEAN trade and intra-regional competition provides, according to them, evidence of the
failure of the ―ASEAN way‖ to foster regional economic integration.
One way to reconcile these interpretations is to underline the fact that the promoters of Asian
regional integration do not deny the persistent low level of ASEAN trade. Indeed, the
acknowledgement of this reality is often presented as a reason to integrate the South-East
Asian region further. Put simply, regional economic integration should be distinguished from
mere trade intensity figures. This dichotomy has been underlined by Richard Higgott, who
differentiates between ―regionalization”, referring to ―those processes of integration that arise
from markets, private trade and investment flows‖, and ―regionalism”, which is more ―a state-
led project of cooperation that emerges as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and
34 Terada,Takashi, ―Constructing an ‗East Asian‘ concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3‖, The
Pacific Review, Vol. 16 No. 2, 2003, pp 251–277 35 ASEAN Economic Blueprint, 2007, paragraph 5, p 5, (emphasis added) 36 Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, ―East Asian Power and the 21st Century Global Economy: from a
Production Base to a Market Base?‖, Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and Fort, Bertrand (eds), Paths to Regionalisation –
Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Asia-Europe Research
Series, 2005, pp 8-30 37 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Loc. Cit, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion 38 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, ibidem
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 11
treaties39‖. Furthermore, it could be argued that the replication and adaptation of the Japanese
developmental model among South-East Asian countries reflects the diffusion of norms
highlighted by constructivists.
Until the end of the 20th century, the European model of integration seemed to be of a
completely different nature and, therefore, not particularly pertinent as a reference point for
other integration projects. However, it should be noted that the European Monetary Union
project played a role in motivating ASEAN leaders to put into place AFTA in 199240.
The Asian Crisis and its consequences for regional integration in East Asia
The financial crisis that hit East Asian countries in 1997 had terrible, although relatively short-
lived, consequences. Within the space of a few months, it put the ―Asian tigers‖ and the fast
developing countries in South-East Asian on their knees. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and South Korea, in particular, were severely affected with a brutal fall in the
countries‘ growth rates paralleled by the explosion of unemployment, with no social security
net to mitigate the dramatic social effects. An intense academic debate soon developed
concerning the causes that precipitated this crisis. In broad terms, the theory of a purely
―Asian crisis‖ opposed that of the ‗localized‘ manifestation of a ―systemic crisis‖41. According to
the first analysis, the Asian economic model itself was seen as the source of the crisis because
of its ―current account deficits, a speculative property boom, short-term borrowing to fund
long-term investment, as well as poor banking and financial regulation, which ran the
spectrum from the inept and opaque to the fraudulent and corrupt42‖. On the contrary, the
theory of a systemic crisis, as alluded to by Walden Bello, argued that, ―first of all, one of the
prime causes of the current crisis has been the indiscriminate globalization of financial
markets43‖. For diverse political and economic reasons (supposedly those countries‘ humiliation
and the harsh economic restructuring policies demanded by the IMF in exchange for loans),
the second view was largely embraced by Asian governments, who shaped their response
accordingly. Yet, given that the reactions to the crisis have been both national and regional,
this has left room for disagreement between the realists and the constructivists.
Realists have supported their scepticism of Asian regionalism by pointing, first, to the initial
and uncoordinated reactions to the crisis by South-East Asian countries. David Martin Jones
and M.L.R Smith, notably, underline the fact that, while Thailand and Indonesia accepted the
rescue packages of the IMF and the restructuring plans attached to them, Malaysia rejected
them and imposed currency controls. Then, these authors dismiss the economic integration
rhetoric expressed in the Hanoi declaration on the ASEAN Community. On the contrary, they
see no subsequent progress in the liberalisation of the ASEAN ‗internal‘ market.
Constructivists, on the other hand, view the Asian crisis as a catalyst for regional integration.
They refer to two major institutional developments to support this theory, which are the
Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2000, which within the framework of ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and
South Korea) set up a more robust regional financial cooperation system. Moreover, the
39 Richard Higgott, Loc. Cit. 40 Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, Op. Cit 41 Figuière, Catherine, Guilhot, Laëtitia, « L‘Asie d‘une Crise à L‘autre : Impact sur l‘intégration régionale », Paper
presented at XXVIème Journées du développement de l‟Association Tiers-Mondes : Crises et soutenabilité du
développement, Strasbourg, June 2010. 42 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Loc. Cit, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion;
Camdessus, Michel, ―Crise Regionale ou Crise de Système?‖, Sociétal, n°23, 1998, pp 15-18, (Michel Camdessus was
then director of the International Monetary Fund) 43 Bello, Walden, ―East Asia : On the eve of a great transformation?‖, Review of International Political Economy, vol 5,
N°3, 1998, pp 424-444
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
12 European Institute for Asian Studies
endorsement of the concept of an ASEAN Community in 2003 indicated the crisis had
engendered greater integration. According to this view, the narrative developed by ASEAN
epistemic communities has become a consensus view among, not only the ASEAN-10, but also
among its partners, with Japan and China eager to get involved in the ASEAN+3 initiative.
There is no space in this article to develop the argument extensively over the pertinence of the
ASEAN+3 setting. For the purpose of argumentation, it suffices to highlight the antagonist
viewpoints on it. Indeed, the constructivists, on the one hand, assume that the common
handling of the Asian financial crisis has created an unprecedented sense of regional identity
and shared interest. This would explain the arguable decline of APEC and the increased
momentum for a purely East Asian setting44. Furthermore, they put emphasis on the central
role played by ASEAN and the ―ASEAN way‖ as a centrifugal force, recalling that the ASEAN+3
initiative was taken by Singapore‘s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, when, at the 1995 ASEAN
Summit, he proposed to invite Japan, China and South Korea as a triumvirate to join ASEAN
informal summit meetings. ―In sum, the formation of the East Asian concept and awareness of
a shared identity within the same region of East Asia can be said to be gradually fermenting as
an essential foundation for the establishment of the ASEAN+3 meetings.45‖ For the realists, on
the other hand, this institutional arrangement makes little sense and represents mere ―paper
words‖. They argue that China, for instance, has grown into a major economic competitor for
ASEAN‘s less industrialized economies. ―The rise of China after 1998, and its attraction by
foreign investors, actually affected growth negatively in Southeast Asia, whose low-technology
manufacturing industries also depend upon foreign direct investment.46‖ Arguably though, the
ASEAN approach to China has rather been a mix of both, with the AEC expressly aimed at
resisting the competitive pressure from China, while at the same time a landmark ASEAN-
China free trade agreement entered into force in 2010. Whereas the incoherence of this
strategy can reasonably raise questions about the viability of South-East Asian integration
ambitions, it shows, if anything, that the preferences of South-East Asian leaders are not as
clear-cut as realists assume.
The concept of ―Community‖ and its ―three pillars‖ basis raises serious questions for European
observers. While the terms seem directly borrowed from the vocabulary developed by the EU,
the content they have been given and the instruments put into place to achieve their goals are
radically different from those adopted in Europe. The same point can be made concerning the
AEC objectives to create a ―common market‖ and a ―common production base‖. The orthodoxy
pertaining to economic integration has been traditionally developed from the European model
of institutional regionalism and puts forward an incremental integration process based on a
progressive treaty revision through four stages, each of which adds a new layer to the
preceding one. The first ‗level‘ of economic integration is a ‗Free Trade Area‖ (FTA), which
implies the removal of all tariffs on trade among the members. The second level is a customs
union, which adds a common external tariff to the FTA. The third level is a ―common market‖,
where barriers to the free movement of capital and labour are removed, in addition to the free
movement of goods and services. In Europe, this is known as the ―EU Four Freedoms concept‖.
44 Yu, Hyun-Seok , ―Explaining the emergence of new East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and Interest-Based
Approaches‖, Asian Perspectives, Vol 27, n°1, 2003, pp 261-288 45 Takashi Terada, Op. Cit. 46 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Michael L.R, Op. Cit., ―Making Process, not Progress – ASEAN and the Evolving East
Asian Regional Order”
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 13
The fourth and last level is an economic union, which involves the unification of economic
institutions, a single currency and the coordination of economic policies47.
In this iterative process, a customs union is a necessary step on the way towards the creation
of a ―common market‖. However, in ASEAN, the ―free flow of goods simply implies removal of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers‖, and an attempt to ―minimize adverse effects of border and
behind border measures through trade facilitation, custom integration, the ASEAN single
window, harmonization of standards, etc48‖. In short, it is more an ―AFTA+‖ project than the
creation of an EU-like internal market.
Parallel to this, the institutions49 proposed by ASEAN to achieve the ASEAN Economic
Community by 2015 diverge strikingly from those chosen by European leaders back in the
1950s. On the contrary, as with the European Commission in the area of a common market,
the ASEAN Secretariat has no decision-making power at all. Hence, decision-making remains,
even after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, intergovernmental and consensual. Moreover,
financial and monetary integration is only embryonic, with only two initiatives, the Chiang Mai
initiative in 2000, modified at least twice—the most recent being in 2009—and the Asian Bond
Market Initiative since 2003. Furthermore, although ―Asian‖, it is substantially ―external‖ to
ASEAN, since it has developed from a Japanese initiative in the framework of ASEAN+3 and
since Japan and China contribute over two-thirds of the capital in the fund.
ASEAN also rejected the option of establishing an ―ASEAN Court of Justice‖, which would have
the authority to enforce regional commitments upon its member states. For European jurists,
who see the European Court of Justice as a masterpiece in the successful construction of the
common market, this absence means the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Thus, many
European observers tend to agree with the realist analysts who claim that ASEAN ideas are
bound to remain merely ―paper words‖.
Finally, European scholars have pointed to the fact that the ASEAN solidarity mechanisms,
which would be required to realize a ―community‖, were no match for those put into place in
the European context. The European Union supported its integration project with four types of
‗structural funds‘, among which the ‗regional development fund‘ is the best known. Moreover,
the European Investment Bank played an active role in financing development projects50,
notably in the new members. In ASEAN, on the contrary, arguably until the ―Master Plan on
Connectivity‖, ―the major instrument for convergence and ―sub-regional‖ development has
been sub-regional cooperation51‖, while being financed mostly through external sources,
notably the Asian Development Bank. This adds to the fact that, as opposed to the EU, some
among the ‗least developed countries‘, like Cambodia, Laos and Burma-Myanmar, have been
integrated into ASEAN without any pre-accession economic convergence criteria being imposed
upon them. While this mirrors ASEAN‘s ‗inclusive‘ philosophy and its overall development
47 Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1961, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irvin Inc, 1961, 308
pages. 48 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, Op. Cit. 49 ―Institution‖ here refer to ―persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural
roles, constrain activity and shape expectations‖, as defined by Robert Keohane in Keohane, Robert International
Institutions and State Power: Essay in International Relations Theory, Mountain, US, Boulder (Col) Westview Press,
1989, 270 pages 50 Cuyvers, Ludo, ―Contrasting the European Union and ASEAN integration and solidarity‖, Paper presented at Fourth
EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue, EU and ASEAN – Integration and Solidarity, European Parliament, Brussels, 25-26
November 2002 51 Cuyvers, Ludo, Op. Cit
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
14 European Institute for Asian Studies
project, it also explains the wide development gap between its members and the tremendous
challenge ASEAN faces to bridge it.
Since the Asian crisis, while the ―ASEAN way‖ concept has remained the same in essence, it
has certainly adopted a new stance with regard to institutions. In particular, economic
integration seems to have shifted from being merely seen as ‗market-led‘ to one that needs to
accept more ‗institution-led‘ integration. The AEC, but also the ASEAN+3 initiatives, are
illustrative of the new ―faith‖ in regional institutions. This is particularly interesting from a
European point of view, at a time when the merits of institutionalism are strongly questioned
in the EU52. How far this new rhetoric has been matched by the actual economic policies of
ASEAN individual member states clearly remains the main bone of contention that divides
academia. Hence, the bottom line to any initiative remains the refusal of any perceived loss of
sovereignty. In this regard, ASEAN has developed a series of new concepts, which remain in
line with the ―ASEAN way‖ core principles, while going further than purely informal and
―laissez-faire‖ policies. In this context the ideas of ―ASEAN connectivity‖, ―ASEAN scorecard‖
and ―ASEAN-X‖ have been promulgated.
We will now turn to these new concepts, presenting them within this theoretical framework and
assessing their potential effectiveness in helping ASEAN members to realize their aspirations.
New concepts striving to maintain the momentum of economic integration-
added value and shortcomings
The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint was adopted in 2007, in order both to establish a
time frame and to establish specific deadlines to reach the objective of creating the AEC by
2015. The Blueprint is a legally binding document, which commits the member states to
making ASEAN ―a single market and production base‖, ―a highly competitive economic region‖,
―a region of equitable development‖ and ―a region that is fully integrated into the global
economy53‖. This last characteristic is the manifestation of the ASEAN member states‘ acute
consciousness of their dependence on exports for domestic growth. To achieve these goals, the
Blueprint lists a number of ―actions‖ to be implemented within specific timeframes, with a
differentiation between the original ASEAN-6 members and the less-developed economies of
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). The Blueprint identifies a certain number of
material challenges: these mainly concern non-tariff barriers to intra-ASEAN trade, the
involvement of ASEAN businesses in regional economic integration, national investment
regimes, competition policy (or the lack of it), infrastructure development and international
production networks. Another identified methodological challenge pertains to the monitoring of
the implementation of the blueprint by the member states. Finally, two major challenges to
ASEAN integration, which at the same time potentially constitute the region‘s principal assets,
52 Higgott, Richard, Op. Cit. In his article, Higgott talks about the questioning of institutionalism in the EU in the
aftermath of the rejection of the European Constitution. However, his remark remains pertinent even after the
adoption and entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. Indeed, in spite of renewed institutional creativity, the traditional
faith of Europeans in institution‘s capacity to enhance the integration process has waned. 53 ASEAN Economic Blueprint, paragraph 8, p6
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 15
concern both its internal economic diversity and the geostrategic position of ASEAN, anchored
within a wider, economically booming, Asian region.
Each of the concepts we will now turn to have been developed to address these challenges in a
specific, ―ASEAN‖ way. They put forward a new form of limited regional institutionalisation,
consistent with ASEAN core principles, while at the same time putting the emphasis on
regional institutions as the engine for regional economic development. Whereas, four years
ahead of the AEC 2015 deadline, it is still premature to formulate a meaningful appraisal of
their effectiveness, it appears nonetheless possible to draw some conclusions as to the
renewed impetus for the regional integration they are designed to provide.
Presenting the new instruments aimed at implementing the economic blueprint: ASEAN
‘connectivity’ and the ‘scorecard’ mechanism
The ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Charter and the AEC Blueprint are
four documents that seem to be in contradiction with the pragmatism and aversion for any
pre-determined architecture implicit in the ―ASEAN way‖. Potentially, they establish a new
modus operandi for regional integration, one that seems more ‗state-led‘ and directed than
previously. The concepts of Connectivity, Scorecard and ASEAN-X, although different in nature,
are all instruments designed to operationalise these objectives. They also illustrate ASEAN‘s
own approach to institutionalisation.
Connectivity – a bold concept
The concept of ―Connectivity‖ was first discussed by the ASEAN leaders at the 15th ASEAN
Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, in Thailand, on 24 October 2009. The idea was proposed by the
Thai Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kasit Piromya, and
seems to have been inspired by a globalist vision of an ―interconnected world‖. The basic idea
is to turn both the diversity in internal economic development and the strategic central position
of ASEAN in East Asia into assets, through a bold project of ―connecting‖ all segments and all
the communities of ASEAN. The deepening and widening of connectivity in the region would
reinforce ASEAN‘s position as the hub of the East Asian region, which could further be
strengthened through realizing the potentials of a broader connectivity in the longer term with
its partners in the wider region. In this regard, the Leaders were of the view that this concept
of ASEAN connectivity would complement and support integration within ASEAN and within the
broader regional framework in East Asia54.
In more specific terms, ―connectivity‖ encompasses “physical connectivity‖, pertaining to
infrastructure building; ―institutional connectivity”, targeting trade liberalization and facilitation
measures; and finally “people-to-people connectivity”, enhancing shared education, culture
and tourism55. The concept of ‗Connectivity‘ therefore involves pursuing several of the goals at
the core of ASEAN‘s regional project: bridging its internal development gap, fostering the
emerging economic complementarities across the region and unlocking some of the biggest
―roadblocks‖ to foreign investment, namely the lack of regional infrastructure, legal
uncertainty and the related increase in logistical costs56. Indeed, the lack of adequate cross-
border infrastructure has been identified by the Asian Development Bank as a major
54 ASEAN Leaders‘ Statement on ASEAN Connectivity, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, 24 October 2009, paragraph 6, 55 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, executive summary, (i) 56 Introduction, ISEAS, ASEAN Studies center, ―ASEAN Community, unlocking the roadblocks Report N°1”, Singapore,
2008
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
16 European Institute for Asian Studies
impediment to the region‘s economic growth and integration. In short, the concept of
―connectivity‖ is also intended as a strategic response to stagnant intra-ASEAN trade and a
palliative to the relative loss of competitiveness in comparison to the booming Asian powers
(China and India) in the wake of the global financial crisis.
The concept of ―connectivity‖ encompasses cross-border infrastructures in both ―hard‖ forms,
such as roads, power grids, pipelines, etc., and ―soft‖ forms like cross-border regulation,
harmonization and mutual recognition. While it is not a trade liberalization measure per se but
rather a means that targets the environment surrounding and supporting trade, this aspect is
often overlooked by economists, who address the issue of economic integration only from the
perspective of trade intensity. Yet, several studies from the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank have demonstrated the link between spending on infrastructures and long-
term economic growth57. According to Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, considering the large
imbalance in levels of basic infrastructure across ASEAN member countries—with only 13% of
the population of Myanmar having access to electricity compared to 64.5% in Indonesia—the
potential benefits from large-scale building of regional infrastructure are considerable 58.
Hence, infrastructure building has also been a key to the European integration project, while
more recently China has vaunted its mammoth infrastructure projects as a way of reducing the
development gap between the developed east coast and the less-developed inland. The
decision of the ASEAN countries to ―regionalise‖ the issue is consistent with the objective of
pursuing multilateral development projects that can benefit all the countries in the region and
produce a sense of ―shared identity‖. Once again, it appears from the political discourses that
the European Union‘s achievements in this respect have inspired the vision of a ―connected‖
and ―borderless‖59 area. However, as distinct from the EU, ASEAN ‗connectivity‘ has at its core
integrating the neighbouring regional powers as well. Indeed, considering the trade patterns in
East Asia, ‗connecting‘ ASEAN with the rest of Asia seems as crucial as ―connecting‖ ASEAN
countries among themselves. Moreover, Japan, South Korea and more recently China, as
major economic actors in South-East Asian production circuits, have heavily invested in
physical infrastructure projects. Together with international institutions, such as the World
Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the private sector, these regional partners are
targeted as major sources of funding for ASEAN infrastructure development, which, according
to the ADB, require some US$ 600 billion in investment for the period 2006-201560.
―Institutional infrastructure‖ covers essentially the regulatory measures necessary to ensure
the ―free flow‖ of goods, services, investment and ―skilled labour‖, which is the cornerstone of
the AEC. These measures concern the harmonization of customs procedures (the ASEAN single
window) and the integration of goods transit routes with the objective of eventually agreeing
on establishing an ―ASEAN single Shipping Market‖. Furthermore, they involve updating and
implementing ASEAN database on non-tariff barriers to trade and removing technical barriers
to trade through harmonizing standards, technical requirements, mutual recognition
agreements, etc.
57 World Bank, ―Infrastructure for Development‖, World Development Report 1994, New York, Oxford University Press,
1994; Bramait, Seethepalli, K. M, Veredas, D, ―How relevant is infrastructure to growth in East Asia?‖, Policy Research
Working Paper 4597, World Bank, Washington DC, 2008 58 Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath, ―Infrastructure for ASEAN Connectivity and Integration‖, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol
27, No 2, 2010, pp 200-220 59 Pibulsonggram, Pradab, Thai Representative to the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity, introductory
remarks, International Seminar on ASEAN Connectivity, Bangkok, Thailand, 10 September 2010 60 Pibulsonggram, Pradab, Op. Cit.
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 17
Following the Hua Hin Summit in 2009, a High Level Task Force (HLTF) was established to
draft a ―Master Plan‖, in order to give flesh to the concept and chart its implementation. The
HLTF was composed not only of senior officials from the member states but also of private
sector representatives and a former ASEAN Secretary-General. The ―Master Plan on
Connectivity‖ was adopted at the 17th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, on 28 October 2010, and
presented as a stepping-stone in the project of building the AEC and, beyond that, the ASEAN
Community.
In contrast to former ASEAN political documents, the Master Plan is a very detailed 85-page
study that not only gives an exhaustive list of all the ongoing regional and sub-regional
projects and agreements but also clearly highlights the current shortcomings and failures.
Hence, the document recognises that most of these pertain to the lack of ratification and
delayed implementation in the individual member states. It then details a number of ―key
strategies‖ to remedy the situation, which are to be implemented within specific time frames.
For instance, addressing the problem of underperforming customs services, the Master Plan
lists a series of ―key actions‖:
Accelerate the full implementation of the National Single Windows (NSWs) for
ASEAN-6 as soon as possible, noting that the deadline for the establishment of
NSWs in ASEAN-6 was in 2008, and for CLMV in 2012.
Activate and operate the ASEAN Single Window in selected ports as early as
possible for Member States who are ready to implement it, and for all ASEAN
Member States, by 2015.
Simplify customs procedures, formalities and practices of all Member States with
priority on those serving to a single market and single production base (such as
design and operation of outward processing, inward processing, temporary
admission) by 2013 with the target of reducing processing costs by 20 percent by
2013 and by 50 percent by 2015.
Develop a comprehensive and compatible regulatory framework on customs
procedures and border management operations by 2014.
Promote partnership and active engagement of businesses and industries into the
process of policy making in fostering its speedy and smooth implementation.
Develop the human resources necessary to complement the above actions by
201361.
Be that as it may, it should be noted that most of the projects identified in the ‗Master Plan‘
were already ongoing, either at a regional or at a sub-regional level. In the area of land
transportation for instance, the Singapore Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) project already existed,
even though, due to the lack of funding, some important sections were missing. Where the
Master Plan clearly innovates is in the fact that it brings all the sub-regional projects and
initiatives under the single regional umbrella provided by ASEAN. It also addresses rather
frankly the thorny issues of financing and implementation, clearly referring to regional
institutions as preferred solutions.
On the implementation side, the Master Plan saw the appointment of an ‗ASEAN Connectivity
Coordinating Committee‘ and ‗national coordinators‘ supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, to
―coordinate and oversee the implementation of the Master Plan‖ and regularly report to ASEAN
leaders on the progress made in coordination with other ASEAN bodies. Moreover, many
61 Master Plan on Connectivity, Chap 3, paragraph 29, p 53
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
18 European Institute for Asian Studies
measures are subject to the ―AEC scorecard mechanism‖ for peer review, in particular with
regard to the ratification of regional agreements.
Implementation Arrangements for the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity:
Note: Coordinating
Reporting
Source: Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, Figure 5.1, p 69
Regarding the funding, the ‗Master Plan‘ not only refers to the traditional external sources
(ADB, WB and bilateral assistance programmes with developed countries, such as the ASEAN
Economic Integration Support Programme with the EU), but also advances the idea of
establishing an ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, ―in an effort to clearly signal ASEAN‘s self reliance
and centrality as part and parcel of an ASEAN connectivity package62‖. It also refers to the
financial resources that could be ―generated by the deepening of regional and local financial
and capital markets‖ and their eventual integration at regional level, under the ASEAN Capital
Market Forum and the setting up, by 2011, under the ASEAN+3 Asian Bonds Market Initiative,
of a $700 million trust fund (CGIF). This initiative, which is aimed more generally at ―reducing
the currency and maturity mismatches and making the regional financial system more resilient
to volatile capital flows and external shocks‖, is also intended, for the purpose of ‗connectivity‘,
to encourage private investment in ―bankable‖ ASEAN infrastructure projects.
From these considerations, it appears that the idea of ―connectivity‖ fits perfectly into the
discourse of ASEAN leaders on regional integration. ―ASEAN Connectivity can be achieved by
enhancing physical connectivity and institutional connectivity thereby reducing the costs of
investment and international trade in goods and services, including services link costs and
network set-up costs. Enhanced physical and institutional connectivity can contribute to
narrowing development gaps by expanding the frontiers of production/distribution networks
62 Master Plan on Connectivity, Chap 4, paragraph 13, p 63
ASEAN Summit
ASEAN Coordinating
Council/ASEAN Community Councils
ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee
(Comprising the Permanent Representatives to ASEAN or
any other special representatives appointed by respective ASEAN Member
States)
ASEAN Secretariat
(Dedicated unit at the ASEAN Secretariat to
be established)
ASEAN Sectoral Bodies
Sub-regional Arrangements related
to ASEAN Connectivity
National Coordinators for Implementation
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 19
and augmenting people-to-people connectivity, which will further nurture a sense of
community in ASEAN.63‖
The discourse on connectivity clearly contributes to creating a sentiment of togetherness and a
new sense of solidarity with the less developed parts of ASEAN. This document details a series
of political commitments to harmonize norms and procedures across the region, distinguishes
regional institutions as a solution and seems to show ASEAN‘s desire to involve the civil and
business communities in a so far mainly ‗elite-oriented‘ rhetoric of regional integration. In this
regard, the Master Plan seems to corroborate a constructivist paradigm according to which ―a
felt need for interdependence and a common destiny (or fate) can over time transcend
egotistical state identities and forge a group identity that will, in turn, fashion new norms that
establish an alternative pattern of interests that has the potential to displace older, more
restrictive identities64‖. Whether it is successful in doing so is, of course, questionable, and one
of the generally acknowledged weaknesses of constructivist theories is the difficulty of testing
their hypothesis against hard data. In this regard, it needs to be underlined that, while the
ambitions displayed in the Master Plan are particularly bold, the implementation remains
entirely in the hands of national actors, and the ASEAN Secretariat is yet to be given the
appropriate means to perform its monitoring tasks. These elements would certainly lead to a
realist criticism that the Master Plan is, once again, a political smokescreen, one designed to
delude. For example, a ‗red line‘ appears clearly in the documents, beyond which power
transfer to regional institutions and the pooling of sovereignty becomes too demanding for
ASEAN political leaders. Yet, whereas benchmarking with the EU integration model is often
rejected on these aspects, it still begs the question of the feasibility of ASEAN‘s stated
ambitions with the extremely limited implementation tools at its disposal. In order to address
the implementation problem, the latest concept proposed by ASEAN is the ―scorecard‖
mechanism, which, while going beyond mere ―summit politics‖, still strictly respects the ―soft ―
consensual forms of implementation mechanism acceptable to ASEAN leaders.
The Scorecard – ASEAN’s Open Method of Coordination?
The concept of a ―scorecard‖ was developed by the ASEAN Secretariat following the adoption
of the AEC blueprint, as a way to carry out its duty to report to ASEAN economic ministers
about implementation progress towards the 2015 deadline. The first AEC ‗scorecard‘ was
produced by the ASEAN Secretariat in December 2009 and made available to the public in
March 2010.
A ‗scorecard‘, in its original meaning, is a term used in some sports -golf and cricket in
particular- to designate a printed card or screen on which the names of the players, their
scores and other important statistics of the match are recorded. Applied to business, the
‗balanced scorecard‘ refers to a strategic planning and management system originated by
Robert Kaplan and David Norton at the Harvard Business School, and is a system that ―is used
extensively in business and industry, government, and non-profit organizations worldwide to
align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization, improve internal and
external communications, and monitor organization performance against strategic goals65‖.
The basic idea borrowed by the ASEAN Secretariat is to provide a method of monitoring the
implementation of agreements by the member countries, which makes use of public reporting
63 Master Plan on Connectivity, Introduction, paragraph 11, p 3 64 Jones, David Martin, Smith, Mike L.R, Loc. Cit, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, Regional Delusion ,
chapter 5, in which the authors present Wendt‘s constructivist theory before refuting it. 65 Definition displayed on the website of the ―Balanced Scorecard Institute‖, which claims to be a Strategic
Management Group company. http://www.balancedscorecard.org/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
20 European Institute for Asian Studies
and benchmarking, while preserving the sovereignty of the member countries. As ASEAN
Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said:
“This is not just to blame one against the other; this is just to be frank and
candid among family, who is falling behind on what promise.66”
This mechanism resembles the European ―Open Method of Coordination‖ (OMC) introduced in
the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam in the field of employment and social policies. Indeed, the OMC
is a method developed to encourage policy convergence among EU Member States through the
production of benchmarks and indicators of best practices, upon which the results reported by
the Member States are measured with regard to the convergence objectives they had
previously set to attain.
The OMC and the Scorecard have several similarities both in method and goals but, first and
foremost, in the reasons for their adoption. Indeed, in both cases, the main reason was the
refusal by the Member States to transfer areas of competence to the supranational level. In
the EU, the OMC has often been criticised as an important step backwards from the traditional
―Community Method‖ (involving some transfer of competences to the EU level and the top-
down diffusion of norms through the integrated European judicial system) and the results are
often seen as far from optimal. Whereas, in ASEAN, the ‗Scorecard‘ fills the vacuum on
monitoring that pre-existed, objectively, the ‗Scorecard‘ appears to be a compromise between,
on the one hand, the refusal to put into place an EU-like system of integrated judicial
enforcement and, on the other hand, the recognition that mere declaratory policy was
insufficient to move forward the agenda of economic integration. It was further linked to an
assessment that only a ―common‖ and politically ―neutral‖ institution, like the ASEAN
Secretariat, could legitimately produce such a proposal and document. The merits and
efficiency of these kinds of ―soft law‖ enforcement mechanisms are hotly debated in academia,
both among European studies specialists and among international law scholars. For South-East
Asia, it suffices to mention that, considering the broad divergence of economic interest
between ASEAN countries and the acknowledged powerful domestic economic interest that
keeps putting pressure on their government to protect them from intra-regional competition,
the challenge seems enormous compared to this rather ―weak‖ implementation tool. It is, of
course, too early to judge the long-term results of this method on effective regional economic
integration. The first Scorecard found that, as of December 2009, 91 out of 124 AEC legal
instruments had been ratified and entered into force in all ASEAM member countries,
representing 73.6% of the total. However, these figures in themselves do not say anything
about post-ratification compliance. As opposed to the EU integrated judicial order, where
individuals can invoke EU Law against contradictory national laws before national courts,
according to the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law and direct effect67, ASEAN citizens and
private interests have no means to ―force‖ their country to respect its regional engagements.
The only mechanism put into place so far is the legally non-binding ASEAN ―Consultation to
Solve Trade and Investment Issues‖, an internet based instrument, which is adapted from the
66 Anthuvan, Augustine, ―Scorecard evaluates ASEAN progress‖, Asia Pacific News online, 10 April 2010 ASEAN
Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan reportedly made this statement answering to a question from Mr Ong Keng Yong
and Mr Rodolfo Severino, both former ASEAN secretary-generals, on how leaders of the 10-member grouping would
ensure compliance with economic commitments, at a ‗live‘ video conference organized with Academia, civil society
organisations, media and other stake holders from seven ASEAN cities at the close of the 16th ASEAN Summit, in
Hanoi, Vietnam, on 9 April 2010 67 Theses doctrine were developed by the European Court of Justice from the landmark cases Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR
585 (6/64) (for the supremacy of EU law on national law) and Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 (26/62)
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 21
EU SOLVIT mechanism68. Yet, a study by the Philippines Institute for Development Studies
showed that ―there exists a large gap between policy and practice; coordination among
government agencies has remained ineffective; governance has been weak; poor
infrastructure continues to hamper efficient business operations; and many processes, such as
registration and applications for permits and licenses, have remained complex, problematic,
and costly.69‖
Other criticisms of the system put in place have been made already, notably concerning the
lack of transparency in the preparation of the ‗Scorecard‘ and the control that ASEAN political
leaders maintain over its content and publication70. In this regard, it should be kept in mind
that the ‗Scorecard‘ is primarily a reporting mechanism for the benefit of individual ASEAN
member governments, one that is to be presented to them at summit meetings before they
decide whether to disclose it to the public. Indeed, the published version of the first scorecard
appears to be written in very general terms, not mentioning any country in particular. In this
context, suspicions have been expressed that the ‗Scorecard‘ can be manipulated to brush up
complacent positive achievements, while hiding less glorious records71. In any case, the lack of
transparency of the ‗Scorecard‘ undermines the potential for public pressure, upon which the
efficiency of all peer review mechanisms is based.
These caveats aside, the ‗Scorecard‘ review mechanism still represents a significant step away
from previous conventional behaviour in ASEAN and a significant adaptation of the ―ASEAN
way‖. Moreover, it is, arguably, only the first concrete move towards the strengthening of
centralised compliance mechanisms. The already-existing dispute settlement mechanism,
stemming from the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM),
has never been used for adjudicatory proceedings, most likely because its functioning depends
on the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (―SEOM‖), a political body working through consensus
-so involving the parties to the dispute- and ―devoid of any notion of adversarial approach to
dispute resolution among members72‖. However, the EDSM has now been allocated earmarked
funding and ―ASEAN is considering improvements to the current arrangements and
mechanisms for dispute settlement in the region to ensure that the ASEAN DSM meets the
purposes it is designed to serve.‖ Arguably, APEC ―concerted unilateralism‖, even if supported
by reports, voluntarily made by individual governments, of progress towards the 1994 Bogor
Goals, lags now a step behind ASEAN in terms of its implementation mechanisms. According to
the ASEAN Secretary-General for the ASEAN Economic Community, this shows the move from
a ―process-based regionalism‖, defined as ―the series of meetings, dialogues, consultations and
engagements‖, towards a ―result-based regionalism‖, ―supported by concrete results and
outcomes based on a structured and rules-based regime73‖. In this regard, the traditional
assimilation between the ―ASEAN Way‖ and the ―Asia-Pacific way‖ seems less relevant than
previously.
68 ―SOLVIT is an on-line problem solving network in which EU Member States work together to solve without legal
proceedings problems caused by the misapplication of Internal Market law by public authorities. There is a SOLVIT
centre in every European Union Member State which can help with handling complaints from both citizens and
businesses. They are part of the national administration and are committed to providing real solutions to problems
within ten weeks. SOLVIT has been working since July 2002.‖ See http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm 69 Aldaba, Rafaelita M. & al, ―ERIA Study to Further Improve the ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard: the
Philippines‖, Discussion Paper Series N° 2010-24, Philippines Institute for Development Studies, Makati City, October
2010, 208 pages 70 Basu Das, Sanchita, ―Building the ASEAN Economic Community‖, Business Times, Singapore, 25 January 2011 71 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, Loc. Cit 72 Atje, Raymond, Kartika, Prativi, Loc. Cit 73 Pushpanathan, Sundram, ―No place for passive regionalism in ASEAN‖, The Jakarta Post (online), 7 April 2010 ; Mr
Pushpanathan is secretary-general for ASEAN Economic Community.
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
22 European Institute for Asian Studies
It will be noted that as distinct from to the concept of ‗connectivity‘, the ‗Scorecard‘
mechanism is exclusively targeted at ASEAN countries and no mention has been made of
expanding it to the wider East Asia. This pertains to the fact that the ‗Scorecard‘ mostly relates
to the obligations subscribed by ASEAN member countries in the framework of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA), as part of the AEC. As long as debates about an ―East Asian Free Trade
Area‖ belong to the realm of academic speculations, ASEAN innovations in terms of
implementation mechanisms can only be worked out within its own borders. This being said,
ASEAN+1 FTAs (with China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India, etc) are also replete with dispute
settlement mechanisms.
Maintaining the process and retaining centrality - political objectives superseding economic
realities
The two concepts presented above are salient because they reinforce the perception that
ASEAN members have a strong political willingness to respect their regional commitments.
They are symbolic of a renewed language supportive of a larger movement towards
accelerating (or deepening in Eurospeak) the ―process‖ of ASEAN integration through common
institutions.
However, the overriding question about their capacity to bring about an ASEAN Economic
Community by 2015 remains unanswered. Admittedly, beyond these instruments‘ own limits,
two major trends challenge this goal. The first of these trends, which has raised considerable
wonders in the literature, pertains to the proliferation of cross-cutting Free Trade Agreements
involving ASEAN member states and creating preferential trade corridors with third countries
both in East Asia and beyond. This pattern of practical, perhaps ―short-termist‖ economic
integration seems to contradict ASEAN‘s push for a multilaterally concerted and reasoned
approach to economic integration. The second trend relates to the increasing superposition of
layers of cooperation in East Asia to which ASEAN is a party.
FTAs versus Community or FTA + Community?
As of 31 July 2010, some 474 Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), counting goods and services
notifications separately, have been notified to the GATT/WTO, among which 283 agreements
were in force at that time74. By May 2010, East Asia has emerged at the forefront of global FTA
activity, with 45 FTAs in effect and another 84 in various stages of preparation75. This
explosion is motivated, according to most specialists, by the belief that FTAs can support the
growth of trade and investment. It is seemingly a response to stalled multilateral liberalization
in the WTO Doha Round of negotiations. Interestingly, the biggest promoters of FTAs have
been the regions‘ largest economies, Japan, South Korea and, above all, China. Yet, some see
China‘s FTA policy towards South-East Asia as motivated principally by foreign policy priorities
and notably a competition for leadership with Japan in the region76. In South-East Asia,
Singapore has been by far the most active economy in terms of the number of FTAs. As a
founder of AFTA, the main argument of Singapore to justify its ―aggressive‖ bilateral policy is
74 WTO Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, consulted
on 16 February 2011. 75 Kawai, Masahiro, Wignaraja, Ganeshan, ―Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward Trade Liberalization?‖,
ADB Brief N°1, June 2010; Comparative and cumulative data on Asia FTAs up to January 2011 is available on the
website of the Asian Development Bank at http://aric.adb.org/ftatrends.php, consulted on 16 February 2011 76 Sally, Razeen, ―FTAs and the Prospect for Regional Integration in Asia‖, ECIPE Working Paper N° 01/2006, 2006
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 23
to continue the momentum of liberalization by overcoming the ‗convoy‘ problem, in which the
pace of trade integration is held back by the ‗least willing‘ members, and initiating a ‗domino
effect‘ that would eventually result in pan-regional, and then global, liberalization77.
However, this vision of a web of FTAs as a ―benign ―competitive-liberalization‖ process, a
building block of multilateral liberalization78‖ has been seriously questioned. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to cover this discussion in detail. It should simply be noted that while the
prospects for an East Asian FTA are still limited, what has come to be described as ―the
spaghetti bowl‖ or ―noodle bowl‖ of FTAs in East Asia has raised an array of criticisms79. In
October 2010, the ADB summarized the challenges associated with Asian FTAs80. It stated that
while Asian firms are poor users of FTA preferences, Japanese and Chinese firms are largely
dominating the process. Moreover, the multiplicity of overlapping rules of origins and the
divergence in terms of the goods covered by the trade agreements (notably agricultural
products), as well as their level (many of Singapore‘s FTAs are WTO-plus, including non-trade
related measures) are cited as issues of concern.
Besides these general worries, the relationship between these FTAs and the regionalism
advocated by ASEAN is controversial. Notably, bilateral FTAs carry the risk of marginalizing
ASEAN‘s poorer member states81, which seems to run counter to ASEAN‘s ―people oriented‖
development project to integrate all SEA countries into a comprehensive framework of regional
cooperation. However, the dynamic between ASEAN and wider regional FTAs can also be seen
in a positive light. Hence, the CLMV countries and Indonesia have relied on ASEAN, as a block,
to enter into FTAs with the region‘s larger economies. Most remarkably, the ASEAN-China FTA,
negotiated in 2002 and fully in force since January 2010 with ASEAN-5 original members +
Brunei (CLMV in 2015) and covering ―substantially all trade‖, initiated a wave of FTA
negotiations between ASEAN and Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, India and even
the US and the EU (negotiations started in 2007 but suspended in 2009). However, this trend
has not prevented bilateral FTAs from the most advanced ASEAN member states to flourish at
the same time.
The result of this, either negative or positive in terms of economic growth, challenges the
conventional understanding of ―economic community‖, which supposedly implies an inward
looking economic integration, whereby the member countries create a ―block‖ for the purpose
of their economic relations with the outside world. Whereas the idea of ―open regionalism‖ that
developed within the framework of APEC tries to come to terms with this contradiction,
arguably ASEAN‘s latest institutionalization struggles to cope with the regional economic
reality. From an historical point of view, the ASEAN economic community building, in a post-
WTO era, faces tremendously more challenges than that of the European countries in the
1950s.
The attempt by ASEAN to match economic trends with institutions is reflected in the
multiplication of East-Asian frameworks of cooperation since the Asian crisis.
77 Mahani, Zainal-Abidin, ―ASEAN Integration : At risk of Going in Different Directions‖, The World Economy, Vol 25, n°
9, September 2002, pp 1263-1277 78 Sally, Razeen, Loc. cit 79 Bhagwati, Jagdish, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade, New Delhi,
Oxford University Press, 2008, 139 pages 80 Kawai, Masahiro,Wignaraja, Ganeshan, ―Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges‖, ADB Economics Working
Paper N° 226, October 2010 81 Engammare, Valérie, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, Loc. Cit.
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
24 European Institute for Asian Studies
Source: Ernest Z. Bower, “A New Paradigm for APEC?1 http://csis.org/publication/new-paradigm-apec
Deeper regional institutionalisation or inefficient superposition?
Within the economic domain alone, ASEAN is involved in ASEAN+3, APEC (at least some
members) and more recently the East Asian Summit (EAS), while, bilaterally, it is also
engaged in structured relationships, for instance with the EU, under the auspices of the Asia
Europe Meeting (ASEM). None of these settings, however, focuses solely on trade and all deal
with several fields of cooperation.
Asia regional architecture:
This institutional effervescence makes the essence of Asian regionalism extremely difficult to
grasp and prompts many questions. A dynamics of competition-collaboration seems to
underline ASEAN initiatives towards its neighbours, in particular China and India. For instance,
while the aforementioned ASEAN-China FTA and the ASEAN+3 initiatives of financial solidarity
tend to push for a far-reaching ―North-South‖ Asian integration, one of the stated reason for
the AEC is precisely to resist competition from China and India82. Moreover, while some
authors point to the disappearance of APEC in favour of the East Asian Summit since 2005 and
the related ―asianisation‖ of Asian regionalism83, the recent move to invite the US and Russia
to join the EAS makes it become a trans-pacific structure again. This recent development
raises again the difficulty of defining the relevant ―borders‖ of East Asian regionalism. Hence,
the viability of any project of East Asian regionalism is controversial. Arguably, this is where
82 Hew, Denis, ―Towards and ASEAN Economic Community by 2015‖, in ASEAN Community, unlocking the roadblocks,
ISEAS, ASEAN Studies center, Report N°1,2008 83 Bower, Ernest Z, ―A New Paradigm for APEC‖, Southeast from the Corner of 18th & K streets, CSIS, Southeast Asia
Program, Vol 1, n° 24, August 2010; Yu, Hyun-Seok, Loc. Cit.
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 25
the divergence between realists and constructivists crystallizes. The latter claim that a
progressive construction of an Asian ―identity‖ is occurring, one they see reflected in the
integration and institutionalisation of East Asia. The former, on the contrary, denounce a
delusion, by underlining all the aforementioned contradictions. In any case, the regional
architecture in East Asia appears to be largely fragmented and resembles more a
superimposition of ―circles‖ of integration, with overlapping membership but different functions
and logical underpinnings. Notably, the redundancy between the different layers risks
jeopardising the global economy of the regional governance. More specifically, the
compatibilities between the ―ASEAN Economic Community‖ and the ―ASEAN+3‖ framework of
cooperation are questionable. A striking example of this is the dichotomy between the
frameworks of economic integration (AEC single market) and those for financial integration
(ASEAN+3 Chiang Mai Initiative). This ―two-level‖ integration model is markedly different from
the path followed by the European Union, where financial and monetary integration was
pursued, in order to deepen the integration of the single market proclaimed by the Single
European Act (despite acknowledged shortcomings), within the same geographical borders.
While this might be explained by the fact that ASEAN economies alone, unlike European
countries, do not possess enough capital to sustain such a financial scheme, it is a real
challenge for their leaderships to ensure the coherence of the choices made. In turn, these
processes run the risk of paralyzing initiatives because of contradictory leaderships in the
superimposed institutional frameworks. One element, however, stands out in the most recent
developments: the increasing centrality of ASEAN to all the different circles of cooperation in
East Asia.
ASEAN striving for leadership in the region
It has been observed in the case of the European Union, that ASEAN rhetoric and choices are
driven by ―identity‖ objectives at least as much as by substantive political or economic
objectives. In this regard, the ―identity objective‖ that transcends ASEAN ―community
discourse‖ is to preserve its central position in East Asia, in the face of rapidly growing regional
competition. In light of rapid developments in the region and the world resulting from
globalisation, ASEAN must continue to strive to maintain its centrality and proactive role by
being the driving force in the evolving regional architecture. To do so, ASEAN needs to
accelerate its integration and Community building efforts while intensifying relations with
external partners.84
For individual South-East Asia countries, direct economic and political competition with the
Chinese and Indian giants is a threat to their economic survival in a globalized world. However,
there is also an ever growing interdependence between their economies. Unable to contain the
rise of regional economic competitors, South-East Asian elites have no choice but to embed
their rivals within a framework of cooperation, in order to make their voice audible. However,
in order to achieve this goal, it is crucial for ASEAN countries to ―lead by example‖ and, thus,
propose an ostensibly successful regional integration project. As the preceding arguments have
sought to demonstrate, this goal explains why all ASEAN countries adhere to the enhanced
―community‖ discourse and concede to be gradually constrained by a more rigid legally binding
regional framework, even though this does not always consistently match with their immediate
economic priorities. This argument is linked to the concept of leadership, given that one of the
most debated topics in the literature on East Asian regionalism revolves around this issue. In
this regard, Richard Higgott makes a useful distinction between ―structural/institutional
84 Master Plan on Connectivity, Executive Summary, paragraph 2, p i
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
26 European Institute for Asian Studies
leadership‖ and ―agency oriented/political leadership85‖. He then asks the question, ―Where are
the East Asian Schumans and Monnets?‖
Leaving aside the leadership issue in political and security-related matters, the leadership, in
terms of economic integration, involves three kinds of actors. First of all, industrialized
economies – particularly the US -, play a crucial role in South-East Asian economic growth, as
principal export-markets. More importantly, Asia‘s major competing powers, namely Japan,
China and India, have an important role to play. Finally, ASEAN, as it has developed into a
relatively stable and non-threatening grouping of states, can also take the lead. Hence, with
the perceived withdrawal of the US and the intensification of intra-Asian trade, ASEAN member
states see an opportunity to endorse their own leadership, at least of the
―structural/institutional‖ kind. From a neo-realist perspective, this opportunity can also be
explained by the unwillingness of China, Japan, India or the US to tolerate any other major
Asia-Pacific power taking the lead in the region. ASEAN, which is perceived as weak and non-
threatening, is the only viable alternative, acceptable to all.86 Hence, the emerging East Asian
structures since the Asian crisis, namely ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit (as well as the
earlier ARF), are all centred on ASEAN. Therefore, while the ‗liberalising‘ push through FTAs
comes from China, Japan and other non-regional powers, East Asian institutionalisation seems
to have been entrusted to ASEAN, if by default.
Increasingly, ASEAN is becoming the centre of a wider, multi-faceted and multi-layered
regional institutional framework. This strategy seems to be the only way for ASEAN countries,
and certainly for its poorest members, to get their way through the incredibly fast
development of the region, even if it is at the price of coherence. The Economic Community,
the concept of connectivity and the gradual legalisation of cooperation in ASEAN all strive to
establish it as a hub for economic exchanges in East Asia and sustain the momentum for
foreign investment, as it is the main driver of economic growth. Moreover, in the wake of the
rapid and robust recovery from the 2008 global economic crisis, the idea of rebalancing a
South-East Asian export-led growth pattern with more internal market-based orientation could
find its way through among ASEAN leaders. According to Kiichiro Fukasaku, an economist in
the OECD Development Centre, ―The global financial crisis has offered Southeast Asian
countries an opportunity to rethink past growth strategies and define new development
objectives. Both regional integration and national efforts will help promote more balanced
growth in the region87.‖ In this regard, establishing an ―ASEAN market‖ is an idea that is
gaining momentum, in order to reach the lower hanging fruits of regional economic activity.
85 Higgott, Richard, Op. Cit. 86 Kesavapany, K, ―special lecture on ASEAN centrality in regional integration‖, Bangkok, 26th February 2010, Report
by ISEAS, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/asco07-10.pdf 87 OECD, ―ASEAN Countries returning to pre-crisis growth‖, OECD Development Center webpage,
http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3746,en_2649_33731_46367966_1_1_1_1,00.html , consulted on 26 February
2011
Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 27
Conclusion
With the AEC, ASEAN has developed a new approach to regional integration. The ―ASEAN way‖
discourse has shifted towards a more ―rule-based‖ regional order, which distinguishes it from
the ―Asia-Pacific way‖. In parallel to this, pan-East Asian relations have intensified greatly, and
several superposed frameworks of cooperation have emerged, with ASEAN being entrusted
with the institutional leadership. While constructivists have found that it was an indicator that
the informal ―ASEAN way‖ had spurred cooperation and a feeling of shared identity throughout
the region, realists have not attributed any great significance to these achievements. However,
none of these opposing standpoints offers a satisfactory explanation for the complexity of
Asian regional integration. In this regard, given the EU‘s own experience, European scholars
could offer a more nuanced appraisal of the situation. Indeed, debates surrounding the issues
of a shared identity and the limits to enlargement are amongst the hottest in the European
Union. On the other hand, most of the realist criticisms about ASEAN‘s regional integration
project pertaining to the persistence of national interest-based calculations also apply to the
EU. Furthermore, Europeans‘ strong belief in the power of law to manage peaceful inter-state
relations—a belief that underlies the whole European integration process—seems to have
gained ground in East Asia. The increasing trust in a commonly defined rule-based regional
system is arguably the most striking departure from the traditional ―ASEAN way‖.
Despite these ―rapprochements‖, some fundamental differences persist between the European
Union and ASEAN. As argued above, ASEAN‘s ‗rule-based‘ system finds its limits in the deep
resistance to the ―pooling of sovereignty‖ and the extremely limited acceptance of mutual
intervention in the member‘s domestic affairs. In the economic realm, these limits are
particularly striking in two areas: First of all, it appears in the goal to integrate customs
procedures without creating a customs union (common external tariff). Secondly, it finds
shape in the ‗Scorecard‘ implementation mechanism, which strives to deepen the mutual
commitment to the regional legal agreements, while continuing to respect strictly the principle
of non-intervention.
ASEAN integration is taking place in a regional and post-Cold War global context that is
fundamentally different from the European continent of the 1950s. Indeed, the Asian regional
economic and major powers are located outside ASEAN, whereas in Europe, the Franco-
German couple has been the main driver of the integration project since its inception.
Moreover, South-East Asian countries‘ economic growth has been largely export-led, taking
place in a post-WTO era of globalised competition. Thus, ASEAN, for all its integration
ambitions, cannot be built into an ―Asian fortress‖. ASEAN has also increasingly become a
regional development project, whereby new members have been accepted despite enormous
divergences in terms of political regimes and levels of industrialization. In this view, ASEAN is
seen as the framework through which each nation can enhance its economic development
peacefully. However, a consequence of this is the tremendous challenge of building a single
market while satisfying different needs and capabilities, much more than in the EU, where pre-
accession criteria have ensured a certain degree of convergence between the new and old
members.
The EU has long been a strong supporter of ASEAN integration. Through several programmes
such as the TREATI (Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative) or ASEAN-EU Programme for
Regional Integration Support (APRIS II), it has offered technical assistances in the field of
customs, compliance mechanisms and other measures linked to the building of an internal
Building an ASEAN Community by 2015
28 European Institute for Asian Studies
market. Hence, many of ASEAN‘s new instruments are adaptations of mechanisms in place in
the EU. However, the EU has been, perhaps, too quick in recognising ASEAN as its peer,
thereby failing to understand the different political dynamics behind Asian regionalism. For
instance, one of the reasons, which led to the stalemate of EU-ASEAN free trade negotiations
in 2009, is the fact that the EU Commission had received a mandate to negotiate only with
ASEAN-7, the most advanced economies, while leaving a door open for Cambodia and Laos to
join later and refusing, for political reasons, to include Burma/Myanmar88. This segregation
was seen as totally unjustified by the ASEAN countries themselves, given their inclusive
philosophy of regional integration. Moreover, European demands for a ―WTO+‖ trade
arrangement, including service and investment liberalisation and the tackling of non-tariff
barriers between the two regions, clearly showed a misunderstanding of the actual stage of the
construction of ASEAN‘s internal market. However, the trend since then, to pursue bilateral
FTAs only with those individual ASEAN countries which are ready to meet EU‘s liberalisation
demands (like Singapore), is not devoid of contradiction with the EU‘s stated intentions to
support ASEAN community building. It could be argued that the EU so far has not lived up to
its ambitions, in terms of support to other regional integration projects. In particular, it has
failed to make other regions benefit from its own experience, beyond the sharing of expertise
on technical market mechanics. However, as the ASEAN case illustrates, there is perhaps not a
strong demand outside of Europe for anything more than this kind of technical assistance in
integration matters.
In order to enhance its relations with ASEAN - a goal, for example, reaffirmed by European
Trade Commissioner De Gucht at the 42nd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) in August
201089 - the EU should perhaps seek more to upgrade its understanding of the dynamics and
parameters, of East Asian regionalism as a whole. This area is certainly where an open and
equal-footed interaction between the well-developed European integration studies and
international relations studies in East and South-East Asia can bring a critical contribution.
88 Astuto, Michaela, ―EU-ASEAN Free Trade Negotiations‖, IPSI Analysis n°26, October 2010 89 Invited to attend the meeting for the first time in three years, the EU Commissioner for trade De Gucht stated that
he ―"came here to underline Europe‟s desire for greater economic and political engagement with ASEAN“, and that
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Coraline Goron
European Institute for Asian Studies 29
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